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490
as implying, thiswouldnotprovidethereaderwithanyreasonforbelief.
No matter howbroadtheirpresumed experience ofhumanity, theycannot
be supposedto speakwithanyparticular authority. Andsecondly, ifwhat
one learnedfromliterature werethepropositions whichare contained in
particularworks,a wideracquaintance withliterature wouldparadoxically
resultin a constriction ofknowledge since,formanyliterary works,a work
can be foundwhichimpliesthe opposite.Hospershimselfadmitsthat
ParadiseLostalso impliesthat'man'sfallis a direcatastrophe, a workof
Satan in defianceof God'. Greektragedyrevealsthe existenceof an
immutable orderin theworldwhichis independent ofhumanhopesand
wishes.Beckett'sMolloy may be said to implythatactionis absurd,
motivation unintelligible.
Unfortunately, theanti-cognitivist'sclaimisnomorecoherent atbottom.
It is the philosopher's afterall, to unmask,or to givean
responsibility,
accountoftheordinary sensein whichwespeakofworksofartas 'illumin-
ating'or 'edifying' If thesedescriptions
or 'revealing'. areused speciously
in connection withworksofart,thephilosopher is in a positionto locate
thesourceoftheerrorand to unraveltheconfusion. Richardsalonehas
struggled to explainwhypoetryis believedto be a sourceof knowledge.
His explanation oftheillusionofintellectual significance wentas follows:
inreading a poema personmaybe struck withanimpression ofdeepimport.
As a resultofa mentalhabitofassociation betweenlearning a factofdeep
theoretical importance and similarfeelingsof significance, he concludes
thathe musthavelearnedsomething. In fact,whathe has experienced is
simplya revision ofhisattitudes, thesumtotalofhisemotional responses
to the world.He regardswithawe, or fear,or tenderness, presumably,
whathe hitherto regardedwithindifference, mildinterest, or repulsion.
This accountis altogether unconvincing. It is unclearhow a moderately
awarereadercould everconfusetheacquisition of information withthe
reorganization of his attitudesif the twothingsare,as Richardsinsists,
reallypolesapart.It is difficult to givea philosophically adequateexplan-
ationof howonemightgettheillusionof learning froma novelas it is to
explainhowonemightactually succeedin doingso. As a result,it is clear
thatalthoughtheproposition theoryis untenable, thetheoryof 'emotive
discourse'whichis supposedto replaceit is equallyso.
In an influential book, DorothyWalsh has attempted to locatethe
cognitive valueofliterature in an altogetherdifferent areabyarguingthat
the philosophical classificationof knowledge into 'knowledge how' and
'knowledge that'is radicallyincomplete.8 A personmaybe said notonly
to know,e.g.howto playchessor ridea bicycle,and that,e.g.theWarof
theRosesbeganin I456, butalsowhatitis liketo,e.g.fallsuddenly inlove,
491
492
ofthenovelis precisely
Phillipsarguesthatthesignificance thereverse:
'That it hasall beena waste'is a notinfrequent on completing
reaction a
readingof The Age of Innocence. In makingsuch a judgmenthigh
priority is givento the importance of satisfying
genuinelove,talking
outdifficultiesin frank,
opendiscussion, making up one'sownmindon
moralissuesandnotpayingtoomuchattention towhatone'sparentsor
one'sfamily to
have say... what I am againstis theequation
protesting
ofthesebeliefswithintelligence as such.12
He goesontoquotewithapprovalLouisAuchincloss's remark that'Thisis
theclimaxofthemessage;thatunderthethickglassofconvention blooms
thefine,fragile flower ofpatient sufferinganddenial'.13 'The philosophical
consequences', Phillipscontinues,'ofwaiting onEdithWharton's novelare
thattheartificiality ofan abstract conceptofreasonableness is revealed."14
Whatthenovelhasrevealedto him,he claims,is first, thatthe'reasonable
man'of muchof contemporary moralphilosophy is a kindof phantom,
andsecondly, that'thequestionofwhatwemeanby"allegiance andchange
in morality" doesnotadmitofa generalanswer'.
Phillips'sinterpretation of the novelis, as he goes to a good deal of
troubleto pointout,idiosyncratic. However,I amnotconcerned herewith
thejustifiabilityofhisinterpretation, butwithhisclaimthatthenovelpro-
videsa counter-example to certainthesesin philosophy. Anyattempt to
off
slough such a claim as the report of a simplechange in attitudeis
impossible to take seriously,for it is to
impossible say in this case what
attitudeit is thatis supposedto havechanged,or to havegonethrough a
processofreorganization. The claimis,afterall,thatcontemporary moral
philosophers aremistaken. Atthesametime,itwouldbe wrongtosuppose
thatthenovelin anysenseimpliesand justifies thepropositions 'Renun-
ciationisa finething'or'Oldvaluesmaybethebestvalues'.Unlikea philos-
ophicaltreatise on reasonableness, thenovelfailsaltogether to layout the
practicaland spiritual advantages whichmightaccruefromrenunciation.
It simplytellsthe storyof a manwho,as a matterof fact,choosesone
womanoveranother whomhe mighthavechosenwithout physical orlegal
consequences. We do notevensee Archerprospering as a result.
WhatthenofWalsh'sclaim?Can we interpret Phillips'sallegedlearning
as simplytheexperience ofcomingto know'whatit is like'to be a manof
NewlandArcher'stype,in his situation?I thinknot. There is a wide
33 493
494
495
shiftedoutoftherealmoffiction. Considerthecaseoftheyoungmanwho
learnsaboutkindness fromhisagedaunt.Thereneedbe no moment when
theyoungman realizesthatthereis something defectiveabouthis con-
ceptionofkindness; he neednoteventhinkofhimself as possessing sucha
conception. Norneedtherebe a moment whenhe weighsthebehaviour of
hisauntagainsthisownanddecidesin favourof hisaunt.The difference
betweentheyoungmanwholearnsfromtheexampleofhis auntand a
similarlysituatedyoungmanwhodoesnot,doesnotamountto a kindof
mechanical failurein thelattercase, but to a differencein thewaythey
regardtheiraunts.For the secondman,she is 'too kind'or 'impossibly
kind'or 'kindness isn'teverything'-or he mayhavefailedto be struck by
herkindness in thefirstplace.The essentials
areno differentin thecaseof
thereaderwhois leftunmoved by,e.g.,Japanese orExistentialistliterature.
Thereis a gooddeal thatremainsto be filledin in theaboveaccount,
notablytheveryidea ofa person'spossessing a conceptofhonour,kind-
ness,reasonableness, orevenof'causalinfluence'. Nevertheless, itsuggests
one wayofpreserving theinsightsofbothproposition-theorists and their
emotivistopponents without reproducing theirincoherencies. The kindof
understanding whichliterature affordscannotbe represented as a bodyof
statements occupying a particularlocationin thenexusof historical and
doctrine.But, as I have triedto show,by 'knowledge'we do
scientific
notmeanthatbodyofdoctrine.
University
ofOregon
496