Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 2

Think Tanks: The Missing Link in Saudi

Arabia’s Vision 2030


By Michael Schwartz

In April 2016, King Salman of Saudi Arabia announced the bold and ambitious
Vision 2030. This initiative, developed by the new crown prince, Mohammad Bin
Salman (MBS), seeks to diversify and expand the economy, moving it away from
dependence on petroleum and state-run enterprises, while also introducing
government reforms to enhance transparency and public engagement.1 With this focus
on reforming the public sector and expanding the private, the Saudis have largely
ignored the role that the third sector, civil society, could play in realizing Vision 2030.

Compared to other states in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia’s civil society is
significantly underdeveloped (see map). As a whole, Saudi think tanks are rarely
recognized among top-tier organizations globally or even regionally. By 2030, Saudi
Arabia intends to have over 450 social and cultural clubs, but a new 2016 NGO law,
which eased the requirements for forming organizations, reinforced the ban on
political groups. 2 Given the ever-wary Saudi royal family, the public sector’s
monopolization of power and the dearth of independent think tanks can be expected;
however, Vision 2030 offers an opportunity to develop the kingdom’s third sector to
support this grand plan.

Number of Middle East think tanks by country3

Enabling civil society to support the implementation of Vision 2030 would offer
tangible benefits for the Kingdom. Currently, the government is the sole force in
developing, initiating, and executing reform, and think tanks could bring innovative
ideas to the process. By distributing duties to think tanks, the Saudis could also begin
the reduction of the bloated public sector through privatization, a key goal of Vision
2030. In addition, think tanks could serve as a counterweight to entrenched
conservative forces within the government.4 Moreover, the Saudi government has
often hired leading global consultancy firms, such as McKinsey & Company, but
Saudi think tanks could serve as in-country advisory organizations, able to better
understand the Kingdom and suggest implementable, bespoke reform policies.5 If the
Saudis truly want to achieve their Vision 2030, developing top-flight think tanks is
imperative.

Although the development of a genuinely efficacious third sector is a long, complex


process--like Vision 2030--there are some concrete steps that the Saudis could take to
accelerate it. First, as stated earlier, they should formally empower civil society to
assist with the implementation of the Vision 2030 plan. Second, they should establish
an elite, professional track for selecting and training Saudi citizens in economic,
political, and foreign policy at top domestic and global institutions. Third, the Saudi
government should tell the think tank community what it truly needs, whether short-
term, industry-specific policies or long-term predictive analyses. Saudi think tanks
could offer outside yet in-house expertise that could be tailored to particular
challenges.6 While implementing Vision 2030 and opening a space for civil society
could radically alter the long-established socio-political contract between the
Kingdom and its citizens, to truly reap the benefits of reform Saudi Arabia needs to
actively nurture world-class think tanks and enable them to augment reform efforts.

1 Kinninmont, Jane. “Vision 2030 and Saudi Arabia’s Social Contract: Austerity
and Transformation” Chatham House (July 2017) p.2-13
2 Ibid. p.34-35; Montagu, Caroline. “Civil Society in Saudi Arabia: The Power and

Challenges of Association” Chatham House (March 2015) p.6, 17-30


3 Produced by Michael Schwartz for McGann, James. Think Tanks and Civil

Societies Program, The Lauder Institute, University of Pennsylvania (May-August


2017)
4 Rahman, Omar. “Saudi Arabia Transforming: Conference Report” Arab Gulf

States Institute in Washington (12 June 2017) p.8


5 Ulrichsen, Kristian. “An opportune time for new think tanks in Saudi Arabia” Al

Arabiya (26 March 2015)


6 Ibid.; Montagu. “Civil Society in Saudi Arabia” p.36

Вам также может понравиться