General of the Night

Henry W. Lawton
A Biography

By

Rudolph Rau

Copyright  May 2007 by Rudolph Rau-All Rights Reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Rau, Rudolph, 1938-

General Of The Night-Henry W. Lawton- a Biography/

by Rudolph Rau – 1st Edition

Includes bibliographical references

 Major General Henry Ware Lawton
Courtesy of The Smithsonian-Museum Of American History

Military Branch
I dedicate this book to the memory of Henry Ware Lawton; to my mother,
Mary Elizabeth Rau who inspired it; and to my wife Patricia and son Paul
who supported me and provided important help in writing it.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. A Knight Passes On................................................................... 7

2. Lawton’s Boyhood...................................................................... 10
3. Lawton Goes To War.................................................................. 16
4. Civilian Life-And Beyond........................................................... 32
5. Early Years In The 4th Cavalry................................................... 37
6. The Southern Plains.................................................................... 50
7. The Cheyenne Episode ................................................................ 64
8. The Apache Years........................................................................ 77
9. The Last Geronimo Campaign...................................................... 91
10. The Lull And The Storm.............................................................. 125
11. The Occupation and a New Assignment...................................... 161
12. Lawton Leaves Cuba……………….......................................... 193
13. The Philippines-Phase One......................................................... 206
14. Lawton’s Last Battles................................................................. 227
15. Lawton’s Final Voyage………………………………………... 254
16. Reflections……………………………………………………… 260
Bibliography ................................................................................. 272
Index…………………………………………………………… 278

i
 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Major General Lawton............................................................... Frontispiece

George S. Lawton....................................................................... 12
Jennie White............................................................................... 13
Marie Lawton............................................................................. . 14
Capt. Lawton-Corinth Ms............................................................ 19
Ranald S. MacKenzie………………………………………….. 34
Young Lieutenant Lawton, 4th Cavalry…………………………. 46
Lawton’s wedding bond………………………………………… 76
Lt. A. Smith letter………………………………………………. 112
Lawton and 4th Cavalry Troop at San Antonio railhead.............. 113
Lawton with General Miles and staff officers.............................. 117
Letter from Governor of New Mexico…………………………. 118
Letter from Governor of Texas…………………………………. 123
Letter from Col. Dodge…………………………………………. 128
Letter from General Sherman…………………………………… 129
Letter from Col. Anderson…………………………………….... 134
Maj. Gen. Lawton-taken during campaign in Cuba..................... 142
Maj. Gen. Lawton-Philippines 1899............................................ 213
Lawton with Admiral Dewey 1899.............................................. 218
Lawton resting…………………………………………………… 228
Lawton with staff 1899.....................................………………… 230
Lawton with cavalry trooper……………………………………. 233
Lawton at Arayat PI and with staff……………………………… 234
Late photograph of Lawton-1899....................................……... .. 236
Lawton’s funeral caisson………………………………………… 255
Statue of Lawton in Manila.......................................................... 262

ii
 Acknowledgments

For their untiring help and support, I thank my wife, Patricia, and
son, Paul, who have assisted me with much of the primary research needed
for this book. They have also been faithful to the necessary task of reading
my rough drafts and helping me to bring the story of Henry W. Lawton
into existence.
My mother, Mary, did a great deal of the early research into
Lawton’s life back in the 70’s. Her notes betray a diligent endeavor to
bring his achievements to light.
So much of the information about Lawton is scattered about in a
variety of sources, it would have been next to impossible to even have a
starting point without the work of the Ft. Wayne Historical Society and
Public Library, which, in 1954, honored their home town hero. The
Society compiled a great number of public domain documents, primarily
newspaper reports, special articles from Harpers Weekly, Colliers, and
other publications that had followed Lawton’s career in 1898 and 1899.
The resulting pamphlet provided an important set of pointers that helped
me determine the sources of information for this book.
I wish to acknowledge Steve Locke, Culbertson Mansion,
Louisville, Ky. He has been most generous in his effort to provide me with
information, leads on photos and Lawton family information along with a
great deal of support for this endeavor.
I also wish to thank the research center personnel at the First
Division Museum-Cantigny, Wheaton, Illinois, who provided me with a
number of source documents and assistance on doing my early research;
the National Archives; U. S. Army Military History Institute; and the
Newberry Library of Chicago.
Special thanks to the Lawton Ledger, particularly members Leo
Lawton and Stephen Lawton who have provided me with support and
interest in my efforts.

iii
 INTRODUCTION

As a young teenager, the old photographs in my mother’s albums

always fascinated me. Many of them were of people who had lived far
before my time, and all, according to my mother, had interesting stories
surrounding them.
Because of my interest in history, and in particular, the Civil War,
I was more fascinated than usual with two photos in one album. The first
was of a young Union Army officer with the name “Capt. Henry W.
Lawton” written at the bottom of the picture. On the reverse side were
comments written by my maternal grandmother about her cousin Henry. It
seems that my grandmother referred to many persons in her family as
‘cousins.’ This picture was taken after Lawton’s promotion to Captain at
Corinth, Mississippi, in 1862.
Another picture was of a tall, older officer, in a white uniform,
standing next to Admiral Dewey. This picture was of General Henry W.
Lawton in the Philippines. It was taken near Manila in 1899. I was initially
interested in this picture because it showed Lawton as a rather tall man and
he was wearing what appeared to be an ‘English’ helmet rather than an
American style helmet.
My curiosity caused me to ask my mother what she knew about
Lawton. She recalled that as a very young girl, she listened to
conversations between her mother and grandmother about Henry Lawton
who apparently was very popular with my grandmother. Her mother
continued to talk about Lawton from time to time, whenever there was
occasion to be looking through the family photo albums.
My Mother, Mary E. Rau (Gelvin), encouraged my interest in
Henry Ware Lawton because her own natural curiosity about family
ancestors led her to Lawton, among others. He appeared to have a unique
and fascinating story about him that resulted in a great deal of research,
letter writing, and piles of notes.
Moreover, other photographs in my mother’s album developed a
connection between Lawton and me, however distant. It turned out that
my maternal great-great-grandmother, Marie Lawton, was Lawton’s aunt
and that her picture had been in the album all along, as had one of George
S. Lawton, Henry’s brother. I had not paid much attention to either until
iv
the past few years when I began in earnest to try and learn more about this
interesting distant relative, Henry.
After some initial interest on my part in the 1970’s, the subject lay
dormant until recently. When my mother prompted me again I decided to
do some research in earnest and find out as much as possible about our
distinguished ancestor.
As I got into the task, Lawton’s character developed and I in turn
developed an appreciation of the man and others of his time and the
history in which they participated.
As my mother’s health deteriorated in the late 1990’s, she wished
to have something put down in writing about Lawton for the family. I also
determined, after watching a 1994 movie ‘Geronimo’, to find out once and
for all, just who Lawton was. In the process of doing so, I learned that he
was quite a unique individual in the history of the West, and in the
development of the U. S. Army in the late 19th Century.
While he did not have a flair for the limelight, as did General
George Custer, his achievements probably exceed anything Custer could
have hoped for. Unlike Custer, Lawton did not die in utter defeat. While
he did not attain the stature of Generals Sherman, Sheridan, or Miles, he
was no less dedicated and sure of purpose in his life mission and perhaps
achieved more in pushing America’s frontiers beyond its natural borders.
The little that has been written of him concentrates on his role in
the Geronimo campaign of 1886 and his death in the Philippines in 1899.
Getting to know Lawton was an adventure unto itself. But the greater
adventure was to watch the character of the man Lawton unfold as
research led to more and more information about this interesting man.
There is a great deal more to him than those two campaigns so I
began looking for something that would reveal, underneath his soldierly
manner, what kind of person he was. I believe the revelation of who he
was can be found in large part in his conduct after the Northern Cheyenne
campaign in 1877. I will allow the reader to form an independent opinion
without writing anything more on that subject other than to comment that
there was a good heart in Henry Lawton.
Throughout Lawton’s life, a number of his personal traits remain
consistent and demonstrate that the accolades and gratitude displayed after
his death were probably not overstated.
For one, he was an honest man and not given to lies or deception
about himself or others who served alongside him. His ambitions were
normal for an officer striving for promotion, but there is no evidence in his

v
reports or the reports of others that he gained at the expense of someone
else.
Lawton was a compassionate man from accounts given by former
adversaries, friends, superiors, and men who served under him. While a
determined and fierce fighter who put himself at high risk, he also
displayed sympathy and support for the defenseless, including his enemies.
Portrayed by one account, “he symbolized the dedicated soldier ready to
sacrifice financial gain for national glory.” 1 The records and notes kept by
Robert G. Carter, a longtime friend of Lawton, and now housed in the
Graff Collection-Newberry Library, Chicago are invaluable insights to
Lawton’s activities. They also reflect his own assessment of a number of
events. Combined with the information that was brought together from a
variety of sources to enable the writing of this book, they portray a man
who has perhaps been ignored too long.

1
Dictionary Of American Military Biography-Roger G. Spiller
vi
 CHAPTER ONE

A KNIGHT OF THE 19TH CENTURY PASSES ON

On December 30, 1899, the U. S. Army transport ship, the

“Thomas”, set sail from the Philippine harbor at Pasig. Its destination was
the United States. As the “Thomas” proceeded from the harbor it passed
the U. S. cruiser “Brooklyn” and the battleship “Oregon” on one side, the
cruiser “Baltimore” and the monitor “Monadnock” on the other. Each
fired a thirteen-gun salute. The British battleship “Endymion” dipped
colors, and its band played solemn music. When the transport was thirty
miles at sea, the minute guns still boomed.
As the ship neared Nagasaki, one German and four Russian men-
of-war in port dipped their colors. In port, Rear Admiral Grenet of the
Italian cruiser “Carlo Alberto” came aboard to pay respects to certain
passengers. The governor of Nagasaki also boarded the “Thomas” with
gifts. Later, as the ship sailed out of port, the band on the British
battleship “Victorious” played a dirge.
The “Thomas” arrived in San Francisco on the 30th of January.
Its flag was at half-mast, as were the flags at Fort Baker and Angel Island,
and on all the ships in the harbor. Minute guns boomed; ships of all
nations dipped their colors as the “Thomas” slowly moved past them. 2
The attention and respect directed to the “Thomas” as she sailed
from the Philippines to San Francisco was only a small part of the tribute
paid to a fallen soldier and his comrades who traveled on board.
Major General Henry Ware Lawton, truly considered an
American warrior, had come home to rest. The final journey of General
Lawton took him to rites and services of a kind afforded heads-of-state and
dignitaries. Fiery oratory, admiration at home and abroad, and finally
burial in a place of prominence at Arlington National Cemetery ended the
life’s journey of a young boy from modest beginnings, to a national figure
of heroic proportions.
Writing about General Lawton in terms of dates and events would
accurately portray his fine career and accomplishments. Using a simple
date and event approach would not, however, fully develop what kind of

2
Ft. Wayne Ind. Historical Society-Henry W. Lawton
7
person he was. Since Lawton did not spend a great deal of time speaking
or writing about himself, his insights are not available in any volume.
One can only rely mainly on the observations of people who knew
him and their own credibility. There are also some limited numbers of
documents and letters of correspondence between Lawton and others.
Studying the observations, interviews, letters and documents, and actual
events in his life provides a picture of an interesting character that played a
key military role in the development of the American west and early over
seas expansion in the late 19th century.
Lawton died in combat, a situation that he seems to have preferred
to be in during his distinguished military career. Moreover, he died in
victorious combat at San Mateo in the Philippines, as another of his many
successful battle plans achieved its objective. To many who knew Lawton,
his superiors, peers, and subordinates; his death probably came late in his
military career. In the many major conflicts in which he participated, his
fearless execution of duty placed him squarely in the line of fire. His
nature was such that he believed in being in the thick of a fight and leading
from the front, rather than directing his troops from the rear.
This trait was evident from the time he was an 18-year-old
volunteer in the Union army and found himself at Shiloh, early in the Civil
War. That Lawton escaped death so often in over thirty years of military
life, had to be a matter of fate.
To those who admired him in his time and later, and the numbers
are great, his death was early. He would not have the luxury of writing his
memoirs, or of benefiting from his battlefield experiences through later
promotions, or elevation to the top levels of the U. S. Army. Nor would he
have the opportunity to bathe in public recognition after the Philippine
conflict and accept the thanks of his many admirers.
While his feats were of a magnitude to gain national recognition,
and the nation as well as foreign governments mourned his death, Henry
W. Lawton had not yet put the final touches on his career. As a result, his
prominence in the military annals of the late 19th century would fade as
America moved on with its rapidly changing role in the world.
A writer of 1899 had referred to General Lawton as a “Knight Of
The 19th Century.” 3 Lawton was indeed a dedicated soldier who devoted
himself to country, honor, and to gallantry. The terms used to describe

3
National Magazine-1899-Newberry Library-Chicago Il
8
him might be viewed today as somewhat flowery, but even today, his
character would attract the admiration of those who hope that there are still
idealists among us. And even soldiers can be idealists.

9
 CHAPTER TWO

LAWTON’S BOYHOOD

Henry’s father George W. Lawton was born in Buffalo, New York

on October 12, 1806. The Lawton family including brothers Daniel,
Charles and sisters Maria and Hannah moved to Loraine County Ohio in
1836. George married Catherine Daley December 4, 1836, in Henrietta,
Loraine County Ohio.
George’s sister, Maria Lawton, my maternal great-great-
grandmother was born November 20, 1823. Maria lived with George and
Catherine for a time, before her marriage to Edmund Oscar White, August
20, 1843, in Ohio. Oscar died in 1853 leaving five children behind. Maria
remained in the Toledo area until her death on July 30, 1869. She
remarried in 1857 to Samuel Bratton. Both she and her brother remained
close over the years and she undoubtedly had a great deal of contact with
young Henry.
Three children were born to George and Catherine; Manley
Chapin, born in 1838; Henry Ware, born March 17, 1843; and George S.,
born in 1848; all in the Manhattan (Toledo) Ohio area.
Henry’s father and two uncles, Daniel and Charles, worked as
millwrights. Their trade caused them to move around to various job sites
so George was frequently away from home. For example, the three
brothers built mills in New York, at Youngstown, Roanoke, as well as
several locations in Indiana. In 1843 George Lawton went to Ft. Wayne
Indiana to work on a mill. The rest of the family joined George in Ft.
Wayne where they lived in a home located along a bank on the St. Mary’s
River, near the Main Street bridge. 4
In about 1850, Henry’s father traveled to California to build
mining equipment for the gold miners-no doubt hoping to cash in on a
gold find himself. While George was still in California in 1852, Catherine
Lawton died unexpectedly. As it would have taken quite a while to notify
George that his wife had died, the more pressing need would have been to
find someplace for the boys to live. For all intents and purposes the George
W. Lawton family ceased to exist as a family unit. Nine-year-old Henry

4
Ft. Wayne Historical Society
10
went to live with a Mrs. E. D. Moore who cared for him and acted as a
surrogate mother. It is not clear where the other boys went, but it is known
that they stayed in the Ohio area either with other relatives or other
families.
One can only imagine how desolate Henry and his brothers must
have felt. Not only was their mother dead, but their father was so far
away. The worst part would have been that even if letters were exchanged
between relatives, they still took time to reach their destinations, and most
of the time no one wrote to children. Letters would have been written to an
adult and in the body of the letter, a reference would be made to the child,
so at the beginning, Henry would have felt very isolated from everyone.
Henry ended up living with Mrs. Moore for the next five years.
After a time, Mrs. Moore moved back to Maumee, Ohio area that was very
close to the other Lawton family members that finally afforded Henry
opportunities to visit his Aunt Maria and other relatives.
Whether Henry really enjoyed spending Sundays with a group of
girl cousins is not known.
He had several cousins, one of whom was my great grandmother,
Jennie M. White. Jennie was born December 28, 1845, and had four
sisters; Ellen, Lavena, Mary and Ella, children of Maria Lawton White.
Whatever Henry’s feelings towards his cousins, their memories of
him were always fond and generous. Jennie was talking about him years
after she moved to Iowa in 1861 and raised ten children of her own. One of
Jennie’s daughters, in later years, named her son Manley Lawton Ratcliffe,
in honor of Henry’s own son, Manley.
Another of Jennie’s daughters, my grandmother Jessie, kept
photographs and mementos of Henry and his father and passed them down
to my mother.
During the time Henry was in Fort Wayne, he was befriended by
a neighbor, Jack Waters, who had served in the War of 1812 as a fife. 5
Like most young boys, Henry probably had his imagination stirred by the
tales of ‘glorious deeds’ such as marching into battle with the drum and
fife playing and the soldiers carrying banners. The influence may have
been all the greater since Mr. Waters would have been a role model for
him.

5
Ft. Wayne Historical Society
11
 In 1857, after having been gone seven years, George Lawton
returned to the area. He stayed a short time and then took Henry west with
him to Iowa and Missouri, returning to Ft. Wayne a year later.

George S. Lawton-Henry’s younger brother

Family photo

12
 At that time Manley was teaching school in the Huron, Ohio area,
but younger brother George’s whereabouts are not known. Shortly after his
return in 1858, George announced that he was going to remarry. Manley
became very upset at the news and a schism occurred in the family. On
the father’s wedding day, Manley packed his belongings and left for parts
unknown. 6

Jennie White-Lawton’s cousin, author’s

Great grandmother

6
Robert G. Carter’s notes-Newberry Library, Chicago
13
 After the quarrel between his father and his brother, perhaps
Henry did not feel at ease with the new situation at home either, because
that same year, Henry entered the Ft. Wayne Methodist Episcopal College,
a preparatory school. It was during his school years that his youthful
imagination and military tendencies were further aroused. The Hickories
and the Wide-Awakes were active men’s marching clubs that participated
in political and other local events. Henry joined the Wide-Awakes and
participated in regular drills and marches. 7

Maria Lawton-Lawton’s aunt, author’s

Great-great grandmother

The Zouaves, a specially uniformed organization, was also formed

in Ft. Wayne, at his school. With their history based on gallantry in battle,
the Zouaves were a natural attraction for young men with a sense of
patriotism and an inclination for bravado. Henry, like most young men his

7
Ft. Wayne Historical Society
14
age, could see the glamour and dash, but not yet the gore and tragedy-
although in later years it did not seem to dampen his spirits or frighten
him.
Henry was in school, just past his eighteenth birthday when the
Civil War began. His boyhood was ending as he became one of the early
volunteers in response to President Lincoln’s call to arms. It was becoming
evident that his future did not include following in his father’s footsteps as
a millwright. It would not be too long before Lawton decided that he
would devote his life to service to his country.
One coincidence that occurred later on during the Civil War
involved Henry and his cousin Jennie’s husband, Darius Garlinghouse of
Sand Spring, Iowa.
Henry received his commission as a captain at Corinth,
Mississippi while Garlinghouse received a medical discharge from the
Union Army at the same location.
Garlinghouse had served with a regiment from Iowa and was
assigned as an aide to General Rosecrans earlier in the war. Lawton had
also served under Rosecrans, while with the 30th Indiana Volunteers, in
Kirk’s Brigade. It is unlikely that either man knew of each other during
the Civil War although Garlinghouse probably heard a great deal about
Lawton in later years, from his wife Jennie. 8
A short six years after Lawton entered the Army for the first
time, his father passed away in Ft. Wayne.

8
Family notes-most of the information about Lawton’s early family
life has been passed down and is augmented by information from the
Ft. Wayne Historical Society and Dr. F. E. Weeks’Pioneer History
Of Clarksfield Ohio -published in1908.
15
“ This great loss is ours--the nation’s--not Lawton’s. We should not and
would not wish to call him back. After a name has been written as high as
it can be on the scroll of a nation’s heroes, what better death can come to a
brave soldier than to be suddenly stricken on the field of battle-- to close
one’s eyes and ears on the scenes of blood and carnage and open them to
see sweet fields of peace beyond the swelling flood?” Col. R. S. Robertson
at Lawton’s funeral.

CHAPTER THREE

LAWTON GOES TO WAR

Henry W. Lawton entered the spring of 1861 having just passed

his eighteenth birthday. Certainly aware of the sentiments to abolish
slavery and the strong reactions from the people of the south, he could not
have been aware of where his life would begin to lead in a few short
months. He could not have envisioned that the eulogy above would be
given after his death, thirty-eight years later.
Like many young men of his age, the instinct to ‘do something’,
to join and become a part of a great historical event was strong. Honor,
valor, comradeship, and patriotism are words and feelings that become a
real part of a young man’s life. The desire to become a soldier and march
forth for his country was probably uppermost in Lawton’s mind.
Unlike others who soon became disillusioned with the realities of
war and eagerly returned to more peaceful lives, Lawton never lost his
taste for the battle, nor his eagerness to fight.
Henry was among the first to respond to President Lincoln’s call
for three-month volunteers. 9 On April 16, 1861, he enlisted in Company E
of the 9th Indiana Volunteers. His brother George joined the Union army
late in the war, was wounded during the conflict, and died of
complications from the wounds after the war. Manley was living in the

9
U.S. War Department Report-Inspector General’s Office-12-21-
1899-in author’s possession.
16
South at the outbreak of hostilities and was pressed into service for the
Confederacy as an engineer.
According to War Department and other documents , Lawton was
mustered in as a sergeant. 10 Captain W. P. Segur commanding Company E
received a recommendation from Colonel Robert H. Milroy that Lawton
be immediately elevated to the rank of sergeant.
While proud of his rank and acceptance into E Company, Lawton
also demonstrated his honesty and self-effacing qualities that were to be
hallmarks of his conduct throughout his career. He related to a friend that
he had “never had as much rank since. I was impatient to learn it all, but I
soon saw how much there was that I didn’t understand.”
“ I had the company drill pretty pat; but of guard mounting, picket
and outpost duty, and many other things, I knew absolutely nothing.” 11 It
was in his nature however to learn quickly, often puzzling his superiors
with difficult tactical questions not often posed by enlisted men. Here
another trait of Lawton’s was surfacing, that he took his job seriously and
meant to meet or exceed the expectations others had of him.
Lawton’s regiment left Indiana shortly after the beginning of
May, 1861 after grouping in Goshen. The unit took the Baltimore & Ohio
RR to Bellaire, Ohio, then crossed the river to enter Benwood, West
Virginia, in pursuit of a Confederate force led by General Garnett. The
retreating rebels tore up the tracks as they moved back and the line had to
be re-built by Union forces as they advanced.
About this time, Lawton had picked up one of the many
nicknames he would receive, ‘Long Hank.’ He contracted measles and was
hospital confined. His place of rest was a boxcar fitted with beds. While
ill and resting in the boxcar, it was blown off its tracks by a storm but
Lawton was unharmed. Still sick, he insisted on marching with his unit as
it moved on to Philippi, West Virginia.
At Belington, Confederate forces were sighted. Company E and
other units of the 9th Volunteers bivouacked early on the morning of June
3, 1861, in a large field. Arms were stacked and the enlisted men rested
while the officers determined the order of battle.
Several men, including Lawton, became restless and initiated
action on their own. Taking their rifles, several moved up the road

10
Ft. Wayne Historical Society-Henry W. Lawton
11
Ibid
17
towards the Southern picket lines. Among the men were W.H. Miller, later
a major; Frank Chilcote, later to become a circuit judge; Mart Whitman,
and John Auten. Lawton and Chilcote took the lead. The small group
attacked the Confederate pickets.
Auten was one of the first soldiers to be killed in the war. He
was shot through the heart. Ignoring his own safety, Lawton ran to his aid.
When the little force returned to camp, Major Henry J. Blowney ordered
the men arrested and placed in the guardhouse. 12
Lawton, an imposing and self-composed figure, intimidated the
guards, threatening to reduce them in rank. The officer of the guard, and
officer of the day were called and ordered Lawton and the others released.
The two officers who ordered Lawton released were later to become U. S.
Senators representing North and South Dakota.

12
Ft. Wayne Historical Society
18
 Captain Lawton Corinth Mississippi
Family photo

The daring and lack of fear displayed by Lawton was to remain with him
through his life, ultimately causing his death years later. His eagerness to
get into a battle was also a trait that he would display with regularity,
sometimes to the point of being competitive with his fellow officers.
19
The 9th continued its pursuit of General Garnett to Carrick’s Ford where
Garnett was killed in battle. As the Confederates retreated along a narrow
road by the Cheat River, they slowed the Union advance by blocking the
road with Hemlock trees. Several men, including Lawton, were given the
task of removing the obstacles and Lawton showed that his years in school
had not prevented him from becoming proficient with an ax.
His tenacity soon became apparent as well. After clearing the
trees from the road, the Union soldiers reached the Confederate pickets.
Having waded the river some fifteen times during the day, they were close
to exhaustion and sought rest. Lawton used his leadership abilities to
encourage his comrades on and together they pushed the pickets back
another half-mile.
A major engagement took place on July 14. At that time, Captain
Segur’s company was the first company in the regiment, with Lawton as
its top enlisted man. In the immediate area were the 9th and 14th Ohio
Volunteers and the Confederate forces had taken a strong defensive
position on the opposite side of the Cheat River.
The 9th Indiana Volunteers formed a line parallel to that of the
14th Ohio Volunteers in preparation for an attack across the river. Once
the command was given to cross the river, Lawton led his regiment across
the river, ahead of the Ohio regiment. Early on, he had formed the
judgment that a soldier’s job was to fight and he never deterred from that
judgment. In his three months of service, Lawton saw action at Philippi,
Laurel, and Carricks Ford, W. Virginia.
If the North had any hopes of a short war and quickly thrashing
the Confederacy, those hopes soon dimmed. Like many of the three-
month volunteers Lawton was mustered out of service on July 21, 1861
and returned home after his short tour. 13
His zeal was not dampened by his first experiences in combat and
he was quick to place himself back at the disposal of the Army. Colonel
Sion S. Bass organized the 30th Indiana Volunteers. Captain O. D. Hurd
commanded a company in the 30th and Henry Lawton re-enlisted with
Hurd’s unit.
The 30th was officially mustered into service on August 20, 1861.
At first, Lawton was his company’s drill sergeant but was quickly
promoted to 1st Lieutenant on August 20. The 30th joined the Army of

13
U.S. War Department Report
20
the Ohio, under General Don Carlos Buell in Kentucky and remained there
for a brief period. The army moved on to Tennessee early in 1862. Its
first major engagement would be at Pittsburg Landing (Shiloh) where
Lawton’s regiment was one that suffered heavy losses. 14
General U.S. Grant’s army of 42,000 men was in place at
Pittsburg Landing since early March, 1862, waiting for General Buell’s
Army of the Ohio. The two forces were to join in a major push into
Mississippi. Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston commanded
southern forces that were positioned at Corinth, Mississippi, just 22 miles
away from Grant’s position.
Both the Union and Confederate forces had been suffering from
dysentery, scarce rations and cold, wet weather. Johnston, over the
objections of his second-in-command, General Beauregard, had decided to
attack Grant before Buell could arrive at Pittsburg Landing. On the
morning of April 6, 1862, Johnston’s forces attacked Grant’s
encampments. Some of the early fighting took place around a small white
washed church named Shiloh, which in Hebrew means “place of peace.”
The Confederate attack so surprised Grant’s troops that many
abandoned their bivouac area and left their breakfasts behind. The
Confederate soldiers who had not eaten for twenty-four hours stopped to
take advantage of the free meals. 15
General William Tecumseh Sherman was in position with his
troops near the church but they were pushed back by the 6th Mississippi.
General Johnston himself led a charge of southern soldiers. So
preoccupied by the battle, he did not notice that a Union bullet had torn
through his leg and severed an artery. He died mid-afternoon of the first
day of battle and was replaced by General Beauregard.
Grant’s troops were in a difficult way but on the second day of
battle, General Buell’s Army of the Ohio finally joined the battle. With
Buell’s fresh troops, the Union forces counter-attacked and drove the tired
and outnumbered Confederate forces from the field. Beauregard withdrew
to Corinth.
The casualties were extremely heavy with one in four of the
100,000 combatants being killed or wounded. Observing the field of
battle, strewn with corpses, caused Grant to comment that he could walk

14
U.S. War Department Report
15
Ward, Geoffrey C.-The Civil War-p. 114
21
across the area in any direction, stepping on bodies, without his feet
touching the ground. 16The aftermath for Grant was so bad that he was
denounced as a butcher and summarily relieved of his command and
reassigned by his superior General Henry W. Halleck, Commander of the
Department of Missouri. Privately, General Halleck spread the rumor that
Grant had been drinking during the battle.
Lawton, one of the fortunate survivors of Shiloh, had experienced
with others, one of the bloodiest battles of the Civil War. His unit moved
on and fought at Corinth, Mississippi.
General Halleck moved the forces to Corinth, although it took
him close to a month to cover twenty miles. His movement was over-
cautious as General Beauregard’s forces numbered less than half of
Halleck’s. Under pressure from the Union army, Beauregard abandoned
Corinth and withdrew to the south. Halleck, on the other hand, would stop
the army every day and put up fortifications to protect against Confederate
attacks which never materialized, and when he did reach Corinth, the
rebels had moved south and offered no resistance.
Regardless of his indecisiveness and lack of progress, Halleck
was promoted to general-in-chief of the Federal armies. Grant, in disgust,
came close to resigning and going home but was talked out of doing so by
Sherman.
Lawton’s unit also fought at Iuka while attached to Buell’s forces.
At the age of 19, on May 7, 1862, outside of Corinth, he was promoted to
the rank of captain. 17 The memory of being handed his captain’s bars in
June was recalled later:

“It was on a lovely day in June, 1862, that my commission of captain was
handed me. I had been commanding my company for some time; and I
knew I would receive the formal promotion, for my immediate superiors
had all endorsed me in the most favorable terms. But I did not have the
formal warrant to assume the rank. When it was handed to me, I would not
have changed places with king or kaiser. I was nineteen years old; and,
though my upper lip was as bare as a girl’s, I was captain in a fighting
regiment. It was then that I felt that if I had a “vocation” for anything on
earth it was for the life of a soldier. Then and there I determined to make

16
Ward, Geoffrey C.-The Civil War-p. 121
17
U.S. War Department Report
22
 18
the service of my country my life’s work.”

In the meantime, Lawton, with the 30th, transferred to the Army

of the Cumberland, where he would serve in Kirk’s Brigade, under Major
General William S. Rosecrans. His regiment was among the forces
commanded by General George H. Thomas. Rosencrans spent two months
preparing for an offensive against General Bragg’s Confederate forces in
Tennessee. On the day after Christmas in 1862, he split his army into
three columns and advanced towards Murfreesboro. Bragg and his army
had been camped there for over a month.
Bragg’s defensive position straddled Stones River. On December
29, Rosecrans’ army arrived in the area of Murfreesboro and by that
evening, two-thirds of his unit was positioned 700 yards from the
Confederate line, along the Nashville Turnpike.
By December 30, Rosecrans had 44,000 men arrayed against
Bragg’s 38,000 soldiers. The battle plan of the opposing generals turned
out to be the same, that is, each planned to hold their right side static and
advance with their left. 19
In the early morning hours of December 31, the air was cold and
crisp, the men of the 30th Indiana had been able to get some sleep during
the night, and were preparing for the day’s events. The 30th, along with
the 29th Indiana, 34th Illinois, and 77th Pennsylvania regiments, were
positioned in a line just above present day Franklin Road.
Some of the Union troops were cooking breakfast when rebel
troops under General William J. Hardee struck against the Union right
flank. The Federal troops offered stiff resistance but began to roll back,
one brigade at a time so that by 10 A.M., the line was at a right angle to its
original position. Lawton’s unit came under heavy fire, suffering high
casualties, and was pushed back about one mile in the first hour of
fighting. The regiment continued to fall back, seeking cover, and the men
keeping their heads low. At one point, Lawton was observed ambling
along, taking his watch out to check the time of day. He either failed to
understand the danger of a bullet or was completely unafraid. At his height
of 6 feet four inches, he was an ample target for any rebel rifleman.

18
Ft. Wayne Ind. Historical Society
19
Catton, Bruce-The Civil War-p. 266
23
It seems, as was borne out by his actions in later battles, that he had a
special presence of mind, and was extremely brave in the face of danger.
The 30th, along with several other regiments on the right side of
the Union line were driven back past Wilkinson Pike. Furious fighting on
the part of the Federal troops as the Confederates pushed through the
wooded sections allowed Union artillery on the high ground to set up and
halt rebel charges across the open areas. Rosecrans was forced to recall
part of his forces that he had sent across Stones River in order to
consolidate them. By late in the afternoon, he had re-formed his lines and
further Confederate attacks were repulsed.
General Bragg was confident that Rosecrans would withdraw his
forces to Nashville. In fact, on the next day, January 1, 1863, Bragg as a
prelude to withdrawing misinterpreted re-forming actions on the part of the
Federals. On the contrary, Rosecrans was strengthening his defensive line
and setting up protection for his supplies. The next morning, Bragg was
surprised to find the Union army still in place, confronting his forces. He
spent a quiet morning, then ordered General Breckinridge to dislodge the
Union troops from the east bank of Stones River. Breckenridge protested
the order, but ordered his men to attack at about 4 P.M.. The rebels had to
charge across a wide expanse of open ground and came under heavy Union
artillery fire.
The Confederates lost 1,800 men in the effort and withdrew. To
make matters worse for Bragg, he learned that Rosecrans was receiving
reinforcements. He then moved his troops 36 miles from the engagement
for the winter while Rosecrans moved into Murfreesboro where his army
camped for the next six months.
Lawton saw his next major action at Chickamauga as part of
Rosecrans summer campaign against Bragg. At the end of June, Rosecrans
began what appeared to be a dazzling show of generalship. He outflanked
and out-maneuvered Bragg all the way to Chattanooga. His only problem
was that once in Chattanooga, he didn’t stop to re-supply or rest his troops,
rather, he continued his pursuit of Bragg through very difficult terrain.
Meanwhile, Bragg had halted his retreat and was receiving
reinforcements, including those commanded by General James Longstreet.
Twelve miles south of Chattanooga, Bragg attacked on the banks of
Chicamauga Creek. On September 19 and 20, he routed a major part of
Rosecrans’ Army.

24
 Lawton and the 30th, part of Thomas’ command, were positioned
on the right (or south) of the Union line near Lee & Gordon’s Mill,
opposing Longstreet’s troops. When Bragg struck, Rosencrans perceived a
gap in his own line that actually did not exist. When he ordered it closed,
the movement created a gap on the right through which Longstreet’s rebels
attacked, routing two Union corps. The troops under General Thomas,
known as “Pap” to his soldiers, managed a stubborn and orderly
withdrawal that prevented Chickamauga from becoming a total disaster.
Thomas earned a new nickname; “the Rock Of Chickamauga.”
Bragg failed to follow up on his success and Longstreet was
incensed to the point of requesting his removal as commander. 20 The
Union troops then retreated to Chattanooga and were bottled up and under
siege for the next several months.
Troops were cut off from most supplies, were infested with
vermin, and were cold and hungry. They cut down trees and knocked
down houses and other buildings in order to have firewood. Plagued by
fall rains, the stench of dying mules and horses, the federal troops
experienced a great deal of misery.
In October, after having been named commander by Lincoln of
Union armies between the Appalachians and the Mississippi, Grant made
Chattanooga a priority. He went to Chattanooga and replaced Rosecrans
with General Thomas as head of the Army of the Cumberland. With
Grant’s arrival, the union troops’ morale improved and activity increased.
A gap was created through the Confederate lines so that a pontoon bridge
could be laid across the Tennessee River. Supplies began to reach the
army, and Grant conceived a strategy to drive the Confederates off
Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain.
Like Lawton, Arthur MacArthur, Jr., eighteen year-old
Lieutenant with the 24th Wisconsin, was also at Chattanooga. The two
would later serve in Cuba and the Philippines as senior officers.
On November 24, the battle of Chattanooga began with
Sherman’s attack on the left flank of Bragg’s line. It stalled but Joe
Hooker’s men stormed Lookout Mountain and planted the Union flag on
the summit. On November 25, “Pap” Thomas’ veterans of Chicamauga
made a limited attack on the first line of rebel trenches below Missionary
Ridge as Hooker’s units launched an all-out assault on the right. The rebel

20
Ward, Geoffrey C.-The Civil War-p. 256
25
positions were supported by artillery lining the crest; rifle pits on the slope;
and trenches at the bottom of the hill. 21
Thomas’ soldiers overran the trenches, held their ground and
awaited further orders. General Sheridan was with the troops in the
trenches. When he pulled a flask from his coat and toasted the rebel
gunners on the slope, they opened fire, spattering him and his officers with
dirt.
Sheridan roared, “That was ungenerous! I’ll take your guns for
that.” His words triggered an immediate response from the Union soldiers
who, without orders, jumped from their trenches and started up the slope.
Shouting, “Chickamauga! Chickamauga!” as they fought past the rifle pits
and on to the top. 22 Grant, observing from a distance questioned who had
given orders for the advance and was informed that the men had started up
on their own. MacArthur carried his unit’s colors to the top of Missionary
Ridge yelling, “On Wisconsin.”. It seemed that the veterans of
Chickamauga had been doing a slow burn for some time, having suffered
the jeers from Hooker’s and Sherman’s men for the defeat at
Chickamauga. The two-day battle cost the Confederacy the war in the
West. 23
General Sherman was then named commander of the armies in
the West including the Army of the Cumberland under General Thomas.
Lawton served in the Army of the Cumberland until November of 1864.
In July of 1864, he was assigned as inspector on the staff of General
Grose, commanding the 3rd Brigade, 1st Division, 4th Corps. He held this
position prior to assuming command of the regiment that reflected the trust
placed in him by his superiors.
Lawton saw more action and was under fire at Tunnel Hill, Rocky
Face, Dalton, Resaca, Adairsville, Cassville, New Hope Church,
Kennesaw Mountain, Smyrna Camp Ground, Chattahoochee River, and
Peachtree Creek, all in Georgia.
These engagements were part of Sherman’s movement towards
Atlanta. At Kennesaw Mountain, Georgia, Sherman found the
Confederates well dug in. “Pap” Thomas’ men attacked under a broiling
sun facing death “as coolly as if they were automatic or wooden men.” The

21
Ward, Geoffrey C.-The Civil War-p. 260
22
Ibid., p. 261
23
Ibid.
26
frontal attack failed and Sherman resumed a flanking strategy, forcing
General Johnston of the Confederacy, to the Chattahoochee River, less
than ten miles from Atlanta.
General Johnston chose to fight a stalemate war hoping for a
change in the political winds in the North if Lincoln lost the Presidential
election. However, Sherman’s flanking movements allowed Union troops
to cross the Chattahoochee unopposed forcing Johnston to fall back to the
edge of Atlanta. Jefferson Davis replaced Johnston with General John Bell
Hood who was more of a gambler. His understanding of his role was that
he was to attack rather than to fall back, and he did so.
General Thomas was crossing Peachtree Creek and there was a
gap of several miles between his men and those of McPherson and
Schofield. Hood launched a savage attack on Thomas on July 20 in the
hopes of destroying his forces before Sherman could consolidate. Hood’s
attack was vicious but Thomas was a tough fighter and his troops were just
as tough. The Confederates were thrown back and the Union forces
consolidated.
On August 3, 1864, Lawton was serving as brigade officer of the
day and commanding Company A. He personally led his brigade across
open ground in a charge against the Confederate rifle pits in front of
Atlanta. Two other brigades were to charge the Confederate positions as
well, one on Lawton’s right, one on his left. Lawton not only captured the
pits, he held them as well against two desperate attempts by the rebels to
re-take them. What made the accomplishment more notable was that the
brigade on his right was repulsed by the Confederates; the brigade on his
left never attacked leaving Lawton’s brigade as the only one carrying the
weight of the charge. 24
In later years, Lawton was awarded the Congressional Medal Of
Honor for “distinguished gallantry”, and with characteristic modesty,
considered himself ‘unentitled’ to the award. 25 He was relieved from his
position as inspector in November, 1864, and promoted to Brevet
Lieutenant Colonel on November 15, taking command of his regiment.
As the Union Army under Schofield fell back towards Nashville, it
was pursued by General Hood’s forces. Hood hoped to effect a change in

24
National Archives-Lawton papers
25
National Archives-American Museum Of History Branch-Medal
Of Honor Roster-p. 168; War Department
27
Sherman’s strategy by attacking Union forces in Tennessee and forcing
Sherman to turn north from Georgia. Hood’s forces moved north in an
effort to prevent Schofield’s units from joining with General Thomas’s
Federals at Nashville. Schofield beat Hood to Columbia by two days, yet
Hood still hoped to outflank Schofield and cut him off at Spring Hill,
eleven miles to the north.
Hood reached Spring Hill on November 29. With the Union
escape route to the north still open, the Confederates went into bivouac for
the night allowing Schofield to slip through. Hood, extremely angry at his
lost opportunity, pressed his men forward and found the Union forces
entrenched at Franklin, just south of Nashville.
Lawton distinguished himself again at Franklin, displaying
excellent leadership qualities. Schofield used two Corps to protect the
withdrawal of his wagon trains and artillery across the Harpeth River.
While getting into position and waiting for action to start, Lawton took the
time to provide some instruction to his troops, many of which were new
and not battle hardened. Lawton’s own version of this action is contained
in his report of December 5, 1864:

Report of Capt. Henry W. Lawton, Thirtieth Indiana Infantry, of

operations November 30, 1864.

HEADQUARTERS THIRTIETH INDIANA VOLUNTEERS,

Nashville, Tenn., December 5, 1864

“Sir: In compliance with instructions, I have the honor to report the part
taken by my regiment in the action at Franklin, Tenn., on the 30th day of
November, 1864:
After a very irregular march of all night, I arrived, with the brigade
(Third), at Franklin at about 8 a. m. of the 30th instant. Was formed in
irregular order, and, with arms stacked, remained long enough to prepare
breakfast.
About 11 a. m. we were moved to the right, near the western
portion of the city, and were formed by General Grose, commanding
brigade, in line of battle. My position was in the front line, joined on the
right by the Seventy-fifth Illinois and on the left by the Eighty-fourth
Indiana.

28
 Skirmishing had already begun on the left of the line, and was now
commencing in our front. A line of works was now being rapidly
constructed, and by 4 p. m. was completed. My regiment being composed
mostly of new levies or drafted men, and entirely ignorant of the use of
arms, I deemed it necessary to have all spare time given to drill;
consequently when the works were finished, I was forming for that
purpose, when the pickets in my front commenced firing very rapidly, and
by the time I formed behind the works, were driven by a charge from the
enemy.
They fell back immediately in my front, and compelled me to hold
my fire for the purpose of saving our own men. The enemy received an
oblique and very destructive fire from the Ninth Indiana, on the right of the
line, which checked him until the pickets got under cover of the works,
when I immediately opened up on him. The two fires soon became too hot,
and he was compelled to fall back which he did in considerable disorder.
Pickets were again sent out in my front, and kept up a slow fire, but were
not again driven in. Heavy fighting was done, however, on the left, but my
command had no part, and nothing further occurred until 12 that night,
when our line was withdrawn and I moved with the brigade across the
river without further molestation. The losses sustained by my regiment
were as follows: Private John Ottman, killed; Privates Stephen Vancamp,
Julius Burns, James Simmons, and Adam Humburger, and Tollman
Morris, Company C, wounded. The men above named, except the last,
were all new soldiers, and were not yet assigned to companies. The
conduct of both officers and men was good without exception, and they
have my warmest thanks for the promptness with which they did their
part.”
Very respectfully,

H.W. LAWTON,

Captain, Commanding Thirtieth Indiana Volunteers.

Lieut. F. Bingham,
26
Acting Assistant Adjutant General, Third Brigade

26
National Historical Society-War of the Rebellion-Vol. 45 Series I,
pp. 222-223
29
 Lawton’s unit was positioned to the north and west of the Carter
House, where a museum and visitor center now stands. The unit took
heavy losses at Franklin and at Nashville shortly after. Lawton continued
to distinguish himself throughout this campaign according to War
Department records.
The report of Brigadier General William Grose, commanding
officer of the 3rd Brigade, filed January 1865 includes the following;
“ The 30th Indiana, most of them recruits, under Captain Lawton,
commanding the regiment, stood by the colors to the man and fought
well.” Grose was reporting on the action of his unit at Franklin, November
30th. He was on the line during action, positioned near the 30th and able to
personally observe Lawton and his men in action. 27
On December 3, 1864, the regiment was reorganized into a seven-
company battalion with about seven hundred men. In early 1865, a
remnant of the 36th Indiana was added. On February 10, 1865, Lawton
was promoted to Brevet Colonel, for gallant and meritorious service. He
had not yet attained the age of twenty-two.
Senior officers filed other reports reflecting on Lawton’s
meritorious conduct. General Grose commended Lawton and the other
regimental commanders for their bravery and obedience to orders.
Brigadier General Nathan Kimball reported on January 6, 1865 concerning
an attack on rebel positions at Nashville by Lawton’s unit and commended
Lawton for his leadership. 28
Lawton’s promotions might have been awarded earlier had his
regiment been at full strength. In September of the preceding year, the
officers and men of the 30th, with the exception of those who re-enlisted
and some new recruits, had been mustered out of service. The three-year
terms of many of the senior officers had expired. Lawton had decided to
stay in the service and “see it to the end.”
Since the regiment was below required manpower level, it was
not entitled to a field officer. Lawton was brevetted colonel of volunteers
on March 13, 1865.

27
National Historical Society-War of the Rebellion-Vol. 45 Series I,
pp. 208-209
28
Ibid., pp. 180-212
30
 After the surrender of the Confederate armies, he was ordered to
Texas, where, on account of the good condition and discipline of his
regiment, the division commander assigned him to an independent
command. His regiment took part in every march, battle, and skirmish in
which it was engaged until mustered out in December, 1865. 29
Lawton had proven that he was a person with presence of mind
under great pressure; he certainly had exhibited leadership abilities, and
never folded in the line of fire. He also demonstrated that he was a team
player, with keen organizational skills, and that above all, he loved
soldiering.
Lawton did not have the benefit of an affluent family with
connections; no political sponsors as such, and had not attended West
Point; yet he had attained a rank and recognition level through
fundamental achievement. His standing was high among his troops and his
neighbors when he returned home.
He now had the opportunity to look with pride on his
accomplishments, and to go home and find a peacetime profession.

29
War Department
31
 CHAPTER FOUR

CIVILIAN LIFE-AND BEYOND

Henry Lawton, approaching twenty-three years of age ended the

war with a fine service record and would have been able to find a suitable
civilian profession. The Army, after all, was going to undergo major
changes, most of which would not make it an easy place to be.
For one thing, since peace was at hand, the size of the Army
would be substantially reduced. The United States perceived no threats
externally or internally that would warrant huge appropriations for the
military.
What remained of the Army would be split pretty much in half.
A portion would be kept in the South, enforcing the peace and supporting
reconstruction. Southerners, particularly in those areas where Black troops
were employed, would despise a good part of those forces.
The remainder of the Army would be spread thinly throughout the
western territories and states to protect settlers and an ever-advancing line
of frontier people as they moved into Indian lands. Those troops would be
under-supplied, under-budgeted, and unappreciated by most of the people
in the country.
In addition, the Army itself would be disorganized with conflict
between the generals and the Secretary of War as to who would have
command function. Many of the politically connected officers of the
Army would go directly to their congressman for favors or support. This
practice circumvented the chain of command, frustrating efforts by
generals such as Sherman and Sheridan in their efforts to consolidate their
control.
‘Staffers’ enjoyed the benefits of a posting in Washington D. C.
as they would curry favor with politicians, often passing up their military,
and often more qualified colleagues in the field.
Friction developed between the Regulars, West Point officers, and
the Volunteers. Many of the volunteer officers had achieved high brevet
rank but held lower permanent or regular rank. Brevets were promotions
given in the field without raise in pay. Often, in a command conflict with
32
a senior regular officer, the volunteer could ‘pull rank’ by reverting to
brevet rank. In many cases, the West Pointer may simply not have been as
well qualified to handle a command situation and there was no basis in fact
for the continued friction.
At any rate, this is the Army that would evolve after the Civil War
and its problems would continue for decades. So much so, that a man like
Lawton could have certainly avoided the types of headaches found in the
Army by finding and pursuing a respectable civilian career.
It appeared at first that he had identified such a career when he
was mustered out of service. He entered the legal profession as a law clerk
in the service of a Judge Ninde. At the judge’s urging, Lawton began law
studies at Harvard Law School in the summer of 1866.
During this initial period after the Civil War, despite the problems
in the Army, many men sought to pursue military careers. Quietly,
Lawton let it be known that he was interested in receiving a commission.
In July of 1866 Congress fixed the size of the Army at 60,000 men,
officers and enlisted combined.
That action seemed to close the door to many aspirants, but
Lawton was offered an appointment to the rank of second lieutenant in the
regular Army, 41st Infantry, an all Black unit. Lawton declined the
assignment and continued his studies at Harvard. A number of his friends
felt that he should receive at least a captain’s grade but Lawton himself did
not get involved in a great deal of self-promotion. He applied for a
commission and hoped for a captain’s rank and waited for a response from
the Army.
Lawton also received recommendations from Generals Sherman,
Sheridan, and Thomas J. Wood. Wood was a major general of Volunteers.
In July, Sheridan strongly advised Lawton to take the appointment as
second lieutenant, which Lawton seemingly chose to ignore. However, on
April 4, 1867, when the offer was again tendered, Lawton accepted. In the
process of reducing in size, the Army had gone over a number of brevet
officers from the Civil War. Many had received their brevet promotions as
favors or because of family ties and political connections. The senior
officers wanted the smaller Army to have the least number of patronage
officers and the maximum number of battle tested and qualified officers.
One man destined to have a major influence on Lawton’s life was
Ranald S. Mackenzie, one of the Union’s star officers during the Civil
War. He had been reduced to the regular rank of captain in the Corps of
Engineers after the War. His fine record and bravery brought him to the
33
attention of General Grant and other senior officers and he hoped for a
promotion to major with a field command.
The all Black units needed experienced officers but few white
officers were willing to join those units. Therefore, when Mackenzie was
offered a promotion to colonel of the 41st Infantry regiment, he accepted.
His official acceptance letter was written March 11, 1867.30

Ranald S. MacKenzie- National Archives

Although Mackenzie and Lawton had not known each other prior to their
respective assignments to the 41st, they were soon to learn that there were
striking similarities between them. Both were fearless and fiercely
confident of their ability to handle difficult missions, often seemingly

30
Robinson, Charles M., III-Bad Hand p. 42
34
impossible to other officers. Both had displayed great courage during the
Civil War and had received brevet promotions to the level of colonel.
The fact that Mackenzie was a West Pointer and Lawton was not,
never created a source of friction between the two men as they were to
become close and fast friends over the next several years.
Lawton joined the 41st in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. On July 31,
1867, he was promoted to the rank of first lieutenant after being
recommended by Colonel Mackenzie. The regiment was ordered to Texas
in June and Lawton served as its regimental quartermaster. He would hold
this position, while serving under Mackenzie, for close to ten years.
He developed a reputation as a solid organizer who kept
Mackenzie’s troops supplied under severely adverse conditions. It was his
determination that enabled Mackenzie to get the jump on Nelson Miles, a
few years later, in pursuing and locating Quanah Parker’s Comanche’s at
Palo Duro Canyon. It is also believed that his performance as
Quartermaster contributed greatly to Mackenzie’s many successes.
Mackenzie’s regiment served in Texas as an Army of occupation,
using Fort Brown as its base of operations. Fort Brown was located on the
coast along the Gulf of Mexico and on the Rio Grande. One of
Mackenzie’s responsibilities was to administer the town of Brownsville
that was situated near Fort Brown. Tensions along the Mexican border
added to the duties of the 41st but the Army was very welcome on the
Texas frontier. 31
Coupled with the military assignments given him, Mackenzie had
the job of turning untrained ex-slaves into soldiers. He merged black
soldiers and new recruits from the north into the regiment and diligently
worked at turning the men into proficient and respected military personnel.
32

After border tensions were reduced in late 1867, Mackenzie’s

regiment was transferred to Fort Clark Texas.

On November 11, 1869, the 41st Infantry and 38th Infantry were
consolidated to the 24th Infantry to which Lawton was transferred. 33

31
Robinson, Charles M., III-Bad Hand -pp. 43-46
32
Ibid.
33
U. S. War Department Report-Inspector General’s Office-12-21-
1899
35
 With the reduction of the Army in 1870, came the creation of
several new cavalry regiments. Mackenzie, with an instinct for where the
action would be, requested transfer to a cavalry regiment. His request was
granted and he took command of the 4th Cavalry regiment. That regiment
was to become one of, if not the finest, cavalry regiments in the Army.
Mackenzie also had his eyes on several promising young officers,
Lawton being one of them. He requested Lawton’s transfer as well and on
January 1, 1871, Lawton became Mackenzie’s regimental quartermaster.
It was with the 4th Cavalry that Lawton would develop a
reputation for tenacity and determination, loyalty, and a fondness for his
fellow officers that resulted in some lasting friendships. The new
assignment and the adventures it brought would seal permanently,
Lawton’s decision to return to and remain in military life.

36
“What he thinks, he says. He has a strong sense of justice, but his temper is
terrific and he is not gentle. He requires of subordinates the utmost
endeavor, and gets it. He asks no one to do work that he is not competent
and willing to do himself. Naturally a leader, he goes first, and the more
difficult or desperate the undertaking, the faster he goes.” NY Times 12-
20-1899 quoting an officer who served with Lawton in the southwest.

CHAPTER FIVE

EARLY YEARS IN THE 4TH CAVALRY

The Southwest and Western Army campaigns served as a great

equalizer among officer types. The Indian presented problems for which
there were no book fixes. Traditional military battle order would not
compete well with their hit-and-run, guerrilla style tactics.
The west was a school of hard-knocks and only those soldiers who
adapted to the new environment would have any chance of surviving.
Lawton and his comrades were soon to learn that old conventional theories
most often did not fit the current problems. As time passed, the newer
officers, those without battle experience in the Civil War, would bring
their West Point theories and youthful exuberance to their western
postings. Frequently, rivalries and resentment developed between the
older, seasoned and hardened officers, and the younger West Point officers
with no battle experience but plenty of textbook answers.
Lawton would serve ably as post quartermaster for the 4th Cavalry
and as its regimental quartermaster in field campaigns. For one who had
been at the head of troops in over twenty major Civil War engagements,
the duties would not be glamorous. They would, however, be a test of his
willingness to serve in a support role rather than one of command. He also
served in various other positions as requested by Mackenzie as he was
flexible and able to adapt quickly to changing environments without
complaint. At least there is no record of his having resisted any of the
assignments he was given.
Serving under Mackenzie in itself would not be an easy task.
Ranald S. Mackenzie had graduated first in his class from West Point in

37
1862. 34 He had an exceptionally fine record during the Civil War and was
highly regarded by Grant. He was a perfectionist, quick tempered, and
demanding. He was the type of person who would not tolerate having to
tell his subordinates more than once what his wishes were. When he
issued an order or made a request it was understood that full compliance,
on Mackenzie’s timetable, was expected. The other difficulties imposed on
Lawton in his new position were manifestations of the cutback in
appropriations for military spending and reductions in the Army in
general. There were many in the general public who did not want, nor did
they appreciate the Army. Only when there was a pressing police matter
did the press and public scream for fast action by the Army.
Line units such as Quartermaster were hindered in getting supplies
in the quantities needed or on time to meet the demands of field
campaigns. Lawton would have his abilities tested regularly in coping
with the shortage problems as well as meeting Mackenzie’s demands. He
would also use the quartermaster position to learn the fundamentals of
supply and logistics extremely well.
During the next eight years, he was found to be practical, quick,
and willing to get his hands dirty. One trait that consistently appears in
describing Lawton is that he had an iron determination and did not quit.
Another and perhaps more important trait is that he maintained presence of
mind under extreme pressure. He might get temperamental or short with
others, but he never lost his focus in doing the right things. His ability to
roll up his sleeves as an officer may have cost him some points with some
of the newer cerebral type officers, as well as with some of his peers and
seniors who tended to be text book soldiers, as well. However, his
superiors always rated Lawton high and held him in high esteem. In 1871,
Lawton would put his skills to work in an entirely new environment.
In June of 1871, most of the 4th Cavalry was being pulled together
from its various posts to form a large unit of operation. It was at this time
that Henry Lawton became known to men and officers of the 4th.
Lieutenant Robert G. Carter, adjutant to Colonel Mackenzie, recalled his
first meeting with Lawton soon after his transfer to the 4th Cavalry when
he joined with Troop ‘C’ of the 4th in January, 1871.

34
Robinson, Charles M., III-Bad Hand-p. 13
38
 Troop C marched up to Fort Richardson, Texas from Laredo along
the Rio Grande on June 29, 1871. 35 Carter and Lawton became close
friends and remained so years after each had moved on in their careers.
Even after Lawton rose in rank and served in areas away from Carter, the
two corresponded and confided in each other. Carter was one of several
military associates of Lawton who promoted Lawton’s cause particularly
when Lawton would not speak for himself.
It was during the assembly of several companies of the 4th in June
1871, that First Lieutenant Lawton became known to the other officers.
He was 6 feet 4 inches tall in his stocking feet with dark brown, almost
black, bushy, wiry hair, brushed up and stiffly back. His eyes were dark
brown, and he had an immensely long mustache. In his dress he was
unpretentious, wearing clothes that were practical for duty at hand rather
than sending the message he was an officer.
He impressed his new acquaintances as being restless, quick
spoken, energetic in his movements, and full of life and fire. Carter uses
another description, that of being; “a live wire, and as hard as nails.” The
other officers and men meeting Lawton for the first time would feel that at
first he was somewhat stiff and distant. Lawton would prove to be
genuinely friendly but a shyness in his personality gave the impression he
was aloof. First impressions aside, Lawton gradually developed many
friendships among his fellow officers and took to his tasks in earnest. 36 It
was Carter, after Lawton’s death in 1899, who compiled a record of their
friendship and kept clippings of Lawton’s accomplishments in a special
album. That album is now in the Graff collection at the Newberry Library
in Chicago, Illinois. It seems, according to Carter, Lawton drew the envy
of some of his fellow officers, particularly the academic West Point types.
Lawton was not a book-person but instead was a no-nonsense, down to
earth person, and had little, if any, tolerance for bureaucracy. He had a
short fuse with people who insisted on dabbling in abstracts when the
situation required quick and competent decisions.
Lawton and his new acquaintances now faced a new kind of
situation that had been developing in the months prior to June and
precipitated the assembly of the 4th Cavalry.

35
Carter, Robert G.-On The Border-p. 106
36
Ibid.
39
 In May of 1871, General Sherman visited Mackenzie’s 4th
Cavalry at Ft. Richardson to get a first hand look at the frontier situation.
He was escorted by Lieutenant Robert G. Carter.37 Sherman received an
earful from the settlers, who were represented by a delegation from
Jacksboro.
The Kiowa’s and Comanche’s had been leaving the Ft. Sill
reservation and raiding local ranches and supply trains. The settlers were
most concerned that the Indians were being fed and supplied by the
government and were being equipped with breech loading rifles. Of
course, the settlers did not give the Indian side of the argument, that they
were under fed, and that the Buffalo they hunted were being killed off in
large quantities by White hunters for nothing but sport.
Sherman, when hearing the accusations against the Indians,
appeared to be incredulous, casting some doubt on the pleadings of the
settlers. 38 At some point, when everyone felt that Sherman would not
respond to the requests for military assistance, a wounded man, Thomas
Brazeale, came into the post hospital with the story of the Salt Creek
prairie massacre that occurred on May 18, 1871.
General Sherman visited Brazeale the morning after he came into
the hospital, and listened to his story. He appeared as skeptical as when he
had heard the settlers’ story. 39 Brazeale and two other men, R. A. Day,
and Charles Brady, had escaped the slaughter of the mule team party on
Henry Warren’s corn wagon train, ten wagons in all. The wagon train had
been intercepted by a large party of Indians about four miles from where
Lieutenant Carter had first met General Sherman and his party.
The report of Brazeale got Sherman’s attention and he ordered
General Mackenzie to send out a force to the massacre site to investigate
the story. If the story was true, Mackenzie was to round up his entire force
and meet Sherman at Ft. Sill.
Later, some understood how close Sherman had been to being the
victim himself of the attack by the Indians. Colonel Mackenzie and
companies A, B, E, and F arrived on the scene of the massacre to find that
Brazeale’s account was not an exaggeration. Hard rain covered the area
and the bodies of the seven men who died were already bloated. The

37
Carter, Robert G.-On The Border - p. 76
38
Ibid., p. 80
39
Ibid., p.80
40
victims had been stripped, scalped, and mutilated. Their bodies resembled
porcupines as they were filled with arrows. After disemboweling the men,
while they were still alive, their attackers had meticulously placed hot
coals on top of their abdomens. The survivors had managed to fight their
way out and later came into Fort Richardson.
Mackenzie moved his troops towards Fort Sill and arrived there on
June 4, 1871. He had sent a dispatch to General Sherman concerning his
findings at Salt Creek. Sherman had arrived at Fort Sill and Santanta’s
Kiowa war party was close behind. Santanta no sooner arrived when he
began to boast of the massacre to the other Indians.
Word reached Indian agent Lawrie Tatum, so when the Indians
came in for rations he asked what they knew of the events in Texas.
Santanta freely admitted to leading the attack. He felt that the agency had
not met many requests such as providing rifles and ammunition needed for
hunting to supplement the agency’s food rations. He complained that
nothing had been done to improve things for his people since his arrest by
General Sheridan in 1868 after General Custer’s fight with Black Kettle on
the False Washita.
Santanta was angry because he had heard about a railroad being
built through Kiowa country, which he would not tolerate. Because of his
many grievances, he had taken one hundred warriors to Texas to teach
them how to fight. Chief Setank, Eagle Heart, Big Tree, Big Bow, and
Fast Bear had also gone along. Santanta related to attacking the mule train
and killing seven men while losing three warriors. He further said that he
did not plan on doing much raiding in the vicinity of Fort Sill but did plan
on more raids in Texas. 40
The other chiefs with Santanta when he made his statement to
Tatum attested to its accuracy. Tatum then requested that Colonel
Grierson, post commander, arrest the Indians and charge them with
murder. Grierson in turn called for the Indians to come into his quarters.
General Sherman had been informed of the proposed meeting between
Grierson, Tatum and the Indians and hedged his bets by having a
contingent of fully armed soldiers concealed behind the area where the
meeting was to be held.
The soldiers hid behind shuttered windows and had their carbines
aimed at the spots that would be occupied by the Indian chiefs. Santanta,

40
Carter, Robert G.-On The Border -pp. 84-85
41
White Bear, Lone Wolf, Setank, and Big Tree, along with their sub-chiefs
sauntered up on the porch. They were covered with blankets even though
the weather was warm. Both sides, the soldiers, and the Indians, sized
each other up carefully. Horace P. Jones, the post interpreter, read the
murder charges to the Indians. Santanta, acting as group spokesman,
denied the accusations. 41
Sherman ordered all of the Indians to be seized and taken to the
guardhouse and placed in double irons. The Indians immediately threw off
their blankets and raised rifles, or prepared to use bow and arrow. Just as
quickly, Sherman gave the signal to the Buffalo soldiers in hiding. In a
brilliant counter measure, the blinds flew open and twenty cocked
carbines, no more than a few feet away, pointed with dead aim at the
Indians.
Lone Wolf leapt over the rail along with some of the sub-chiefs
and ran towards a number of Indians waiting below. He and Big Bow
were able to ride off. Santanta, Setank, and Big Tree were thrown in the
guardhouse in irons.
On the way back to Texas for trial, Setank managed to escape his
handcuffs and with a concealed knife, attacked one of the soldiers who
dropped his carbine in the scuffle. Setank seized the carbine and aimed at
another trooper but the cartridge jammed. The Kiowa leader was shot and
killed and left by the roadside. 42 Santanta and Big Tree were returned to
Fort Richardson and held for trial at Jacksboro. They were tried on July 5,
and July 6, 1871, found guilty and sentenced to hang September 1, 1871,
People sympathetic with the plight of the Indians argued against
their hanging and eventually, the governor of Texas commuted the
sentence. Santanta and Big Tree were held at Fort Richardson until about
November 1871, transferred to Huntsville prison but were subsequently
released in September 1872.
As a result of the massacre, General Sheridan ordered all Kiowa’s,
Comanche’s, Arapahos, and Cheyenne onto the reservations. In order to
enforce that order, in mid-1871 Mackenzie began preparations to move
against Kicking Bird, another Kiowa chief and his followers to force them
onto the reservation at Ft. Sill. Two factions developed among the Kiowa’s

41
Carter, Robert G.-On The Border -p. 86; Utley, Robert M.-
Frontier Regulars-p. 210
42
Josephy, Alvin M., Jr.-500 Nations
42
after Santanta’s confinement in prison. One, a peaceful group, was led by
Kicking Bird. The other, warlike, was under Lone Wolf. Lone Wolf’s
group began raids along the Texas frontier often operating from Ft. Sill. 43
Before Kicking Bird resolved to be peaceful, he and his followers roamed
outside the Ft. Sill reservation. Mackenzie, after grouping his forces in
June of 1871, planned to force Kicking Bird back on to the reservation.
The chase was difficult as Kicking Bird was elusive and his movements
hard to follow.
General Sherman had given Colonel Grierson full authority on the
reservation and Mackenzie full authority for the State of Texas. It is
believed that Kicking Bird was warned by Colonel Grierson from Ft. Sill
of Mackenzie’s effort to corner him. Kicking Bird eventually moved back
to the safety of the reservation, where, Mackenzie, restricted by his orders
was not allowed to enter.
With Kicking Bird safely under Grierson’s supervision
Mackenzie’s forces now focused on Lone Wolf. Comanche’s led by the
half breed Quanah Parker often joined the Kiowa’s in the frontier raids,
and Mackenzie’s soldiers had a number of skirmishes in late 1871 with
Parker’s warriors. On September 19, 1871 Mackenzie launched his fall
campaign. The troops marshaled at an old camp near Fort Griffin, Texas.
On September 25th, eight troops of the 4th Cavalry, two companies of the
11th Infantry, along with about twenty Indian scouts were camped,
awaiting Mackenzie’s arrival. 44
A short distance away at Murphy’s ranch, a large raiding band of
Indians rustled a herd of cattle plus some ponies. The ranchers joined the
troops at camp, insisting that Captain Wirt Davis mount troops and give
chase to the Indians. Davis was not going to leave camp against the orders
of Mackenzie that only frustrated the ranchers more. 45
On October 3rd the command, consisting of some six hundred
men, scouts, and pack train departed their campsite. The scouts under
Lieutenant P.M. Boehm moved ahead of the troops looking for signs of
trails.
Since this was Henry Lawton’s first major action as regimental
quartermaster in the field under Mackenzie, other officers frequently came

43
Utley, Robert M.-Frontier Regulars-p. 211
44
Carter, Robert G.-On The Border-p. 158
45
Ibid.
43
to the rear to assist him in getting his pack trains over difficult terrain and
through streams. Mackenzie soon learned to respect Lawton’s ability and
often commented on his confidence in Lawton and other officers who had
Civil War experience under their belts. Lawton maintained the necessary
pace, and Mackenzie was satisfied that he had selected the right man for
the job.
Sometime during his service in the west, Lawton was given a
name by the Indians, ‘Man Who Gets Up In The Night To Fight.’ 46 Night
fighting, for the most part, was an unconventional military method up until
the twentieth century.
No doubt, Lawton acquired a taste for night fighting under
Mackenzie who frequently had his scouts out searching for hostile camps
so that he could initiate a night attack. Of course the Comanche’s were
unconventional as well, and there were lessons to be learned from their
night attacks.
In September, near Duck Creek, the troops discovered caves used
as trading stations between Mexicans and the marauding Indians. From
near this point it was decided to have the reluctant scouts search at night
for signs of the Comanche’s. Lawton was placed in charge of supplies and
two infantry companies were detailed to provide protection. A small
detachment under Lieutenant R.G. Carter was sent out to try and locate the
scouts. 47
Mackenzie himself struck out with a large part of the command,
without waiting for the scouts to report back. He hoped to locate and
surprise the Comanche’s while they were sleeping. The night march
produced no results other than troops halting in line on trails, not risking
moving off in the dark for fear of falling into a ravine, or meeting some
other disaster in the dark. 48 After a fruitless search the command
consolidated again the next morning at the Freshwater Fork of the Brazos
River. A preliminary check of the area indicated that Indians had recently
camped nearby.
Captain E. M. Heyl took a squadron out on reconnaissance in the
early afternoon. Somewhat later the scouts who had not yet rejoined the
force came into camp. Having spotted a few Comanche’s not too far away

46
Carter Papers-Newberry Library
47
Carter, Robert G.-On The Border-p. 161
48
Ibid., p. 162
44
they also reported that they had come across what they believed to be
Quanah Parker’s trail. 49
Mackenzie mounted his troops and moved out to pick up the trail.
Captain Heyl’s squadron was called in and that evening the troops camped
in what probably was not an ideal location, but it was the only one at hand.
Near midnight the camp was attacked by a war party. The Indians first
goal was to stampede the horses, which would have stranded the entire
command.
In the darkness, amidst great confusion, the men used lariats or
anything they could get their hands on to prevent the loss of their mounts.
Once the confusion subsided and the troops were able, the horses were
gathered and placed under heavy guard. The command, mostly G and K
troops, lost around seventy horses. 50 The next day, in its hurry to recapture
some of the horses, troops under Captain Heyl and Lieutenant W. C.
Hemphill, accompanied by Lieutenant Carter, gave chase to a number of
Comanche’s seen in the distance with cavalry mounts. About two miles
from the main camp, the troopers rode into a large body of Comanche’s.
Retreating and firing on the run, the small group of soldiers attempted to
fend off the warriors.
Unfortunately, Captain Heyl and Lieutenant Hemphill and their
troops decided to make a break for it leaving Carter and only a small group
of men to face the charge, led by Quanah Parker himself. 51 What saved
that small group was the charge by Lieutenant Boehm and his Indian
scouts that discouraged the Comanche attack and sent them into a
withdrawal. Boehm also turned Heyl and Hemphill’s troops around, back
into an offensive posture, which added to his number of attackers.
The cavalry gave chase for a time but the Comanche’s eluded
further direct contact and were able to make good their escape. Mackenzie
decided to continue pursuit of the Comanche’s although he sent the
dismounted troops back to base camp. By early October the weather would
begin to work against the fall campaign, but Mackenzie persisted. The
troops sighted the moving camp of the Comanche’s. As the gap closed
between the two forces, Mackenzie, for some reason, became conservative
and did not decide to attack.

49
Carter, Robert G.-On The Border p. 163
50
Ibid., p. 167; Robinson, Charles M., III-Bad Hand- p. 99
51
Carter, Robert G.-On The Border-p. 169
45
 The weather was foul, and it was becoming dark, and both those
factors plus the fact the command was a distance from its supplies might
have convinced Mackenzie that the potential for loss was high. The
command dismounted as a storm struck and vision was obscured. The
Indians sent back several scouts to determine what the troopers were up to
and there was a momentary exchange of gunfire before contact was broken
off.
Mackenzie realized that he had quite a distance to travel in bad
weather to get to the nearest post, Fort Sumner in New Mexico. He turned
his command around and began his trek back to winter camp. A few of the
Comanche pursued and in a brief firefight Mackenzie was struck in the leg
by an arrow. 52
Now wounded, and with his men suffering from the elements and
facing a long march, Mackenzie sent orders to Lawton at Duck Creek,
some distance in the rear, to move his train to intercept the command at
Fresh Fork.

Lieutenant Henry W. Lawton-National Archives

Lawton had the challenge of proving to Mackenzie, no doubt in an

ugly mood, that he had made the right decision in putting him in the

52
Robinson, Charles M., III-Bad Hand-p. 106
46
Quartermaster position. The weather was no different at Lawton’s
position, and if he was to hook up he would need to make a night march to
meet the General the next morning. One hundred infantrymen had been
assigned to Lawton for escort duty. His route was difficult as it ran across
several bad creeks and sandy terrain.
As Lawton’s wagon train moved ahead near daybreak the next day
he faced a major obstacle. He had reached a sheer and treacherous bluff
over which he had to move the supply train in order to arrive at
Mackenzie’s designated meeting place on time. He later told Carter that
he knew he had to make good. One of the infantry officers approached
him suggesting that Lawton double up the mule teams in order to get the
wagons across.
Without hesitation, and with his usual disdain for much
discussion, Lawton brushed the Lieutenant aside and informed him that he
knew the rule, but in this instance, doubling up all the mules he had
wouldn’t even get an empty train across. In fact, they would not be able to
pull off the Lieutenant’s hat given the grade and lack of footing. Lawton
apparently cussed which was his habit in these situations.
He did not hesitate and his orders were quick and emphatic to the
wagon master. Lawton ordered that all of the mules be unhitched from the
wagons and directed the infantry lieutenant to position his men in such a
way so that with the ropes they were able to snake the wagons over the
bluff. They used a leverage system, each wagon in its turn, and Lawton’s
entire train was moved over in time to meet Mackenzie on schedule. 53
Lawton’s ability to think on his feet and meet the difficult
demands of providing support to the command was becoming apparent.
What was also becoming clear was a degree of impatience with ‘schooled’
officers, particularly younger ones, who offered advice. Lawton’s
demeanor was such that if one took the brusque, grouchy appearance at
face value and never tried to get under the veneer, Lawton would be a
difficult person to get along with. Fortunately, a majority of the officers
and enlisted men saw through the outer crust and grew to know and
appreciate the person underneath the outward appearances.
Towards the end of 1871, Mackenzie’s troops worked their way
back to Fort Richardson. Heavy snow began to plague the soldiers and
animals with as much as five inches falling around November 2nd when

53
Carter, Robert G.-On The Border-p. 108-109
47
Major Mauck’s command rejoined. Both men and horses were hungry,
wet, and tired. Lawton also experienced a difficult time getting his supply
train with corn through the bad weather, arriving on November 8th.
Back at Fort Richardson, Colonel Mackenzie had the task of
regrouping and refitting his unit. Morale was very low following the 1871
campaign. The desertion rate among the enlisted ranks had reached a
critical level of close to thirty-two percent. Mackenzie’s command was no
exception even though the 4th Cavalry was regarded as one of the army’s
best regiments.
Adding to the miseries of life was the government’s act to reduce
pay thus further reducing a soldier’s incentive to live out his enlistment
agreement. There continued to be low public and political support for the
Army, most units were under manned, supplies were short, and pay was
bad. Among the enlisted ranks there was the least amount of incentive to
display any form of enthusiasm for what they had to do.
The problem produced, in a strange way, a diversion of sorts for
Lawton and his fellow officer, Lieutenant Carter. Mackenzie, infuriated at
the desertion of ten of his troops, selected Carter and Lawton to go after
them. 54
Orders were cut November 29, 1871 providing funds for both
officers for travel and expenses. Mackenzie personally directed the efforts
of the two officers with explicit orders for their conduct of operation while
pursuing the deserters. Both Lawton and Carter were to travel in civilian
garb and take along enlisted personnel as aides. Carter and Lawton were
given instructions to travel in different directions and to take whatever
means legal within the framework of civilian law to bring the men in. In
his usual way Mackenzie demanded results and expected them. 55
While the assignment might have seemed to be a welcome
diversion from what they had been through, Lawton no doubt had
questions about being a detective when his interest lay in soldiering. By
the time this adventure was over, Lawton probably decided that a civilian
profession in law enforcement was not his forte. While Carter brought
back ten deserters, Lawton’s travels produced nothing more than
frustration. He had traveled into the Indian Nation, which later became
Oklahoma, and for his troubles one his own men deserted. In the end

54
Carter, Robert G.-On The Border- pp. 219-222
55
Ibid.
48
Mackenzie was both satisfied and amused. 56 He decided Carter was the
better of the two for tracking deserters and sent him out to retrieve
Lawton’s lost soul. Lawton for his part quietly accepted the minor failure
in good spirits.

56
Carter, Robert G.-On The Border- p. 245
49
“ A giant in stature, tireless, fearless, and a veritable demon when aroused
to action, he was a perfect type of the hero that in every age and country
has commanded the worship of his followers.” NY Times, 12-20-1899 on
Lawton’s death.

CHAPTER SIX

THE SOUTHERN PLAINS

Army life, while dismal for the most part, had its lighter moments.
One such time came during the interlude between the 1871 and 1872
campaigns. As quartermaster, Lawton had an older Scottish clerk named
Masterton. He had found a bride and was to be married to a young woman
from Jacksboro, Texas. The weather had turned bitterly cold, but the
wedding was held in frontier style and many of the men and officers were
invited. Lawton and his fellow officers were given to some hard drinking
when duty allowed, so the opportunity to share the spirits could not be
passed up. With the exception of the sick and disabled, the troopers went
into town and joined the festivities in a local home. The house was sealed
up against the weather and heated to an extremely hot temperature by
'airtight' stoves. 57
Masterton and his bride had prepared a large feast with most of the
food and liquor shipped in from Galveston or San Antonio. It was
probably the best meal the soldiers had enjoyed in months. Included were
smoked buffalo tongue, quail, wild turkey, and roast pig. For those who
had found a companion, couples were called to the meal. When
Mackenzie, a bachelor, and his lady partner were called to the table and
moved at a pace slower than what the other guests wished, a younger
officer gave him a slap on the back to hurry him along. 58
Given Mackenzie’s aversion to the use of alcohol, it probably took
a great deal of tolerance on his part to ignore the state in which he found

57
Carter, Robert G.-On The Border With Mackenzie- p. 340-341
58
Ibid.
50
his officers that evening. 59 Later, attempting to return to barracks, the
officers and men found themselves stumbling across a creek, and then
trying to get into warm nightclothes.
The opportunity to eat and drink heartily did not occur often, so
both officers and men alike would avail themselves of the chance
whenever possible. Of course the enlisted men, with their rock bottom
pay, could not afford to drink finer alcohol often and the Army had a
surplus of home made stills working with regularity. On other occasions,
the men would entertain themselves by arranging an impromptu dance. An
orderly would be sent out from headquarters to announce to the men and
officers the location and time of the dance.
One barrack would be selected and cleared out. Often there were
musicians among the men who would ‘voluntarily’ make up a small band
or orchestra to provide the music. Officers on duty were not invited for
obvious reasons. The women on post were obliged to bring the food, and
their creativity with what food was available, was admirable. When
possible, the meals were supplied with fresh meat brought in by hunting
expeditions.
In the case of Mackenzie’s post, a regimental band was formed
and provided the evening’s entertainment. The men were not particular as
to what the ladies wore to the event, but their presence was essential as it
created a little sense of home and brought warmth to the occasion. In their
desperation for entertainment, the men attempted to form small theatrical
groups but the results were generally disastrous. These efforts to hold
morale up in the face of severe duty conditions helped, but the inevitable
campaign would interrupt any merry making soon enough.
In 1872, activity in Texas intensified. Kiowa - Comanche raids on
settlers along the entire frontier showed no signs of let up. In fact, the
Cheyenne and Arapaho warriors would join in, and the Army had its hands
full for the next few years. One of the major problems was the rapid
killing of the buffalo because of a demand for their hides.
Sheridan also saw the decimation of buffalo herds as an expedient
for getting the Indians back on the reservations simply because their food
supply was being destroyed. None of the Indians took this factor lightly

59
Robinson, Charles M., III-Bad Hand -Robinson accurately
portrays Mackenzie’s abstention from alcohol.
51
and can hardly be blamed for their response to what they saw as a
senseless waste of food.
In addition to the Kiowa - Comanche raids, the Army directed its
attention to the Mexican bandits known as Comancheros who traded rifles
and whiskey with the Indians for goods they had plundered in their raids.
In addition, Mexican marauders crossed the Rio Grande to add to the
apprehension of the frontier settlers.
Mackenzie reopened his Texas campaign on June 14, 1872,
moving out of Ft. Richardson to the Freshwater Fork of the Brazos, where
the main supply camp was located. Lt. Colonel William R. Shafter brought
another command into the area and he and Mackenzie spent the summer
months criss crossing the plains. 60
Mackenzie led his troops as far as Fort Sumner and Fort Bascom,
New Mexico. Troops A, D, F, and L, of the 4th Cavalry were accompanied
by Company I, of the 24th Infantry. Two acting assistant surgeons were
attached to the command so in total, there were 272 enlisted men and 12
officers. 61
It was in September that Mackenzie’s efforts paid off. On the
29th, Tonkawa scouts under Lieutenant P. M. Boehm picked up the trail of
Indians near McClellan Creek. The scouts lost the trail but some detective
work by F Troop’s Captain Wirt Davis soon got the command on track.
Davis observed grape vines growing along the creek and under
closer scrutiny detected the tracks of a pack train. The Indians were
known to be fond of wild grapes. He remounted and soon picked up the
trail again about mid-afternoon. The grapes falling from the pack animals
were easy to follow and a short time later, Davis located the main camp. It
turned out to be Mow way’s Kotsoteka Comanche village of about 260
lodges. 62
Grouping his forces, Mackenzie waited until early evening when
the Comanche’s were asleep. Confident that they were hidden Indians
rarely posted sentries, so the attack on the encampment was a total
surprise. Mackenzie sent in F troop, supported by A and I troops; D troop
was used to chase down and round up the Indian ponies. The attack turned

60
Utley, Robert M.-Frontier Regulars-p. 211; Carter-On The
Border-p. 376
61
Ibid., Carter
62
Ibid., p. 377
52
into a rout and the village was captured after a brief fight of less than an
hour.
Approximately 50 Indians were killed, 130 women and children
captured, and 800 ponies taken. Troopers were sent after those who
escaped but were unable to cut them off, although several were killed or
wounded by fire from the pursuing troops. Meat stores for the coming
winter were destroyed along with the lodges and other supplies. The
ponies were placed under the care of Lieutenant Boehm and his scouts. 63
Later in the evening, though, the Comanche’s returned and
recaptured the majority of their horses. Mackenzie was upset at this and
while Lawton did not know it at the time, the event would cause him to
acquire a very unpleasant task two years later. Mackenzie did not
appreciate the loss of the horses since not having them would have
crippled this particular group of Comanche’s.
Lawton’s friend, Lieutenant Carter, did not get to participate in the
raid on Mow-Way’s village. He had been detailed in early September to
go to Dallas and receive Santanta and Big Tree from federal marshals.
The government was attempting to settle things down at Fort Sill and the
surrounding area with the promise of freeing the two in 1873. 64
They were brought to Fort Sill as part of a large meeting and then
returned to Huntsville for confinement. The captured Comanche’s were
held at Fort Concho until June 1873 when they were released. Santanta
and Big Tree were released shortly after, in October 1873, in keeping with
the promise made by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to achieve peace
in the area. The release of Santanta and Big Tree was not received well by
General Sherman who felt the consequences would be dire. However the
promise of their release in 1872 served to put a lid on things over the
winter months and there was a short period of calm. During winter
quarters at Fort Richardson Henry Lawton had the opportunity to gain
some experience in a position other than quartermaster, although
Mackenzie wanted him in that slot for a time to come. His campaigns
depended on Lawton’s skills.
On December 11, 1872, Lawton was assigned to the job of Post
Adjutant, replacing his friend Lieutenant Robert G. Carter, who was

63
Carter, Robert G.-On The Border With Mackenzie- p. 378
64
Utley, Robert M.-Frontier Regulars-p. 212
53
assigned to head a troop requiring discipline. He had a short period of time
to rest, but with his cohorts would soon be on the move again. 65
On March 1, 1873, rumors circulated concerning the possibility of
the command moving to Fort Concho. Soon orders were received
concerning a move to Fort Clark, Texas, and Mackenzie began his
preparations. Behind these orders was the pressure from settlers for the
Army to retaliate against marauders who moved freely across the Mexican
- U. S. border. Kickapoo, Lipan, and Mescalaro Indians had, for some
time, been raiding on the U. S. side and then returning to their sanctuaries
in Mexico. No treaty existed with Mexico that allowed for hot pursuit by
the Army or civilian officials.
The matter had gone as far up the line as President Grant and was
getting attention from Secretary of War, W. Belknap, as well as General
Sheridan. Any military operation, though, would be of a clandestine
nature, and senior officials did their best to keep a lid on information.
The Army had actually begun getting requests from the ranchers
and settlers in Texas for assistance as early as 1871. The raiding Indians
had killed hundreds, and claims were piling up before a joint commission
in Eagle Pass, Texas, amounting to millions of dollars.
In February of 1873, General C.C. Auger, commanding the
Department of Texas, received a letter from General Sherman stating that
President Grant wanted great attention given to the raids of the Mexicans
and Indians upon the people and property of southwest Texas. Sherman
also ordered that the 4th Cavalry be moved so as to be in a position to
respond to the raids. 66
On April 12, 1873, Mackenzie, Lt. Colonel Wesley Merritt,
Belknap, and Sheridan held a meeting specifically to discuss the Indian
incursions across the border and what could be done to stop them. After
that meeting, Belknap and Sheridan traveled on to San Antonio to confer
with General Auger. 67
Sheridan had advised Mackenzie that he had moved the 4th to
replace Merritt and the 9th Cavalry, as he felt Mackenzie could get
something done to halt the incursions. The 4th moved to Fort Clark as a

65
Carter-On The Border-p. 394
66
Thompson, Richard A.-Crossing The Border With The 4th
Cavalry
67
Carter-On The Border-p. 417
54
marshaling point, and from there units moved to the Mexican border.
Sherman issued orders to Auger to fill in at Fort Clark with units from the
7th Cavalry. 68
While on the march from Richardson to Fort Chadburne at an
interim stopover, Lieutenant Carter assisted with quartermaster duties.
Much of the supply train was ragtag, made up of any piece of moving
equipment the troopers could find. Lawton managed the movement of the
water train, and the officers and men would refer to him as the ‘prince of
quartermasters,’ or the ‘indefatigable quartermaster,’ whenever he would
show up with relief supplies. 69
On one occasion, his wagons were overloaded by the troops and
while descending a hill near the Colorado River, the weight caused a
wheel to break causing a delay in crossing. Crossing the North Concho
River the supply train encountered a fierce storm, and Carter had to prove
his worth as temporary quartermaster while Mackenzie and Lawton
watched from the other side. Everything proceeded with some difficulty,
but without any tragedies.
By early April, Mackenzie’s forces reached Fort Clark where they
would remain until his night raid into Mexico. It was during this time that
a humorous event took place involving Lawton and Mackenzie. Lawton
was well liked by his fellow officers and was known to be shy and quiet.
His common sense, extraordinary energy, and enterprising skills made him
a favorite of the regiment. However, on those occasions that permitted, he
would take a few drinks too many, and was inclined to lose his inhibitions
and would talk about anything that was in his head. For that reason,
Mackenzie was careful about talking to Lawton about anything that needed
to be kept secret.
The raid into Mexico was just such a situation. The 1873 raid
authorized by President Grant was regarded as a punitive one to let the
Indians know that they could be found and punished. It did not have the
sanction of Mexico and there were plenty of government officials who
would have decried it as illegal. 70

68
Utley, Robert M.-Frontier Regulars-p. 346
69
Carter-On The Border-p. 121
70
Thompson, Richard A.-Crossing The Border With The 4th
Cavalry
55
 Secrecy was of utmost importance. Mackenzie had no written
orders, only assurances from General Sheridan that if anything went wrong
Sheridan and Grant would ‘back him.’ He was to keep information about
the raid to as few people as necessary.
Lieutenant Carter, Mackenzie’s adjutant for the operation, was
filled in and told to keep the information to himself. He was told
specifically not to let Lawton in on the secret. While Lawton was one of
Mackenzie’s favorite officers and well suited to meet the demands of his
temperament, there was to be no risk of Lawton becoming talkative after a
few drinks with the officers.
Lawton, as regimental quartermaster, knew something was up
simply by virtue of the massive movement to Ft. Clark. Moreover, he was
being ordered to have a supply train on the U. S. - Mexican border at a
certain time, on a certain date, but he was not told why.
Lawton pressed Mackenzie for more information, and the more
Mackenzie kept his silence, the more Lawton asked questions. It reached a
point where, according to Lieutenant Carter, Lawton implied that he could
find out from Carter, and if not from him, from Carter’s wife.
This was because the Carters told Lawton everything. This led to a
confrontation between Mackenzie and Carter one evening when
Mackenzie asked Carter if he had leaked any information to Lawton.
When Carter responded that he had not, Mackenzie became insistent,
saying that Lawton was aware that Carter knew what was going on and
would continue to try and find out from Carter or his wife where the
expedition was headed. Mackenzie finally accepted Carter’s word on the
matter. Lawton, for his part, dutifully prepared supplies and equipment for
an operation making preparations in detail to “go-where he knew not.” 71
Preparations continued to around May 15, 1873. Mackenzie
employed several tactics to keep his officers and men in the dark about the
operation such as dispersing the horses and moving them around. Target
ranges were improved, men were drilled and their shooting skills honed.
The troops and companies went through battle drills and formations
exercises. The best effort to disguise all these activities was undertaken
because of the added concern for Mexican spies in the Bracketville area,
near the post.

71
Carter-On The Border-p. 426-427
56
 Lawton was not the only one who was kept in the dark. Aside
from General Auger, and perhaps Sheridan, no one knew where
Mackenzie planned to strike or when. The other officers including some of
the older ones began to grumble that all the work and preparation for a
simple field expedition was senseless. They, like Lawton, began to get
persistent in their questioning and Lawton began to emphasize that he
“ought to know.”
On May 17, 1873, at about 2 p.m., Mackenzie’s strike force,
comprised of some 400 men, cavalry troops, infantry companies, and
Seminole scouts, proceeded from their marshaling area towards the Rio
Grande. The venture was a covert operation by armed regulars without
sanction of treaty, thus placing it in the category of an invasion of Mexico.
At this late hour, Mackenzie briefed his men on the mission and its risks,
which included the possibility of death by hanging or firing squad if
caught on the Mexican side.
He did not, however, inform the men that he was acting at the
‘urging’ of General Sheridan and without official orders. There was an
implicit belief on the part of his officers that Mackenzie was acting with
approval from the War Department.
The troops had already marched twenty miles under a hot sun and
were beginning to tire, though their mission had not yet really begun.
Reaching the Rio Grande a little after 8 p.m., the American forces were
able to cross under cover of darkness.
Riding under moonlight the troopers’ presence may have startled a
few local ranchers but no alarms were given. For the sake of speed several
officers suggested cutting the food packs loose from the supply mules.
Mackenzie gave the order to do so, and most of the rations were jettisoned.
Mackenzie allowed five minutes for that action to take place. He had
hoped to reach his objective by daybreak; however, delays set his
timetable back two hours. 72
About thirty-three miles had been traversed by daybreak and it
took another two hours to reach the valley of the San Rodrigo River.
Mackenzie had selected this area because of information brought back on
May 16 by three scouts that he had sent into Mexico. They had located
three villages in the area where Mackenzie now stood poised, each
numbering about fifty lodges. One village was Kickapoo, another Lipan,

72
Carter, Robert G.-On The Border- p. 436
57
and the third was Mescalero. The Kickapoo warriors had left their village
the morning of May 16. This village was near Remolino.
Slightly after 8 a.m. on the 18th, Mackenzie’s troopers struck the
Kickapoo village. Even at that hour, most the inhabitants were still
sleeping. The soldiers rushed through the village firing as they ran, and
those to the rear fired the lodges. The remaining inhabitants, without their
younger men to defend them, fought as best as possible but to no avail.
Mackenzie’s raiders attacked and destroyed the other two villages, then
turned back towards the U. S. border.
The raid itself was a deliberate attack on women and children with
the intent of terrorizing the tribes into ceasing their raids into the U. S.
While history would later view the attack as shameful, it had the desired
effect. Shortly after the raid the Kickapoo’s began negotiating for a
peaceful return to the U. S.
Other Indian attacks slowed as well and Texas enjoyed a
reasonably peaceful period for the next three years. The Mexican
government itself began taking steps to better protect the border from
crossings by raiders. 73
The men, worn out by the time they reached the Rio Grande,
crossed to the other side without major incident. Shortly after, the tireless
and in-the-dark Lawton arrived, by previous arrangement, with the
supplies of food and forage. Local grateful ranchers brought Mescal, a
Mexican drink, to share with the men and officers. On this occasion,
Mackenzie ordered that it be poured out and not consumed. 74
After Remolino, Lawton’s role took on a more civic nature during
the summer of 1873. The town of Bracketville, near Fort Clark, was a
ramshackle collection of old and deteriorating buildings. He spent the
summer months reconstructing and improving many of the structures. His
peaceful activities were to be short-lived though, as another storm
approached that would consume the attention of the 4th cavalry late in
1873, and into 1874. Conditions for the Kiowa’s and Comanche’s
continued to worsen as White hunters depleted the buffalo herds. Rations,
if and when the Indians received them, were meager and inadequate.
Santanta and Big Tree left the reservation again and were on the loose and
the raids began to increase in late 1873. The warriors used the reservation

73
Utley, Robert M.-Frontier Regulars-p. 349
74
Carter-On The Border-p. 456
58
at Ft. Sill as a base to which they could return without fear of retaliation by
the Army.
In December Lone Wolf’s son was among a party of Indians that
engaged in a fight with members of the 4th Cavalry near Fort Clark. He
was killed by Lieutenant C. L. Hudson, as was a nephew of Lone Wolf.
The deaths turned Lone Wolf against any thoughts of peace and he along
with the other war leaders intensified their raids and vengeful activities. 75
The Cheyenne’s too, were being hard-pressed by circumstances to
choose any path but a peaceful one. White men routinely stole their
horses, whiskey traders kept them supplied with alcohol, and their hunting
successes were few. They began to join with the Kiowa and Comanche
raids. 76
In the spring of 1874 matters rapidly heated up on the Texas
Plains. In late June, around seven hundred Comanche’s and Cheyenne’s
attacked a small village at Adobe Walls. Isati, a Comanche medicine man,
led the attack, which was beaten off by buffalo hunters with high-powered
rifles. Quanah Parker was a key leader of the attacking Indian force. 77
Failure to destroy the settlement at Adobe Walls did little to
soothe the emotions of the Indians. Infuriated by their losses they
rampaged throughout the territory. General Sherman, realizing the
magnitude of his problem in Texas, received permission from the
Department of the Interior, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and the
Secretary of War to take action against the combined tribes. He wired
General Sheridan to unleash the Army troops and in so doing, effectively
declared that a state of war existed. It would be called the Red River War.
78

The Kiowa’s, led by Lone Wolf, were joined by Southern

Cheyenne’s, Arapahos, and Comanche’s and moved off their reservations
and into at least five wintering camps in the Texas Panhandle.
Two department commanders, Generals Pope and Auger headed
the major campaign of the Army. Several Army columns were to search
out and destroy, or capture the Indians now raiding in Texas. Under

75
Carter-On The Border-p. 392; Utley, Robert M.-Frontier
Regulars-p. 213
76
Ibid., Utley
77
Utley, Robert M.-Frontier Regulars-p. 213
78
Ibid., p. 214
59
Pope’s command, Colonel Nelson A. Miles combined the Fifth Infantry
with eight troops of the Sixth Cavalry at Fort Dodge, Kansas and moved
south along the same route followed by Custer in 1868. Major William R.
Price commanded another column made up of units from the Eighth
Cavalry moving east from their base in New Mexico.
General Auger put three columns in the field. One was
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John W. Davidson of the Tenth
Cavalry moving west from Fort Sill. Another, commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel George P. Buell of the Eleventh Infantry, operated somewhat
north of Mackenzie’s route. 79 Mackenzie was ordered to move his Troops
from Fort Clark to Fort Concho where he formed up his units for the
campaign. Eight Troops of the 4th Cavalry combined with three
companies of the Tenth Infantry and one company of the Eleventh
Infantry. On August 23, 1874, this command moved out from Fort
Concho, was inspected by Generals Auger and Mackenzie, and moved on
to its supply base on the Freshwater Fork of the Brazos. 80
Lawton was regimental quartermaster and in charge of supplying
Mackenzie’s command for this operation. He would prove to be one of the
key factors in keeping Mackenzie in the field during the campaign while
the other columns would have to drop out because of supply and weather
conditions. Some 4,800 Indians were on the move in late August 1874.
This number included over 1,200 warriors. They moved along the Washita
and Red Rivers.
During late August the columns commanded by Miles and Price
marched towards the Indian encampments, suffering from extreme heat
and dry weather. On August 30, 200 Cheyenne’s attacked Miles advance
unit. He deployed his troops and for several hours, fended off and drove
back the attackers who were joined by Comanche’s and Kiowa’s. 81
As the Indians regrouped, Miles’ men continued to push them
back towards the Staked Plains. Miles’ supplies gave out, however,
forcing him to turn his command back in order to re-supply. During this
march the weather turned stormy and the region was rain drenched
complicating the movement of Miles’ soldiers. Worse, he learned that his
supply train was under attack but this siege was lifted by the approach of

79
Utley, Robert M.-Frontier Regulars-p. 220
80
Carter-On The Border-p. 474
81
Utley, Robert M.-Frontier Regulars-p. 223
60
Major Price’s troops in search of their supplies. 82 The encounters between
soldiers and Indians in early September frightened a number of the
warriors back onto reservations. In their number were Santanta and Big
Tree. However, a large group of Kiowa’s and Comanche’s eluded the
soldiers and moved southwest to rejoin the other Indians.
Miles was unable to pursue for lack of supplies and worried that
one of the other commanders would find the hostiles first, and gain the
glory that he had hoped to reap from this campaign. Unknown to Miles,
Davidson had run out of supplies and turned back from his search. Buell
started late and was nowhere near the hostiles.
Mackenzie however, had spent a bit more time than the other
commanders, delaying his departure while he stockpiled resources under
Lawton who had been working diligently to build up supplies.
He was sent to Fort Griffin on September 2nd, a 140-mile march
from the present camp. His assignment was to receive supplies en route
from Army contractors. All of the commands had been affected by a
shortage of food and forage as evidenced by General Auger’s letter of
September 17 to General Sheridan. Auger forwarded reports from
Mackenzie relating his initial difficulties. He may have been fending off
pressure from Sheridan to get Buell’s and Davidson’s columns moving as
Sheridan, a sponsor of Mackenzie might accept Mackenzie’s word
regarding the supply problem. 83
On September 19th Mackenzie met with his subordinate
commanders and gave them their assignments after which the command
moved across Catfish Creek. Early on the morning of September 20 it
began its march to locate the hostiles. The industrious Lawton was
waiting for the command about 15 miles from the point at which it started.
Moving out again on the 21st Mackenzie’s troops ran into foul
weather and heavy rain. The ground turned into a sea of mud, yet Lawton
was able to get the meal train through using twelve mules to pull one
wagon. The balance of the supplies had to be left some distance behind
due to the weather. However Lawton, tenacious as he was, had all of the
supplies in place for Mackenzie the evening of September 23. On
September 24 another storm struck complicating the movement of troops
and supplies. Lawton, using his block and tackle method with men and

82
Utley, Robert M.-Frontier Regulars-p. 224
83
Carter-On The Border-p. 480
61
ropes, moved his supply wagons over slippery and steep grades. The
command moved four miles that day.
In addition to the weather there was evidence of the presence of
hostile Indians in the vicinity. On the morning of September 25
Mackenzie moved out leaving his wagon train fairly mired in the mud. It
would be Lawton’s challenge, with his infantry support, to get the train out
of the mud and moving.
Tonkawa and Seminole scouts under Lieutenant William
Thompson had encountered hostiles, which alerted Mackenzie to a
possible attack. Once before during such a brush with the Indians he had
lost a number of his command’s horses. On this occasion he was prepared,
having had the horses secured in a way that they could not be stampeded.
84

As anticipated, Mackenzie’s camp was attacked the evening of

September 26th, by over two hundred Comanche’s. The first assault came
at about 10:30 p. m., with the usual din of noise from the attacking Indians.
In the dark the officers yelled out their commands and kept the men in a
ready position to defend the camp. In the middle of the ruckus, around
midnight, Lawton showed up with the supply train, having succeeded in
moving it out from the mud where it had been left. Not one to be deterred
by cold or rain, it seems the Comanche’s did not distract him either.
Everything quieted down after 2 a. m., but the Indians began
taking shots at the camp a few hours later. The troopers were quickly able
to drive them off and the command saddled up for the day’s march.
Lawton’s efforts had enabled Mackenzie to now supply his troops with
sufficient rations to last ten days. Mackenzie, armed with information from
his scouts, moved his troopers out towards Palo Duro canyon. It was there
that the Kiowa’s, Comanche’s, and Cheyenne’s had set up their camps and
taken refuge.
The command marched for twelve hours before resting, but were
up at 4 a. m., the next morning and on the move again. In the early
morning hours of September 28 Mackenzie reached Palo Duro Canyon and
after some searching he found trails down into the Indian encampment.
The hostiles had already spotted the troopers and began dispersing their
ponies and alerting the rest of the camp.

84
Carter-On The Border-p. 485
62
 Mackenzie dismounted his cavalry and the men led their horses
down the paths and remounted once at the floor of the canyon. Captain
Eugene B. Beaumont and A Troop reached the bottom first and took up
pursuit of the fleeing Indians. A large number of Indians were able to get
into the rocks and lay down a heavy fire on the pursuing troopers that
caused them to fall back. 85
Mackenzie’s men destroyed the Indian encampment, burning
lodges, food stores and supplies. In the surprise dawn attack the Army had
captured a substantial number of Indian ponies. Lawton, remembering the
last occasion the Indians had recaptured their ponies, assured Mackenzie
that he would be able to corral and guard the horses.
Mackenzie however, had made a different kind of decision, much
to Lawton’s distaste. The herd of ponies, with the exception of those
Mackenzie cut out for Army use, was to be destroyed. Lawton was placed
in charge of this gruesome detail, supervising two infantry units. It took
close to two days to shoot all the horses and their remains rotted for a long
time to come.
The loss of food, horses, and supplies severely crippled the Indian
ability to stay out from the reservations and many were discouraged by
their losses and began returning. The area swarmed with soldiers as
Mackenzie remained in the field for the early part of October moving
around the head of the canyon before quitting for his supply base.
Buell continued his march in early October until a shortage of
supplies forced his return to base. Miles and Price campaigned late in
October and into November with success until winter drove them from the
field. Mackenzie closed this chapter on his campaign shortly before
Christmas, 1874, with the last of his troops returning to post in January
1875.
Mackenzie and the 4th Cavalry were moved to Fort Sill in 1875
where he took command, relieving Colonel Davidson. By late spring all
troops had moved to join the 4th’s headquarters.

85
Carter-On The Border-pp. 488-491
63
 “ Lawton was, in many respects, an ideal soldier; single-minded, devoted
to his duty, and of unqualified courage. He belongs to that class whom the
world designates as the bravest of the brave. When called upon to speak in
public, he answered but with a word. But, somehow, as you heard that
word and looked in his face and saw the man, you felt that if anything was
to be done, he was the man to do it.” Navy Secretary John Long reported
in NY Times December 21, 1899.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE CHEYENNE EPISODE

Lawton enjoyed a brief respite from quartermaster duties in 1875-

76. He was sent to Boston for a short tour of recruiting duty. He and
Lieutenant Carter also had light duty attending graduation ceremonies at
West Point, along with several others officers accompanying General
Sherman. 86
The hard work during the Southern Plains campaign had not
diminished his eagerness for frontier duty however. He returned to
Mackenzie’s command at Fort Robinson, Nebraska, shortly before the
campaign against the Northern Cheyenne’s. Mackenzie reinstated him in
the role of regimental quartermaster within a half-hour of his return. He
and his fellow officers were happy to see each other, but Lawton allowed
little time for celebrating.
He was soon hard at work calculating the amount of forage needed
for the command’s horses for an extended campaign. The large Army
force in the area required large quantities of supplies. Carter records his
impression of Lawton, who on one occasion, was setting up supplies for
General George Crook. Lawton’s wagons and equipment were scattered
about the various troops and companies of Mackenzie’s command when an
order came in for special supplies for General Crook. Lawton rounded up

86
Carter, Robert G.-On The Border With Mackenzie-pp. 106-111
64
all of the wagons, poles, bows, and sheets, assembled the wagons, loaded
them with 61,000 pounds of stores, armed the teamsters, and got the
wagon train off the next morning. 87
He responded quickly and calmly to special situations and had the
ability to see the whole problem to be solved as well as the common sense
to manage the small details. He was not only good at the command
process, but could take apart, repair, or build any component of the wagon
train without difficulty.
His resourcefulness would be tested in the next big Army
campaign in the west. Following Custer’s disastrous last battle at the
Little Bighorn, troops were rushed to the west to reinforce the Army units
there.
Sitting Bull had decided to take his people north to Canada. Crazy
Horse’s people were on the move, evading the Army. In July 1876,
Colonel John Gibbon and General Terry waited on the Yellowstone for
reinforcements and supplies. General Crook, meanwhile, waited in the
Bighorn Mountains for the 5th Cavalry under Colonel Wesley Merritt.
During Crook’s wait, he had ample time for game hunting and fishing
which caught the attention of the eastern press. 88
After a delay of one month, Crook finally headed for the Rosebud
with a force of over 2,000. Many of his critics, among them General
Sherman, already faulted Crook for Custer’s defeat. They were now
impatient for him to move on the hostiles and thought that his delaying
tactics allowed many of the Sioux and Cheyenne’s to slip away.
General Terry had moved to the mouth of the Rosebud and his
reinforcements arrived by steamer. Among them was Colonel Nelson A.
Miles with six companies of the 5th Infantry, and Lieutenant Colonel
Elwell S. Otis, with six companies of the 22nd Infantry.
Crook and Terry met in the Rosebud Valley the early part of
August, somewhat surprised to find each other in the same area. They
combined forces, breaking Miles’ unit off to search on his own. Many of
the men and Indians with the combined commands perceived a great deal
of ineptitude on the part of the two generals. The Shoshones gave up and
returned to their homes. Terry and Crook finally separated their
commands. Crook remained on the Indian trail while Terry moved back to

87
Carter, Robert G.-On The Border With Mackenzie-pp. 106-111
88
Utley, Robert M.-Frontier Regulars-p. 268
65
the Yellowstone. Any further attempt to pick up the trail and make contact
with the main body of Indians by Crook proved essentially fruitless.
Colonel Mackenzie had arrived at Fort Robinson, Nebraska, with
six troops of the 4th Cavalry as part of Crook’s reinforcements. Crook
gave Mackenzie the assignment of locating hostile camps. The forces
assigned to this task numbered about 2,000 men, including 400 Indian
scouts. The scouts included Pawnee, Sioux, Arapaho, Shoshoni, Bannocks,
and some Cheyenne.
Mackenzie had ample supplies to support his operations, with 168
wagons plus 400 pack mules. His operation began in mid-October. His
first action was to enter Red Cloud’s village at the Pine Ridge agency in
the vicinity of Fort Robinson. While the camp was not hostile, Crook was
concerned with the activity of the younger warriors. Soldiers surrounded
the camp in the evening while its inhabitants were asleep. 89 Mackenzie
sent scouts into the camp to announce to the Sioux that they must
surrender, after which time their rifles and ponies were confiscated. Swift
Bear’s camp was neutralized in the same manner.
After these actions at the local villages, Mackenzie’s Big Horn
campaign left Fort Robinson in November, moving north. The soldiers
crossed the North Platte River and moved on to Fort Reno where they
were joined by Shoshoni scouts.
The troops moved to Crazy Woman’s Fork on November 22nd,
and set up their camp. Plans were made to head for Crazy Horse’s camp on
the Rosebud River. A young Cheyenne came into camp and revealed that
the small Cheyenne camp on the Powder River was joining Crazy Horse’s
camp.
Adding to the number of Indians in the area was a larger Cheyenne
camp in the Bighorn Mountains. Mackenzie took about 1,100 men to
search for this larger camp, leaving the main encampment on November
24th. His men moved about twelve miles up Crazy Woman Fork and
camped among the foothills in an area of good concealment. 90
Henry Lawton, Mackenzie’s field quartermaster on this operation,
and John Sharp, his wagon master, were sent out several hours ahead of
the main group, on a special mission. They were to prepare a passable
route for the main body of troops over streams and through ravines.

89
Robinson, Charles M., III-Bad Hand-pp. 202-204
90
Grinnell, George Bird-The Fighting Cheyennes-p. 362
66
Lawton and Sharp did a great deal of work on frozen ground to prepare a
path for Mackenzie’s force. When the work was finished, the route was
still difficult because of many steep ravines. 91 The command moved up
the valley, depending on the Indian scouts to detect signs and sounds of the
Cheyenne’s. Gradually, they closed on the Cheyenne camp. It was an
extremely cold night when Mackenzie brought his Pawnees and soldiers
into a pre-attack position. At daybreak, the attack on the Cheyenne camp
was launched.
The Pawnees, mounted on horses taken from the Sioux by
Mackenzie, were the first to go in. Since most of the Cheyenne were
asleep, the onslaught caught them in their lodges and many were killed.
Some of the best Cheyenne warriors lost their lives protecting their women
and children as they attempted to flee the troops. 92
One of those killed was Dull Knife’s son. Dull Knife and Little
Wolf formed a rear guard along the upper wall of a canyon. Mackenzie,
however, concentrated his initial efforts at killing off the Cheyenne ponies,
and burning lodges and foodstuffs, as he had done against the Comanche’s
at Palo Duro Canyon.
Dull Knife’s Cheyenne’s were left with only a few horses, and
little clothing to protect them from the cold. They were forced to trek for
thirteen days in severe conditions to Crazy Horse’s camp on Box Elder
Creek. Once there, Crazy Horse shared food, shelter, and blankets with
the Cheyenne, but warned them he did not have enough ammunition to
fight the soldiers. 93
Colonel Miles was pursuing Crazy Horse from the north and
General Crook’s forces were pursuing from the south. Suffering through
many severe hardships during the winter, Crazy Horse finally surrendered
to the Army at Fort Robinson. Many of the Cheyenne’s surrendered with
him including Chiefs Dull Knife and Little Wolf.
The chiefs had hoped that the Army would live by a treaty signed
in 1868, which allowed the Cheyenne to live with the Sioux on the
reservation. However, the Indian Bureau reneged as it had done so often
in the past and informed the chiefs that the Northern Cheyenne would be
moved south to join the Southern Cheyenne.

91
Grinnell, George Bird-The Fighting Cheyennes-p. 363
92
Ibid., p. 364
93
Ibid., p. 382
67
 While at the agency near Fort Robinson, a cavalry lieutenant by
the name of William P. Clark had been working with the Cheyenne’s. The
Indians took a liking to him as he went to great lengths to understand their
customs and help them with their problems. The Cheyenne’s referred to
him as ‘White Hat’ as he was in the habit of wearing a non-regulation
white helmet. When the time arrived for the Cheyenne to leave for the
south, it was Lieutenant Clark they wanted to escort them. 94
However, the Army informed the Indians that Lieutenant Lawton
had been detailed to be in charge of their escort. It was to be one of
Lawton’s first assignments that put him in direct contact with the Indians.
This particular event in his career found him worthy of the trust placed in
him by Mackenzie and Crook.
Lawton, up to this point, had certainly proven his bravery,
gallantry, and determination to succeed. However, as a somewhat
reserved person, no one knew how he would react to a situation in which
the welfare of a captive group was in his hands.
Within a short time of departing Fort Robinson, it became
apparent that beneath Lawton’s tough exterior was a man very capable of
warmth and concern. The Cheyenne, like any other Indian people who had
suffered at the hands of the Whites, did not easily take a liking to one. In
Lawton’s case, the Cheyenne soon found him to be a kind man who
worked hard to make them comfortable on their journey. That observation
was made by Wooden Leg, a Northern Cheyenne warrior who had fought
alongside the Sioux at the Little Big Horn. In Wooden Leg’s words,
Lawton was a “good man, always kind to the Indians.” 95
The Cheyenne’s came to call Lawton the Tall White Man. He
allowed the sick, elderly, women, and children to ride in the Army wagons
during the march south. He personally made certain that all of the Indians
had enough meat and other food to eat every day.
This one event might seem to have been easy to accomplish, but
the Bureau, in its typical way of doing things, had not allowed for food
provisions for the Indians on their trip. It was due to Mackenzie’s concern
for them, and willingness to pull from military stores that any provisions
reached Lawton and enabled him to feed his charges.

94
Brown, Dee-Bury My Heart At Wounded Knee-p. 317
95
Ibid.
68
 During the escort duty, Lawton displayed another characteristic
that few of his peers would have. His notion of trust was that if a man
gave his word on something, it was to be trusted. After all, when Lawton
gave his word, he could be trusted and he felt that other men operated
under the same principle.
Therefore, when the Cheyenne’s asked him for rifles and
ammunition to hunt the occasional buffalo sighted along the route, he
agreed, with the understanding that they would return and not cause any
problems. As the Indians recalled, Tall White Man issued rifles and
ammunition to about thirty warriors and allowed them to hunt the buffalo
and antelope. These hunting parties enabled the Cheyenne’s to augment
their meat diet with fresh game. 96 It also allowed them the freedom to
hunt, even if for a short time, as they had done for so many years in the
past. Lawton’s display of trust and compassion, while still maintaining
control over his situation, was to be repeated many times again.
The journey south was not without its hazards however. The
Cheyenne’s passed through many familiar hunting areas and places they
had roamed as a free people. On one occasion, the emotions of several
warriors welled to a point that in their anguish, they refused to go on and
created quite a commotion. Lieutenant Lawton, riding back through the
column to see what the ruckus was about, nearly lost his life. Several
warriors, who had nothing in particular against Lawton but just wanted to
vent their anger, began to pull Lawton off his horse. Just in time, some of
the chiefs interceded and shouted at the warriors to turn Lawton loose. The
chiefs calmed the warriors down and the march south continued.
As with most military expeditions, Lawton was plagued by a
shortage of supplies and transportation but managed to keep his group of
Cheyenne’s together. Only a few young warriors slipped off, to return to
the Sioux reservation.
There were also a few deaths among the Indians. Otherwise, the
trip was uneventful with the exception that Lawton and the Cheyenne’s
had developed a bond between them. 972 Cheyenne’s started the trip from
Fort Robinson, 937 arrived at Ft. Reno on August 5, 1877. The entire trip
had been completed three weeks ahead of the schedule set for Lawton by
the Army. 97

96
Brown, Dee-Bury My Heart At Wounded Knee-p. 318
97
Berthrong, Donald J.-The Cheyenne And Arapaho Ordeal-p. 28
69
 At Fort Reno, Indian agent Miles took charge of the Northern
Cheyenne’s. In no time at all, it became apparent that either sufficient food
was lacking or its distribution was being mismanaged by the Indian
agency. Tensions arose between the Cheyenne’s and Miles. Miles
attempted to correct the methods by which the chiefs distributed food to
their tribe but the problems persisted and complaints among the Indians
increased.
Many of the Indians felt that the longhorn beef being provided by
contractors was unfit to eat. Flour rations were inadequate to distribute
among the Indians. The problems got up to Superintendent Nicholson of
the Agency who wrote Miles and admonished him for the problems.
To compound the potential for difficulties, too few Army troops
were stationed nearby. Nicholson suggested increasing the beef ration and
asking for more troops from Fort Sill.
In the meantime, Lawton was about to get himself involved in the
situation more deeply than he might have anticipated. He was visiting at
Fort Reno in September of 1877, when he learned from some of his friends
that the Northern Cheyenne were camped some distance from the agency
and refused to come in. Poking around some, he learned from a Major
Mizner and a Mr. Rowland that the Indians had not been issued full rations
for several weeks. No corn or flour had been given to them in that time,
nor were any substitutes provided. 98
In a fashion typical of Lawton, he involved himself in a thorny
situation that most others would have avoided. In his contact with the
Cheyenne’s, they complained about the lack of rations and the treatment
from the agency, which they felt, was unfair. Rowland had informed
Lawton that he was concerned that under the conditions prevailing, many
of the Cheyenne’s would steal horses and bolt for the Red Cloud agency.
Standing Elk and Living Bear, Cheyenne chiefs, told Lawton that
their rations were not enough to prevent starvation. As a result, many of
the women and children were ill. On September 30th, as a result of his
probing, Lawton received official sanction from Mackenzie to investigate
the shortages at Fort Reno. It seems Lawton had been sending reports
concerning his unofficial inquiry to Mackenzie and got his attention. One
of Lawton’s observations had noted that the beef he saw was of poor
quality and “would not have been considered merchantable for any use.”

98
Berthrong, Donald J.-The Cheyenne And Arapaho Ordeal-p. 29
70
 The Tall White Man as he was referred to, gathered the chiefs, not
to talk, but to listen. Lawton spent a week observing the issuance of food
and medicine and to hear the chiefs out. Dull Knife, Standing Elk, and
Wild Hog addressed Lawton on behalf of their people. Dull Knife was
conciliatory in tone and Lawton was assured that the chiefs remembered
the promises they made to stay with the Southern Cheyenne. 99
The chiefs complained again of a shortage of food and said that
the beef in particular was poor. Lawton felt that agent Miles’ distribution
methods were poor and unbalanced and he had enough experience in the
area to make the observation. Miles response to the criticism was that he
could do nothing as he was following a prescribed system from the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs.
Lawton visited the primary Northern Cheyenne camp twelve miles
north of the agency. Many of the people there were ill and suffered from
fever and other ailments. He reported that at least 150 Indians were quite
sick. As his reports came to agent Miles’ attention, Miles rejected them out
of hand. The matter heated up as Lawton stood his ground and Miles
continued to insist that the Indians had no major complaints. Miles
actually invited a high level official investigation.
Lawton submitted a report on September 13, to the Adjutant of the
4th Cavalry at Fort Sill triggering an official investigation. His findings
were submitted in a Report of the Inspection of the Conditions of the
Cheyenne at the Cheyenne and Arapaho Agency, dated October 8, 1877.
In the midst of this conflict between the Army and the agency, Miles
began putting pressure on the Cheyenne’s to send their children to the
agency school. Some of the chiefs refused resulting in Miles’ threat to cut
off rations unless they complied. Having mishandled the whole affair,
Miles claimed there had never been a better sense of harmony among the
tribes. The situation aggravated an already bad rift between the Army and
the Indian agency.
On the basis of Lawton’s findings and concerns, Mackenzie and
General Pope bumped the Army’s warning up to Washington, contending
there was a constant threat of an outbreak unless the Indians were better
fed and cared for. The issue was a sore one for Mackenzie as he had
previously predicted that unless properly fed and cared for, the Cheyenne’s

99
Brown, Dee-Bury My Heart At Wounded Knee-p. 319
71
would escape within two years. He and Lawton shared the same concerns
for the Indians.
A part time Indian trader, Phil McCusker, accused Miles of
dishonesty and collusion “to defraud the Indians.” It was McCusker who
alleged that Miles was a partner in a trading company on the reservation.
In such a role, he played favorites with some Indians, overcharged others,
and certainly had a conflict of interest. In addition, Miles held little
admiration for the Northern Cheyenne. Ultimately, he survived the
criticism of Lawton and Lawton’s superiors.
Even as Lawton and Mackenzie pursued the matter all the way to
Carl Shurz, Secretary of the Interior in Washington, no action resulted
from their complaints. Shurz was totally ignorant of Indian matters and in
ignoring the pleas of the Army he allowed more bloodshed to occur, as
many of the Cheyenne’s bolted the reservation. 100
General Sheridan, in his usual eloquence concerning Indian
affairs, concluded that the eventual Cheyenne flight from the agency was
due to “insufficient food”, a common condition to many reservations. In a
ruthless fashion typical of Sheridan, he ordered General Crook “to spare
no measures-to kill or capture” the escaped Cheyenne. He did not want
the escape episode to reflect a sign of weakness on the part of the Army.
Sheridan, like Sherman, would pursue a punishment policy
concerning the Indians while admitting that the underlying causes for
Indian discontent were lack of food, mismanagement, or dishonesty on the
part of government officials.
The policies from the top, often implemented with a fury by the
General officers, often undermined the hard work of the line officers that
went beyond reasonable means in some instances, to improve the plight of
the Indians. Lawton did just that. He could of easily returned to his unit
and allowed the situation at Fort Reno to fester. However, he took the
political risk of criticizing the Indian Agency and pestered Mackenzie until
the latter became concerned and involved.
Lawton had proven that he was a good diplomat and able to
establish a bond of trust with the Indians. His treatment of them suggests
that in his military role, he did his job, but did not necessarily relish the
situation the Indians found themselves in. Whatever his personal

100
Brown, Dee-Bury My Heart At Wounded Knee p. 321
72
philosophies though, they had to give way to Army duty which of its own
nature, persisted in a steady process of elimination of Indian culture.
The year 1877 did not close for Lawton without another visit to
Fort Clark, Texas. Three years of relative quiet in Texas after Mackenzie’s
raid on Remolino had given way to renewed hostilities. 101
In 1876, matters began to heat up again. The Lipan’s and
Mescalero Apaches began raiding again, only to bring a sharp response
from the Department of Texas commanded by General O. C. Ord. Ord and
Lieutenant Colonel William R. Shafter employed a punishing policy
regarding the Indian raids. Shafter led his 24th Infantry against the
Lipan’s and Mescalero warriors, chasing them across the Mexican border
even though no treaty existed with Mexico allowing such pursuit.
Even though relations with Mexico, under its new leader Porfirio
Diaz, were straining as a result of the cross-border incursions by American
troops, Ord increased the pressure. With approval from Sherman, a hot
pursuit policy was implemented. Ord, in a manner suggesting he would
have liked to launch a campaign against Mexico pushed the pursuits to
new limits. 102 Ord’s actions were causing discomfort for Sherman, a West
Point classmate and friend, because Ord’s immediate boss, General
Sheridan, was pushing for his removal from command. In December of
1877, Sheridan ordered Mackenzie and the 4th Cavalry back to Texas.
During the late part of 1877 and into 1878, Lawton participated in
numerous expeditions led by Mackenzie, according to the War
Department’s transcript of his service record. He had the opportunity to be
with Mackenzie during one grand demonstration of force in Mexico itself.
He took the opportunity despite the fact that he had been quite ill during
the early part of 1878. On April 21, 1878, Lawton applied for a six-month
leave of absence due to illness. The Assistant Surgeon’s certificate of
disability stated that Lawton had suffered malarial fever and dysentery on
and off for about four months. He recommended a leave from duty in
order to save Lawton’s life or at least prevent permanent disability. 103
The leave was granted, however, Mackenzie’s need for Lawton’s
presence on the expedition into Mexico, and Lawton’s desire to be with his
commander were great enough for Lawton to suspend his leave.

101
Utley, Robert M.-Frontier Regulars-p. 350
102
Ibid., pp. 351-352
103
National Archives-Lawton papers
73
 In June of 1878, Mackenzie headed a large expedition into Mexico
that numbered over one thousand men. Lawton accompanied the
expedition. Mackenzie’s force included eight troops of cavalry, Colonel
Shafter and three battalions of infantry, artillery batteries, Indian scouts,
and a large supply train of forty wagons. Mackenzie and part of the
command crossed the Rio Grande mid-June. Shafter brought up the rear
with the main body of troops.
Mackenzie purposely maneuvered in a way to confront opposing
Mexican forces, which were faced down by the American forces. After
satisfying his objectives, Mackenzie crossed back into Texas. The
expedition together with other aggressive action by the Army against
Indian raiders once again brought quiet to the border area. Moreover, the
pressure by the military, while in flagrant violation of normal international
relations, caused the Mexican government to increase its own activity to
reduce Indian raiding. Once back in the U.S., Lawton took sick leave
between July and September of 1878 and then returned to duty.
On March 20, 1879, Lawton was rewarded for his service under
Mackenzie when he was promoted to Captain. 104 He had been in grade as
a lieutenant for twelve years, which was not unusual in the Army of that
time. However, many young officers coming into service at this time
would buck for promotions a lot quicker. Many West Pointers would
become disgruntled if they had not been promoted a few years after their
graduation and their expectations did nothing to soothe the rift between
them and the older officers.
Lawton remained with Mackenzie’s command as six troops of the
4th Cavalry were moved to Fort Garland, Colorado, in the San Luis Valley
in response to the Ute uprising. The move in October 1879 was in
response to a major outbreak of hostilities in Colorado. In 1878, Indian
Agent Nathan C. Meeker had taken over at the White River Agency.
Another in a long line of corrupt agents, he used his position to pressure
the Ute’s into giving up their lands and becoming farmers. 105
Of course, he was but one of many whites pushing to remove the
Indians from their reservation as it held many precious minerals. After
1876 when Colorado was granted statehood, the movement to push the
Ute’s to Indian territory gained impetus. After a confrontation with Chief

104
War Dept.-Svc Record
105
Utley, Robert M.-Frontier Regulars-pp. 334-335
74
Douglas in September 1879, Meeker urgently requested Army troops.
This act in itself further infuriated the Ute’s who could get no satisfaction
from the agency as to why they had to be moved from their reservation.
The initial troops arrived, commanded by an officer who had been
given his rank by General Crook, Major Thornburgh. At first contact with
the Ute’s to conduct talks, he positioned his troops in such a way so as to
suggest to the Ute warriors that he intended to fight. 106
There was indeed a fight and during the fight between the Ute’s
and soldiers, other Ute warriors struck the White River Agency and killed
Meeker and nine others there. Hostilities continued for a period of time
and began to quiet down in 1880. In May 1880, Mackenzie moved his
troops over the mountains to the Los Pinos Agency where they were used
to enforce a peace between Indians and Whites. Soon after this, Lawton
was assigned as Inspector of the Department of Arkansas, a well-deserved
recognition of his service under Mackenzie. He remained in this position
until 1881, according to his service record, when he returned to duty in
Colorado for a period of time.
The resourceful Henry Lawton as his friends referred to him
managed to experience a major event in his life in 1881. He surprised all
his friends by announcing that he was engaged to a debutante from
Louisville, Kentucky by the name of Mamie Craig, daughter of Alexander
and Annie Craig. Lawton’s plans to take leave in order to marry Mamie
Craig were put aside because of Indian campaigning. Illness and marriage
were insufficient reasons for Lawton to leave his duty. Later, plans were
made for an elaborate wedding to take place in 1882. The grand plans had
to be suddenly put aside however. Late in the year, Mamie’s sister became
very ill and when she sensed the end was near, begged her sister to marry
quickly so that she would be able to attend. Mamie quickly sent a
telegraph to Henry and he obtained leave and left for Louisville by special
train. The wedding then took place on December 12, 1881 at the sister’s
deathbed. Mamie’s sister died the next day. 107

106
Utley, Robert M.-Frontier Regulars-pp. 335-336
107
Newberry Library-Carter Papers: Oldham County, Ky. Court
Records

75
 The honeymoon was short as Lawton reported to new duty on
January 1, 1882 as inspector and engineer officer in the District of New
Mexico. He had finished twenty years, with a short break after the Civil
War, in the service of the military and gained respect from those among
whom he served.

76
“We loved him; we always have, ever since old cavalry days, when he was
the hardest and most daring of all the band of young officers that won
distinction under Crook, Miles, and Merritt. He was Mackenzie’s ‘right
bower,’ and his later work in the Philippines was incomparable. As friend
and comrade he was as lovable as he was great and heroic as a soldier.”
Gen. Charles King 12-20-1899.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE APACHE YEARS

When Captain Henry W. Lawton arrived in New Mexico to his

new assignment as inspector and engineer officer, in January of 1882, he
had twenty years of military service under his belt, except for a brief hiatus
after the Civil War.
He had served for over ten years under Ranald S. Mackenzie
during several Indian campaigns, most of those years with the
responsibilities of quartermaster. He was admired as a man who knew
few, if any, impossibilities and who tenaciously met the demands of his
job. His experience had exposed him to the corruption of the Indian
Agency, or “Indian Ring” as it was referred to by many of the Army
personnel. He had learned the ways of several Indian peoples and had
spent most of the last ten years in wild and formidable country.
While immediately under Mackenzie’s orders, Lawton’s service
included time under General Crook’s command. He was not a stranger to
Crook or his methods of command. Lawton would spend the next four
years engaged in running skirmishes and battles with the Apaches along
with the other soldiers in this area.
In this period, his instincts and abilities would sharpen as these last
campaigns closed out the Indian wars in the Southwest. Lawton would also
experience a disheartening change over the next few months as
Mackenzie’s status became questionable. The two had been very close for
the years they served together. The period in which the two served
together after Lawton’s return to New Mexico would be short.

77
 The history of conflict between the U. S. and the Apaches went
back a considerable period of time to the Gadsen Purchase in December of
1853. Prior to that time, there had been conflicts between the Apaches and
the Spanish settlers in southern Arizona. At the beginning of the Civil
War, the white population numbered less than six hundred persons. 108
After the Civil War, the U. S. established military bases in the area with
questionable results.
Mexico complained to the United States about the Apaches who
regularly raided into Sonora creating havoc. At one point, General
Sherman recommended that all white people be removed from Arizona
and that it be renamed Indian Territory. The suggestion was unworkable
as the treaty with Mexico stipulated that the Apaches be kept north of the
U. S. -Mexican boundary.
The Apache nation was divided into six bands, of which the
Chiricahua were the fiercest. Extremely brave and resilient, they were the
fiercest guerrilla fighters, marching or riding long distances to pounce on
ranches and settlements then quickly scattering in different directions only
to meet up again at some preordained spot. They could travel up to 50
miles in one day, and were experts at finding food and water in a barren
unforgiving desert land. In the several years that the U. S. soldiers would
have to encounter the Apaches, the Chiricahua would prove extremely
worthy opponents.
Eastern religious groups worked and succeeded at having General
O. O. Howard and Vincent Coyler appointed Indian Commissioners to the
area and they in turn, established a treaty with Chief Cochise in 1872. 109
Cochise was given a large ranch and the Apaches received a large tract of
land in Cochise County. Peace was established for two years until Cochise
died. When he died, Geronimo, a powerful Medicine Man, took control of
the Chiricahua band and led them on raids into Mexico and throughout
Arizona.
The Apaches who could be found were moved to the San Carlos
Indian Reservation in 1876. The remaining Apaches went on the warpath,
which forced the Washington politicians to take measures against them.
The first measure was to select experienced Indian fighters to establish a
new base in Apache country. Captains Samuel M. Whitside and William

108
Traywick, Ben T. -Thunder Fort-p. 4
109
Ibid., p. 5
78
A. Rafferty were selected for the assignment. 110 Two troops of cavalry
were sent into the Huachuca Mountains to halt the Apache raids into
Mexico and against civilians along the San Pedro and Santa Cruz Rivers.
Whitside chose a site near Babcomari Creek in the mouth of Huachuca
Canyon to build a fort. For a considerable period of time until the fort was
completed his men camped and survived in the open.
Rafferty meanwhile operated along the Sonora and Santa Cruz in
response to reports of repeated Apache raids and murders. Forty Indian
scouts from San Carlos reinforced the two troops of cavalry in May of
1877. They were under the command of Second Lieutenant Robert Hanna.
The Army often rode into Mexico after the Apache raiders and
several units from other posts in the area shared in the effort to contain the
raiders. Geronimo was captured in 1877 and returned to the San Carlos
reservation that left Apache Chiefs, Victorio and Loco loose to continue
leading raids. The habit of Apaches slipping away from San Carlos to go
on raids had become a common event by the time Lawton arrived at his
new post in 1882.
The Army units chasing them around in the desert filed many
reports of hardships faced in their pursuit of the Indians partly due to the
unrelenting heat of the desert. When General Sherman visited the area in
April 1882, he recalled his observation of thirty years earlier; “ We fought
one war with Mexico to take the southwest... we should fight another war
to make them take it back.”
Geronimo’s ventures off the San Carlos Reservation became a
matter of habit. After a year at San Carlos, he slipped away to join in raids
on Mexican settlements. Pressure from the Mexican military forced him
along with Juh, and over one hundred followers to return to the reservation
in early 1880. 111
Conditions at San Carlos, though, were hardly conducive to
maintaining the Apaches in a peaceful frame of mind. Forced to attempt to
become farmers in the worst possible farming conditions, the Apaches
would eventually bolt the reservation and start on another rampage
throughout their familiar haunts north of the boundary and into Mexico
itself.

110
Traywick, Ben T. -Thunder Fort-p. 5
111
Utley, Robert M.-Frontier Regulars-p. 370
79
 As with the Northern Cheyenne at Fort Reno, the distribution of
food and other goods to the Apaches was corrupted by the Indian Agency.
The military, though it brought these affairs to the attention of higher-level
officials, never accomplished an end to them. One year under the capable
administration of Captain Adna R. Chaffee achieved some respite from
hostilities, but they commenced again after a civilian filled his position. 112
Adding to the pressure was the increase in white settlers, once
under 600, now swelled to 80,000. Not only did the Apache have to
contend with the stifling regulations of the government, they had to deal
with miners who wanted reservation land for its mineral deposits.
In 1881, many of the Apaches came under the influence of
Nakaidoklini, a shaman who preached that the dead warriors would rise
from the dead and that the earth would be rid of whites. Events led to an
order for his arrest and confinement. 113 Army troops, accompanied by
normally loyal White Mountain Apache scouts, apprehended Nakaidoklini
at his village on Cibicu Creek in August. As the troops moved away from
the village, they were followed by outraged Apaches who attacked the
troops at nightfall. The White Mountain scouts mutinied and joined in the
attack. 114 News of the affair reached General Sherman who impressed
upon his subordinates that if necessary, he would send the entire Army to
stop the Apache escapades once and for all. General Pope who was in
Santa Fe when he heard the news of Cibicu recalled Mackenzie and six
troops of the 4th Cavalry from Ute duty in Colorado. Sherman named
Mackenzie the field commander with responsibility for rounding up the
Apaches who had caused the trouble.
The Chiricahua band had been reasonably quiet at the Camp
Goodwin agency, but with the increased activity of Army troops after
Cibicu, feared that they might become targets of the Army’s attention. A
number of them, under the leadership of Juh, Naiche, Chato, and
Geronimo jumped the agency and headed for Mexico. They joined Nana
and Victorio and again raised the specter of heightened violence in the
Southwest.
Mackenzie arrived at Fort Apache in late September and
immediately, a conflict developed between he and Colonel Willcox,

112
Utley, Robert M.-Frontier Regulars-p. 370
113
Ibid., p. 371
114
Robinson, Charles M., III-Bad Hand-pp. 282-283
80
commander of the Department of Arizona. Mackenzie continued to report
through his chain of command whereas Willcox wanted him to act as a
subordinate on this assignment. Sherman, at the head of the Army,
excepted the normal command structure and allowed that Mackenzie
would retain special command authority for his forces in the field. 115
What resulted can best be described as a mess as communications
snafus and lack of cooperation between Willcox and Mackenzie only
frustrated both and lessened the impact of their individual missions.
Mackenzie ultimately felt the Apache problem was no longer a problem
and requested that he be returned to his command in New Mexico.
About the time Lawton returned to the command in January of
1882, the Army had picked up information that Loco and his Warm
Springs Apaches were going to be forced by the Apaches in Mexico to join
them in the Sierra Madre Mountains. Colonel Mackenzie, commanding the
District of New Mexico, ordered troops into the area to prevent such an
occurrence. Troops on the border were alerted. Regardless, a war party
led by Geronimo and the other chiefs attacked the Camp Goodwin agency,
killing the police chief, and making off with Loco and several hundred of
his people. 116 The Apaches plundered their way back toward Mexico,
leaving up to fifty dead white people in their wake.
Lieutenant Colonel George A. Forsyth, under Mackenzie’s
command, put patrols out in the Peloncillos Mountains. One patrol spotted
the Indians in Horseshoe Canyon and Forsyth followed up with an attack
using five troops of the 4th Cavalry. The ensuing battle resulted in losses
for the 4th and the hostiles escaped. Captain Tullius C. Tupper,
commanding two troops of the 6th Cavalry gave chase and was able to
attack the Apaches but was unable to overcome the Apache defenses. 117
Forsyth and Tupper combined forces as they pursued the hostiles into
Mexico but were forced to turn back by Mexican forces. The Apaches had
run into this force and during a fierce battle, had suffered major losses.
They then moved off into the Sierra Madre.
During the summer of 1882, Captain Chaffee of the 6th Cavalry,
reinforced by troops commanded by Major A. W. Evans, carried out a
successful attack on the Apaches. The Indians suffered badly in this

115
Robinson, Charles M., III-Bad Hand-pp. 283-287
116
Utley, Robert M.-Frontier Regulars-p. 375
117
Ibid.
81
exchange and straggled back to their reservation. 118 The events of the
year led Washington to replace Colonel Willcox, commanding Army
forces in Arizona, with General George Crook. Crook’s first move upon
taking command was to personally take stock of the Indian situation at San
Carlos.
Crook, seen by some as an expert Indian fighter who exercised
humanitarian methods, was quick to say that the first priority was to give
the Indians a sound thrashing. He had established that sort of policy in
1871 when he first confronted the Apaches. He conducted a ruthless but
successful campaign in the winter of 1872-1873. His tactic was simple;
his troops would endure whatever hardships the elements delivered, stay
on the trail, and outlast the Apaches. It was a tactic to be used by other
officers after him over the next twelve years, but rarely with as much
success.
While Sherman had some reservations about Crook as a result of
the Sioux-Cheyenne campaigns a few years prior, Crook was still the best
candidate at the time for the job of bringing order to the southwest. Crook,
who had a habit of favoritism, selected officers of a caliber to enable him
to place his stamp of authority on the command. Stated another way, he
generally selected young officers who he could hold under his influence,
or officers who would not disagree with him, or both.
Captain Emmett Crawford was senior of four officers picked.
Lieutenant Britton Davis, fresh out of West Point, was selected by Crook
to help him at the San Carlos agency. The choice of Davis, an
inexperienced, but likable young officer, may have cost Crook a few years
later when Davis let Geronimo slip away from the reservation.
Lieutenants Charles B Gatewood and Hamilton Roach were to
work with the White Mountain Apaches. Gatewood, while a relatively
new officer, had made a number of good contacts among the Apaches and
many of them trusted him.
Given the gravity of the situation at the time, one wonders why
men like Adna Chaffee and other more experienced officers were not
selected for what Crook considered to be pivotal positions. The same
question may have occurred to Generals Sheridan and Sherman as events
unfolded over the next three years.

118
Utley, Robert M.-Frontier Regulars-p. 376
82
 In October of 1882, Mackenzie received a much-deserved
promotion to Brigadier General and shortly after, relinquished command
of the 4th Cavalry Regiment. He then took leave and was gone from New
Mexico from mid-November until late February of 1883. Colonel William
Royall was given command of the 4th during Mackenzie’s leave. In
November of 1882 Mackenzie returned to his command and met with
General Crook. Early in 1883, Crook took over operations against the
Apaches. 119
However, Mackenzie’s involvement in any military operation was
practically over due to his deteriorating health. In October, 1883,
Mackenzie was reassigned to the Department of Texas. By December of
the same year, he was admitted to an asylum for the insane. It was a cruel
end to the career of such a brilliant officer and his loss would be felt
greatly by men like Lawton who would remain loyal to Mackenzie for
years into the future.
During the winter of 1882-1883, the Apaches remained south of
the boundary line. Their raids took place against the villages in the Sierra
Madre and after the raids they sought shelter in the gorges along the Yaqui
River. Crook attempted to open communications with the hostiles by
sending his own Apache scouts into the area in which they were hiding. 120
Captain Crawford’s scouts also probed into Mexico, trying to locate them
but with no success.
In the spring of 1883, two raiding parties under Geronimo and
Chihuahua went into Sonora in a search for livestock. Chato raided north
into the U. S. in search of weapons and ammunition and this raid set off
the alarms in the Southwest. The Apaches struck into New Mexico killing
some eleven people and were able to vanish south again. The soldiers and
civilians out to catch up to them never caught sight of the hostiles.
General Sherman, when word reached him, ordered Crook to
locate and destroy the Apaches no matter where they were at. Crook in his
fashion, personally took charge and prepared for operations north and
south of the boundary line. He stockpiled provisions and put together his
strike force of soldiers and scouts. 121

119
Robinson, Charles M., III-Bad Hand-pp.307-308
120
Utley, Robert M.-Frontier Regulars-p. 378
121
Ibid., p. 379
83
 Crook met with Mackenzie to set up his plan of action in New
Mexico, then set off to confer with Mexican officials about his plans. His
force consisted of the Apache scouts numbering over 190 under Gatewood
and Crawford, forty-five troopers of the 6th Cavalry under Adna Chaffee,
and a large pack train carrying food and ammunition for two months.
Colonel Carr led units of the 3rd and 6th Cavalry blocking
important border crossing points. Mackenzie’s operation was to patrol the
New Mexico area in the event the hostiles slipped north into the U. S.
Lawton led one of Mackenzie’s expeditions into the Guadalupe Mountains
to pick off any Apaches heading through that area.
Crook crossed the boundary on May 1, 1883, following the San
Bernardino River to the Bavispe, then along that stream up into the
mountain range. On the 15th of May, Captain Crawford’s Apache scouts
located and attacked two of the hostile camps killing several warriors and
destroying their lodges. Once the Apaches were alerted to Crook’s
presence, Crook would not again have the good fortune of surprising them
in a direct engagement. Yet, the fact that he had brought such a large force
into their hiding area would be persuasive in getting them to surrender. 122
Contact was made with the hostile groups and within a few days,
they began to show up at Crook’s camp. After much deliberation with the
chiefs, and more so with Geronimo, Crook secured their promise to return
to the San Carlos agency. Geronimo did obtain agreement from Crook to
remain in Mexico for a short time to gather up many of his people who
were scattered around. Crook acquiesced in the matter as he could not
remain in Mexico any longer. His supplies, intended for two months, had
dwindled down to a dangerous level in slightly over one month.
Crook left Geronimo in Mexico and returned to the U. S. with over
300 Warm Springs Apaches, crossing the border on June 10th. He
returned to the usual eastern press stories about the campaign, including
speculation that he had been captured by Geronimo. The press also
rumored that many of his Apache scouts had turned on him in Mexico.
Senior officers in Washington, often accepting press reports as gospel,
became very shaky about putting any faith in Indian scouts. These
feelings spread to Sheridan in particular as his trust in using scouts was
already faltering. 123

122
Utley, Robert M.-Frontier Regulars-p. 379
123
Ibid., p. 380
84
 There were also conflicting stories running about as to who should
get credit for Geronimo’s surrender and they might have been somewhat
premature as Geronimo, on his own time table, did not appear as Crook
had hoped he would.
Crook now had to face some ridicule from federal and local
officials as well as the press because his famous captive appeared to have
pulled the wool over his eyes, at least for a time. Crook was not one to
appreciate the attention he was getting as he was not known to accept
criticism well.
When Geronimo finally did straggle back into the U. S. in March
of 1884, he brought with him a herd of stolen cattle from Mexico. He was
met at the border by Chiricahua and Warm Springs scouts under
Lieutenant Davis and escorted to San Carlos. 124 Geronimo had repeated
his habit of doing things at a time and place of his choosing and would do
so again. Unfortunately, Crook was convinced that he had finally put
down the Apache uprisings and did not anticipate that his influence on
Geronimo was no greater than any other Army officer’s had been.
Crook’s method of operation, however, was not to be doubted. He
had put together a highly mobile and streamlined force of men, augmented
by Apaches who were the only ones who could ferret out their kinsmen in
the many hiding places in Mexico. His mule pack trains, instead of
wagons that were useless in the mountainous terrain, kept his people in
food and ammunition so that he could stay on the trail of the hostiles.
His primary tactic of hounding the Apaches, and not counting on
direct engagement, wore them down and the knowledge that their own
people were aiding the Army demoralized the hostile Indians.
During a conference in Washington, Crook was given full
responsibility for policing the Apaches on the San Carlos reservation.
Lieutenants Gatewood and Davis were handed the assignment for taking
the most recent returning Apaches to the area around Fort Apache. Crook
again placed full trust in relatively junior officers, convinced that he had
substantially subdued Geronimo and the other war leaders.
Crook also determined to change the habits of the Apaches and
imposed on them two new rules. They were ordered not to beat their
wives as was their custom and to refrain from making tiswin, a form of

124
Adams, Alexander B.-Geronimo-pp. 256-261
85
beer. Both of these rules rankled the Indians and caused an under current
of resentment over the next several months. 125
The resentment surfaced in June of 1884 when a young warrior,
Kaytennae challenged Davis over the rules. Davis reacted quickly and had
Kaytennae arrested. He was sent off to Alcatraz so that he could not stir
up the other young Apaches. Problems continued to simmer however, as
conflicts arose between the Army and the Indian agent. Things reached a
point that the senior officer in charge of the Apaches, Captain Crawford,
offered his resignation. Crook and his immediate superior, General Pope,
pushed Washington for full Army authority over all Apache affairs.
Where Sherman had been lukewarm about Crook, General
Sheridan was definitely non supportive. Moreover, the country’s
administration was changing and the whole matter was put in abeyance
leaving Crook and his officers to deal alone with their problems.
Crook’s short-lived success was to blow up in his face. In May of
1885, a formidable group of Apache leaders approached Davis to complain
about the wife beating and tiswin rules. The complaint became a
challenge in that the Indians proposed that they would resume their
customs and in effect defied Davis and the Army to stop them. 126
Picking the wrong time to pass the buck, Davis told the chiefs that
he would have to consult with General Crook for an answer. Reportedly
considered an Apache expert by Crook, and only four years out of West
Point, Davis was anxious to avoid a major confrontation with the Apaches.
He sent a telegram to Crook that was never received.
The Apaches were not interested in why Crook did not respond,
they only knew that he had not. Davis, for some unexplained reason,
elected to attend a baseball game at Fort Apache. 127 With the Apaches
aggravated and Davis’ guard down, over 125 Apaches jumped the
reservation, among them, Geronimo, Nache, Chihuahua, and Mangus.
Chihuahua and his group began raiding in New Mexico and
Arizona, even though they were pursued by several troops of cavalry and a
large contingent of Indian scouts. Geronimo took his band into Mexico.

125
Utley, Robert M.-Frontier Regulars-p. 381
126
Adams, Alexander B.-Geronimo-pp. 268-269
127
Haley, James E.-Apaches-p. 379; Worcester, Donald E.-The
Apaches -p. 290
86
Troops were deployed from the 4th Cavalry at Fort Huachuca including
Lawton, Captain C.A.P. Hatfield; and the 1st Infantry.
Lawton, commanding a squadron of the 4th Cavalry was the only
unit available to Crook to try and block Chihuahua in his move from New
Mexico to Mexico. 128 Lawton and three troops of the 4th Cavalry, along
with Lieutenant George Henderson, and Roach’s scouts were positioned
again in Guadalupe Canyon near the Mexican border and used as a
blocking force. A new addition to the 4th Cavalry, assistant surgeon
Leonard Wood, was given command responsibilities with Crook’s
approval and accompanied Lawton.
Earlier, when Lawton first met Wood, he had laughingly inquired
as to why he even wanted to be in such a desolate place. Wood replied
that he was seeking a career in the Army and the two became friends.
Captain Adna Chaffee was among the experienced officers who led troops
on the north side of the border.
By the time the Apaches had left the reservation, general chaos
reigned and Geronimo and his cohorts once again led the Army on a merry
chase. Lieutenant Gatewood arrived at San Carlos from Fort Apache with
several White Mountain scouts. He and Lieutenant Davis, two troops of
the 4th Cavalry, and several Indians loyal to Davis, pursued the Indians.
They had no success as Geronimo, Chihuahua and the others skillfully
eluded them.
Meanwhile, Crook took immediate action and sent two task forces
into Mexico with the objective of locating the Apaches in the Sierra
Madre. The first force crossed the Mexican border on June 11, 1885. 129 It
was led by Captain Emmett Crawford, known as Tall Chief, who was
accompanied by Lieutenant Davis, one troop of the 6th Cavalry and close
to one hundred scouts.
The second group was commanded by Captain Wirt Davis along
with Lieutenant Matthias W. Day. Davis was a veteran of the Southern
Plains Wars under Mackenzie. His group was made up of a troop of the
4th Cavalry and 100 scouts. Davis crossed the border on July 13. 130
While the two mobile units were chasing the Apaches in Mexico,
Crook positioned troops at key crossing points and at all of the water

128
Haley, James E.-Apaches-p.n 381
129
Utley, Robert M.-Frontier Regulars-p. 383
130
Ibid.
87
holes. In total he had over 3,000 troopers and infantry, supported by
Indian scouts, chasing Geronimo and the other runaways. It would take
these combined forces around ten months to bring Geronimo to another
talk with Crook under truce at which time Crook would learn that
Geronimo would continue to play his own game as long as he saw fit.
Pressure from the press, from frontier settlers, and from the Army
upper-echelon would all serve to make Crook’s life as miserable as
possible. In no time, Sheridan was complaining that the use of Apache
scouts was a mistake as they really would not help the Army locate the
missing Apaches. In fact, it was believed in some quarters that the scouts
would purposely lead Army troops away from their quarry.
Often, the troops would have to return to garrison to re-supply,
thus losing the trail. The usual problems with terrain and conditions of the
environment also wore down the soldiers.
Crook himself made the admission in 1885 that any pursuit of the
hostiles in the rough terrain was a farce Yet, a scant year later when he
was removed and General Miles replaced him and had Geronimo brought
in about five months after taking over, Crook was one of the first to
ridicule Miles and his results.
The forces that had been sent into Mexico by Crook were led by
two extremely capable officers, Captains Crawford and Davis. Yet, their
men chased very elusive warriors who managed to stay out of the Army’s
grasp for months. Apache scouts, Crook’s trump card, did locate the
hostile camps a number of times but never did any real damage. The
Apaches were bold enough to send a small party into Arizona on a raid and
the Army troopers and scouts that Crook had positioned there fared no
better.
Crook recalled his units from Mexico in October, three months
after they had crossed the border. They returned to Fort Bowie for rest and
re-supply. To add insult to injury, the hostile Apaches numbering about
twelve, went on a rampage covering over 1,000 miles in Arizona and New
Mexico, killing more than three dozen people. Not one Army patrol was
able to intercept them or cut them off from their eventual escape back into
Mexico. 131
Towards the latter part of November, 1885, Davis and Crawford
began a second operation in the Sierra Madre. General Sheridan

131
Worcester, Donald E.-The Apaches-p. 295
88
personally visited General Crook at Fort Bowie, increasing pressure on
Crook to end his reliance on Apache scouts. Sheridan also began
discussions of moving the two Apache groups, the Warm Springs and
Chiricahua, away from the area altogether. 132
Crook’s hold on his current position probably slipped a great deal
when he resisted Sheridan’s suggestions, and even more as he paid no
heed to Sheridan’s constant requests for information during the early
winter.
In January of 1886, Army troops and scouts located the Apache
camp some two hundred miles south of the border. Crawford’s subsequent
attack on the camp was just late of catching the hostiles in it, but his ability
to locate them gave the Apaches reason to consider a truce. Geronimo and
the other chiefs could almost be counted on to want to return to San Carlos
after some months of running. 133
True to his timetable, Geronimo sent an emissary to arrange talks
with the Army. The problem at the moment was that the Mexican Army
had also been tracking the Apaches and with less than happy plans for
them. While Crawford and his men were preparing to meet with the
Apaches, the Mexican soldiers attacked the camp. Crawford, attempting
to stop the attack by showing himself, was killed in the process.
The Apaches watched the entire fight, which raged on for some
time before one of the U. S. officers managed to halt it. Lieutenant Marion
P. Maus was able to stop the firing, but his men were short of ammunition
and supplies and not able to risk a further confrontation with the Mexicans
or the Apaches.
Though the Army and scouts began to pull back and head for Fort
Bowie, the Apaches still felt it was time to negotiate a return to the U. S.
Four chiefs, including the wily Geronimo, conferred with Maus, and
suggested that he would come back to discuss terms with General Crook.
Again, he did not want to return immediately but promised to meet Crook
in about two months.
Maus returned to Crook with the news and on March 25, eight
months after leaving the reservation, Geronimo met with Crook. They met
at the Canyon de Los Embudos, (Funny Canyon), and the ultimate results
of their meeting were anything but funny to Crook or the men who had

132
Utley, Robert M.-Frontier Regulars-p. 384
133
Ibid., pp. 384-385
89
been chasing Geronimo for months. After formal meetings plus between
meeting discussions between the scouts and hostiles, Geronimo, Nache,
and Chihuahua agreed to surrender.
General Crook left the Apaches with Lieutenant Maus and
returned to Fort Bowie to wire Sheridan about his success. Again, he was
over confident and under estimated Geronimo’s propensity for mischief.
On their way back to Fort Bowie, the Apaches succumbed to the
lure of whiskey offered by a peddler. They engaged in an all night
drinking spree and within a day of surrendering, Geronimo, Nache, and
several others headed back for the mountains. 134
As reported by some, the peddler was James Triblett. 135 He had a
contract to provide beef to the Army and having the Apaches on the loose
improved his business. He was thus motivated to provide Geronimo and
the others with alcohol as it would decrease their desire to return to
captivity.
What added to Geronimo’s decision to head south was his distrust
of General Crook. He suspected that Crook had issued orders for his
confinement in prison once back at the reservation. If he resisted, he was
to be killed. His fear of treachery was strong. 136 Why would Crook be any
different that any other white man who made promises only to break them.
The other chiefs might be tired and ready to place themselves under
Crook’s rules again, but not Geronimo.
President Cleveland had already ordered that any terms other than
unconditional surrender by the Apaches were unacceptable to him. Crook
received orders direct from General Sheridan ordering him to go back to
the hostiles and demand total surrender and short of receiving agreement,
he was to destroy them. Once Sheridan heard of Geronimo’s escape, he
immediately took Crook to task, particularly over his use of Apache
scouts.
With his very judgment questioned by Sheridan and presumably
the President, Crook tendered his resignation. It may have been a tough
bluff on Crook’s part, Sheridan called his bluff and relieved him of his
command.

134
Worcester, Donald E.-The Apaches-p. 298
135
White, Lonnie B.-Hostiles & Horse Soldiers-p. 209
136
Barrett, S.M.-Geronimo-pp.135-136, 139
90
“ I feel deeply grieved over the death of General Lawton. At Santiago, as
in the Philippines, he showed himself one of the ablest Generals and one of
the most gallant soldiers in the entire American Army. I admired him
greatly, and I mourn his loss, as I know all the country must.” Theodore
Roosevelt, reported in Chicago Tribune December 20, 1899,

CHAPTER NINE

THE LAST GERONIMO CAMPAIGN

Captain Henry W. Lawton was about to step out of the shadows

and into the limelight in April of 1886. Were one able to know what his
thoughts were at that time, they probably included a personal sense of grief
at the loss of his friend and commander, Ranald S. Mackenzie. Lawton
was certainly able to stand on his own two feet and carry on, but since
Mackenzie left the New Mexico command in October 1883, and later was
retired from the Army in early 1884, a big void existed that would be hard
for another senior officer to fill.
Mackenzie had been a demanding and volatile boss, but he shared
credit with his officers and men. Crook on the other hand, while an able
general, was more inclined to look out after his own interests first and
those who served him had better agree with his way of thinking.
Now, with Crook relieved of command by General Sheridan,
under instructions from President Cleveland, Lawton would serve under
General Nelson A. Miles. 137 Miles was ordered by Sheridan to take the
field against Geronimo and other hostile Apaches as soon as possible.
Miles was a notable Indian fighter in his own right and had many
successes to his credit. More of a showman than Crook, he was also wiser
politically in that he ran his campaigns his way, while maintaining the

137
NY Times, December 20, 1899
91
appearance of complying with superiors who were recommending
alternate methods.
He was also related to General Sherman by marriage, which
provided some political shelter when needed. Miles and Lawton knew
each other but were not close friends nor were they closely associated.
Other than a short stint as Miles’ acting Aide de Camp between February
and May of 1881, they had not served together. Lawton certainly was not
a Miles protégé as some writers have suggested. The two were distinctly
different in personality but apparently got on well together.
When Miles relieved Crook at Fort Bowie in April, 1886, his
orders from Sheridan were to capture or kill Geronimo and to do so with
minimal use of Indian scouts who could not be trusted. Miles’ first task
was to size up his new command and the people in it to develop a plan that
would work and not leave him in the same position as he found Crook. In
looking within the 4th Cavalry for qualified candidates to execute his plan,
he was dealing with men extremely loyal to Mackenzie with whom Miles
had been a fierce competitor.
They had competed for their first general’s star and carefully
watched each other’s results in the many Indian campaigns on the southern
plains. The rivalry came to General Sherman’s attention more than once
and he intervened by communicating with their respective Department
commanders. In the end, Miles won the promotion to General that did
nothing to improve the feelings between the two men. Since Mackenzie
was known to share his thoughts with men like Lawton, Lawton himself
would have been aware of the antagonism between Miles and Mackenzie.
Miles reports 138 that after spending a considerable amount of time
traveling among the military posts in his command, he selected Lawton to
lead a special expedition in Mexico, in pursuit of Geronimo. At the time
the two men met, Lawton commanded B Troop, 4th Cavalry, at Fort
Huachuca. One of Lawton’s assets, according to Miles, was his positive
attitude about achieving the mission. Lawton’s firm belief that the
Apaches could be subdued by soldiers who were determined, would
employ Indian tactics, and who were physically able to endure the certain
hardships they would face, impressed Miles as well.
The fact that both men had come up through the ranks and had not
attended West Point probably scored some points with Miles. There is

138
Miles, N.A.-Personal Recollections-pp. 486-487
92
nothing in Miles’ reports or book, or in the official Army accounts of this
last Geronimo campaign that would suggest Miles did not make the
selection of Lawton without outside help. Yet, given the difference in their
personalities and the fact that Lawton was every ounce a Mackenzie man,
it is reasonable to speculate that Sheridan may have had something to do
with the whole process. He had been a sponsor of Lawton’s in 1867, and
certainly was a backer of Mackenzie. Knowing the officers of the 4th
Cavalry and probably having his favorites, it is entirely possible he
suggested Lawton to Miles.
Whether or not he did does not detract from the fact that Miles
choice was a wise one. Not that there were no other capable officers, but
Lawton was probably the most iron willed and tenacious one of the bunch.
Moreover, he gave Miles no sense that he thought the mission could fail.
It would succeed, and Miles needed a success. Colonel W. B. Royall, who
took command of the 4th Cavalry, later revealed that he had made the
recommendation to Miles that Lawton lead the expedition into Mexico.
Royall made the comment in a letter to Lawton dated October 17, 1867. 139
Once the decision had been made by Miles to put Lawton in
charge of a special small strike force that would pursue Geronimo over the
border, the remainder of the unit had to be selected. Miles was impressed
with Captain Leonard Wood, assistant surgeon. Wood was still pursuing a
career in the Army that would lead him to command positions.
The small unit was ultimately made up of cavalry, infantry,
Apache scouts, and a pack mule train to carry supplies. The understanding
Lawton had of the command was that he was in charge of operations south
of the Mexican border. His job, quite simply, was to pursue Geronimo on
the Mexican side and either kill or capture him, or drive him back into the
U. S. where troops on the north side of the boundary could deal with him.
The officers selected to serve under Lawton’s command were
Lieutenants H. C. Benson, R. A. Brown, R. S. Walsh, and A. L. Smith, of
the 4th Cavalry; Henry Johnson, Jr., of the 8th Infantry; and Leighton
Finley, of the 10th Cavalry.
Finley was in charge of the scouts for the first two months of the
campaign and Brown took over during the final two months. Twenty

139
National Archives-Lawton papers
93
White Mountain and San Carlos Apaches were sent along as scouts. 140 In
total Lawton had 35 cavalry troopers and 20 infantrymen plus some 20-
mule train packers and 100 mules. His strategy was to stay in the field and
re-supply, without having to come back in as had the special strike forces
set up by Crook the year before.
The small force was not as picture perfect as Miles portrayed it
years later in his book, Personal Recollections. Within a short time of
taking the field, Lawton was complaining to Miles that Lieutenant Benson,
while well meaning, was too immature to command. 141 Leonard Wood
reported in his diary that many of the infantry soldiers were unruly and had
to be disciplined. Later in the campaign, several of the Apache scouts
became drunk during the day, including Gatewood’s companions.
Nevertheless, the hastily constructed force had its effect.
If Miles was concerned about Sheridan’s emphasis on minimizing
the use of scouts, he apparently gave more weight to Lawton’s plan to use
them. They made up close to a third of his force. Before Lawton and his
command could start out after Geronimo, Crook’s supporters were already
scoffing at Miles’ strategy. As the campaign under Miles unfolded, and
for years later, Crook partisans played down Miles’ and to some extent,
Lawton’s understanding of the proper use of Apache scouts.
However, the one critic Lawton would be concerned with was
Geronimo himself who, in later years, credited Lawton’s tactics for
wearing him down. When Lawton was given effective command of the
expedition, he “wisely employed” several of Geronimo’s old friends as
scouts. 142
Another part of Miles’ plan to run down and capture the hostiles
was the establishment of an elaborate communications system in New
Mexico and Arizona. He stationed heliograph operators on the peaks of
the mountains in such a way so as to speed up information transmissions.
He hoped that movements detected by troops stationed on the peaks would
be relayed quickly enough to allow his troops to react fast.

140
Accounts differ on the number of scouts: Miles reports 20;
Britton Davis, “The Truth About Geronimo” reports 12 but his
account is secondhand; 30 scouts are reported in Lawrence R.
Jerome’s account; all other accounts report 20 Apache scouts.
141
Lane, Jack C.,Chasing Geronimo-p. 124, fn 15
142
Barrett, S.M.-Geronimo-p. 43
94
 With everything just about in place, Miles was ready to launch his
effort to end the Apache escapades in the Southwest. The Apaches
though, preempted him. Rather than remain secluded in the Sierra Madre,
they reappeared, raiding in northern Mexico, and then crossing into the U.
S. Raids were conducted in the Santa Cruz Valley by Apaches who broke
into small units and scattered in different directions.
Captain T. C. Lebo with a troop of the 10th Cavalry gave chase
and crossed over the border into Mexico. He caught up with one band in
the Pinito Mountains and skirmished with them, sustaining light casualties.
Lieutenant Benson picked up the hostiles’ trail after this event. The
Apaches were, at different times, confronted by Benson, Lebo, and
Captain Hatfield as they moved south and west.
One group was surprised on May 15th by Hatfield’s troop of 4th
Cavalry and lost twenty horses to the troopers. According to Geronimo,
the Apaches returned the favor later in the day and recaptured the ponies.
Benson had started out on May 2nd, to pick up Geronimo’s trail.
On May 5th, Lawton led his group into Mexico for what was to be one of
the most trying expeditions he and his men had endured. What must have
been going through his mind at the time he started out? Safely one can say
that Lawton certainly carried the memory of Mackenzie with him. That
memory along with Lawton’s own stubborn determination would not
allow him to fail. Even if failure was allowable to most men, Lawton
would not tolerate it of himself.
Miles had close to 5,000 men either chasing the Apaches, or
positioned to block or observe their movements. This was the largest force
used so far and the fact that they were pursuing such a small group of
Indians came under ridicule quite frequently. Among the Army critics
were men who not long before had been part of Crook’s force of 3,000
who chased the Apaches for over ten months and came up essentially
empty handed.
Locating the Apaches was extremely difficult. The hostiles knew
the territory in the U. S. and Mexico intimately and could disappear from
sight without effort. The soldiers on the other hand had far less knowledge
of the terrain. They also tolerated the environment with less endurance
than Geronimo and his followers.
Geronimo also knew he could move south into Mexico far enough
to stretch out the Army’s ability to supply itself. Sooner or later, the
troopers would simply wear out and return home.

95
 Even he, however, knew he could only go a limited distance south
or risk being enveloped by Mexican forces and trapped south of the
border. He kept open his options, one being the ability to slide back into
the U. S and in order to do that, his group had to leave open, routes of
escape.
Two major elements of this campaign made it distinctly different
than previous efforts to capture Geronimo. Both would play out in a way
that he would have to stop running sooner than he had hoped.
The first event was the rounding up of Geronimo’s people back at
the reservation for movement to Fort Marion, Florida. General Sheridan
had proposed the action to General Crook, however, Crook objected noting
that many of the Apaches who were helpful to the Army’s cause would
suffer along with the hostile groups.
Miles set out in short order to implement the policy of removing
the Apaches from Southwest territory. He knew that whatever public
outrage might occur among religious groups, there was broad support at
the top of the government. President Cleveland and the senior Army
officers wanted this chapter of Indian warfare closed, completely closed.
The second element, which made the campaign different than
previous ones, was Lawton. While he did not single-handedly capture
Geronimo as some newspapers liked to report later, he was pivotal in
determining the outcome. Lawton, likened to a bloodhound, 143 was
different than other soldiers Geronimo had confronted.
Geronimo could elude him for periods of time, and make the
Lawton unit miserable by running them around in little circles. Yet there
was something about Lawton that even Geronimo and the Apaches
admired. He did not quit, he did not go away. By the time Geronimo
sought terms in August, 1886, he and his little band were tired, ragged,
starving, and their will to resist had been broken. 144 One of Lawton’s
many attributes would serve him well in the campaign. It was one that his
superiors had taken note of during the Civil War. Under duress, he always
kept his presence of mind. Although he might experience the same
aggravations as any other officer, he was one of those rare individuals who
could clear his mind and keep it focused on his objective.

143
Longstreet, Stephen-War Cries On Horseback--p. 101
144
Barrett, S.M.-Geronimo-p. 44
96
 When Lawton crossed into Mexico, Geronimo doubled back into
New Mexico and roamed the mountains near Hot Springs. He remained in
that area for some time, then believing Lawton would have turned back to
the U. S., Geronimo headed into Mexico. He returned to his people in the
Sierra de Antunez Mountains. 145 The Apaches were surprised to learn that
Lawton and his troops were still in the area and hot on their trail.
According to Geronimo’s account, there were daily skirmishes at times
and on four or five occasions, early in the campaign, Lawton caught him
by surprise. The presence of Mexican troops in the area became evident as
well and their numbers grew as they sensed that the Apaches might be in a
no-win situation.
Lawton’s horses gave out within a week after crossing the
boundary line and all of his men became foot soldiers. It must have been
extremely aggravating to him that early on in the campaign, the officer in
charge of moving the supplies failed to keep up with the unit. The officer
had become drunk and Lawton’s much needed provisions fell behind. 146
The former quartermaster who never failed his commanding officer in a
campaign, found it necessary to send a member of his group back to the
pack train to get it moving. The supply officer was severely disciplined
and there were no more failures on the part of the supply officer after this
episode.
Lawton pushed himself and his men relentlessly. They were most
often on their feet and moving close to twenty hours a day, often with only
two meals and very short stops for water. One of the problems facing
Lawton when he did pick up a fresh trail was finding that the hostiles often
broke into smaller groups and went in different directions. According to
Lawrence Jerome, an enlisted man with Lawton, the quandary was which
trail to follow. By breaking his small command into several small groups,
Lawton could have easily created a situation in which the Apaches would
be able to pick off the small units.
In the early part of June, Lawton was camped near Calabasa,
waiting for Lieutenant Finley to return from reconnaissance. Indians were
reported moving southward through the Whetstone Mountains of Arizona.
Lieutenant Walsh of the 4th Cavalry surprised the hostiles, capturing most
of their horses and supplies. The Indians escaped later, under the cover of

145
Barrett, S.M.-Geronimo-p. 140
146
Lane, Jack C.,Chasing Geronimo-p. 37
97
darkness. Lawton moved to Walsh’s position and met him on June 7.
Finley arrived later in the morning.
The command pursued the Apaches who abandoned their horses
and fled on foot. Their trail led through the Azul Mountains which
prompted Lawton to believe they were headed for their stronghold in the
Sierra Madre. By this time, most of Lawton’s soldiers were near
exhaustion. Enlistment of some of his scouts had expired and new
infantrymen and scouts came up as replacements,
Although he had been out on Geronimo’s trail for a relatively
short period of time, people were quick to note that Geronimo had eluded
the Army for over a year. The fact that he had come in for a parley with
Crook did not matter, he was still on the loose, murdering and stealing at
will.
Local and national newspapers began to critique the whole affair
in a not so generous manner. The New York Times jumped into the fray
with its own stories, such as the one that appeared on July 1, 1886:

“ Should the report prove true that Capt. Lawton has been
baffled in his determined pursuit of the hostiles into
Sonora, no little disappointment will be felt. Should it be
also found that Geronimo has doubled on his course, after
being chased to Sierra Azul, and is again moving north,
threatening the Arizona border, disappointment will be
coupled with alarm”.

“On the other hand, Gen. Miles has not lost faith in the efficacy of
a relentless pursuit so to wear out the hostiles as to make them an
easy prey. It may be that close upon the late discouraging tidings
will come welcome news of a triumph in the long hunt”.

“It must be remembered that Gen. Crook’s successes with

the Chiricahuas were gained by the course now pursued,
that of following them across the Mexican line far down
into their retreats among the Sierra Madres”.

“In the first instance Gen. Crook conducting the campaign

in person, secured the surrender of the hostile camp, and
gave Arizona a respite of two years from Indian troubles.
In the other instance, after the fresh outbreak, Capt.
98
 Crawford, who had been with him in the first campaign,
pursued them again into Mexico, and although the
completeness of the second success was marred, not only
by the blunder resulting in his death, but by the breaking
away of Geronimo and many of his braves, after their
surrender had been counted upon, it certainly did result in
getting off to Florida seventy-six of the hostiles, mostly
women and children, but including such renowned chiefs
as Nana and Chihuahua”.

“It was a good piece of work to get so many of the hostiles

under guard, and in one way or another a further reduction
of their numbers may be looked for from Gen. Miles. In a
report to the War Department from Calabasas, June 7,
Gen. Miles said that for thirty-six days his troops had
pursued the Apaches, covering 800 miles of mostly
mountainous region. These days have now become sixty,
and how many miles the pursuit has covered it might be
hard to tell.”

The press, and all of the other observers, friendly and critical alike,
likened Lawton’s methods to those of General Crook. Even writers
exploring the subject years later came to the same conclusion. Had Lawton
been asked whose counsel he was following, he would have pointed to
Ranald S. Mackenzie as his inspiration. It was Mackenzie who believed in
relentless pursuit, keeping supplies to levels that allowed him to stay in the
field when other commanders like Miles or Crook might have withdrawn
to re-supply.
Mackenzie advocated taking away the Indians’ resources or
severely limiting their ability to acquire them Geronimo was able to steal
fresh mounts and move a distance away from Lawton, but the Tall White
Man on foot inevitably caught up. Geronimo was forced to remain
concealed or run, but was not allowed to rest and recuperate.
The method of pursuit being employed by Lawton was
Mackenzie’s, not Crook’s or Miles’. Miles for his part, not only had to
keep his superiors content, he had the additional burden of maintaining a
positive posture with the press. It was sure to have been disconcerting
enough to him that some doubts were creeping into his head. He stayed

99
the course, but as was his prerogative, mulled over any other options that
came to mind to bring the whole affair to a satisfactory conclusion.
By July 5th, the Apaches had been pushed to a place southeast of
Ospura. Lawton established a base supply camp there and regrouped his
command. The Indians had been operating in small groups, raiding and
stealing. On several occasions, the command was able to capture horses
and animals, which the Indians had stolen from local settlers.
By this time, many of the men in Lawton’s command were
suffering diarrhea. Captain Wood, as the medical officer, was dispensing
what medication he had but was running out. He had developed a good
rapport with the men and had earned their respect.147 The trek was having
its toll on him to the same extent that it affected everyone else but he was
holding up well.
Lawton became ill and had to be carried about for a couple of
days, which drew some humor from the enlisted men. It seemed to them
that the smaller men were holding up, but the big men were having
troubles. The men and animals had to endure the heat of the day, and the
cold of night. Chilling rains served to worsen their plight as well as wash
away trails left by the Apaches. They led the troops on a wild chase but
were pressed to circle back to the U. S. The constant pressure by the
ragged soldiers and scouts was beginning to tell on the Apaches. While the
troops were not having much success trapping and engaging the Indians,
they were taking away their ability to rest, or come out in the open to
forage.
The inability of the troops to engage Geronimo was not unusual
since Indians were not known to face off in any kind of direct
confrontation unless they had a distinct numerical advantage, or were
trapped. They were far more likely to wait in ambush and pick off
unsuspecting opponents. Geronimo did not even attempt to way lay
Lawton and he may have suspected he would be on the losing end of the
bargain if he did.
The only tactic Geronimo could use was to break and run, and
while on the run, try to capture stock or horses. As often as he did so, he
would have to leave his plunder behind when the troops disrupted his
activity. Lawton became more determined than ever with each day and his
men picked up on his spirit. Near exhaustion, they also became more

147
White, Lonnie B.-Hostiles & Horse Soldiers-p. 211
100
determined as the Apaches cut virgin trails over the mountain ranges and
zigzagged back and forth. Towards the middle of July, the troops reached
the Aros River.
On July 13th, Lieutenant Brown, in charge of the scouts, located
the Apache campsite some distance away but near the river. He sent a
runner back to Lawton’s camp with the news and asking for infantry help.
Lawton sent word back to Brown to contain the scouts until he and the
soldiers could move up into position. Brown was unable to control the
scouts who rushed the camp, firing their guns as they did.
The Apaches wasted no time beating a path away from the camp,
but they left their animals, food, and supplies. The scouts became
preoccupied in celebrating their plunder. By the time Lawton and his rag
tag soldiers arrived, Geronimo was long gone and the scouts were enjoying
the booty. When Lawton’s dispatches were received by the military in the
U. S., some thought that the scouts purposely alerted Geronimo’s camp to
the presence of troopers.
Lawton was initially a little more than upset with the turn of
events. He had spent more than two months tracking and chasing
Geronimo, finally getting the opportunity to capture him only to have over
eager scouts ruin his chances. His men were worn out, their shoes had
worn off their feet, tempers were short, and it would be difficult to get so
close to the Apaches again.
Lawton’s feelings were evident in his letter to his wife Mamie
dated July 14th. In it, he expressed his frustration, and acknowledged that
his responsibility was weighing on him. He was not ignorant of the
growing publicity in the press, nor was he unaware of the possibility a
failure could ruin any chance of promotion if General Miles was made to
look bad by the episode. 148 However, while greatly disappointed, Lawton
knew it was another step in taking away Geronimo’s ability to sustain
himself. Sooner or later, he would have to quit. Lawton certainly had no
intention of quitting first and probably would have expended himself and
every man in the unit if necessary to complete his mission.
While humor does not appear to be evident in Lawton’s day-to-
day routine, it managed to surface on occasion. Leonard Wood records one
such instance on July 18, 1886 that no doubt, gave rise to a few chuckles
among the men, even though they were careful to hide their mirth from

148
Lane, Jack C.,Chasing Geronimo-p. 16
101
Lawton. He was bathing in the river when a number of deer ran through
the camp. The men immediately began firing rapidly and the canyon walls
amplified the noise and made it difficult for Lawton to tell where the shots
were coming from. He hastily gathered up his clothes and ran, naked, back
to the campsite. In the process, he ran across ground that was covered
with short cactus spines and both of his feet were full of them. His mood
was foul and his language bad enough that Wood did not wish to print it in
his records. While Lawton lay prone for a period of time, Wood and some
of the scouts pulled the spines from Lawton’s feet. 149
After the scouts alarmed Geronimo’s camp, Lawton had the
presence of mind to send couriers out to local small towns to warn them
that Geronimo was in the area. Scouts were also sent out in different
directions to try and pick up the trail. Lawton, meanwhile, had the present
job of getting his supplies across the river.
He had the men construct rafts and after some time, succeeded in
moving his supplies. While he was dealing with his situation, Geronimo
had headed south near the Yaqui River and managed to attack a Mexican
pack train and steal horses. He and his band then turned and rode north
towards the border. He and his people were tired and hungry, some
wounded, and their options in the south had been taken away.
General Miles, perhaps edgy about the whole situation, was taking
steps on the north side of the border to bring the matter to a conclusion. A
major step was the plan to remove all Chiricahua and Warm Springs
Apaches from Arizona and transport them to Fort Marion, Florida. Miles
devoted a great deal of his time to this project including negotiations with
Washington. General Sheridan supported his action.
Critics of General Miles later challenged his motives for planning
to relocate the Apaches to Florida. In response, Miles professed his
concern for the safety of the Apaches who, he thought, could fall victim to
local settlers who were ready to spill Apache blood. Law enforcement
officers were also eager to get their hands on Geronimo and the other
chiefs. The practical side of Miles’ plan however, was to prevent the
reservation Indians from re-supplying Geronimo’s group. Moreover, once
the Apaches were away from their usual haunts, they might be inclined to
become more docile and submit to the white man’s ways.

149
Lane, Jack C.,Chasing Geronimo-pp. 74-75
102
 Willing to hedge his bets in any way he could, Miles also went to
Fort Apache and secured the cooperation of two Apaches, Martine and
Kayitah, who agreed to find Geronimo and take Miles’ surrender message
to him. Miles needed an officer to go with the two Apaches and searched
the command for someone who would stand the best chance of being
accepted by Geronimo.
He selected Lieutenant Charles Gatewood who had been involved
in negotiating with Geronimo before. The Apaches knew they could trust
Gatewood, at least to talk with him. Gatewood for his part, though not in
good physical health, responded to Miles’ request. He was at some risk as
far as he knew, for the last time he had arranged a truce talk between
Geronimo and General Crook, it had not worked out well from
Geronimo’s perspective.
Miles was getting information back from Mexico via dispatches
that Geronimo was heading north to the border and might be in the mood
to talk.
The ever-present press maintained a daily vigil that added to
Miles’ nervousness. It was not just the local newspapers, but the bigger
eastern papers as well and since Miles’ base of public support lay mainly
in the eastern states, he wanted to come out looking as good as possible. In
all probability, he was also just being a good general and playing the cards
in a way to bring the best results. Whatever he did or whatever his motive,
he remained under the watchful eye of reporters.

The New York Times on July 26, issued the following story:

“ The long chase of Capt. H. W. Lawton, Fourth Cavalry,

three hundred miles below the Mexican border, after the
elusive Geronimo, has not been wholly fruitless, and has,
indeed, achieved a partial success in the capture of the
hostile camp; but, unfortunately, although he has the nest
the bird has flown”.

“Capt. Lawton has a reputation for indomitable energy

and sound judgment, and his trophies of nineteen horses
and a quantity of dried beef are visible proofs that he
effected a surprise of the camp, although the great
103
 precautions taken by the hostiles to secure means of
escape proved effectual”.

“Since the 1st of May, the campaign has been conducted

by Gen. Miles with untiring perseverance and under many
discouragement's. It is now about four months since
Geronimo and his follows broke away from the party
which surrendered to Gen. Crook and resumed the
warpath.”

While Lawton was working to get his supplies across the Aros
River, Lieutenant Gatewood arrived with Martine and Kayitah. An
interpreter and packers also accompanied his small group. Gatewood had
been given orders by Miles to seek assistance from any U. S. command he
should encounter.
He had found little assistance on the way into Mexico but was
finally given protection by Lieutenant James Parker who accompanied him
to Lawton’s position.
Lawton was aggravated by the fact that his scouts had prematurely
jumped Geronimo’s camp, ruling out any chance for capture. That plus the
problem of getting his supplies across the stream, was probably enough to
put him in an ill mood, notwithstanding the fact that he and his men were
not in good physical shape.
He probably did not appreciate the appearance of a slightly smug
Gatewood with his special orders from Miles. No doubt Gatewood made
it clear that he was acting under Miles directly and had the authority to
contact Geronimo directly and secure his surrender.
Gatewood, however, was not feeling in the best of health, having
an inflamed bladder, which made riding difficult. He also voiced his own
disgust with and lack of confidence in Miles’ plan. After some discussion
with Lawton, he placed himself under Lawton’s command. 150 Martine
and Kayitah did not want to carry arms but Lawton insisted that they do so
for their own protection. 151 He was concerned with the activity of the
Mexican militia in the area and the possibility of the two Apaches being

150
Lane, Jack C.,Chasing Geronimo p. 88
151
Betzinez, Jason- I Fought With Geronimo-p. 137
104
shot on sight. Gatewood sent the two scouts to where Geronimo had been
camped but they were unable to find any trace of a trail.
Gatewood had one problem, he could not find Geronimo on his
own and would need to rely on Lawton’s command to help him. Lawton
had some idea of Geronimo’s movement, but he had no contact for about
two weeks. 152
Two couriers arrived in camp with the news of Geronimo’s attack
on a Mexican pack train. The information reported that Geronimo was
south of Lawton’s position and was the only fresh information he had at
the moment. Lawton gave Lawrence Jerome and another courier
dispatches for Lieutenant Benson at the supply camp at Ospura. Lawton’s
instructions were to get fresh horses and that he was re-crossing the Aros
River and would be south of Nacori.
At about this time, on August 7th, Leonard Wood reports that
Gatewood was complaining of being ill and having no faith in the plan. He
wanted to return to post but Wood declined to give him medical leave. A
few days later, Lawton became deathly ill from contaminated meat and
almost died. The episode was severe enough that Lawton became dizzy
and passed out while on his mount, falling to the ground. It took a couple
of days before he had regained his strength but the matter did not slow
down the operation.153 On the way to the supply base, Jerome encountered
a cattleman who informed him of the presence of the Apaches in the area.
The man also guessed that Geronimo would head for Cochise’s old
hideout in the Terrace Mountains.
Jerome was given two Mexican couriers and he sent them back to
Lawton’s camp with the news. When Lawton was given the information,
he and Gatewood headed north. 154
Lawton wanted Gatewood, the two Apache scouts, and the
interpreter to move out ahead. Gatewood, apparently ill or not extremely
motivated, did not pack and move out as fast as Lawton had desired.
Having instructed Gatewood to pack and move out on July 19, Lawton
learned a couple days later that Gatewood was still in camp. Lawton’s
mood fouled sufficiently that he suggested replacing Gatewood with
another officer but was talked out of doing so by Leonard Wood.

152
White, Lonnie B.-Hostiles & Horse Soldiers-p. 219
153
Lane, Jack C.,Chasing Geronimo-pp. 92-95
154
White, Lonnie B.-Hostiles & Horse Soldiers-p. 219
105
Gatewood eventually left camp five days after he had agreed to do so. 155
The episode angered Lawton, but again, he regained his composure, with
Leonard Wood’s encouragement, and remained committed to helping
Gatewood. A letter from Lawton to his wife, Mamie, mentioned his
willingness to continue helping the Lieutenant who was really not
physically up to his task. 156 Jerome, who had been trusted by Lawton
to carry important dispatches, was to run into his own bad luck on this trip.
157

When he reached the supply camp at Ospura and gave Lawton’s

instructions to Benson, the group broke camp and struck out to join
Lawton. Jerome had been suffering intestinal problems along with the rest
of the men and needed to stop. Lieutenant Benson refused to stop the
column briefly, but agreed to allow Jerome to get off his horse. Once
Jerome dismounted, Benson led the rest of the group away and stranded
Jerome in the dark. The enlisted man worked his way out on foot and was
able to contact another command. Lieutenant James B. Richards of K
Troop of the 4th Cavalry was trying to locate Lawton.
It seems that the U. S. and Mexico were involved in another
dispute over the treaty that allowed the Army to pursue hostiles into
Mexico. Richards’ orders were to warn Lawton to remove his command
from Mexican soil.
Jerome rode with Richards’ group, which reached Lawton’s
position in a few days. When he gave Lawton a report of where he had

155
See Thrapp, The Conquest of Apacheria-pp.357-358 and fn 20:
On the basis of Leonard Wood’s diary entries August 23-27, Thrapp
concludes that Lawton and Wood had no inkling as to Geronimo’s
whereabouts and Gatewood alone found Geronimo and that the
situation is to his credit. Wood’s entries beginning August 21 show
that Lawton in fact, directed Gatewood’s actions. Furthermore,
Gatewood did not comply with his instructions until 4-5 days later.
Wood’s August 25 entry indicates Lawton does indeed know the
hostile location and by August 27, he is talking terms with
Geronimo and from Wood’s account, Geronimo surrendered to
Lawton’s camp.
156
Lane, Jack C.,Chasing Geronimo-pp.98-99
157
White, Lonnie B.-Hostiles & Horse Soldiers-pp.220-222
106
been, Jerome learned that Lieutenant Benson had filed false reports as to
why Jerome was not with Benson. Lawton, according to Jerome, was too
just a person to condemn a man based on one version of a report. He
heard Jerome’s version and dropped the matter. At least, he never made
official note of it but probably took Benson’s apparent lie into account
when giving credit , or lack of it, to the men who were with him on the
campaign.
Geronimo, for his part, was once again trying to negotiate his way
out of a tight situation. Pressure from an increasing number of Mexican
troops was reducing his mobility and space for evasive movement. The
locals were interested in seeing his rampages come to an end as well. By
mid August, Geronimo’s band was in the area of Fronteras, near the
Mexico-Arizona border. A message from the Presidio to the adjutant
general in Washington D. C. relayed a message from General Miles of
August 18.
Miles reported that he had received dispatches from Governor
Torres, dated Hermosilla, Sonora Mexico, and from Colonels Forsythe and
Beaumont, commanding the Huachuca and Bowie districts. The
dispatches confirmed that Geronimo and forty Indians were endeavoring to
make peace with the authorities at the Fronteras district. Miles further
reported that one of the Army’s scouts, returning to Fort Huachuca from
Lawton’s command, had met Geronimo, Naiche, and thirteen other
Apaches on their way to Fronteras. He had a long conversation with
Geronimo who told the scout he wanted to make peace. The scout
described Geronimo’s group as worn and hungry and Geronimo had his
right arm in a sling.
This scout, according to a New York Times article dated August
19th, was named Gonzalez. The article reported that Geronimo and his
band were all mounted. Geronimo asked Gonzalez if he was in the service
of the U. S., to which he responded in the negative. He told the Apaches
he was on his way to his ranch.
The same newspaper reported that Miles had ordered two troops of
cavalry into the Fronteras area to seek Geronimo’s surrender. A Lieutenant
Lockett and a command of Pima Indians were dispatched to take up
positions to prevent Geronimo’s escape. Within a couple days, the Times
was reporting that the Mexicans had completely surrounded Geronimo
removing any chance of escape.
Lawton and Gatewood made good time in moving north and
arrived at Fronteras on August 20th. The news of Geronimo’s presence
107
near the border had brought an increasing number of U. S. troops near the
area as well. This was an old process that Geronimo had been through
before although previously, he had not been so worn down and his
situation had not been quite as precarious. The people of Fronteras were
also negotiating from a different position as well.
In the past, one of two things would happen. Either the people of
Fronteras would bribe Geronimo with goods to keep him from attacking
the town, or if they thought his position weak, would attack him. In either
instance though, they kept his presence quiet. Now they were spreading
the news that is why word got to Lawton, north to the U. S. troops, and to
Mexican authorities. 158
From the Mexican point of view, Geronimo’s fate was sealed no
matter what negotiations took place. If he fell into their hands, he would
be killed. Geronimo knew that and while he played along with the game
of negotiation, he was biding his time, trying to rest, refit, and look for
another way out of his dilemma
Gatewood, who had been sent ahead to Fronteras by Lawton,
found that Lieutenant Wilder of the 4th Cavalry had already reached the
area and made contact with Geronimo’s two emissaries. Two of his
women had been sent into town to put out peace feelers, and bring back
‘ refreshments ‘ for Geronimo.
The people of Fronteras had their own plans set which were to get
Geronimo drunk, lure him into town, and kill him. Mexican troops were
also in the area for the same purpose. Geronimo though, kept a safe
distance from town. When Gatewood and the two scouts showed up, the
locals and the authorities were upset that Gatewood would ruin their plans
and tried to throw Gatewood off the track. Gatewood used his own powers
of deception, took eight men from Wilder’s unit, and moved to locate
Geronimo’s camp.
Kayitah and Martine advised Lawton to hold his main party back
along a creek as any large group of men would startle Geronimo and cause
him to run. Lawton sent the two scouts with Gatewood and Tom Horn
forward to locate Geronimo’s camp. The party moved forward and on the
third day, located the hideout along the top of an escarpment near a
mountain called “Mountain Tall” by the Apaches. Kayitah and Martine

158
Adams, Alexander B.-Geronimo-p. 295
108
spotted the camp and motioned Gatewood and the rest of the group to halt
while they went up to talk with Geronimo.
The two Apaches met with Geronimo and after some discussion,
were able to get him to agree to talk with Gatewood. The scouts later
reported that Geronimo was tired and his small group was short of
supplies. Of this meeting Geronimo would later report that it was the two
scouts and not Gatewood who convinced him that it was safe to come to
some agreement with the Army troops pursuing him. Geronimo had
nothing to fear from such a small group and knew Gatewood from their
previous encounters. He agreed to see Gatewood and hear what he had to
say.
Several of Lawton’s troopers joined Gatewood at his camp,
meanwhile, Geronimo spent the night drinking. On the next day,
Gatewood, the scouts, and several of the troopers approached Geronimo’s
camp. Geronimo became worried about being surrounded and trapped and
demanded that the soldiers pull back.
Even though he was under a flag of truce, he did not trust the
soldiers not to try and kill him. Gatewood went into Geronimo’s camp and
had a lengthy and trying discussion with him. Gatewood presented the
terms that Miles had sent and Geronimo did not like what he heard.
Although he was finished for all practical purposes, he preferred to fight it
out to the last man where he stood.
What unnerved Geronimo was Gatewood’s disclosure that Miles
had removed Geronimo’s fellow Chiricahuas from the reservation and was
sending them east. The news had a disconcerting affect on Geronimo’s
half-brother, White Horse as well. He told Geronimo that he wanted to
give up and return to be with his wife and children. 159 Another brother
decided that if White Horse was going to surrender, he was going to give
up too.
Geronimo mellowed somewhat and told Gatewood that he would
take some time to think about Gatewood’s offer. Gatewood returned to
camp to find Lawton had arrived with the rest of the troops.
He went to Lawton, somewhat concerned that he had not
accomplished what he came to do. Lawton later reported that Gatewood
wanted to leave camp so that he could make contact with Miles for further

159
Betzinez, Jason- I Fought With Geronimo-p. 138
109
instructions. Lawton, sensing that Geronimo was about to come in,
convinced Gatewood to stay in camp as his services were needed there.
Other reports about Gatewood’s disposition were less generous
than Lawton’s as Leonard Wood reported that Gatewood was discouraged
and wanted to leave but Lawton ordered him to stay. Gatewood himself
wrote later that when he made suggestions about leaving camp, Lawton
threatened to use force to keep him there as necessary. According to
Gatewood, he submitted to Lawton’s authority as the senior officer.
The next day, Geronimo and some of his warriors approached the
camp and called Gatewood out. While Gatewood assured Geronimo that
he should trust General Miles and hear him out, Geronimo had conditions
that would have to be met before he would agree to meet Lawton or Miles.
He wanted assurances that he would be reunited with his family and that
no harm would come to him or his group.
Gatewood could not give any assurances to Geronimo about being
united with his family. Geronimo then insisted that he would not
surrender to Gatewood but would go north to meet with Miles, with certain
conditions. Geronimo first of all insisted that he and his warriors be
allowed to keep their weapons. 160 Secondly, since he did not trust the U.
S. soldiers, he wanted them to travel at a respectable distance, but at the
same time, protect the Apaches from the Mexicans.
Moreover, he wanted Gatewood to travel with the Apaches and
serve as a hostage. Finally, Geronimo would select the place of meeting
with General Miles, a place that would offer an easy escape route if events
turned sour. 161
While Gatewood had not talked Geronimo into surrendering as he
had earlier hoped he would, he had him talking, but had no authority to
agree to Geronimo’s terms. He returned to Lawton and spelled out the
conditions under which Geronimo would come in.
Lawton kept his presence of mind in the matter since his job was
to either capture or kill Geronimo. If Geronimo was willing to head north
with the troops, that would satisfy his mission objective. Lawton approved
of Geronimo’s request. When Geronimo and his people came into
Lawton’s camp, he is reported by Gatewood and Wood as having walked

160
This arrangement was no different than that made by General
Crook in 1883 ; Adams-p. 254
161
Ibid., p. 299
110
up to Lawton and given him a hug. Some of the men interpreted this as
meaning that the two knew each other but it was later described as a
‘customary’ greeting that the Apaches learned from the Spanish.
There is no report however, of Geronimo ever giving Generals
Crook or Miles such a hug of greeting, nor did he share it with any of the
other officers or troopers. It is doubtful that Geronimo would have used
this form of greeting lightly and it can be interpreted as a sign of respect
for the man who had hounded him for four months.
In years to follow when debates erupted over Geronimo’s capture
and the failure of Gatewood or Lawton to secure a “surrender” from him, it
was forgotten by some that Indians normally did not surrender to line
officers. They knew that officers of Gatewood’s or Lawton’s rank could
offer no terms or promises. Even the generals had trouble making
promises they could keep.
Geronimo came in under a flag of truce and it is probable that
everyone at Fronteras understood that. Lawton’s job, now that Geronimo
and his warriors were protected by the truce, was to get him back to Miles
in one piece. Had Lawton’s pursuit of the Apaches not been so relentless,
Geronimo would have still been holed up somewhere in the south. If
Lawton’s command of his present situation not been so certain, Geronimo
would probably have chosen to fight it out, or he would have been killed
along the way back to the U.S..

111
Lt. Smith letter of recommendation-National Archives. Clearly places
credit for Geronimo’s surrender with Lawton.

112
 Lawton, in tall hat, with troopers of 4th Cav.
at San Antonio railhead Sept. 1886.
Courtesy Smithsonian-Museum of American
History-Military Branch

It is interesting that at the same time Gatewood and Geronimo

were discussing terms, the press was reporting that Geronimo had again
escaped. A New York Times article dated August 24th reported that the
President of Sonora had arrived in Tombstone, Arizona. He reported that
he had been at Chucuta Ranch when Geronimo and twenty-three Indians
came in . The Apaches were waving a white flag of truce and indicating
their desire to make peace with the Mexicans.
Two days later, two troops of soldiers arrived in the area with the
intent of surprising the hostiles. The Apaches however, learned the
soldiers were in the area and escaped. The Mexican further reported that
several of Lawton’s men had come into the ranch and were wounded but
that Lawton was unhurt.
Another New York Times article, this time dated September 3rd,
quoted two Army officers stationed in D. C. as saying that the stories of
Geronimo’s capture and subsequent escape were untrue. The officers

113
reported that two sources existed in the Southwest that were fueling all of
the rumors, one in El Paso, the other being in Tombstone.
An officer of General Sheridan’s staff was interviewed and
reported that if the American troops got their hands on Geronimo, he
would not be allowed to escape alive. He further commented that if the
Mexican soldiers captured Geronimo, their sole purpose would be to kill
him and he did not believe Lawton would intervene. A later dispatch
reported that earlier stories about a fight between Lawton’s troops and the
Mexicans with the Apaches escaping was untrue.
When Lawton finally settled back into garrison a while later, he
responded to his old friend, Robert G. Carter’s questions about the rumors
and stories. He told Carter not to be concerned with the lies in the press,
that he had endured a difficult summer but had succeeded in bringing
Geronimo in. 162
In order for Geronimo, and Gatewood who rode as his hostage, to
make it back to Miles alive, a number of decisions had to be made
correctly. In terms of whether or not Lawton understood that Geronimo
had not technically surrendered, it seems that he did. He was posting
notices on settlers’ cabins and giving warnings to local towns that
Geronimo was in the area and had not surrendered.
Geronimo decidedly developed a rapport with Lawton and also a
trust as he frequented Lawton’s camp on a number of occasions. When
Gatewood wrote his account of the situation several years later, he
recounted that Geronimo had come into Lawton’s camp unarmed and the
two spent time talking.
No matter that Geronimo was tired and beaten, had he decided he
could not trust Lawton, he would have found another avenue to pursue.
He was not guaranteed that all of his warriors would follow him again, but
given enough provocation, they more than likely would have created a
major problem.
As Geronimo, Gatewood, and the band of Apaches moved north,
Lawton’s small force moved in parallel fashion. Lawton was not only

162
Newberry Library-Carter papers: This letter was published after
Lawton’s death as part of a story Carter published concerning
Geronimo’s capture. Some writers have mistakenly construed it as a
defense against claims that Lawton had misstated his
accomplishment in Mexico.
114
concerned with Geronimo attempting to escape, he had greater concern for
the two hundred Mexicans and soldiers in the area who clearly wanted
their chance to have at Geronimo. He was also concerned with Geronimo
being bushwhacked on the other side of the border by trigger-happy
troopers or settlers.
On the second day of the trip north, the Mexicans approached
Lawton’s group with the intent of attacking the Apaches. Lawton moved
quickly and decisively to diffuse the situation. Geronimo did not make it
easy for him. Since the two groups were a short distance apart, Geronimo
saw an opportunity to trap the Mexicans. He just needed to convince
Lawton of the opportunity. 163 Lawton in turn informed Geronimo he
would have no part of it and firmly ordered Geronimo’s group to break
camp and begin moving. It was apparently forceful enough a demand as
Geronimo and his men broke up their camp and began moving north,
leaving Lawton between the Apaches and Mexicans.
The Mexicans were not happy with the turn of events, in fact, they
were furious. Their one opportunity to repay Geronimo and the rest of his
group for his crimes against them was slipping away. They outnumbered
the U. S. troops and could have easily started shooting.
Lawton could have turned his head and allowed it and would have
never been any worse off bringing back Geronimo’s corpse. However, it
was not in his character to do so since he had given his word to Geronimo
that he would protect the Apaches from anyone who tried to harm them.
Lawton faced off with the Mexicans in a way that they knew to get
at Geronimo, they would face a firefight with Lawton’s troops. It was
Lawton’s sense of diplomacy in a ticklish situation that may have
prevented everything from falling into a shambles. He offered to allow a
small number of Mexicans to come into his camp to see for themselves
that he had Geronimo under control.
The presence of the Mexicans alarmed the Apaches but Lawton
instructed them to come into camp and show the Mexicans that they were
in fact returning to the U. S.

163
Adams, Alexander B.-Geronimo-p. 300
115
 After this event, Lawton rode with Geronimo and Gatewood to
provide greater security. He knew that unless he kept close to Geronimo,
there was a good chance that American troopers could easily take a shot at
Geronimo once he crossed the border. 164
Now that Lawton had secured the situation and moved Geronimo
across the border, he was faced with another problem he had not counted
on. General Miles was reluctant to travel to the meeting place Geronimo
had specified. Whatever his reasons at the moment, he must have
remembered that the Indians were not going to completely surrender to
Lawton or any other line officer in the field. The only way to effect such
an event would be to initiate some kind of fight between the two groups
after which Lawton could forcibly secure the surrender.

164
See Thrapp, p. 362; the Apaches reportedly became excited
because some of the junior officers spoke of killing the Indians and
Gatewood appears to have saved the day; Gatewood wants to be
moved out of Lawton’s unit because he fears for his own life. This
strongly appears to have a Gatewood slant: Lane, p. 108; Leonard
Wood reports that Lt. Smith made contingency plans to surround the
Apaches if they attempted to escape and the Apaches became
nervous but there is no indication from Wood that Gatewood’s story
is valid.
116
 Lawton, fourth from left, next to General Miles-Sept. 1886
Courtesy National Archives

Miles instructed Lawton to require the Apaches to surrender in the

field as prisoners of war. Lawton, through a series of messages, found that
he had to manage Miles as well as the Apaches. Having served under
Crook in the earlier campaigns, he was familiar with what might happen if
Geronimo sensed that Miles would not come to meet him. The whole
capture would have unraveled, leaving Lawton holding the bag. Miles
probably did not want to run the risk of traveling to meet Geronimo only to
have him refuse surrender, or worse, slip off again which would have
placed Miles in a precarious position with his superiors.
Geronimo was jumpy when the group reached the meeting place
and immediately sized up several routes of escape. The appearance of two
cowhands in Lawton’s camp while Geronimo was present made the
Apache even jumpier. One of the cowhands, W. T. Melton of Anadarko,
Oklahoma, later gave his account of the meeting. 165 Melton was
employed by the Sansimone Cattle Company between 1882 and 1887. He
was stationed in Skeleton Canyon in 1886, about ten miles north of the
Mexican-Arizona border.

165
Barrett, S.M.-Geronimo-pp. 185-190
117
Letter of Edmund G. Ross, Governor of the Territory of New Mexico.
National Archives

118
His job was to keep strays from going into Mexico. He had been watchful
for Geronimo as he knew the Apaches were somewhere in Mexico. One
day, he came across an Indian, then a Cavalry trail moving towards his
base camp, both going in the same direction.
He and his partner did not know what to make of it and returned to
their camp. There they found a note from Lawton, posted to the door of
their cabin, warning the inhabitants to be careful as Geronimo was in the
area and had not yet surrendered. Melton and his partner located Lawton’s
camp and talked with Lawton who urged them to stay with him for their
own safety. While they were in the camp, Geronimo rode up to Lawton,
eyeing the two men and asking Lawton who they were. Lawton settled
Geronimo down and there were no disruptions.
Lawton requested that Melton provide some beef to feed the
Indians and troopers. Melton killed three cattle the next day and was paid
by Lawton. The following day, two Mexican scouts came into Lawton’s
camp at which time the Apaches grabbed their guns and scattered into the
rocks. Lawton explained to the scouts what he was doing and they left.
The Apaches returned to their camp.
Miles meantime had instructed Lawton to use all precautions in
dealing with the Apaches. President Cleveland and Miles’ superiors
wanted Geronimo held at all costs and authorized the use of force should
the Apaches attempt to escape. If there was implicit meaning in those
messages, Lawton understood what Miles was implying but refused to go
along. To create some type of scene and then kill Geronimo was out of the
question.
Miles was just going to have to comply with Lawton’s request that
he meet with Geronimo. Miles in turn wanted some sign of good faith on
the part of the Apaches that they intended to surrender. Geronimo sent his
brother to Fort Bowie as such a sign and Miles finally relented. He arrived
at Lawton’s camp on September 3rd.
Geronimo came into camp and met with Miles who was fascinated
by the Apaches. After reaching an agreement to surrender, Geronimo,
Naiche and a few others journeyed with Miles. Lawton brought up the
rear with the remainder of the Apaches. According to Melton, Lawton
built a monument of rough stone at the ‘treaty’ spot.
Dispatches picked up by the press confirmed the surrender of
Geronimo and the other Apaches to General Miles. Miles referred to the
event as the Apaches’ surrender in the field as prisoners of war, thus
119
giving the Apaches some protection from civilian law enforcement
officers.
Miles arrived at Fort Bowie on the 5th of September, Lawton
arrived a short time after. In his later report of the account, Gatewood
reported that twenty-four warriors in all came in. Lawton’s report
indicated eighteen warriors and this report is accurate. 166
In later years, Geronimo credited Lawton’s pursuit and use of
Apache scouts as the main reason he surrendered. Jason Bitzenez was to
remember Lawton many years later when Lawton Oklahoma was named
“after our old friend Henry Lawton.” 167
Lawrence Jerome, in his narrative of the campaign, was alive at
the time of Lawton’s death years later. He referred to Lawton as “one of
the truest, bravest men on God’s green earth.”
Within short order of the conclusion of the campaign, the press
was publicly insisting on rewards for Lawton and his men. With a great
deal of truth, the New York Times of September 10th, claimed that there
was little chance of advancement in the Army, and little in the way of
recognition for the men who fought on the frontier. Part of the article was
as follows;

“ What shall the reward of Capt. Lawton and the other

gallant officers and men of our Army who, through the
heats of an Arizona midsummer, have been hunting down
Geronimo and his gang of miscreants by night and day,
enduring all hardships and never relaxing their efforts till
the prey was within their grasp”?

“The enormous labors, trials, and sufferings attendant on

such a campaign as the one that has been carried on since
May, 1885, can hardly be appreciated from mere
description. But, something can be understood everywhere
of the priceless relief brought to the Southwest frontier by
the capture of that merciless Chiricahua chief, who has
been its terror for sixteen months, murdering in cold
blood, scores of innocent people, without pity for age or

166
Debo, Angie-Geronimo The Man-p. 287; fn 10
167
Betzinez, Jason- I Fought With Geronimo-p. 185
120
 sex, and often under circumstances of the most horrible
atrocity”.

“What, then, shall be the mark of distinction for those who

have performed exceptional service in freeing the frontier
from this pest?”

In a short time after arriving at Fort Bowie, Miles was transporting

the Apaches off to Fort Marion, Florida. They made it eventually but had
to endure lengthy delays and hardship because of a government
investigation into the specific terms of the surrender and what the Apaches
understood of the agreement they had made.
When the Apaches were brought to the railhead, an Army band
played Auld Lang Syne but the attempt at cruel humor was lost on the
Indians.
Miles moved rapidly to complete the plan he and Sheridan had
agreed on to remove all hostile Apaches from the Southwest. He was to be
soundly criticized for his actions and General Crook was to be one of his
greatest critics.
However, he may have saved Geronimo and the others from the
civilian authorities. President Cleveland had sent his congratulations to
Miles and ordered him to hold the Apaches for the civilian authorities to
stand trial for their crimes. Given the history of such trials, the Apaches
would not have stood a chance and would have been dead before the year
was out.
Lawton and a detail of men were to provide escort for the Apaches
as they left their homes. His wife had just arrived from back east but this
last duty had to be fulfilled before he could spend any time with her.
Lawton’s report dated September 9, 1886 was filed while he was
in transit to Florida with Geronimo and the Apaches. The report is
pragmatic and concise. Among other details, he covered Gatewood’s
contact with Geronimo on the evening of August 24. Gatewood was in
communication with the hostiles, but on returning to Lawton’s camp, he
reported that Geronimo refused to make an unconditional surrender
(Lawton does not say that Gatewood failed) and wished Gatewood to bear
certain messages to General Miles.
Lawton persuaded Gatewood to remain in camp as Lawton
believed the hostiles would yet come to terms and “in this, I was not
disappointed.” Lawton complimented Lieutenant R. D. Walsh who had
121
been in the field against the hostiles since May 17, 1885, longer than any
officer in the department. He also complimented Lieutenants Finley,
Benson, and Smith for their individual contributions that he spelled out in
the report. The scouts William Edwardy, W.L. Long, and J. Wilson were
complimented as well. Lawton gave special mention to the detachment of
the 8th Infantry, which handled their assignment without any complaints.
Leonard Wood received high marks from Lawton and probably because
the surgeon saved his life on more than one occasion. 168
The fact that he did not praise or criticize Gatewood’s
performance is understandable since Gatewood was directly under Miles’
command and had made that fairly clear to Lawton when he arrived in
Lawton’s camp. Moreover, if Gatewood had voiced his disgust with Miles’
plan and slim hopes for its success, and taken five days to depart camp to
follow Geronimo’s trail as reported by Leonard Wood, Lawton probably
was discrete and kept quiet altogether about Gatewood.
Lieutenant E. J. Spencer, Corps of Engineers submitted a report
dated September 25, 1886 from Fort Bowie, confirming in detail Lawton’s
report of hardships and conditions during the Geronimo campaign. 169
Spencer had been detailed by the Department to visit several field
commands with messages, and to map areas of the campaign. In his travel,
his observation of terrain and hardship was a function of his own
experience.
Nelson Miles annual report of 1886 commended the men under his
command for their achievement. He did not neglect to commend
Lieutenant Gatewood who he reported rode boldly into Geronimo’s camp,
at great risk to his own life, to negotiate with the hostiles. 170
President Cleveland authorized that a special trip be made by
Lawton and B Troop early in 1887. Along with a 6th Cavalry troop, B
Troop traveled to Fort Myer, near Washington D. C.

168
Lawton’s report is contained in the SW Report of 1886-National
Archives Serial 2461 and a clear copy is kept in the Graff Collection
F2420, Newberry Library. General Nelson A Miles’ reports are
housed in the same two locations.
169
Newberry Library-Graff Collection-F2420-R.G. Carter-Chicago
IL.
170
Ibid.
122
Letter from Governor Ross of Texas-National Archives.

123
There they formed an honor guard and were proudly reviewed by
government and foreign dignitaries as the finest cavalry troops in the
world. Another veteran of the Indian campaigns, General David S.
Stanley, would later comment in a letter written to President Cleveland
December 20, 1887 that “ it is my settled opinion, that had there been no
Captain Lawton, there would not be any captive Geronimo.” 171
When Lawton returned home to his wife, the life of fighting on the
frontier had come to an end. He and his fellow soldiers, would for a time,
be able to lead a more docile life. That the Army had the misfortune of
serving as the government’s instrument in eliminating many Indian
cultures from the scene was a source of bitterness for generations to come.
Yet, the soldiers had done their job with a large degree of compassion, not
wanting to deprive the Native Americans of their homelands, but not able
to change the course of history either.
For Lawton, the next twelve years would be a period of
recollection, peace, and family life. He did not know that another frontier
would open that would again call for his kind of soldiering.

171
National Archives-Lawton papers
124
“He had not merely the quality of courage, but the quality of command,
which inspired his troops with his indomitable will and disregard of
danger.” “I believe that the crowning achievement of his life of strenuous
and noble service will be deemed to add lustre to American arms and
secure for him an enduring place as one of the heroic figures of American
History.” Secretary of War, Elihu Root, December 21, 1899.

CHAPTER TEN

THE LULL AND THE STORM

Henry Lawton, known to the Indians as the Tall White Man, and
Man Who Gets Up At Night To Fight, was to become a peacetime soldier
in the fashion of the Army of the day. Aside from some minor border
skirmishes, all major campaigns had been concluded. In the period
between 1871 and 1889, Lawton had served at more than eleven Army
installations, not including the locations he visited as part of his new duties
assumed in 1888.
The United States had stretched to its borders and in 1887, had no
territorial interests. The country was not imperialistic in policy, rather a
peaceful nation seeking only to protect its own interests in the world.
Army forts in the Southwest were closed and the number of troops
in the area declined. For the next eleven years, fighting would not be a
part of Lawton’s life. His wife, Mamie, had joined him at Fort Huachuca
in 1886. Aside from a short trip to Fort Myer Virginia with B Troop of the
4th Cavalry, Lawton was to have ample time to devote to family life.
By November, Lawton was contemplating his career and what his
future held in the Army. There is little published history relating to
Lawton’s personal feelings or aspirations after the Geronimo campaign.
One insight comes from the information he shared with his friend Robert
G. Carter.
In a letter to Carter, dated November 16, 1886, Lawton describes a
recent trip to New York during which he had hoped to visit his friend but a
death in his wife’s family forced a detour to Louisville, Kentucky.

125
 The letter goes on to say that while in the Washington D.C. area
for the display of his troop of the 4th Cavalry, Lawton visited with General
Sheridan who gave him some advice about career possibilities. Most of
the options though, were not palatable to Lawton as they involved staff
positions in Washington. He was quite clear in expressing his dislike for
any type of staff job. He would consider a position with the Inspector
General’s office however, as that would allow him the freedom to move
among the line troops and remain active. If a position could not be found
for him in the Inspector General’s department, he preferred to remain in
the line. Lawton also confided his hopes for a promotion to major and
reflected on his tenure in the Army. He talked about looking forward to
retirement and moving to California to be close to his older brother,
Manley, who lived in San Francisco.
The most revealing comment made by Lawton in his letter
pertained to the Geronimo campaign. He had lost more than thirty pounds
during the ordeal in Mexico, yet never complained or indicated that he had
suffered physically. However, he informed Carter that he had worked very
hard during the summer, “and the work told on me more than I liked or
acknowledged.” “I am growing old and there is no use in trying to deceive
myself.” The letter shows a side to Lawton that he did not allow many
people to see. 172
What Lawton did not reveal to his friend Carter was the heartbreak
of losing three children in succession. A year after writing Carter, Lawton
wrote a letter to another old friend, John M. Godown of Lowell,
Massachusetts.173 Godown, formerly a captain in the 12th Indiana Infantry
and Lawton had been friends since they were boys. A letter dated
November 22, 1887 from Ft. Wayne, Indiana begins “My Dear Godown”,
in the fashion of the day. Lawton makes no mention of his campaign into
Mexico in chase of Geronimo. He does write that he has spent most of his
time on the frontier with Indians, Mexicans, and other breeds of cutthroats.
Lawton also tells of his marriage to Mamie Craig and the
unfortunate deaths of two sons soon after birth. A third child, a daughter,
lived for a few months, then became ill and died. All of that had a telling
affect on Lawton.

172
Newberry Library-Carter Papers
173
Courtesy Mark Weldon, Ft. Wayne, Indiana
126
 A son, Manley Lawton, was born on July 29, 1887. As he had
written Carter, Lawton also wrote Godown that he felt he was getting old
and was concerned that he might not live to see his son mature. Three
other children were born over the course of the next five years, all three
were daughters.174
Frances was born January 28, 1889; Catherine M. was born May
20, 1890; and Louise was born June 21, 1892. Three other children died at
birth. Henry and his wife Marie, sometimes referred to as Mamie,
concentrated on raising the children. All had the opportunity to see a big
part of the country as Lawton’s assignments took him to some interesting
places.
The level of recognition and popularity Lawton had achieved
among field and staff officers became evident in this period of time. When
he was recommended for promotion to major, letters poured in from all
corners of the country, written by general, staff, and line officers.175

174
Family records-National Archives
175
Copies of over 200 hundred letters from National Archives in
author’s possession.
127
Letter of recommendation from Col. Richard Dodge-National Archives

128
Letter of recommendation from General W.T. Sherman-National
Archives

129
 All of the accolades he had won while serving under Mackenzie
were amplified by officers who had been his seniors or peers during the
Civil War, and during the campaigns in Texas, the Southwest, and West.
176
Letters not only originated from military personnel, they came from
high-ranking congressmen, the governors of Texas, Arizona, New Mexico,
and Indiana. Testimony arrived in the office of the President, Secretary of
War, and the Commanding General of the Army as to Lawton’s long and
dedicated military service, his fine character, and outstanding
achievements.
There is also a hint of rivalry between the older officers, both
West Point and those who rose through the ranks, and the more junior
West Point graduates since some of the many letters written on Lawton’s
behalf point out his longer and more dangerous service to the country over
his West Point competition.
Lawton was promoted to the rank of major, inspector general on
September 17, 1888. 177 It had been a little over twenty-one years since he
returned to the Army as a second lieutenant. The average period of time
for an officer to move from second lieutenant to major was twenty-four
years and he was slightly ahead of the average. There was a small
minority of critics who felt he was unjustly promoted due to his connection
with the Geronimo campaign. That effort certainly helped his cause but it
was an accumulation of service accomplishments, which earned him the
promotion, not one event. The Army’s struggle to gain some level of
recognition from politicians and the general public was most likely aided
by Lawton’s emerging public profile. Today he might be viewed as the
ideal poster person for the Army. In his time, Lawton gained favorable
recognition for the Army, a feat that no doubt influenced his brother
officers to support him at every opportunity. As the Army’s stature
improved, theirs improved as well.
Lawton’s service in the inspector general’s office covered some
five years, through December, 1893. He received a promotion to lieutenant
colonel and inspector general on February 12, 1889. 178 The Army took

176
National Archives-Lawton papers
177
War Dept.-Svc Record
178
Ibid.
130
advantage of his background as a regimental quartermaster as well as his
general knowledge of sound soldiering. Lawton, not the type to sit behind
a desk, was proactive in traveling throughout the country, inspecting
military sites and making recommendations to the Army for
improvements.
He gained recognition for his accomplishments in the area of re-
vamping the recruiting process. Being an Army still dependent on cavalry,
the military establishment had basic systems concerning the acquisition
and replacement of mounts for the troops. Lawton became involved in
developing reforms and improvements in that area. He also worked on
improvements in firearms and his recommendations were adapted by
Winchester. 179
One special tour took him to most of the Army posts in the West
where he traveled as far north as Fort Canby, down the Pacific coast to Los
Angeles, California and then back to Washington. Another major tour of
installations embraced inspections on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts.
Lawton traveled from Wilmington, North Carolina, through St. Augustine,
Florida, on to Montgomery, New Orleans, Vicksburg, Memphis, Little
Rock, and north to Duluth, Minnesota. This tour involved engineering
inspections.
A third great tour covered the post exchange system. Lawton also
aided in consolidating the various printing offices of the War department
into one. His many talents extended to the Army Supply departments
where his influence was felt as well. He had no end of energy and
curiosity and applied his peacetime service to a seemingly unlimited
number of tasks aimed at improving the Army. 180
By nature, Lawton was highly active and any job involving strictly
desk duties was inhibiting. It was noted by his colleagues, after his death
in 1899, that he strained to return to some type of a line unit even though
his position offered him comforts that the line officers did not enjoy.
In 1893, his gallantry at Atlanta, during the Civil War, was
recognized when he was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. His
old regiment, the 30th Indiana Volunteers, agreed during a re-union in
April of 1893, to recommend Lawton for the medal. The Congress was at
that time contemplating the award and letters of testimony were received

179
National Archives-Lawton papers
180
Ibid.
131
from active and retired senior officers who had observed Lawton’s actions
on August 3, 1864. The official document recording the award was issued
May 13, 1893. 181 Lawton accepted the award with his usual modesty.
In December 1893, he requested and received relief from office
duties and assumed station at Los Angeles, California. The area suited him
and his family as he purchased several acres of land with plans to retire
there someday. The home purchased by the Lawton’s was of substantial
size and may have later contributed to his financial worries.
On September 28, 1894, Lawton was assigned as inspector general
of the Department of Colorado and stationed briefly in Denver. After his
tour in that area, he moved on to Santa Fe, New Mexico, where he
assumed the position of inspector general of the southern inspection
district on April 29, 1895. He returned to Los Angeles where he made his
headquarters. His area of inspection included all Army posts along the
Mexican border.
Lawton brought to the inspector general’s job a thorough
knowledge of the improvements needed in the field to modernize the
Army. In 1897, the Army was still in the throes of fragmentation and
disorganization, a force essentially divided between well-attended staffers
and lightly supported field units. The Army was not one that could be
counted on to mount a major offensive action, nor even provide any real
security against a foreign threat.
A small group of reformers was at work to make the Army a
cohesive force, but their work had yet to bear fruit. 182 Politicians had as
much a hand in making military decisions as did the professional soldiers.
Many of the top ranking officers were stationed in cities where
they lived a reasonably comfortable life whereas their junior counterparts
in the field had to scrape for modern weapons and supplies. Command of
the Army was divided between a Commanding General and the Secretary
of War, both of whom reported to the President. Actions requested by the
Secretary of War were to be transmitted through the Commanding
General, however, those orders were often transmitted directly to field
commands. 183

181
National Archives-Lawton papers, information for promotions
and positions derived from these papers.
182
Cosmas, Graham A.-An Army For Empire-p. 3
183
Ibid., p. 10
132
 The chain of command was for all practical purposes, something
to be desired rather than a reality. This caused no end of frustration for
command and other line officers who needed a clear-cut picture of their
mission roles. Lawton, in the middle of this transition, made a number of
friends on the senior staff who also respected his abilities. He was
considered a man of few words, but one who was honest and spoke his
mind on the subjects he represented.
His duties allowed him to visit old friends from his cavalry days
such as Robert G. Carter who served with Lawton in the 4th Cavalry. The
two remained in contact and since Carter had some insights as to what was
going on in Washington, was a good source of news for Lawton. 184
Towards the latter part of Lawton’s staff assignments, the
Geronimo campaign came back into focus for a time, partly because of a
book written by General Nelson A. Miles, now commanding general of the
Army. Published in 1897, it was an elaborate dissertation of Miles’ virtues
and accomplishments. A large portion of the book dealt with Miles’
handling of the Apaches and Geronimo in 1886 and painted a picture
perfect view of his plans and achievements.
The book followed one written by Lieutenant Charles Gatewood
in 1895 giving his version of the Geronimo campaign. Gatewood had
performed a valuable service for the Army and for Miles in particular
when he negotiated with Geronimo to get him out of hiding and to agree to
meet with Lawton who had been in pursuit of the Apaches in Mexico. In
addition to his book, Miles had previously recommended Lawton and
other officers to the Army in 1890 for a brevet in recognition of their
gallantry during the Geronimo campaign. Since Lawton’s own official
report of the action gave credit to his troops but made no mention of his
own actions, the Army had no choice but to deny the recommendation
after careful study. The decision was handed down in 1894. 185
Miles had never given Gatewood the amount of recognition
Gatewood felt he deserved and Gatewood’s account was an effort at
achieving some recognition for his role in the affair. Naturally, the
conflict between Gatewood’s and Miles’ accounts raised a few questions
as to what had actually happened. At the time though, no one questioned

184
Newberry Library-Carter papers
185
National Archives-Lawton papers
133
Lawton’s role although he was asked on occasion to comment on the
campaign as it had become a part of Army lore.

Letter of recommendation from Col. Thomas Anderson

National Archives
134
 Captain A.J. Dougall, an acquaintance of Lawton’s, met him in
Cleveland in 1898 and asked him about the stories going around
concerning the 1886 campaign. In typical fashion, Lawton did not blow
his role out of proportion and did not seem perturbed by the renewed
interest in what had happened. When Dougall asked Lawton to elaborate
on the tactics he used to corner Geronimo, Lawton’s response was simple.
He “ just went after Geronimo and got him. There was no room for
tactics, we simply had to follow him and land him.” 186 While the issue did
not become a major one at that time, a few envious junior officers would
again raise it, but waited until after Lawton’s death to do so.
Any concerns about the capture of Geronimo or other events of
years past were soon to be overshadowed by growing tensions with Spain.
The Spanish had oppressed the people of Cuba and the Philippines for
several years. When the Ten Years’ War had ended in 1878, the Spanish
had promised to implement reforms in Cuba but by 1895, had neglected to
live up to their promises. As a result, the Cubans broke into open revolt
against the Spanish rulers.
Conditions in the Philippines were no better and a rebellion
against Spanish rule had begun in 1896. Led by Emelio Aguinaldo, the
Filipino rebels fought the Spanish forces in Luzon, the main island in the
Philippine archipelago. A brief truce was achieved after an agreement
between Aguinaldo and Primo de Rivera, the Spanish governor in 1897.
The Spanish promised to pay a large sum of Mexican currency to
the rebels and institute reforms. In turn, Aguinaldo and other rebel leaders
entered a self-imposed exile in Hong Kong. Within a short time however,
it became evident that the Spanish were not going to hold up their end of
the bargain. They failed to make full payment as agreed and to implement
the promised reforms. As a result, hostilities flared anew. 187
In the United States, popular support, borne of humanitarian
reasons, grew for both the Cuban and Philippine people. Because of the
close proximity of Cuba to the U.S., initial sympathies for the rebels there
were more intense. Major newspapers in the U.S. kept a steady stream of

186
Ft. Wayne Ind. Historical Society
187
Cosmas, Graham A.-An Army For Empire-p. 186
135
information flowing concerning ruthless treatment of the Cubans by the
Spanish occupational forces. The New York Journal, headed by William
Randolph Hearst, was extremely active in reporting damage to American
economic interests as well. Pressure was building within the U.S. for
government officials to intervene and protect American interests as well as
Cuban lives. While sentiment for intervention grew in Congress, President
Grover Cleveland, at the end of his term, and President William McKinley,
early in his term, resisted U.S. action.
In 1897, the Spanish tried to alleviate the problems in Cuba. Their
prime minister, Praxedes Mateo Sagasta, promised to do away with prison
camps and grant additional autonomy to the Cubans. By that time
however, the rebels would be satisfied only with complete independence
from Spain. The U.S reached a point where it cut off all trade with Cuba.
At the same time Spain was having its difficulties in Cuba and the
Philippines and pressure was building in the U.S. towards conflict with
Spain, the U.S. was facing major issues with its own army. For one, the
army was essentially a constabulary force and fought its last engagement
at Wounded Knee during the winter of 1890-91.188 No doctrine existed for
a major out of country military operation, senior officers had not trained
for overseas operations, nor did any have actual experience in such
operations.
The infantry, cavalry, and artillery operated separately and no
training took place combining the branches. As of April 1, 1898, army
strength was roughly 28,000; 2,100 officers and 26,000 enlisted. 189 While
the enlisted and lower officer ranks had the benefit of more recent combat
experience than the Navy, the general officers who would be in charge of
transport, logistics, medical, and combat planning were lacking greatly in
large operations experience. 190
The individual states had regulated militias and Volunteer forces
and a large number of Americans disdained the use of Regulars who were
considered less desirable than Volunteer soldiers. Volunteers were viewed
as patriots who had better motives than fighting for pay.
States, eager to jump on the bandwagon rushed to influence how
the military establishment would develop a force capable of dealing with

188
U.S. Army, Center of Military History
189
Ibid
190
Leech, Margaret-In The Days of McKinley-p. 198
136
the Cuban and Philippine affairs. In the Regular Army, a good number of
experienced, battle trained, general officers had retired. Many of the
officers in queue for promotion to senior levels, had not commanded large
groups of men.
The Volunteer officers were often appointed as a result of family
or political ties with persons of importance. They were not necessarily
qualified to command men in battle. General Miles did not feel that any
outbreak of hostilities with Spain would involve the Army in a major way.
His civilian and military colleagues at first agreed with him. If there was to
be a war with Spain, the Navy would handle the brunt of the fight and the
Army might be called upon to send small detachments to Cuba for the
purposes of securing a port for the Navy. 191
As early as 1896, the Naval War College had drawn up plans for
going to war with Spain. Naval forces would be used to destroy the
Spanish ships, and to blockade Cuba to starve the Spanish defenders into
submission. If necessary, the Navy would conduct assaults on Manila in
the Philippines and even along the coast of Spain. 192
Joint planning between Naval and Army staffs aimed at giving the
Navy the lion’s share of the offensive burden. Money from military
appropriations was allocated accordingly. General Miles, supported by
other professional Army officers, resisted any suggestions to involve the
Army in any large-scale operations.
He particularly resisted the idea of using Volunteer or state militia
organizations in any role but continental defense. However, as conditions
in Cuba and the Philippines worsened, tensions in the U.S. rose rapidly.
Pressure to increase the size of the Regular Army and to infuse large
numbers of Volunteers grew steadily. The views of the President also
appeared to change dramatically as he began to recognize the possibility of
expanding U.S. foreign power.
As the political objectives of the U.S changed from helping
oppressed natives in Cuba and the Philippines, to attaining foreign naval
bases that would in turn extend American economic influence, the military
planning also changed.
In December of 1897, the U.S. battleship Maine was sent to the
port of Havana to protect American citizens and property. On the evening

191
Cosmas, Graham A.-An Army For Empire -p. 75
192
Ibid.
137
of February 15, 1898, a great explosion shook the Maine and she sank with
260 lives lost. The American press now fueled war fever and politicians
railed against the Spanish and for war. Even though the cause of the
explosion was not determined, the press fed the rumors that sabotage had
precipitated the Maine’s sinking.
Members of Congress were roused by a speech by Senator
Redfield Procter of Vermont, in March of 1898, decrying the deplorable
and inhumane conditions that he had witnessed in Cuba. The pace of war
fever hastened during the month of April. It seemed as though Congress,
buoyed by public sentiment, was attempting to wrest control of foreign
policy away from the President. McKinley for his part continued to hold
out hope for a peaceful resolution until the last moment.193 Once McKinley
decided on the use of force of arms, he wanted a quick end to the conflict
so that he could re-focus on domestic issues and the fall congressional
elections.
As the case for war intensified, Rear Admiral William T. Sampson
recommended an attack on the city of Havana itself. Because a large
number of Spanish forces were concentrated there, a bombardment of the
outer defenses plus a threat to bombard the city itself could bring an early
surrender by Spain. His superior, Secretary of the Navy, John D. Long,
vetoed the plan on the grounds that Sampson first needed to find and
destroy the Spanish fleet. It had not concentrated itself near Havana as the
Americans had first thought it would, rather, stayed at sea and undetected.
194

Sampson’s plan had called for occupation of Havana by Army

forces after the city had submitted to U.S. Naval pressure. General Miles
and other Army officers resisted Sampson’s plan fearing that once in
Havana, Army troops could be cut off if the Spanish fleet appeared and
destroyed U.S. Naval support.
Moreover, Miles insisted that any incursion into Cuba by Army
forces would unnecessarily expose the troops to Yellow Fever between
April and September. No cure had been found for the disease and along
with Malaria, it posed a serious threat to the health of any troops that
might be in Cuba.

193
Leech, Margaret-In The Days Of McKinley-pp. 185-187
194
Cosmas, Graham A.-An Army For Empire -p. 97
138
 Concurrent with the arguments for and against an early strike on
Havana were the continuing debates over how the Army was to be
constituted. Up until the time war was actually declared, the Army’s role
remained in a state of confusion. States continued to lobby heavily for use
of their militia and Volunteer units but wanted those units to go into the
war intact. The Army on the other hand was striving to increase its size by
having militia members and Volunteers enlist directly into the service as
Regulars.
The matter was hard fought in the House of Representatives and in
order to gain some advantages, those pushing for an all Regular force
augmented by Volunteers, gave way to states’ demands to use their
Volunteer units. 195
By early April of 1898, most of the top government officials were
involved in all forms of intrigue, pursuing their own agendas. The
President was leaning towards a military offensive against Havana and was
supported by General John M. Schofield who had been brought on board
by McKinley as a special advisor. 196
Secretary of War Russell A. Alger and General Miles continued to
circumvent each other whenever possible. In a meeting of his top military
and civilian staff on April 20, McKinley, for the moment, decided on a
course of action. While Army units were either in place or moving
towards marshaling areas in the south, the Navy would implement a
blockade of Cuba over the summer months. 197 Miles again argued against
any major Army operation in Cuba during the rainy season that would risk
the health of the troops.
The entire top echelon of the administration and War Department
were constantly at odds with each other and dealing with fluid plans that
seemed to change from one day to the next. Miles and Alger were in
conflict, Navy Secretary John Long differed with Alger, and McKinley
went from one plan to another. At one point, Miles was ordered to attack
Havana with a phantom force of 70,000.198
In addition, the Army, now being given a greater role than
previously anticipated, needed time to re-size and prepare. Use of Army

195
Cosmas, Graham A.-An Army For Empire- pp. 89-91
196
Ibid., p. 94
197
Ibid., -p. 98
198
Leech, Margaret-In The Days of McKinley-p. 200, pp. 214-217
139
troops over the summer would be limited to sending small units into Cuba
with arms and material for the Cuban rebels. A number of Army units had
been deployed to camps in Tampa, Mobile, and New Orleans. Following
the meeting on April 20, the War Department ordered six infantry
regiments to Camp Chickamauga for training with cavalry and field
artillery. 199
With its smaller share of military appropriations, the Army had
been busy for several months reinforcing coastal defenses. There was
concern that the Spanish fleet could attack anywhere along the U.S. coasts
which were essentially undefended.
The parties to the meeting of April 20 left the discussion with a
sense that a final plan was in place. However, the call for 60,000 men
from the states created a situation in which the individual states would be
forced to send incomplete units in response. Friends and families wanted
to serve together in the national cause and pressure forced the President
into a different frame of mind within days of the meeting.
On April 20, President McKinley endorsed a congressional
resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of Spanish forces from
Cuba. In response, Spain declared war on the United States on April 24.
On April 25, Congress declared that hostilities had begun as of April 21.
The congressional declaration also declared that the U.S. had no plans to
annex Cuba or establish an empire.
In addition to the pressure from the states, McKinley was also
being advised to call up a larger number of men to avoid being short of
forces if and when a major conflict erupted. His call then was for 125,000
men, which caught a number of people, including General Miles,
completely off guard. When McKinley finally decided on a major Cuban
offensive, he did so before most of the troops needed were even mustered
into service. 200
Miles and Secretary of War, Alger, who had been at odds for some
time, now found their tensions at higher levels. 201 Miles of course was
faced with trying to figure out how to bring the Regular Army up to
strength, accommodate a huge and rapid development of Volunteer units

199
Cosmas, Graham A.-An Army For Empire-p. 98
200
Musicant, Ivan-Empire By Default- p. 259
201
Leech, Margaret-In The Days Of McKinley-p. 201
140
and equip and supply both. Not only did he face those difficulties, he was
to face a changing time line as well.
To add to the stresses and opportunities in Washington, a major
event was about to occur in the Philippines. Commodore Dewey had met
with Emelio Aguinaldo and other Filipino rebel leaders in Singapore in
April, 1898. Aguinaldo was allowed to sail with Dewey’s fleet on its way
to Manila. He was landed near Manila and immediately set about to raise
hostilities against the Spanish in southern Luzon. 202 On May 1, 1898,
Dewey attacked and destroyed the Spanish fleet, which was at anchor in
Manila Bay. The victory raised hopes that the U.S. ventures against Spain,
now accelerated, would result in early and quick victories in the Caribbean
as well. 203 What also became apparent was the American zeal for using
the conflict in order to gain foreign military bases. The opportunity to
extend American influence and economic power to the Far East was an
enticement McKinley could not ignore. Even if he chose to do so, there
were too many influences and pressures from American businessmen and
politicians to expand, to allow him to have purely altruistic motives.
Henry Lawton had been serving as Inspector General in the
Southern District when the conflict with Spain moved towards a war
footing. He held the rank of lieutenant colonel. His friends remembered
that he was straining to get into the fight, if there was to be one. He was
remembered as having two loves in life; fighting and hard work. He felt
that he had been doing enough hard work and if there was to be a war,
Lawton wanted to return to his first love. 204
Since there were officers senior to him who would most likely be
selected to lead actual combat troops, it would have seemed that Lawton’s
chance of commanding in Cuba was slim. Nevertheless, he made it known
that he wanted to have a part in the action in Cuba. On April 14, 1898,
Lawton submitted his request to Army Headquarters for an appointment to
command troops in the case of immediate war. On the same date, the
Adjutant General’s office submitted a long file to the War Department
relating to Lawton’s military experience, attaching copies of the many
endorsements in his file from numerous military men and politicians. 205

202
Cosmas, Graham A.-An Army For Empire-p. 187
203
Ibid., p.110
204
Ft. Wayne Historical Society
205
N.A.-Lawton papers
141
Endorsements were submitted to the Secretary of War on April 14 by J. C.
Breckenridge, Inspector General, and Major General Nelson A Miles.
Lieutenant General Schofield submitted a letter dated April 19,
1898 to the Secretary of War adding his recommendation that Lawton be
given command of volunteer troops. General William R. Shafter,
commanding the V Army Corps, which was to lead the Army’s attack on
whatever target was finally selected, knew Lawton from the 4th Cavalry.
Shafter had served immediately under Colonel Mackenzie when the 4th
was formed in 1871 and knew Lawton from their cavalry days. Shafter
personally wrote emphatic letters requesting Lawton as one of his division
commanders. 206 A telegram from Shafter to the Adjutant General’s office
dated March 28, 1898, requested that Lawton be assigned to duty in
Shafter’s command.

Maj. Gen. Henry W. Lawton 1898

Courtesy National Archives
On April 18, 1898, Lawton, with the permission and support of his Army
superiors, wrote to Senator Redfield Proctor asking for his support.
Proctor in turn wrote the Secretary of War on April 19 stating; “ I know no
officer in the Army to whom I would sooner give the command of a

206
National Archives-Lawton papers
142
brigade than Col. Lawton. He will give a good account of himself and will
fight every time.”
Lawton had partisans in Ft. Wayne, Indiana, his hometown who
had been vocal in trying to have Lawton selected as the leader of the
Indiana Volunteers. Since it was becoming the practice of some of the
Regular Army officers to give up their Regular commissions to take
favored commissions with Volunteer units, Lawton had entertained that
thought. Scores of Indiana signatures were forwarded to the President and
Secretary of War requesting that Lawton be given a field command.
Even President McKinley had indicated that he would appoint
Lawton as commanding general of the Indiana Volunteers. The politicians
in Indianapolis had greater voice with McKinley however. Senator C. W.
Fairbanks sent a telegram to the Secretary of War indicating resistance to
Lawton’s appointment to lead Indiana volunteers. The candidate of choice
was William James McKee and he was selected instead of Lawton. In the
years since the final Indian campaigns in the Southwest, Lawton’s service
in the Inspector General’s office had taken him out of the spotlight in
Indiana. When Adjutant General Henry C. Corbin suggested to Senator
Fairbanks that Lawton had been proposed as brigadier general, Fairbanks
was not familiar with him. 207 As things worked out, Lawton’s failure to
gain a state Volunteer position worked in his favor. McKee, conversely,
languished with his men in a camp and never got into the fighting.
Lawton was also known to Major General Wesley Merritt from the
Indian campaign days and both respected each other. Whatever lobbying
Lawton did in private among those senior officers is not known, but the
Army needed decisive and non-political generals to lead troops in Cuba.
Lawton was one of those.
President McKinley, General Miles, and Secretary of War, Alger,
were all personally involved in screening and selecting officers and
generals for the various Army corps and divisions. Lawton’s selection was
approved at the top. Adjutant General Corbin would have concurred with
the selection and he also later supported Lawton for an independent
command in the Philippines. The many Army officers who knew Lawton
wrote in support of an appointment for him to a major field command. In
all likelihood, Adjutant General Henry C. Corbin supported Lawton as
well. Corbin, in the midst of the confusion, was an anchor for the War

207
Ft. Wayne Historical Society
143
Department and worked diligently to keep matters at an even keel. He was
considered honest, consistent, and loyal to the army. 208
When Lawton was assigned to the Department of California on
April 16, 1898, he reported instead, directly to Shafter. On May 4, 1898,
he was appointed brigadier general of volunteers and assigned to Shafter’s
V Corps. Shafter immediately wired Army headquarters on May 4
requesting that Lawton not be assigned elsewhere after his promotion to
Brigadier General. Shafter wanted Lawton as his chief of staff although he
indicated that if necessary, he would assign Lawton to command a brigade.
As events unfolded, Lawton took command of one of two infantry
divisions. 209 Colonel J. Ford Kent took command of the other infantry
division and was also appointed as brigadier general. Joseph Wheeler,
who, at the end of the Civil War was the senior Confederate cavalry
officer, was asked to come out of retirement and take command of a
dismounted cavalry division. He gave up a seat in Congress to do so.
Wheeler, an elder statesman among soldiers, accepted the commission
gladly as he was eager to get back into a fight that held promise of a final
victory. His selection was partially political, a move to help heal the rift
between North and South, but it also revealed the Army’s need for battle-
seasoned leaders.
Lawton’s final assignment was not handled cleanly as general
confusion continued to reign. Correspondence to and from Generals
Corbin, Breckenridge, and Shafter indicate that Lawton somehow was
assigned first to a position in California, then to Major General John R.
Brooke at Camp George Thomas at Chickamauga Park, Georgia. 210
On May 11th, a somewhat frustrated Lawton wired General
Corbin that he had arrived and reported at Camp Thomas, had nothing to
do for at least a week, and felt “very sore that I could not go with Shafter.”
211
He appealed to Corbin to assist him so he could sail with the first
column to depart for Cuba. The matter was finally cleared up on May 17,
1898 when the Secretary of War directed General Brooke to relieve

208
Cosmas, Graham A.-An Army for Empire- p. 58
209
War Dept.-Svc Record
210
N.A.-Cables between Shafter and War Dept. May 4, 8, 9, 1898,
Lawton and War Dept. May 9, 1898 copies in author’s possession
211
N.A –cable Lawton to Corbin May 11, 1898, copy in author’s
possession
144
Lawton from his duty at Camp Thomas so he could join Shafter in Tampa
Florida.212
As the Volunteer units absorbed men into their ranks and the
Regulars attempted to enlist to come up to a war footing, planning
continued to evolve in a chaotic fashion. 213 What had been originally
planned as a Naval operation, now expanded to include the Army in a
greater role than it had planned for.
President McKinley pushed his plan to attack Havana, and General
Miles persisted in his effort to have any ground operation wait until after
the warm and rainy season. As troops drilled and waited for supplies and
transport, the brass modified planning to have Shafter land in Cuba with a
relatively small force and attack Havana. Once in position, Miles would
follow with a large force, which would have been able to come to full
strength by the time Shafter gained a foothold in Cuba.
Because of Dewey’s success at Manila and the failure of the
Spanish fleet to materialize in the Caribbean, McKinley became bolder in
his planning. Along with the plan to attack Cuba, he decided to send
troops to take Manila and assigned Major General Wesley Merritt to take
charge of the expedition. Planning, strategy, and the development of forces
continued to follow a crooked path obstructed by political and military
confusion.214
General Miles, already frustrated with the ebb and flow of events
in Washington surrounding Cuba and the confusion relating to preparing
for military operations, now became involved in the planning for Manila.
Early on he and Merritt sparred over the number of troops to be allotted to
the Manila expedition.
Miles’ first plan in the early part of May, 1898, called for 5,000
troops to be dispatched. By the end of the month, the War Department had
increased that number to 20,000. 215
To Merritt, the President must have seemed like a confused child,
wondering which cookie jar to plunder first and never reaching a
conclusion. After one meeting with the President to settle down details and

212
N.A.-cables between War Dept. and MG Brooke, Lawton,
Lawton thanking commander in chief, copies in author’s possession
213
Cosmas, Graham A.-An Army for Empire- p. 105
214
Ibid., pp.106-124
215
Ibid., p. 113
145
objectives, Merritt still did not understand if McKinley’s objective was to
seize Manila only, or to seize and occupy all Spanish territory in the
Philippines. 216
At the same time McKinley was ambiguous about his objectives in
the Philippines, he seemed to crystallize his plans for Cuba. Emphasis in
early May was given to an early expedition led by Shafter, aimed at
capturing Havana. The Navy now gave impetus to the plan to move the
Army into action. Since many of the Navy’s ships were engaged in
blockade duty, naval officers began to take heed of the concerns for
malarial and yellow fever sicknesses. Moreover, the concern over wear
and tear on equipment and personnel pushed Navy Secretary Long to press
for action on the part of the Army.
Despite the Navy’s growing insistence on an Army invasion of
Cuba, which in turn caused orders to pass to Shafter and other Army
commanders, the Navy had not the ships to transport an invading force
immediately. In turn, delays were again experienced. 217
Coincidental with the transport problem was the growing
recognition that the Volunteer units were not as prepared as thought.
General Miles had been saying all along that supplies and training could
not meet the demands of such a large force in a matter of days or weeks
even though Secretary Alger seemed confident that miracles could be
worked. One of the problems was the lack of a definite lack of a plan for
the campaign compounded by the fact that maps and intelligence were
sorely lacking for the process of coming up with a plan. It seemed that the
plan was to get as many troops, ships, and supplies to Florida and then
determine what to do with them. 218
Miles felt that if a land expedition were to be launched, the Army
should select targets away from Havana, which would pose less risk, use
fewer resources, and secure the same results. In mid-May, he and others
who opposed an early Army assault gained some respite as the Spanish
fleet appeared in the Caribbean. Rear Admiral Sampson now needed all
available sea craft to go after the Spaniards, eliminating any possibility of
providing transport and support for the Army.

216
Cosmas, Graham A.-An Army for Empire- p. 112
217
Ibid., p. 118
218
Infantry Journal Press, 1946, -pp. 28-34
146
 Shafter meanwhile, continued to prepare his forces for the
eventual assault on whatever target the higher brass eventually settled on.
As he was inclined to deal with broad concepts better than with details and
tactics, he tended to be overly optimistic about his chances for success.
Whenever asked for his opinion about a potential operation, he normally
responded as though the Spanish posed no real opposition to his forces.
While he was extremely capable of grasping strategy, he generally failed
to take into account local or immediate tactical problems that eventually
resulted in problems once ashore in Cuba.
While all of the political and military problems were being sorted
out, Lawton reported to duty at the base in Tampa. A good number of
senior officers had already congregated there and spent their waiting time
renewing acquaintances. One evening, soon after his arrival, Lawton
appeared at a large gathering of officers, wearing civilian clothes. Moving
about the gathering and renewing his own acquaintances, he caught the eye
of many of the other officers who were in their dress uniforms, and the
attention of the press. His height and bearing may have had much to do
with the fact that he was noticed. When the question was raised as to who
he was by persons unfamiliar with him, the response generally was, “that’s
Lawton the Indian fighter.” 219
Lawton had not been in Tampa long before Shafter sent him to
Key West to assess that location as an embarkation point for the advance
units of Shafter’s V Corps. He was also to confer with the Navy to
ascertain what operations might be feasible in the near future. The Navy
reported that it could conduct reconnaissance along the coast of Cuba or
handle small expeditions to the north coast, but not both.220 Lawton also
found a lack of sufficient drinking water to supply the men. On the basis of
his evaluation and report, Tampa became the embarkation point for the
troops. 221
Between the early part of May and the actual departure of
Shafter’s forces on June 14, the entire command process was in a fluid
state that caused indignation on the part of personnel in Florida. Theodore
Roosevelt was one of those, chafing at the bit and ready to go, only to
observe utter confusion. War Department personnel showed up in Tampa

219
Chicago Tribune, December 20, 1899
220
Musicant, Ivan-Empire by Default-p. 259
221
Chicago Tribune, December 20, 1899
147
pressing for immediate Army action, but the Army itself was essentially
immobilized for a time because of the confusion.
The Navy itself had shifting objectives. Once the Spanish fleet
showed up and became trapped in the harbor at Santiago de Cuba, Naval
officers decided it too risky to go into the harbor itself to flush out the
Spanish. It now became important to have the Army land troops so that
shore batteries could be reduced or neutralized and several thousand
Spanish troops eliminated.
The change of objectives removed a burden from the Army, which
still was not ready for a major offensive against Havana. Santiago was an
easier target and lay in an area that would be difficult for the Spanish to
reinforce because of the strength of Cuban rebels in the area. General
Miles was also vindicated in that this final plan conformed essentially to
what he had been advocating all along.
McKinley’s objective of attacking Havana, held to the last
moment, now changed to support the Navy’s aims. On May 30, Shafter
received orders to invade Cuba. General Nelson Miles, feeling
disenfranchised in Washington, showed up in Tampa with the aim of
helping to clear up all the bottlenecks. He added to the confusion in the
process 222 In fact, Miles hoped to get into the action by sailing with
Shafter and taking command of the entire Army operation. His message to
Washington requesting permission to do so was however, ambiguous, and
he was denied the opportunity. 223
When the time came to load the ships, sailing craft, and whatever
other vessels had been commandeered for the assault, the troops began
loading in helter-skelter fashion. The historical picture that is painted of
this event tends to describe it more as a drunken sailing party than a well
planned military operation. 224 Even Roosevelt, eager to get to the place of
action, loaded the Rough Riders in a berth designated for other troops.
First come, first served was the name of the game. Rail cars were back up
for miles on siding tracks, bills of lading forced officers to break open
supply cases to determine what they contained. Supplies were mixed up

222
Leech, Margaret-In The Days Of McKinley-p. 224
223
Ibid., p. 225
224
Ibid., p. 227
148
and the army quartermaster and the commercial rail lines were in a state of
total confusion. 225
When Shafter’s troops finally sailed on June 14, it took another
week to reach the Cuban coast. He had two infantry divisions, one
commanded by J. Ford Kent, the other by Lawton. Both men were Army
colonels who received promotion to Brigadier General. Lawton received
his appointment, May 4th. 226
A dismounted cavalry division commanded by Major General
Joseph Wheeler was also a part of V Corps. “Fightin Joe Wheeler” as he
was referred to by his men and colleagues was a capable fighter, but would
soon make his competitive nature known to everyone around him. The
famous Rough Riders were a part of Wheeler’s division as were five
regiments of Regulars. Shafter also had an independent infantry brigade
and four batteries of field artillery attached to his corps.
Shafter’s plan had not really sharpened beyond knowing that some
12,000 Spanish troops awaited his forces, somewhere, once the Americans
reached Cuba. In effect, he did not have a plan other than putting his
troops ashore and hoping for a quick victory, which would cause the
Spanish to surrender. 227
Shafter also had no great love for the Navy, or an understanding of
how naval guns could soften the landing for his men. For its part, the
Navy seemed to be detached from what the Army was doing. It was more
intent on destroying the Spanish fleet now trapped in the harbor than
deploying to support Army landings.
All of the intrigue and posturing that had been taking place at
senior levels, had worked its way down through the ranks to include Army
and Navy officers in the theater of operations.
The first actual landing of troops in Cuba occurred when the Navy
landed marines at the outer harbor of Guantanamo Bay. A base was
secured and it was noted that the Spanish defenders fought in ‘Indian
fashion’ from ambush points.228

225
Cosmas, Graham A.-An Army For Empire-p. 190; Lane, Jack C.-
Armed Progressive-pp. 34-35
226
War Dept.-Svc. Record, N.A. Lawton cable to War Dept. May 4,
1898, copy in author’s possession
227
Leech, Margaret-In The Days Of McKinley-pp. 247-249
228
Ibid., pp. 223-224
149
 Because of his reputation of fearlessness and determination, and
his overall qualification as a tough commander, Lawton was assigned by
General Shafter to take the point of the assault when it began. Once on
land, Wheeler, who was as anxious as Lawton to “get first blood”, would
circumvent his own orders from Shafter to jump ahead of Lawton’s forces.
229
Shafter himself had apparently overlooked the fact that as long as he
remained on board the transport, Wheeler was the senior land officer for
the Army and used that to his advantage in his rivalry with Lawton. 230
Shafter selected Daiquiri , a shallow beach area eighteen miles
east of Santiago, as the point at which his initial assault forces would
disembark. The first objective of the landing on June 22, 1898, was to
secure a port into which reinforcements and supplies could flow. The 2nd
Infantry Division, under Lawton, was selected as the invasion spearhead.
Upon landing, Lawton was to move his forces towards Siboney, about
seven miles to the west of Daiquiri. He was to secure Siboney, then move
inland and secure a foothold until reinforcements were brought ashore.
Wheeler’s division was to follow Lawton, and hold the port at Siboney for
the landing of General Kent’s infantry division. Shafter had great concern
for getting all of his troops and supplies ashore before any major
engagement with the Spanish began.
Disembarking the troops was no less chaotic than the embarkation
had been at Tampa, Florida. The Navy began shelling the port of Siboney
early in the morning of June 22 and Shafter ordered a halt to the
bombardment shortly after 10 AM. Lawton’s division led the way,
followed by Wheeler’s dismounted cavalry and the Rough Riders.
Since the troop transports were anchored about three miles
offshore, animals for the artillery and pack trains had to be thrown into the
water and forced to swim towards shore. By the evening of the 22nd of
June, 6,000 troops were on land and Lawton was on schedule, leading the
2nd Division towards Siboney along a narrow jungle trail. Spanish forces
in the area retreated and offered no real opposition to Lawton’s group. 231
The 5th Army Corps, once ashore, was comprised of about 17,000
men and could be best described as a collection of many efficient small
fighting units. The regulars were well trained and disciplined and were led

229
Morris, Edmund-The Rise Of Theodore Roosevelt-pp. 639-640
230
Ibid., p. 645
231
O’Toole, G.J.A.-The Spanish War-p. 269
150
by capable officers. The general officers lacked in experience with large
organizations and there was a lack of competent staff officers. The Corps
lacked proper artillery for the upcoming engagements, having only light
3.2 inch field guns. The larger 5 inch siege guns were never off-loaded. 232
Shafter’s forces also lacked mounted cavalry for recon, engineers,
medical personnel, signal and transportation personnel. 233 The absence of
trained reconnaissance personnel would soon impact on the attacks at El
Caney and San Juan.
The 2nd Division reached Siboney on June 23rd, after one
overnight camp, and turned inland as ordered. At 9:20 AM on the 23rd,
Lawton reported Siboney captured which irritated General Wheeler who
did not like the fact that Lawton had made first contact with the enemy.
Wheeler, coming up behind Lawton, was to hold at Siboney but could not
ignore the opportunity to beat a former Union Officer and rival to the
punch in getting into battle. He naturally had the eager Roosevelt and the
adventure seeking Rough Riders to encourage his thinking.
At 3:43 PM on June 23rd, Wheeler ordered his troops to march,
but not at a leisurely pace. He wanted the Rough Riders in Siboney that
same evening. At dusk, Wheeler’s advance troops caught up with
Lawton’s rear guard, commanded by Brigadier General J. C. Bates.
Leonard Wood, leading the Rough Riders, camped his troops north of
Siboney then returned to confer with Wheeler and Brigadier General
S.B.M. Young. General Wheeler decided he was not going to stay put as
ordered and supervise troop landings. He planned to attack the Spanish at
Las Guasimas at daybreak. 234 With skimpy reconnaissance, Wheeler laid
out plans for Young’s Regulars and Wood’s Rough Riders for the next
morning.
Wheeler pushed a brigade ahead of Lawton’s position and on the
morning of June 24th, found the Spanish dug in on a fortified hill position
at Las Guasimas, which protected a strategic gap on the road to Santiago.
Sensing a quick victory, Wheeler’s men rushed ahead through thick
foliage to attack the position. The Spanish however, were not as easy to
dislodge as Wheeler had hoped.

232
Trask, David F.-The War With Spain- p. 216
233
Ibid., p. 217
234
Morris, Edmund-The Rise Of Theodore Roosevelt-p. 640
151
 Many of his troops were picked off by the Spanish soldiers and
suddenly, the Americans found themselves in a real firefight. Wheeler,
having second thoughts about his situation, rushed word back to Lawton to
send up help. 235 Lawton, one to follow the rules, was immediately angered
that General Wheeler had decided to fight the battle by his rules, rather
than Shafter’s. He nevertheless moved troops forward to relieve Wheeler’s
brigade. As they arrived at Las Guasimas, the Spanish broke from their
position and ran. Wheeler momentarily, or purposely, lost track of where
he was in time and yelled to his men: “We’ve got the damn Yankees on
the run.”
When the troops assaulting the hill from the front reached the
crest, Roosevelt and the Rough Riders were cresting from the side.
Wheeler had sixteen dead and fifty-two wounded, the first American blood
shed in the conflict. Wheeler’s operation had started just before dawn and
was over by 9:20 AM.
Lawton for his part was furious with Wheeler’s improvisation of
orders and confronted him with his disapproval. The younger former
Union officer, at six feet three inches tall, towered over an older Wheeler
who stood at five feet two inches. Lawton reportedly accused Wheeler of
deliberately stealing a march. 236 Moreover, Lawton was in charge of the
advance and if necessary, would place a guard at the rear of his formation
to keep other troops behind. He also informed Wheeler that he was
engaged in a military campaign, not a political one. 237
The age and height advantage, and temper, had no affect on the
old cavalryman however, and he simply responded with patience and
diplomatic wisdom. He was philosophical about the matter since he had
been the first to engage in a major fight with the enemy, had beat an old
Union rival, and avenged Appomatox. The rivalry then became a regular
event, which strangely brought the two men closer together.
They developed a strong respect for each other but both continued
to try to get ahead of the other when possible. Wheeler’s habits did not
change however. When he was later assigned to General MacArthur in the

235
O’Toole, G.J.A.-The Spanish War-p. 278
236
Morris, Edmund-The Rise Of Theodore Roosevelt-p. 645
237
Sexton, Wm. Thaddeus-Soldiers In The Philippines-p. 160
152
Philippines, he disregarded orders during battle, creating problems for
MacArthur. 238
General Shafter was also not pleased with Wheeler’s decision to
change plans and leave Siboney unprotected while Kent’s division was
landing. However, he could not publicly criticize Wheeler, as the triumph
at Las Guasimas had moved the Army’s timetable up a bit and opened a
route to Santiago sooner than anticipated. Privately, he gave Wheeler a pat
on the back.
From a practical standpoint, the relatively quick victory at Las
Guasimas created a false sense of the fighting ability and determination of
the Spanish soldiers in the minds of the American officers. They were
convinced that the campaign would be a cinch and obstacles could be
easily overcome. That assessment was incorrect and probably caused them
to miscalculate the difficulties ahead. 239
The press picked up the situation though and for a short time,
rumored that General Wheeler might be court-martialed for violation of his
orders. 240 Court martial was the farthest thing from Shafter’s mind
although he took the time to remind his officers to avoid impulsive actions
in the future.
Lawton was promoted to Major General just a week after the
incident and while Wheeler remained his senior, the promotion helped to
establish Lawton’s standing. 241
Shafter now wanted to hold the ground he had until his supplies
and reinforcements were all brought on shore. Naval support was strained
in trying to provide sufficient craft to meet Shafter’s timetable. His
confidence in a quick victory was bolstered by the success at Las
Guasimas. He believed that the 12,000 Spanish troops were positioned
near the Sierra de San Juan, a range of hills situated between his troops
and Santiago. If he could take Santiago, he believed the Spanish would
surrender. 242 The Americans would need to storm and take San Juan Hill

238
Sexton, Wm. Thaddeus-Soldiers In The Philippines - p. 162
239
Leech, Margaret-In The Days Of McKinley-pp. 245-246; Trask,
David F.-The War With Spain- p. 223
240
Chicago Tribune December 20, 1899
241
War Dept.-Svc. Record; Lawton cable to Corbin 7-10-1898 copy
in author’s possession
242
Leech, Margaret-In The Days Of McKinley-p. 247
153
as it came to be known. However, Shafter observed that the small village
of El Caney, about two miles north of San Juan Hill, could pose a threat to
forces attacking up the hill.
His plan then was to send two divisions in a frontal assault on San
Juan Hill, and one division, with light artillery support, to reduce El
Caney. 243 Shafter had estimated that El Caney could be taken in a matter
of minutes after which the division would swing south and support the
other two divisions attacking San Juan Hill. General Adna Chaffee,
Lawton’s Brigadier, with a force of 1,200 Cubans, had independently
reconnoitered the area before El Caney. It was necessary to clear a road
with picks and axes for the light artillery pieces. 244 Of concern was
information the Americans had received that the Spanish had erected two
heavy gun batteries with guns taken from Spanish warships. The batteries
were reportedly supported by 6,000 men and protected the approaches to
Santiago. 245
Heavy guns protecting Spanish positions would have influenced
the placement of the American light artillery. Moreover, the Spanish had
German made Mauser rifles with a substantial battle range and Chaffee
would not have wanted the artillery pieces too close to the fighting where
their crews would have been easily picked off. In later testimony to the
Dodge Commission investigating the Santiago campaign, Chaffee
confirmed his reconnaissance and planning. He had been commended for
his planning prior to El Caney and for his leadership during the assault by
Lawton. In a syndicated column written by George L. Kilmer, Chaffee’s
work was reported to the public. It was a matter of record that the light
artillery pieces used black powder which gave off a large white cloud of
smoke when firing. The smoke in turn, allowed the Spanish to zero in on
the artillery units and each round fired was followed by a hail of Mauser
bullets. Had the battery been closer to its targets, and obviously more
effective, it would have been silenced by Mauser fire alone. 246
Chaffee’s reconnaissance report and battle recommendations were
submitted to Lawton who read and approved the plan without changes.

243
Leech, Margaret-In The Days Of McKinley-pp. 247-249
244
Musicant, Ivan-Empire By Default- pp. 396-397
245
Naugatuck (Conn) Daily News June 29, 1898
246
Cedar Rapids Evening Gazette, November 26, 1898 and other
newspapers.
154
Chaffee felt that the maximum time to take the town would be two hours.
General Wheeler had also scouted the area and was of the same opinion
and General Kent concurred. Chaffee while as eager as the other generals
to get on with the assaults had a remaining concern. Aside from one road
leading to Santiago, there was a narrow jungle trail. All of the troops
would have to move along these two paths and where they broke into the
open was well known to the Spanish defenders. Chaffee made
recommendations to relieve the problem but Shafter either did not get the
recommendations, or he ignored them. 247
During a staff meeting preceding the assault, General Wheeler,
who would have taken the El Caney assignment, was temporarily ill and
was replaced by General S. S. Sumner, another cavalry officer. The
assignment therefore went to the next ranking general, Lawton. It was also
decided to get the action underway before Wheeler could manage to raise
himself from his sick bed and steal the opportunity back from Lawton. 248
The overall plan split the American forces into three groups and
for his own reasons, Shafter did not ask for naval big gun support. What
had seemed like an easy task for the American officers proved more
difficult. In effect, Shafter attacked entrenched and fortified positions with
infantry that was supported only by light artillery. While his generals
concurred with his planning, it was Shafter who underestimated the
problems facing him at El Caney and San Juan.249
On July 1st, Generals Sumner and Kent moved their divisions in
close-knit formations along a narrow trail at the base of San Juan Hill that
opened onto a meadow, which was strung with barbed wire. As they
prepared to assault the hill, Lawton, who had moved his division into
position the night before, was already attacking at El Caney. Shafter, ill
and unable to move his large frame about in the heat, had to be satisfied
with observing from far in the rear and depending on dispatchers.
On both fronts, the Americans soon learned that they had been
over-confident in assessing the strength, and resolve, of the Spanish
defenders. The Spanish, holding high ground, had all of the ranges

247
Leech, Margaret-In The Days Of McKinley- p. 249; Musicant,
Ivan-Empire By Default- p. 398
248
O’Toole, G.J.A.-The Spanish War-pp. 288-289
249
Leech, Margaret-In The Days Of McKinley- pp. 248-249; Trask,
David F.-The War With Spain – p. 216
155
estimated closely before the battle. They also knew the terrain and where
the Americans would have to maneuver. In addition, the Americans sent
up an observation balloon that was pulled along by men on the ground.
The Spanish artillery simply used the balloon as a spotter at which
they fired shrapnel rounds that then burst over the heads of the troops
below. The American artillery had not switched to smokeless powder thus
giving away their positions every time the guns fired and providing easy
targets for the Spanish. Another observer who attested to the presence of
Spanish artillery was Lt. John J. Pershing who recounted the battle and
spoke of an artillery duel in an address made on November 27, 1898.250
Lawton moved his forces ahead against El Caney but found the
fort and blockhouses in front of him to be far more formidable than he or
Chaffee had expected. The Spanish also had barbed wire strung out on
front of their rifle pits and blockhouses whereas the Americans had only
brush in which to take cover.
Again, their smoking guns revealed excellent targets to the enemy
as Lawton’s riflemen fired. Although they were outnumbered 10 to 1, the
Spaniards were well entrenched and they were brave. Their hard fighting
inflicted unexpected losses on Lawton’s division.
Captain Allyn Capron’s artillery had opened the action at El
Caney but proved ineffective at the range they had been placed in
neutralizing the block houses and Spanish positions. There are differing
accounts concerning Spanish artillery. 251 Although some reports indicate
no Spanish artillery at all in the El Caney fight, other reports clearly
indicate a presence of heavy guns. One such report relates that the light
artillery was purposely placed out of range of the Mausers, and also placed
at a distance to protect the crews from the ‘Krupp’ guns used by the
Spanish. Frederic Remington who was present at the engagement
remarked that they had the range of the American 3.2 inch guns. 252
A report carried by the Galveston Daily News, July 4, 1898 relates
that Capron’s battery fired twenty-seven shots without a response from
Spanish artillery. After the twenty-eighth shot, the “Spanish opened with

250
Cashin, Herschel V.-Under Fire With The Tenth U.S. Cavalry-p.
92, pp. 204-205
251
Trask, David F.-The War With Spain- p. 236, Trask writes the
Spanish lacked artillery
252
Dierks, Jack Cameron-A Leap To Arms- p. 99
156
their heavy guns.” The duel lasted for an hour before cessation. In
‘Gatlings at Santiago’, Lt. John H. Parker observed that the Americans
performed well in spite of “the very poor cooperation of the artillery”, and
the absence of cavalry which made reconnaissance virtually impossible.
Varying accounts and opinions exist concerning the assault on El
Caney, some complimentary, a few not complimentary. In the latter vein,
Lt. Russell C. Langdon wrote of his experience during the fighting. As to
his opinion of Capron’s battery, he writes “Capron was very much
hampered and interfered with, so we are told. We know his battery did
almost nothing, though it fired all day with the slowness of a salute.”253
While Lawton was having his difficulties, the two divisions
assaulting the ridge at San Juan were moving up the hill in a hail of
artillery and rifle fire. The green volunteers of New York’s 71st Regiment
were in the front. Their black powder bullets revealed their positions to
the Spanish gunners at the top of the hill. Led by inept, politically
appointed officers, the regiment froze and would not move forward.
Roosevelt, who had taken command of the Rough Riders, moved
past the 71st and into position to try and take Kettle Hill, the Spanish
forward position in front of San Juan Hill. The remaining vanguard troops
assembled at the edge of the meadow near the San Juan River.
The 6th Infantry lost a fourth of its men to Spanish fire during a
ten minute waiting period. In all the American positions were being
pounded by withering Spanish fire and the Americans elected to take high
ground at any costs, or lose the day. Roosevelt led the Rough Riders,
mixed with the 9th and 10th Cavalry units, up Kettle Hill. Once on top,
his troops observed the 6th and 16th Infantry troops advance up San Juan
Hill, eventually cresting and overwhelming the Spanish defenders.
At El Caney, the American attack that was to take two hours to
complete, was well beyond that time. Shafter became agitated when two
hours passed and he continued to hear heavy gunfire in that vicinity. He
now considered withdrawing Lawton’s forces to avoid a disaster. His
messages to Lawton urged that Lawton not be side tracked by the little
blockhouses but in fact, the little blockhouses were a big part of the
problem for the American forces. 254

253
Brooklyn Eagle August 17, 1898 P. 7
254
O’Toole, G.J.A.-The Spanish War-p. 320
157
 Lawton determined that the artillery battery was not going to
provide effective support at the range it had been placed and ordered it
forward to a position about 1000 yards from the Spanish fortifications. The
road from the hill where the battery had been originally placed to the edge
of town was nearly impassable but by 5pm, Capron had his battery in
place.255
Lawton had also moved three brigades up into a skirmish line
advancing on El Caney. Many of the Americans were picked off by
Spanish sharpshooters in trees along the defensive barrier. General Chaffee
displayed contempt for the bullets flying around him and exhorted his
men, who were less than enthusiastic about remaining in their positions, to
hold firm. By afternoon, Shafter decided that the assault on El Caney could
be abandoned and he sent a courier forward to request Lawton to
disengage and move his troops to the San Juan Ridge area.256
Lawton, still believing that the El Caney position could threaten
the American forces in the San Juan Ridge area, and feeling that to
withdraw would demoralize his men, took a different tact. Shafter’s aide
reached Lawton just as he was about to launch his final assault on the
town. Lawton’s response to the aide after hearing Shafter’s orders replied
that the orders were too serious to be issued verbally and requested written
confirmation. 257 In addition to demoralizing the troops, disengaging at this
point would have given up ground gained and left the Spanish with a
strong position from which they could threaten Santiago’s water supply,
and Santiago itself. 258
He also recognized that Shafter had probably foreseen such an
eventuality and authorized his aide to create a written order if Lawton
required one. With Capron’s battery now having a devastating affect on
the Spanish defenses, Lawton ordered Chaffee to storm the fort according
to his best judgment. Chaffee responded immediately by ordering the 12th
Regiment to charge.
The infantrymen charged through the barbed wire and bullets with
the other regiments of Chaffee’s brigade following suit. The sudden show

255
Waukesha Freeman-July 7, 1898
256
Trask, David F.-The Wa With Spain-p. 237
257
Ft. Wayne Historical Society
258
Musicant, Ivan-Empire By Default- p. 407
158
of determination by the Americans panicked the Spanish defenders and
they turned and fled.
Many of the defenders retreated towards Santiago, some were
captured by General Ludlow’s brigade. Others raised a white flag and
surrendered El Caney to Lawton’s men. The Spanish losses were
considered heavy but counts were inaccurate as they carried off many of
their dead. Lawton detailed a few companies to garrison El Caney and
moved the remainder of his division towards San Juan, followed by Bates’
brigade.
Moving along the road to support the other divisions at San Juan,
Lawton received orders to return to El Pozo. Lawton’s men, now
enthusiastic to join the main fight were disheartened that they were being
pulled from action. Yet, Lawton knew he had received a clear order and
moved the division back to their camp area. El Caney and San Juan Ridge
had been taken, but at a higher cost of men and material than Shafter’s
plans had expected. The Americans suffered the loss of 18 officers and
117 enlisted men killed; 111 officers and 686 enlisted men wounded.
On July 2nd, Lawton brought his division into the line on San Juan
Heights, to the right of the cavalry. His men were exhausted, having gone
without sleep for two days. 259 Food was scarce, ammunition was low and
the dead and wounded had to be cared for.
Now that V Corps had succeeded in taking the high ground and
had an open road to Santiago, Shafter became concerned that any major
counter-offensive by the Spanish could have dire consequences for his
troops. He became hesitant about continuing the assault on Santiago,
extremely worried about casualties. 260 The American public at this time
was being fed news by many of the ‘yellow’ papers that fueled fear and
anger over ‘mishandling of the troops’ and lack of medical treatment and
food. The administration and War Department were tense over progress or
lack of it in the campaign.
At 6pm on July 2nd, Shafter met with his generals, and polled them
as to whether the corps should proceed towards Santiago, or withdraw and
consolidate. All of his generals voted to continue the offensive. 261 Bates,
the junior general did not think he could hold his position without

259
Musicant, Ivan-Empire By Default-p. 427
260
Leech, Margaret-In The Days Of McKinley- p. 261
261
O’Toole, G.J.A.-The Spanish War-p. 327
159
reinforcements. Lawton said to ‘hang on’, Kent and Wheeler agreed with
Lawton. Shafter decided to stay put for 24 hours and meet again with his
staff.262
On the morning of July 3rd, Shafter cabled the War Department
with a gloomy assessment of his situation and view of his consideration to
withdraw V Corps five miles back to a point where he could be supplied
by railroad.263
Alger considered July 3rd the ‘darkest day of the war’. 264 On July
th
4 , McKinley met with the War Department and discussed relieving
Shafter on the basis of ill health.265 Shafter was cabled with instructions
that if his health did not improve, he was to turn over his command to
Wheeler. In the event Wheeler was ill, the next ranking general was to take
over V Corps. General Miles was also dispatched to Cuba.266 Within a
short time however, Shafter recovered, met again with his staff and
bolstered by his generals, regained his confidence and renewed plans to
take Santiago. 267
The V Corps pressed its action against the Spanish and the Navy
was successful in destroying the Spanish squadron when it attempted to
break through the blockade on July 3rd. By mid-July, after a series of
negotiations watched nervously by the administration and public as well,
the Spanish capitulated and the Americans entered Santiago de Cuba.

262
Musicant, Ivan-Empire By Default-p. 428
263
Ibid. ; Leech, Margaret-In The Days Of McKinley- pp. 252-253
264
Musicant, Ivan-Empire By Default-p. 428
265
Leech, Margaret-In The Days Of McKinley-p. 263
266
Ibid.
267
Musicant, Ivan-Empire By Default-p.428
160
“General Lawton’s death is a great loss to the army and the country. He
has done the principal fighting in the Philippines. He was a man of great
energy and absolutely without fear. He was a fine type of the soldier and
officer, and, moreover, a very kindhearted gentleman. He could suffer
injustice, but I never knew him to do an unjust act to any one.”
Nelson A. Miles, 12-20-1899, St. Louis Republic

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE OCCUPATION AND A NEW ASSIGNMENT

The campaign in Cuba was being scrutinized before it was over,

and continues to be scrutinized to this day. Simply stated, the American
civil government and army structure were not prepared to launch and fight
a foreign war of any size or duration. Yet, the Army, despite its many
shortcomings and lack of experienced generals, prevailed. Although
sustaining the losses of 243 officers and enlisted killed and 1,445
wounded, the Americans controlled the eastern half of Cuba, had captured
24,000 prisoners, and destroyed the Spanish fleet. All within a few short
weeks of initiating military action. 268
When the Americans entered Santiago, Generals Shafter and
Wheeler rode into the city first with Lawton and Kent just to their rear.
During the ceremonies, the general officers lined up by rank with their
respective staffs to their rear. Lawton was later selected to serve with
General Wheeler and First Lieutenant J. D. Miley, 2nd Artillery and
representing General Shafter, as a Commissioner representing the U.S. in
surrender negotiations with the Spanish. The preliminary agreement
between the two sides, as reported by General Wheeler was as follows:

“We met as stipulated, in the meantime having had the

agreement typewritten; and after some negotiation the
following was adopted and signed by all parties”:

268
Cosmas, Graham A.-An Army ForEmpire- p. 232
161
 PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT for the capitulation of the
Spanish forces which constitute the Division of Santiago de
Cuba occupying the territory herein set forth, said
capitulation authorized by the Commander-In-Chief of the
Island of Cuba, agreed to by General Toral, and awaiting the
approbation of the Government at Madrid, and subject to the
following conditions:
Submitted by the undersigned commissioners, -Brigadier-
General Don Federico Escario, Lieut.-Colonel of Staff Don
Ventura Frontan, and Mr. Robert Mason, of the city of
Santiago de Cuba, - representing General Toral, commanding
Spanish forces:
To Maj.-Gen. Joseph Wheeler, U.S.V.; Maj.-Gen.H. W.
st
Lawton, U.S.V., and 1 Lieutenant J. D. Miley, 2d Artillery,
A.D.C., representing General Shafter, commanding American
forces. For the capitulation of the Spanish forces comprised
in that portion of the Island of Cuba east of a line passing
through Aserradero, Dos Palmas, Palma Soriano, Cauto
Abajo, Escondida, Tanamo, and Agnilera, -said territory
being known as the Eastern District of Santiago, commanded
by Gen. Jose Toral.
1. That pending arrangements for capitulation all hostilities
between American and Spanish forces in this District shall
absolutely and unequivocally cease.
2. That this capitulation includes all the forces and war material
in said territory.
3. That after the signing of the final capitulation, the United
States agrees, with little delay as possible, to transport all the
Spanish troops in said District to the Kingdom of Spain; the
troops, as near as possible, to embark at the port nearest the
garrisons they now occupy.
4. That the officers of the Spanish army be permitted to retain
their side-arms, and both officers and enlisted men their
personal property.
5. That after final capitulation the Spanish authorities agree
without delay to remove, or assist the American navy in
162
 removing, all mines or other obstructions to navigation now
in the harbor of Santiago and its mouth.
6. That after final capitulation the commander of the Spanish
forces deliver, without delay, a complete inventory of all
arms and munitions of war of the Spanish forces, and a roster
of the Spanish forces.
7. That the commander of the Spanish forces, in leaving said
District, is authorized to carry with him all military archives
and records pertaining to the Spanish army now in said
District.
8. That all that part of the Spanish forces known as volunteers,
movilizadoes, and guerrillas who wish to remain in the Island
of Cuba are permitted to do so under parole not to take up
arms against the United States during the continuance of the
present war between Spain and the United States, delivering
up their arms.
9. That the Spanish forces will march out of Santiago de Cuba
with honors of war; depositing their arms thereafter at a point
mutually agreed upon, to await their disposition by the United
States Government; it being understood that the United States
commissioners will recommend that the Spanish soldier
return to Spain with the arms he so bravely defended.

ENTERED INTO this fifteenth day of July, eighteen hundred

and ninety-eight, by the undersigned commissioners, acting
under instructions from their respective commanding
generals.

JOSEPH WHEELER FEDERICO ESCARIO

Major-General, U.S. Volunteers

H. W. LAWTON VENTURA FRONTAN

Major-General, U.S. Volunteers

J. D. MILEY ROBERT MASON

269
1st Lieutenant, 2nd Artillery, A.D.C.

269
Wheeler, Joseph-The Santiago Campaign-pp. 126-128
163
 During the brief campaign, Lawton had developed a friendship
with Theodore Roosevelt and frequently congratulated him on his
achievements in Cuba. Lawton and Wheeler, while they continued to spar
on a friendly basis, had also developed a strong respect for each other.
The press, always anxious to find heroes for the American public,
played up the achievements of Lawton and Roosevelt who both came out
of the campaign as well known public figures. Both had been easy on the
press as well. Lawton was careful not to undermine the military effort
with loose talk and did not exaggerate his achievements, rather, placed the
credit for them with his men. The press liked this in him, plus he was an
old cavalryman, known as a tough Indian fighter, quiet and resolute and fit
well into the character that the Protestant and Republican leaders were
proclaiming as pure American.
Wheeler later wrote that “General Lawton and the commander of
his 1st Brigade, General Chaffee, are both superb soldiers. They have
spent their lives in military service and are thoroughly familiar with
military business.” 270 Lawton’s national reputation had grown to a point
that when he sailed for the Philippines in 1899, the government, press, and
Public had high expectations of him.
For his part, Roosevelt continued to have a great deal of respect
for Lawton which was obvious in an observation he made in his
autobiography;
“The very best men, men like Lawton, Young, Chaffee, Hawkins, and
Sumner, to mention only men under or beside whom I served,
remained good soldiers, soldiers of the best stamp, in spite of the
disheartening conditions.”271
In light of increasing public hostility towards the Santiago
campaign, due in large part to the reports in the ‘yellow press’, and
pressures to investigate the campaign, men like Lawton became an asset to
the McKinley administration. McKinley and Republicans, thinking ahead
to the fall elections, continued to desire a rapid end to hostilities. They also
wanted to avoid unnecessary criticism of McKinley’s policies which
would play into the hands of their political opponents. Lawton, Leonard
Wood and other army officers made public statements that helped turn

270
Wheeler, Joseph-The Santiago Campaign - p. 198
271
Roosevelt autobiography, Chapter VII
164
public opinion positive. Their later testimony indeed helped to put the
administration and War Department back into a positive light.272
On July 17th, 1898, at 11am, V Corps officially entered Santiago
and at noon, the American flag was hoisted over the city. General
McKibbin was appointed temporary military governor of the city. Shafter,
Wheeler, Kent, Lawton, Ames, Sumner, and McKibbin rode directly to the
Captain General’s Palace where they were greeted by the Spanish
generals, municipal authorities, and the Archbishop of Santiago. It was
announced that for a period of time, Spanish municipal authorities would
remain in charge of most city departments. An elaborate dinner was held
for some fifteen generals at the palace and celebrations lasted into the
evening. 273
On the way into the city, Shafter had taken note of the earthworks
and barbed wire of the inner city defenses. He became convinced that he
would have sacrificed 5,000 troops had he been forced to assault the
city.274Shafter also had an unusual experience involving Sylvester Scovel,
a correspondent for the New York World. Scovel had been atop the palace
roof during the flag raising and was ordered down. Scovel aimed a punch
at Shafter’s face and either struck him or came close. 275
Since the city was under military rule, Scovel could have been in
serious trouble. Shafter elected not to be severe in rendering punishment
and simply ejected Scovel from Cuba. Scovel was among a number of
correspondents who worked for the ‘yellow’ papers. While all of the
correspondents could be counted on to be alert for interesting news, the
yellow reporters were known to go beyond having an eagle-eye out for
news. They created news, or exaggerated stories and in the process, caused
scandals and flagrant inaccuracies. That resulted in problems with the
Spanish and U.S. authorities.276
A number of correspondents had been expelled from Cuba a short
time after the fighting had ended. The incident with Scovel resulted in

272
Cosmas, Graham A.-An Army For Empire-p. 286 ; Musicant,
Ivan-Empire By Default- p. 634
273
Chicago Daily Tribune-7-18-1898 p. 1
274
Leech, Margaret-In The Days Of McKinley- p. 270
275
Ibid., pp. 269-270
276
NY Public Library-research department on line-Journalists and
Reporters
165
more expulsions. Correspondents were circulating inflammatory posters
calling upon the people of Santiago to remember the Maine. They also
promoted their newspapers to people who could not speak or read English
and were also starving and ill. The bad behavior on the part of the
correspondents served to make the task of the army more difficult than it
already was.277
The friction that occurred early between some of the newspapers
and the American military created an environment in which some
correspondents simply became more critical of Shafter and the army. The
net result was that the public back home was fed a steady stream of anti-
military news and sharp criticism of how the campaign had been handled.
Questions arose early about San Juan and El Caney. A British
liaison officer, Captain Arthur P. Lee, had inquired just after El Caney had
been taken if it was customary for U.S. infantry troops to assault fortified
blockhouses before they had been reduced by artillery. 278 Captain Lee
elaborated on his observations some time later and offered a great deal of
detail on the fight at El Caney.279
Lee’s version of El Caney and San Juan differed somewhat from
the official stories. He reported that El Caney was ‘premeditated’ as a
planned assault on July 1. The assault on San Juan was not to have taken
place until July 2. Lawton had cautioned Shafter’s adjutant not to release
troops to the San Juan assault until Lawton’s division had taken El Caney
and could link up for the second assault. According to Lee, Kent’s and
Wheeler’s divisions prematurely attacked San Juan and ‘scattered
Shafter’s plans to the winds.’ Lee continued his report by stating that
Chaffee had reconnoitered the area around El Caney June 28 and was
familiar with the network of bridle paths. Chaffee submitted a plan that
was his alone and Lawton approved it.
Lee’s assessment of the light artillery support was that it was quite
unequal to the task given it. The infantry had to do all the fighting. He
further commented on Shafter’s late day request to Lawton to consider
disengaging from the fight. Lawton was committed and to comply with the
request would have “entailed a demoralizing defeat in the face of the

277
Brooklyn Eagle-July 25, 1898, p. 6
278
Dierks, Jack Cameron-A Leap To Arms- p. 109
279
Davenport Weekly Leader- August 23, 1898-feature article. All
references to Captain Lee and his report derive from this article.
166
enemy”. Lee’s commentary concluded by saying “that the attack
succeeded was entirely due to the magnificent courage and endurance of
the infantry officers and men”.
However viewed at the time and since, Shafter commended his
generals, officers, and men. Lawton commented on the fortifications at El
Caney, commended General Chaffee for his reconnaissance and leadership
and complimented all of his troops as well.280 It was in character for
Lawton to speak and write positively about those under him. He was loath
to place blame and if any was deserved, he would have taken it upon
himself.
Criticism of the campaign, justification of tactics employed, and
problems with the correspondents would mount and increase. Yet, Shafter
and V Corps faced a host of other problems much more important that had
to be dealt with quickly. Santiago was a city of sick and starving people,
filled with garbage. Shafter’s troops were suffering from Yellow Fever,
Malaria, and a number of other ailments brought on by the climate.
Spanish prisoners had to be reckoned with. An administration had to be
established to govern the newly acquired territory.
For his part, Lawton was ill and early on had contracted a fever
that would dog him over the next few months. Franklin Matthews who
wrote about Lawton stated that after the campaign in Cuba, Lawton
became ill and took a rest.281 Had Lawton taken sick leave as did General
McKibbin on July 23rd, he might have earned an early return to the U.S.
His tendency though was to try to ignore illness and not complain about it,
sensing that tending to his duties was more important than fussing over a
fever.
Lawton wrote to his close friend Robert G. Carter shortly after the
campaign ended. In the letter, dated August 5, 1898, Lawton expressed
concern for his troops because so many of them were sick. He also
professed pride in his men and their accomplishments adding that the work
had been hard. Lawton confided to Carter that he had a fever and probably
malaria, but urged Carter not to worry as he, Lawton, felt the condition
would pass quickly.282 The fever apparently never subsided totally and

280
NY Times-July 7, 1898
281
Matthews, Franklin-Henry W. Lawton, the Soldier & the Man-
Harpers Weekly-January 6, 1900
282
Newberry Library-Chicago-Carter Papers
167
from the history available on Lawton’s activities until October 13 when he
sailed home, he stayed true to character and performed his assignments in
a way better than expected of him.
There was some confusion early on as to who was in charge of
administration, second to Shafter of course. General McKibbin asked to be
relieved of the role of Military Governor on July 23rd due to illness and his
request was granted. Within a day or two, the press was quoting Leonard
Wood as the ‘Military Governor’. On July 26th, Wood was threatening to
hang looters, even though he did not appear to have any authority to make
such statements.283 He also did not volunteer to correct the correspondents
who referred to him as ‘Military Governor’. The same article reported that
Shafter had banned armed Cubans from the city. In disgust, Cuban general
Garcia withdrew his army to the interior and General Gomez was ‘sulking’
at Las Villas, refusing to comply with orders of the new government. Both
generals, allies of the U.S., formed a dislike for Shafter but would later
develop a close relationship with Lawton.
The NY Times was quick to emphatically report that Wood was
not Governor General of Santiago as had been “erroneously reported” and
in fact there was no such officer as Governor General or even Military
Governor. The Times had obviously checked with the War Department
which clarified Wood’s position.284 It would not be until September 6th that
Leonard Wood would get the assignment to Military Governor of the city
of Santiago and be given specific responsibilities. 285
Interestingly, Wood seemed to have one or more ‘press agents’ on
his staff or partial to him. More elaboration will follow later in the chapter,
but is worth noting in light of his ambitions and the manner in which he
later moved ahead. As an individual, Leonard Wood was extremely
capable and versatile. Yet, his ambitions were unbridled and in later years,
many in the upper echelon of the army believed Wood betrayed Lawton,
and later, Major General John. R. Brooke who was to become Military
Governor of Cuba.
Soon after the fighting, a number of officers returned to the U.S.
In terms of what Lawton and Wood ‘wanted’ one can only speculate. In
Lawton’s case, he probably desired to remain with Shafter’s command and

283
Chicago Daily Tribune-July 26, 1898 p. 1
284
NY Times-July 24, 1898
285
Washington Post- September 6, 1898 p. 6
168
earn a position that would take him to the Philippines. Lawton had proven
he was not good at being idle or sedentary. Wood may have wished for
promotions to the line as well. Sometime late in July or early in August, he
intimated to Secretary of War, Russell Alger that he desired to return home
on leave.286 It would appear that he jumped the chain of command in going
direct to Alger and continued to cultivate the association in the months to
come.
Wood obviously was not granted a leave and remained in Cuba.
He developed a reputation of having intense ambitions and the willingness
to push aside anyone who became an obstacle to his progress. 287 Moreover,
during his tenure in Cuba, Wood developed self-righteousness about his
views and became moralistically intolerant of the views and behavior of
others.288 Wood’s tendencies may have influenced his relationship with
Lawton in the later summer and early fall months of 1898. Though they
had served together during the Geronimo campaign of 1886 and were
seemingly good friends, it became apparent in Wood’s letters to his wife
that Lawton became an obstacle as Wood referred to him as an
“obstructionist”. 289
Lawton and Wood became involved in a matter in early August
which may have impacted the selection of one of them for the position of
Military Governor. Shafter, alarmed with the amount of sickness among
his soldiers, wanted to evacuate them from Cuba at an early date. 290 The
War Department and McKinley, after consulting with the army’s surgeon
general ordered Shafter to move his troops to higher ground where they
would not be as likely to contract Yellow Fever.
Shafter called a meeting of his senior officers and medical staff.
The general officers concurred with Shafter that the army should be
evacuated with haste to the U.S. The regular officers were reluctant to put
their views in writing by the volunteer officers were m ore than eager to
express their views in what became known as the ‘round robin’ letter.
Roosevelt claimed that Wood wrote the letter to Shafter, demanding in no
uncertain terms that the army be evacuated immediately. The letter was

286
Brooklyn Eagle-November 1, 1898 p. 3
287
Lane, Jack c.-Armed Progressive- p. 23
288
Ibid., p. xv
289
Ibid., p. 64
290
Leech, Margaret-In The Days Of McKinley-p. 275
169
then signed by the general officers. Lawton, objecting to the dictatorial
tone of the letter, signed with reservations.291 The letter, addressed to
Shafter, was actually intended for the War Department. The letter reached
the newspapers and resulted in a public outcry, not to mention anger and
indignation on the part of McKinley and the War Department. 292 Within a
short time when the administration announced the establishment of the
Department of Santiago, there was consideration of passing over Shafter’s
general officers for the position of Military Governor. Wood, who had
been Shafter’s first choice for the position was out of favor and the
assignment went to Lawton. 293
At about the same time the ‘round robin’ letter was being written,
the American officers formed a society known as the Society of the Army
of Santiago de Cuba. The first meeting was held on August 1st at the
Governor’s Palace and was opened by General Lawton. 294 General
Wheeler who gave an inspiring speech was nominated as temporary
chairman.
No amount of celebration could however, prevent the inevitable
press attack on Shafter and the campaign. On August 3rd, a highly critical
article hit the papers virtually damning Shafter for his lack of leadership
and planning beginning at Tampa. 295The War Department also became a
target for the press and the entire matter was exacerbated by the public
utterances of General Miles who had been feuding with Alger for some
time. The same article quoted its sources as claiming that a Congressional
investigation would be made into the entire conduct of the Cuban
campaign. Among the various criticisms was the statement that Shafter
had failed to offload his heavy siege guns which made it necessary to carry
out assaults with inadequate light artillery.
The situation caused political concerns for McKinley and
Republican congressmen running for re-election. McKinley, wanting to
avoid a congressional investigation, established the Dodge Commission to
investigate the matter.296 The commission was made up of hand picked

291
Leech, Margaret-In TheDays Of McKinley- pp. 275-276
292
Ibid.
293
Lane, Jack C.-Armed Progressive- p. 63
294
Associated Press-Brooklyn Eagle-August 1, 1898
295
Brooklyn Eagle-August 3, 1898 p. 1
296
Leech, Margaret-In The Days Of McKinley- pp. 313-315
170
officers who delved into the Cuban campaign for the next several months.
While news accounts basically calling for heads to roll raged and aroused
angry public opinion, it would be the commission and more importantly,
testimony given by officers such as Lawton that would neutralize the work
of the yellow press and turn the tide of public opinion back in favor of
McKinley and the War Department.
Before the official news broke about the Department of
Santiago, Shafter passed the word on to Lawton concerning the offer of an
assignment to Military Governor. There is no way of determining if
Lawton wanted the position, but given his nature, he probably preferred to
return to the states and hope for an assignment in the Philippines. At the
same time, Lawton was always grateful for the opportunities he was given
and would not have wanted to give offense by turning down the new job.
His letter to Shafter of August 6, 1898 sheds some light on his
frame of mind as he responds to the offer.297In the letter, Lawton expresses
deep gratitude to Shafter for his efforts to further Lawton’s interests.
Further, he states that it is his “duty” to accept what falls to him and in that
spirit he accepts the new position. His statement can not be construed as
whole-hearted or enthusiastic, rather, dutiful. Lawton goes on to make
recommendations as to who he would like in his command and almost as
an afterthought, recommends leaving Wood where he is as his professional
attainments fit him peculiarly for the duty.
News of the new department was reported in the press on August
th
10 . One announcement reports the creation of the Department of
Santiago with Major General Henry W. Lawton assigned to its command,
but with the unusual comment that Wood will continue in command of the
city. 298 Unusual in that Wood had yet to be appointed as military governor
of Santiago and there is no record that he was given such an appointment
prior to September 6th.
A second article spells out with more detail Lawton’s new
assignment. Adjutant General Corbin issued the orders at midnight August
9th stating that by direction of the President, a geographical military
department known as the Department of Santiago was established. Lawton
was assigned to command the department and generals Wood and Ewers

297
N.A.-Lawton Papers-letter Lawton to Shafter 8-6-1898-exact
copy in author’s possession
298
Boston Daily Globe-August 10, 1898- p.3
171
were to report to Lawton. General Shafter was to retain command until he
returned with V Corps to the states, he and Lawton were to determine the
date on which the command change would occur.299
An editorial appeared two days later titled “A New Era In Cuba”.
Neutral in tone, it acknowledged the rapid end to the military campaign
and the challenges of governing a foreign country. The article itself did not
agree or disagree with the establishment of the department but speculated
that the experiment would be successful. 300
Much of the information concerning Lawton’s term as military
governor is gleaned from news accounts since a great deal has not been
written in historical texts about the period. Given the fact that news
correspondents were eager for a scoop, or some special event to report, the
newspaper accounts are quite revealing in that they reflect a day to day
accounting of Lawton’s activities and accomplishments. They also show
that in terms of Lawton himself, nothing of a ‘spectacular’ nature, worthy
of a major scoop, occurred. If such an event had taken place, the constant
snooping of the correspondents, particularly those with the yellow papers,
would have picked it up.
On August 15th, Lawton officially relinquished command of the
2 Division of the 5th Army Corps. He addressed the division as it
nd

prepared to return home. He concluded his address by saying; “ When

overtaken by the dreaded fever, your courage, cheerfulness, and fortitude
did not forsake you. When the history of the wars for Cuban independence
is written the second division will deserve and receive a full page on every
important occurrence that led up to its successful termination. To my staff
I desire to acknowledge a special obligation for most loyal and faithful
duties well performed under circumstances and conditions too trying to be
described”.301
On the 16th of August, Lawton, Wood, and Major Somers
representing the army medical branch met with Cuban leaders and
informed them that they could not enter the city under arms. If the rule was
violated, the Cubans were told they would be treated as hostiles. General

299
Chicago Daily Tribune-August 10, 1898- p. 2
300
NY Times-August 12, 1898
301
Chicago Daily Tribune- August 15, 1898- p. 1
172
Castillo promised compliance and it was also learned that General Garcia’s
army had disbanded. 302
The August 16 issue of the Chicago Daily Tribune carried yet
another blistering review of Shafter, written by H. J. Whigham who also
criticized other newspapers for ‘whitewashing’ the War Department and
the mistakes made in the Santiago campaign. 303The editorial concluded
that there had been a needless loss of American lives due to Shafter’s
mistakes. It further stated that the success of the campaign was due to the
independent decisions of Shafter’s generals and blasted the lack of food,
guides, staff officers, and horses.
The press carried nothing but compliments for the work of Lawton
and Wood although a conflict between the two developed early. Even
though Wood was apparently not carrying an official title and reported to
Lawton, he was nevertheless given responsibility for certain functions in
the city of Santiago. Faced with the daunting tasks of cleaning up the filth
and restoring health to the inhabitants and the U.S. troops, he naturally
needed funds for those activities.
Up until the middle part of August when he left Cuba, Shafter had
controlled currency in Cuba and dispensed funds as needed by Wood for
his work. When Lawton took over responsibility for customs collections
on about August 20, the purse strings apparently tightened. 304The
responsibilities of both men tended to overlap and both being strong-willed
and of a mind to handle things their own way found themselves at odds. 305
Another factor that played a role was the appearance of a Customs
Bureau Inspector by the name of Donaldson some time before Shafter
exited.306 One of the many bureaus involved in the affairs of government,
Customs was to set exchange rates for the varying currencies that existed
in Cuba. Lawton was not only frugal, to a fault perhaps, but also aware
that he could not dole out funds indiscriminately since Donaldson was
running a close audit of the income and expenses of the Department.307 It

302
Chicago Daily Tribune-August 16, 1898 – p. 1
303
Ibid., p. 3
304
Lane, Jack C.-Armed Progressive- pp. 64-65; Hartford Courant-
August 30, 1898
305
Hagedorn, Hermann-Leonard Wood- i, pp. 209-210
306
Hartford Courant-August 30, 1898
307
Middletown Daily Argus-September 23, 1898
173
stands to reason that Lawton understood the consequences of
misappropriating funds, real or perceived. The matter was further
complicated by the fact that an accurate exchange rate could not be
immediately determined for some of the Spanish silver coin. The trouble
occurred during a period between July 16 and September 1 and Lawton
would not have had an accurate accounting of available funds until the
issue was corrected. 308
Wood, apparently unable to restrain himself, wrote directly to
Alger concerning his money problem. 309If Alger became aware of the
situation involving Wood and Lawton, then McKinley was likely aware of
it as well, not to mention Corbin and other members of the War
Department. It would not be the last time Wood violated protocol to serve
his own interests.
Lawton had a number of other pressing demands requiring his
attention. A number of armed Cubans were camping around the outskirts
of the city and posed a potential threat to peace. Lawton cabled the War
Department for instructions in how to deal with them and received a
response that conveyed information directly from the President. McKinley
requested that the Cubans be treated fairly and justly, but that they also
recognize the military occupation and the authority of the department.310
The administration recognized that specific guidelines for the
military governors had not yet been established. McKinley was meeting
with his cabinet to put together plans for administering foreign territories.
It was also noted that functions such as customs collections and
supervision of funds, postal service, commerce rates and fees, and other
civil matters were to be directed by the appropriate bureaus in due time. 311
For the time being however, Lawton was responsible for military order,
and all other functions of civil government. Wood was to handle the civil
matters with the city of Santiago, but Lawton was accountable for the
entire province. For two men primarily interested in matters of the
military, Lawton and Wood did commendable work as administrators.
There was a difference between the two however. Lawton continued to
praise the work of Leonard Wood whereas Wood decided that to advance

308
NY Times-September 23, 1898- p. 3
309
Hagedorn, Hermann-Leonard Wood- i, pp. 209-210
310
Hartford Courant-August 16, 1898
311
Chicago Daily News-August 16, 1898- p. 1
174
his agenda, it was necessary to circumvent Lawton and in all likelihood,
undermine him.
The War Department had not only to be concerned with affairs in
Cuba, but also with evolving events in the Philippines. At the same time,
criticism of the War Department’s handling of the Santiago campaign
continued. In the midst of intense meetings, Alger was faced with a request
from Lawton for regular troops as they were more disciplined than some of
the volunteers. The situation in Santiago was raising concerns in
Washington about keeping order in the city. Washington had sent
“emphatic” orders to Lawton about keeping the peace and followed up
with a promise to send more troops. The President ordered the 23rd Kansas
Volunteer Regiment to Cuba. The regiment had been formed on July 22nd
and actually arrived in Cuba on August 31st, long after the situation had
calmed down. 312 The President by this time was quite familiar with
Lawton. It has been suggested by a small number of writers that McKinley
first took notice of Lawton later in the year, however, McKinley had a
sound picture of Lawton and his capabilities long before that time.
The patience of the American public was wearing thin due to the
news coming from Cuba. While there had been no doubt as to the bravery
of the Cubans who fought against the Spanish, there was criticism of the
lack of discipline, and the sense that Americans were doing all the work in
Cuba. 313
Lawton was a visible figure in Santiago, not one to sit behind a
desk and allow subordinates to do all the work. Among his concerns was
the fact that the local police were still manned by Spanish personnel, a
number of businesses in the city were owned by Spanish persons and the
Cubans were not happy with those facts.
Correspondents seemed to keep a close eye on Lawton in the
hopes of getting a story. They were quick to note his methods and style.
One story reports that there would be no uncertainty about the manner in
which General Lawton would run things. “He will give his orders and the
Cubans, Spanish, and Americans will abide by them. If they don’t, there
will be trouble. He will doubtless be a great shock to the diplomacy loving
Spanish residents who may try to influence him. He always says what he

312
Brooklyn Eagle- August 18, 1898- p.1
313
Ibid., August 19, 1898- p. 3
175
thinks. He obeys implicitly the orders of superior officers, and he expects
subordinates to obey his in the same way.”
Not only was Lawton concerned with restoring the rule of law in
Santiago itself, he also had the outlying towns and cities to be concerned
with. On the 22nd of August, at San Luis, a Cuban crowd passed an
American sentry. When he challenged them and they failed to stop, they
were fired upon by other American soldiers. The crowd returned fire and
killed the sentry. At the same time, American camps abandoned by
departing American troops were being pillaged by Cubans. The Cubans
were placing their flags about town and Lawton personally removed an
insurgent flag from a public building.314
Lawton’s efforts to bring calm to the province paid off in a
relatively short period of time. Towards the end of August, he began
easing up on some restrictions. The press noted that since Lawton assumed
command of the department, there was a decided change in what had
previously been a severe military character that marked the
administration.315 Lawton announced that within a few days, certain
conditions would be changed to enhance commerce and lessen military
restrictions. Port charges were to be reduced and wharf and storage
facilities opened up.316
The 5th Infantry was to be kept out of sight as much as possible,
soldiers would be stationed only in public buildings where it was
necessary for them to be on guard, and would not carry loaded weapons.
The government was to assume a more civil character. One of the changes
most likely appreciated by the locals was that bars would again be open
from 7am to 11pm.
Importantly, Lawton announced that the municipal police would
be re-organized with an increase in manpower, in effect, turning law
enforcement over to the Cubans. He was continuing to remove Spanish
influence from enforcement at the same time as he was reducing American
influence. It would be a practice that Lawton continued in the Philippines
that proved successful and was used long after his death.
Leonard Wood was asked to draw up a plan for civil government
of the city and he confirmed the changes that Lawton had announced.

314
Chicago Daily Tribune-August 23, 1898- p. 1
315
L.A. Times-August 27, 1898- p. 2
316
Ibid.
176
Lawton also received communications from Cuban generals in the interior
as to their activities and plans. It had been about three weeks since Lawton
assumed command of the department and already, improvements were
being made and more planned.
Lawton was diligent and consistent with his daily sickness reports
which carried in detail the conditions at Santiago. While the number of
deaths among the troops decreased, the number of sick cases continued to
be a concern. On August 28th, Lawton reported 380 sick, number of fever
cases 322, and the number returned to duty as 97. A number of deaths
were also reported for that date and the 29th. 317
Efforts to reconcile differences with the Cuban military were also
paying off. On August 29th, General Castillo expressed the view that
disbanding the Cuban military could be accomplished without trouble.
Lawton reported that his request to Wood for a plan for civil government
asked for a model based on the old regime, with some modifications. For
one, Lawton believed the number of officers should be fixed. Wood was to
make nominations and arrange salaries which Lawton would then
approve. 318
Lawton also ordered that the American flag be flown from all
public buildings and reiterated his order that troops would not carry arms
except on duty, and then only in specified areas. Shafter had imposed a
rule that required that ships remain in the harbor unloaded until their duty
had been fully paid. Lawton rescinded the rule and opened all warehouses
and wharfs for commerce, one wharf for public use. 319
Late in August Adjutant General Corbin received a cable from
General Shafter concerning customs in which Shafter reports that he has
transferred business relating to customs to Major General Lawton. To date,
$102,093 had been collected and a balance of $90,000 existed. Shafter
credited the economy of the customs house in large part to Inspector
Donaldson.320 At about the same time, Lt. Richmond Hobson arrived for
the purpose of attempting to raise two sunken Spanish cruisers, the
Cristobal Colon and Infanta Maria Teresa. Hobson received an enthusiastic

317
Chicago Daily Tribune- p. 2
318
Stevens Pt. Journal-September 3, 1898
319
Ibid.
320
Hartford Courant-August 30, 1898
177
formal welcome from Lawton with whom he quartered during his stay in
Cuba.321
From all appearances and reports, Lawton’s schedule was not only
very busy, but varied as well. On the 30th, he received information that the
Cuban government had relieved Major General Calixto Garcia of
command of troops in eastern Cuba. Lawton informed correspondents of
the news and also discussed continuing lawless acts by armed Cubans
upon planters in the interior.322
Lawton’s even-handed work with the many factions in his
province paid off in neutralizing antagonists. On September 1, he received
word that the Cuban leaders Cebreco, Lacret, and Pedro Perez had been
ordered by General Maximo Gomez to place themselves under Lawton’s
command. In his briefing of correspondents, Lawton stated that he
believed the action would expedite the disbanding of Cuban forces.
Moreover, Lawton felt the time was right to employ Cuban officers in
several key posts in the province. General Castillo was to get a position
and would act as Lawton’s advisor in making appointments.323
The story indicated a major change in attitude among the once
‘sulking’ Cuban generals and the press was quick to note Lawton’s role in
converting them. Lawton stated that the actions indicated a gratifying
change of policy on the part of the Cubans. It was noted that Castillo
enjoyed Lawton’s confidence and his extensive acquaintance among the
Cubans made his service valuable.324 Lawton may not have desired the
position he held, but certainly was proving to be a statesman and capable
civil administrator, factors important to McKinley and the War
Department during a period of harsh criticism of them.
As if to herald the accomplishments of Lawton and Wood, the
Washington Post carried an editorial covering their work. The article
pointed out the long hours Wood was working to clean up Santiago with
excellent results. Lawton and Wood were considered successful abroad
despite the pessimism of the “mugwump and pernicious activity of the

321
Woodland C. Daily Democrat-August 30, 1898 – p. 1
322
Chicago Daily Tribune-August 30, 1898 – p. 6
323
Ibid., September 2, 1898 – p. 2
324
Naugatuck Conn. Daily News-September 2, 1898
178
party hack”. 325 Topping off the favorable news of the day was a report
commending Lawton’s work in Cuba.
The report stated, “General Lawton, in command at Santiago,
appears to be the right man in the right place”. A change for the good had
come about since Shafter’s departure and the change was attributed to
Lawton. The New York Herald correspondent wrote, “General Lawton’s
conciliatory policy, and his deference to the peculiar sensibilities of the
Cubans has won them over. The result is the strong feeling against General
Shafter has been replaced by equally unreasoning admiration for General
Lawton”. 326
The problems certainly were not over for Lawton and Wood and
the regular sickness reports coupled with press reports of scattered
problems continued to be a source of concern for the administration. The
favorable editorials were followed shortly by news about serious problems.
Lawton reported early in September that there were about 1,000 armed
Cubans near Santiago who could not be induced to put away their arms
and go to work. At the same time, Lawton expressed an empathy with
them indicating he understood their concerns. They were ignorant and
suspicious and were still not convinced that the Spanish influence was
permanently removed. Lawton continued by saying that the problem
would continue until the Spaniards and Spanish office holders had left the
country.327Behind the scenes, Lawton worked to eliminate Spanish
influence in public office. If particular concern to him was the police
department which he was convinced, had to be re-established. In addition
to his other accomplishments, the civil police were to be a major
achievement during his tenure.
Not only were armed Cubans creating headaches for the
Americans, but the behavior of some of the American troops was also a
major concern. Lawton had about 7,000 troops under his command. Four
regiments were ‘immunes’, those soldiers believed to be immune from
Yellow Fever, although they were still vulnerable to malaria and other
climate related sickness.
In addition, there was one volunteer regiment from Illinois, the 8th
Illinois, and one regiment of regulars. The 8th apparently was ill

325
Washington Post-September 7, 1898 – p. 6
326
Idaho Daily Statesman-September 7,1898
327
Chicago Daily Tribune-September 10, 1898 – p. 6
179
disciplined and Lawton posted them outside Santiago. Colonels Hood and
Sargent commanded regiments believed to have good discipline so Lawton
kept them close at hand for emergencies. It turned out that they had signed
up to fight and had difficulty adjusting to peace time duties. The‘immunes’
in the two regiments became known as “Hood’s communes” or “Sargent’s
communes” due to their riotous behavior and heavy drinking. Native rum
flowed freely and cheaply and the men took advantage.
General Lawton impressed upon the sitting court martial the
importance of dealing vigorously with the first batch of offenders and that
after the court did its work, the immunes would have a pretty clear idea of
the serious side of military duty.328
No one has any way of knowing the minds of Lawton or Wood
and their individual thoughts about the positions they held in the fall of
1898. Wood may have felt that as unpleasant as his task was, it was
challenging and probably a means to getting a promotion. He had been
promised command of the province by Shafter who saw him as first
choice. The War Department and McKinley had instead picked
Lawton.329For Lawton, the position may not have been the most desirable
as it had the potential to keep him from a line position in the Philippines
and he did want to be where the fighting was. He too committed himself in
a duty-bound way to doing work that would exceed the expectations of his
superiors. How much his fever and illness hampered his day to day
activities was not apparent.
The gossip in the press, some of which was stirred up within the
War Department, probably made both Lawton and Wood wonder if they
were actually appreciated by their superiors. There was little to allay their
concerns with the news that Miles was publicly proclaiming his readiness
to head up the campaign in the Philippines. 330 Miles’ friends and
supporters were to make a case for Miles to head up military operations,
no reflection upon the ability of General Elwell Otis in Manila, of course.
All the ruckus on the part of Miles, added to confusion about the status of
MG Wesley Merritt’s role in the Philippines certainly added to the worries
McKinley entertained at the time, not to mention the inquiries of the
Dodge Commission, press and public discontent with the War Department.

328
Galveston Daily News-September 10, 1898 – p. 1
329
Lane, Jack C.-Armed Progressive- pp. 63-64
330
Brooklyn Eagle-September 7, 1898
180
 Then Lawton and Wood learned through the news that the
President was considering placing another general over them both. It was
known that at some point in time, a Governor General of Cuba would be
appointed. If Lawton or Wood aspired to such a position, they had not let
on by September. The New York Times made it clear though that for the
present, they were not in the running. It seemed that the candidate of
choice was Major General James Wade, a regular.331 At the time the story
was printed, Wade served as the head of the Cuban Evacuation
Commission which was dealing with returning all Spanish prisoners to
Spain. Once the commission finished its work, Wade would be free to take
on the job in Cuba.
Friends of Wade, interviewed for the article were quick to point
out that Wade should have commanded V Corps during the Santiago
campaign, that he was entitled to the post and better suited than Shafter.
Other army officers were reported in the article to admire the dashing
former cavalry officer and one can surmise from the article that several
senior officers harbored ill will for and jealousy of Shafter and his
generals. That ill will poked up its ugly head later on in relation to
references made about Lawton by the group that allied itself with Wade.
The Times article continued by speculating on other generals
being considered for the position of Governor General and they included
Generals Merritt, Otis, John R. Brooke, and Shafter. Wade was favored
however and reportedly, he would have generals Wilson, Graham, and
Lawton reporting to him. The one general who was mentioned as one who
would clearly have no place in Wade’s command was Fitzhugh Lee. The
Times specifically referred to McKinley’s belief that Lee had received
enough glory and did not need more. An interesting point to remember
when in a few short weeks, Lee became the favored candidate for the job
in Cuba.
These sorts of ‘official’ reports in the press were commonplace
and served no purpose other than to aggravate the men doing good service
and provide interesting gossip to the reading public. As things turned out,
Wade was later sent to Luzon where he was in conflict with Adna Chaffee,
and the job of Military Governor of Cuba went to MG Brooke in January
1899.

331
NY Times-September 12,1898
181
On some days, aside from small stories relating to Lawton’s daily health
reports, nothing of significance showed up in the press as to happenings in
Santiago. Yet the press did not overlook even the small human interest
stories such as the one appearing on September 12th. Sunday was observed
for the first time since hostilities ended with all business shops closed.
Religious services were held at the Palace with Lawton and Wood in
attendance. Unarmed Cuban soldiers filled the city resulting in a large
number of gala parties at the many clubs.332
A few days later, Shafter was back in the news, feeling compelled
to give his version of the Cuban campaign in the face of constant criticism.
Shafter’s views were made public and explained a great number of details
involved in the campaign. He included his reasons for not transporting
horses for the cavalry claiming that transportation was lacking and it was
believed that mounted cavalry could not operate efficiently in the areas
around Santiago.
He claimed that the expedition was taken in exact compliance with
orders received from the War Department on May 30th. Outlining a
number of unforeseen problems and obstacles, Shafter complimented all of
his staff and the troops. Given the climate and the health condition of his
troops, he reported that the operation was a success and several officers
and men were commended and recommended for promotion. 333
If fever and health were personally affecting Lawton, it did not
become conspicuous at the time. However, he remained concerned about
the health of his troops and what appears to be a difference of opinion
between he and the War Department surfaced on September 20th. Lawton
recommended to the War Department that he be allowed to muster in
former Cuban troops for employment in various positions in and around
Santiago. 334 For the moment, he was not suggesting that they be used to
police the city or province. He was already re-building the civil police
force which would handle enforcement duties. A bill had been introduced
in Congress the winter before which would have authorized the use of
Cubans in the American army. It did not pass as many felt the American

332
Brooklyn Eagle-September 12, 1898 – p. 1
333
Ibid., September 15, 1898 – p.1
334
NY Times-September 21, 1898
182
troops would resent having to serve alongside Cubans.335 The bill was
being re-considered but there seemed to be continued resistance to its
passage.
The United States, still considering its occupation options, then
announced the intention of the administration to add 40,000 troops to the
garrison serving under Lawton. The article reported that within two weeks,
orders would be cut to dispatch 10,000 of the total on October 10th, with
the remainder to follow in short order.336
Lawton had developed an entirely different point of view and
recommended withdrawing all American troops and turning garrison
responsibility over to the Cubans. His primary reason for making his
recommendation was the large amount of sickness among the troops under
his command. The information he sent caused uneasiness at the War
Department. The War Department insisted that with a cooler climate,
illness would not be a major factor affecting the troops who would be
‘immunes’. Lawton took the position, apparently based on his daily health
reports that while the immunes might not be subject to Yellow Fever, they
would suffer from malaria, fever, and other diseases peculiar to the
region. 337
For the first time, Lawton was at odds with the War Department
although he did not press his point publicly. The fact that he did not was
favorable to McKinley who, just prior to Congressional elections, could
not afford to have a hero of the American people raising criticism of a
decision of the War Department.
Did the disagreement have an affect on Lawton? The answer was
quick in coming. At 7:51pm the evening of September 20th, Lawton cabled
Corbin with a request that Corbin look after Lawton’s interests with the
President as vacancies opened. In effect, Lawton said “get me out of here!”
No doubt the President was informed of Lawton’s cable that
evening. He and War Department officials were in the habit of being up
late at night watching developments in Cuba and the Philippines. At 10pm
the same evening, Corbin cabled Lawton assuring him that the President
would look after his interests. Lawton was also authorized to take a leave
of absence as soon as he could get important matters settled down. He was

335
Brooklyn Eagle-September 20, 1898 – p. 1
336
AP-Janesville Daily Gazette – September 20, 1898
337
Ibid.
183
to put Leonard Wood in charge in his absence. Wood was also authorized
to return home on leave when his services could be spared.338
At this point, the President and Corbin probably considered
options for relieving Lawton and bringing him home. Lawton’s physical
health was diminished and he was in need of a rest. Moreover, he was
about to take a position concerning the health of American troops that, if it
became public, could be damaging to the President’s domestic political
agenda. No one believed Lawton would purposely undermine the
administration, yet, in a state of poor health and worn out, a slip could
occur.
At the same time, Lawton who would never ‘quit’ while standing
on his feet, must have known that his health was going to be a problem and
he needed a rest. His personality was such that he could not ask to be
relieved due to illness. Not voluntarily. His cable to Corbin was the
caution light and in the next few weeks, matters would be worked out so
he could be relieved gracefully and brought home.
With some assurance of relief, Lawton was able to put to rest his
tendency to speak his mind and repressed whatever frustration he felt over
the matter. His day to day activities and public statements continued in a
soldierly fashion. On the 21st of September, he received Calixto Garcia as
an honored guest at the palace where various American officials were
presented to the former Cuban general.339 The local Cubans were
particularly delighted with Lawton’s treatment of Garcia and again
contrasted Lawton’s diplomacy with Shafter’s lack of same. Some 10,000
Cubans crowded the plaza in front of the palace. The 5th Infantry band
provided the day’s entertainment. In the evening, a second reception was
held at the San Carlos Club, attended by prominent Cubans, American
officers and ladies. 340 Lawton spoke of his satisfaction with the gradual
lessening of tensions between the Americans and former Cuban military.
On September 23rd, an article appeared giving glowing tribute to
the work being done in Santiago to clean up the city and restore health. At
the same time, the story raised concerns over the fact that while Yellow

338
N.A.-cables Lawton to Corbin / Corbin to Lawton 9-20-1898,
exact copies in author’s possession
339
Hopewell NJ Herald-September 21, 1898
340
Chicago Daily Tribune-September 23, 1898 – p. 1; Boston Daily
Globe-September 23, 1898 – p. 3
184
Fever was declining, mortality from malaria and dysentery remained
high. 341
In the same period, a series of stories were reported concerning
Lawton’s and Donaldson’s work with Customs collections and the impact
of Lawton’s decisions relating to fees charged to commerce. On the 23rd,
Lawton gave the Associate Press correspondent full access to Donaldson’s
report covering the period July 16th to September 1st. The report was an
exhaustive six-page study of the work done by the newly organized
Customs House of Santiago and in it was included the difficulties of fixing
an exchange rate for Spanish silver coin.342
Donaldson estimated annual income of the province at $2,150,000
and reported that a stable currency for Cuba had been established. The
report went into detail as to the daily expenses of government and civil
departments. By lowering rates of duty and opening wharfs and
warehouses, Lawton had actually increased revenues beyond predicted
levels. The revenue situation had the affect of improving employment
conditions and encouraging the development of business and trade. 343
The announcement of Leonard Wood’s expanded responsibilities
came on the 24th of September. Prior to that date, his duties involved
medical and some civil jurisdictions, and it was expanded to the whole of
the province by McKinley. While Lawton was not relieved of any of his
duties, this seems to have laid the groundwork for a transition of
authority. 344 Lawton moved his headquarters from the palace to the offices
formerly occupied by Spanish general Toral on the 27th, leaving the palace
essentially for Wood to occupy.345
Aside from those stories, nothing unusual appeared to suggest a
change in command. Lawton’s daily health and status reports continued in
their regular detailed fashion and Lawton was visible and available to the
press. His daily sick report of September 28th reflected a total sick of 1,093
and total fever 773 with 120 new cases. On a more optimistic note,
Lawton’s progress in bringing the former Cuban generals into the fold was

341
Chicago Daily Tribune-September 23, 1898 – p. 12
342
AP-NY Times-September 23, 1898 – p. 1; Washington Post-
September 23, 1898 – p. 1
343
Middletown Daily Argus-September 23, 1898
344
Brooklyn Eagle-September 25, 1898 – p. 29
345
Washington Post-September 27, 1898 p. 1
185
highlighted in another article on the 28th. In a dispatch to the NY Herald on
September 28th, it was reported that Lawton had conferred with Generals
Dimetro Castillo and Garcia. He offered a position to Castillo as assistant
to Leonard Wood. Garcia cautioned Lawton that unless Cubans felt that
they would ultimately be granted full independence, problems between
them and the Americans would continue. For his part, Garcia promised to
help smooth relations between the two peoples.346
On the 29th, letters were received from Lawton and Wood at the
War Department concerning their work in Cuba. They were in concert in
describing conditions, improvements, and work to be done. Wood had
commented on the re-establishment of a new police force.347On the 29th
and 30th, news of the newly re-organized police force appeared in some
detail. This would have been a major step in alleviating some of the
grievances held by the Cuban population and Lawton’s work was
impressive.
Lawton announced the Cuban mounted police for the Province of
Santiago with General Castillo in charge of initial appointments. There
were to be 240 enlisted men earning at a military pay grade equal to pay in
the U.S. Army, with a major as commandant.348 In addition, there would
initially be three captains, six lieutenants, and ten sergeants. The same
article stated that Inspector Donaldson had requested General Lawton to
appoint U.S. Consuls at Guantanamo, Santiago, and Manzanillo.349
A letter to Secretary Alger by Leonard Wood sometime late in
September was partially revealed to the press on October 1st. Wood goes to
some length to describe health conditions, employment and sanitation and
outlines his expenses for the work he is doing. The letter indicates that
Wood also wrote Alger on September 16th indicating everything was going
smoothly. On the surface, from what Alger revealed, there is no indication
of problems in Santiago. 350
The ebb and flow of events continued for the next several days
with nothing extraordinary occurring in the reports of correspondents. If

346
NY Herald as carried by Daily Light-September 28, 1898
347
Brooklyn Eagle-September 29, 1898 – p. 16
348
Atlanta Constitution-September 30, 1898
349
Chicago Daily Tribune-September 30, 1898 – p. 10
350
AP special report-October 1, 1898

186
there was any effort behind the scenes to bring Lawton home and put
Wood in charge, it had not become evident, although it was already a work
in progress. On the 2nd of October, there was a disturbance in the city
which could have become serious had one of Lawton’s aides not
intervened. A crowd of over 200 people armed with machetes and stones
attacked a policeman. Captain R.G. Mendoza quickly went to the scene,
spoke to the crowd and they dispersed peacefully. 351
Lawton was interviewed on the 3rd of October concerning
transport for the sick and he indicated that no more troops would be sent
by the transport Obdam.352 An editorial appearing on the same day once
again was rich with praise for Lawton and Wood and the work they had
done in Santiago. The editorial summarized by claiming that “things were
going marvelously well” and wondered if future governors would do as
well.353 As if to rebut the editorial, several alarming sick reports were
issued by Lawton over the next several days. On the 4th it was announced
that fourteen had died from fever and that one-sixth of Lawton’s command
was ill. Over one-thousand troops were reported ill on the 5th.It was
apparent that while the press had treated some of the bulletins as routine in
the past, they were now headlining the reports, a situation the
administration could ill afford. 354
On the 6th the news reported that General Garcia and his son along
with other prominent Cubans were to travel to the interior on Lawton’s
behalf in an effort to allay restlessness among the Cuban armed forces.
Reports of disorders from remote places were becoming more numerous
and Lawton sought to head them off at an early stage. 355
On October 6th, a new story, or rumor, about the proposed future
assignments to Cuba was in the papers. It was announced by the War
Department that General Fitzhugh Lee would return to Havana on October
27th. The news included details as to the various ports in the U.S. from
which Lee’s regiments would depart. Moreover, the report covered a major
reorganization of the army with a reduction of corps, re-assignment or

351
NY Times-October 3, 1898
352
Chicago Daily Tribune-October 4, 1898 – p. 3
353
NY Times-October 3, 1898
354
Ibid., October 4 and 5, 1898; Boston Daily Globe-October 4,
1898 – p. 7; Washington Post-October 5 and 6, 1898 – p. 2
355
Chicago Daily Tribune-October 7, 1898 – p. 10
187
mustering out of general officers, and the comment that Lee’s orders
would be issued on the 7th. It was stated that General Wade would likely
still be named Military Governor of Cuba, Lee’s specific role was not
elaborated upon but Lawton was now to report to Lee, rather than Wade. 356
Was this the straw that broke the camel’s back in Lawton’s case?
He had received a cable from Corbin the evening before granting him a
leave of absence for 60 days due to illness.357A second cable on the 6th at
11pm instructed Lawton to assign command to Wood and after transfer of
command, to report to the adjutant general in D.C. upon his return for
further instructions, which was strange considering Lawton was given 60
days sick leave. 358On October 7th, Corbin cabled Leonard Wood giving
him temporary command of the department during Lawton’s absence.
There is no indication in any of the cables that Lawton was permanently
relieved of his command. 359
Franklin Matthews had reported in the Harpers Weekly article to
appear later that Lawton became ill during the Santiago campaign. It was
also reported that Lawton who had been ill with fever off and on for three
months, broke down, as General McKibbin had, and was relieved. 360The
illness may have caught up with Lawton towards the end of September or
early October although he continued to be seen in public. There was a
short period of a few days somewhere around October 7th to the 11th that
correspondents noticed that he was not in his office. One report had it that
he was living for a time at a private hospital which Wood had set up. He
was seen there by a Dr. Elliott Brackett who was impressed with his quiet
manner.361Newspaper accounts with a couple of exceptions were
surprisingly sedate, reporting only that Lawton was ill and was preparing
to return to the U.S. on a sixty-day sick leave. 362Some time after Lawton’s
departure and new assignments, rumors circulated that he had committed a

356
Galveston Daily News-October 7, 1898
357
N.A.-Corbin cable to Lawton October 6, 1898-exact copy in
author’s possession
358
Ibid., 11pm
359
N.A.-Corbin cable to Leonard Wood October 7, 1898-exact copy
in author’s possession
360
Hagedorn, Hermann-Leonard Wood-i, p. 212
361
Ibid., i, pp. 209-210
362
Washington Post-October 10, 1898 –p.3
188
major transgression, to wit, drunkenness. However, the rumors seemed to
emanate only from a few officers who were considered detractors and
jealous of Lawton and have never been substantiated. Wood was
considered by many in the military establishment as a source of those
rumors as he was quite willing to do just about anything to remove people
who he deemed to be obstructions on his path to advancement. He proved
capable of doing so a year or so later when his actions undermined his
superior, MG John R. Brooke. 363
While there is no evidence of a major wrong doing on the part of
Lawton, there is also no strong evidence of Wood backstabbing his
‘friend’ although there is information that casts at least suspicion on Wood
and two of his associates. In a special editorial written some years later by
Oswald Garrison Villard, owner of the NY Post and Nation, he illustrates
in detail how Wood advanced his cause by attacking Lawton, and later,
Brooke.364 In 1898, Villard was the associate editor of the Post and was in
a position to have a finger on all of the news events around the world.
Villard reported that four men were instrumental in the
transformation of Wood from inconspicuous military surgeon into a
general with a record of administrative reconstruction in Cuba: Theodore
Roosevelt, Henry W. Lawton, a “chain-gang convict under the alias of
Edgar E.G. Bellairs”, and a retired officer of the army, James E. Runcie.
Bellairs had obtained employment as a correspondent by mis-representing
his credentials. He was fired for deceit and financial irregularities and went
on to the AP. Villard goes on to relate the story of Lawton’s appointment
to the position of military governor of Santiago after the Cuban campaign
ended with Leonard Wood second in command.
Lawton had one weakness, occasional intemperance, which in the
eyes of all who knew him detracted little from what was otherwise a most
estimable character. But somebody, a subordinate, or some one else,
reported to the War Department that Lawton had been seen on streets of
Santiago in an improper condition. At the time, Edgar G. Bellairs was a
correspondent for the Associated Press but acted more like a press agent

363
Lane, Jack C.-Armed Progressive-pp. 84-85; Leech, Margaret-In
The Days Of McKinley- pp. 392-393
364
Villard, Oswald Garrison-The Truth About Leonard Wood-The
Nation May 29, 1920-all references to Wood’s actions derive from
this article.
189
for Leonard Wood. Runcie, a Major in the army was Wood’s subordinate
and extremely loyal to him. It was Runcie who, a year later, wrote a
damaging article about General Brooke, leaked it to the press then lied
about its source. Wood was complicit in the matter, but after Runcie’s
deed was exposed, Wood was forced to remove Runcie from his staff.
Bellairs was like a camp follower and wherever Wood was,
Bellairs appeared with press articles flattering to Wood.
Villard therefore, with a good grasp of what was happening in
Cuba in 1898, treats Lawton’s potential minor indiscretion as something
insignificant. Given Lawton’s strict adherence to the rules, if he did over-
indulge on an occasion, it was off-duty and at a time when his actions did
not attract attention or detract from the uniform. It is reasonable to think
such an occurrence took place after he was granted sick leave. As to the
source of the information, no one has ever been able to identify the
‘reporter’ or subordinate who might have communicated the information
to the War Department, but it is logical to assume it was a uniformed
person. Runcie perhaps? Somehow, William Laffan of the NY Evening
Sun was given the information and allegedly decided to do a good deed
and cable it on to McKinley. The Sun was noted for its practice of printing
stories about the habits and ‘weaknesses’ of prominent individuals, even
long after their death.365 No document has ever surfaced to confirm the
rumor about Lawton except for a letter from McKinley to Laffan on
October 7, and Leonard Wood’s diary entries.366 The former was probably
a wise ploy on the part of McKinley to avoid antagonizing Laffan while
deflecting his ‘news’, and Wood’s entries, given his tendencies, may
simply have been self justification.
Given the background provided by Villard, it becomes easier to
understand the style and wording of the press releases of October 7th and
9th sent by special dispatch to the Syracuse NY Standard.367 On the 7th, it is

365
Gen. Wm T. Sherman writes about a news clipping from the Sun
February 1887 that focused on President Grant’s drinking habits.
366
The McKinley letter does not specifically address ‘drinking’, nor
does it mention Lawton. It seems ‘someone’ sent a story on to
Laffan and he doubted its veracity, but forwarded it to McKinley.
The information pertained to Santiago, not a person.
367
Syracuse Standard-special dispatches from Santiago-October 7
and 9, 1898
190
reported that President McKinley granted Lawton a 60 day leave of
absence due to illness, at Lawton’s request. Lawton had been suffering
from malaria since the siege of Santiago and had recently been laid up in a
private hospital. The article goes on to say that Lawton was popular among
the Cubans and had done much to allay the discontent that existed. It was
noted over a few days that Lawton was unable to pay attention to public
business “which led to some confusion but that General Wood had
straightened matters out”.
On the 9th, the special dispatch reports that Leonard Wood was
officially assigned to the command of the department of Santiago by
special order of the War Department. He was to retain the command
during the absence of General Lawton and was exercising the functions of
commanding general of the department, civil governor of the province, and
military governor of the city. The press release went on to say “ it is
presently believed here that the present arrangement will be made
permanent and Gen. Wood in the course of time will be advanced to the
grade of major general of volunteers. General Lawton never liked the
Santiago assignment.368It is thought that the war department will find
another post for him after his sick leave.”
“Gen. Wood received many congratulatory calls this morning
from Cuban and American friends here. Several messages came from
Washington from friends who knew that the assignment would be made.”
In terms of the assignment, Wood never clarified the temporary
nature of it at the onset. Other newspapers were quick to report that he was
‘military governor pro tempore’ and that status applied until about the 22nd
of October. However the events unfolded, they seemed to do so in a
fashion that agreed with both Lawton and Wood and again, the wheels
were probably set in motion sometime around September 20th. The fact
that Lawton took a glass or two of wine after duty hours soon after getting
sick leave was not unusual for an officer to do. The fact that ‘someone’ yet
unknown to history elected to make something out of nothing raises
questions as to motive. The story remains unfounded opinion and nothing
has ever surfaced to put it in the context of historical fact.

368
Lawton never publicly commented on his like or dislike of the
assignment so the observation had to be conjecture or offered by
Wood or his staff.
191
 McKinley, as will be shown, opted to treat the matter as
unimportant. Lawton felt some guilt about it later on, but it never detracted
from his fine performance as a general.

192
“I came to know him intimately, and learned to admire
and love him as did all those who had that great privilege.” Dean C.
Worcester

CHAPTER TWELVE

LAWTON LEAVES CUBA

On October 11, 1898, business continued as usual in Santiago de Cuba.

Lawton had come in to town from the officers hospital located about two
miles outside Santiago.369 Correspondents interviewed him about the state
of affairs with the troops and he indicated that he was well satisfied with
the soldierly qualities displayed by his men since they arrived. Reports
about the conduct of his troops from around the province were equally
satisfactory. Lawton stated that there had been very little drunkenness
which, when one remembered “drink was cheap and there was plenty of
it”, was commendable. 370
A delegation of leading Cubans presented Lawton with a letter
thanking him for his fairness, kindness, and generosity. Lawton, not
expecting the tribute, was taken aback by the gesture. 371
On the 12th, Lawton and Wood issued a joint statement
recommending a quarantine against vessels sailing to Cuba from infected
ports. Both men felt that Santiago had become one of the healthiest ports
in the West Indies. Lawton added that he did not think it fair that his men
should be infected by people arriving from infected ports.372
Before his ship the Michigan sailed from Cuba, General Wood and
other officers saw Lawton off and a delegation of Cubans boarded the ship
to wish him well. They included Carlos Garcia, son of General Garcia. The
Cubans informed Lawton that he had won the admiration of all Cubans by
his considerate conduct toward General Garcia during the campaign, and
because of his kindness in his capacity as commander of the province.

369
Syracuse Standard-October 10, 1898 – p. 1
370
Fitchburg Daily Sentinel-October 12, 1898
371
Chicago Daily News-October 12, 1898 – p. 9
372
Cedar Rapids Evening Gazette-October 12, 1898
193
They told him that the present amicable relations between Cuba and the
U.S. were due to his tact.373Lawton was accompanied by his aides,
Captains R.G. Mendoza and Edward L. King. As his transport left the
harbor, the battery at El Morro fired a thirteen gun salute. 374The two aides
remained with Lawton during his short stateside stay and traveled with
him to the Philippines the next year.
Before the Michigan had reached New York, Lawton supporters in
Congress were at work. Senators Fairbanks and Beveridge cabled
President McKinley urging him to appoint Lawton to succeed Shafter as
brigadier general in the regular army. Several other Indiana senators gave
their support to the proposal.375
The Michigan arrived outside of port in New York October 18th
where Lawton’s wife Mamie waited. A storm prevented the ship from
docking until the next day.376 When Lawton arrived the next day, he was
greeted by correspondents looking for news from Cuba. They reported that
Lawton looked ‘fairly well’ and that he said the voyage had done him a
great deal of good. Lawton indicated he was headed to New Haven to rest,
and the next day would start for Washington where he was expected to
report on the conditions in Cuba.377
Lawton reported that Leonard Wood was making good progress
on the initiatives they had started. He further stated that the people of
Santiago claimed that the city was as clean as it had ever been, business
was reviving, and the confidence among businessmen was restored. The
net result was that capitalists were again investing and business prospects
were booming. 378 The reporters asked questions about annexation of Cuba
to which Lawton responded with answers indicating he was not willing to
discuss the matter at that time.
An American businessman who had been on board the Michigan,
L.A. Faher of Philadelphia was also interviewed about his experiences in
Cuba. He said that while in Havana he found it unsafe to go unarmed. He
stated that the businessmen he had met while in Cuba held General Lawton

373
Lincoln Evening News-October 12, 1898
374
Boston Daily Glone-October 13, 1898 – p. 3
375
Ft. Wayne Evening Sentinel-October 17, 1898
376
Chicago Daily Tribune-NY Bureau-October 18, 1898 – p. 5
377
Brooklyn Eagle-October 19, 1898 – p. 3
378
Ibid.
194
in the highest esteem. Several merchants doing business in Cuba were
forming a delegation which planned to meet in Washington in late October
for the purpose of presenting a petition to McKinley favoring the
appointment of Lawton as military governor of Cuba. Faher added “I
cannot speak too highly of the General and, in a nutshell, his standing can
be appreciated when I say that he commands the confidence of everybody,
both military and civic”. 379
The War Department received a cable from Lawton on the 19th
indicating that he was on his way to New Haven to rest and Corbin
responded stating that Lawton should take as much time as necessary to
recover. Corbin also congratulated Lawton on his recovery from the illness
that caused him to relinquish his command at Santiago, indicating that the
matter was being treated lightly at the War Department.380
On October 26th, Lawton was with General Shafter in New York
where he was cabled by Adjutant General Corbin with instructions to join
President McKinley in Philadelphia the next day, and then to return to
Washington for a conference. 381 On the same day, Corbin cabled the Union
League in Philadelphia advising them that Lawton would be joining the
President for dinner and that if crowded, they were to give Corbin’s place
to Lawton. 382 The next day, Lawton and Shafter were in Philadelphia
together with the President and other dignitaries at the Peace Jubilee and
reviewed the parade during the day, were present at the Clover Club
during the McKinley’s speech and at the Union League for dinner.383
The newspapers were still poking into the matter of Shafter’s
generalship in Cuba on October 29th. The Brooklyn Eagle of that date
carried an article which probed the reasons for Shafter’s telegram to the
War Department on July 3rd suggesting he might withdraw his forces to the
rear. His subordinate generals were reasonably quiet on the subject but
were reportedly urging Shafter to speak out on the matter. The public had
been led to believe that the thought of retreat was solely Shafter’s. The

379
Brooklyn Eagle-October 19, 1898 – p. 3
380
Hartford Courant-October 20, 1898 – p. 1
381
N.A.-Corbin to Lawton cable c/o Shafter NY October 26,1898-
exact copy in author’s possession
382
N.A.-Corbin to Union League cable October 26, 1898-exact
copy in author’s possession
383
NY Times-October 28, 1898
195
Eagle and other papers now proposed that Shafter’s generals insisted on
the telegram. Lawton was at the White House and War Department on the
29th, providing information to McKinley, Alger, and Corbin about the
situation in Cuba as they weighed their options and plans for the
occupation of Cuba. The President voiced his gratitude to Lawton for the
victorious conclusion to the campaign at Santiago and for the manner in
which the officers and men conducted themselves.384
Lawton was interviewed and declined to give any comments
regarding his recommendations to the President or Secretary Alger
concerning future operations of the army and the government in Cuba. He
told correspondents it had not been definitely determined if he would
return to Cuba but expressed the opinion that he probably would not.
Lawton expressed satisfaction at the manner in which affairs were moving
in Santiago province. With Lawton at the White House were his aides
Mendoza and King. 385
Recognizing the Lawton had regained his health sufficiently, and
that the public might find it odd that he was at the White House, War
Department, and other functions while on sick leave, the War Department
changed his leave status. A cable from Corbin to Lawton dated November
3rd advised Lawton that by order of Commanding General Nelson A.
Miles, his leave was changed from 60 days sick leave to 30 days ordinary
leave effective October 19, 1898.386 Regardless, even though Lawton had
some time to rest with friends, he spent a better part of his leave time in
Washington, testifying before the Dodge Commission.
On November 4th, he was back in Washington giving testimony to
Colonel Denby of the commission. Lawton testified about activities from
the date of embarkation at Tampa and forward. He stated that the
transports were furnished as well as could be expected given the fact they
were not troop transports. Medical and commissary supplies were
sufficient to prevent absolute discomfort. Overall, Lawton did not criticize
the War Department, Shafter, or the administration. He said it was true that

384
Brooklyn Eagle-October 30, 1898 – p. 29
385
Ibid.; Ft. Wayne Daily Gazette-October 30, 1898 – p. 3;
Washington Post-October 30, 1898 – p. 5; LA Times-October 30,
1898 – p. A2
386
N.A. Corbin to Lawton cable-November 3, 1898-exact copy in
author’s possession
196
the men had gone some time without a change of clean clothes but that
was because they had thrown away their extra clothing. The medical
personnel did the best job possible under existing conditions. To the
surprise of many of the yellow journalists and the President’s opponents
who expected Lawton to add more criticism to that already piled on,
Lawton’s testimony basically killed the critical reports. One point that
Lawton had tried to make in mid-September was raised again when he told
the commission that while conditions in Santiago were improving, there
had been much suffering among the soldiers. He added that in his opinion,
anyone going from the states to Cuba would have to suffer the
acclimatizing fever.387
On the 1st of November it was announced that Lawton was to
command the 3rd Corps, replacing General Graham who was retiring. In a
few days, the War Department announced that it had overlooked a general
senior to Lawton in time and grade and the assignment was rescinded.
If anything was apparent about the War Department,
administration, and army of 1898, it was that utter confusion reigned in
terms of communications and announcements. Miles’ differences with
Alger resulted in public statements that were at cross purposes and
certainly not in step with the President’s objectives. Promotions were
announced to the press, then changed or withdrawn, or they simply failed
to take place with no explanation given. Had the President put his foot
down and insisted on disciplined communications, there might have been
improvements, but he himself was slow to make corrections. Moreover, he
did not want to appear critical in public of the very people he had placed in
high positions.
General Lawton did take a few brief rest periods during his leave,
returning to Pewee Valley with his wife after his early November
testimony in Washington. During his stay there, a New York Times
reporter spent time with him the afternoon of November 8th for an
interview, and for the purposes of making general observations.388One
thing that struck the reporter was how much the children adored Lawton,
and the fact that he broke away from the interview to spend time with
them. The same reporter, a year later, remembered that Lawton had not

387
Brooklyn Eagle-November 4, 1898 – p. 1
388
Louisville Times-November 10, 1898
197
wanted to talk about the Cuban campaign, but did not object to his wife
answering the reporter’s questions.
Lawton arrived at the Galt House in Louisville at 8pm sharp that
evening to attend a reception in his honor. Several dignitaries from
Louisville were present along with military officials and prominent people
from outside Louisville. 389 The impressions of Lawton from the guests
indicated that he was a quiet man of few words, without frills. It was also
noted that while most guests drew freely from the punch bowl, Lawton did
not imbibe.
Lawton’s aide, Captain R.G. Mendoza was with him and was
interviewed about the Cuban campaign. Mendoza commented that few
people at the reception would have been able to guess at the hardships
Lawton endured in Cuba. Mendoza, a Cuban native, had been curious to
see how an American general would provide for himself in the field.
Lawton acted like any other soldier in the field, sleeping out in the open in
the rain or curling up under a bush for a short nap.
The Times reporter sensed that Lawton might have been
somewhat bored at the reception. Lawton had told the writer earlier in the
day that he was not much of a talker and that war never had amusing
phases for him. He viewed war as a grim business and preferred not to
discuss it.
Possibly, Lawton was not bored, rather distracted by something he
was thinking about that day. He wrote a letter to Henry Corbin, the
adjutant general on November 8th which clearly indicated that something
was troubling him. 390 Written from the Culbertson home in Pewee Valley,
Ky., the letter conveyed both a sense of irritation and remorse on Lawton’s
part. He started the letter by referring to a note he had received from
Schwan (assistant adjutant general Theo Schwan) the same day, then
writing that he felt he was becoming a “white elephant” to his friends
which “worried him a great deal”. Lawton continued by writing that he
would like to be retired as a brigadier general, but felt he was still capable
and competent to remain in service.

389
Courier-Journal- November 9, 1898 – p. 8; All articles
concerning the Galt House Reception are courtesy of the Culbertson
Mansion, Louisville, Ky.
390
Library of Congress-Corbin Papers-Lawton to Corbin November
8, 1898-exact copy in author’s possession
198
 It is possible that the administration wanted to offer Lawton a
promotion to brigadier, regular army and retirement at that grade however,
the letter only hints at that and there is nothing specifically stated on the
subject. Lawton also may have been feeling some remorse about the
‘incident’ in Santiago towards the end of his tenure, particularly after the
fine reception he had been given in Louisville on the 8th. He acknowledged
an incident although he admits that the President apparently did not think it
was of major significance.
Interestingly Lawton refers to the helter-skelter confusion in
Washington and the fact that Corbin is the person holding things together.
Finally, Lawton, in so many words, tells Corbin that if he wanted Lawton
to retire, to send the paperwork which Lawton would fill out. Otherwise, it
was time to move on and drop the matter. Lawton also emphasized that
whatever Corbin decided, he needed to give Lawton something to do while
he waited as he disliked being idle. The War Department and McKinley
obviously put the whole matter behind them and moved on to more
important issues. There remained however, a small minority in the Army
who would continue to spread unfounded rumors that Lawton was a
regular drinker.
Lawton soon had something to do. On November 10th, he was
ordered back to Washington by the Secretary of War, Alger, who intended
to send Lawton back to Havana and other Cuban cities. Lawton was to
study the problem of policing the larger towns and the feasibility of
employing Cubans in the police service. 391 Since Lawton had already re-
built the Santiago police force, using Cubans, he was no doubt considered
somewhat of an expert on the matter. The inane order of Alger, like many
of the reports issued from the War Department, turned out to be
meaningless.
The war in the press for and against McKinley’s policies and
critical of the ineptitude of the War Department, abated somewhat by early
November. Congressional elections were over, the Republicans held their
own and McKinley’s sensitivity to criticism from within the military ranks
would have lessened somewhat. Not altogether though and Lawton was
one of the generals who remained important to McKinley, particular as the
situation in the Philippines evolved.

391
Warren Pa. Evening Democrat- November 10, 1898
199
 For its part, the yellow press continued to speculate about mistakes
made in Cuba. An article appearing November 10th claimed that since the
elections were over, men such as Lawton were anxious to tell more to the
commission. 392 He had more to say than what he had told the commission
previously. Another article of the same date, obviously in a pro-
administration newspaper, stated that the yellow journals had put things in
the mouths of testifying military officers even before they testified. In
Lawton’s case, those who thought he would now add more to his
testimony were mistaken. He had no criticism to offer of the campaign
even though the yellow papers predicted beforehand that he would give
damaging evidence.393 Though Lawton was recalled to testify again before
the commission, once more his testimony offered no criticism of the War
Department, McKinley, or the army.
General Adna Chaffee also testified on or about November 7th and
during this session, he outlined his reconnaissance of the area around El
Caney before July 1. When asked why Chaffee did not have more artillery
for the assault at Caney, Chaffee stated the siege guns had not been landed.
He took personal blame for the difficulty at Caney stating that he had
under estimated the strength and determination of the Spanish defenders.
His testimony placed no fault with anyone else for problems and like
Lawton he felt that conditions were typical of a battle situation.
On November 19th, Lawton, at Pewee Valley, cabled Corbin for
instructions since his leave was about to expire.394 On the 20th, Lawton
received a reply from Schwan telling him his leave was extended
indefinitely and that within ten days, the secretary would have an
assignment satisfactory to Lawton. 395 Lawton was hoping for an
interesting new assignment but at the moment, did not know what that
assignment would be. McKinley, his cabinet and the War Department were
considering several options in the Philippines. Major General Wesley
Merritt , military governor of Manila had wanted to devote his time to

392
Trenton Evening Times – November 10, 1898
393
Indiana Pa Weekly Messenger- November 16, 1898
394
N.A.-Lawton to Corbin cable-exact copy in author’s possession
395
N.A.-Schwan to Lawton cable-exact copy in author’s possession
200
administrative duties while giving command of the troops to General
Elwell S. Otis who had arrived in August. 396
Merritt ultimately gave up his command, turning everything over
to Otis and returned home via the Paris peace conference late in 1898.397
McKinley had been indecisive about his plan for the Philippines. He later
related that he had not wanted the Philippines and spent many a sleepless
night in the fall of 1898 wondering what to do. He finally fell on his knees
and prayed for guidance and the answer came to him, to take all of the
Philippines. 398 Once McKinley made the decision to annex, the need for
capable military leaders became more obvious and Lawton’s role was
more or less assured.
Lawton was asked to accompany the President’s party once more
and he was at the Peace Jubilee in Atlanta on December 15th. 399 He then
traveled back to Washington and attended a dinner hosted by the
prestigious Gridiron Club. McKinley attended as did a host of dignitaries
including cabinet members, peace commissioners, the Canadian joint high
Commissioners, and members of the diplomatic corps. Several prominent
military officers also attended including Generals Miles, Shafter, and
Lawton, and Admirals Schley and Sigsbee. 400
Miles may have felt some resentment about Lawton’s presence as
evidenced by the fact that he decided late in the day to change the evening
dress code to civilian coat and tie. He never got word to Lawton who
showed up in full dress military uniform. The ploy apparently backfired
though as Lawton received a great deal of attention from the other
attendees. Called on to make comments, he simply stood up, took a bow
and sat back down. Some time later, when asked if he had ever been
afraid, Lawton replied that the request to speak at the Gridiron Club
frightened him more than any battle he had been in. 401

396
Leech, Margaret – In The Days Of McKinley- p. 331
397
Ibid.
398
Ibid., pp. 344-345
399
Idaho Daily Statesman-December 14, 1898 – p. 1
400
Ft. Wayne Historical Society: Chicago Tribune December 20,
1899
401
Ibid.
201
 While he was in Washington, Lawton found time to visit with his
friend, Robert G. Carter from the 4th Cavalry days. While limited as to
what he could tell Carter, Lawton tried to keep him abreast of current
events. 402
His rest period over, he was assigned to command IV Corps at
Huntsville, Alabama effective December 22nd, replacing General Joseph
Wheeler. 403 The assignment was known to be of a temporary nature as
military personnel have to be under orders no matter where they are, and
need an assignment of record. On December 29th, he was relieved of
command of IV Corps and assigned to service in the Philippines.404 This
particular article stated that Lawton would be second in command under
Otis and should Otis be appointed as military governor, Lawton would
take command of all field forces. The statement had to be of some interest
to readers who paid close attention to the news since Otis had already been
referring to himself as military governor.
Whoever was putting out the press releases from the War
Department failed to assure that each correspondent was getting the same
news. Another article reported that Lawton was to relieve Otis of the
command of military forces in Manila.405 The same article gave specifics
as to Otis’s pending promotion to the position of military governor similar
to the position held by General Brooke in Cuba. However, in providing
background on Lawton, the article credited him with leading the forces
that took San Juan Hill.
A third article claimed that Lawton was to go to Manila to relieve
Otis who would contine as military governor.406 All of the news articles
stated that Lawton was to sail immediately. It should be remembered that
Nelson Miles had only recently made known his desire to be assigned to
the Philippines at the head of army forces. Whether his public declarations
caused him some embarrassment in light of his being passed over by the
President is not known. He was not one to appreciate slights.

402
Newberry Library Chicago-Carter Papers
403
War Department-Service record
404
NY Times-December 29, 1898
405
Trenton Evening Times-December 30, 1898 – p. 2
406
Syracuse Standard-December 30, 1898 – p. 1
202
However Lawton later perceived his assignment in the Philippines, his
initial impression was clearly outlined in the press. It was also
communicated in the same fashion to him by his superiors before he sailed
for Manila. Later accounts, though few, say that Lawton ‘misunderstood’
his role. Rather, McKinley would once again vacillate and allow his
whims to adversely affect military operations in the field.
Lawton had apparently received notification of the pending
assignment to Manila well before the 29th of December. In effect, his
posting to Huntsville was perfunctory since his superiors had to have
known Lawton was going to the Philippines. On December 28th, he wired
Corbin from Huntsville stating that it would suit him to sail from New
York. 407 On December 29th, the assistant AG cabled the Army
Quartermaster General and advised him that Lawton desired
accommodations to sail from New York and that the Secretary of War had
informed Lawton that his wishes had been conveyed. Provisions were to
be made for General Lawton.408On December 30th, Corbin, by command of
Miles, cabled Lawton at Anniston directing Lawton to travel to
Washington en route to Manila. The President and Alger wished to confer
with Lawton concerning the situation there.409
On December 30th, Lawton, handling affairs of IV Corps, cabled
Corbin asking for clarification of his orders. The Adjutant General had
cabled Lawton at Anniston, Alabama however, Lawton was in Huntsville
at Corps headquarters. The AG’s cable caused some confusion and Lawton
wanted clarification. With some emphasis, he instructs Corbin “WIRE me
IMMEDIATELY”.410Corbin requested Lawton’s presence in D.C. which
is where he was when he received an order from the assistant AG stating
that the Secretary of War ordered Lawton to New York City to make an
inspection of troops designated for the Philippines. Those Lawton
determined as not fit, he was to discharge. Upon completion of the task,
Lawton was to return to Washington.411

407
N.A.-Lawton to Corbin cable-December 28, 1898- exact copy in
author’s possession
408
Ibid., December 29, 1898
409
Ibid., December 30, 1898
410
N.A.-Lawton to Corbin cable-December 30, 1898-exact copy in
author’s possession
411
Ibid., AG cable to Lawton-January 5, 1899
203
 On the same day, Lawton received a second cable from the
assistant AG, this time adding several other locations the Secretary of War
wanted Lawton to visit to inspect troops. He was to travel to Philadelphia,
Columbus Barracks, Ft. Sheridan, Jefferson Barracks, and Ft. Riley. Then,
travel to Washington prior to departure for Manila. 412
In short order, Lawton had to inspect troops at widely scattered
posts in the U.S., meet with McKinley and Alger, get his affairs in order
and his family ready to go, and prepare to sail on or about January 16th
1899. He was in Illinois at Ft. Sheridan on January 9th, having arrived from
Columbus, Ohio, making a hurried trip to the post to inspect the men of the
4th Infantry. After interviewing the post officers and inspecting rank and
file, Lawton left for Jefferson Barracks and Ft. Riley. The personnel at Ft.
Sheridan told reporters that they believed Lawton would be in command of
field forces in the Philippines and Otis would be promoted to Military
Governor. As in the press, rank and file was passing the word that Lawton
was to be in charge. Lawton for his part was tight-lipped other than to say
he was inspecting the troops to make sure only the best fit men shipped
overseas.413
During his last days in Washington, Lawton had received his
orders directly from the President. Robert G. Carter recalls that Lawton
left the White House and visited briefly with General Miles and other
friends. He requested Carter’s company as he traveled to the train station
in General J. C. Breckenridge’s carriage. Lawton confided in Carter that
the President had given him specific orders concerning the split command
of the American Army once he reached Manila. 414
Lawton stepped out of the carriage, stooping to walk under the
railroad station canopy as Carter remembered, waved, and boarded his
train. It was the last time Carter and Lawton saw each other. Lawton was
not the first to receive instructions from McKinley, which were like
shifting desert sands. He and his family sailed through the Suez Canal to
the Philippines, a voyage of some fifty-five days. By the time he reached
Manila, the President’s instructions had been changed, or ignored.
Whether the envious General Miles got in his last jab and influenced a

412
N.A. – AG to Lawton, January 5, 1899
413
Chicago Daily Tribune- January 9, 1899 – p. 9
414
Newberry Library Chicago-Carter Papers
204
change in thinking, or McKinley simply vacillated in his usual way was
never to be known. 415
On January 17th, army officials and members of the Senate and
House Committees on Military Affairs left Washington at midnight by rail
to travel to New York to see General Lawton and his staff off. Corbin was
among the high ranking officers in the party.416 Within three months of his
return to the U.S., Lawton left home bound for action on foreign soil for
the last time.

415
Newberry Library Chicago-Carter Papers
416
NY Times- January 18, 1899
205
“Lawton was a striking and soldierly figure. He was six feet, four inches
tall, erect and well built. He was quick and energetic in manner and
speech, a fine organizer, a thoroughly practical field soldier and a highly
competent commander, respected and loved by superiors and subordinates
alike. As America’s greatest campaigner in the Philippines, he was a titan
of courage and strength. He had been the terror of the Indian marauders of
the Southwest. In the Philippines, he had become the “General of the
Night,” feared with superstitious dread by the Filipinos.” Quoted from
material provided by the Manila City Library, March 27, 1980.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE PHILIPPINES-PHASE ONE

When Lawton sailed from New York, he was considered the new
commander of army field forces In the Philippines. There is no question of
him having misunderstood his role since it had been conveyed to him by
the Secretary of War, Adjutant General, and the President. His position
was a matter of public knowledge. The War Department had clearly
announced the position and his role to the press. Unfortunately, no written
orders were ever issued.
Lawton was known to be headstrong, but loyal to his superiors
and his record reflects that he was never openly insubordinate, or critical
of those over him. Yet, he was to find his nemesis in the person of General
Elwell S. Otis, the self-appointed military governor of the Philippines who
sought to subjugate and civilize societies that were not white and
Christian. For the better part of a year or more, Otis hoodwinked President
McKinley with a constant stream of upbeat reports while failing to
recognize what was going on around him and ignoring his senior officers
and other advisors. While well educated and a man of many achievements
since the Civil War, the best that can be said of Otis is that he was a man
who time had passed by.
As a Lieutenant Colonel in the army of the west, he wrote a book
clearly outlining his opinions and philosophies about the American Indian
societies and carried those views with him for the rest of his career. He
was an articulate but narrow-minded bigot. In 1878, Otis had written his
opinion that despite all evidence pointing to a decline in the Indian

206
population it had actually not decreased since the 17th Century.417 He also
elaborated on his belief that until the Indians were dispersed among the
white population, they would continue to be a threat to society for
generations.
In terms of their standing among civilizations, the Indians were
considered inferior by Otis to the extent that he wrote that any inter-
marriages would result in “an inferior being both in mind and morals.”418
Otis considered the Indian to be “almost entirely destitute of the moral
qualities” and “lacking the faculty of abstraction, and consequently his
imagination, reason, and understanding were of a very low order.”419 It
was this mindset that governed Otis’ thinking as he sought to impose his
form of government on the Filipinos. In doing so, he was not without a
large base of support in the United States.
In this period of time, nationalistic fervor was sweeping the
country, engulfing politicians, religious leaders, businessmen, the wealthy
and poor alike. Two distinct communities were establishing themselves in
the United States, the imperialists and the anti-imperialists. It is difficult
to find a middle ground in the history of those days. 420
Increasingly, the imperialists who sought to annex Cuba and the
Philippines held such desires for varying reasons. Geopolitical motives
dictated that naval bases be established in the Pacific as a way of
extending American economic power and gaining inroads into China and
the Far East.421
Religious leaders, particularly those of the Protestant
denomination, saw annexation as a God given right, or a means to bring
Christianity to a heathen people. Politicians viewed annexation as
necessary to bring American democracy to a people who were basically
viewed as belonging to a sub-culture and not able to govern themselves.
The vision of Anglo-Saxon conquerors bringing true civilization to
savages was as vivid as that of earlier generations justifying their conquest
of the Indians. 422

417
Otis, Elwell S.-The Indian Question- p. 45
418
Ibid., p. 282
419
Ibid., p. 229
420
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation- p. 14
421
Ibid., p. 18
422
Ibid., pp. 8-17
207
 A number of people felt Lawton was bucking for another
promotion or for Major General Elwell S. Otis’ position. There was even
some thought that Roosevelt supported such a move. 423 The truth was that
Roosevelt, while a friend and admirer of Lawton, had personally
recommended to McKinley that Otis be replaced by General Francis V.
Greene. 424
What Lawton did believe, and wish for, was that he would have a
relatively free hand in running the army’s ground operations in the
Philippines. He was to be sorely disappointed.
When Major General Wesley Merritt and the 8th Army Corps
sailed for the Philippines in mid-1898, the primary objective he was to
address was that of defeating the Spanish forces in Manila. Major General
Elwell S. Otis was his second in command. When Merritt arrived in the
Philippines July 25, 1898, he was still unclear about President McKinley’s
final aims for the islands. 425 Yet he must have sensed what they were
because he cut off any form of dialogue with Emelio Aguinaldo and the
other rebel leaders.
Up until Merritt’s arrival, Admiral Dewey and General T. M.
Anderson, the Army’s first commander in the area, had met and
maintained open communications with Aguinaldo. 426 They were in fact,
Aguinaldo’s sounding boards as to ultimate American policy and when
questioned about the future fate of the Philippines, could only respond that
the U. S. Constitution did not allow America to have colonies.
In the U. S., McKinley’s unclear ambitions also continued to
confuse the military and civilian hierarchy. Relations between General
Miles and Secretary of War, Alger, had deteriorated to a point where they
rarely bothered to talk with each other. Adjutant General Corbin was
running the military show for all practical purposes. 427
Between July and December, the American forces in the
archipelago were there ostensibly to drive the Spanish out and free the
Filipinos. Ambiguity or outright rudeness on the part of senior officers

423
Karnow, Stanley-In Our Image-p. 148
424
Leech, Margaret-In The Days Of McKinley-p. 375
425
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation- p. 44
426
Ibid., p. 41
427
Cosmas, Graham A.-An Army For Empire-pp. 56-59
208
however, caused Aguinaldo and his officers to grow increasingly wary of
just what the Americans were up to.
By late August, 1898, when it appeared that the Spanish
commander in Manila was all but finished, the rebels expected that they
should take part in the liberation of the city as well as occupy the former
Spanish positions ringing Manila. To their consternation, the American
military did not give any indication that it was going to give up ground,
rather, it gave every appearance that it wanted more. 428
Otis became obvious in his attempts to alienate Aguinaldo and to
block the rebels in their efforts. Whenever messages were exchanged
between him and the rebel leader, Otis was threatening in his use of
language and in his demeanor. He was by no means a diplomat, and by all
means an arm chair general who had no notion of the military implications
of the pending conflict between the U. S. and the insurgents. 429
Otis was McKinley’s link to events in the Philippines and
throughout his period of influence as a commander, McKinley was
unfortunately tied to Otis’ sense of reality and grasp of events. Otis, from
what is read of his conduct and attitude was clearly a military man
dabbling in the power-play process. Moreover, he was in over his head
according to more than one well placed source. According to the papal
delegate to the Philippines, Archbishop Chapelle, Otis was “of about the
right mental caliber to command a one-company post in Arizona.”430
Otis’ primary preoccupation was to remain at his desk in the
governor’s mansion the better part of a day intensely reducing stacks of
paper. He delegated no authority, was pompous and fussy, and inspired
few.431
Spain had ceded the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Guam to
the U.S. at the signing of the peace accord. The peace commission which
McKinley had sent to Paris to negotiate with the Spanish was foggy about
the ultimate designs of the U.S., but the appearance of General Wesley
Merritt in Paris left no doubt as to what the Americans had in mind. One
of the more aggressive military officers in stating U.S. aims he advocated
the annexation of the entire archipelago.

428
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation-pp. 43-45
429
Ibid., pp. 46-47
430
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation - p. 46
431
Ibid.
209
 In the Philippines, while Emelio Aguinaldo and his followers had
once hoped that the Americans would free the Filipinos of the Spanish and
go home, they were becoming more convinced that the Americans would
remain and rule the islands.432
Between December, 1898, and early February, 1899, General Otis
continued to bully and bluff the rebels while at the same time, urging
McKinley to push for ratification of the treaty as early as possible, before
the rebels turned their hostilities against his forces.
The presence of a small German fleet near Manila exacerbated the
situation in that it gave the imperialist faction in the U.S. propaganda
ammunition. The pro-annexation press questioned why the United States
should bring its troops home just to have Germany, or another European
power take the islands for themselves. 433
Lawton in fact, predicted that the next major war in which the
U.S. would find itself would involve Germany as a foe. 434 With American
Far East trade of paramount importance, it was felt that the U. S. should at
least protect its trade system by having naval bases in the Philippines.
Otis aggravated the situation in Manila, almost goading the rebels
into a fight, but his communications with McKinley led the President to
believe everything was under control.435 In February 1899, Otis was
informing McKinley that rebels were being dispersed and the situation was
well in hand. At the same time he cabled Lawton who was en route
informing Lawton that he should hurry his arrival as the situation in
Manila was critical. 436 Generals Merritt and Corbin soon after advocated
splitting the command so that Otis could run administrative affairs and
Lawton could take the field command. He was considered far more
energetic than Otis and would provide the leadership needed by the
American troops.437 While Lawton was certain to have been aware of the
government’s intentions, he kept his own counsel, believing it was not a

432
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation- p. 40; Trask,
David F.-The War With Spain- pp.402-405
433
Trask, David F.-The War With Spain-pp.377-378
434
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation - p. 19
435
Ibid., pp. 46-47
436
Karnow, Stanley-In Our Image- p. 45
437
Leech, Margaret-In The Days Of McKinley-pp. 397-398
210
soldier’s job to interfere in politics, a frame of mind that would change
once he arrived in the Philippines.
As McKinley was busy with his public relations campaign,
General Otis and his subordinates were busy stirring up excuses to take
military action in the Philippines. By mid-December of 1898, Aguinaldo
was fairly convinced that the Americans were no longer partners with his
forces in freeing the Islands from Spanish rule. He reminded the U.S. of its
promise to guarantee Philippine independence. He also issued a not so
thinly veiled threat of war if independence was not granted.
Otis, looking for excuses to grab more land area before the Paris
accord was ratified, found one in the Spanish garrison in Iloilo, the major
city of Panay. The garrison continued to hold out against Filipino rebel
attacks. 438 The Spanish had indicated a willingness to surrender, but only
to the Americans. Otis needed ships to get his troops to Iloilo and without
orders from Washington. Admiral Dewey would not provide them. In
mid-December, Otis requested orders from Washington and received them
more than a week later. 439 They carried the stipulation that he could move
his troops to Iloilo only if the city could be taken peacefully.
Dewey now provided the transport and Otis sent General Marcus
Miller to head the expedition.440 By the time American troops reached the
city, they found that the Spanish had already left and were on their way to
Manila. The Filipinos were surprised, and concerned, to find American
troops at their doorstep. When pressed by the Filipinos to explain his
presence, Miller passed on a copy of a proclamation by President
McKinley. Unfortunately, Otis had doctored it and changed some of the
wording to make it more palatable, in his view, to the Filipinos.
The Filipinos had however, obtained a copy of McKinley’s
original proclamation, and quickly discovered those changes Otis had
made. Otis in effect had proclaimed American sovereignty over the
Philippines before the Paris Treaty was even ratified. 441 Moreover, he
used the title ‘Military Governor of The Philippines’ which enraged the
Filipinos. When asked later by a U.S. Senator why he had chosen to assign
himself that title without authorization Otis responded “because it occurred

438
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation-pp. 50-53
439
Ibid., p. 51
440
Ibid.
441
Ibid., p. 52
211
to me at the time to do it.” During the same testimony Otis was quite clear
that he felt it was his prerogative to launch a war in the Philippines without
any approval from Washington. 442 The pattern of miscalculations, deceit,
and misinforming the President was well established and Otis would
continue the pattern in the midst of his continuing poor results.443
Miller’s contingent remained outside Iloilo until hostilities broke
out February 4, in light of specific instructions from Washington in early
January to avoid conflict. Aguinaldo and his lieutenants, with their backs
up against the wall, could have easily begun hostilities by January, but
Aguinaldo understood that the Americans would prove to be a more
dangerous adversary than the Spanish. He continued to use diplomatic
means by sending a group of rebel leaders to meet with the U.S. military
officials. 444 The Filipinos had a specific discussion agenda but the
Americans came to the meetings, held throughout January, 1899, with
nothing to talk about. In fact, the American participants made fun of the
meetings and the Filipinos to the extent that Aguinaldo realized he was not
being taken seriously.
Part of Otis’ stalling tactic at the meetings had to do with waiting
for reinforcements from the states, then underway under Lawton’s
command. While issuing optimistic reports to Washington, Otis at the
same time understood that his force of 24,000 men was far less than what
the rebels could put in the field. His double-talk was apparent even in his
official communications later in February, claiming to have matters well in
hand.

442
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation- p.52, pp.63-64
443
Karnow, Stanley-In Our Image- pp. 139-149
444
Ibid., p. 144
212
 Maj. Gen. Lawton-1899-National Archives

While Lawton, his wife and children, and the new regiment were
bound for the Philippines, Otis continued to play out his cards in Manila.
Having reached a breaking point in late January, Aguinaldo’s forces
needed little to push them beyond the brink. In the first days of February,
they were given the final push.
General Arthur MacArthur pointed out to the rebels that they were
still holding a piece of land behind American lines and ordered their
withdrawal. The Filipino officer was willing to comply but wanted to
discuss the matter. MacArthur instead, ordered his troops to occupy the
parcel and the American soldiers were more than happy to follow their
orders. For some time, many of them had been insulting and physically
threatening towards the Filipinos. The situation was a natural
manifestation of the sentiment back home and the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ rhetoric
that had been spewing from the American press. 445

445
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation-p. 60
213
 The Americans knew that on February 4th, the senior Filipino
officers would be attending a special gathering, which would include
drinking and celebrating.446 A situation was devised so that American
sentries were given cause to open fire on several of the Filipinos as they
returned to their units. Congressional investigations into the events in later
years revealed that everything fell into place according to Otis’ plan.
MacArthur had to have been in on the plan or well aware of the direction
in which Otis was directing affairs. Washington, despite its plans to annex
and govern the Philippines, had not wanted a shooting war with Aguinaldo
and the insurrectionists. No matter, the armchair general had concocted the
reasons he needed to “shoot savages” and the conflict began in earnest.
Even when the Filipinos offered to negotiate a truce on February 5, Otis
declined and took it upon himself to escalate the fight.447
While he apparently did not realize it at the time, McKinley was
leaning on an entirely distorted set of facts coming from the Philippines
because General Otis was the source. He had in fact, provoked a war with
Aguinaldo because in his own mind, he had come to believe the Filipinos
did not want independence. What he believed they wanted was to take
over the islands, kill whites and plunder. For his own reasons, Otis
launched offensive military operations against the rebels that clearly were
not authorized by the U.S. government, and would not have been approved
had senior officials known the real facts.
Within a few days of the initial outbreak of war, Otis demanded
unconditional surrender of all rebel forces, a demand that was not to be
met. American forces pushed out from Manila to find that their new
enemy was quite capable of guerrilla warfare. Rebel troops laid traps and
melted into the underbrush. American soldiers walked into the traps and
suffered casualties that in turn triggered angry reprisals by Americans.
Villages were burned with little regard for civilian suffering.
Any information relating to possible mistreatment of the Filipinos
by American soldiers never made it back to the U.S. Back home, the
patriotic press was having a field day extolling the achievements of the
American Army. Public sentiment was strongly in favor of doing the right
thing and punishing an enemy, which had been unappreciative of
American good will, was the right thing. No real inkling of what was

446
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation - pp. 60-61
447
Ibid., p. 63
214
happening reached home until Otis’ official report of June, 1899 and even
then, the press did not immediately begin to doubt its own rhetoric for a
time.
General Lawton arrived early in March with fresh troops. Because
of his public image in the U.S., the press picked up immediately on his
appearance. While Otis initially put him on hold, perhaps because Otis
resented earlier suggestions that Lawton take command of the field Army,
it was not too long before Lawton was actively engaged in the fighting.448
The press would later report:
“ From March 10, 1899, the date of his arrival in the
Philippines, to his death from an insurgent bullet on December 18 of
the same year, there was one man whose name was enough to alarm the
Filipino insurgents. He was Major General Henry W. Lawton, an
excellent soldier. A large man, well over six feet, he was entirely
fearless. Had Otis permitted him to carry out the aggressive measures
he continually proposed, it is possible the Philippine Islands might have
been pacified at a much earlier date.” 449
One reason Otis had been reluctant to give Lawton a free hand in
the Philippines was the early publicity Lawton received, even before he
arrived in Manila. When he sailed for the Philippines, Lawton had been
given a clear impression by McKinley and Alger that he would have an
independent command. He was led to believe that he would ultimately
take over from Otis although no orders were ever written and McKinley
vacillated on the subject. Generals Corbin and Merritt were fully behind
the plan and felt that Lawton’s energy and tactical skills pre-eminently
fitted him for irregular warfare. 450By the time Lawton reached Manila,
there was already bad blood between him and Otis.
General Anderson, Lawton’s predecessor, later commented
regarding speculation about Otis being replaced. Anderson did not think
Otis would be removed unless Secretary Alger first resigned. He felt that
Corbin who was the “power behind the throne” would influence any
changes. Anderson told reporters that if he had not been held back by Otis,

448
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation- p. 70
449
Sexton, Wm. Thaddeus-Soldiers In The Philippines-p. 93
450
Leech, Margaret-In The Days Of McKinley-p. 397, p. 403
215
he could have finished the war with his division and knew that Lawton felt
the same way. 451
The press was quick to observe Lawton and make comparisons
between the two generals. Lawton’s arrival in the Philippines resulted in
immediate speculation as to his first move. “Lawton is on the Warpath”
one headline blared even though Otis had not even given Lawton a field
assignment. The absurdity, one might say stupidity with which Otis and
the administration handled the whole affair was spelled out clearly in the
newspapers. Both, rather than focus on the problems facing them were
more concerned with protecting their positions, or standing idly by while
matters deteriorated.
The Oakland Tribune and other papers were eager to report some
news to their readers about progress in Manila. So eager in fact, that a
meeting between Lawton and Otis would have been a step forward. The
Adjutant General denied that any such meeting had taken place the
evening of March 10, 1899. The war Department was waiting, as was the
public, to see just how Otis would utilize Lawton. 452
It was generally understood that Lawton would take over
operations in the field allowing Otis to handle the administrative functions
of his office. The War Department though, had not wished to tie Otis’
hands and had issued no hard and fast rules. From McKinley to Otis,
ineptitude reigned supreme. Otis was reportedly waiting for more
reinforcements in order to launch an active campaign although the AG had
heard nothing from Otis on that matter either. Another report carried
essentially the same AP dispatch but flavored its story with speculation
about how Lawton would employ Indian fighting tactics. The headline
reported that the War Department had no clue as to a plan to be pursued by
Otis and Lawton. 453
There was quite a contrast between Otis and Lawton. Both had
served on the western frontier. Otis had evolved to be an armchair paper-
pusher who retained his skills in working with civil administrations. He
was in fact an administrator who busied himself with trifling matters,
angered quickly at anyone or anything that seemed to disagree with him,

451
The Plattsburgh NY Sentinel- July 21, 1899
452
Oakland Tribune – March 11, 1899
453
Oakland Tribune-March 11, 1899; Cedar Rapids Evening
Gazette-March 11, 1899 – p. 2
216
refused to share authority and information, and was certainly not in touch
with the military methods needed in the Philippines. 454
Lawton on the other hand was an excellent tactician who quickly
adapted to methods required to fight insurgents. He developed special
fighting squads, flying columns, scout units which were specially suited to
terrain and conditions. Further, he advocated the use of garrisons so the
army could avoid having to re-take so many positions that were lost when
the troops moved away from an area, under orders from Otis. Lawton
would also retain his reputation as a night fighter which was somewhat
unconventional for the period. In short, Otis was trying to use conventional
warfare methods which failed, and Lawton used guerrilla tactics against
guerrillas.455
The press and Otis’ subordinates were very much at odds with him
but McKinley was committed to Otis, mainly on the basis of the favorable
reports Otis sent on a regular basis to the War Department.456At the same
time McKinley had implicit confidence in Otis, he was still puzzled by his
failures. Had McKinley paid more attention to the press releases he might
have caught on that there indeed was a gap between what Otis said and
reality.
In terms of personality, Otis was one to cause extreme
aggravation, and Lawton had a magnetic gift for attracting attention. That
gift won him friends among the press, but more importantly, earned him
admiration from across the army ranks. The more popular Lawton became,
the more intense was Otis’ dislike for him.
Otis was reluctant to deal with the press, or provide much other
than perfunctory information. He censored most of the news, threatened
reporters, ignored diplomats and peace emissaries, and in general, isolated
himself.

454
Leech, Margaret-In The Days Of McKinley- pp. 397-403
455
Ibid.
456
Ibid.
217
 Lawton with Admiral Dewey-1899-R.W. Kilburn

Lawton by contrast was reasonably open with reporters. While not as

concerned with publicity as Otis, Lawton allowed correspondents John
Bass and O.K. Davis, the latter with the New York Sun to travel with him
and observe his operations. Both gave Lawton good press in their
respective papers. 457 Lawton was scrupulously accurate in his battle
reports which did not attempt to inflate his importance, rather, gave
elaborate praise of the courage of others. The reporters and soldiers alike
adored Lawton. 458
Otis’ press reports were completely outside the realm of reality, so
much so that the correspondents as a group, rebelled against him. The
correspondents like many of the army officers knew that the situation in
the Philippines was anything but what Otis was reporting. Since Otis

457
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation- p. 181
458
Ibid.
218
controlled the one cable out of Manila, he prevented any stories, other than
those he approved, from reaching the States. The correspondents issued a
press release through Hong Kong, which reported that Otis was falsifying
battle reports and misleading the American public. They further stated that
all of the senior commanders in the Philippines did not agree with Otis’
assessment of the war. The news reached the American public, causing
many to begin to doubt the veracity of the official war accounts. 459
Among the correspondents were two who typically gave Otis favorable
treatment, Bass and Davis, yet could no longer tolerate Otis’ untruths.
When confronted with the information, McKinley passed over it but asked
the new Secretary of War, Elihu Root to encourage Otis to be somewhat
more liberal with the press. Otis ignored that request as he had all the
others and even became more stringent with particular reporters who
issued releases contrary to official reports. 460
When he went into action, Lawton learned as the other
commanders had that Otis was constantly interfering in field operations.
Content to work at his office sixteen hours a day, reviewing action from
maps and dispatches, he managed every small detail. The general
consensus was that if every officer had followed each of Otis’ orders, the
Philippines would never have been pacified. 461
Lawton’s first assignment then was to command the 1st Division
of the 8th Army Corps. which included elements of the 4th Cavalry. It
was not until early April that Lawton was given an opportunity to take to
the field. By the time he took field command of a fighting unit, he had
assimilated enough information about native fears and American prejudice
to guide his conduct for the coming campaigns.
The Spring Luzon campaign involved three probes; one north,
one south, and one east of Manila. The northern operation was intended to
cut off rebel retreat routes to the mountains. General MacArthur led the
northern campaign that was launched on March 24, 1899. MacArthur
reached the insurgent capitol, Malolos, on March 31, and found the rebels
gone and all records destroyed.462 Otis ordered a halt to this operation

459
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation- p. 84
460
Ibid., pp. 84-86
461
Sexton, Wm. Thaddeus-Soldiers In The Philippines-p. 91
462
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation- p.70
219
until Lawton could complete his mission to the south, then move
northward and help to hem in the rebels.
Lawton had been ordered south and he was obliged to gather up
the 1,500 men he needed from various units in the area. His objective was
to operate against and capture Santa Cruz, a rich and important city in La
Laguna Province, situated on the southeast shore of Laguna de Bay. 463
Lawton felt that the capture of Santa Cruz would cut off the
insurgents’ retreat and have an important effect on the local population.
General Charles King, a long time friend of Lawton’s, was to lead the
attack with Lawton accompanying him.
The force included one squadron of the 4th Cavalry, two
companies of the 14th Infantry, one company of the 1st North Dakota
Infantry, and one company of the Idaho Infantry. The unit assembled at
San Pedro Macati and embarked on two launches, sailing up the Pasig into
Laguna de Bay, to Santa Cruz. On April 9, a landing was made late at
night. General King had become ill and could not leave the boat with his
command. After some delay, the force re-grouped with Lawton taking
command. The infantry advanced across a bridge and the 4th Cavalry
moved from the beach area.
Lawton’s action was swift and decisive and he captured Santa
Cruz on April 10th. General King’s health had declined to the point that
Lawton was forced to order him back to Manila for medical attention.
King’s health was not up to the campaign and he returned to the U.S. He
would later relate how Lawton, from the moment he went into action in the
Philippines, took great risk to observe a battle.
He would make his reconnaissance in person, far to the front of
his own lines which always put him in more danger than the other officers
wanted him in. When Lawton first appeared on King’s front on one
occasion, to inspect that part of his command, the men were amused by the
contrast between Lawton and King. King was short, Lawton very tall.
King ordered two companies to the front of the line so he and Lawton
could take a look at enemy positions. Lawton strolled out to a rocky
formation some 300 yards in front of the troops. He stood like a
lighthouse on the rocks, slowly observing enemy positions with his field
glasses.

463
Sexton, Wm. Thaddeus-Soldiers In The Philippines- p. 70
220
 King became alarmed and rode out to where Lawton was standing
and urged him to get down as he was too important to make a target of
himself. Lawton simply laughed and asked how he would be able to see
anything if he was not willing to expose himself to fire. General King
failed to convince Lawton to take cover.464
King also touched on Lawton’s personal habits that were evident
in that period of time. Various types of drink and refreshment were
available but Lawton never touched a drop.465That did not stop some of
Lawton’s jealous detractors from attempting to spread the rumor that he
was drinking however,. When King returned to the states, he attended a
dinner at which a senior major general quite loudly suggested that Lawton
was drinking. King put the general in his place and retorted that Lawton
had not touched a drop of alcohol while King was with him in the
Philippines. 466
Before he had an opportunity to capitalize on the victory at Santa
Cruz and move on to Calamba, Lawton was ordered back to Manila. It
was the practice of Otis, due to a thin number of troops left to protect
Manila, to recall his forces following any operation, to reinforce Manila’s
defenses. The withdrawal of Lawton’s forces gave the insurgents the
impression that the Americans had been defeated and they simply moved
back into positions abandoned by Lawton’s troops.
Otis continued to feed Washington his usual blarney about major
victories which only spurred McKinley on to want even quicker and better
victories. The imperialist press played on Otis’ regular victory reports,
that is, until later in the year when he was still waging too many ‘final
battles.’ The early victory reports caused the American public to be stirred
by the prowess of Lawton’s and MacArthur’s divisions.
When Lawton returned to Manila a second concerted effort to the
north was commenced. Lawton and MacArthur led their expeditions out of
Manila on April 22nd. MacArthur’s forces captured San Fernando, forty-
five miles north of Manila, along the main railway line. General Lawton
moved northeast then west towards Baliuag, a main war depot for the
insurgents. Maps, many of them Spanish, were of little value and the
troops made slow progress due to bad or non-existent roads.

464
Wisconsin Magazine of History-September 1922 – p. 31
465
Ibid., p. 32
466
Ibid., p. 33 : Also see ‘Reflections’ p. 269
221
 In addition to the insurgents, Lawton had to contend with Otis who
became concerned with rebel troop movements to Lawton’s rear and
ordered him to hold up his advance. Lawton in turn became annoyed and
tried to convince Otis that estimates of rebel troop strength were
exaggerated. Nevertheless, he sent scouts to his rear and flanks for several
miles only to confirm his belief. The scouts found no evidence of rebel
forces. 467
It also became commonplace for Otis to order Lawton to hold up
an advance and wait for supplies. In one instance, he ordered Lawton to
move back for supplies. In obeying the order, Lawton gave up ground that
had to be re-taken when he continued his advance. 468
The dispute between Lawton and Otis broke into the open the
middle part of April. Otis thought little of giving up ground gained and
allowing it to fall back into the insurgents’ hands. Lawton believed
garrisons could hold that ground so that it would not require the loss of
American life to keep re-taking it. His frustration peaked to the point that
he authorized the New York World correspondent to release his opinion
that 100,000 troops would be needed to put down the rebellion and hold
territory gained.. Otis for his part claimed that the rebels would eventually
disappear into the mountains where they would become small bands of
robbers fighting among themselves. 469 Lawton’s prediction was accurate in
that it eventually took about that number, years later, to end the war. His
comments were printed in the newspapers back in the U.S. and while
Lawton drew a rebuke from some editors, most of the journalists
demanded the dismissal of General Otis. 470
Realizing that his comments had created a stir back home, Lawton
backed away from publicly criticizing Otis, but his relationship with Otis
had soured greatly. While he toned down any public comments, Lawton
did correspond with his high placed Army friends in Washington. Under
normal circumstances, he would not have done so. Yet, the manner in
which Otis was double-talking his way through the early months of the

467
Sexton, Wm. Thaddeus-Soldiers In The Philippines- pp.102-104
468
Ibid.
469
Bismarck ND Daily Tribune – April 18, 1899; The Daily
Northwestern, Oshkosh – April 17, 1899
470
Karnow, Stanley-In Our Image-p. 150
222
war suggested that he was circumventing even the highest levels of
government, including the President.
The insurgents engaged the American troops in more than twenty-
two confrontations in twenty days. Lawton in turn harried the rebels by
persistent attacks and kept them off balance. He learned soon that if the
rebels were in a fixed position, they did not seem able to defend against
flanking movements and used that maneuver frequently with success.
Lawton also adjusted his tactics to jungle warfare. He organized small
scout units and gave them the job of probing the rebel positions, which in
turn kept the rebels, busy and away from Lawton’s outposts. 471 The
scouts were hand picked riflemen who were placed under a civilian, W. H.
Young.
Lawton captured Novaliches, San Jose, Norzagaray, Angat, San
Rafael, and Bustos. At Baliuag, the insurgents were well dug in but
Lawton had been informed by friendly natives of the rebel positions and
strength. He slipped his troops around the entrenchments and the
insurgents found him attacking from a position 2,000 yards to their rear. A
flag of truce was raised but turned out to be a trick when the rebels fired on
the Americans approaching their position. The Americans returned fire at
which the rebels quickly fled to their own lines.472
The rebels gave up Baliuag and Lawton’s forces entered the town.
His discipline over his troops became evident early on as he made it clear
that there was to be no looting and the civilian population was to be treated
well. He began the practice of encouraging the local natives to hold
elections and set up their own civil government, which endeared him to the
Filipinos. The first official Filipino provincial government was set up
under Field Orders # 8, signed by Lawton May 7, 1899. 473
He had also continued his practice of being visible on the firing
line in his pith helmet and faded uniform. Early on, his staff and soldiers
tried to convince him that he should keep his head down or stay under
cover but his common response was that he needed to see what was going
on if he was going to be able to direct the action. He is quoted on one
occasion as saying: “This is a dangerous business, and we have to take
chances. The only way you can see what is going on is by getting to the

471
Ft. Wayne Historical Society
472
Ibid.
473
Sexton, Wm. Thaddeus-Soldiers In The Philippines-p. 102-104
223
front, and of course, you run risks when you get up there. You can’t direct
a fight you can’t see, and you can’t see a fight without getting into the
bullet zone.” 474
Lawton held at Baliuag until MacArthur could reach him and
together, they could press on against larger insurgent groups. The
limitation of manpower meant that he could not garrison the towns
captured along the march and in some cases, the insurgents merely came in
behind and repossessed the area.
Meanwhile, MacArthur still held his position at San Fernando
believing that rebel General Luna was to his north with about 2,500 men.
He also believed there were another 1,000 rebels lying between his
position and that of Lawton’s, preventing him from moving to Baliuag.
MacArthur’s troops were completely exhausted from their forced marches
in the humid , mosquito infested heat and no replacements were to be had.
While Otis trumpeted the grand successes of his forces, Lawton
and MacArthur along with their troops, struggled to cope with the
elements. It must have seemed to Lawton that he was in a campaign very
similar to that in Mexico in 1886.
In this period, the rebels put up a flag of truce and asked for an
armistice but were rebuked by Otis and the hostilities continued. 475 It was
decided that MacArthur would hold San Fernando against Luna and send a
detached force up the Rio Grande to give Lawton the troops he needed to
advance. Lawton was then given approval of his plan to advance north on
May 14th, San Isidro as his objective.
The insurgents offered stiff resistance as the city was Aguinaldo’s
second capitol and headquarters. Lawton however, speedily reduced the
defenses and captured the city, forcing the rebels to flee into the
mountains.
Heavy rains made it impossible for Lawton and MacArthur to link
up and exploit the successes. To make things worse, the meddling general
in Manila again recalled Lawton to return to base. Lawton felt certain that
he could corner and capture Aguinaldo and asked permission to press his
offensive but Otis insisted that he cease operations. As a result all of the
towns captured during the campaign, with the exception of Baliuag, had to
be abandoned to the insurgents.

474
Ft. Wayne Historical Society
475
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation- p. 76
224
 During the return march, the troops were exposed to heavy rain
and harassment from the rebels. They were attacked at Ildefonso and
Maasin, halting and effectively driving off the attackers. Because of the
withdrawal, the rebels believed that a general retreat was intended. As a
result, they began moving forces by rail to MacArthur’s front,
concentrating near San Miguel.
Lawton had, in a brief period of time, proven that the trust of his
superiors and the President were well placed. He was determined and a
highly capable field commander, considered brilliant in his use of tactics
by many writers in later years, yet he was to be dogged and vexed by Otis’
politics and indecision for the balance of the year. The recall from San
Isidro incensed Lawton enough that he confronted Otis at his headquarters
in Manila.
He brought Professor Dean C. Worcester with him to witness his
discussion with Otis. Worcester latter recounted the meeting and stated his
belief that had Lawton been granted the request he made, he could have
shortened the war measurably.476 Worcester who observed Lawton in the
field also believed that had Lawton been placed in command in the
Philippines, the war would have ended promptly.477 General Lawton
requested two regiments from Otis and permission to launch an expedition
that would require sixty days at maximum. Lawton proposed to deliver
Aquinaldo, dead or alive, within that period of time and end the war. Otis
in turn laughed at Lawton’s idea, which fueled the differences between the
two men even more. 478
Lawton left Otis’ office and for the first time, vented his anger by
complaining about Otis’ complacency in front of the correspondents in
Manila. Lawton was not alone in his criticism of Otis. Whatever their
opinions about the war, its objectives and moral implications, the senior
officers agreed as a whole that Otis was prolonging a bad thing with his
incompetence. 479 Lawton stated his belief that the rebellion was more than
the action of a small group of insurgents rather, it was a movement of the
populace to gain independence.

476
Worcester, Dean C. –The Philippines Past and Present Vol I- pp.
189-191
477
Ibid.
478
Leech, Margaret-In The Days Of McKinley-p. 403-404
479
Karnow, Stanley-In Our Image- p.147
225
 Any suggestions made by Lawton relating to the campaign were
supported by senior officers in Washington. However, when they passed
these suggestions on to McKinley, he simply forwarded them to Otis who
in turn, became more envious of Lawton.
The San Isidro battle, which had sparked the Lawton-Otis
confrontation, was of course a cause for a victory announcement by Otis.
That in turn drew McKinley’s compliment to Lawton, passed through Otis,
which read as follows:
“To Otis, Manila, Convey to General Lawton and the gallant men
of his command my congratulations upon the successful
operations during the past month, resulting in the capture this
morning of San Isidro.” 480
The congratulatory message was of little consolation to Lawton
who was beginning to understand how badly Otis was misrepresenting the
war to McKinley.
Events to come would reflect that whenever Otis gave Lawton a
seemingly minor assignment, Lawton would turn it into a major victory. 481
In turn, Otis, endeavoring to maintain his standing, used the achievements
for good press releases. Lawton was not the only one affected by Otis’
personal vanity, the entire Army and the whole of the Philippine people
would suffer as well. By the end of 1899, even MacArthur, and General
Shafter back home, both of whom had been loyal to Otis, became critics of
his policies. 482
Because of his good standing and achievements, and despite his
conflict with Otis, Lawton’s support among politicians back home was
growing. His rank of Major General of Volunteers was temporary as his
Regular Army permanent rank was that of Colonel. Letters were arriving
regularly at the office of President and Secretary of War, recommending
Lawton be promoted to the permanent Regular Army rank of Brigadier
General. 483 Among those advocating Lawton’s promotion was Senator
Charles W. Fairbanks who just a year before was objecting to the
possibility that Lawton might command Indiana Volunteers in Cuba.

480
Inspector General-War Dept. December 21, 1899
481
Karnow, Stanley –In Our Image- p.150
482
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation-p. 94
483
National Archives-Lawton papers
226
“Lawton is a fighting machine. Otis has six feet of animated steel for a
lieutenant.” American Manila, May 6, 1899

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

LAWTON’S LAST BATTLES

At about the same time that Lawton arrived in Manila, a civilian

commission, appointed by President McKinley, showed up to hold
hearings concerning the future of the Philippines. Chairing the
commission was Jacob Gould Schurman, the president of Cornell
University. Schurman at first declined McKinley’s request to head the
commission, being opposed to the annexation of the Philippines. He gave
in however and served along with two other civilians, Dean Worcester and
Charles Denby. 484
Admiral Dewey had suggested a commission prior to the
beginning of hostilities so that the President and senior government
officials might derive an independent assessment of the situation in
Manila. Dewey and General Otis were appointed as the two military
members. The commission arrived a full month after hostilities had
erupted and found Otis none too receptive to their inquiries. He basically
ignored their activities and offered no help of substance.485
The commission remained in Manila, conducting interviews with
some sixty individuals, primarily Americans and British, who testified to
the Filipinos’ lack of self-governing ability. Some Filipinos were
interviewed but they were of the more affluent class and only lent support
to Otis’ contention that America would have to occupy and govern the
entire archipelago.486 Trinidad Pardo de Tavera, Emelio Aguinaldo’s

484
Karnow, Stanley-In Our Image -p. 150-151
485
Ibid., pp. 152-153
486
Leech, Margaret-In The Days Of McKinley-pp. 351-352; Miller,
Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation- pp. 131-133
227
director of diplomacy, testified that an American presence was needed in
the Philippines to assure stability. Rich landowners, bankers, and
attorneys also testified in like manner, providing the same narrow
information they had given General Otis. The view of these people was
that Aguinaldo was power hungry and represented only a small faction of
the people, therefore, American protection was needed to guarantee that
the Philippines’ newly won freedom and independence would survive.

Lawton at rest 1899-R.W. Kilburn

Had they testified otherwise, it is unlikely that Otis and most

American government officials would have altered course. As it was, the
opinions of the selected witnesses were enough to reinforce McKinley’s
viewpoints and encourage total annexation. The reports issued by the
commission were the work of the civilian members as Dewey never
attended meetings and did not bother to read any of the reports. Otis also
ignored the commission’s meetings and in fact, attempted to have the
commission recalled, irritated by its intrusion into his domain.487

487
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation- pp.76-77;
Karnow, Stanley-In Our Image- p.152
228
 Otis held that the natives were basically incapable of self-
government and he essentially differed with the commission’s views and
reports. One of his generals, Arthur MacArthur, supported Otis’ views and
even went beyond in his assessment of the rebels as common murderers
and criminals.
Lawton seems to have had some basic differences of opinion with
Otis and General Arthur MacArthur on the issue of Philippine self-
determination. Within a short time of his arrival, he was actively
promoting local and regional self-government. His practice of helping the
natives to establish their own provincial governments became known to
the commission. At the height of his power and influence, Lawton strongly
supported the overall American strategy of benevolence towards the
inhabitants of the Philippines. Moreover, he advocated that self-governing
bodies be established as soon as possible. 488 Lawton was responsible for
the first such native government at Baliuag. He also organized self-
government in Cavite Province. He was quoted as saying that the
Americans should impress the Filipinos with good intentions and destroy
the notion that Americans were barbarians. 489 For many of his military
peers and superiors, Lawton’s ideas appeared idealistic but they
represented the basic thinking of many Americans who wished to avoid
becoming a colonial power. The degree of impact which Lawton’s
initiatives had on the Filipinos was revealed to some extent after his death
when many of the provincial leaders sought to attend his funeral in Manila.
While in the Philippines, at least one member of the commission
sent by McKinley had an opportunity to observe Lawton’s work firsthand.
By July 1, 1899, Lawton had set up several provincial self governing
bodies but lacked a formal plan for carrying out the work on a systematic
basis. 490 Since Lawton’s edict to his troops had demanded decent
treatment of the natives, the Filipinos in turn demonstrated a desire to
cooperate with the Americans in establishing some form of stability. A
Filipino attorney friendly to Lawton, created a basic document providing
guidelines for establishing governing bodies. Señor Arrellano, president

488
Dictionary Of American Military Biography-Roger G. Spiller -
Vol II., p. 592
489
Ibid.
490
Ft. Wayne Historical Society
229
of the Manila Supreme Court made slight alterations. After translation, the
plan was presented to Lawton who, without making changes, issued it as
an order for the areas under his control.
On July 1, he began a tour of his area of control, accompanied by
Dean C. Worcester, commission member. Felipe Calderon who was fluent
in Spanish and Tagalog, went along as translator. Lawton had a small
cavalry escort along for protection. When Lawton reached the first town,
Paranaque, the villagers were apprehensive at first. When questioned as to
their uneasiness, they reported to Lawton that it had been a practice of the
Spanish to assemble the leaders of a town prior to a meeting, only to show
up and execute them. They feared the same fate awaited them at the hands
of the American general.

General Lawton and staff-Philippine Islands 1899

Courtesy National Archives

230
 When Lawton assured them they had nothing to fear, Worcester
translated to Spanish and Calderon translated to Tagalog. When the plan
for self-government was explained the natives responded with cooperation
and held elections almost immediately. In this first town, Lawton
congratulated the newly elected officials and received spontaneous
cheering from the Filipinos. Lawton and his party moved on to Bacoor,
Imus, and Las Pinas. He also personally extended the new system to Santa
Ana, San Felipe, Nery, and Malibay among other towns. 491
Lawton was kept busy with military campaigns, but worked
diligently to make time to work with the newly elected officials in the
various towns so that their systems would remain stable. At first, many
issues were difficult to resolve and Filipino officials would seek Lawton’s
guidance when he visited their towns. They even visited him in Manila to
consult with him. Several Americans in Manila had predicted that the
small local governments would fail due to ignorance, lack of intelligence
on the part of the Filipinos, or because of dishonesty. To their surprise, the
system that Lawton initiated held up and took root.
Lawton also made it a practice to visit the natives as much as
possible, accepting their offers of hospitality. He often shared meals with
them and slept in their homes, which was contrary to the practice of most
officers. That Lawton was keenly aware of the concerns of the Filipinos is
evident in a letter, which his wife, Mamie, wrote to a friend in 1899.
Commenting on the character, “ Mr. Dooley,” created by columnist Finley
Peter Dunne, Mrs. Lawton stated that she and General Lawton agreed with
“Mr. Dooley” that the situation in the Philippines was complex and not
easy to sort out. She added that Lawton was very much aware of and
sympathetic with the Filipino fear of cruelty at the hands of American
soldiers.492
In the letter she described an incident in which several American
soldiers appeared to be threatening twenty Filipinos. General Lawton
stepped in between the two groups and prevented any harm from coming
to the natives. 493 In yet another instance, it was reported that two drunken
soldiers assaulted, robbed, and wounded a native near Marikina. Two

491
Ft. Wayne Historical Society
492
Carter Papers -Newberry Library
493
Boston Sunday Journal June 25, 1899; Newberry Library-Carter
Papers
231
native women witnessed the incident but were afraid to come forward and
testify. Lawton interceded and promised them protection after which they
told their stories. A court convicted the two soldiers and restored the
money to the victims from the soldiers’ pay. The story became known
among Filipinos who at first found it difficult that American soldiers could
dispense justice. As Lawton’s practices gained a foothold however, he
won over the natives and in many instances, probably prevented them from
taking up arms and joining the rebels. Another practice that Lawton
employed was to feed and clothe the destitute from captured stores. He
was tireless in fighting the armed insurgents where he found them, and in
helping the unarmed civilians to the best of his ability. 494 Lawton’s
determination to work at the dual role he found himself in, general and
pacifier, eventually gained recognition for him as having sympathetically
recognized the popular aspiration among the Filipinos for independence.
Otis never understood the concept from Lawton’s perspective, and
MacArthur continued to suggest that the insurgents be treated as
murderers. Supporters of Lawton’s methods felt that if he had been
allowed to pursue a policy of pacification, tied to self-government, the war
would have ended much earlier than it did. 495 Otis did however expand
Lawton’s process of setting up provincial governments, beginning in July,
1899. As long as the Army remained in charge and local authorities
reported to Army officials, he encouraged efforts that would reduce the
danger to his troops.
Otis, devoted to long hours of administrative leadership, also
failed to grasp the military situation as it truly existed. He dismissed
Aguinaldo as unimportant and treated the war as though it was being
fought in a conventional manner. Lawton and MacArthur both recognized
that the capture of Aguinaldo could bring the armed conflict to an early
end. As it turned out, hostilities ended soon after Aguinaldo’s capture in
1901. 496

494
Ft. Wayne Historical Society
495
Leech, Margaret-In The Days Of McKinley-p. 404
496
Ibid., pp. 400-404
232
General Lawton with Cavalry trooper 1899
Courtesy National Archives

233
 Lawton at Arayat-National Archives

Lawton with Staff-Library of Congress, courtesy Theo. Roosevelt Assn.

Whether they engaged in disagreement over military policy, or

pacification procedures, the differences between Otis and Lawton
continued to be a focal point for many in the press. Correspondents were

234
quick to point out the differences to the reading public and as 1899 wore
on, Otis’ public image suffered while Lawton’s grew in importance.
Each man was devoted to his military career and loyal to his
duties. Lawton, at age fifty-five, was a vigorous soldier, always
anticipating action, and ready for the excitement of a ‘beautiful battle.’ He
was once one of the most daring of all the young cavalry officers on the
plains. He was the picture of a soldier; tall, erect, with iron-gray hair.
Mounted on his black horse or walking up and down the front line, Lawton
was undisturbed when exposed to enemy fire and personified the disdain
for personal survival. 497 Because of these traits, he was admired by his
fellow soldiers and war correspondents who did not hesitate to play up his
image and contrast it with Otis who never saw a battle.
On June 1, 1899, General Lawton was placed in command of the
defenses of Manila. 498 About this time, American troops were stretched
thin and in danger of being worn down by the constant marching back and
forth through jungles. Since there were insufficient troops to garrison the
many towns taken by the Army, it was often necessary to retake positions
that had already been wrested from the rebels.
As of May 31, 1899, the Army had numbered an estimated 33,000
enlisted men and 1,200 officers. Just under 26,000 were fit for duty and
on Luzon, the primary action area, there were under 22,000 men. Of the
grand total of some 34,000 soldiers, 16,000 were Volunteers waiting for
return to the United States and 18,000 were Regulars.499
Correspondent John Bass filed a dispatch through Hong Kong
deploring the situation in the Philippines and the condition of the troops.
He claimed that over 5,000 American troops were hospitalized due to
illness and that many were suffering symptoms that resembled Malaria.
His doom and gloom report accurately portrayed the plight of the
American forces, but failed to recognize that there was some
fragmentation of Aguinaldo’s forces as well.

497
Leech, Margaret-In The Days Of McKinley-p. 401
498
U.S. War Department Report-Inspector General’s Office-12-21-
1899
499
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation- p. 78; Manila
City Library (MCL) a summary March 27, 1980 of Lawton history
in the Philippines, Federico J. Galang, Supt. To author’s mother.

235
 Late photo of General Lawton-Courtesy USAMHI

In his report, Bass revealed Lawton’s thoughts about the need to

place garrison troops in the many towns taken by the Army, if indeed the
U. S. planned to hold all of the Philippines. 500
In this period, the rebels had once again attempted to make peace
overtures to Otis but the effort failed. Some in Aguinaldo’s group blamed
their emissary, Apolinario Mabini, for the failure and he was retired. This
angered General Antonio Luna, one of the key officers in Aguinaldo’s

500
Karnow, Stanley-In Our Image-p. 155
236
coalition. Already at odds with Aguinaldo, the dismissal of Mabini added
fuel to the fire. Luna was invited to nationalist headquarters where he was
murdered by Aguinaldo’s officers.501
The event weakened the nationalist movement and revealed
publicly that the rebels had not really achieved solidarity among their
ranks. Another of the rebels, General Gregorio del Pilar, had been
operating in the district of Morong. 502 Reports from inhabitants of
Antipolo, Morong, and other towns east of Manila indicated that they were
suffering heavily on account of crimes committed by Pilar’s troops. The
people in those areas asked the Americans for help. On June 2nd, Lawton
was ordered to drive off the rebels and on June 3rd, he attacked the rebels
from three directions and defeated them. 503 The victory was not an easy
one however, as Lawton’s troops had to deal with bad roads and excessive
heat. The town of Morong was taken without losses and Lawton sent out
reconnaissance missions into the interior.504
Meanwhile, with political pressures building at home, McKinley’s
patience was wearing thin. Having been led to believe that the conflict
would be won in short order, McKinley and the War Department were
perplexed that despite some gains, Otis was still fighting the same battles
as he had been months earlier. The President asked Otis and Lawton if
doubling or tripling their forces would aid in bringing the war to an end.
The President also was concerned that there apparently had been
no effort to land troops above Aguinaldo in an effort to hem him in. Tired
of delay, the Administration was informing Otis and Lawton that it was
time for results. McKinley seemed to have forgotten that Otis ran the show
and until removed, would continue to do so.505
It had been quiet in Cavite province for a time, but with the arrival
of rebel General Trias, things heated up again. On June 7, Lawton was
ordered to engage Trias’ forces. Moving into the area, Lawton spotted the
enemy location on June 12th, from the top of a gunboat.
He made a personal reconnaissance despite rebel gunfire and
engaged his troops. Two companies of infantry became trapped in a

501
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation- p. 156
502
MCL, p. 433
503
Ft. Wayne Historical Society
504
MCL, p. 433
505
Brooklyn Eagle, June 11, 1899 – p. 1
237
crossfire and as their senior officers were wounded, the companies were
left in the command of a junior lieutenant. Under the withering fire, the
men began to fall back from their positions, which did not suit Lawton
well. He went forward to rally the men and the lines re-formed for a time.
However, as Lawton would try to move away from the position to
regain control over the whole area, the troops would begin to move back
with him. It took several bouts of cussing and leading the men back into
position before the soldiers finally held in place. Lawton was observed
standing on a dike with his helmet off, yelling “ If only I had a detachment
of the Salvation Army.” 506 He was given to ill temper when a situation
threatened to get out of hand but usually had his way and put things in
order. It was noted in interviews after his death, among enlisted men and
officers that his determination spilled over and encouraged his men. They
also recognized that he never asked them to endure any hardship that he
did not endure with them.
Later reported as the battle at Las Pinas, or the Zapote River, the
engagement was the largest of the war and lasted the better part of a day
on June 13th. Part of Lawton’s troops were at one time partially
surrounded but fought their way out of a trap. American artillery and
gunboats joined in the fight. At the peak of the fighting when some of the
American troops appeared to be cracking, Lawton and other officers ran
into the line, picking up rifles from wounded soldiers and personally
joined in the firefight. The action rallied the troops and turned the tide in
favor of the Americans.507
With his force of about 4,000 men, Lawton captured Calamba and
Los Baños, two towns on the southern shore of the Laguna de Bay, as well
as a strip of territory south of Manila. In Bacoor, the natives hailed Lawton
as a deliverer from ill treatment received at the hands of the rebels.508 The
day after Lawton and his staff rode into Bacoor, the president of Imus
announced the voluntary surrender of the city and invited the American
forces to garrison the town. Lawton ordered meat and rice provisions from
Manila to relieve the citizens’ food shortages. As a result, many of the
natives who had fled into the hills, returned to their homes.

506
Ft. Wayne Historical Society
507
Ft. Wayne Sentinel - June 13, 1899- p. 1
508
Ft. Wayne Historical Society

238
 Lawton was not naive about what was really happening however.
He recognized that many of the rebels had simply hidden their weapons
and blended into the population to wait for another opportunity. His
reports to Otis were candid on that point, reflecting his negotiations with
mayors in the newly won areas, but warning that the rebels would take up
arms as soon as the Americans left. Otis was more concerned with the
positive news, which he could relay back to Washington. He also ordered
Lawton to return with his forces to Manila, but finally acquiesced on the
need to leave behind garrison troops to hold the towns Lawton had
captured.
During this period of time, Lawton and several of his staff had
been in contact with the people in the village of Macabebe in Pampanga.
The Macabebes had strong warrior traditions and had fought alongside the
Spanish against the insurgents. They offered their services to the
Americans as scouts and soldiers.509 When Captain Matthew Batson
carried their offer to General Otis, he declined as he did not feel the
Americans could trust any of the natives to serve under arms against the
rebels. Batson then brought the matter before Lawton who agreed with
Batson’s proposal and bumped it up to the new Secretary of War, Elihu
Root. In a quick response, Root , without consulting Otis, ordered that the
Philippine Scouts be placed in service at the earliest possible date. Otis in
turn was extremely resentful, suspecting that the popular Lawton had gone
over his head. He placed the matter back at Lawton’s doorstep by putting
the Macabebe scouts under his command. Not one to pass up the
opportunity, Lawton had Batson promoted and gave him command of the
scouts. Once public, the press endorsed Root’s decision and the use of the
scouts. The Macabebe scouts proved instrumental in the capture of
Aguinaldo a few years later. 510
Putting Filipinos into action served a number of purposes for the
Americans, one being the relief of the burden for the fighting which had
rested solely on the shoulders of American soldiers.
Lawton also worked with Felipe Calderon and Dean Worcester in
an effort to convert some of the Tagalog bandits. His plan was to combine
Tagalog and American scouts, knowing the Tagalog people were familiar
with rebel routes and hiding places. He eventually developed a group

509
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation-pp. 81-82
510
Sexton, Wm. Thaddeus-Soldiers In The Philippines-p. 132
239
comprised of fifty-two natives and forty Americans under a Captain
Castner. This group would advance ahead of Lawton’s main body during a
campaign and would even dress in rebel uniforms, allowing infiltration of
insurgent strongholds. Over the summer and autumn months, both the
converted Tagalog and Macabebe soldiers proved invaluable to Lawton’s
campaign. He was putting his experience of the Texas Plains and Apache
campaigns to good use in that he understood the value of having native
soldiers on his side. 511 Over one-hundred years later, methods developed
and used by Lawton and other officers who adjusted their tactics to the
situation remain the modus operandi that current U.S. military doctrine
recognizes.512
During the early summer period, Otis’ standing among his senior
officers continued to deteriorate. Not only his commanders grew to detest
his style of leadership, the problem was extending into the ranks as well.
Some senior officers went as far as to engage in shouting matches with
Otis in front of the enlisted men which in turn brought threats of reprisals
from Otis. Combined with his failure in leadership, the severe shortage of
troops was painting Otis into a bad corner with the press. Recognizing that
Otis had managed to hoodwink President McKinley, editorials began
tearing at Otis’ reputation. At the same time, Lawton’s achievements in the
field and obvious grasp of the situation in which the Army found itself,
continued to create more positive press for him. Yet, in Washington, even
though Root favored putting Lawton in charge, McKinley remained
stubbornly committed to Otis.513
Among the many stories were those related by troops returning
home from the Philippines. Discharged soldiers brought long lists of
complaints against Otis. Joseph S. Walthall of the 2nd Infantry was quoted
as saying: “I was with General Lawton on the firing line one day when we
had about 1,500 Filipinos hemmed in and at our mercy. General Lawton
was just about to give orders to charge when an orderly rode up with a
dispatch for him. General Lawton read it and then said to one of his staff
that Otis had ordered a retreat to Manila. This is the third time he has done

511
Ft. Wayne Historical Society
512
Bundt, Thomas S.-Military Review-5-1-2004
513
Leech, Margaret-In The Days Of McKinley- p. 398
240
so when I had the googoos caught.” Lawton further stated that there was
no use in trying to do anything with such a man in command.514
Lawton’s growing credibility was not the only major source of bad
publicity for Otis though. He was also getting hammered by the troops
returning to the U. S. Senior officers like General Charles King were
complaining that Otis had led the U. S. into a war it need not have been
in.515 Enlisted personnel complained of his poor leadership and the
hardships they suffered because Otis constantly marched them back and
forth in the hot jungles. Despite the increasing signs that Otis might not be
the man to lead the war effort, McKinley kept him on the job until the
middle of the next year when General MacArthur replaced him.
In his assignment of commanding Manila’s defenses, Lawton had
time to be with his wife and four children who were with him in the
Philippines. He is reported to have taken his son Manley with him on tours
of the defensive perimeter on several occasions and was able to entertain
guests in a well-appointed Spanish style estate where he was living. His
wife wrote to friends quite frequently about her life in the Philippines and
when referring to Lawton, she most often called him the “old man.”
Mamie commented on occasion about his poor eating habits when
he was in the field. She observed that he gained weight when he was in
Manila, and lost it quickly when he was out with his troops. In fact, some
of his officers found him difficult to be around at mealtime. Lawton was
interested in reviewing his maps, or pondering the next step in a campaign.
When food was suggested, more often than not he would accuse his
officers of being more interested in food than fighting. On one occasion,
he is reported to have said: “ Eat, Eat, Eat! I did not come out here to eat, I
came out to fight!” 516 When one of his aides, a Captain Sewell informed
Lawton that the other officers had prepared something to eat, Lawton’s
response was to ask if they thought of nothing but eating. If the officers
lounged a bit too long after meals, he would firmly urge them back to their
duties.
Lawton’s strict attitude about certain matters did not however,
alienate the officers. Rather, they took him in stride and in fact, found

514
Iowa State Press- August 4, 1899
515
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation-p. 88
516
Ft. Wayne Historical Society

241
some humor in his mannerisms. They even established a “Cussin Club.”
Lawton was known to use two variations of the English language, one
variation for use among his troops in the field, the other, a calmer and
proper version, for use among the general population. The officers who
had suffered during a cussing session were known as “Lawton’s cussees.’
It was easy to gain membership in the club, one only had to spend three
successive days in the field with Lawton and be cussed out in that period.
Service with Lawton in Manila did not count because he was known to
tone down his language when back in garrison. 517
At one time, every officer under Lawton was a member of the club
with the exception of one officer, Colonel Jesse Lee. Lee, a favorite of
Lawton’s, seemed to escape Lawton’s ill temper and the other officers
were anxious to have him join their ranks. It became the hot topic
apparently because one day, a message flashed over the wires that Lee had
joined the club. No one found out what had caused Lawton to cuss out one
of his favorite officers, but Lee had joined the club.
Lawton, apparently amused by the whole affair, insisted that he
should attain membership as well because of the number of times he had
cussed himself. One of the traditions of the club was to have the officer
who received Lawton’s strongest rebuke of the day, preside over the
evening session. On one day, Captain George H. Penrose received the
honors. As a medical officer, he was responsible for tending to the
wounded during battles. On the day in question, the troops were operating
near Imus. Lawton, wearing his high crowned pith helmet, was walking
erect on a ridge, observing enemy positions at the same time he had
ordered his men to stay down to avoid being hit by gunfire.
When bullets from the rebel positions started flying in earnest,
Penrose began to move his hospital unit and in doing so, exposed them to
the rifle fire. Lawton, standing on the ridge, observed the movement and
began barking orders at Penrose to get back to cover. Complying with
Lawton’s orders, and cussing, Penrose moved back away from the danger
zone while Lawton stalked back to the firing line with bullets flying over
his head.
As fierce as Lawton’s appearance and mannerisms might have
seemed, he was considered a goodhearted man by the people who knew

517
Ft. Wayne Historical Society-references to Lawton’s give and
take with his officers are all taken from the Society’s booklet.
242
him. He was also generous in his verbal and written praise of his officers
and men and was known to have an aide write down commendations
during the course of an action so that he would remember to include them
in his reports later on.
Rumors and stories about Lawton, MacArthur, and Otis increased
in number as interest heightened as to who would eventually be in charge
in the Philippines. The newspapers in their effort to stir up interest printed
lively stories about the pending changes. One article quoted a regular army
officer passing through Chicago as saying Otis was pushing MacArthur to
the forefront while holding Lawton back. The rumors had it that Leonard
Wood would be transferred from Santiago to Manila to be in charge
overall and that MacArthur would handle the fighting.518 The officer
providing the story claimed to have a talk with McKinley while in
Washington and McKinley was the source of the ‘information’.
The same article also speculated that there was a chance the army
would team Lawton up with General Joe Wheeler and that Wheeler had
voiced a desire to serve under Lawton. Other officers returning from
Manila informed correspondents that Lawton and MacArthur were in
competition for the vacancy in the regular army for brigadier. Most
indicated that if the soldiers were given a vote, they would serve under
Lawton. The fact that he got out on the line and fought inspired them. 519
Another story claimed that Elihu Root was visiting with President
McKinley and was advocating that MG Wesley Merritt be given supreme
command in the Philippines. There was no thought of bumping Lawton up
to replace Otis as Lawton was needed in the field where he did his best
work. In the event Merritt would not take the promotion, the
Administration preferred to leave Otis in charge.520
That the insurgents had worked to hold out until the rainy season
during which they could recover appeared to have been a successful
strategy based on one story taken from the Associated Press. By calling for
retreats and giving up ground gained, Otis played into their hands. Not that
Lawton or MacArthur could have brought the conflict to an end if left to
their own devices, but reports leaned in that direction. “Lawton made
himself a terror to the insurrectionists” because there were no obstacles

518
Ft. Wayne Evening Sentinel –August 8, 1899.
519
Ibid.
520
Brooklyn Eagle- August 21, 1899
243
that could stop him. He made roads where none existed, when rations were
short, everyone tightened their belts. The tactic of lightening strikes and
surprise attacks by the Americans under Lawton became a norm. 521
A completely different option appeared in the press when it was
reported that Otis would probably retain some responsibilities in Manila,
but the full command of field forces would be divided between Lawton
and MacArthur. One would handle the area north of Manila, one the south,
both responsible for planning and carrying out their operations without
administrative interference from Otis.522
Elaborate stories continued to appear in the press and the general
theme was that Lawton had proven the methods needed to win in the
Philippines. That he had not accomplished what he set out to do in early to
mid 1899 was not considered his fault. The blame was laid squarely at the
feet of General Otis. The majority of army officers in the Philippines, the
press, and the public hailed Lawton as the greatest fighting soldier in the
Philippines. 523 The stories continued on into the fall during which time
General Shafter’s retirement became official. Rumors continued to fly as
to who would stand to gain from his retirement and the bets were placed
on Lawton. As it turned out, Lawton received his promotion to brigadier,
regular army at the time he was killed.
The rainy summer months had halted a great deal of military
activity on both sides of the conflict. However, MacArthur had occupied
most of eastern Pampanga . As the rains abated, a brilliant pincer
movement, designed by Lawton, was launched.524 MacArthur pushed his
forces up the central plain toward Tarlac while Lawton sealed off the
mountain passes and moved his forces along the eastern edge of the plain.
General Wheaton landed some 2,000 troops at Lingayen after shelling by
U. S. warships softened up the rebel defenses. 525 These troops moved
north to join MacArthur’s column, which had moved north to capture the
town of Dagupan, along the coast. The town served as the terminal of the
island’s single railway, which ran to Manila.

521
Fresno Morning Republican-August 25, 1899
522
Brooklyn Eagle-September 10, 1899-p. 4
523
Davenport Republican-Special Edition-August 20, 1899
524
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation-p. 96
525
Karnow, Stanley-In Our Image-p. 157
244
 The lightning strikes scattered the rebel forces and Aguinaldo was
forced to flee to Tarlac. Lawton had requested permission to move
supplies up the swollen rivers during the rainy season and Otis had again
refused permission. The result was that the supply boats became bogged
down in dried up river beds, slowing Lawton’s advance and hampering his
operations. Otis’ interference in tactical matters he little understood
disrupted what could have been a successful operation. 526
Once at Tarlac, Aguinaldo consolidated his forces as best as
possible and changed from using large forces to using small, battalion size
units to initiate raids against the Americans. Aguinaldo recognized that his
Army could not defeat superior American forces in direct battle
confrontations. He therefore decided to use hit-and-run tactics to reduce
his casualties and prolong the conflict, hoping that the drawn out war
would force American public opinion to turn against it. After this last
battle, Aguinaldo officially ordered his forces to discontinue conventional
tactics and to employ guerilla methods.
Rain and the jungle, as usual, hampered American advances.
Lawton moved ahead with difficulty, but irresistibly. He elected that he
could go to bed with the insurgents in the evening and arise with them in
the morning. The Spanish commission, operating to relieve the needs of
several thousand military and civilian Spanish prisoners in the Tarlac area,
returned to Manila. They visited General Otis and brought word that while
Aguinaldo respected the American army, he planned to continue the war.
It was during this visit with Otis that the commissioners conveyed
information about the recent fight and informed Otis that Aguinaldo
referred to Lawton as “El General de La Noche”, the General of the night.
When they asked Aguinaldo why he used that term to describe Lawton, he
replied that Lawton had attacked him in the darkness so often, Aguinaldo
never knew when to look for him. 527
The northern campaign, despite bad weather, moved rapidly and
was slowed again by Otis’ decision not to allow Lawton to establish
forward supply bases when the rivers would have permitted. As a result,
Lawton had to contend with attempting to get his supplies brought slowly
forward by carabao-drawn wagons and Chinese bearers. The speed at

526
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation-p. 96
527
Cumberland Md Evening News-October 31, 1899; Ft. Wayne
Journal-October 31, 1899
245
which Lawton was moving was making Otis nervous that his lines would
become overextended and beyond re-supply.
Realizing that a failure to capitalize on the American gains could
result in losing momentum, Lawton devised a rapidly moving column
under his chief cavalry officer, General Sam Young. Young, with a
minimum of supplies, struck out to close up a trap at Dagupan. Lawton
realized that Young was under his direct command and if he could move
out of range of telegraph lines, Otis would be unable to order him back. 528
Had Otis been aware of Lawton’s plan, he would have refused to allow it.
Lawton did not bother to inform him until operations were underway.
General Wheaton had landed his forces at San Fabian as part of Lawton’s
plan to meet up with Young’s troops and seal off the rebels. However,
Otis had ordered Wheaton not to move too far from the coast and Wheaton
moved slowly, his feeble probes barely missing capturing Aguinaldo at
Rosario. 529 Young’s troops were near exhaustion and short of supplies at
this time and Wheaton was not willing at first to provide fresh troops to
Young’s forces. Young, without needed assistance, pushed ahead in
pursuit of Aguinaldo. His Macabebe scouts provided him with good
intelligence which would have resulted in the capture of Aguinaldo had
not one Tagalog scout betrayed the Americans and tipped off Aguinaldo to
the presence of U. S. troops. Aguinaldo slipped out of the trap at
Pozorubio but Young captured his son, a printing press, and his secretary
of foreign affairs.
Young finally convinced Wheaton to assign Major Peyton March
and a battalion strength unit to the pursuit of Aguinaldo. March kept close
on Aguinaldo’s heels and captured his mother. He also recovered several
American and Spanish prisoners released by the rebels in their flight. The
young rebel general, Gregorio del Pilar held his ground at Tirad Pass to
protect Aguinaldo’s flight and was killed by March’s men. During
October, Lawton had moved east of Mount Arayat and recaptured San
Isidro on October 22nd. By November 1, he had taken Aliaga and
Talavera, captured sizable amounts of rebel ammunition and stores, and
totally disrupted their land and river transportation. True to his fashion, he
stayed in the front of the advances and was often admonished by his men
for taking unnecessary risks.

528
Sexton, Wm. Thaddeus-Soldiers In The Philippines-p. 148
529
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation-p. 96
246
 Because he wore a yellow rain slicker due to the wet weather, he
became an easy target. One of his officers begged him to remove the
slicker as it would be the cause of his death, to which Lawton replied that
if he removed the slicker, he would die of pneumonia. Another officer
requested that he move to the rear or risk dying and Lawton only became
more adamant, and even exploded, “Tell me, by God, if I am not where I
am supposed to be!” 530 Once he made it clear he was not going to duck
the enemy fire, his officers reluctantly left him alone. Strangely though,
Lawton became intensely concerned for the safety of his men. A young
lieutenant who mimicked Lawton by standing up to observe rebel positions
was told by Lawton not to be a fool and to get under cover. When the
officer asked Lawton why he himself was taking the risk, Lawton replied
that he was an “old fool” which was worse than the young kind, but
continued to order the younger man to remain out of the line of fire.
It became apparent during the campaign that Generals Lawton
and Young made a good team. Both were competent, hard driving, and
did not compete with each other. Their apparent compatibility did a great
deal to increase their success, and attract the attention of the press as well.
This did nothing to make General Otis feel good. Rather than being
focused on the success of their campaigning, he became more envious of
the two instead. He felt threatened by Lawton, and disliked Young.
Young had earlier sent a note to the War Department criticizing Otis’
handling of the war, only to have the note passed back to Otis. Young was
not cowed by Otis however, and like Lawton, physically towered over
Otis. A few years later, Roosevelt would select Young over Otis to
become Army chief-of-staff. 531
By November 12, MacArthur’s troops had moved as far north as
Tarlac and finding the city deserted, occupied it. On November 13, the
rebels held a conference at Bayambang. Aguinaldo and several of the
Filipino leaders attended and adopted a resolution, which in effect
dissolved the rebel Army. Opposition took the form of purely guerrilla
warfare with the generals returning to their own provinces to organize the
people into small fighting groups. MacArthur occupied Bayambang on
November 19. From this point on, General Otis gave priority to the
capture of General Aguinaldo who continued to flee the American forces.

530
Ft. Wayne Historical Society
531
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation-p. 97
247
 Recognizing that the conflict had evolved to a state of guerrilla
warfare, MacArthur submitted a proposal to Otis recommending that a
general amnesty be declared. During a fixed period of time, the rebels
would be able to lay down their arms in return for amnesty. After a
predetermined deadline, those who refused to surrender to the Americans
would be declared common criminals and hunted down as such. Otis
declined to approve the plan fearing that the level of barbarities between
the rebels and Americans would escalate. 532
In Manila, Otis played the overused victory card to the press.
Dubious Americans, having become familiar with his use of victory
announcements, were cynical towards the news leaving Otis’ office. The
imperialist press however, more or less took him at his word. Even though
the differences between Otis and Lawton had increased, Otis was savvy
enough to understand Lawton’s publicity value in the eyes of the hero
worshippers back home. Utilizing Lawton’s history as a cavalryman who
had hunted Geronimo thirteen years before, Otis made every effort to lend
credibility to his announcements by connecting them to Lawton’s
activities.
The pro-Otis editors in the States simply picked up on the news
from Otis and amplified it to a point that ridiculed any thought that the
rebels were even close to being a match for Lawton. 533 In a curious way,
Otis helped to boost Lawton’s image as a dashing national hero in the
States while his own stock continued to slide.
The campaign caused hardships for the American troops operating
in the jungles and away from base for the prolonged period of time.
Mamie Lawton missed her husband and reflected her concerns for his well
being in a letter she addressed to A. R. McCurdy of Ft. Wayne, Indiana on
December 1. In it she laments the fact that “the General has been away for
over a month up on the northern line, beyond telegraphic communication,
and he is continually moving from point to point. They are having very
hard work on account of all the rains, bad roads, and many difficulties. He
cannot even receive mail and has no way at all of writing.” 534
In the field, Lawton became the vanguard of the American effort
to overtake and capture Aguinaldo. His relentless pursuit began to worry

532
Karnow, Stanley-In Our Image-p. 157
533
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation-p. 97
534
Ft. Wayne Historical Society
248
the conservative Otis who was accustomed to classic troop movements and
did not comprehend that Lawton had adjusted his tactics according to the
style of war being fought. He requested that Lawton stop his pursuit to
allow for additional equipment and supplies. Otis did not realize that the
delay was unnecessary but his commander was strictly devoted to obeying
orders and held up his advance. As a result of Otis’ orders, Aguinaldo
slipped away from Lawton. 535
Otis decided to recall Lawton to Manila for reasons only he could
fathom. In effect, he denied Lawton’s request for permission to cross the
mountains into the Cagayan Valley and catch Aguinaldo before he could
settle and regroup.
Lawton however, had learned, like MacArthur, that he could defy
Otis if his actions met with success and would benefit Otis in a public
sense. He selected Captain Joseph Batchelor to lead about 300 troops on a
scaled down version of his plan. Batchelor was unable to locate
Aguinaldo but achieved a major coup when rebel Colonel Danilio Tirona
surrendered 1,100 men and close to 1,000 rifles and other equipment to
him. 536 Even though Aguinaldo managed to escape the American
operation, it was one of the major successes of the war and typical of
Lawton’s ability to turn small operations into big victories.537
Dutifully, Lawton returned to Manila as Otis had ordered. A brief
respite allowed him to be with his wife and children, unknown to him, for
the last time in his life. Waiting for General Otis to approve his plan for a
campaign in southern Luzon, Lawton also visited and corresponded with
friends. Even though he had personal doubts about American involvement
in the Philippines, as a soldier he had come to believe that the sooner the
war could be ended, the sooner the Filipinos could be taught to govern
themselves.
To a friend, the Honorable Judge Barrett, he wrote a letter. In it he
voiced regret that Americans in general could not see and appreciate the
war for what it was. In his way, Lawton saw the potential of the
Philippine Islands and the people and felt that the anti-imperialist press
was actually prolonging the conflict by giving false hope to the rebels. He
considered the antiwar people to be honest and well intending, but

535
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation- pp.96-97
536
Ibid., p. 97
537
Ibid.
249
misinformed. During discussions with friends visiting him in his home, he
openly stated his beliefs that had the American forces aggressively gone
after Aguinaldo earlier in the year, rather than continually withdrawing
from their successes, the war could have been over. He dismissed Otis’
claims that the rebels had “surrendered” as ridiculous.
Lawton was able to convince Otis to allow him to lead a small
expedition to the Marikina Valley, east of Manila. Lawton’s ‘itch’ to
engage in a fight did not allow him to relax for long. The rebels had
fortified a line of communication between their southern and northern
positions and Lawton proposed to break it. 538
On the evening that he departed with the troops, Lawton was
commenting to his wife and friends that after the Philippine conflict ended,
he wanted the opportunity to visit the site of the Boer War as an observer.
His wife retorted that after the Philippines, he was going home to their
estate in California and raise oranges. 539
During the evening of December 17th, Lawton joined a small
force leaving on the expedition. He obviously was becoming restless as
the mission was not one that a general would normally accompany. Troop
I of the 4th Cavalry, under Colonel Lockett, along with units from 27th
and 29th Infantry under Lieutenant Colonel Sargent moved out with the
capture of San Mateo as their final objective.
A sudden downpour caused Otis to have second thoughts about
the mission and he ordered that it be postponed until the weather cleared.
While Otis was dining at his headquarters, Lawton joined him with a
request to authorize the troops to go ahead with their plans. Lawton felt
the rain would abate in short order and also indicated that some of the men
had already moved out from La Loma Church where they had assembled.
Otis agreed to Lawton’s request but had reservations about the men getting
across the San Mateo River, which was swollen with rainwater. Again,
Lawton gave his assurances that the crossing could be made and left to
join the men.
Lawton suspected that Otis would become conservative because of
the rain and he ordered Locket and Sargent to move out on time to be at
the point of attack by early the next morning. Lawton was reasonably

538
Ft. Wayne Ind. Historical Society-majority of narrative about
this last campaign based on the Society’s history of Lawton.
539
Karnow, Stanley-In Our Image-p. 159
250
certain that the rain, which had been coming down for two days, would
abate. Had he been aware that the weather was to become quite violent
over the next day, he himself might have had second thoughts about the
operation.
The plan was to have the force depart Manila in small separate
groups and join up early on the 19th in the hills opposite San Mateo. The
4th Cavalry Troop served as Lawton’s escort and together, they had left
from La Loma around midnight. The meeting up of the various troop units
occurred as planned even though the movement of troops was impeded by
the rain and bad trails. Lying ahead of them was a small but determined
rebel force commanded by General Lucerio Geronimo. If there was to be
any irony in the fact the general had the same name as the Apache tracked
by Lawton through Mexico, it was not discussed.
Lawton, leading the way during the night through fifteen miles of
mud, hills, and rocks, reached the head of the valley before daybreak.
Sargent had arrived at the rendezvous point at around 5 a. m. December
19th, but had not sighted Lockett’s group, nor had he encountered Lawton.
He had been told the night before not to wait for Lawton, rather to leave
from La Loma at 10 p. m. and Lawton would be at the meeting place the
next morning as planned.
As it turned out, Lawton’s experience was probably a mixture of
humor and frustration. He encountered the same obstacles during the night
as had his troops. Because of the heavy rain and dark, Lawton lost
Sargent’s trail and got turned around. He came up on Lockett’s column
and at first, wanted it to reverse direction, thinking that Lockett was going
the wrong way. After some discussion, and after marching in the wrong
direction for a time, Lockett convinced the general that he was in fact, the
one who was headed away from the target area.
Lawton showed up at Sargent’s location at 6:30 a. m. and began
his reconnaissance of the attack routes to San Mateo. Sargent and Lawton
made their observations and when Sargent indicated that he had already
determined his plan of assault, Lawton told him to proceed with his plan
and did not interfere. Later, Lawton did adjust the point at which troops
were to cross the San Mateo River because he had noticed a shallow point
that the other officers had not observed.
Sargent recalled later that when he started down the hill, he turned
and observed Lawton standing on the bluff in his yellow slicker and white
helmet, “ his large form clearly outlined with the sky for a background, the
stern features of his face showing the decision, energy, and determination
251
of his character, himself intensely interested in the movement of his troops
going on about him.” 540 As Sargent and his men advanced, Lawton and his
staff descended the bluff, in the rear of Captain Atkinson’s command and
advanced along the trail leading towards San Mateo. When the firing
began, Lawton was observed by Sargent arriving on the firing line, three
hundred yards away from the rebel rifle trenches.
At 8:00 AM, the Americans attacked the positions in front of San
Mateo. A three hour fight ensued with Lawton prowling the firing lines,
taking it all in as he had always done in the past.
The Americans had to cross a rice field to reach the San Mateo
River. On the other side of the river, long lines of rebel trenches protected
the town itself. While on the near side of the river, the Americans had
some cover from trees and shrubbery as well as a fog, which had settled in.
To reach the rebels though, the river had to be crossed and the rifle
trenches overcome. Lawton ordered Colonel Lockett to move along the
river and cross at a point where he could flank the right end of the rebel
lines.
After allowing Lockett time to cross the river, Lawton had the
infantry advance into the valley. Shortly after 8:00 AM, the Filipinos
detected the Americans’ movement and moved into their trenches. Two
American infantry companies moved towards the river in a line of
skirmish. Lawton and his staff waded through the rice field in order to get
closer to the river and locate a crossing point for the infantrymen. After
locating a good spot, Lawton and his officers moved back. Lawton ordered
the two companies forward to firing positions where they could suppress
rebel fire and keep the Filipinos in their trenches.
Lawton was beginning to draw rebel sniper fire. Lieutenant
Breckenridge who had been standing near Lawton was suddenly struck by
a bullet and fell. Lawton and three other officers carried the lieutenant to a
depression in the ground. Lawton ordered them to get a medic to help
Breckenridge who, by this time was yelling at Lawton to take cover or take
off his slicker.
Lawton, nonplused as usual, helped get the young aide to the rear
and out of danger, then returned to a point just behind the American firing
lines. Rebel fire was getting uncomfortably close as Lawton was observing

540
Rodenbough, Bvt. Brig. Gen. T. F., Editor, Journal of the
Military Service Institution-Account of Lt. Col. H. H. Sargent-p. 51
252
the movements of the two companies he had sent forward. He said; “ I am
afraid this is not a good place for a general. I like being on the firing line
when I can be the least bit of good, but today, I am going to let someone
else do it.” To the relief of his men and officers, he turned away to the
rear, but a few minutes later, Captains King and Fuller turned and noticed
Lawton was crossing the rice field, towards the front again, with his field
glasses aimed at the rebel positions.
It was about 9:00 AM. Suddenly, Lawton made a quick motion,
clutching at his chest, which attracted King’s attention. Exclaiming
“damn!”, Lawton grimaced as the officers rushed to his position. King
asked him where he had been hit and Lawton, coughing up blood, replied
that he was shot in the chest. The officers tried to assist him, but as
Lawton began to fall, he was already dead, having choked on his own
blood from a severed artery. 541
The fears of his officers and men had been realized. The veteran
of more than twenty Civil War engagements, the Plains and Southwest
Indian Wars, El Caney, and the Philippines, lived no more. More than
thirty-seven years of devoted service to his country, and an illustrious
chapter in American military history was closed. Yet, though Lawton did
not know it, President McKinley, the army and the country were paying a
tribute to Lawton, his long service, his character, and his achievements.
The rumors about who would fill the vacancy of Brigadier
General-Regular Army were stilled. McKinley and the army gave their
vote of confidence to Lawton and promoted him. Even though he did not
live to acknowledge it, he received the President’s ultimate seal of
approval and the appropriate ending to his story.

541
Lt. Col. Sargent gives an ample description of Lawton’s death,
clearly stating that Lawton was facing enemy lines when shot, and
that he was struck from the front. His and numerous other accounts
are substantial enough to dispel any whimsical speculation that
Lawton was killed by one of his own men.
253
 CHAPTER FIFTEEN

LAWTON’S FINAL VOYAGE

When the insurgent’s bullet fatally wounded Major General

Lawton, that rainy day of December 18, 1899, the Army lost a soldier who
had dedicated his entire adult life to its service.
Lawton’s body was carried to the rear of the battle zone by his
men and examined by Dr. Beardsley. The troops of Lawton’s command
vigorously carried out his plan, despite the loss of their commander, and
captured San Mateo.
Lockett’s cavalry, after crossing the river, executed a flanking
maneuver and scattered the rebels to the mountains. The remaining forces
crossed the river and pushed into San Mateo. Lawton’s final battle plan
was another success in a long line of victories. After San Mateo was
secured, six cavalrymen carried Lawton’s body on a litter into town,
preceded by the unit’s colors, and followed by a cavalry unit. The remains
were placed in a large building and the troops filed bareheaded, past their
fallen commander. It was noted that tears were seen streaming from the
eyes of many of the men. 542
Later that same evening, a sergeant and several soldiers arrived in
Manila, bringing the tragic news to Army headquarters and to the Lawton
residence. The general’s remains were escorted from the battlefield by a
squadron of the 4th Cavalry and the procession was greeted in each town
by garrison troops. The journey was a sad one as Lawton was revered by

542
Chicago Tribune-December 20, 1899.
254
his men, and by many of the Filipinos living in the villages through which
his silent form now passed.

The funeral caisson-Library of Congress

Courtesy Theo. Roosevelt Assn.

The funeral cortege arrived in Manila and moved to Lawton’s

place of residence. Pallbearer duties, usually assigned to sergeants in a
deceased general’s command, were requested by officers in Lawton’s
staff. Word of Lawton’s death quickly reached the United States and was
promptly carried by most of the nation’s newspapers in their headlines.
The Chicago Tribune of December 20, 1899 headlined: “ Lawton
Killed On Firing Line.” “ Indian Fighter Falls Before San Mateo While
255
Laughing At Bullets.” The article in part reported that : “ A soldier’s
death was today the lot of Major General Henry W. Lawton. The hero of
the Indian wars was shot to death while on the firing line before San Mateo
at 9:30 this morning (Dec. 18). General Lawton, always courageous to a
degree bordering on personal recklessness had exposed himself to the fire
of the rebel sharpshooters. His staff officers warned him of his peril and
pointed to the bullets as they clipped the grass at his feet. The soldier
merely laughed, and still smiling he was hit.”
The New York Times of December 20, 1899, reported the same
news in its fashion and added that Lawton’s death had caused universal
sorrow in Manila. The story went on to say that no American officer had
greater popularity among all ranks, and in his dealings with the Filipinos,
he commanded their respect and confidence to a remarkable degree.
In Manila, expressions of sorrow and grief poured in to Otis’
headquarters and at the Lawton residence. President McKinley, Elihu
Root, high-ranking dignitaries from the U. S. and other nations,
unanimously expressed their sorrow at the loss of General Lawton. In the
U. S., public figures were quick to speak out regarding the high esteem in
which they held him. Former President, Benjamin Harrison stated: “ I had
the highest appreciation of General Lawton as a soldier and citizen. He
was heroic, courageous, and we will miss him. It is distressing news,
coming when the trouble in the Philippines is so near an end. It is too bad
that he did not live to come home.”
Theodore Roosevelt referred to Lawton as one of the ablest
generals and one of the most gallant soldiers in the entire American Army.
General Charles King noted in his public statements the love Lawton’s
fellow soldiers had for him, and also recalled Lawton’s habit of exposing
himself to danger when there was no need in doing so. 543
Lawton had symbolized the dedicated soldier ready to sacrifice
financial gain for national glory. Even though he and his wife had
purchased a large home in California and planned to retire there, his
financial resources were not such that his widow could afford to retain the
home after his death. Lawton himself had confided in Senator Beveridge
of Indiana a few months earlier that he did not believe he would return
home alive, which in itself did not concern him. He was worrying

543
Material from the Ft. Wayne Indiana Historical Society which is
followed extensively for this chapter.
256
however, that his financial state would result in a heavy burden for his
wife and children.
Within two days of Lawton’s death, Adjutant General Corbin
recommended to President McKinley that the nation be asked to contribute
to a fund to take care of Mrs. Lawton and the four children.544 The
newspapers picked up on this effort and moved solidly to support it
resulting in an outpouring from Americans; high government officials,
military men, and the public. Within a short time, the press was tracking
the collections as the donations came in. Americans contributed close to
$100,000 to the Lawton fund, a sizable sum in 1900. 545
On December 22nd, private funeral services were held at the
Lawton residence in Manila. The coffin was then taken to the chapel at
Paco Cemetery and was interred there, surrounded by a guard of honor,
until after the public funeral on December 30th. After the funeral services,
the casket was carried on a six-horse caisson to the Army transport ship,
“Thomas” in the harbor at Pasig.546
Major General Otis and his staff as well as the other Army
generals, accompanied the caisson. The foreign consuls and members of
the Philippine Supreme Court were present as well. The Twentieth
Regiment Band played dirges; two troops of the 4th Cavalry, a battery of
artillery along with a naval battalion, clergymen, and Lawton’s staff
moved with the procession which was trailed by Lawton’s black horse.
Lawton’s remains, along with the bodies of three other officers
killed in the campaign, were placed on board ship and the “Thomas” sailed
for the United States. Ships of several nations were passed along its route
and out of respect, lowered colors or fired gun salutes.
Public mourning back home was taking place across the country
with many businesses and schools closed in memory of Lawton. The
people of Ft. Wayne, Indiana had wanted Lawton to be buried in their

544
Ft. Wayne Sentinel-December 20, 1899; AG Henry C. Corbin
initiated the fund and three other generals participated in pushing the
campaign out to the public, Generals Shafter, Ludlow and Weston.
545
Monroe Times December 20, 1899; within a day or so of the
fund’s announcement, the majority of newspapers in the states had
announced it and within a week of December 20, close to $25,000
had been raised from across the country.
546
The Daily Northwestern- December 20, 1899
257
town, and citizens of Indianapolis, now suddenly claiming Lawton as a
man from their state, wanted the same honors.
Stories about Lawton were already circulating. One appeared on
December 26th in which Senator Beveridge made several observations. He
first met Lawton at the latter’s home in Manila prior to a campaign.
Lawton explained his plans in detail to the senator. Beveridge described
Lawton as a “very intense man” concentrating his entire mind on a
problem at hand. At other times, Lawton proved to be very
companionable. He could be frank, or he would say nothing at all. In terms
of his ‘fearlessness’, Beveridge felt that Lawton immersed himself in a
battle and the need to be forward blanked out any thought of danger.547
It had already been determined at higher levels that Lawton was to
be buried at Arlington National Cemetery. Lawton had already selected a
burial plot there but the Army selected a site of greater prominence,
located just inside the main gate. McKinley and the government allowed
that Lawton’s body would pass through Indianapolis and Ft. Wayne before
being moved to Washington D. C. for final services.
Meanwhile, the public adulation continued as scores of highly
placed and prominent politicians and educators spoke of the country’s loss.
Among them were J. G. Schurman, President of Cornell and a member of
McKinley’s commission to the Philippines. He said: “General Lawton’s
death is a great public calamity. At the front and in the very eye of danger,
the post he always sought for himself, our prince of fighters has fallen. In
him, the Army loses a mighty inspiration, the public a sure bulwark of
confidence. Fearless, impetuous, and always successful, so that his very
name was in itself the strength of legions.”
The “Thomas” arrived in San Francisco January 30th, 1900.
Major General William R. Shafter was detailed to accompany the bier to
Washington. Lawton’s casket was removed from the ship and carried to a
mortuary. On February 1st, he was taken to the Ferry Building in a silent
procession, which was observed by over 30,000 people. The escort retired
at the ferry, which then carried the casket across San Francisco Bay to
Oakland where a special funeral train was waiting.
The funeral train proceeded first to Indianapolis where General
Lawton laid in state at the capitol. Lawton’s second destination was Ft.
Wayne where thousands awaited the funeral train. It arrived on the

547
Ft. Wayne News-December 26, 1899
258
morning of February 5th. The Secretary of War had ordered that no funeral
services were to be held in Ft. Wayne. Memorial services were held and
employees of the factories and railway shops were given the day off to
attend.
Flags throughout the nation were at half-mast and in Ft. Wayne, it
was clear that the people were in mourning. Shortly after 9:00 AM,
Lawton’s casket was transferred from the rail car to a gun carriage. At
9:20, a cannon at the north end of Calhoun Street boomed the major
general’s salute to signal the start of the procession. The solemn cortege
moved ahead as bands played dirges. Observers lined the streets along the
route from the train station to the new courthouse where the body was
taken. Military pallbearers lifted the casket and carried it inside, setting it
on pedestals after which a military guard of honor filed in and was
positioned around the bier.
Lawton’s battle flag, that of the First Division, 8th Corps, was
placed at the head of the casket. Solemn memorial services were
concluded and Lawton’s remains were removed to the train for transport to
Washington D. C. On February 9th, funeral services were held at 2:00 P.
M. at the Presbyterian Church of the Covenant in the capitol. The church
was crowded to overflowing long before the services and thousands had to
be turned away. 548
President McKinley, cabinet officers, foreign dignitaries, civilian
and military leaders attended the services. Army, Navy, and Grand Army
of the Republic members provided honorary pallbearers. A regiment of
infantry, one of artillery, a squadron of cavalry, and two mounted batteries
provided the escort to Arlington Cemetery. The Marine Corps Band,
followed by a battalion of Marines and a Navy detachment marched in the
procession. A warship fired its guns in salute as the procession crossed the
aqueduct bridge on its way to Arlington.
Chaplain Pierce who had accompanied Lawton’s remains from
Manila, read the burial service. The traditional gun volleys were fired after
which the crowd thinned, and Lawton was at rest.

548
Ft. Wayne Historical Society
259
 CHAPTER SIXTEEN

REFLECTIONS

If one were to select a word to best describe Henry Ware Lawton,

it would be, ‘genuine.’
His many admirable traits have been articulated in written and
spoken form by writers, historians, politicians, and military men. They
have adequately reported for us the countless times Lawton was praised by
people from all walks of life who lived during his time.
That Lawton was brave without question has been absolutely
confirmed by the history of his service with the Army. His determination
in surmounting what were impossible tasks for other men has been
documented well beyond the need to establish further credibility. His
fearlessness in facing untold dangers that made other soldiers cringe is a
fact, permanently etched into what we know of him.
An anecdote related by one of Lawton’s military friends, Major
Whipple, suggested that Lawton might not have been entirely fearless. On
the day of the San Juan fight in Cuba, Whipple was seated and leaning up
against a tree. Lawton approached and sat down next to the major. The two
began a discussion about nervousness under fire. Lawton admitted that he
never was in such a position “without feeling considerable of it.” Whipple
would not admit to any sense of fear. Suddenly a bullet struck the tree
against which they were leaning, just behind them, and Whipple jumped
about two feet in the air. Lawton didn’t move and gave no sign of being
alarmed. “Yes” he said dryly, “ I notice you are not nervous.”
Lawton, rather than being fearless, may have simply controlled his
fear which was necessary if he was going to lead men from the front. He
was also a compassionate man who truly felt from his heart a concern for
those who were ill-treated or fell victim to the ravages of war. He was
honest and loyal to a fault, not one to mislead or back stab, rather, working
by a noble set of rules to which he fixed his standard of self-conduct. That
he was fair and just has been amply demonstrated in his recorded deeds.
Lawton was also a man of temper and passion, impatient with
injustice and indecision, one who lacked tolerance for anyone who shirked
his duty or gave up without a reasonable effort. He had aspirations like the
next person, but those did not give license to envious or dishonest
behavior. He was known to give in to alcohol at times, which only proved
260
that weakness, and strength struggled side by side in his endeavors and
that made him real. Yet, the vast preponderance of evidence supports the
positive claims about his character and overwhelms the few speculative
clues to the contrary. A few writers have speculated that Lawton was
troubled. He lost his mother at a young age and at a time when his father
was away from home for several years. Most of his teen years were spent
without his natural parents. In one of his letters he indicates that he joined
the Army in 1861 at a time when he was angry with his father and he
regretted having done so. His father passed away in 1867. Lawton and his
wife lost their first three children soon after childbirth which weighed on
him. Yet, there is nothing else in his history to suggest he was ‘troubled’ or
‘depressed’ on a regular basis. He carried some burdens but managed his
life well in spite of them.
That he was genuine may have been the main reason so many
people were attracted to him: presidents, generals, judges, scholars, clerks,
privates, and the average person on the street. He was the embodiment of
something pure and American, a symbol of what many people wanted to
be like.
Had Lawton lived, his chances for promotion to the position of
Army chief-of-staff were excellent. One of his primary supporters,
Theodore Roosevelt, became President a short time after Lawton’s death.
Under his Presidency,

261
 Statue of Henry W. Lawton-Manila-family photo

Lawton would have been a prime candidate to head the Army. As

events worked out, Lawton would have agreed with Roosevelt’s choice for
the spot in 1903, General Samuel Young. Young had served under
Lawton in the chase after Aguinaldo. He was denied command of the 1st
Division after Lawton’s death, by General Otis, who in turn was passed
over by Roosevelt for the Army’s top job in favor of Young.
Sadly, a minority of contemporary authors write that a rumor has
persisted that Lawton may have been killed by one of his own men. If so,
there is no sign of that rumor in the volumes of reliable information about
the Spanish-American War and it was apparently the thought of a small
mind. As is customary when a public figure dies, the press conducted far
ranging interviews with enlisted men and officers who had served with
Lawton and to a man, they communicated their respect and love for
Lawton. Lawton was, in fact, killed by a bullet from a rifle fired by an
insurgent.
After General Lawton’s death, General O. O. Howard wrote an
article, as had several of Lawton’s associates, describing his sense of who
262
Lawton was. He commented on Lawton’s bravery during the Civil War
and how Lawton had stood by the colors in many battles. 549 He
particularly remembered Atlanta, Franklin, and Nashville. Howard went
on to describe that while he was commanding the Pacific Military Division
in 1886, he became aware of Lawton as the captain of B Troop, 4th
Cavalry who was sent by Miles to pursue Geronimo in Mexico.
Howard developed a respect for Lawton and took pride in
Lawton’s assessment of well-led American soldiers as good soldiers. He
felt that the Geronimo campaign was one of Lawton’s finest achievements
and was not swayed by the opinion of a few junior officers concerning the
affair, in later years. Howard remembered that in 1886, many officers were
complaining about the quality of their men. Lawton, like Howard, believed
that the enlisted men needed good leadership and were under appreciated
by many officers who were actually of poor quality themselves.
General Howard’s son, Colonel Guy Howard, served as Lawton’s
chief quartermaster in the Philippine Islands. Colonel Howard, before
being killed in the conflict, wrote several letters to his father about the
campaign. One of the things that struck General Howard was the fact that
his son frequently wrote about General Lawton and that he was admired by
both the officers and the men. 550 In terms of the Philippine Insurrection,
most authors agree that had General Otis been relieved and Lawton taken
over, the conflict would probably dragged on for a time, but perhaps not as
long as it did. Lawton at least had an appreciation of what the war was all
about and took steps to give the natives a major part in self-determination.
There were questions raised about the official version of the
Geronimo campaign by a few junior officers who served in that period.
Most waited until after Lawton’s death thus avoiding any real challenge to
their statements. What initially prompted some resentment from officers
such as Charles B Gatewood was Nelson A Miles’ book, Personal
Recollections and Observations, published in 1897. Miles was a self-
promoting individual with visions of the presidency. He wrote in a style
that reflected perfect planning and perfect results, as though there were no
flaws, as far as the Geronimo campaign was concerned. He also failed to

549
Newberry Library-Graff Collection-F2420-R.G. Carter-Chicago
Il.
550
Ibid.
263
give due credit to Gatewood who had put his life on the line by agreeing to
meet with Geronimo.
After Gatewood’s death, his records and letters were made public
in an effort to gain him greater recognition. Some years after Lawton’s
death, Britton Davis wrote his account of the affair, even though he had
only second hand knowledge of the true events. His sympathies are easily
understood since he had been friends with Gatewood. He was also
impressed by General George Crook and perhaps flattered that Crook had
selected him, just a fresh lieutenant out of West Point, for an important
role on his staff. Davis probably never sensed that by the 1880’s Crook
had become a very self-centered person who picked his aides on the basis
of their willingness to agree with him. 551
In any event, Davis quit the Army after a short few years of
service, for reasons known only to him. The fact that his sponsor, General
Crook, had fallen into disfavor may have had a bearing on his decision.
Another officer who served during the campaign, Lieutenant H. C.
Benson, recorded his views on the matter in the Army-Navy Journal in
1909. However, Benson’s credibility has to at least be questioned in light
of his less than truthful reports to Lawton about Lawrence Vinton’s
whereabouts in Mexico. 552 Benson had stranded Vinton during a night
ride in Mexico and then filed a false report with Lawton, no doubt,
assuming that Vinton would never make it back to the command.
Fortunately, Lawton was fair and gave Vinton a hearing and dismissed the
report as untrue. Lawton still gave Benson good grades on his
performance in terms of keeping the command supplied during the
campaign. 553
On the basis of information from Gatewood, Davis, and Benson, a
small group of writers later suggested that a growing body of information
indicated that Lawton had “falsified” his report about the Geronimo
campaign. However, the great majority of writers, while examining the
issue, have found merit in the official and supporting versions of the
campaign. Those in fact, lay a good share of the credit for flushing
Geronimo out of Mexico, with Lawton. In doing so, they are in concert

551
Robinson, Charles M., III-Bad Hand-p. 212
552
White, Lonnie B.-Hostiles & Horse Soldiers-p. 222
553
Serial 2461, Secretary Of War Annual Report, 1886-Reports of
N. A. Miles, H. W. Lawton, O. O. Howard
264
with the vast majority of military and civilian people of the period who
were quite expert in the entire matter. The number of Lawton supporters
in the Army, from commanding general to lower rank officers, is so great
as to dispel the opinions of a few envious junior officers. Lawton spent
over twenty arduous years in the Army with only one leave of absence.
Given the kind of duty he had in those years, his contribution to the
country as a whole far exceeded the achievements of Gatewood or Davis,
as noble as they might have been.
For his part, Lawton never claimed to be the sole reason Geronimo
surrendered to General Miles in 1886. He was however, instrumental in a
major way of forcing Geronimo and the small group of Apaches to keep
on the move and in the process, become worn down. Lawton never
complained publicly about the ordeal in Mexico but revealed his humanity
in a letter to R. G. Carter in 1886 in which he admits that the campaign
tired him down more than “he liked to admit or acknowledge.” He was
getting old and would have to face up to it. 554
Miles for his part played every card in his hand lest he run the risk
of falling victim to General Sheridan’s wrath as Crook had done. His
decision to send the two scouts, Kayitah and Martine to talk with
Geronimo, was a natural one and since Gatewood had established a rapport
previously with Geronimo, having him along with the scouts improved
Miles’ chances. However, it was Lawton’s scouts who located Geronimo
near Fronteras, and Lawton’s presence that protected Gatewood’s venture.
Moreover, Lawton was the one to decide whether or not Geronimo’s
request to essentially come under Lawton’s protection could be approved.
The possibility that Geronimo, Gatewood and the two scouts would have
made it out of Mexico alive, without Lawton’s presence, is extremely slim.
Lawton’s report was pragmatic, and at the same time, quite
complimentary of the officers and men who had been with his campaign
since its inception. In detail, he commended the scouts, Lieutenants Finley,
Benson, Brown, and Smith.
He gives special credit to Leonard Wood of course, but makes
particular mention of Lieutenant R. D. Walsh “who had been in the field
against the hostiles since May 17, 1885, longer than any other officer in
the command.” Unlike Leonard Wood who recorded Gatewood’s opinions
in detail, Lawton does not bring up the fact that Gatewood was

554
Newberry Library-Carter papers -Lawton letter 11-16-1886
265
immediately critical of Miles’ plan and had no faith in it. In addition,
Gatewood’s physical condition was not too good which apparently caused
him to move slower than Lawton expected him to. Lawton and his men,
after four months, were not in the best physical condition either but
seemed to work around their physical ailments. Leonard Wood was quite
detailed in his observations of these events, Lawton never used them
against Gatewood and never discussed them even with his friend Carter as
far as records show.
Lawton felt the weight of responsibility for the campaign and
became most concerned when General Miles appeared to balk at the last
minute. Miles by his own admission states that he became engrossed with
the process of moving the Apaches off of their reservations and on to
Florida. He seems to have forgotten when writing his book that the first
priority, which he had been given, was the capture of Geronimo, not the
resettlement of the Apaches. That priority was established by President
Cleveland and General Sheridan. It was Lawton who persisted through a
variety of urgent communications with Miles in reminding him of it.
Miles’ annual report of 1886 quite clearly commends Lieutenant
Gatewood for his bravery and for risking his life by entering Geronimo’s
camp to negotiate with him. 555 As such, there is not a total lack of
recognition as claimed by some.
The man who unwittingly stirred up a hornet’s nest on this matter
was Lawton’s old friend, Robert G. Carter. After Lawton’s death, Carter
was so anxious to promote Lawton’s memory, he began sending stories
about Lawton’s feats with the 4th Cavalry to various publications. What he
sent were the press reports that included the same fabrications that Lawton
himself had scoffed at some years prior. Harpers Weekly declined to print
the Geronimo story, Colliers accepted it. 556

555
Newberry Library-Carter papers -Lawton letter 11-16-1886
556
Carter Papers -Newberry Library: Carter sent the embellished
news story to Harpers which declined to publish on January 2, 1900.
He then sent it to Colliers which accepted the story January 12,
1900. The story, written by Harry Dodd gave Lawton credit for
pursuing Geronimo between May, 1885, and August, 1886. The
report also claimed that Lawton made disparaging comments about
the Apaches. It was one of the very stories Lawton had discounted
266
 Carter also made public the contents of letters Lawton had written
him in response to Carter’s questions about the campaign. Newspaper
accounts dated after Geronimo’s surrender erroneously reported that he
had escaped. Lawton’s replies to Carter informed him not to pay heed to
the newspaper reports, that he had endured a hard summer, Geronimo was
captured, and the affair had ended. In his goodhearted effort to
memorialize Lawton, Carter unintentionally aggravated some old wounds.
To add to the problem, the newspapers had dredged out some of their old
stories about Lawton’s Geronimo mission from their archives. Many of
those stories were the same exaggerations that had embarrassed Lawton
when he was alive.
Perhaps one of the strongest views supporting Lawton was one
expressed by Lieutenant A. L. Smith of the 4th Cavalry who accompanied
Lawton into Mexico during the Geronimo campaign. He would have had
every reason to contest the credit given Lawton as did some of his fellow
Lieutenants, but in a letter he wrote to Lawton on January 1, 1888, he
seems to undermine the position taken by Gatewood, Davis, and Benson in
later years. (See page 106 )
Despite the public extremes taken by some of Lawton’s friends,
and his few foes, his reputation remains untarnished. As a dedicated
officer in the Army, he was unsurpassed. Despite the fact that natural age
crept up on him, and he admitted it to certain people, his fearlessness never
diminished.
That Lawton was a driven person seems evident in his energy
level and ability to keep going when others had given up. One can only
imagine that as a young boy, without his father present, his formation of
standards was influenced by the many soldier stories he heard. He set his
own standards based on some high ideals and those standards were
extremely high, enough so that they gave him little rest. When he felt he
had failed those standards, he was inclined to find relief in alcohol.
Serving under Ranald S. Mackenzie only served to reinforce Lawton’s
standards as the two men shared a common view of what soldiering was
all about.
On December 23, 1899, the Reverend Peter McQueen provided
some insight to Lawton. McQueen said that Lawton was, in his view, the

as untrue, years earlier but no doubt, aroused anger among some

who did not see through the sensationalism.
267
best and noblest soldier in the army. He was liked by everybody, the
soldiers and the press praised him. On one occasion during a dangerous
river crossing, Lawton had been without food for two days. He had a wet
sandwich in his pocket and sat down to eat it. That evening, McQueen
arranged to have a chicken sent to Lawton and he later learned that Lawton
paid the natives full price for it. He was careful and fair in his dealings
with the Filipinos.557
J.G. Schurman, president of the Philippine Peace Commission and
Cornell University commented on what a splendid man Lawton was.
Where others needed time to prepare for an important event, Lawton was
ready at a moment’s notice. His soldiers believed in him as he never lost
his head and was an inspiration to them. Schurman added that Lawton was
an object of terror to the insurgents, and of confidence to the Filipino
people. They felt and recognized his greatness and understood that he was
wise and humane as well. 558
General Breckenridge said of Lawton that obstacles that would
have thwarted anyone else scarcely checked Lawton. His insight into any
problem, particularly a military one, and his “clear perception of things
were almost phenomenal.”559
Like Mackenzie, Lawton faded from memory soon after his death.
Like Mackenzie, his deeds and valor exceeded those of many of the men
who later became American idols because of their flamboyance and ability
to self-promote.
Still, Lawton’s counter-insurgency tactics remain a cornerstone of
present day U.S. Army doctrine as does his method of establishing local
self-government and utilizing natives for policing and garrison work. Early
in 1900, Lawton’s plan for maintenance of peace after the war which he
had submitted to Otis, was sent on to the War Department. The department
announced that the plan would be put into effect. It called for the use of
native police, the same as Lawton had set up in Santiago. It was Lawton’s
belief that by using native officers, the population would be more receptive
to them and the officers would be loyal to the local population. 560

557
Leslies-January 6, 1900-courtesy Culbertson Mansion
558
Ibid.
559
St. Louis Republic-December 20, 1899
560
Brooklyn Eagle-February 25, 1900
268
 Later in 1901, General MacArthur submitted a report from Manila
to the War Department reporting on the progress of the Native Police from
various areas. He included reports from several American generals
including Lloyd Wheaton, J. H. Smith, F. Funston, Bell, F.D. Grant, J.F.
Wade, and S.S. Sumner all stating that the native police organizations were
meeting or exceeding expectations. They further commented on
Macabebe Scouts, established and organized by Major Batson at the
direction of General Lawton. These scouts were successful in recon,
locating and capturing marauding bands of rebels, and maintaining
peace. 561
As to the occasional reference of little weight to Lawton’s
occasional intemperance, General Corbin best summed things up in a letter
to George B. Cortelyou, McKinley’s secretary August 22, 1899. In it he
describes the stories about Lawton as “mischievous gossip.”562 Cortelyou,
at McKinley’s behest had inquired about a cable from Otis to the AG
concerning the rumors. Lawton himself had written Corbin July 12th
asking Corbin to make sure the false reports were dealt with. 563 Lawton
was reacting to a letter he received from General Charles King dated June
5th. King described a discussion with General Shafter in San Francisco in
which Shafter indicated someone in a high position in Manila was
slandering Lawton. He wanted King’s view and King was emphatic in
stating that the rumors were purely lies. 564
One is reminded of William T. Sherman’s reaction to a New York
Sun article about Ulysses Grant’s drinking, written well after Grant’s
death. Sherman reminded a friend who had sent him the article of
President Lincoln’s comment to preachers who, years earlier, had
complained about Grant. He said; “Do you know where Grant buys his
whiskey? I would like to present some to other Generals not so
successful.” Sherman closed his letter with the following comment; “The
good he did lives after him-let his small weaknesses lie buried with his

561
Brooklyn Eagle-August 9, 1901- p. 8
562
Library of Congress-McKinley papers-reel 7 Corbin to
Cortelyou- August 22, 1899
563
Ibid., Lawton to Corbin-July 12, 1899
564
Ibid., King to Lawton- June 5, 1899
269
bones- and Shame on the Curs and Coyotes who aim to rake them up
again.”565
In viewing Lawton’s ‘fearlessness’ and his occasional moments of
gloom, he stands out as no different than any person carrying the burden of
great responsibility on his shoulders. One such man, feeling downcast and
quite sorry for himself, once wrote; “ I have often thought of how much
happier I should have been if, instead of accepting a command under such
circumstances, I had taken my musket upon my shoulders and entered the
ranks, or if I could have justified the measure to posterity, and my own
conscience, had retired to the back country and lived in a wigwam.”566
The memory of Lawton may not have survived the onward rush of
history in America, but his record as one of the more prominent military
men of the late nineteenth century endures. Until the name Black Jack
Pershing emerged during WWI, there was not another general of the same
stamp as Lawton, as Theodore Roosevelt would have phrased it.
In a speech in Indianapolis dedicating a monument to Lawton, he
said;

“For more than one reason I am peculiarly glad that this year I speak on
Memorial Day in the State of Indiana. There is no other class of our
citizen to whom we owe so much as to the veterans of
the great war. To them it was given to perform the one feat with which no
other feat can be com-
pared, for to them it was given to preserve the Union. Moreover, you men
who wore the blue,
blessed beyond the victors in any other war of recent times, have left to
your countrymen more than the material results of the triumph, more even
than the achieving the triumph itself. You have left a country so genuinely
reunited that all of us now, in whatever part of this Union we live, have a
right to feel the keenest pride, not only in the valor and self devotion of
you, the gallant men who wore the blue, but also in the valor and self-
devotion of your gallant opponents who wore the gray.

The hero whose monument we to-day unveil, by his life bore singular
testimony to the completeness of the reunion.

565
W.T. Sherman letter February 4, 1887-Univ. Iowa Library
566
McCullough, David-1776 George Washington -p. 79
270
General Lawton in his youth fought gallantly in the Civil War. Thirty-three
years afterward he again marched to war, this time against a foreign foe,
and served with distinguished ability and success as a general officer, both
in Cuba and in the Philippines.

When he thus served it was in an army whose generals included not only
many of his old comrades in arms, but some of his old opponents also, as
General Wheeler and General Fitzhugh Lee. Under him, both among the
commissioned officers and in the ranks, were many men whose fathers had
worn the blue serving side by side with others whose fathers had worn the
gray; but all Americans now, and nothing but Americans, all united in
their fealty and devotion to their common flag and their common country,
and each knowing only the generous rivalry with his fellows as to who
could best serve the cause for which each was ready to lay down life itself.

To General Lawton it befell actually to lay down his life; a tragedy, but
one of those noble tragedies where our pride rises above our sorrow. For
he died in the fullness of time, serving his country with entire devotion-a
death that every man may well envy.

Excerpted from Roosevelt’s speech on Memorial Day, 1907.

Courtesy Theo. Roosevelt Assn.

271
 Bibliography

Documents

Ft. Wayne In., Historical Society-Henry W. Lawton-1954

Military Service Record-Lawton-(Courtesy National
Archives/Smithsonian Institution-Museum of American History-Military
Branch )
National Archives-Lawton papers (copies in author’s possession)
National Historical Society-War of the Rebellion, Official Record of the
Union and Confederate Armies-Washington Printing Office-1894
(Courtesy 1st Divn Research FacilityCantigny-Wheaton Il)
Newberry Library-Graff Collection-F2420-R.G. Carter-Chicago Il.
Rodenbough, Bvt. Brig. Gen. T. F., Editor, Journal of the Military Service
Institution of the United States-Vol.XXX Governors Island,
Military Svc. Inst.-1902 (Courtesy of the U. S. Army Military
History Institute)
Serial 2461, Secretary Of War Annual Report, 1886-Reports of N.A.
Miles, H. W. Lawton, O.O. Howard
U.S. War Department Report-Inspector General’s Office-12-21-
1899(Courtesy of the National Archives)
Library of Congress: McKinley Papers 1898-1899 ; Corbin Papers 1898-
1899
Books & Authors

Adams, Alexander B.-Geronimo-A Biography -NY: Putnam-1971

Axelrod, Alan-Chronicle Of The Indian Wars-From Colonial Times To
Wounded Knee-Prentice Hall-1993
Barrett, S.M.-Geronimo-His Own Story- -1970-NY:EP Dutton & Co., Inc.-
1970
Berthrong, Donald J.-The Cheyenne And Arapaho Ordeal-Norman:
University Of Oklahoma Press n.d.
Betzinez, Jason- I Fought With Geronimo-Edited by W.S. Nye-Harrisburg,
Pa:Stackpole Co.-1959
Brown, Dee-Bury My Heart At Wounded Knee-NY: Bantam Books-1970

272
Bundt, Major Thomas S. PhD-The Philippine Insurrection,1899-Military
Review May-June 2004
Capps, Benjamin-The Indians-NY: Time Life-1973 / Reprint 1976
Carter, Robert G.-On The Border With Mackenzie-NY: Antiquarian Press-
1961
Cashin, Herschel V.-Under Fire With The Tenth U.S. Cavalry-
Colorado:University of Colorado Press-1993
Catton, Bruce-The Civil War-NY:American Heritage Publishing-1960
Cosmas, Graham A.-An Army For Empire-The United States Army In The
Spanish-American War-Shippensburg, Pa: White Mane Publishing
Crook, General George -His Autobiography-Edited by Martin F. Schmitt-
Norman: -Univ. Okla. Press-1960
Davis, Britton-The Truth About Geronimo- New Haven: Yale University
Press- 1929
Debo, Angie-Geronimo The Man, His Time, His Place-Norman:-
University Of Oklahoma Press n.d.
Dictionary Of American Military Biography-Roger G. Spiller-
London:Greenwood Press
Dierks, Jack Cameron-A Leap To Arms The Cuban Campaign-NY &
Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott-1970
Dyer, Frederick H., A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion- Published
1908
Family Records (Mary E. Rau-Milwaukee Wisc)
Faulk, Odie B.-The Geronimo Campaign -NY: Oxford University Press-
1969
Grinnell, George Bird-The Fighting Cheyennes -Norman: University Of
Oklahoma Press-1956
Hagedorn, Hermann-Leonard Wood A Biography-Harper & Brothers
Publishers-New York and London-1931
Haley, James E.-Apaches-A History & Culture Portrait-NY: Doubleday &
Co., Inc.-1981
Josephy, Alvin M., Jr.-500 Nations-NY: Alfred A. Knopf-1994
Karnow, Stanley-In Our Image-American Empire In The Philippines- NY:
Random House-1989
Lane, Jack C.,Chasing Geronimo-The Journal Of Leonard Wood-May-
September, 1886-Albq. NM:-U. Of N.Mex. Press-1970
Lane, Jack C.-Armed Progressive, General Leonard Wood-Presidio Press-
San Rafeal, Ca. and London- 1978
Leech, Margaret-In The Days Of McKinley-NY: Harper Brothers -1959
273
Linn, Brian M.-The Philippine War 1899-1902-University Press-Kansas-
2000
Longstreet, Stephen-War Cries On Horseback-NY: Doubleday-1970
Miles, N.A.-Personal Recollections and Observations Of Nelson A. Miles-
Chicago: The Werner Co.-1897
Miller, Stuart Creighton-Benevolent Assimilation-The American Conquest
of the Philippines, 1899-1903-New Haven: Yale University Press-1982
Monaghan, Jay-Book Of The American West-NY: Julian Messner-1963
Morris, Charles-Heroes of the Army in America-Philadelphia: J. B.
Lippincott Co.-no date
Morris, Edmund-The Rise Of Theodore Roosevelt-NY: Coward, McCann,
& Geoghegan Inc-1979
Musicant, Ivan-Empire By Default, The Spanish-American War and the
Dawn of the American Century-NY: Henry Holt & Co. 1998
O’Toole, G.J.A.-The Spanish War-An American Epic-1898-NY: W.W.
Norton & Co.-1984
Oswald, Villard Garrison-The Truth About Leonard Wood- Nation-Vol.
110, No.2865 1920
Otis, Lt. Col. Elwell S.-The Indian Question-NY: Sheldon & Co.-1878
Robinson, Charles M., III-Bad Hand-A Biography Of General Ranald S.
Mackenzie-Austin Tx: State House Press-1993
Roosevelt, Theodore-The Roughriders-NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons-1899
Roosevelt, Theodore-An Autobiography-NY: Charles Scribner’sSons-1920
Russell, Don-Campaigning With King- Lincoln:University Of Nebraska
Press-1991
Sandoz, Mari-Cheyenne Autumn-NY: Hastings House-1953
Sexton, Wm. Thaddeus-Soldiers In The Philippines-A History of the
Insurrection-The Infantry Journal-1944
Starita, Joseph-The Dull KnifesOf Pine Ridge-NY: G.P. Putnam’s Sons-
1995
The Harper Encyclopedia Of Military Biography-Harper Collins Publ.
Thompson, Richard A.-Crossing The Border With The 4th Cavalry-
Mackenzies Raid Into Mexico-1873 - Waco Tx -Texian Press- 1986
Thrapp, Dan L.-The Conquest Of Apacheria- Norman Ok: University Of
Okla Press-1967
Trask, David F.-The War With Spain-The Free Press-N.Y.-1981
Traywick, Ben T. -Thunder Fort-The Story Of Fort Huachuca-
Tombstone-Ben T. Traywick- 1972

274
Utley, Robert M.-Frontier Regulars-Lincoln-London -University Of
Nebraska Press-1973
Vinton, Lawrence.-The Geronimo Campaign: As told by a Trooper of ‘B’
Troop of the 4th U.S. Cavalry”-Boulder, Co., Pruett Publishing -1972
Waldman, Carl-Who Was Who In Native American History-NY: Facts On
File-1990
Ward, Geoffrey C.-The Civil War-An Illustrated History-N.Y: Alfred A.
Knopf- 1990
Weeks, Dr. F.E.-Pioneer History Of Clarksfield Ohio -1908
Wheeler, Joseph-The Santiago Campaign-1st Divn Museum, Cantigny-
Wheaton Il -1898
White, Lonnie B.-Hostiles & Horse Soldiers- Boulder Co: Pruett
Publishing-1972
Worcester, Donald E.-The Apaches-Eagles Of The Southwest- -University
Of Oklahoma Press-Norman Ok. (Date damaged)

Periodicals-Newpapers

Chicago Tribune December 20, 1899

Harpers Weekly June 1, 1900
Military Review May 1, 2004-An Unconventional war: the
Philippine Insurrection, 1899-Bundt, Thomas S.
N.Y. Times December 21, 1899 / December 20, 1899 / July 1, 1886
/ July 26, 1886 / August 20, 1886 / August 22, 1886 / August 25,
1886 / September 4, 1886 / September 5, 1886 / September 7, 1886
The Wisconsin Magazine of History-September 1922

Archival Newspapers May 1898-January 1901

Atlanta Constitution
Associated Press
Boston Daily Globe
Brooklyn Eagle
Cedar Rapids Gazette
Chicago Daily Tribune
Dallas Morning News
Davenport Weekly
275
Elizabethtown (NJ) Gazette
Fitchburg Daily Sentinel
Ft. Wayne Evening Sentinel
Galveston Daily News
Hartford Courant
Hopewell (NJ) Herald
Idaho Daily Statesman
Lincoln (NE) Evening News
Los Angeles Times
Middletown Daily Argus
Naugatuck Daily News
Newark Daily Advocate
Newark Sentinel
Racine (WI) Daily Journal
Syracuse (NY) Standard
New York Herald
New York Times
Oakland Tribune
St Louis Republic
Ticonderoga (NY) Sentinel
Washington Post
Waukesha (WI) Freeman

Online reference resources

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http://washingtonhistory.org/wshs/columbia/articles/0100-a2.htm

Parker, John H.-The Gatlings at Santiago-

http://www.authorama.com/gatlings-at-santiago-20.html

Worcester, Dean C.-The Philippines, Past and Present-Vol. 1 of 2-

The Project Gutenberg-
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/12077/12077-8.txt

Davis, Richard Harding-The Battle of San Juan Hill-

276
http://www.pbs.org/weta/reportingamericaatwar/reporters/davis/sanj
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White, Trumbull-Our War With Spain For Cuba’s Freedom-

http://www.knowledgerush.com/paginated_txt/etext03/wrspc10/wrs
pc10_s1_p444_pages.html

Steward, T. G. – The Colored Regulars in the United States Army-

http://www.negroartists.com/writings/The%20Colored%20Regulars
%20in%20the%20United%20States%20Army,%20by%20Chaplain
%20T_G_%20Steward,%20D_D.htm#Contents

277
 Index
Adobe Walls, 59
Aguinaldo, Emelio, 135, 141,
208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213,
214, 224, 227, 232, 235, 236,
239, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249,
250, 262
Alger, Secy of War Russell A.,
139, 140, 143, 146, 208, 215
Anderson, Gen. Thomas, ii, 134,
208, 215
Auger, Gen. C. C., 54, 55, 57,
59, 60, 61
Batson, Capt. Matthew, 239, 269
Bellairs, Edgar G., 189, 190
Benson, Lt. H.C., 93, 94, 95,
105, 106, 107, 122, 264, 265,
267
Brackett, Dr. Elliott, 188
Bragg, Gen., 23, 24, 25
Brooke, Gen. John R., 144, 145,
168, 181, 189, 190, 202
Buell, Gen. Don Carlos, 21, 22,
60, 61, 63
Calderon, Felipe, 230, 231, 239
Capron, Capt. Allyn, 156, 157,
158
Carter, Lt. Robt. G., vi, 13, 30,
38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47,
48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57,
58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 75,
114, 122, 125, 126, 133, 204,
231, 263, 265, 266, 267, 272,
273
278
Chaffee, Gen. Adna, 80, 81, 82,
84, 87, 154, 156, 158, 164
Cleveland, President Grover, 90,
91, 96, 119, 121, 122, 135, 136,
266
Corbin, Gen. Henry C., 143, 144,
208, 210, 215, 257
Crook, Gen. George, 64, 65, 66,
67, 68, 72, 75, 77, 82, 83, 84, 85,
86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 95,
96, 98, 99, 103, 104, 110, 111,
117, 121, 264, 265, 273
Daiquiri Cuba, 150
Davis, Lt. Britton, 27, 43, 52, 82,
85, 86, 87, 88, 94, 264, 267, 273
Donaldson, Customs Inspector,
173, 177, 185, 186
Dougall, Capt. A. J., 135
El Caney Cuba, 154, 155, 156,
157, 158, 159, 253
Fairbanks, Senator C. W., 143,
194, 226
Franklin Tn, 23, 28, 30, 263
Garlinghouse, Darius, 15
Gatewood, Lt. Charles, 82, 84,
85, 87, 94, 103, 104, 105, 106,
107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 113,
114, 116, 120, 121, 122, 133,
263, 264, 265, 266, 267
Geronimo, Apache, i, v, 78, 79,
80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88,
89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97,
98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104,
105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110,
111, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117,
119, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125,
126, 130, 133, 135, 248, 251,
263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 272,
273, 275
Godown, John M., 126, 127
Grant, Gen. U.S., 21, 22, 25, 26,
34, 38, 54, 55, 56
Greene, Gen. Francis V., 208
Grose, Gen. William, 26, 28, 30
Halleck,Gen. Henry W., 22
Hardee, Gen. William J., 23
Hood, Gen. John Bell, 27, 28
Howard, Gen. O.O., 78, 262,
263, 264, 272
Iloilo, 211, 212
Jerome, Lawrence, 94, 97, 105,
106, 120
King, Gen. Charles, 77, 220,
221, 241, 253, 256, 274
Laffan, William, 190
Langdon, Lt. Russell C., 157
Las Pinas, 231, 238
Lawton, Mamie, 75, 101, 106,
127, 231, 248
Lawton, Orrilla M., 10, 11
Long, John D., 17, 64, 122, 138,
139, 146
Longstreet, Gen. James, 96, 274
Macabebes Scouts, 239
MacArthur, Gen. Arthur, 25, 26,
152, 213, 214, 219, 221, 224,
225, 226, 229, 232, 241, 244,
247, 248, 249
Mackenzie, Gen. Ranald S., 33,
34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43,
44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52,
53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62,
279
63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72,
73, 74, 75, 77, 80, 81, 83, 84, 87,
91, 92, 93, 95, 99, 130, 142, 267,
268, 273, 274
Matthews, Franklin, 167, 188
McKinley, President William,
136, 139, 140, 141, 143, 145,
146, 148, 149, 153, 154, 204,
208, 209, 210, 211, 214, 215,
219, 221, 225, 226, 227, 228,
229, 232, 235, 240, 241, 256,
257, 258, 259, 273
Melton, W. T., 117, 119
Merritt, Gen. Wesley, 54, 65, 77,
143, 145, 208, 209, 210, 215
Miles, Gen. Nelson A., 35, 60,
65, 91, 122, 133, 142, 148, 263,
274
Nashville Tn, 23, 24, 27, 28, 30,
263
Otis, Gen. Elwell, 65, 208, 209,
210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215,
217, 218, 219, 221, 222, 224,
225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 232,
234, 235, 236, 239, 240, 241,
245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250,
256, 257, 262, 263
Parker, Quanah-Comanche, 35,
43, 45, 59
Pilar, Gen. Gregorio del, 237,
246
Procter, Senator Redfield, 138
Roosevelt, Theodore, 91, 147,
148, 150, 151, 152, 157, 164,
247, 256, 261, 262, 270, 274
Root, Elihu, 125, 219, 239, 240,
243, 256
Rosecrans, Gen. Wm. S., 15, 23,
24, 25
Royall, Col. W. B., 83, 93
Runcie, Maj. James E., 189, 190
Sampson, Rear Adm. William
T., 138, 146
Santanta, Kiowa, 41, 42, 43, 53,
58, 61
Santiago de Cuba, 91, 148, 150,
151, 153, 154, 155, 157, 158,
159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164,
165, 166, 167, 168, 170, 171,
173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178,
179, 180, 181, 182, 184, 185,
186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191,
193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 199,
243, 268, 275, 276
Schofield, Gen. John M., 27, 28,
139, 142
Schurman, Jacob Gould, 227,
258, 268
Schwan, Gen. Theo, 198, 200
Scovel, Sylvester, 165
Shafter, Gen. Wm R., 52, 73, 74,
142, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148,
149, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155,
157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 226,
258
280
Sheridan, Gen. Phil, v, 26, 32,
33, 41, 42, 51, 54, 56, 57, 59, 61,
72, 73, 82, 84, 86, 88, 89, 90, 91,
92, 93, 94, 96, 102, 114, 121,
126, 265, 266
Sherman, Gen. Wm. T., v, 21,
22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 32, 33, 40, 41,
42, 43, 53, 54, 55, 59, 64, 65, 72,
73, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 86, 92
Siboney Cuba, 150, 151, 153
Tatum, Lawrie, 41
Trias, Gen., 237
Villard, Oswald Garrison, 189,
190, 274
Wheeler, Gen. Joseph, 144, 149,
150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 161,
162, 163, 164, 275
White, Jennie L., ii, 11, 15
Wirt, Capt. Davis, 43, 52, 87
Wood, Leonard, 33, 87, 93, 94,
100, 101, 105, 106, 110, 116,
122, 151, 265, 273
Wooden Leg-N. Cheyenne, 68
Worcester, Dean C., 86, 88, 90,
193, 225, 227, 230, 231, 239,
275, 276
Zapote River, 238