NOTE: ESSENTIAL FACTS ARE HIGHLIGHTED.

1. Bienvenido Dino v. Olivarez GR No. 170447

FACTS:
 Petitioners Bienvenido Dio and Renato Comparativo assail the Decision of the Court of appeals in
nullifying the Orders in Criminal Cases No. 04-1104 and No. 04-1105.
IN THE RTC:
 Petitioners instituted a complaint for vote buying against respondent Pablo Olivarez. Based on
the finding of probable cause in the Joint Resolution issued by Assistant City Prosecutor
Antonietta Pablo-Medina, with the approval of the city prosecutor of Paranaque, two
Informations were filed before the RTC charging respondent Pablo Olivarez with Violation of of
the Omnibus Election Code.
 Respondent then filed before the Law Department of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
an appeal of the Joint Resolution of the City Prosecutor of Paranaque City with Motion to Revoke
Continuing Authority.
 Respondent argued that the pendency of the appeal of the Joint Resolution before the COMELEC
should prevent the filing of the Informations before the RTC as there could be no final finding
of probable cause until the COMELEC had resolved the appeal. Moreover, he argued that the
charges made against him were groundless.
 Subsequently, the COMELEC directed the city prosecutor to transmit or elevate the entire
records of the case and to suspend further implementation of the Joint Resolution until final
resolution of the said appeal before the COMELEC en banc.
 On 11 October 2004, respondent filed a Motion to Quash the two criminal informations on the
ground that more than one offense was charged therein, in violation of Section 3(f), Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Arraignment was
reset.
 Before RTC Judge could act on the motion to quash, Assistant Prosecutor Pablo-Medina, with the
approval of the city prosecutor, filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash and Motion to Admit
Amended Informations.
 The Amended Informations sought to be admitted charged respondent with violation of only
paragraph a, in relation to paragraph b, of Section 261, Article XXII of the Omnibus Election
Code.*
 Hearing was reset.
 Respondent filed an Opposition to the Admission of the Amended Informations, arguing that no
resolution was issued to explain the changes therein, particularly the deletion of paragraph k,
Section 261, Article XXII of the Omnibus Election Code . Moreover, he averred that the city
 prosecutor was no longer empowered to amend the informations, since the COMELEC had
already directed it to transmit the entire records of the case and suspend the hearing of the cases
before the RTC until the resolution of the appeal before the COMELEC en banc.
 RTC denied respondents Motion to Quash and admitted the Amended Informations.
 Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied upon his
absence in the arraignment. RTC Judge ordered the arrest of respondent and the confiscation of
the cash bond.
 Unperturbed, respondent filed an “Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Lift the Order of
Arrest of Accused Dr. Pablo Olivarez,” which was denied. The Order directed that a bench
warrant* be issued for the arrest of respondent to ensure his presence at his arraignment.
 Law Department of the COMELEC moved (1) that the RTC hold in abeyance further proceedings
in Criminal Cases until the COMELEC has acted on respondents appeal; and (2) to revoke the
authority of the city prosecutor of Paranaque to prosecute the case, designating therein the
lawyers from the Law Department of the COMELEC to prosecute Criminal Cases.
IN THE CA
 Respondent filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, assailing the
Orders of the RTC.
 The appellate court granted the appeal in a Decision, declaring that the COMELEC had the
authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of election offenses and to prosecute the
same. As such, the COMELEC may delegate such authority to the Chief State Prosecutor,
provincial prosecutors, and city prosecutors. The COMELEC, however, has the corresponding
power, too, to revoke such authority to delegate. Thus, the categorical order of the COMELEC
to suspend the prosecution of the case before the RTC effectively deprived the city
prosecutor of the authority to amend the two informations.
 The appellate court also pronounced that RTC Judge erred in admitting the amended
informations, since they were made in excess of the delegated authority of the public prosecutor,
and his orders to arrest the respondent and to confiscate the latters cash bond were devoid of
legal basis.
IN THE SC
 Hence, the present petition under Rule 65
 At the outset, it should be noted that the appropriate remedy for petitioners is to file a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 as petitioners aver in their Manifestation and Motion dated 9
January 2006. However, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and
in the interest of justice, this Court has decided to treat the present petition for certiorari as
having been filed under Rule 45, especially considering that it was filed within the reglementary
period for the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the City Prosecutor of Paraaque had acted in excess of its
jurisdiction when it filed the Amended Informations, and whether Judge Madrona had acted in
excess of his jurisdiction when he admitted the said Amended Informations and denied
the respondents motion to quash;

RULING: No. The public prosecutors, in filing the Amended Informations, did not exceed the authority
delegated by the COMELEC. Resolution No. 7457, which effectively revoked the deputation of the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Paraaque, was issued on 4 April 2005, after the Amended Informations were
filed on 28 October 2004. The letter dated 11 October 2004, written by Director Alioden D. Dalaig of
the COMELEC Law Department, did not revoke the continuing authority granted to the City Prosecutor
of Paraaque.

The filing of the Amended Informations was not made in defiance of these instructions by the
COMELEC; rather it was an act necessitated by the developments of the case. Respondent filed a
Motion to Quash on 11 October 2004 on the ground that more than one offense was charged therein

Since the Rules of Court provided for a remedy that would avert the dismissal of the complaints on the
ground that more than one offense was charged (RULE 110), the public prosecutor filed the
Amended Informations. The instructions of the COMELEC, in the letter dated 11 October 2004, were
clearly intended to allow sufficient time to reconsider the merit of the Joint Resolution, not to have the
public prosecutor abandon the prosecution of the case and negligently allow its dismissal by not filing
the Amended Informations, thus, leaving the COMELEC in a quandary should it later dismiss the appeal
before it. By filing the Amended Informations, the public prosecutor had avoided such an undesirable
situation, which would have forced the COMELEC to re-file the cases, waste government resources, and
delay the administration of justice. Thus, the precautionary measure taken by the public prosecutor
was clearly not intended to disobey the COMELEC, or to flout its authority or diminish its powers to
review the appealed Joint Resolution. As such, the filing of the Amended Informations cannot in any
way be considered improper. Consequently, Judge Madrona acted in accordance with law when he
admitted these Informations and dismissed the respondents Motion to Quash, as the ground stated
there in the informations charged more than one offense could no longer be sustained.

Moreover, no abuse of discretion can be attributed to Judge Madrona when he issued the Orders,
dated 9 March 2005 and 31 March 2005, for the arrest of the respondent due to his failure to be present
for his arraignment and for the confiscation of his cash bond. These Orders are consistent with criminal
procedure.
 The filing of an information in the trial court initiates a criminal action. The trial court thereby
acquires jurisdiction over the case. After the filing of the complaint or the information, a warrant for the
arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court. When the accused voluntarily submits himself to the
court or is duly arrested, the court then acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. In this
case, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the accused Carmelo Jaro, Remedios
Malibaran, and the respondent, who posted bail bonds after the trial court issued a Warrant of Arrest
on 4 October 2004. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether
or not a criminal case should be filed in court, once the case has been brought to court, whatever
disposition the fiscal may feel is proper in the case should be addressed to the consideration of the trial
court

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. .

NOTE: Criminal Case No. 04-1104

That on or about the 10th day of May 2004, in the City of Paraaque, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Remedios
Malibiran and Pablo Olivarez, conspiring and confederating together and both of them
mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, engage in vote buying activities on election day of May 10, 2004, by
distributing or giving Uniwide gift certificates, a thing of value, as consideration to
induce or influence the voters to vote for candidate Pablo Olivarez, a candidate for
the City Mayor of Paraaque, in violation of Omnibus Election Code.

Criminal Case No. 04-1105

That on or about the 10th day of May, 2004, in the City of Paraaque, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Carmelo Jaro
and Pablo Olivarez, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
engage in vote buying activities on election day of May 10, 2004, by distributing or
giving Uniwide gift certificates, a thing of value, as consideration to induce or
influence the voters to vote for candidate Pablo Olivarez, a candidate for the City
Mayor of Paraaque, in violation of the Omnibus Election Code.
2. Advincula v. CA GR No. 131144, Oct. 18, 2000

FACTS:
Noel Advincula, in this petition for review, assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals which
set aside the resolution of the Secretary of Justice ordering the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite
to file an Information for Illegal Possession of Firearms against private respondents
Amando Ocampo and Isagani Ocampo.
In the Provincial Prosecutor;
 Private respondent Isagani Ocampo was on his way home when petitioner Noel Advincula
and two (2) of his drinking companions started shouting invectives at him and challenging
him to a fight.
 Petitioner, armed with a bolo, ran after Isagani who was able to reach home and elude his
attackers.
 A certain Enrique Rosas told private respondent Amando Ocampo, father of Isagani, that
petitioner had chased his son with a bolo. Amando then got his .22 caliber gun, which he
claimed was licensed, and confronted petitioner who continued drinking with his
friends. But petitioner threatened to attack Amando with his bolo, thus prompting the
latter to aim his gun upwards and fire a warning shot. Cooler heads intervened and
Amando was pacified. He left to check on his son. Later, however, he saw petitioner's
drinking companions firing at petitioner's house.
 Petitioner however has a different version. According to him, on 1 October 1993 he and his
friends were having a conversation outside his house when Isagani passed by and shouted
at them. This led to a heated argument between him and Isagani. Then Isagani left but
returned with his father Amando and brother Jerry. Isagani and Amando were each armed
with a gun and started firing at petitioner who ran home to avoid harm but private
respondents Isagani and Amando continued shooting, hitting petitioner's residence in the
process.
 A series of criminal complaints were filed by petitioner on one hand and private
respondents on the other. But the controversy in this petition arose from the complaint filed
by petitioner on 5 April 1994 for Illegal Possession of Firearms against private
respondents before the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite;
 After private respondents submitted their counter-affidavits, the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor, with the approval of the Provincial Prosecutor, dismissed Petitioner's complaint
against private respondents for Illegal Possession of Firearms for lack of
evidence. According to the Provincial Prosecutor, the possession of said firearm cannot be
considered illegal or unlawful as the same is covered by a firearm license duly issued by the
chief of the Firearm and Explosives Office.
 Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice insisting that the
pieces of evidence he presented before the Provincial Prosecutor were sufficient to make
a prima facie case against private respondents and prayed that the dismissal of his
complaint be set aside. Private respondents filed their opposition thereto stating in essence
that Amando's gun was licensed and that there was no proof other than petitioner's self-
serving statement that Isagani had carried a firearm.
 The Secretary of Justice granted petitioner's appeal and ordered the Provincial Prosecutor of
Cavite to file the corresponding charges of Illegal Possession of Firearms against private
respondents.
In the RTC and CA

 Pursuant to the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite
filed two (2) separate Informations against Amando and Isagani Ocampo for Illegal
Possession of Firearms before the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite.

 On 17 December 1996, private respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals questioning the Resolution of
the Secretary of Justice.

Court of Appeals (Complaint is dismissed)

 In giving due course to private respondents' petition, the Court of Appeals agreed with the
position of the Solicitor General (Provincial Prosecutor), stating that the weakness of the
case against petitioners is highlighted by the failure of the Information to allege the
identity of the firearms allegedly possessed by petitioners at the time of the incident. No
guns were seized or recovered from them. There is no corpus delicti. It could not therefore
be ascertained with verisimilitude that petitioners did not have the license to possess or
carry guns.
 In crimes involving illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution has the burden of proving
the elements thereof. The existence of the subject firearm and the fact that the accused who
owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to
possess the same. Negative allegation of the lack of a license is an essential ingredient
of the offense which the prosecution must prove.
 How could the people prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioners committed the
offense of illegal possession of firearms when the firearms are not even identified with
certainty?
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: whether the Court of Appeals erred in granting private respondents' petition and in
setting aside the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice.
RULING: In determining this question, we need to address these questions: (a) Was there
sufficient evidence to warrant the filing of charges for Illegal Possession of Firearms against
private respondents; and (b) May the Court of Appeals set aside the Decision of the Secretary of
Justice when the corresponding Information has already been filed with the trial court?
The Court of Appeals found that no charges for Illegal Possession of Firearms could be filed
against private respondents for two (2) reasons: First, as to private respondent Amando
Ocampo, he had the requisite license to possess the firearm, which was established by sufficient
evidence on record. Second, as to private respondent Isagani Ocampo, there was no convincing
evidence that he was in possession of a gun during the incident involving him, his father and
petitioner, except for the eyewitness account of petitioner and one Federico San Miguel.
The Secretary of Justice, in his contested Resolution, thus made the following findings: Even if
Amando had the requisite license, there was no proof that he had the necessary permit to carry
it outside his residence; and Isagani's plain denial could not overcome his positive identification
by petitioner that he carried a firearm in assaulting him. These are findings of fact supported by
evidence which cannot be disturbed by this Court.
Besides, the rulings relied upon by the Court of Appeals and private respondents deal with the
quantum of evidence needed to convict persons for Illegal Possession of Firearms. This petition
arose from a case which was still in its preliminary stages, the issue being whether there was
probable cause to hold private respondents for trial. And probable cause, for purposes of filing
criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The
determination of its existence lies within the discretion of the prosecuting officers after
conducting a preliminary investigation upon complaint of an offended party. Their decisions are
reviewable by the Secretary of Justice who may direct the filing of the corresponding
information or to move for the dismissal of the case. The procedure is in no wise in the nature of
a trial that will finally adjudicate the guilt or innocence of private respondents. The requisite
evidence for convicting a person of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms is not
needed at this point. It is enough that the Secretary of Justice found that the facts, as presented
by both petitioner and private respondents, would constitute a violation of PD 1866. Hence, the
Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in directing the filing of criminal
Informations against private respondents, and clearly, it was error for the Court of Appeals to
grant private respondents' petition for certiorari.
Assuming arguendo that the Secretary of Justice was not able to establish probable cause to
direct the Provincial Prosecutor to file the charges of Illegal Possession of Firearms against
private respondents, the filing of the Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals was not the
proper remedy for private respondents. It should be noted that when the Petition was filed, the
Information was already filed by the Provincial Prosecutor with the Regional Trial Court of
Bacoor, Cavite. The criminal case commenced from that time at its course would now be under
the direction of the trial court.
Whatever irregularity in the proceedings the private parties may raise should be addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial court which has already acquired jurisdiction over the
case. Certiorari, being an extraordinary writ, cannot be resorted to when there are other
remedies available. Private respondents could file a Motion to Quash the Information under Rule
117 of the Rules of Court, or let the trial proceed where they can either file a demurrer to
evidence or present their evidence to disprove the charges against them. It is well settled that
criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final,
subject to certain exceptions, e.g., when the determination of probable cause is done with grave
abuse of discretion, or where a sham preliminary investigation was hastily conducted, or where
it is necessary for the courts to do so for the orderly administration of justice or to prevent the
use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner. None of these
exceptions is present in the instant case. Hence, the Court of Appeals erred in granting private
respondents' Petition for Certiorari and, worse, setting aside the Resolution of the Secretary of
Justice.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals is REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.
3. PCGG v. Desierto et al GR No. 139296

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the Memorandum of then Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto, dismissing the complaint filed by petitioners against private respondents, and the
Order denying their motion for reconsideration.

FACTS:

 President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee) which was tasked to inventory all behest
loans, determine the parties involved and recommend whatever appropriate actions to be
pursued thereby.
 On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 expanding the
functions of the Committee to include the inventory and review of all non-performing loans,
whether behest or non-behest.
 The Memorandum set the following criteria to show the earmarks of a "behest loan," to wit: "a) it
is undercollaterized; b) the borrower corporation is undercapitalized; c) a direct or indirect
endorsement by high government officials like presence of marginal notes; d) the stockholders,
officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies; e) a deviation of use of
loan proceeds from the purpose intended; f) the use of corporate layering; g) the non-feasibility
of the project for which financing is being sought; and, h) the extraordinary speed in which the
loan release was made."
 Among the accounts referred to the Committees Technical Working Group (TWG) for
investigation were the loan transactions between Bagumbayan Corporation (Bagumbayan) and
the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). After examining and studying the loan
transactions, the Committee determined that they bore the characteristics of a behest
loan, as they were under-collateralized and Bagumbayan was undercapitalized at the time the
loans were granted.
 The Committee added that there was undue haste in the approval of these loans. It also alleged
that the Chairman of Bagumbayan, Dr. Pacifico Marcos, was the brother of then President
Ferdinand Marcos.

In the Office of the Ombudsman

 Consequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of the Fact- Finding Committee, and
representing the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed with the Office of
the Ombudsman a sworn complaint for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.)
 No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against Tomas Aguirre, Dr. Pacifico Marcos,
and the officials of the DBP, namely: Recio M. Garcia, Leonides S. Virata, Ofelia Castell, Placido
Mapa, Jr., Vice-Chairman J.V. de Ocampo, Jose Tengco, Jr., and Rafael A. Sison (private
respondents)
 Pending resolution of the case, respondents Aguirre, Marcos and Virata died.
 After evaluating the evidence submitted by the Committee, the Ombudsman DISMISSED the
instant complaint against the respondents for insufficiency of evidence and for prescription for
all the respondents and an additional ground of death for respondents Aguirre, Marcos and
Virata.
 Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the Ombudsman denied it.
 The Committee ascribes legal error and grave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman for
dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence and on the ground of prescription.

Hence, this petition

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the case is barred by prescription. (Main issue which involves rule 110)
2. Whether or not Public Respondent committed jurisdictional error or grave abuse of
discretion when he dismissed the charge against the private respondents on the ground
of insufficiency of evidence.

RULING: Before addressing the issues raised in the present petition, we note that what was filed
before this Court is a petition captioned as a Petition for Review on Certiorari. We must
point out that a petition for review on certiorari is not the proper mode by which
resolutions of the Ombudsman in preliminary investigations of criminal cases are
reviewed by this Court. The remedy from the adverse resolution of the Ombudsman is a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65,[9] not a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45.

However, we have decided to treat this petition as one filed under Rule 65 since a reading
of its contents reveals that petitioners impute grave abuse of discretion and reversible
legal error to the Ombudsman for dismissing the complaint. After all, the averments in the
complaint, not the nomenclature given by the parties, determine the nature of the
action. In previous rulings, we have treated differently labeled actions as special civil
actions for certiorari under Rule 65 for acceptable reasons such as justice, equity, and fair
play.

The Court shall first deal with the issue of prescription.

1. NO. It is true that all offenses penalized by the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act prescribe in fifteen (15) years. Since the subject loans were obtained in 1974 to
1981, the Ombudsman concluded that the offense allegedly committed by the
respondents had already prescribed when the complaint was filed on February 28,
1998. This position of the Ombudsman is erroneous.
 It is true that the Sworn Statement filed by Atty. Salvador did not specify the exact dates
when the alleged offense was discovered. However, the records show that it was the
Committee that discovered the same. As such, the discovery could not have been made
earlier than October 8, 1992, the date when the Committee was created. The complaint
was filed on February 28, 1998, less than six years from the presumptive date of
discovery. Thus, the criminal offense allegedly committed by the private respondents
had not yet prescribed when the complaint was filed.

Even the Ombudsman in his Comment conceded that the prescriptive period
commenced from the date the Committee discovered the crime, and not from the
date the loan documents were registered with the Register of Deeds.

2. The Committee insists that the loan transactions between DBP and Bagumbayan bore
the characteristics of a behest loan. It claims that the loans were under-collateralized
and Bagumbayan was undercapitalized when the questioned loans were hastily
granted.

Case law has it that the determination of probable cause against those in public office
during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the Office of the
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman has the discretion to determine whether a criminal case,
given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically his
call. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith should he find it to be insufficient in form
or substance, or he may proceed with the investigation if, in his view, the complaint is in
due and proper form and substance. We have consistently refrained from interfering
with the constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the
Ombudsman. Thus, if the Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds the case
dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings, unless the exercise of such
discretionary powers is tainted by grave abuse of discretion.

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment

tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been
done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross
as toamount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. In this instance, petitioners utterly
failed to show that the Ombudsmans action fits such a description.

For one to be validly charged under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, he must have acted
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence. On the other hand,
to be liable under Section 3(g), there must be a showing that respondents entered into a
grossly disadvantageous contract on behalf of the government.

The petitioners failed to satisfy either criterion.

It is clear from the records that private respondents studied and evaluated the loan
applications of Bagumbayan before approving them. There is no showing that the DBP
Board of Governors did not exercise sound business judgment in approving the loans,
or that the approval was contrary to acceptable banking practices at that time. No
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence can, therefore, be
attributed to private respondents in approving the loans.

As pointed out by the Ombudsman, the only factor which would satisfy one of the
criteria of a behest loan under Memorandum Order No. 61 was that Pacifico E. Marcos
was the brother of the late President Marcos, thus, ostensibly an identified crony. But as
already adverted to, the presence of only one criterion out of the eight enumerated in
Memorandum Order No. 61 is insufficient to characterize the loan as a behest loan.

In any event, the documents submitted reveal that Dr. Marcos assumed chairmanship of
Bagumbayan only on May 31, 1978, long after the approval of the questioned original
and first additional loans. The subsequent loans, on other hand, were granted pursuant
to the restructuring policy adopted in 1977 prior to the chairmanship of Dr.
Marcos. Apparently, Dr. Marcos did not play a key role in the approval of the questioned
transactions. There appears absolutely no basis to conclude that these loans were
extended simply because the officers were the cronies of the late President Marcos. The
Ombudsman, therefore, acted well within his discretion in rejecting petitioners claim.

Finally, we note that petitioners did not specify the precise role played by, or the
participation of, each of the private respondents in the alleged violation of R.A. No.
3019. There were no circumstances indicating a common criminal design of either the
officers of DBP or Bagumbayan, or that they colluded to cause undue injury to the
government by giving unwarranted benefits to Bagumbayan. The Ombudsman can
hardly be faulted for not wanting to proceed with the prosecution of the offense,
convinced that he does not possess the necessary evidence to secure a conviction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Memorandum and Order of the
Ombudsman in OMB-0-98-0402, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
4. Zaldivia v. Reyes Jr. and People of the Philippines GR No. 102342, July 3, 1992

Rule on Summary Procedure applies to violations of municipal ordinances; Specifying the

prescriptive period for violations of municipal ordinances; Note that the penalty for such violations
CANNOT exceed six (6) months. The prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended
upon the filing of the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the
respondent judge, the Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. SC holds otherwise.

FACTS:

The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in
violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, Rizal.

Timeline:

1. On May 11, 1990 - The offense was allegedly committed.

2. On May 30, 1990 - The referral-complaint of the police was received by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.
3. On October 2, 1990 (5 months after filing of complaint in fiscal’s office) -The corresponding
Information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez.

The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed.

Lower Court Decision: MTC denies motion to quash.

Appellate Court Decision: RTC sustains denial.

In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner:

FIRST argues that the charge against her is governed by the following provisions of the Rule on
Summary Procedure, whose scope includes:

Sec. 1. Scope — This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:

B. Criminal Cases

Xxx

3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;

4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offenses charged does not
exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of
other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom. . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)
 xxx

NEXT, petitioner argues that Act No. 3326,1 the law establishing prescriptive periods for violations
penalized by special acts and municipal ordinances which also provides when such periods begin to run
and when the same will be interrupted, accordingly treats the Information against her as having been
filed way beyond the two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense,
the charge against her should have been dismissed on the ground of prescription.

For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the
complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. (NOTE: The position of the fiscal
seems to be in accordance with the doctrine of Brillante v. CA, G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571. October 19,
2004 - - -That the filing of a complaint with the fiscals office suspends the running of the prescriptive
period of a criminal offense). Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor General also invokes
Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing as follows:

Sec. 1. How Instituted — For offenses NOT subject to the rule on summary procedure in special
cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows:

a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing the
complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite
preliminary investigation therein;

b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts, or a complaint with
the fiscal's office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint
may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.

In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Emphasis is laid on the LAST PARAGRAPH. The respondent maintains that the filing of the complaint
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such institution" and that the

1 Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide
When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows:

Sec. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal
ordinances shall prescribe after two months.

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when PROCEEDINGS (JUDICIAL) are INSTITUTED against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings
are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations of law not included in the Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied
phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases, without distinction, including those falling under the Rule on
Summary Procedure.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure applies to violations of
municipal ordinances. (Specifically, whether or not the CA erred in denying petitioner’s motion to quash
the Information on the ground of prescription, for having applied Section 1, Rule 110, instead of the Rule
on Summary Procedure, as petitioner argues)

HELD:

No, Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure DOES NOT APPLY to violations of
municipal ordinances; it does not apply to offenses which falls under Summary Procedure.

The LAST PARAGRAPH of Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as argued by
respondent, was an adoption of the doctrine in Francisco v. Court of Appeals - - - “that the filing of the
complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or
investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even
if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits.”2 However,
Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for
offenses NOT subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies
that the section does NOT apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase
"in all cases" appearing in the LAST PARAGRAPH obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section,
that is, those offenses NOT governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms
to the canon that words in a statute should be read in relation to and not isolation from the rest of the
measure, to discover the true legislative intent. As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary
Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should
follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of
Rodriguez, is governed by that Rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.

2 In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has re-examined the question and, after mature
consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the complaint in
the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the
criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first,
the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information"
without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if
the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings
against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the
victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
Where paragraph (b) of the Section 1 Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure does speak of
"offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,"
the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts.3 These offenses are not
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Rule on Summary Procedure provides that the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is
filed in court; Running of prescriptive period tolls on the date of filing in court

Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly
in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties
agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if
he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not
the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the
prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date
before that.

This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of
prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The
proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of
the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not
distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.

In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as a special law (SPECIAL RULE) prevails over
Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure; Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure must yield to Act No. 3326

At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and
Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law.
And if there be a conflict between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to
"diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution.
Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.

Going back to the Francisco case, we find it relevant to observe that the decision would have been
conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave oral defamation punishable
under the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period. By contrast, the prosecution in the instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance,
for which the penalty cannot exceed six months, and is thus covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

3 (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four
thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos. - - - These offenses are not
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from
its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in
accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial
proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal
Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already
prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.