20. Office of the Court Administrator v. Indar
National University
"In this case, Judge Indar issued decisions on numerous annulment of
marriage cases which do not exist in the records of RTC-Shariff Aguak,
Branch 15 or the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court,
Cotabato City. There is nothing to show that (1) proceedings were had on
the questioned cases; (2) docket fees had been paid; (3) the parties were
notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared; (4) hearings had been
conducted; or (5) the cases were submitted for decision. As found by the
Audit Team, the list of case titles submitted by the Local Civil Registrars
of Manila and Quezon City are not found in the list of cases filed, pending
or decided in RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, nor in the records of the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. In
other words, Judge Indar, who had sworn to faithfully uphold the law,
issued decisions on the questioned annulment of marriage cases, without
any showing that such cases underwent trial and complied with the
statutory and jurisprudential requisites for voiding marriages. Such act
undoubtedly constitutes gross misconduct.
The Court condemns Judge Indar’s reprehensible act of issuing Decisions
that voided marital unions, without conducting any judicial proceedings.
Such malfeasance not only makes a mockery of marriage and its life-
changing consequences but likewise grossly violates the basic norms of
truth, justice, and due process. Not only that, Judge Indar’s gross
misconduct greatly undermines the people’s faith in the judiciary and
betrays public trust and confidence in the courts. Judge Indar’s utter lack
of moral fitness has no place in the Judiciary. Judge Indar deserves
nothing less than dismissal from the service."
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Cader P. Indar Al
Haj GUILTY of gross misconduct for committing violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, and is FINED the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand
(P25,000.00) Pesos. He is likewise WARNED that a repetition of the
foregoing or similar transgressions shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent OIC Branch Clerk of Court Abie M. Amilil is also
found GUILTY of neglect of duty and is SUSPENDED for two (2) months
without pay with a stern warning that repetition of the same shall be
dealt with more severely.
22. Guzman v.
In 1984, Diosdado Guzman and two others complained that the National
University (NU) barred them from enrolling in the said university. NU
argued that their failure to enroll was due to the students’ fault. It was
alleged that Guzman et al spearheaded illegal mass actions within the
university premises; that such mass actions were violative of school
policies; that due to their mass actions, Guzman et al incurred bad
grades; that Guzman et al hated NU anyway so why should they be
allowed to enroll; that it is in the best interest of both parties for the
students not to be enrolled.
ISSUE: Whether or not National University may not admit the Diosdado
Guzman et al in the case at bar.
HELD: No. Guzman et al were deprived of due process. In the first place,
NU never showed which school policies or duly published rules did
Guzman et al violate upon which they may be expelled from. NU failed to
show that it conducted any sort of proceedings (not necessarily a trial
type one) to determine Guzman et al’s liability or alleged participation in
the said mass actions.
Under the Education Act of 1982, Guzman et al, as students, have the
right among others “to freely choose their field of study subject to
existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation,
except in case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary
regulations.” Guzman et al were being denied this right, or being
disciplined, without due process, in violation of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools which provides that “no penalty shall be
imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in
the Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly
promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted.”
Therefore, in effect, NU, by barring the enrollment of Guzman et al
imposed sanction upon the students without due investigation – such act
is illegal.
The Supreme Court also emphasized the minimum standards which must
be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are:
1. That the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause
of any accusation against them;
2. That they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with
the assistance of counsel, if desired;
3. That they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
4. That they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
and 5. That the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case.
 23. De La Salle University v. CA
FACTS: PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung,
Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma
Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle University (DLSU)
and College of Saint Benilde (CSB) Joint Discipline Board because of their
involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to petitioner James
Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux Fraternity. After this
incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the fraternity
through the intercession of the Student Council. The Tau Gamma Phi
Fraternity was asking for an apology. “Kailangan ng apology” in the words
of respondent Aguilar. But no apology was made. The mauling incidents
were a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner James
Yap and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members
of the “Domino Lux Fraternity,” while the alleged assailants, private
respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente
and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of “Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity,” a
rival fraternity.The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a
complaint with the Discipline Board of DLSU charging private
respondents with “direct assault.” Similar complaints were also filed by
Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee and private
respondents Valdes and Reverente. Thus, cases entitled “De La Salle
University and College of St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar, James Paul
Bungubung, Robert R. Valdes, Jr., Alvin Lee ,Richard Reverente and
Malvin A. Papio were docketed as Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
Issue: Were private respondents accorded due process of law because
there was no full-blown hearing nor were they allowed to cross-examine
the witnesses against them?
Ruling: Private respondents’ right to due process of law was not violated.
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found
violating school discipline, “[t]here are withal minimum standards which
must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process and
these are: that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature
and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to
answer the charges against them and with the assistance if counsel, if
desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they
shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the
evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the
case.”[8][66]
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the
proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due
process.[9][67] Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due
process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must be
respected even in administrative proceedings.[10][68] The essence of
due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.[11][69] So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her
cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there
was denial of due process.[12][70]
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances,
essential to due process – it is enough that the parties are given a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the
controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision
can be based.[13][71] “To be heard” does not only mean presentation of
testimonial evidence in court – one may also be heard through pleadings
and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded,
there is no denial of due process.[14][72]
Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against
them by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner
Sales. They were given the opportunity to answer the charges against
them as they, in fact, submitted their respective answers. They were also
informed of the evidence presented against them as they attended all the
hearings before the Board. Moreover, private respondents were given the
right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the
Discipline Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by
all the parties before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No.
9495-3-25121.
Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process
when they were not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against
them. This argument was already rejected in Guzman v. National
University[15][73] where this Court held that “x x x the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due
process. And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases
involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to
those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The
proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and cross
examination is not, x x x an essential part thereof.”
 24. Tumey v. Ohio
Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, John W. Terry (the
“Petitioner”), was stopped and searched by an officer after the
officer observed the Petitioner seemingly casing a store for a
potential robbery. The officer approached the Petitioner for
questioning and decided to search him first.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. An officer may perform a search for
weapons without a warrant, even without probable cause, when the
officer reasonably believes that the person may be armed and
dangerous.
Facts. The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with another
individual on a street corner while repeatedly walking up and down
the same street. The men would periodically peer into a store
window and then talk some more. The men also spoke to a third
man whom they eventually followed up the street. The officer
believed that the Petitioner and the other men were “casing” a
store for a potential robbery. The officer decided to approach the
men for questioning, and given the nature of the behavior the
officer decided to perform a quick search of the men before
questioning. A quick frisking of the Petitioner produced a
concealed weapon and the Petitioner was charged with carrying a
concealed weapon.
Issue. Whether a search for weapons without probable cause for
arrest is an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution (“Constitution”)?
Held. The Supreme Court of the United States (“Supreme Court”) held
that it is a reasonable search when an officer performs a quick seizure
and a limited search for weapons on a person that the officer reasonably
believes could be armed. A typical beat officer would be unduly burdened
by being prohibited from searching individuals that the officer suspects
to be armed.
25. Macalintal v. Teh
Facts: Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by
Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration
that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual
and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that
public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed
the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 9189 violates the
residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution.
(2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law violates the constitutional
mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning
candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners
by Congress.
(3) Whether or not Congress may, through the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to
review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations
that the Commission on Elections, promulgate without violating the
independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the
Constitution.
HELD: (1) No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those who are disqualified
voting under this Act. It disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident who
is recognized as such in the host country. However, an exception is provided i.e.
unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose
by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years from approval of
registration. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for
citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of
the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of
Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
Petitioner claims that this is violative of the residency requirement in Section 1
Article V of the Constitution which requires the voter must be a resident in the
Philippines for at least one yr, and a resident in the place where he proposes to
vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding an election.
However, OSG held that ruling in said case does not hold water at present, and
that the Court may have to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of the
controversy: Affidavit for without it, the presumption of abandonment of Phil
domicile shall remain. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed an affidavit is
deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines and presumed not to
have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. Section 5 of RA
No. 9189 does not only require the promise to resume actual physical permanent
residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years after approval of registration
but it also requires the Filipino abroad, WON he is a green card holder, a
temporary visitor or even on business trip, must declare that he/she has not
applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, he/she must return to the
Philippines otherwise consequences will be met according to RA No. 9189.

Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not return after he has
exercised his right to vote, the Court is not in a position to rule on the wisdom of
the law or to repeal or modify it if such law is found to be impractical. However,
it can be said that the Congress itself was conscious of this probability and
provided for deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to return as promised
stands to lose his right of suffrage. Accordingly, the votes he cast shall not be
invalidated because he was qualified to vote on the date of the elections.
Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a law sets down plainly its whole
meaning, the Court is prevented from making it mean what the Court pleases. In
fine, considering that underlying intent of the Constitution, as is evident in its
statutory construction and intent of the framers, which is to grant Filipino
immigrants and permanent residents abroad the unquestionable right to
exercise the right of suffrage (Section 1 Article V) the Court finds that Section 5
of RA No. 9189 is not constitutionally defective.
(2) Yes. Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to it. The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation
of the winning candidates for President and Vice President for the entire nation
must remain in the hands of Congress as its duty and power under Section 4 of
Article VII of the Constitution. COMELEC has the authority to proclaim the
winning candidates only for Senators and Party-list Reps.
(3) No. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend and revise
the Implementing Rules & Regulations for RA No. 9189, Congress went beyond
the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the
constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a
situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual silence
in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.
26. OCA v. Floro
Facts: Atty. Floro graduated in ALS and placed 13th in the 1983 bar
exams. He applied for judgeship in 1995 and 1998. In
both applications, he failed the psychological exams. But due to
his impressive academic record, JBC allowed his appointed after a
favorable second opinion from private practitioners. Upon Judge Floro’s
request, OCA conducted an audit on his sala. The audit team
recommended that its report be considered as an administrative
complaint against Judge Floro and that he be subjected to an appropriate
psychological and mental exam.
Issue:
(1) WON Judge Floro is guilty of simple misconduct and unbecoming
conduct(2) WON Judge Floro is fit to be a judge
Held:
(1) YES. Simple Misconduct – circulates calling cards with his name as
an RTC Judge, indicating that he is a bar topnotcher in 1983 bar
exams with full second honors from Ateneo Law School Before the
start of the session, he is introduced with the same qualifications. He
violated Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of Code of Judicial Conduct because there is
no evidence of corrupt motivation, but of thirst of recognition
Unbecoming Conduct Judge Floro is charged with partiality in criminal
cases where he declared he ispro-accused. He admitted to Atty. Dizon
and her staff, including the PAO that he is pro-accused bec his brother
and sis-in law has been accused of so manyunfounded offenses. He is
also charged of openly criticizing the ROC and the PH judicial system and
using highly improper language during court proceedings “Kabulukan ng
hustisya”; “ROC has no use”
(2) NO! Judge Floro cannot remain as RTC Judge bec of the findings
of mental impairment that renders him unable to perform the functions
of his office.
Judge Floro admitted that he believes in “psychic visions” of foreseeing
the future bec of his power in “psychic phenomenon”.
He believes in dwendes and the power of his dwarf friends
He has likened himself as an “angel of death” who can inflict pains on
people.
He wears blue robes during court sessions, only wearing black on Fridays to recharge
hisp owers
He conducts healing sessions during break time. As such he does not
meet the requirement of objectivity and his competence for judicial tasks
leaves much to be desired. His belief system indubitably shows his
inability to function with cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
 27. Zambales Chromite Mining Co. v. CA
Facts: ZCM filed an administrative case before the Director of Mines
Gozon to have them be declared the rightful and prior locators and
possessors of 69 mining claims in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. They are asserting
their claim against the group of Martinez and Pabiloňa. Gozon decided in
favor of Martinez et al. ZCM appealed the case before the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. During pendency, Gozon was assigned
as the Sec of Agri. And Natural Resources. He did not inhibit himself from
deciding on the appeal but he instead affirmed his earlier decision when
he was still the director of mines. ZCM then appealed before the CFI of
Zambales. The CFI affirmed the decision of Gozon. It held that the
disqualification of a judge to review his own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule
137, Rules of Court) does not apply to administrative bodies; that there is
no provision in the Mining Law, disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources from deciding an appeal from a case which he had
decided as Director of Mines; that delicadeza is not a ground for
disqualification; that the ZCM did not seasonably seek to disqualify Gozon
from deciding their appeal, and that there was no evidence that Gozon
acted arbitrarily and with bias, prejudice, animosity or hostility to ZCM.
ZCM appealed the case to the CA. The CA reversed Gozon’s finding and
declared that ZCM had the rights earlier attributed to Martinez et al by
Gozon. Martinez et al appealed averring that the factual basis found by
Gozon as Director of Mines be given due weight. The CA reconsidered after
realizing that Gozon cannot affirm his own decision and the CA remanded
the case to the Minister of Natural Resources. Now both parties appealed
urging their own contentions; ZCM wants the CA’s earlier decision to be
reaffirmed while Martinez et al demanded that Gozon’s finding be
reinstated. The CA denied both petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gozon can validly affirm his earlier decision w/o
disturbing due process.
HELD: The SC annulled the decision of Gozon calling it as a mockery of
justice. Gozon had acted with grave abuse of discretion. In order that the
review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a
farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose
decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or
there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing
officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since
being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of
the case. The SC affirmed the 2nd decision of the CA.
28. Singson v. NLRC
Miguel Singson was an employee of the Philippine Air Lines (PAL). In
1991, a Japanese national alleged that Singson extorted money from her
($200.00) by accusing her of having excess baggage; and that to settle the
issue, she needs to pay said amount to him. Singson was later investigated
and the investigating committee found him guilty. PAL then dismissed
Singson from employment. Singson then filed a case before NLRC against
PAL for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino ruled in favor of
Singson as he found PAL’s side insufficient to dismiss Singson. PAL
appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and his
case was raffled to the 2nd Division thereof.
The 2nd Division, however, was composed of Commissioners Victoriano
Calaycay, Rogelio Rayala, and former Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino – same
arbiter which decided Singson’s case. The commissioners deliberated on
the case and thereafter reversed the decision of Aquino.
Singson moved for reconsideration. This time, only Commissioners
Calaycay and Rayala deliberated on the motion. The motion was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Singson was denied of due process.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Singson was denied due
process. The SC held that Singson was denied due process when Aquino
participated, as presiding commissioner of the 2nd Division of the NLRC,
in reviewing PAL’s appeal. He was reviewing his own decision as a former
labor arbiter.
Under Rule VII, Section 2 (b) of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC,
each Division shall consist of one member from the public sector who shall
act as the Presiding Commissioner and one member each from the workers
and employers sectors, respectively. The composition of the Division
guarantees equal representation and impartiality among its members.
Thus, litigants are entitled to a review of three (3) commissioners who are
impartial right from the start of the process of review.
Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered impartial since he was the
arbiter who decided the case under review. He should have inhibited
himself from any participation in this case. The infirmity of the resolution
was not cured by the fact that the motion for reconsideration of Singson
was denied by two commissioners and without the participation of Aquino.
The right of petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts from the
time he filed his appeal. He is not only entitled to an impartial tribunal in
the resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to
an impartial review of three commissioners. The denial of Singson’s right
to an impartial review of his appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated
his right to due process.
 31. Legaspi v. City of Cebu
FACTS : The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public
concern is invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by
petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The
respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil
service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health
Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and
Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who
passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.
ISSUE : WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate
the civil service eligibilities of the Health Department employees
HELD : The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern
is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the
Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as
may be provided by law" The law may therefore exempt certain types of
information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security It
follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record
must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of
public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted
by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question
is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public
concern. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody
of the desired information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the
agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of
access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information
requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has
been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will
serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is
in an advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against release
. . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right,
every denial of access by the government agency concerned is subject to review by
the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of
Mandamus Public office being a public trust it is the legitimate concern of citizens
to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied
only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to
the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions. In the instant,
case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has
failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the
petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We take
judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service
examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various
professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's
civil service eligibility, if actually possessed.
37. De la Cruz v. Paras
Facts: Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail
the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and
Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said
Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said
ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they
employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge
Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due
hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938
which reads “AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND
COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF
AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of
police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing
that they were deprived of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can,
prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the
pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant
to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then
regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass
the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the
general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as
consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such
a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under
the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and
desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too
wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by
overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained
by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate
not prohibit the business of cabarets.
38. MMDA v. Viron Transport
Facts: GMA declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179 operational, thereby creating
the MMDA in 2003. Due to traffic congestion, the MMDA recommended a plan
to “decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major
Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the
mass transport system.” The MMC gave a go signal for the project. Viron Transit,
a bus company assailed the move. They alleged that the MMDA didn’t have the
power to direct operators to abandon their terminals. In doing so they asked the
court to interpret the extent and scope of MMDA’s power under RA 7924. They
also asked if the MMDA law contravened the Public Service Act.
Another bus operator, Mencorp, prayed for a TRO for the implementation in a
trial court. In the Pre-Trial Order17 issued by the trial court, the issues were
narrowed down to whether 1) the MMDA’s power to regulate traffic in Metro
Manila included the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon and close
their duly established and existing bus terminals in order to conduct business in
a common terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent with the Public Service Act and the
Constitution; and (3) provincial bus operators would be deprived of their real
properties without due process of law should they be required to use the
common bus terminals. The trial court sustained the constitutionality.
Both bus lines filed for a MFR in the trial court. It, on September 8, 2005, reversed
its Decision, this time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of
police power"; that the authority of the MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No.
7924 does not include the power to order the closure of Viron’s and Mencorp’s
existing bus terminals; and that the E.O. is inconsistent with the provisions of the
Public Service Act.
Issues: 1. Is there a justiciable controversy? 2. Is the elimination of bus
terminals unconstitutional?
Held: Yes to both. Petition dismissed.
2. Under E.O. 125 A, the DOTC was given the objective of guiding government and
private investment in the development of the country’s intermodal transportation
and communications systems. It was also tasked to administer all laws, rules and
regulations in the field of transportation and communications.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the
DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a
project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President,
although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must
exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is
the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion,
development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one
so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the
President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law,
rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires. There was no grant of authority to MMDA. It
was delegated only to set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall
coordinate and regulate the implementation of all programs and projects
concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcement,
engineering and education.
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is
devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it
could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project.
MMDA’s move didn’t satisfy police power requirements such as that (1) the
interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class,
requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Stated differently, the police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public
interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes
and the means.
Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,46 this Court emphasized that public welfare lies at
the bottom of any regulatory measure designed "to relieve congestion of traffic,
which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety." As such,
measures calculatedto promote the safety and convenience of the people using the
thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper subject for
the exercise of police power. Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic
congestion is a public concern that needs to be addressed immediately. Are the
means employed appropriate and reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not duly oppressive?
De la Cruz v. Paras- Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede
the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all
terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as
reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been
enlightened. In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription
against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might
be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from
operating at all.
Finally, an order for the closure of respondents’ terminals is not in line with the
provisions of the Public Service Act.
Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC (now the ltfrb)was empowered
to "impose such conditions as to construction, equipment, maintenance, service,
or operation as the public interests and convenience may reasonably require" in
approving any franchise or privilege. The law mandates the ltfrb to require any
public service to establish, construct, maintain, and operate any reasonable
extension of its existing facilities.
40. Republic v. Albios
FACTS: Fringer and Liberty Albios got married on October 22, 2004, before the
sala of Judge Calo in Mandaluyong City. 2 years after their marriage (December
6, 2006), Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Fringer. According to her, the marriage was a marriage in jest
because she only wed the American to acquire US citizenship and even arranged
to pay him $2,000 in exchange for his consent. Adding that immediately after
their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they
never really had any intention of entering into a married state and complying
with their marital obligations. The court even sent summons to the husband but
he failed to file an answer. Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Albios
declaring that the marriage was void ab initio for lack of consent because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention
to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.. However, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) elevated the case to the SC. According to the OSG, the case do not
fall within the concept of a marriage in jest as the parties intentionally consented
to enter into a real and valid marriage. That the parties here intentionally
consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the
purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
ISSUE: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of
consent?
RULING: NO. Both Fringer and Albios consented to the marriage. In fact, there
was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of
consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the
nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as
nothing impaired their ability to do so.
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose
of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates
that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear
intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was
that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely
given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given"
consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into
the marriage.
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by
any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as
fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. None of these are present in the
case.
Therefore, their marriage remains valid.
41. Imbong v. Ochoa jr.
FACTS Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers
from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court,
beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience.
Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court
now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two
(2) petitions- in-intervention. A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law
ISSUE : WON RH Law violates the right to health
HELD : SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the
human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development,
the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and
information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in
accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the
demands of responsible parenthood. A component to the right to life is the
constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with
provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of
the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people
and instill health consciousness among them.
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to
health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and
other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be
priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and
children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug
regulatory system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development,
and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their
rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance, and their integration into the
mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides: Section 9. The State shall protect
consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing.
Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation
to implement these self-executing provisions This notwithstanding, it bears
mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception
and contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A.
No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not
prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a
physician - be maintained.

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave
intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with
it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus,
the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity
of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives
since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices
will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in
place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only
contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must
consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that
the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive
drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means.
As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are
assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it
may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or
incidental to their use
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been
submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its
determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the
agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe
for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the
attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of
contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as
expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that
hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient.
The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug
Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as
operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA.
The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular
hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The
provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or
removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this
construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National
Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination
by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress
that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective"
without the proper scientific examination
42. Obergefell v. Hodges
Facts: Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio,
Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those
states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to recognize legal same-sex
marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages. The
plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal
Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
one group of plaintiffs also brought claims under the Civil Rights Act. In all the
cases, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans on same-sex
marriage and refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did not
violate the couples' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due
process.
Issue: (1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage
between two people of the same sex? (2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment
require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex that
was legally licensed and performed in another state?
Ruling: Yes, yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4
majority. The Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees the right to marry as one of the fundamental liberties it
protects, and that analysis applies to same-sex couples in the same manner as it
does to opposite-sex couples. Judicial precedent has held that the right to marry
is a fundamental liberty because it is inherent to the concept of individual
autonomy, it protects the most intimate association between two people, it
safeguards children and families by according legal recognition to building a home
and raising children, and it has historically been recognized as the keystone of
social order. Because there are no differences between a same-sex union and an
opposite-sex union with respect to these principles, the exclusion of same-sex
couples from the right to marry violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also
guarantees the right of same-sex couples to marry as the denial of that right would
deny same-sex couples equal protection under the law. Marriage rights have
traditionally been addressed through both parts of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and the same interrelated principles of liberty and equality apply with equal force
to these cases; therefore, the Constitution protects the fundamental right of same-
sex couples to marry. The Court also held that the First Amendment protects the
rights of religious organizations to adhere to their principles, but it does not allow
states to deny same-sex couples the right to marry on the same terms as those for
opposite-sex couples.