The United Nations Campaign

to Disarm Americans

bV
William Norman Grigg

~
THE JOHN BIRCHSOCIETY
Appleton, Wisconsin
Copyright ©2001 by The John Birch Society
All Rights Reserved

Published by
The John Birch Society
Post Office Box 8040
Appleton, Wisconsin 54912
www.jbs.org

Printed in the United States of America

LC Control Number
2001 135634
ISBN: 1-881919-05-6
 To Jeremy Glick
and the other heroes
of United Flight 93.

"Let's Roll."
 Contents

Introduction 1

1. Citizens or Subjects? 7

2. Disarmament and Democide 23

3. Blueprint for Global Dictatorship 36

4. Psychological Disarmament 49

5. The Rwandan Genocide 63

6. "Peace" Through Terror 80

7. Militarizing Mayberry 91

8. Stop the Gun Grab: Get US Out! 110

Endnotes 125

Index 141

Acknowledgments 149

About the Author. 151

"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed ."
- The Second Amendment
 Introduction
t seems almost absurd to have to say it, but no person is
I made safer if his right to defend himself is taken away.
Yet our nation is awash in propaganda claiming that civil-
ian disarmament (better known as "gun control") is the key
to personal safety and civic order. Tragically, many Amer-
icans have accepted this incredibly dangerous fallacy.
One reason why so many have succumbed to the illogic
of "gun control" is the fact that personal ownership of
firearm s has been relentlessly demonized by our mass me-
dia. The move to ban gun ownership is well organized and
well financed. Prominent voices in the attack on the right
to keep and bear arms include high-powered Establishment
figures, prestigious tax-exempt foundations, and a sizeable
number of members of Congress. Of course, the gun ban
they seek wouldn' t be total. If the gun-grabbers succeed,
police and milit ary personnel will be permitted to have
weapons, and criminal s will continue to find ways to pro-
cure firearms . Only law-abiding citizens will be denied the
right to be armed .
On many occasions I have had the opportunity to ask
"gun control" advocate s a simple question : "Would you put
a sign on your home announcing that no guns are inside?"
Invariably, the response was dead silence, followed by a
cautious reconsideration of the wisdom of "gun control."
Only someone who is foolish or dishone st would answer
"yes" to such a question. The responses I' ve received to this
question illustrate that even those who readily recite anti-
gun propaganda under stand that the ability of armed citi-
zens to protect themselves and their property - whether
that ability is exercised or not - serves as a major deter-
rent to violent crime .
"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State , the right of the people
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
- The Second Amendment
 Introduction 5

al Gun Grab is its discussion of the folly of believing that

our rights can be protected by working within the UN via
non-governmental organizations, or NGGs. Groups that
seek NGO status from the UN, Mr. Grigg demonstrates,
have to pledge support for the work of the UN and accept
the UN's claim to act as a global legislature. If conserva-
tive NGGs attempt to offer effective opposition, the UN can
- and will- banish them immediately. In addition, as Mr.
Grigg points out, the NGG approach, which is favored by
the National Rifle Association, offers a "purely defensive
strategy" that is ultimately doomed to defeat.
In this valuable book, the reader will find a wealth of in-
formation illustrating that the United Nations is the chief
threat to both individual gun ownership and national inde-
pendence. The UN is much closer to accomplishing its des-
picable designs than most Americans realize, in large meas-
ure because the American people have not been educated
about the true nature of the threat, including the role of the
American Establishment in empowering the UN. Nor do
they understand the necessary response to this threat.
"For Americans who understand the paramount impor-
tance of the right to keep and bear arms - and the threat
to that right represented by the UN - the proper course is
clear," writes Mr. Grigg. That course is to get our nation out
of the United Nations, and to evict the organization from
our land. It can be done, and this book brilliantly illustrates
why it must be done.

John F. McManus
President, The John Birch Society
September 25,2001
2 Global Gun Grab

While many Americans understand the value of individ-

ual gun ownership, and the dangers inherent in restricting
or denying the exercise of that right , they fail to appreciate
the critical fact at the heart of this book: The chief impe tus
for worldwide civilian disarmament is the United Nation s.
In this book, William Norman Grigg has provided Amer-
icans with an abundance of sorely needed inform ation about
the ongoing "Global Gun Grab." Someone had to step for-
ward to combat the anti-gun propaganda with uncompro-
mising thoroughness, not ju st sound bites. Mr. Grigg has
capably accomplished that task in the pages that follow.
Full of fundamental truths that have been suppressed in
our age of sophomoric slogans, Mr. Grigg 's counteroffen-
sive to the dizzying anti-gun campaign begin s by warning
that civilian disarmament does more than just leave citizens
vulnerable to street criminals: It open s the door for gov -
ernments to ama ss police state powers. Citing some of his-
tory's grimmest chapters, he points out that totalitarian gov-
ernment is more deadly than war, and that the disarmament
of civilian s is a necessary prelude to both tyrann y and mass
bloodshed.
To buttress this fundamentally important - and, sadly,
little-understood - point , Mr. Grigg cites the authoritative
work of Professor R.J. Rummel, whose powerful book
Death by Government shows that in the 20th century alone,
governments have killed four times the number of people
who perished in that century's wars. Rummel refers to this
phenomenon as "democide" - the mass murder of people
by criminal governments. And those governments, Mr.
Grigg demonstrates, were able to carry out such incompre-
hensible slaughter because their subject peoples had been
disarmed and were unable to defend themselves.
In Global Gun Grab, Mr. Grigg explains in detail how
"gun control" made possible the genocidal campaigns car-
ried out by governments in Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia,
4 Globa l Gun Grab

in a Peaceful World. This incredibly subversive document,

which rema ins official U.S. policy, outlines a multi-stage
program that concludes with the surrender of our armed
forces to the UN. But it also mandates a total ban on the
"manufacture of armaments" except for those approved by
the UN. Under the Freedom From War design, "all other ar-
maments" would then be "destroyed or converted to peace-
ful purposes" - meaning that they would be turned over
for use by the UN's "global peace force" and its national
affiliates .
Mr. Grigg shows how the same treacherous program is
outlined by another State Department document, A World
Effectively Controlled by the United Nations, which was is-
sued in 1962. Originally classified, that report very candidly
proposes the creation of a UN-dominated world govern-
ment. The document's author, Lincoln P. Bloomfield,
lamented that the American people's "constitutional right
to keep and bear arms" stands in the way of creating the
"government monopoly" on firearms that is necessary for
the creation of world government under the UN.
The plans set forth in these diabolical documents are be-
ing carried out today. Global Gun Grab sheds light on the
ongoing consolidation of the military and police . In the af-
termath of Waco and similar tragedies, many have come to
appreciate the dangers of mixing the military with law en-
forcement. Mr. Grigg highlights the little-understood fact
that these outrages are a direct outgrowth of the UN's dis-
armament campaign. With abundant, frightening evidence
to back up his assertion, the author claims : "What we are
witnessing is the slow but persistent abolition of our inde-
pendent, local police forces, and their amalgamation into a
centralized, militarized internal security force - just as the
State Department's 1961 Freedom From War blueprint
dictates ."
Perha ps the most important contribution made in Glob-
 CHAPTER ONE

Citizens or Subjects?
Disperse yo u rebels, throw down your arm s and
disperse!'
- Ultimatum given by British Major John Pitcairn
to the Minutemen on Lexington Green,
April 19, 1775

The UN declared martial law and .. . [Communist

Party official] Michel Tombelaine of France, deputy
UN civilian commander, announ ced over the UN con-
trolled radio that any civilians f ound in illegal pos-
session of arm s will be summarily executed.2
- Contemporary newspaper account of the UN 's
"peacekeeping" mission in the Congo, 1961

t the point of the trian gle- shaped Lexington Green

A battlefield can be found one of the most celebrated
American symbols : Sculptor Henry Hudson Kitson's stat-
ue of Captain John Parker, who commanded the Minute-
men militia on April 19, 1775 (see photo opposite page 91).
On that day, and at that place , the opening salvo was fired
in the American War for Independence. The Minutemen,
acting upon Paul Revere 's warning , thrust themsel ves into
the path of a well-armed, well-trained British contingent
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Francis Smith.
The Minutemen were determined to prevent the planned
British seizure of firearm s and gunpowder from the militia
depot at Concord. In taking this desperate action the Min-
utemen were driven by an unders tanding of the principle
that a disarmed population is a subject population. Indeed,

7
8 Global Gun Grab

since 1763 the purpose of quartering British troops within

the American colonies, under the pretense of pacifying In-
dian tribes, was to "restrain the colonies at present as well
as formerl y" and to "exact a due obedience" to the whim s
of Parliament.3 Thus the citizen-soldiers had no choice but
to con front the Empire's crimson-clad "peacekeeping"
troops on that April morning.
The initial skirmish at Lexington ended badl y for the
Minutemen: Eight were killed and nine were wounded,
while only a single British soldier was wounded in the ex-
chan ge. Lt. Col. Smith was able to continue his march to
Concord.
But as news of the Lexington engagement spread across
the countryside, thousands of armed militiamen mustered
at Concord, where they mounted an attack upon the British
forces at the North Bridge. By noon , Smith realized that his
position was indefensible and ordered a retreat. But the
Americans, taking shelter behind rocks and trees , subject-
ed the Redcoats to a withering barrage all the way back to
Boston. Only the arrival of 800 British reinforcements pre-
vented the engagement from turning into an undisguised
rout. Nevertheless, the Minutemen gave far better than they
got: American casualties were 49 killed, 39 wounded, and
five missing; the British lost 65 killed, 183 wounded, and
28 taken prisoner, " One of every five British troops who
took the field that day against the American citizen-soldiers
was a casualty.
The Minuteman statue captures the essence of an armed ,
free citizenry. But it also symbolizes the inescapable con-
nection between the right of Americans to bear arms and
our national independence. The statue is therefore an af-
front to the sensibilities of those who believe that "peace"
and "security" are best preserved through "general and
complete disarmament," not only of Americans, but of civil-
ians worldwide.
 Citizens or Subjects? 9

Icons of Evil
There is another statue that expresses the strikingly differ-
ent ideal of "ge neral and complete disarmament." That
statue is found in a courtyard in front of the entrance to the
United Nations Headquarters building in New York City. A
gift presented to the UN by Luxembourg in 1986, the statue,
entitled Disarmam ent, is a large-scale replica of a Colt
Python revolver with its barrel twisted into a knot (see photo
opposite page 90).
That particular model of handgun is a civilian weapon,
rather than military issue. In short, this statue , which is sit-
uated in such a way as to be literally the first thing visitors
to the UN will see as they enter the courtyard, symbolizes
the drive to disarm civilians, not governm ents.
An even more compelling symbolic illustration of the
UN 's lust for universal civilian disarmament was unveiled
at the July 2001 "Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small
Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects." During the
two weeks of the conference, the lobby of UN Headquar-
ters played host to The Gun Sculpture: The Art of Disar-
mament - a mammoth, cube-shaped artifact formed from
firearms, knives, and ammunition (see photo opposite page
91). According to the Canadian pacifist organization "I hu-
man 2000," which commissioned the sculpture and displays
it around the world, the work of "art" was created from
more than 7,000 "deactivated crime and war weapons, do-
nated by police, governmental and non-governmental or-
ganizations, and security forces world wide."s
I human 2000 describes The Gun Sculpture as "a
metaphor for the most violent century in the history of
mankind ." What the group's propaganda fails to mention is
that the single largest source of that lethal violence was the
unrestrained, lawless state in all of its manifestations, which
according to political scientist R.J. Rummel killed nearly
170,000,000 human beings during that period.? This
10 Global Gun Grab

hideous accomplishment easily dwarfs the combined

achievements of all private sector criminal syndicates
throughout recorded history.
Mass murder is the only field of endeavor in which the
state outperforms its private sector competition - and it
does so in classic monopolistic fashion . In this case, the
state seeks to monopolize the use of force by disarming its
subjects. The Gun Sculpture , remember, was fashioned
from weapons collected by police and security forces, the
elements of society that, when corrupted and freed from the
restraints of law, are responsible for genocide and other
forms of political mass murder.
Seen in this light, that work of "art" is not a tribute to
peace, but rather a shrine to tyranny and lethal oppression.
Like the knotted-barrel Disarmament monument, The Gun
Sculpture is an entirely appropriate expression of the evil
intentions of the Power Elite that controls the UN.
Another symbol of a disarmed, UN-dominated world is
the Flamme de la Paix, the so-called "Flame of Peace,"
which has been visible on many occasions as UN "peace-
keepers" have ignited huge bonfires of confiscated
weapons."
In fact, the UN proclaimed June 9,2001, the first day of
the Small Arms Conference, to be "Small Arms Destruc-
tion Day." The event was celebrated at the UN with a cere-
monial destruction of firearms , and governments around the
world were urged to make similar public displays by de-
stroying guns with "bulldozers, hammers, bonfires lit by
victims , by whatever means participating countries would
prefer." Zlata Filipovic, a Bosnian Muslim girl who was
designated a "World Ambassador of Peace" by the UN, was
also on hand during a press conference at UN Headquarters
to be photographed throwing disabled guns into a contain-
er labeled "UN Small Arms Destruction Unit."g
Why such a heavy emphasis on symbolic gestures? Ac-
 Citizens or Subjects ? 11

cording to Sami Faltas , a disarmament activist deeply in-

volved in the UN gun grab, "people act on the basis of their
perceptions. It is not reality, but their perception of it, that
influences their behavior. Bearing this in mind, it is not dif-
ficult to appreciate the influence of symbols and images ....
I would like to suggest that in a weapons collection pro -
gram , like in all fields of human interaction, symbolic ac-
tions may have a powerful effect,"? This process could be
called Psychological Disarmament - an expre ssion that
will figure very prominently in this book.

Preparing the Way

The purpose of such a heavy investment in symbolism by
the UN is to prepare the minds of the masses for worldwide
civilian disarmament. In fact, the UN's Small Arms Con-
ference itself, which produced a "Program of Action" des-
ignating "illicit" small arms to be a global menace, was lit-
tle better than a symbolic gesture, a "first step."
"Faced with the global scourge of small arms,' intoned
Secretary-General Kofi Annan following the conference,
"the international community has now begun an important
process of constructive global action .v'" "Global action ,"
that is, with the ultimate objective of universal civilian dis-
armament - with a particular focus upon American gun
owners.
During the conference, the draft "Program of Action"
was amended to include language calling upon govern-
ments "to seriously consider legal restrictions on unre-
stricted trade in and ownership of small arms and light
weapons" - in other words, to begin the process of
disarming civilians . When the U.S. delegation to the con-
ference, led by Under Secretary of State John Bolton,
objected to this amendment, the language was dropped , and
the original draft was approved by "consensus" (without a
vote, but with no objections or abstentions by the delegates).
12 Global Gun Grab

This was hailed as a victory by many American pro-gun ac-

tivists, who breathed a huge sigh of relief that the UN gun-
grabbers had been repulsed by the Bush administration.
But these celebrations were premature. The purpose of
this last-minute revision was to create a controversy that
could be resolved after agonizing negotiations - much to
everybody's supposed relief. Similar melodramas were car-
ried out at the 1994 UN population control summit in Cairo,
Egypt, and the 1995 UN social development summit in
Copenhagen, Denmark.
Why would the powers behind the UN engage in little
charades of this sort? Once again, it is important to recall
the emphasis they place upon symbolism as a way of in-
fluencing human behavior. By staging a pointless contro-
versy of this sort, the UN can offer its critics an empty tac-
tical victory, which will provide a useful distraction from
the strategic gains made by the UN .
In this case, the UN didn't get everything it wanted -
namely, a plan of action that would require "small arms to
be transferred only to governments, or government-
approved entities." II It did, however, get a program that rep-
resents a "first step" in that direction. Furthermore, the sub-
ject of a UN-enforced ban on civilian firearms ownership
had, for the first time, been seriously discussed. The con-
ference president, Camilo Reyes of Colombia, made clear
that the outcome represented a temporary setback, rather
than a decisive defeat: "What I regret - what most of us
regret - is [that] no decision [was reached] on two or three
issues that were important for us. One related to ownership
of arms and the other one related to the transfer of arms -
the selling of arms." 12 In other words, when it comes to its
desire to disarm civilians, the UN does not regard "No!" to
mean "no," but rather "not yet."
Former Congressman Charles Pas hayan, who atte nded
the conference as a delegate, clearly understood the sinis-
 Citizens or Subjects ? 13

ter significance of the "consensus" reached at that meeting .

"This is not the end," he warned. "Thi s is the opening skir-
mish of a war.... All of this has to be understood as part of
a proce ss leading ultimately to a treaty that will give an in-
ternational body power over our domestic laws."l 3
The Bush administration, nevertheless, decided to keep
the U.S. involved in that process by agreeing to a follow-
up UN conference in five years to review "progress" toward
elimination of small arms . The purpose of the follow -up
event, as Under Secretary Bolton correctly observed at the
Small Arms Conference , is to "institutionalize" the UN 's
anti-gun campaign.14

Demonizing Guns and Gun Owners

Even with the support of the U.S . government, the UN 's
gun grab would have little impact unless it could enlist pub-
lic support, or at least neutralize public opposition. The
2000 UN video production Armed to the Teeth: The World-
Wide Plague ofSmall A rms presents a good summary of the
propaganda themes employed by the world body in its ef-
fort to demonize both privately owned firearms and the peo-
ple who own them .
The UN film depic ts firearms as somehow possessing
the capacity for independent malice: "Small arms are not
fussy about the company they keep . They can murder in-
discriminately. The gun that killed in Africa can do it again
in Latin America, or in Asia .... Humankind is beginning a
new millennium under the sign of the gun . Small arms are
like uninvited guests who won 't leave. Once they take over
a country, they are virtually impossible to get rid of."15
According to the UN, "small arms and light weapons,"
a category that includes all firearms, including revolvers, 16
are subject to global arms controls, just like nuclear, chem-
ical, and biological weapons. "For its first fifty years, the
United Nations focused its disarmament efforts on ad-
14 Global Gun Grab

dressing the proliferation of nuclear weapons," observes the

narrator of Armed to the Teeth. The world body claims that
its authority to deal with the global "small arms crisis" de-
rives from its self-appointed mandate to pursue "general
and complete disarmament.'"?
It is important to recognize that while the disarmament
pursued by the UN would be general, it would not be com-
plete - since the world body would be exempt. What the
organization seeks is the disarmament of its subjects, not
its agents.
This is illustrated by the definition of "legal " firearms
offered in Armed to the Teeth. The agitprop film describes
"legal" weapons as those "used by armies and police forces
to protect us." Civilian-owned weapons, by way of contrast,
are supposedly "illegitimate" and "bring insecurity, pain,
suffering and devastation." Accordingly, the UN's disar-
mament agenda requires that firearms be brought under the
control of national military and police establishments. Ul-
timately, each nation's internal security establishment
would be made subordinate to a globe-spanning UN "peace
force."
• The UN is also being artfully deceptive regarding the
subject of "illicit" firearms. Prior to and during the 2001
UN Small Arms Conference, spokesmen for the organiza-
tion repeatedly sought to placate gun owners by emphasiz-
ing that any agreement would apply only to "illicit" guns.
What law-abiding gun owners were not told was that the
UN considers all privately owned firearms to be illicit by
definition . Furthermore, the "consensus" at the Small Arms
Conference was that legally owned firearms are potential-
ly illicit, meaning that at some point they could be sold,
stolen, or otherwise transferred to "non-state actors" in oth-
er countries, thereby becoming illicit.
Lloyd Axworthy, a former Canadian Minister of Justice
and one of North America's leading advocates of a UN-
 Citizens or Subjects? 15

enforced global gun ban, made this point explicitly: "It is

not sufficient to limit the examination purely to the ques-
tion of illegal transfers . There must be a connection, and a
serious way of looking at the legal transfers, because it is
those legal transfers which end up being illegal, and end-
ing up in the wrong hands.?"
The same point was made during the Small Arms Con-
ference by Jovias van Aartsen, Foreign Affairs Minister of
The Netherlands: "It 's my firm conviction that the illicit
trade cannot be tackled without involving the legal arms
trade. We must further regulate the legal trade in arms, small
weapons included, in order to prevent spillover into the il-
legal arms trade." 19
Leaders of anti-gun non-governmental organizations (or
NGOs) took up the same chorus . "The American public is
learning that guns that are purchased in legal markets here
can and do flow into the illicit market," asserted Mary Leigh
Blek of the so-called Million Mom March at the confer-
ence. "We know that guns know no borders .,,2o
Jo-Marie Griesgraber of the UN-connected Oxfam
America assailed the U.S. delegation for "opposing an
agreement with force of law" that would regulate the inter-
national arms trade, and for insisting on a distinction be-
tween "civilian" and "military" weapons . "It doesn't mat-
ter to 12-year-olds in Uganda whether they are abducted by
guerillas with 'civilian' weapons or military weapons," she
insisted." During the conference, a collection of radical
NGOs convened a "Guns Know No Borders" rally at Dag
Hammarskjold Plaza across from UN Headquarters. One
of the demands made at that event was for the federal gov-
ernment "to resist the globalization of gun violence by en-
acting commonsense gun laws in the U.S." - that is, in-
cremental measures that will eventually lead to outright
confiscation.F
The logic (such as it is) of gun prohibition dictates that
16 Global Gun Grab

the best way to fight crimes committed with firearms is to

focus on the weapon, rather than the criminal. This, in tum,
leads to restrictions on the liberties of the law-abiding,
which supposedly will help prevent the crimes committed
by the lawless . Many Americans are wearily familiar with
these fallacies, which play such a prominent role in our
domestic debate over what is misleadingly called "gun con-
trol." These fallacies are being pressed into the service of
the UN's global gun grab, with this ominous twist: Ameri -
cans are being told that their right to keep and bear arms
must be abolished in order to prevent crimes committed by
foreign regimes, terrorists, and crime syndicates.
So American gun owners are being blamed for crimes
committed by gun-wielding thugs in other nations . Thus the
UN, acting with and through our federal government,must
crack down on the possession and sale of weapons by
Americans. All of this, as Charles Pashayan correctly
warned, is part of a UN "war" on American gun owners .

Disarmament on the Installment Plan

"Controlling the proliferation of illicit [e.g. civilian-owned]
weapons is a necessary first step towards the non-prolifer-
ation of small arms," declared Secretary-General Annan in
his official 2000 report, 'We the Peoples.' "These weapons
must be brought under the control of states, and states must
be held responsible for their transfer."23
How are "surplus" firearms to be brought under state
control? Sami Faltas of the Bonn International Centre for
Conversion (BICC), which assists the UN in "weapons col-
lection" programs, points out that it is best for arms con-
fiscation to proceed step-by-step . "Experience suggests that
before and during the period of collection, strong empha-
sis should be placed on voluntary compliance, positive in-
centives and freedom from prosecution," observes Faltas.
"However, it seems equally important to make it clear that
 Citizens or Subjects? 17

after this period of amnesty, the laws governing the pos-

session of arms by civilians will be fully and actively en-
forced . In other words, use the carrot first, and the stick
later.,,24
"A subtle mix of rewards and penalties is needed for a
weapons program to succeed," continues Faltas. "Ulti-
mately, the ownership ofarms should not be left to the per-
sonal choice of individuals. The state needs to preserve its
monopoly ofthe legitimate use offorce. So sanctions against
the illegal possession and use of arms are necessary and
should be imposed. However, during a weapons collection
program, an amnesty is needed , and the emphasis should
be on voluntary compliance and positive incentivea'P (Em-
phasis added .)
The meaning of the sterile phrase "monopoly on the le-
gitimate use of force" is best conveyed in a single word: To-
talitarianism. In America's constitutional order, govern-
ments both state and federal "derive their just powers from
the consent of the governed." Since government's powers
are limited and revocable, it cannot posses s a "monopoly"
on force . Indeed , the entire premise of the American War
for Independence was that a sovereign people could use
force to take back powers that had been usurped by a cor-
rupt government. The right to armed self-defense, from the
Founding Fathers' perspective, was conferred by God as the
means of protecting all other God-given rights.
The premise of the UN gun grab, by way of contrast, is
totalitarian: Government has a monopoly on the legitimate
use of force, and "rights" are merely temporary, revocable
privileges granted by government. In the UN design for
"general and complete disarmament," each nation-state
would have a limited franchise within the UN's global mo-
nopoly on force.
Most of the individuals promoting this vision are sober
and apparently civilized people. For the most part, they
18 Global Gun Grab

wear expensive suits rather than fatigues or similar mili-

taris tic garb. The y are comfortable speaking the drab lan-
gua ge of bure aucrats, rather than engaging in the histrion-
ics of revolutionary radic als. But while they may not look
like Stalin, Hitler, Mao, or similar bloody-handed despots,
the UN's gun-grabbers - and their allies within the U.S.
government - are diligently pursuing the same totalitari-
an vision .
For that vision to prevail, the population must be intel-
lectually, psychologically, and morally disarmed. Falta s ad-
vises his fellow gun-grabbers that "we apons collection pro-
grammes onl y suc ceed when they enj oy strong support
acro ss the political spectrum" - or, to use the famil iar
American phras e, strong "biparti san" backing. Henc e the
importance of enli sting the support, however qualified, of
the "conservative" Republican admini stration of George W.
Bush for the UN 's crusade against "small arm s." Confisca-
tion measures "stand a much better chance of success if vol-
untary organizations are intimately involved in the process ,"
advised Faltas . Thi s would mean , in the American context,
the involvement of civic groups, medical associations, ed-
ucational organizations, and other "mainstream" voices in
generating public acceptance of the "need" for citizens to
disarm. Clearly, this is happening in the United State s even
now.
Faltas also makes the following very significant point:
"This process will be greatly enhanced if women playa
leading role in it." While he didn 't explicitly refer to the so-
called "Million Mom March," or the UN-created lobby
called the "Billion Mom March," such fabricated pressure
groups certainly fill the role Faltas describes.
And of course, no effort to manipulate public "percep-
tions " can succeed without the active involvement of the
mass media: "Media also have a key role to play, providing
information, reporting on the progress achieved, providing
 Citizens or Subjects ? 19

a forum for debate and replacing the images of insecurity

and violence by images of developm ent and disarma-
ment.,,26 (Emphasis added .) Consumers of American tele-
vision news programs have little difficulty recognizing this
media strategy at work in our nation.

The "Buy-Back" Gambit

While Sami Faltas's template for UN-conducted arms con-
fiscation programs fits much of what is happening in the
United States, some skeptics might protest that we' re deal-
ing with mere coincidence. The argument for "coincidence,"
however, is much more difficult to make when it is under-
stood that UN policymakers have cited domestic disarma-
ment programs underway in this nation as a model for
global civilian disarmament campaigns.
Since the early 1990s, "gun buy-backs," often conduct-
ed by police departments with the help of volunteer organ-
izations or businesses, have become a common spectacle in
many large U.S. cities. The UN Centre for Disarmament
Affairs (UNCDA) refers to such "buy-backs" as a "practi-
cal method of micro-disarmament" ("micro-disarmament"
being a UN term used to describe the disarming of civil-
ians) . Dr. Edward J. Laurance, a consultant to the UN Reg-
ister of Conventional Arms, points out that the UNCDA has
studied both "buy-back programs as practiced in many
American cities" and those "conducted by the U.S. Army
in Haiti" - the latter being part of a peacekeeping mission
carried out on orders from the UN Security Council. Faltas
also cites "Buy-back programmes" conducted in "the Unit-
ed States, Australia, the United Kingdom , Haiti, and East-
ern Slovenia" as models for UN gun confiscation efforts
worldwide.F
Dr. Laurance insists that government "buy-backs" of
small arms "must be conducted in parallel with other ef-
forts," such as "seizure programs." Laurance, reflecting
20 Global Gun Grab

once again the emphasis upon changing public "percep-

tions," also points out that "buy-backs" have the effect of
focusing "attention on the link between weapons availabil-
ity and crime," thereby preparing the public for more ag-
gressive civilian disarmament measures .
To illustrate a successful UN-supervised civilian "micro-
disarmament" pro gram, he refers to EI Salvador's "new
laws outlawing possession of military weapon s and requir-
ing all citizens to register hand guns and personal weapons .
A new police force was created [and] trained under UN su-
pervision ... [which] recei ved specialized training in
searching for, confiscating and destroying .. . military- style
weapons ...." 28

A Clear and Present Danger

The opening phase of the UN 's Global Gun Grab is under-
way. The world body, either through "peacekeeping" troops
or acting through nat ional governments, is confi scating
firearms from civilians. Its polic ymakers are even now
working on plan s to police the international trade in
firearm s. American gun owners have been repeatedly and
explicitly targeted as the source of the global small arms
"scourge." If the UN and its master s have their way, the
world body will become a global state with a monop oly on
force - a circumstance that has historically led to blood-
shed on an inconceivable scale .
Can we trust those who would disarm us to rule us
benevolently? To ask this question in seriousness is to be-
tray our heritage as free Americans. From the earliest days
of our struggle for national independence, Americans un-
derstood themselves as citizens to be governed , but never
as subjects to be ruled . The right to bear arms in defense of
one's person , property, family, and freedom is what distin-
guishes the citizen from the subject, or the freeman from
the slave.
 Citizens or Subjects? 21

The clash of arms at Lexington's Green and Concord's

North Bridge on April 19, 1775 was triggered by the
world's mightiest power attempting to seize weapons from
"non-state actors" and bring their weapons under the gov-
ernment's control. Captain John Parker's Min utemen and
Lt. Col. Francis Smith's Redcoats fought a battle over the
issue of "micro-disarmament." Following the battles of Lex-
ing ton and Concord, British General Thomas Gage ex-
tended an "amnesty" during which citizens were invited to
surrender their weapons and then be allowed to leave
Boston - an agreement that General Gage violated with
impunity once he had disarmed the community.V
These episodes in April 1775, which revealed the inten-
tion of the British imperial power to disarm the Americans,
provided the impetus for America's War for Independence.
Early American historian David Ramsay summarizes:

Previous to this period . .. the dispute had been car-

ried on by the pen ... but from this time forward it
was conducted by the sword. The crisis had arrived
when the colonies had no alternative, but either to
submit to the mercy, or to resist the power of Great
Britain. An unconquerable love of liberty could not
brook the idea of submission.... [The Americans] were
fully apprised of the power of Britain - they knew
that her fleets covered the ocean, and that her flag had
waved in triumph through the four quarters of the
globe; but the animated lang uage of the time was, "It
is better to die freemen, than to live as slaves.,,30

The choice is just as stark today: independence and fre e-

dom, or subm ission and slavery. While the UN, unlike the
18th century Bri tish Empire, does not yet have the power
to enforce its will, it is steadily and stealthily acquiring that
power. If we are to preserve our freedom, we must do so
22 Global Gun Grab

while the means are still available to us - before the sick-

ly pale blue UN banner can wave "in triumph through the
four quarters of the globe," and our only recourse is a con-
test of arms against a global ruler.
Although the British Empire was powerful , and its pun-
ishments could be severe, it was a model of benevolence
compared to the modem totalitarian state. The UN has long
played host to the world 's most vicious, bloody-handed to-
talitarian powers. Soviet Russia, Red China , Castro's Cuba,
Khmer Rouge Cambodia, IdiAmin's Uganda, Rwanda un-
der the "Hutu Power" regime -:- the roster is as lengthy as
it is frightening . If we remain in the UN and allow its glob-
al gun grab to proceed, we will entrust our future to the ten-
der mercies ofregimes like this.
Civilian disarmament, it bears repeating, is a necessary
prelude to tyranny and mass murder. What might happen if
the UN obtains its desired global monopoly on force? To
answer that question, we must review the sad and bloody
history of 20th century disarmament and democide.
 CHAPTER Two

Disarmament and Democide

Democide: The systematic murder, by a government,
of its subject population.

The most fo olish mis take we could possibly make

would be to allow the subject races to possess arms.
History shows that all conquerors who have allow ed
their subject races to carry arms have prepared their
own downfall by so doing. 1
- Adolf Hitler

There is not a moment to lose; you must act resolutely,

with massive reprisals [again st peasants resisting
Communist rule}. Imm ediate exec ution f or anyone
caught with a firearm. 2
- Vladimir Lenin , telegram to Communist Party
officials in Nizhni Novgorod, Augu st 9, 1918.

"L et 's Go Out Into the World and Gath er Up the

Small Arms ,,3
- Title of an essay byMark Malloch Brown of the
UN Development Program and Jayantha Dhanapala,
UN Undersecretary-General for Disarmament Affairs.

nApri11975, "peace" dawned in Cambodia after decades

I of instability and war. With the capitulation of Lon Nol's
government, the capital city Phnom Penh was no longer un-
der siege. Gone were the rocket attacks that had been staged
by the Khmer Rouge Communist insurrection - attacks
that had been merciless and iridiscriminate, staged for the

23
24 Global Gun Grab

purpo se of terro rizing the population into seeking an end to

the war on any term s.
Thus when the Khmer Rouge marched in to claim the
prostrate city on April 17th of that year, the war-weary pop-
ula tion was eager to display its enthusiasm for peace.
"M en, women and children by the tens of thou sands broke
the government curfew and ventured into the suddenly safe
streets or climbed on roofs to await and welcome the com -
munists," recall John Barron and Anthony Paul in their
book Murder of a Gentle Land. "R umors told them they
should signify their acceptance of peace by displaying
white flags, and quickly the city blossomed with emblems
of surrender."
As the black pajama-clad Khmer Roug e troop s stoically
marched through the streets, they were greeted with ecstat-
ic cries of "long live peace!" "We were happy to see them,"
recalled a banker who had witnessed the Communist vic-
tory parade. "It meant the war was over."s But millions of
Cambodians were to discover what other captive popula-
tions had learned: Totalitarian "peace" is more deadly than
war.

"Sensible" Gun Policies at Work

Cambodia, like Rwanda and other countries ruled by mass-
murdering dictatorships, had the benefit of a "sensible" na-
tional firearms policy it had inherited from a less gruesome
government. Under Cambodia's 1956 penal code, which
was promulgated by the French colonial authority, citizens
were forbidden to own or carry weapons without a special
permit. They were also forbidden to own "more than one
weapon at a time except in exceptional cases ." Among those
granted this special status were "princes, sons, and grand-
sons of the King" as well as "Ministers and their deputies"
and "officials, employees, or agents of the government'"
When the Khmer Rouge seized control of Cambodia,
 Disarmament and Democide 25

"relatively few Cambodians owned firearms," note s a study

by Jews for the Preservation of Firearms Ownership. That
the Khmer Rouge troops were ordered to conduct searches
for firearms illustrates that "they we re concerned about
armed oppo sition. It is because mo st Cambodians were not
armed that relatively few armed Khmer Rouge could con-
trol so large a population. There was precedent for [the] rule
of a tiny, armed minority over a huge, unarmed majority:
Cambodian bandits in the 1930s , with only a few firearms,
had terrorized large parts of the country."?
Northwestern University law professor Daniel D. Polsby
points out that "had the Cambodian civilians of the 1970s
been as well-armed as American civilians are, it is far from
obvious that the Khmer Rouge, whose army numbered less
than one hundred thousand troops, could have murdered as
man y of them as they did . Indeed, the Khmer Rouge be-
haved as though they agreed with this assessment. Th e
Cambodian people were already largely disarmed because
guns had been prohibited from the time of the French oc-
cupation. Even so, the Khmer Rouge leadership wanted to
make sure and took the extraordinary precaution of a na-
tionwide house-to -house, hut-to-hut search to confirm the
country was indeed defenseless. "
Once the population was disarmed, the Khmer Rouge
could prey upon it with impunity. Although the Communist
occupation authority announced that civilian looters would
be summarily executed, "they did nothing to deter whole-
sale looting by their own troops," observe Barron and Paul.
"Soon communist soldiers rampaged through commercial
districts, shooting open the bolted doors of shops or ripping
them off with ropes attached to jeeps." Troops simply seized
anything and everything they wanted - food, liquor, jew-
elry. Soon armed troops were confiscating automobiles,
motorcycles, and bicycles at gunpoint, always in the name
of Angka Loeu ("Organization on High," the Communist
26 Global Gun Grab

ruling elite),"
The eruption of gun-related violent crime, committed
by agents of a criminal regime, soon expanded to include
in stances of apparently random homicide. But there was
nothing random -about the systematic "cleansing" of
Phnom Penh and other cities, in which politically " unsuit-
able" people were driven into the wilderness in a forced
march to oblivion. Men, women, children, even hospital-
ized invalids were forced to march out of the cities. Se -
verely wounded or ill patients were seized from hospitals
and tossed like garbage into the streets. !" Civilians who
displayed even an instant's hesitation to abandon their
homes were sprayed with machine-gun fire, or attacked
with rockets and bazookas. 11 Those who survived the
marc h were con signed to forced labor and "re-education"
under lethal conditions.
Because of the gun registration law, it was relatively easy
for Khmer Rouge soldiers to conduct "micro-disarm ament"
in the cities. In the countryside, however, the Communists
had to conduct gun "turn-in" programs. Shortly after the
fall of Cambodia, Communist soldiers were dispatched to
the countryside to disarm the pop ulace. "We are here now
to protect you , and no one has a need for a weapon any
more," the soldiers announced. A Cambodian exile later
described how "everyone who had a weapon ... handed
over [their] rifles and pistols and ammunition, which the
sold iers tossed on a pile " and disposed of. 12 In short order,
the Khmer Rouge would be erecting piles of human skulls
as they methodically killed one-third of the nation 's
population.
Meanwhile, as hundreds of thousands of innocent Cam-
bodians were being systematically slaughtered, the regime
responsible for this holocaust was being feted at the Unit-
ed Nat ions.
Barron and Paul relate:
 Disarmament and Democide 27

After the desolation of the cities, the early massacres

and in the midst of the first famine , one of the Angka
Loeu [Khmer Rouge] leaders, Ieng Sary, in his incar-
nation as foreign minister, flew to a special session of
the United Nations General Assembly. Upon landing
in New York, he boasted, "We have cleansed the
cities," and when he appeared at the United Nations,
delegates from around the world warmly applauded. 13

German "Micro-Disarmament"
Cambodia is not the only nation that has experienced the
dreadful consequences of "micro-disarmament." The coun-
try in which Hans Phillipps was born was blessed with "en-
lightened" welfare polices and "common sense" gun laws .
The basic necessities of life were provided to the citizens,
and firearms possession was strictly limited to the army and
police, along with a few others whose reliability was be-
yond question. Street crime was not a significant problem,
and "anti-government extremism" was an unpleasant mem-
ory. This haven of social order was National Socialist (Nazi)
Germany.
Phillipps, who was six years old when Hitler came to
power in Germany, saw how the Nazi regime used its wel-
fare system to pacify, disarm, and enslave its subjects. As a
child in Berlin, Hans and his family "were given what were
called lebensmittlecarte, or 'means of living cards,' " re-
called Phillipps. "They were color-coded sheets of paper-
one color for adults, another for children, and so on - that
were picked up at any government authority, such as a post
office . The sheets were divided into squares that corre-
sponded to a particular weight or amount of various food
items - dairy, meat, and the like. The total number of
squares represented a monthly allotment, and we had sim-
ilar cards for clothing and other necessities."
This arrangement gave the Nazi state very useful lever-
28 Global Gun Grab

age in controlling welfare recipients . "There were instances

in which these ration cards would be withheld from people
until they would cooperate with the government in some
way," continued Phillipps. Although his family was never
subjected to blackmail of this sort, Phillipps became aware
of instances in which "means of living cards" were with-
held from Germans who resisted the government's civilian
disarmament policies.
"In the Nazi era, ordinary people were not allowed to
own guns, but selected individuals were permitted to own
them , so that they could develop a 'so ldierly' attitude nec-
essary for military service," recounted Phillipps. "My fa-
ther, for instance, was an avid hunter during peacetime, but
was forbidden to hunt or own a gun after the Hitler regime
consolidated power. However, once I was enrolled in the
Hitler Youth, I was permitted to train on a government-
owned gun, under government supervision."
Phillipps also points out that "my father may have kept
his person al guns somewhere, but he was very careful not
to tell me anything about it - he was understandably afraid,
because of my Hitler Youth membership, that anything he
told me might end up reaching the authorities." 14 (Later, af-
ter it became clear that Phillipps hadn 't succumbed to the
Hitler Youth indoctrination, he was assigned to a military
unit that was given suicide missions .)
Nazi Germany offers another splendid example of a state
that achie ved what the UN-approved Hagu e Agenda for
Peace (which will be discussed in detail in the next chap-
ter) call s "norms of non-possession" by civilians of
firearms . And, as happened in Cambodia, the gun laws that
helped facilitate the rise of a genocidal ruling elite were in-
herited from a non-totalitarian regime .
This is an important fact that is often lost upon advocates .
of civilian disarmament: Once a population has been dis-
armed by a relatively humane government, it is deprived of
 Disarmament and Democide 29

the most valuable means of resisting the rise of a more cor-

rupt ruling elite.
The gun laws that proved so useful to the Nazi regime
were enacted by its predecessor, the liberal Weimar Re-
public. The Weimar government enacted on August 7, 1920
a "Law on the Disarm ament of the People." This measure
created the position of Reichkommissar for Disarmament
of the Civil Population. The Disarmament Commissar was
given the authority to define "military-style weapons" -
what would now be called "small arms and light weapons"
- and confiscate them at whim. The 1920 law, which in-
corporated even earlier anti -gun measures, was passed af-
ter the suppression of an attempted putsch by Communists
in Berlin and other cities .15
Although the German government succeeded in pre-
venting the seizure of power by Communist totalitarians, it
apparently absorbed from the Communists some of the key
premises of totalitarianism. Witness a Jan uary 1919 gov-
ernment decree: "All firearms, as well as all kinds of ... am-
munition, are to be surrendered immediately." Another or-
der provided for the summary execution of any civilian
found to possess arms or ammunition. 16
These were the premises upon which was built the 1920
"Law on the Disarmament of the People," which was en-
acted after the crisis of insurrection had subsided. The law
preserved, for use during peacetime, the powers that had
been claimed by the central government during the period
of crisis. The 1920 law was followed in 1928 by a compre-
hensive firearms law that centralized and made uniform
firearms policies throughout the German Hinder, or states. 17
According to the Weimar government's disarmament
commissar: "The purpose[s] and goal[s] of the law at hand
are to get firearms that have done so much damage from the
hands of unauthorized persons and to do away with the
instability and ambiguity of the law that previously existed.,,18
30 Global Gun Grab

The 1928 German national firearms law exemplified

what contemporary anti-gun liberals call "common-sense
gun safety laws." Constitutional scholar Stephen Halbro ok,
in a paper publi shed in the A rizona Journa l ofInternation-
al and Compa rative Law , note s that the 1928 Germ an
firearms law "ensured that police had records of all firearms
acquisitions (or at least all lawful ones) and that the keep-
ing and bearing of arms were subjec t to polic e approval.
This firearms contro l law was quite useful to the new gov-
ernment that came to power a half decade later. " ?
The Natio nal Socia lists came to power in Germany in
January 1933. For more than five years, the Nazis used the
Weimar-era gun laws to disarm their domestic oppos ition.
It was not until March of 1938 that the Nazis found it nec-
essary to create their own firearms law, which was simply
a refinement of the one they had inherited . In short, the Nazi
consolidation of power took place under a national gun reg-
istration law that was created by a liberal regime .
Halbrook summarizes: " .. . a well-meaning liberal re-
public [enacted] a gun control act that [was] later highly
useful to a dictato rship. That dictatorship . .. then consoli-
date[d] its power by massive search and seizure operations
against political opponents.... [The dictator ship then enac t-
ed] its own new firearm s law, disarming anyone the police
deemed 'dangerous' and exempting members of the party
that controlled the state.,,20 Following the National Social -
ist government-instigated anti-Jewish riot of November 9,
1938 - an event known as Kristallnacht, or "Night of Bro-
ken Glass" - German Jews were disarmed and taken into
"protective" custody, and we know the tragic end of that
story.
Even as late as 1939, the London Times took notice of
the fact that there was visible anti-Nazi sentiment among
German s. But, the Times lamented , "Civilians are disarmed ,
and so powerless...." The Nazis exported their enlightened
 Disarmament and Democide 31

civilian disarmament policies to the nations they occupied.

In its description of the fate of occupied France, the New
York Times lamented: " . .. the Nazi decrees reduce the
French people to as Iowa condition as that occupied by the
German people. Military orders now forbid the French to
do things which the German people have not been allowed
to do since Hitler came to power. To own radio[s] ... to or-
ganize public meetings ... to retain possession of firearms
- all these things are prohibited for the subjugated people
of France....,,21

Soviet "Micro-Disarmament"
The Russian Communists - or Bolsheviks - also recog-
nized the importance of disarming the subject population.
Following an August 1918 assassination attempt upon
Soviet dictator Vladimir Lenin , the Bolshevik regime issued
a decree that "all citizens in possession of machineguns,
rifles, revolvers of all kinds, cartridges, and all models of
sabers, are obliged, within a period of a week, to surrender
them" for use by the Red Army.22 This process was facili-
tated by the April 1918 Soviet gun law, which issued cer-
tificates authorizing "the carrying and keeping of firearms"
under certain conditions.P And, predictably, the military
commissars in charge of the Soviet "micro-disarmament"
campaign were ordered "not to take rifles and revolvers in
the possession of members of the Russian Communist
Party" who retained a valid gun permit.P'
Lenin's civilian disarmament decree heralded the be-
ginning of the Red Terror. A directive issued by the dicta-
tor to a local commissar in Nizhni Novgorod illustrates how
terror and firearms confiscation were linked: "Your first re-
sponse [to local protests] must be to establish a dictatorial
troika ... and to introduce mass terror.... There is not a mo-
ment to lose; you must act resolutely, with massive
reprisals. Immediate execution for anyone caught in
32 Global Gun Grab

possession of a firearm/'P
At roughly the same time, Feliks Dzherzhinsky, founder
of the Cheka secret police (which would later be known as
the KGB), was issuing similar orders to his subordinates:
"The working classes must crush the hydra of counterrev-
olution with massive terror! We must let the enemies of the
working classes know that anyone caught in illegal posses-
sion of a firearm will be immediately executed...."26 The
disarmament of the Russians and other subject peoples by
the Bolsheviks had predictable consequences.
"Our morality has no precedent, and our humanity is ab-
solute, because it rests on a new ideal," proclaimed a 1920
editorial in Krasni Mech (The Red Sword), a Cheka news-
paper. "Our aim is to destroy all forms of oppression and
violence. To us, everything is permitted, for we are the first
to raise the sword not to oppress races and reduce them to
slavery, but to liberate humanity from its shackles .... Blood?
Let blood flow like water . .. for only through the death of
the old world can we liberate ourselves forever....-at
The Cheka secret police, which was in charge of main-
taining "internal order," was "filled with social elements
anxious for revenge, recruited as they often were , as the
Bolshevik leaders themselves acknowledged and even rec-
ommended, from the ranks of 'the criminals and the socially
degenerate,' " notes leftist historian Nicholas Werth. "No
longer answerable for their actions to any higher authority,
they became bloodthirsty and tyrannical .. . uncontrolled
and uncontrollable." A March 22, 1920 letter to Lenin by a
Cheka official described how the organization "is filled with
common criminals and the dregs of society, men armed to
the teeth who simply execute anyone they don 't like.,,28
They enjoyed such impunity, of course, precisely because
their victims had been disarmed.
The Bolshevik regime 's treatment of the Cossack popu-
lation eerily prefigured the approach that would later be
 Disarmament and Democide 33

used by the German National Socialists in their camp aign

to exterminate the Jews. "For the first time ," writes Werth,
"on the principle of collective respon sibility, a new regime
took a series of measures specially designed to eliminate,
exterminate, and deport the popul ation of a whole terri-
tory....,, 29 The Cossacks , who had been designated "class
enemies" in 1917, had their land s confi scated and their
indigenous assemblies suppressed. But this was merely a
prologue to the "fin al solution " devised by Lenin and his
associates to the "Cossack problem."
On January 24, 1919, the Bolshevik Part y's Central
Committee issued the following secret decree:

In view of the experiences of the civil war against the

Cossacks, we must recognize as the only politically
correct measure massive terror and a merciles s fight
against the rich Cossacks, who must be exterminated
and physically disposed oj, down to the last man. 30
[Emphasis added.]

Dis armament is a nece ssary prelude to liquidation. Ac-

cordingly, a few weeks after this secret decree was issued ,
a Red Army detachment was sent to the Don and Kuban
River Cossack territories to conduct micro-disarmament op-
erations . The Cossacks "were ordered, on pain of death, to
surrender all their arms (historically, as the traditional fron-
tier soldiers of the Russian empire, all Cossacks had a right
to bear arms)," records Werth.
Once the disarmament was complete, the summary ex-
ecutions began. But the Cossacks would not cooperate
peacefully in their own destruction. Within a year a full -
scale revolt against the Communists was underway. Alas,
by February 1920, the Red Army had put down the rebel -
lion - and an even more murderous campaign was under-
taken to "de -Cossack" the region.
34 Global Gun Grab

Under the direction of Latvian Chekist Karl Linder, the

Soviets created the world 's first death camps in Cossack
territory. Ukrainian Cheki st Martin Latsis recorded the
spectacle:

Gathered toge ther in a camp near Maikop, the

hostages, men, women, children, and old men survive
in the most appalling cond itions, in the cold and the
mud of October.... They are dying like flies. The
women will do anything to escape death. The soldiers
guarding the camp take advantage of this and treat
them as prostitutes.l!

The campaign again st the disarmed Cossacks set the pat-

tern for similar Soviet campaigns again st others who re-
belled against Moscow. In April 1921, the Politburo dis-
patched General Mikhail Tukhachevsky with orders to sup-
press an anti-Soviet uprising in Tambov province. With an
army of 100,000 , including special Cheka detachments,
Tukhachevsky comme nced a war of terror upon the region.
The Communist killing squads seized hostages on a mas-
sive scale, deported entire villages (as the Khmer Rouge
would later do in Cambodia), and - prefiguring the Third
Reich - set up "death camps in which prisoners were
gassed ....,,32
The regime created by Lenin, and perfected by Stalin,
would eventually kill more than 60 million of its own sub-
jects 33 - a feat made possible, in large measure , because
of civilian disarmament. Tens of millions who weren't
killed by the regime wasted their lives, or some significant
portion of them, as zeks (inmates) in the Gulag Archipel-
ago, Soviet Russia's immen se prison camp system. The
most famous former zek, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, elo -
quently expressed the frustration of a disarmed people at
the mercy of an armed criminal state :
 Disarmament and Democide 35

[Hjow we burned in the prison camps .. . thinking:

What would things have been like if every security
operative, when he went out at night to make an ar-
rest, had been uncertain whether he would return alive
and had to say good-bye to his family? Or if, during
the periods of mass arrests, as for exam ple in
Leningrad, when they arrested a quarter of the entire
city, people had not simply sat there in their lairs, pal-
ing with terror at every bang of the downstairs door
and at every step on the staircase, but had understood
they had nothing left to lose and had boldly set up in
the downstairs hall an ambush of half a dozen people
with axes, hamm ers, pokers, or whatever else was at
hand ?

If the subjects of Soviet terror had offered armed resistance

of some kind, Solzhenitsyn concl uded, "The Orga ns [of
state terror] would very quick ly have suffered a shortage of
officers and ... notwithsta nding all of Stalin's thirst , the
cursed machine would have ground to a halt!"34
Lenin and his architects understood this principle. Thi s
was why they, like other tyrant s throughout history, made
civilian disarmament an immediate priorit y. The UN's un-
ambiguous desire to "Go Out Into the World and Gather Up
the Small Arms" offers a compelling illustration of the
tyranni cal intention s of its masters.
 CHAPTER THRE E

Blueprint for
Global Dictatorship
The scientific concept of dictato rship means nothing
else but this: Power without limit , restin g directly
upon force, restrain ed by no laws, absolutely unre-
stricted by rules. I
- Soviet dictator Vladimir Lenin

Lenin was a man with a mind ofgreat clarity and in-

cisiveness and his ideas have had a p rofound influ-
ence on the course of contemporary histo ry.... His
ideals ofpeace and peaceful coexistence among states
... are in line with the aims ofthe UN Charter.... 2
- UN Secretary-General U Thant

he high prai se conferred upon Vladimir Lenin by U

T Thant tells us everything we need to know about the
UN's purpose and intentions. Lenin, the inventor of the
modem totalitarian state, defined "peace" as the elimina-
tion of all opposition to Communism. This must include -
as we saw in the last chapter - disarmament of the subject
population. The UN's application of Lenin's design requires
the disarmament of all individuals and organizations that
are not under UN control.
It's important to recognize that proposals for "disarma-
ment" are selective, not universal. Although calls to "get rid
of the guns" abound in propaganda on behalf of civilian dis-
armament, nobody is talking about getting rid of all of the
guns. All "gun control" proposals allow for firearms to re-

36
 Blueprintfor Global Dictatorship 37

main in the hands of agents of the State , who will then be

able to exercise - in Lenin 's eminently quotable phrase-
"power without limit, resting directly upon force."
Many of the UN 's critics condemn the organization for
its waste, fraud, abuse, and other "excesses." But relative-
ly few critics have pointed out that the real evil of the UN
is not its wastefulness or corruption, but the totalitarian ob-
jectives of those who created it and those who control it to-
day. The purpose of the UN is to pursue Lenin's diseased
ambitions on a global scale : to acquire and exercise total
power over humanity in the name of "peace." That evil am-
bition is made plain in official proposals presented by the
United States government to provide the UN with a global
monopoly on weapons.

"Weapons, Weapons, Weapons"

Cora Weiss, one of the most outspoken proponents of a UN
monopoly on firearms, is an American by birth and a radi-
cal Marxist by conviction. As head of the UN-connected
"Hague Appeal for Peace," Weiss was one of the key or-
ganizers of the June 2000 UN "Millennium Forum" at the
world body's New York headquarters. During her address
to that conference, Weiss declared: "There are only three
documents that you need ... to be an informed, effective
member of organized civil society: The Charter of the Unit-
ed Nations, the International [sic] Declaration of Human
Rights , and The Hague Agenda for Peace and Justice for
the 21st Centu ryl't Neither the U.S. Con stitution nor the
Declaration of Independence made Weiss' cut. This is to be
expected, since the U.S. Constitution explicitly protects the
individual's right to own firearms, and it was the widespread
ownership of firearms by "non-state actors" that made
American independence possible. To her UN audience,
Weiss made it absolutely clear that individual firearms own-
ership must be abolished.
38 Global Gun Grab

"Violent conflicts are fueled . .. by the presence of

weapons, weapons, weapons, weapons of all kinds, all over
the world," declared Weiss. In this case, insisted Weiss, the
pre-eminent threat to peace and security comes from the
global market in "small arms and light weapons" - specif-
ically those types of firearms that can be obtained and used
by civilians.
"Small arms [and] light weapons .. . pose a big threat to
human security; their use results in the majority of civilian
deaths and has made it easier to exploit young children as
soldiers," declares The Hague Agenda (which Weiss co-
wrote). "Full fledged demobilization programs must re-
claim and destroy weaponry .... Steps toward stopping the
flow of weapons include: controlling legal transfers be-
tween states ; monitoring the use and storage of small arms
within states; preventing illicit transfers .. . collecting, re-
moving and destroying surplus weapons from regions of
conflict ... [and] creating norms of non-possession...."4
(Emphasis added.)
While "non-possession" for civilians would be the
"norm," there would obviously be an armed entity of some
sort responsible for the enforcement of that standard, and
to collect "surplus" weapons. Weiss knows just who that
entity should be: "I propose the activation of Chapter VII,
article 47 of the UN Charter, which provides for a Military
Staff Committee to assist the Security Council for the main-
tenance of international peace," stated Weiss in her UN ad-
dress ." Chapter Six deals with "peace enforcement" (a
Soviet-style euphemism for aggressive war) through a
standing UN military with sufficient power to "take such
action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security."
To put it bluntly: Cora Weiss was calling for the UN lit-
erally to declare war on individual gun owners.
Why should we care? Who is Cora Weiss, anyhow -
 Blueprint for Global Dictatorship 39

apart from being a Marxist eccentric? Whil e she is hardl y

a household name , Mrs . Weiss wields considerable influ-
ence within both the UN itself and in the world body 's al-
lied community of "non-governmental organizations," or
NGOs . She is also a very good representative of the par-
tially submerged international network seeking to create a
UN-dominated new world order.
The most important element of that power network is the
New York-bas ed Coun cil on Foreign Relations (CFR),
which has controlled our foreign policy establishment for
the better part of a century. The Unite d Nations was essen -
tially a joint product of the international politi cal and fi-
nancial elite - embodied in the CFR - and the interna-
tional Communist movement.P The basis for this seeming-
ly implau sible alliance was a shared desire for "power with-
out limit" on a global basis.
Alger Hiss, the notorious Soviet spy who served as sec-
retary-general of the UN 's founding conference, was both
a Communist and a member of the CFR. Cora Weiss can
present similar disreputable credentials. The daughter of
Communist Party, U.S.A. activi st Samuel Rubin, Weiss is
also a member of the CFR and the Institute for Policy Stud-
ies (IPS). The IPS is a subversive group with links to the
Soviet KGB and Cuban DGI. In Covert Cadre, a scholarly
study of the IPS, Dr. S. Steven Powell point s out that Cora
Weiss and her husband, IPS chairman Peter Weiss, "carry
on the international socialist tradition through the Rubin
Foundation, which is located in New York City across from
the United Nations building in an unmarked office at 777
UN Plaza."?
In the 1960s, Weiss was prominent in Hanoi's American
"fifth column " during the Vietnam War. Weiss is on record
as approving of the use of small arms - when they are in
the hands of Communists in a war of aggression. In fact,
Weiss was among the American leftists who made a pil-
40 Global Gun Grab

grimage to Hanoi at a time when American Prisoners of War

were being tortured by the North Vietnamese Communists.!
She sees no inconsistency in urging the UN to create a mil-
itary force capable of disarming the world's civilians. Nor
should we - if we understand the true intentions behind
the' world body's appeals to "world peace."

A UN Arms Monopoly
In her June 2000 speech, Cora Weiss was reiterating long-
standing designs to empower the UN with a global firearms
monopoly. One of the most important expressions of that
design is found in State Department Document 7277, Free-
dom From War: The United States'Program for General and
Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World.
Unveiled by President John F. Kennedy in a September
1961 speech before the UN General Assembly, Freedom
from War, and its 1962 follow-up, Blueprintfor the Peace
Race, outline a three -stage program for the disarmament of
all nations , associations, and individuals who are not under
the authority of a UN "peace force." In the third stage of the
Freedom from War plan, "States would retain only those
forces, non-nuclear armaments, and establishments re-
quired for the purpose of maintaining internal order; they
would also support and provide agreed manpower for a UN
Peace Force.,,9
In stage III, according to Freedom From War, "The man-
ufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those
of agreed types and quantities to be used by the U.N. Peace
Force and those required to maintain internal order. All oth-
\
er armaments would be \destroyed or converted to peaceful
purposes." "All other armaments" would obviously include
all civilian-owned firearms . The Freedom From War and
Blueprintfor the Peace Race documents provided the plat-
form upon which was built the U.S. Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency, and they remain the official framework
 Blueprint f or Global Dictatorship 41

for U.S. arms control policy more than 40 years after they
were conceived.
Freedom From War and Blueprintfor the Peace Race are
two of the canonical texts of the UN's gospel of global dis-
armament. A World Effectively Contro lled by the United
Nations, a 1962 study written by MIT professor Lincoln P.
Bloomfield under a contract with the U.S. State Depart-
ment, is also a part of that canon . In fact, Bloomfield 's re-
port - which was all but impossible to obtain , until its text
was posted on the internet by The John Birch Society 10 -
may be the most revealing of the three documents. Bloom-
field noted : "The notion of a 'UN-controlled world' . . .
grows, curiously enough, out of contemporary doctrines on
arms control."
Wri ting on behalf of the top-echelon planning elite of
our own military and political leadership, Bloomfield de-
scribed how the United Nations could be transformed into
a full-fledged world government with "powers sufficient to
monitor and enforce disannament... ." That force would con-
sist of fighting men, wearing UN insignia, recruited indi-
vidually from UN member-states, and would also include
a nuclear component (so much for the "abolition" of nu-
clear weapons ).
Through the "Peace Force" envisioned in the Bloomfield
study, the UN would have the capaci ty to conduct "unre-
stricted international inspection of all states against viola-
tion of the disarmament agreement.. ..» Ll The basis of that
UN-enforced agreement would be the Freedom From War
blueprint, which Bloomfield described as a product ofD.S.-
Soviet collaboration.
"On September 19, 1959, [Soviet] Chairman Khru-
shchev announced to the UN General Assembly his plan for
'general and complete disarmament' within four years," re-
called Bloomfield. "The Americ an response was given by
Secretary of State [Christian] Herter [CFR] on February 18,
42 .Global Gun Grab

1960, in a speech to the National Press Club." The first stage

of the Herter proposal was "the creation of a 'stable mili-
tary environment' " through curbs on the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. "The second stage of Mr. Herter's coun-
terproposal was that of general disarmament... . The second
stage would include progressive establishment of an inter-
national peace force within the United Nations sufficient to
preserve world peace under disarmament. The September
1961 U.S. proposals [e.g. Freedom From War] follow the
same pattern."?
Behind all of the bluster and bloodshed of the Cold War,
noted Bloomfield, the political elites of both East and West
shared a common objective: "[I]f the communists would
agree, the West would favor 'a world effectively controlled
by the United Nations.' "13
This covert collaboration required a careful balancing
act on the part of the Western elite, according to Bloom-
field. Obviously, if the Communist powers continued their
aggressive ways, "the subordination of states to a true world
government" would be impossible. But , on the other hand,
"if the communist dynamic were greatly abated, the West
might well lose whatever incentive it has for world gov-
ernment." The trick was to make the Communists appear
just menacing enough to scare the West into international
cooperation through the UN and its regional affiliates (such
as NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization). Even-
tually it would be possible "to transform and tame the forces
of communism .. . to the point where the present interna-
tional system might be radically reshaped,"!"
Following the "mellowing" of Communism, according
to Bloomfield, the UN would be in a position to emerge as
an undisguised world government - and this is exactly
what the American ruling elite desires. Noted Bloomfield:
"It was not made explicit, but the United States position [on
disarmament] carried the unmistakable meaning, by what-
 Blueprint for Global Dictatorship 43

ever name, of world government, sufficiently powerful in

any event to keep the peace and enforce its judgments." 15
The UN "Peace Force" would necessarily include a "disar-
mament policing agency,"!" through which "a significant
'UN presence' [would exist] in all countries/"?
"National governments [would] continue to exist in these
units, to make, execute and enforce domestic laws" under
the UN-dominated world order. But they would not con-
tinue to control their respective military establishments,
since in the new system they would be "limited . . . to the
right to maintain sufficient police forces to ensure domes-
tic security." 18 Although the UN would have both "a nuclear
capability" and "a significant conventional capability" for
the purpose of enforcing world order, the national admin-
istrative units of the world government would be compelled
to undergo "total disarmam ent down to police and internal
security levels."? Of necessity, total disarmament would
mean not only the abolition of independent national mili-
tary establishments, but the disarmament of civilians as
well.
Although he is relentlessly candid elsewhere in his study,
Bloomfield becomes somewhat evasive regarding the im-
plications for individual firearms ownership in a world "ef-
fectively controlled" by the UN. He does make clear, how-
ever, that each of the elements in that world order must have
a "monopoly of political power, accompanied by prepon-
derant military force, at the center of the system .,,20 Just as
the UN enjoys an international monopoly on force, each na-
tional subdivision must exercise similar powers within its
own borders . And Bloomfield does not flinch from the fact
that this arrangement is incompatible with the constitutional
protections enjoyed by Americans: "In the United States,
the people have the constitutional right to 'keep and bear
arms '; the government monopoly is legally abridged to this
extent."
44 Global Gun Grab

Interpreting the Texts

Bloomfield's paper also cited the study World Peace Through
World Law, a 1958 book co-authored by Wall Street lawyer
Grenville Clark and Professor Louis B. Sohn .j !
For devout globalists, the Clark -Sohn study is the sacred
text from which subsequent UN disa rmament proposals
sprang. Both Clark and Sohn were deeply involved in the
movement to create a world government: Clark in his ca-
pacity as vice president of the World Federalist Association ;
and Sohn through his membership in the CPR. World Peace
Through World Law is breathtakingly explicit about the
UN 's disarmament objectives, and the means to be em-
ployed to achieve them .
The Clark-Sohn book was a proposal for revising and
expanding the UN Charter to make the world body a full-
functioning global government, equipped with "A World
Police Force" that would possess "a coercive force of
overw helming power.,,22 The Globo-Cops would "be reg-
ularly provided with the most modem weapons and equip -
ment," including nuclear weapons, which could be used
to deal with especially stubborn opponents of global
"peace.,,23
The happy illusion that the UN seeks to abolish weapons,
rather than monopolize them, perishes rudely when it col-
lides with the reality described by Clark and Sohn:

The initial weapons and equipment of the Peace Force

would come from the transfer of weapons and equip -
ment discarded by national military forces during the
process of complete disarmament. Subsequent sup-
plies would be produced by the United Nations in its
own production facilities through a separate agency
to be established by the General Assembly and called
the United Nations Military Supply and Research
Agency. This Agency would engage in research rela-
 Blueprint for Global Dictatorship 45

tive to the development of new weapons and relative

to methods of defense against the possible use by any
nation of prohibited weapons clandestinely hidden or
produced .?"

So the UN's "World Police Force" would have first pick of

the best confiscated firearms, until it was supplied with even
better cutting-edge weaponry. It would justify the accumu-
lation of global police-state powers by the need "to deter or
suppress any attempted international violence," which will
require "complete disarmament by each and every na-
tion .,,25 And this would, in tum, require the liquidation of
independent police forces and confiscation of civilian-
owned firearms:

[I]t must be recognized that even with the complete

elimination of all military forces there would neces-
sarily remain substantial, although strictly limited and
lightly armed, internal police forces and that these po-
lice forces, supplemented by civilians armed with
sporting rifles and fowling pieces, might conceivably
constitute a serious threat to a neighboring country in
the absence of a well-disciplined and heavily armed
world police.i"

"Even in a world in which all national military forces were

abolished," continues the study, " ... it is conceivable that
... an aroused nation with a strong grievance could marshal
quite a formidable armed force even if no one in it pos-
sessed any weapon stronger than a rifle." Thus the UN 's
need for "a genuine fighting force, well equipped and high-
ly disciplined.... We submit, in short, that a strong and well-
armed [global] police force is part of the indispensable price
of peace and the sooner the world faces up to this conclu-
sion the better it will be for all peoplea??
46 Global Gun Grab

"Trust Us - We're Benevolent"

In the UN's escalating campaign against "small arms," and
its ever-incre asing dem ands for independent military
"peacekeeping" power, we can see the vision described by
Clark and Sohn being realized before our eyes.
Clark and Sohn allow for the possibility that the "Peace
Force" they describ e "might be perverted into a tool of
world domination," as if what they are describing is some-
thing other than world domin ation, albeit of what they con-
sider a "benevolent" variety. "It is with this danger clearly
in mind that meticulous care has been taken to surround the
proposed Peace Force with . .. careful limitations and safe-
guards, so as to make its subversion virtually impossible."
Sign ificantly, they do not specify those checks and bal-
ances; indeed, by consolidating political power at the glob-
allevel and disarming everybody but UN-approved offi-
cials, the Clark -Sohn proposal would liquidate all checks
and balances entirely.
Clark and Sohn admit that "the danger of the possible
misuse of the Peace Force cannot be wholly eliminated....
However, in order to achieve complete national disarma-
ment and genuine peace, some risks must be taken."28Thus
we are asked to believe that it is less risky to create an all-
powerful, unaccountable world government, with a mo-
nopoly of weapons (including nuclear weapons) , than to al-
low law-abiding individuals to bear arms in their own de-
fense . We are to entrust our fate to those who would enjoy
unlimited power over us. This is a proposal that has been
made often in modern history, with uniformly tragic results.
Professor R.J. Rummel of the University of Hawaii , at
the very beginning of his 1994 book Death by Government,
offers this resonant warning: "Power kills; absolute Power
kills absolutely.... The more power a government has, the
more it can act arbitrarily accord ing to the whims and de-
sires of the elite, and the more it will make war on others
 Blueprintfor Global Dictatorship 47

and murder its foreign and domestic subjects .,,29 During the
first nine decades of the 20th century, Rummel documents,
"almost 170 million men, women, and children" were killed
by governments, and the body count "could conceivably be
nearly 360 million people . It is as though our species has
been devastated by a modem Black Plague. And indeed it
has, but a plague of Power, not germs .,,30
Advocates of UN-enforced "world law" and global civil-
ian disarmament often present their case in terms of stark
alternatives: Global government or worldwide chaos and
bloodshed. Rummel's study of what he calls "democide"
- the mass murder of individuals by government - has
led him to reject these false choices .
"[T]here is the common and fundamental justification of
government that it exists to protect citizens against the an-
archic jungle that would otherwise threaten their lives and
property," notes Rummel. "Such archaic or sterile views
show no appreciation of democide's existence and all its re-
lated horrors and suffering .... A preeminent fact about gov-
ernment is that some of them murder millions in cold blood.
This is where absolute Power reigns."31

Freedom or Power?
America's Founding Fathers, in their efforts to design a
constitutional republic, took care to establish checks and
balances in order to prevent the consolidation of "power
without limit" over the people. Rather than centralizing
power and disarming the citizenry, the Founders institu-
tionally divided and limited power - and incorporated into
the Constitution an explicit prohibition against central gov-
ernment infringement of the right of law-abiding individu-
als to keep and bear arms.
The Framers, like nearly all of their contemporaries,
were unalterably opposed to the creation of standing armies,
or what would today be called "peacekeepers." In his ex-
48 Global Gun Grab

amination of the potential for the corruption of a national

military into such an engine of oppression, Alexander
Hamilton wrote: " .. . if circumstances should at any time
oblige the government to form an army of any magnitude
that army can never be formidable to the liberties of the
people while there is a large body of citizens, little if at all
inferior to them in discipline and the use of arms, who stand
ready to defend their own rights and those of their fellow-
citizens. This appears to me the only substitute that can be
devised for a standing army, and the best possible security
against it, if it should exist.,,32
"Before a standing army can rule, the people must be
disarmed; as they are in almost every kingdom of Europe,"
observed educator and statesman Noah Webster. "The
supreme power in America cannot enforce unjust laws by
the sword; because the whole body of the people are armed
and constitute a force superior to any band of regular troops
that can be, on any pretense, raised in the United States.'>33
Where the people are armed, the state can govern, but it
cannot rule. Thus it is to be expected that proponents of
world government make universal disarmament a priority,
and treat our Founding Fathers and their handiwork, the
Constitution, with utter disdain.
Advocates of UN-imposed disarmament insist that the
world body must be given "power without limit " in order
to bring "peace" to the globe. The soothing assurances
offered by such people regarding their benevolent intentions
are drowned out by the voices of 170 million victims of total
power - who had been disarmed, and then annihilated, in
the name of "peace."
 CHAPTER FOUR

Psychological Disarmament
Obviou sly the United Nation s must first have ma-
chinery which can disarm and keep disarm ed those
parts of the world that would break the peace.... The
United Nations must back up military disarmament
with psychological disarmament.... I
- Vice President Henry Wallace (an avid socialist,
globalist, and occultist), 1942

The demand side ofthe problem [of "micro-disarma-

ment"} involves tactics and strategies f or lowering
the needfor weapons on the part ofcitizens.... [Mea-
sures} have been utilized in U.S. cities in this regard,
including educating citizens about the dangers ofpos-
sessing a gun ... and employing volun tary weapon
collection programs as a device to change attitudes
toward gun posse ssion and use....2
. - Dr. Edw ard J. Laurance of the UN Register
of Conventional Arms

t has been said that walls cannot imprison a man whose

I mind is free. While this comforting propos ition is debat-
able, the reverse is indisputably true : No walls are needed
to imprison a man whose mind has been enslaved. This is
why every successful despotism depends upon the psycho-
logical enslavement of its subjects. And in like fashion,
tyrants who seek to disarm their would -be subjects physi -
cally must first disarm them psychologically.
As the statement by Henry Wallace quoted above illus-
trates, "psychological disarmament" was a priority for Unit-

49
50 Globa l Gun Grab

ed Nations planners even before the formal organization

came into being. It is not widely understood that, beginning
with a declaration signed in January 1942, the Allied side
in World War II referred to itself as the "United Nations,"
and that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his asso-
ciates spoke often of the fact that the war was intended to
bring abou t a permanent world government bod y with suf-
ficient power to enforce its decrees.' Of course, the Amer-
ican serv icemen who fought and sacrificed in that war effort
were not told that they were bein g asked to kill and die on
behalf of a socialist world order, one that would ulti mately
pur sue the disarmament, first psychological and the n phys-
ical, of Americans.
Few were more eager to promote this utop ian vision than
Henry Wallace. In the 1942 address quoted above , Wallace
referred to the "world-wide democracy we of the United
Nations hope to build ." This global system would be con-
structed around the principles of "home rule and central-
ized authority"; the central world authority "would not give
so many rights to member nations as to jeopardize the rights
of a11.,,4
As we have seen, the ultimate objective of the architects of
the UN-dominated world order is a political system in which
only UN-authorized officials would have the privilege of bear-
ing arms. In his speech Wallace spoke of the need to "de-
militarize" the minds of the young in both Germany and
Japan' But such re-education efforts would not be confined
solely to children who had been born in former Axis nations.
Shortly after the UN Education, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) came into being, it produced a 10-
volume series of pamphlets entitled Toward World Under-
standing as a framework for efforts to indoctrinate children
worldwide (including in the United States) in the UN's cul-
ture of "peace." This would include a willingness "to accept
the obligations an interdependent world imposes."? Of
 Psychological Disarmament 51

course, this would eventuall y include not only national but

civilian disarmament.
In recent years, since "micro-disarmament" became an
overt priority for the United Nations, efforts to "demilita-
rize" the minds of people worldwide have proliferated. As
we have previously seen, UN-connected bodies such as the
Commission on Global Governance and The Hague Appeal
have open ly referred to the disarmament of civilians and
creating "norms of non-possession" of weapons as neces-
sary steps toward the creation of a "culture of peace ." In a
very real sense, this work has been proceeding very rapid-
ly in what might be regarded as the homeland of the gun
culture - the United States.
As we discus sed earlier, one of the chief psycho logical
tactics used by the gun grabbers is to demonize guns as in-
trinsically evil. Gun "buy-backs" or "tum-ins" can reinforce
that message and, in some situations, serve as an overture
to more aggressive confiscation progra ms.
Obviously, offering financia l or other incentives to citi-
zens to tum in their firearms does nothing to solve the prob-
lem of firearms violence by the crimina l element. Sami Fal-
tas of the UN-connected Bonn International Centre for Con-
version (BICC), one of the most energetic proponents of
"buy-backs," has even admitted that such initiatives reward
those who obtain weapons illegally, and have the effect of
"Disarming potential victims and creating an illusion of
security."? UN-connected disarmament specialist William
Godnick offers a similar assessment of gun tum-in pro-
grams: "It depends on what your goals are.... If your goal
is getting the worst of the bad guys to tum their guns in -
come on, get real."s
If weapons turn-in and buy-back programs yield such
unde sirable practical results , why are they promoted so
heavily in UN disarmament literature? Faltas ' comrade at
the BICC, Dr. Laurance, offers a revealing answer: "Vol-
52 Global Gun 'Grab

untary weapons collection program s have been conducted

extensi vely in American cities for the past five years [1991-
1996], and continue to be a popu lar approach to both col-
lecting guns and addres sing gun violence by emphasizing
the negative consequences of gun possession and use."
(Emphasis added. )?
Laurance emphasizes that such collection programs
focu s on "getting weapons off the street and out of home s"
in order "to publicize the connection between weapons and
violence...."10 So in spite of its utter uselessness in practi-
cal terms , the "tum -in"l" buy-back" approach is highl y use-
ful for propaganda purposes, as a means of advancing psy-
chologi cal disarmament. Furthermore, since such programs
create a perverse incentive for criminals to stea l arms, or
otherwise obtain them illegally, they actually help to create
even more firearms-related violence - which certainly
suits the purpose of "publiciz[ing] the connection between
weapons and violence."
Anybody who doubts that the UN is cynical enough to
create such problems in order to capitalize upon them sim-
ply hasn't been paying attention.
The 1996 paper in which Dr. Laurance emphasized the
psychological usefulness of "tum-in"l"buy-back" programs
was intended as a framework "for the deliberations of the
UN Disarmament Commission in 1996, the UN panel group
on small arms , and Member States addressing this issue in-
dividually or as part of either of these forums," !' He con-
cluded that voluntary weapons collection "appears to be a
tool that fits the UN mode of operation when it comes to
micro-disarmament programs." 12

Mass Indoctrination
In the drive for psychological disarmament, the official con-
nections between various propaganda campaigns and the
UN are sometimes tenuous. Often, as was the case with gun
 Psychological Disarmament 53

"buy-backs" and the "Million Mom March," the campaign

began domestically in the United States before being ap-
propriated by the UN.
Here is an important principle to remember: In matters
of disarmament, all roads lead to the UN. As we saw in the
previous chapter, the official U.S. policy on national disar-
mament explicitly envisions a world "effectively con-
trolled" by a United Nations with a monopoly on force, and
this would mean both national and individual disarmament.
In pursuing that design, the UN has proven to be as adept
at adopting disarmament propaganda campaigns that began
independently as it has been at creating its own. Further-
more, since most high-impact propaganda campaigns are
funded by left-leaning, globalist tax-exempt foundations,
the UN will be the eventual beneficiary.
In 1992, then-UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali published his Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, in
which he called for accelerated national disarmament and
"parallel progress in conventional arms, particularly with
respect to light weapons.t'P Within a short time, "inde-
pendent" groups began to materialize to work on behalf of
the goals outlined by Boutros-Ghali. The world of UN front
groups is a tangle of inter-connected think-tanks, non-gov-
ernmental organizations, quasi-official panels, and ad hoc
committees, and following these links can be tedious . But
it is useful nonetheless to examine a few significant groups
to illustrate how the world body creates the illusion of "con-
sensus."
• The British-American Security Information Council
(BASIC) is a foundation-funded group that "commenced a
Project on Light Weapons, developing a network for such
efforts" shortly after Boutros-Ghali published his small
arms report. By 1996, scores of organizations and "inde-
pendent" researchers were working to create a "consensus"
on behalf of UN efforts to beat back the supposed scourge
54 Global Gun Grab

of small arms. 14
• The Program on Security and Development (SAND)
offers another useful example of a foundation-created UN
front group. SAND began in 1993 as the Conventional
Arms Proliferation (CAP) project at the Monterey Institute
of International Studies. The chief financial benefactors of
CAP/SAND were the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie
Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Conflicts, with
supplemental funds coming from other foundations and the
Canadian government. 15 SAND lists a staff of exactly one:
Dr. Edward J. Laurance, the UN's ubiquitous expert on
"voluntary" gun turn-in programs. 16
• Between 1992 and 1996, Dr. Laurance worked as a
consultant to the UN 's "Panel of Experts" to develop a Reg-
ister of Conventional Arms. His key task was to conduct re-
search "on weapons buy-back programs in U.S. cities, Haiti,
El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua." I? In
1996, Laurance presented a paper on micro-disarmament
issues "to the Council on Foreign Relations' [CFR] Center
for Preventive Action." 18
This is not the proper place to offer a lengthy descrip-
tion of the CFR's role as the apex organization of our po-
litical Establishment; there are several thoroughly docu-
mented studies that deal with this subject. 19 There are two
key points to remember: First, the United Nations is essen-
tially a joint creation of the world Communist movement
and the Council on Foreign Relations; second, the CFR is,
in the words of Washington Post ombudsman Richard Har-
wood, "the nearest thing we have to a ruling establishment
in the United States," with an effective stranglehold on the
mainstream press.i" It is noteworthy, and hardly a coinci-
dence, that Dr. Laurance's address to the CFR took place
just before gun "buy-back" programs became a "sponta-
neous" global phenomenon.
"From Mozambique to El Salvador, from the Republic
 Psychologica l Disarmament 55

of Georgia to Newark, N.J:, gun owners - legal or illegal

- are being encouraged to tum in their weapons in return
for money, food , footwear, or farm tools," reported the May
4, 2000 Christian Sci ence Monitor. The report described
the $2.6 billion "Buyback America" campaign inaugurated
by Bill Clinton through the Department of Housing and Ur-
ban Developme nt, through which more than 100 U.S. cities
queued up for federa l fun ds to cond uct gun tum -in pro-
grams . Commenting upon the carefully orchestra ted "spon-
taneo us" trend he had done so much to arrange, Laurance
told the Monitor : "The whole idea of weapo ns collecti on is
now huge - it's something you can do.... This is now a
global trend ."21
Laurance has played a prominent role in assembling the
worldwide coalition of UN -linked non -governmental or-
ganizations that work to create the illusion of "consensus"
for weapons turn-ins - and that will, in the UN 's long-term
strategy, help enforce weapons confisc ation programs. Ac-
cording to Laurance, his objective is "to get NGOs to work
together on a campaign, so when governments come along ,
they will have someone to work with ." As one interviewer
summarized SAND 's perspective, "The real work on con-
trolling the spread and use of light weapons will take place
at the local level, through such projects as voluntary turn-
in or buy-back weapons centers - an international treaty
can only coordinate these local efforts.,,22 (Emphasis added.)
In other words, the efforts ofNGOs here in the U.S. and
abroad is to prepare the ground for future UN gun confi s-
cation initiatives.
In 1998, the UN , with funding from various radical tax-
exempt foundations and several socialist governments, cre-
ated the International Action Network on Small Arms
(IANSA), an umbrella group to coordinate agitation on be-
half of UN global gun control. IANSA quickly became a
clearinghouse for anti-gun propaganda campaigns, and was
56 Global Gun Grab

identified by the UN as the chief organizer of the July 2001

UN Small Anus Conference.P Of course, by giving IANSA
cred it for "organizing" that event, the UN was acting like a
ventriloquist who insists that his hand-puppet writes his
own comedy material.

Retailing Anti -gun Propaganda

Groups like BICC, BASIC, SAND, and IANSA could be
regarded as wholesale propaganda outlets: They create the
UN-ordained party line for the benefit of academics, agita-
tors, and policymakers, both national and global. But for
the psychological disarmament program to proceed, the
propaganda must be peddled at the retail level, to the pub-
lic at large . This method of mass mobilization is a familiar
revolutionary approach called the "scissors strategy," which
describes how pressure on behalf of collectivist measures
is brought simultaneously "from above" by radical elites
and "from below" by street-level agitators .i" This is where
groups like the so-called "Million Mom March" and "Bil-
lion Mom March" playa significant role.
The artfully misnamed "Million Mom March" (MMM)
is a minuscule organization that grew out of a media event
staged to coincide with Mother's Day 2000. The MMM ral-
ly brought tens of thousands (by no means anywhere near
one million) people to Washington to agitate on behalf of
"common sense" gun laws, beginning with the demand for
a national system of gun registration.
As is always the case with collectivist political agitation,
the MMM organizers swaddled themselves in warm, fuzzy
rhetoric about "protecting our children," who are purport-
edly menaced by widespread civilian gun ownership. Don-
na Dees- Thomases, the chief organizer of the event, insist-
ed that she was simply a typical suburban housewife with
no political experience who had been shaken out of her ap-
athy by neo-Nazi Buford Furrow's 1999 armed assault upon
 Psychological Disarmament 57

a Jewish day-care center in Los Angeles . This image was

useful in persuading the public that the event was a spon-
taneous expression of middle-class suburban outrage over
guns . Dees- Thomases, though, was hard ly the political
novice she pretended to be: She was a longtime Democrat
Party activist with ties to the Clinton White House, and a
former publicist for CBS News.25
Curiously, none of the organizers of, or speakers at, the
rally saw fit to mention a child who had been menaced in
his own home just weeks earlier by a machine gun-wield-
ing thug: Six-year-old Cuban refugee Elian Gonzalez, who
had been kidnapped at gunpoint from the home of his
Miami relatives in an illegal federal raid . The April 22nd
assault was staged by the Clinton administration in order to
return young Elian to slavery under a government that
described him as a "possession" of the state .26
The pre-dawn federal "raid, which was staged at the
orders of Attorney General Janet Reno even as Elian 's
Miami relatives and their legal counsel were concluding
good-faith negotiations with Reno to reunite the refugee
with his father, produced a Pulitzer-winning candid photo -
graph. The unforgettable still captures a federal stormtroop -
er, his face contorted in a menacing grimace, waving a ma-
chine gun at Elian and Donato Dalrymple, the fisherman
who had helped rescue the child from the sea. Understand-
ably, the helpless child is screaming in terror at this appa-
rition, which embodied the proverbial "Three A.M. Knock"
that is the calling card of a totalitarian police state. More
than 150 armed troops were sent to the Miami home of
Lazaro Gonzalez, where they met no resistance of any kind.
In the course of the abduction, federal troops abused an
NBC cameraman and defiled religious icons in the home.i?
At the "Million Mom March," not a syllable was spoken
in condemnation of this particular act of firearms-related
violence. This was a curious oversight, if the purpose of that
58 Global Gun Grab

event was to condemn the danger to children that firearms

supposedly represent. But this omission is entirely pre-
dictable once it is understood that the "Million Mom
March" and other anti-gun campaigns do not seek to abol-
ish firearms , but to help create a state monopoly on firearms
- just as the UN plans for "general and complete disar-
mament" dictate .
Once again: In matters of disarmament, all roads lead to
the UN. Thus it was inevitable that the UN would beget its
own version of the campaign. On May 10,2001 , the UN
grandly announced the formation of the "Billion Mom
March," which, appropriating the MMM's catch-phrase , an-
nounced its intention "to work for common sense gun laws
to protect our children and loved ones all over the world .,,28
The UN front group did not see fit to instruct us as to
what we could do to protect "our children and loved ones"
once the UN and its allies have aglobal monopol y on force.

Turn in Your Neighbors!

Another key role to be played by NGOs, according to the UN
Development Programme (UNDP) , an agency that has su-
pervised gun collection programs in scores of nations, is to
provide informants . After all, explains the UNDP, "The first
step" in any successful confiscation program "is [to] gain
information on their numbers and whereabouts." Accord-
ingly, the UNDP's guide to weapons collection programs
prominently lists "informants" among the "human intelli-
gence" sources needed to carry out civilian disarmament"
Just as every totalitarian state has enforced a strict regime
of civilian disarmament, each of them has also depended
heavily upon citizen -informants - called stukachi in So-
viet Russia, chivatos in Communist Cuba , and spitzel in
Communist East Germany. The East German Stasi secret
police, staffed with former agents of the Nazi Gestapo, was
able to recruit one informer for every 6.5 inhabitants of that
 Psychological Disarmament 59

unfortunate country. 3D Castro's Cuba, Red China, and Na-

tional Socialist Germany were all notorious for their use of
"block committees," which were used to enforce political
conformity and to ferret out enemies of the ruling Party.'!
In the build-up to the UN's July 2001 Small Arms Con-
ference, Americans suddenly found themselves urged on
every side to become anti-gun informants. The "A.S.K."
("Asking Saves Kids") campaign, organized by a founda-
tion-funded group called Pax, entreated Americans to
question their friends -and neighbors about gun ownership.
"Zero Tolerance" policies in government-run schools across
the nation relentlessly indoctrinated schoolchildren about
the supposed objective evil of weapons of any sort, to the
point that children were expelled or otherwise punished for
drawing or speaking of weapons, or possessing any object
that could (in the wildest excursion of a paranoid official's
imagination) be used as a weapon. In the State of Con-
necticut a law was enacted allowing police to seize firearms
- on the basis of anonymous tips - from any individual
deemed "dangerous," without a trial or legal proceeding of
any kind.
The "A.S.K." campaign, which grew out of the founda -
tion-funded Gun Violence Project.F seeks to induce Amer-
icans to become "human intelligence" assets in the war on
guns by playing upon the fear that their children might
stumble across an unsecured gun at a friend's home. "The
idea is simple," summarized Maine 's Portland Press Her-
ald. "Before sending your kid over to a playmate's house,
take the time to ask if there are firearms in the home. If there
are . .. organizers of the campaign say parents should make
sure the guns are stored away, unloaded and locked, prefer-
ably in a gun safe. Hiding a gun is never a safe option.'>33
Within a few weeks of its inception, the A.S.K. campaign
was given quasi-official federal status by Andrew Cuomo,
the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development for the
60 Global Gun Grab

Clinton administration, who referred to the campaign as an

official administration initiative. "Our A.S.K. campaign is
such a simple yet powerful idea," intoned Cuomo at an
August 23,2000 press conference. "'Is there a gun where
my children play?' If there is, has the owner taken steps to
make sure that gun is safely stored and won't fall into the
hands of the children? Every parent needs to know the an-
swer to these questions. It doesn 't-matter where you live."34
Obviously, firearms owners should take suitable pre -
cautions to protect young children who might find their
weapons. But to keep them unloaded, inaccessible, and
locked in a safe is to nullify any value they might have as
tools of home protection. It is not difficult to imagine how
criminals could make use of the "Just Ask!" approach when
they are "casing" prospective targets for home burglary.
Furthermore, it is just as easy to see how this campaign will
make the task of gun confiscation relatively easy, should
the day ever arrive that federal (or global) authorities de-
cide that they're coming for the guns.
The most effective precaution is to teach children the
proper respect for fire arms. Providing such instruction is
the moral duty of every firearms owner with children. Act-
ing through the government-controlled school system , how-
ever, the campaign for psychological disarmament is seek-
ing to indoctrinate children in the belief that guns and other
weapons are such evil objects that they can't be touched,
seen, spoken of, alluded to, or even thought ofby students,
upon penalty of expulsion and incarceration. This is the log-
ic, such as it is, of the "zero tolerance" policies that have
been enacted in government-run schools across the nation .
In the wake of the 1999 Columbine massacre and several
other high-profile school shootings, school systems have
begun a comprehensive, inflexible crackdown on any speech
or behavior that can be construed as a "threat." This has in-
cluded the possession of toy guns, drawings of guns, spoken
 Psychological Disa rmament 61

references to guns, playing "cops and robbers," possession

of tiny replicas of guns, carrying a straight-e dge rule r that
could be used as a weapon, or having a kitchen knife on the
floor of an automobile.
"Welcome to the brave new world of 'zero-tolerance'
schooling, where young minds are molded to abhor ag-
gression," commented Yale University Law School senior
research scholar John R. Lott Jr. "Schools are banning
dodge ball and tag because the games encourage 'violent
behavior.' Some schools are removing any references to the
military from their libraries .... Elementary students in Texas
and Louisiana have been suspended for pointing pencils and
saying 'pow' and drawing pictures of soldiers. Students in
Mississippi were held in jail for trivial infractions, such as
throwing peanuts at one another. A fifth-grader in St. Peters-
burg, Florida, was arrested for drawing pictures of 'weapons.' "
Among the culprits caught in the "zero toler ance" drag-
net was Lindsay Brown, "an exemplary high school student
[and] National Merit Scholar, jailed in Ft. Myers, Florida,
because school authorities found a kitchen knife under her
car seat. The knife had accidentally fallen there during a
move between apartments . 'Terrorist threat' criminal charges
were filed against two 8-year-olds in Irvington, New Jer-
sey, for 'playing cops and robbers with a paper gun.' " Lott
points out that between 1997 and 200 1, 32 students and
three teachers were shot to death in U.S. schools. "By con-
trast, during that same period, 53 students died playing high
school football,,35 - which, come to think of it, is a com -
bat sport and thus could be seen as contributing to violent,
aggressive attit udes.
When a fifth -grader was arrested at Tampa, Florida's
Oldsmar Elementary School for draw ing a picture of
weapons, a school district spokesman explained: ''That's
the normal procedure in a situation like this.',36
Contemplate the meaning of those words. In 2001 Amer-
62 Global Gun Grab

ica, "normal procedure" for dealing with a young boy who

displays a typical interest in firearms is to treat him as a
criminal, a potential terrorist; it is to slap the cuffs on his
tiny wrists, read him his rights, humiliate him in front of his
friends , and teach him that the state has no sympathy for
those who think incorrect thoughts. This is a literal real -
ization of the totalitarian future described in George Or-
well's 1984, in which the protagonist Winston Smith was
punished for being a "thought criminal" on the basis of what
he had scribbled covertly in his private notebook.
"Bad" thinking is to be punished without mercy; "good"
thinking is to be rewarded. In the UN propaganda video
Armed to the Teeth, some American schoolchildren who
have been through the process of psychological disarma-
ment are shown eagerly reciting the UN's disarmament
doxology. "Stop selling guns," one young boy declares.
"Only policemen should have guns." "I would just stop
making guns all of a sudden and then just have the govern-
ment prohibit guns from everybody," adds a young girl.
These American youngsters are shown at a school assem-
bly reciting a pledge "never to touch a weapon.'>37
On November 6, 1933, one of history's most devoted ex-
ponents of civilian disarmament explained this strategy:
"When an opponent declares; 'I will not come over to your
side,' I calmly say: 'Your child belongs to us already....
What are you? You will pass on. Your descendants, howev -
er, now stand in this new camp. In a short time they will
know nothing else but this new community.' "38 Thus spoke
Adolf Hitler as he undertook the psychological disarma-
ment - and reconstruction - of Germany's youth. While
American gun owners are occupied with the task of pro-
tecting their rights in the present, advocates of UN-imposed
civilian disarmament are seeking to steal the future by con -
trolling the minds of the young.
 CHAPTER FIVE

The Rwandan Genocide

For when they shall say "peace and safety," then sud-
den destruction cometh upon them .. . and they shall
not escape.
- I Thessalonians 5:3

They take them from this building, this church . They

have guns and knives and machetes, the people from
the Government party, so we can't fight back. We
don't have arm s. 1
- Jeanne Niwemutesi, a Tutsi survivor of the 1994
Rwandan genocide

. Really, it was UNAMIR [the UN "peacekeeping" mis-

sion to Rwanda] that tricked us into staying. We saw
all these blue helmets, and we ... thought even if
Hutus start to attack us the three thousand men of
UNAMIR should be enough.t
- Odette Nyiramilimo, Rwandan genocide survivor

Did the ineffectiveness ofthe UN mission [in Rwanda]

... abet the genocide? ... I believe it did .3.
- Lt. General Romeo Dallaire, Canadian commander
of the UN 's "peacekeeping" mission to Rwanda

"What does it tell us about the UN," asked human

rights activist Alex de Waal, "that not a single of-
ficial thought fit to resign over the first indisputable geno-
cide since the UN Charter was signedj?" This fact tells us
a great deal about the corruption and hypocrisy of the world

63
64 Global Gun Grab

body. It also demo nstrates the utter emptiness of the orga-

nizat ion 's clai m to represent the conscience of mankind, as
if that claim had any credibility after the tumultuous wel-
comes that have greeted nearly every thug or tyrant who has
journeyed to New York to address the General Assemb ly.
But even more importantly, the UN 's role in the Rwan-
dan genocide, and its refusal to censure, in any way, the
high-ranking UN official s complicit in that tragedy, illus-
trate the lethal fooli shne ss of submitting to the organiza-
tion's formula for "peace and safety " through civilian dis-
armament. The Rwandan Tutsis followed that formula with
remarkable fidelity, and the result was one of history 's most
concentrated campaigns of political mass slaughter.

The Last Victim

In mid-June 2000 , a disheveled, drunken middle-aged man
was found curled under a park bench in Hull, Quebec. The
pathetic figure was retired Lt. General Romeo Dallaire, who
had once been one of Canada's most distinguished military
officers.l
"When I finally discovered it was him , I was really sad,"
recalled Stephane Beaudoin , a television news reporter who
had come upon Dallaire. Beaudoin declined to shoot
footage of the forl orn scene "because I was depressed to
imagine a man like that could be there and didn 't have help.
He was so important to Canada when he was in good
shape.?"
Dallaire had retired from the service two months earlier,
describing him self as "a casualty of Rwanda, an injured
officer of the Rwandan war."? He had served as command-
er of the UN military force s deployed in Rwan da in 1993
to admi nister a cease-fire between the Hum-domi nated gov-
ernment and the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front. On his
watch as UN commander, Dallaire had witnessed Rwanda
descend into a carefully orchestrated orgy of mass murder
 The Rwandan Genocide 65

following the .assassination of the nation 's pre sident on

April 6, 1994. During a period of 103 days, at least 800,000
- by some estimates over one million - human beings
were murdered by the Hutu-dominated government and its
killing squads.f
The indelible images of the Rwandan massacre are those
of unarmed, defenseless people being hacked to death by
hate-crazed assailants wielding machetes, knives, and
sharpened farm implements. Dallaire described incidents
in which troops under his command came upon "chopped-
up - but living - men and women," who were often left
to bleed to death because almost one-third of the local pop-
ulation had AIDS, and no surgical gloves were available to
protect medical workers." Dallaire often found himself
"standing knee deep in mutilated bodies, surrounded by the
guttural moans of dying people, looking into the eyes of
children bleeding to death with their wounds burning in the
sun and being invaded by maggots and flies. I found my-
self walking through villages where the only sign of life
was a goat, or a chicken, or a songbird, as all the people
were dead , their bodies being eaten by voracious packs of
wild dogs ,"!"
For years after he returned to Canada, Dallaire was tor-
mented by dreams in which he waded "waist deep in bod-
ies, covered in blood.... I am holding up my arms trying to
get out. Each time it comes back, the scene is worse . I can
hear the rustle of bodies, and I am afraid to move for
fear of hurting someone." Even when he was awake, the
images of the relentless killing frenzy - "are digitally clear
and come one at a time. They do not disappear over
time, and your normal state becomes acute depression." I I
Before being discovered in Hull, Dallaire had twice tried
to kill himself. "There are many days in the past, and
less so now, where I wish I had died there," Dallaire told
CBC-TV. 12
66 Global Gun Grab

Dallaire's traumatic memories of the genocide were

compounded with a sense of guilt and frustration over the
fact that he had offered detailed advance warning to his UN
superiors that the massacre was imminent, and he had been
forbidden to do anything to prevent it.

The "Genocide Fax"

On January II, 1994, amid accumulating signs of an im-
pending slaughter of Tutsis and moderate Hutus by the
"Hutu Power" regime in Rwanda, Dallaire sent an urgent
fax to UN Headquarters. The message explained that Dal-
laire had been warned by a defector from the regime that it
was planning "to register all Tutsi in Kigali [the capital] .
He suspects it is for their extermination. [The] example he
gave is that in twenty minutes his personnel could kill up
to a thousand Tutsis .,,13 The informant offered to lead Dal-
laire and his men to a local government weapons cache, and
requested that he and his family be taken into protective
custody. Dallaire asked for permission to raid the govern-
ment arms cache within 36 hours.
Within a short time, Dallaire had his reply. His superi -
ors forbade him to disarm the government killing squads .
Instead, he was ordered to share his information with the
Hutu government and sternly inform it that the killing
squads ' activities "represent a clear threat to the peace
process."
"Never mind that Dallaire's informant had explicitly de-
scribed the plans to exterminate the Tutsis .. . as emanating
from [the Rwandan president's] court : the [UN] mandate
said that peace-treaty violations should be reported to the
President," wrote reporter Philip Gourevitch in his award-
winning account of the tragedy." In other words , Dallaire
was ordered to expose his informant and surrender his in-
telligence about the planned genocide to the government
that was planning the crime.
 The Rwandan Genocide 67

Printed at the top of the fax to Dallaire was the name of

Kofi Annan, who was then the chief of peacekeeping oper-
ations . Notes Gourevitch, this "suggests that [Annan] was
its author , or at least the one ultimately responsible for its
contents." 15 A UN inquiry headed by former Swedish Prime
Minister Ingvar Carlsson (a co-chair of the UN-funded
Commi ssion on Global Governance) concluded in 1999 that
Annan was, in fact, the author of the notorious reply to Dal-
laire .!" Copies of Dallaire's warnings of the impending
slaughter were made available not only to Annan but also
to then-Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali .!?
It says a great deal about the UN 's institutional priori-
ties that while Dallaire - who had tried , as best he could,
to prevent the genocide - was left to descend into alco -
holism and suicidal depression, Kofi Annan - the man who
in effect gave the green light for the genocide - was later
chosen to be secretary-general.
Another illustration of the UN 's deeply entrenched cor-
rupti on was on display after the government of Belgium ,
which lost 10 soldiers at the hand s of Rwandan killing
squads, created a commission to investigate the tragedy.
Kofi Annan "refused to testify or allow General Dallaire to
testify," reports Gourevitch . "The UN Charter, Annan ex-
plained in a letter to the Belgian government, grant ed UN
official s ' immunity from legal process in respect of their
official acts,' " and Annan did not see how waiving that im-
munit y "was in the interest of the Organization. ? "
Belgian Senator Alain Destexhe believes that the UN
actually facilitated the Rwandan genocide by ordering
Dallaire to share his intelligence with the regime. "They
were the ones preparing the massacres .... It 's like inform-
ing a terrorist that you know he 's preparing his terrorism
and assuring him you're not going to do anyt hing about
it.,,19
The UN 's own inquiry concluded that "the instructions
68 Global Gun Grab

from New York certainly gave the signal to the Interahamwe

[the Rwandan killing squads] and other extremists that
UNAMIR was not going to take assertive action" to prevent
the killing.P

Proliferating Danger Signs

The UN 's foreknowledge of the impending Rwandan
slaughter was not limited to Dallaire's detailed fax of Jan-
uary 11, 1994 . UN officials were aware that systematic
massacres of Tutsis had begun as early as the fall of 1993.21
Nor were such massacres a novelty in Rwanda. Tutsis had
been murdered in large numbers by Hutu s on several occa-
sions since 1959. A UN-employed schoolteacher in Rwan-
da described the anti-Tutsi pogrom of December 1963-Jan-
uary 1964 as "a veritable genocide." At the time, left-wing
academic Bertrand Russell described the bloodletting as
"the most horrible and systematic massacre we have had
occasion to witness since the extermination of the Jews by
the Nazis .,,22
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali would later dismiss
Dallaire's warnings as typical of "alarming" reports re-
ceived by field commanders in UN "peacekeeping" mis-
sions .P But he knew better. In December 1993, Boutros-
Ghali, according to the UN's own inquiry, had sent an emis-
sary to meet with the Rwandan president. At that meeting
the UN official warned that "he had information that
killings of the opposition were being planned, and that the
United Nations would not stand for this.,,24
Just a few weeks later, Dallaire sent his fax to New York.
Nothing in that fax came as news to the UN officials who
ordered Dallaire to stand out of the way and let the Rwan-
dan regime murder hundreds of thousands of people. By
staying in Rwanda and cooperating with a government bent
on genocide, the UN "peacekeepers" perpetrated a mur-
derous fraud : They beguiled many thousands of victims into
 The Rwandan Genocide 69

staying, when they might otherwise have fled .

By January 1994, both Hutus and Tutsis sensed that the
massacres were coming. One Tutsi nurse testified : "Really,
it was UNAMIR that tricked us into staying. We saw all
these blue helmets, and we talked with Dallaire.... We
thought even if Hutus start to attack us the three thousand
men of UNAMIR should be enough. Dallaire gave us his
phone numb er and his radio number, and said, 'If anything
happens you call me immediately.' So we trusted them.,,25
After the nurse and her family returned from a visit to Bu-
rundi in January 1994, they were set upon by a Hutu mob.
After two grenades thrown by the mob blew out the win-
dows of the family car, "I called Dallaire ... but nobody
came from UNAMIR. I realized then that these people
would never protect us.,,26
Shortly after the April massacres began , the nurse and
her family tried to flee, only to be surrounded by the killin g
squad s. The nurse 's sister was shot and killed , and mem-
bers of the mob "put grenades to our necks ." They might all
have suffered the same fate that claimed hundreds of thou-
sands of Tutsis had her husband not procured "illegal"
firearms, in this case, two Chinese-made hand grenades,
which he used to create an armed stand-off with his fami-
ly' s would -be killers. "So they didn 't kill us. Instead, they
took us to the village for interrogation," after which they
were taken under the protection of the local mayor.F
This famil y survived despite, not because of, the UN 's
intervention in Rwanda. The key to their survival was the
fact that the husband, unlike hundreds of thousands of vic-
tims, was armed , and thus able to deter the killing squads
at a critical moment. This experience illustrates , in micro-
cosm, the fatal futility of the UN 's approach to "collective
human security," in which the world body, along with UN-
approved national "internal security" establishments, would
"keep the peace."
70 Global Gun Grab

"Human Security"
Despite Annan's best efforts at damage control, political
pressure from several nations (notably Belgium) led to the
creation of a panel of inquiry. That panel's official report
documented, in damning detail, the UN's complicity in the
Rwandan genocide, but insisted that the tragedy supposed-
ly illustrated the need to give the UN even greater military
power. "The overriding failure in the response of the Unit-
ed Nations before and during the genocide in Rwanda can
be summarized as a lack of resources and a lack of will to
take on the commitment which would have been necessary
to prevent or stop the genocide," concluded the report"
Annan's response to the report was a masterpiece of
rhetorical misdirection. "Of all my aims as a Secretary Gen-
eral," intoned Annan , "there is none to which I feel more
deeply committed than that of enabling the United Nations
never again to fail in protecting a civilian population from
genocide or mass slaughter'F" It's a very typical collectivist
reaction to failure: Focus on "intentions," rather than re-
sults, and on "commitment," rather than culpability. Annan
was saying, in effect, "We failed - so give us more power,
more money, and more military strength."
Rwanda was, in a tragic sense, a test case for the UN's
doctrine of "Human Security." Although the term is referred
to as "recently a new concept" in Our Global Neighbor-
hood,3° the 1995 report of the Commission on Global Gov-
ernance (CGG), the concept is at least as old as the UN it-
self. The CGG report insisted that the UN and its subsidiary
bodies must bear the primary responsibility for providing
"human security" on a global basis. This would mean the
disarmament of civilians and other impositions intended to
bring about "a culture of non-violence."
"Militarization today not only involves governments
spending more than necessary to build up their military ar-
senals," declared the CGG. "It has increasingly become a
 The Rwandan Genocide 71

global societal phenomenon, as witnessed by the rampant

acquisition and use of increasingly lethal weapons by civil-
ians - whether individuals seeking a means of self-defense,
street gangs, criminals, political opposition groups, or ter-
rorist organizations.v"
The UN's "h uman security" doctrine, as expressed by
the CGG, defines the legal civilian ownership of firearms
to be morally indistinguishable from terrorism or crime.
The UN believes legal civilian gun ownership to be anoth-
er manifestation of "militarization," which must be sup-
pressed by government measures intended "to encourage
the disarming of civilians ...."32
Once civilians are disarmed, claims the UN, their phys-
ical safety will depend on each nation's "internal security"
apparatus - that is, police and military establishments. But
to whom or to what will disarmed civilians appeal if the
chief threat to their security comes from that same "inter-
nal security " establishment?
The CGG explain s that when civilians are threatened by
their own governments, the UN has an "o bligation .. . to
act in a purely internal context" within the affected nations,
and that the body has the authority to represent the "inter-
ests of the international community in situations within in-
dividual states in which the security of people is violated
extensively/'P To help carry out that task , the CGG rec-
ommends that the UN devise "an NGO Early Warning Ser-
vice" to antic ipate and interdict large-scale human rights
abuses.l"
The UN followed this program in Rwanda. The civilian
population was disarmed, except for militia units under cen-
tral government control. The nation's "internal security"
force actively collaborated with the UN "peacekeepers" in
administering the peace accord, which called for efforts to
confiscate "all weapons distributed to or illegally acquired
by civilians ...."35 And there was certainly ample "early
72 Global Gun Grab

warning " about the government's intention to murder the

Tutsis .
Yet somehow, these efforts to propagate a "culture of
peace " in Rwanda precipitated a genocidal rampage pro-
ducing a huge numbe r of casualtie s, virtually all of whom
were disarmed civilians. The death toll "accumulated at
nearly three times the rate of Jewish dead during the Holo -
caust. It was the most efficient mass killing since the atom-
ic bombings of Hiro shima and Nagasaki," Gourevitch
concluded.l"

Civilian Disarmament in Rwanda

A rmed to the Teeth: The World-Wide Plague ofSmall Arms,
the UN 's propaganda film produced in anticip ation of the
2001 Small Arms Conference, insists that only through a
global crackdown on civilian arms possession "can geno-
cide as happened in Rwanda be prevented ." The film im-
putes to firearms a capac ity for independent malice and the
ability to "murder indiscriminately."
Curiously, however, the UN seems to believ e that
firearms are miraculously purged of their demonic qualities
when they are wielded by repre sent atives of the State.
Armed to the Teeth defines "legal" arIll:s as those "used by
armies and police forces to protect us," while denouncing
civilian-owned arms as "illegitimate" weapons that "bring
insecurity, suffering and devasration /'F In fact, the Rwan-
dan tragedy vividly illustrates how mass political murder is
carried out by standing armies and nationalized police, the
very people to whom the UN wishes to give excl usive na-
tional franchises on firearms ownership (under UN super-
vision, of course).
The hundreds of thousands of Rwandan victims were not
slaughtered by weapons acting independentl y of human
will, as Armed to the Teeth might lead some viewers to con-
clude. Nor were the massacres spontaneous outbreaks root-
 The Rwandan Genocide 73

ed in "ancient tribal hatreds"; in fact, there are no recorded

instances of inter-ethnic violence between Hutu and Tutsi
prior to 1959.38 The genocide was a carefully planned, rig-
orously executed conspiracy by the central government.
"This genocide, like all genocide, was planned," notes a
study of the Rwandan massacres compiled by Jews for the
Preservation of Firearms Ownership (JPFO). "It did not just
'happen.' The primary inten ded targets were easily identi-
fied in advance by community leaders , by appearance, and
by their 'national identity' cards.,,39
During the 103-day rampage, "an average of 8,000 per-
sons was murdered every day. The Nazis' industrialized
murder process may have surpassed this daily toll excep-
tionally, but did not do so on a sustained basis. Such a sus-
tained murder campaign obviously was carefully planned
and skillfully led. It was in no way a spontaneous event, a
'happening.' "40
Philip Gourevitch, the most acclaimed chronicler of the
Rwandan holocaust, confirms JPFO's account, pointing out
that "mass violence .. . must be organized; it does not oc-
cur aimlessly. Even mobs and riots have a design, and great
and sustained destruction requires great ambition. It must
be conceived as the means toward achieving a new order,
and althoug h the idea behind the new order may be crimi-
nal and objectively very stupid, it must also be compellingly
simple and at the same time absol ute.?"!
"Genocide, after all, is an exercise in community build-
ing," continues Gourevitch. "A vigorous totalitarian order
requires that the people be invested in the leaders' scheme,
and while genocide may be the most perverse and ambi -
tious means to this end, it is also the most comprehensive .
In 1994, Rwanda was regarded . .. as the exemplary instance
of the chaos and anarchy associated with collapsed states .
In fact, the genoc ide was the product of order, authoritari-
anis m, decades of modem political theorizing and indoc-
74 Global Gun Grab

trination, and one of the most meticulously administered

states in history.,,42
The Rwandan State was lavishly subsidized by the UN's
International Monetary Fund, which by the late 1980s was
underwriting about 60 percent of the regime's national budg-
et. 43 It also enjoyed the monopoly on firearms ownership
that the UN insists is the foundation of "human security."
While most of the State murders committed in 1994 were
carried out with machetes, knives, and farm tools, the vic-
tims - having first been disarmed - were rounded up and
kept in line by armed government troops and government-
organized militia, the only group permitted to have guns.
"To outsiders," wrote UN-aligned arms control special-
ists Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T. Klare, "it appeared as
if the people of Rwanda had been caught up in a violent
frenzy, with common farm implements as their favored in-
struments of extermination. But this isn't the whole story.
Before the killing began, the Hutu-dominated government
had distributed automatic rifles and hand grenades to offi-
cial militias and paramilitary gangs. It was this firepower
that made the genocide possible. Militia members terror-
ized their victims with guns and grenades as they rounded
them up for systematic slaughter with machetes and knives.
The murderous use of farm tools may have seemed a me-
dieval aberration, but the weapons and paramilitary gangs
that facilitated the genocide were all too modern.v'" (Em-
phasis added.)
Boutwell and Klare correctly identified one half of the
killing equation - the use of government-controlled
firearm s in the genocide . But they ignored the other neces-
sary factor : The disarmament of the intended civilian vic-
tims. JPFO 's analysi s takes into account both of these nec-
essary preconditions for the slaughter.
"The genocide regime's police and troops had govern-
ment-issued firearms," observes the JPFO study. "The geno-
 The Rwandan Genocide 75

cide regime also gave firearms and training to trusted civil-

ians. In other cases, the regime issued to its supporters per-
mits to buy firearms."
The victims were not armed, "even though they knew
they were at risk. They had previously been subject to
smaller-scale attacks. However, 'gun control' laws enacted
on 21 November 1964 . .. and 7 May 1979 ... kept them
from legally buying firearms for self-defense. Many had the
money to do so, despite Rwanda's general poverty. Many
members of the target group were of the former political or
current business elite.... Almost all the intended victims of
Rwanda's genocide regime tried to resist. They did not sub-
mit quietly to their murderers. The intended victims used
stones, clubs, and improvised weapons. In literally a hand-
ful of cases, they used firearms, taken from their would-be
murderers.t'P

Power Without Accountability

"I look back with a sense of pride and fulfillment at the hon-
orable end of the UN mission in Rwanda," boasted UN spe-
cial envoy Shaharyar Khan as the world body's pale blue
banner was lowered over Kigali. A crowd of protesters who
had gathered outside the UN's Rwandan headquarters ex-
pressed a different point of view. One of them raised a ban-
ner reading: "Boutros. The blood of our husbands, children
and relatives will always be with you.,,46
Who was to be held responsible for the UN 's perform-
ance in Rwanda? Nobody. Under the UN 's "human secu-
rity" regime, the organization enjoys power without ac-
countability - and it was not at all hesitant to invoke its
immunity even as it sought greater power and resources to
enforce its will upon the world.
In 2000, an American law firm representing the survivors
of two Tutsi officials killed in the genocide filed a lawsuit
against the UN. Australian attorney Michael Hourigan, who
76 Global Gun Grab

had worked as an investigator for the UN, offered his serv-

ices as an adviser to the plaintiffs "because he was dismayed
by what his investigation revealed about UN actions," ac-
cording to a news account.
Among the documents discovered by Hourigan during
his work as a UN investigator was an official memorandum
showing that the UN was aware of the impending genocide.
UN officials were thus aware that the victims whose rela-
tives filed the suit "faced a 'serious threat' of being killed,"
but they did not share that information with them . Had the
victims known that "UN protection was just an illusion ,"
they, like many others, would have fled.47 Even more shock-
ing was the discovery that some "peacekeepers sent to pro-
tect [potential victims] .. . either handed them over to the
rampaging militants or ran away when fighting broke
OUt.,,48
The UN responded to the lawsuit by asserting a com-
prehensive claim of immunity. According to UN spokesman
Farhan Hag, "as a gener al rule, the United Nations cannot
be sued for its official actions.T'? Fred Eckhard, Kofi
Annan 's personal spokesman, insisted that this plenary
grant of immunity was necessary to protect the vital work
of peacekeeping: "I can say that if we allowed our peace-
keepers to be brought to courts and tried over matters like
this, that would be the end of peacekeeping. We do not feel
responsible for what happened, and we do not believe we
should have to answer for anything in court."so
Power without accountability is a time-tested recipe for
tyranny. Undeterred by the UN 's role in the Rwandan geno-
cide , one of the architects of that tragedy - Kofi Annan -
has urged the world to pursue the same course that was fol-
lowed there: Civilian disarmament; nationalization of law
enfo rcement; and deference to the United Nations as the
world 's ultimate custodian of "human security."
"For the United Nations," declared Annan during a 1998
 The Rwandan Genocide 77

visit to Rice University, "there is no higher goal, no deep-

er commitment and no greater ambition than preventing
armed conflict."Sl Armed conflict is indeed terr ible and
tragic, especially when it takes the form of modem total
warfare . But there are circumstances in which armed con-
flict is unavoidable for those who seek to protect them -
selves, their families, their communities, and their nations .
Had the Rwandan Tutsis been in a position to mount an
armed defense in 1994, the genocide could have been
prevented.
The UN's premises, it bears repeating, are totalitarian.
In the UN's vision , the State (in this case, a world state ad-
ministered by itself) is the custodian of every individual's
physical security, with a monopoly on force and the power
to "prevent" violence through coercive intervention. And in
totalitarian fashion, Annan, who has spent his professional
lifetime as a UN bureaucrat, insists that the UN's failures
clinch the case for giving the body total power : "Have we
not seen enough coffins, from Rwanda to Bosnia to Cam-
bodia , to pay for the price of prevention?"s2
This is a more honest question: Have we not seen enough
coffins, from Soviet Russia to National Socialist Germany to
Communist Cambodia to UN-administered Rwanda, to un-
derstand the lethal consequences of civilian disarmament?
Each of those nations fell prey to a totalitarian govern-
ment that stripped its opposition of weapons - often using
laws passed by non-totalitarian predecessor regimes - and
then murdered hundreds of thousands, millions, or even tens
ofmillions of its disarmed subjects. The only "human secu-
rity" afforded such hapless peop le is the securi ty of the
grave, where at least they can suffer no more.

The Drive for Total Power

Among the most influential works of 18th-century Engl ish
political science was Cato 's Letters, a series of anonymous
78 Global Gun Grab

libertarian tracts. The authors of those essays - which were

eagerly read by the Founders of our republic and the
Framers of our Constitution - defined despotism as "the
unrelenting War of an armed Tyrant upon his unarmed Sub-
jects." In a similar vein, English essayist James Burgh , writ-
ing at the time of the American Revolution, reminded
British parliamentarians that "the possession of arms is the
distinction between a freeman and a slave.,,53Entrusting the
UN - or, for that matter, our own central government -
with the protection of our "human security" would be an
abdication of individual liberty in favor of self-imposed
slavery.
Following its performance in Rwanda, the UN sought to
shift blame from itself by indicting a "lack of will" on the
part of its member-states to provide the organization with
manpower, money, and resources. "I can assure you that no
government would have said, 'Yes, here are our boys for an
offensive operation in Rwanda,' " declared Iqbal Riza, Kofi
Annan 's deputy chief of UN peacekeeping.54 But there is a
reason why national governments have been unable to attract
volunteers willing to die on behalf of the UN's vision of
"human security": The natural human inclination is to pro-
tect himself and his family, as well as his immediate com-
munity - not to die on behalf of collectivist abstractions.
The best defense against criminal assaults aimed at the
innocent is self-defense. While people do create govern-
ments for the collective exercise of the individual right to
self-defense, no free society can have a government so all-
encompassing that it can come to the aid of all individuals
facing imminent danger. Attempts to create such govern-
ments always result in immediate peril from that govern-
ment itself
A presentation made during the UN's July 2001 Small
Arms Conference underscored this reality. During his ad-
dress to the conference, Isaac Lappia of Amnesty Interna-
 The Rwandan Genocide 79

tional in Sierra Leone acknowledged that "small arms and

light weapons are now the principal weapons used by gov-
ernment and opposition armed forces in violent conflicts....
In addition, our factual data shows incontrovertibly that
small arms are also used in many more countries to facili-
tate serious crimes by law enforcement personnel - in-
cluding police, prison authorities, paramilitaries, and the
army - where they commit persistent human rights viola-
tions including torture , rape, 'disappearances,' and arbitrary
killing s."
According to Lappia, however, the real problem is that
these crimes committed under the color of State authority
"have a powerful demonstration effect on civil society, en-
couraging civilians to take up illicit arms.,,55
In other words : Even when governments are committing
hideou s crimes against their subjects, it is still "illicit" for
civilians to own firearms for the purpose of self-defense.
This is the digested essence of the UN 's doctrine of "human
security."
 CHAPTER SIX

'.'Peace" Through Terror

Nervous [UN peacekeepe rs} positioned in elevated,
sandbagged bunkers opened fire on the crowd with
auto matic weapons, killing at least 14, including
women and children, and wounding 20. Some of the
demon strators were appa rently shot as they tried to
flee the gunfi re, and victims lay in their own blood as
UN armored vehicles drove by making no effort to
help the wounded. "There was a man whose arm was
almost severed," reported Paul Watson, a correspon -
dent with the Toronto Star. "He was basically mush
from the hips down. The guy was still alive when the
UN trucks passed by, but they just kept on going:"!
- An account of the UN's "peace enforcement"
mission in Somalia, 1993

As an Army we are fortunate to have ... a rich web of

historical tradition . But our experience is oflittle use
if it cannot be interpreted in light offuture opera-
tions .... [T}he future will be dom inated by a single
overwhelming presence - the United Nations. 2
- James J. Schneider, professor of military theory
at U.S. Command and General Staff College,
Fort Leavenworth

would the UN go about enforcing a global gun

H OW
ban? The most effective means of enforcing civilian
disarmament, as we have seen, is psychological disarma-
ment - inducing people to tum in their weapons voluntar-
ily. After all, even the most efficient and comprehensive

80
 "Peace" Through Terror 81

police state ultimately depends upon the cooperation of its

subjects. Why use overt force when indoctrination works
much better?
But the UN has shown that it has ways of being more ,
shall we say, persuasive when indoctrination and other
means of inducing voluntary disarmament prove ineffec-
tive. Consider the case of the UN 's "peacekeeping" mission
to Croatia, a mission known as "UNTAES ."

Disarmament Through Intimidation

Derek Boothby, who was one of the highest-ranking civil-
ian officials for UNTAES from 1996-1997, described how
the UN mission was given the task of maintaining "law and
order" in the affected areas within the former Yugoslav
province of Croatia. To carry out that mandate, blue-hel-
meted troops from several nations conducted weapons turn-
in programs for the specific purpose of disarming the Serb
minority, many of whom had been driven from their homes
or otherwise victimized by Croatian authorities during the
Yugoslav civil war. .
"Although the mandate of UNTAES contained no spe-
cific reference to removing weapons from civilian hands, it
was clear that a determined effort of this nature was con-
sistent with the need to ensure civilian law and order," ex-
plains Boothby. "[T[he philosophy of the UNTAES leader-
ship was to regard the [Security Council] mandate as a floor
on which the fabric of implementation was to be con-
structed, rather than a ceiling that placed restraints and lim-
its on the operation.l"
There is an important fact to remember about the "man-
dates" the UN gives to itself: They are open-ended and sub-
ject to expansion without prior notice. In this case, the
UNTAES commanders invoked an August 1997 report of
the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms,
which recommended "the prompt collection and destruc-
82 Global Gun Grab

tion of all weapons not under legal civilian possession and

not required for national defense or interna l security/"
(Emphasis added.)
From the UN 's perspective, no civilian firearms owner-
ship is ever justified. Thus the UNTAES "peacekeepers,"
following standard UN guidelines, organized a two-phase
" weapons collection" program. In Phase I, ex-combatants
- soldiers and paramilitaries - were "de-mobilized" and
disarmed. Phase II of the UNTAES operation consisted of
"longer-term efforts aimed at disarming an armed civilian
population....,,5 In Croatia, once the Serb military unit s were
de-mobilized, "the next logical step was an organized ef-
fort to control the weapons that remained and, as far as po s-
sib le, get them out of civilian hands,"?
Thi s was complicated by the fact that the Croatian gov-
ernment, which was und er the control of a faction see king
to re-create the World War Il -era Ustash e Fas cist regime,"
was contemplating a military offen sive "tha t would eradi-
cate the Serb problem once and for all." g Not surp risingly,
many Serb s res isted the dem and that they relinquish the
means of defending themselves. Th e UN, though, insisted
upon providing an arms monopoly to the centra l govern-
ment - and it made clear the fact that it was willing to use
lethal for ce to disarm tho se who resisted :

As the [UN] troops and their military assets arri ved

and were deployed, with heavy equipment taking up
its positions and helicopter gun ships exercising over
the region, an un spoken but clear message was being
deliberately sent to the Serb and Croatian authorities,
and to the people of the region, that UNTAES was
more robustly equipped than other UN missions and
would be prepared to impose security if challenged.
This attitude .. . undoubtedly helped to create an at-
mo sph ere that was conducive to the civilian popula-
 "Peace" Through Terror 83

tion subsequently taking part in the weapons buy-

back program."

Very rarely has a UN official spoken so candidly of the ba-

sic premise of the organization: Peace through terror. The
entire purpose of the UN's display of might in Croatia was
to intimidate Serb civilians into surrendering their weapons,
which were in tum handed over to the neo-Fascist central
government. At the end of the UNTAES operation in Janu-
ary 1998, Boothby proudly recalls, damaged weapons were
destroyed, and "the UN [arms] containers were removed
from their positions in front of the storage doors and the
UN keys were formally handed over to the Croatian au-
thorities, thereby transferring the entire control of the re-
maining weapons over to the Croatian government." 10 This
left the Serb minority at the mercy of a government that had
once openly contemplated liquidating them once and for
all.

From "Restoring Hope" to Killing Civilians

The UN's "peacekeeping" mission in Croatia was not the
first time that a UN "humanitarian" invasion was given a
gun-grabbing mandate. The world body had tried the same
trick in Somalia - with tragic and bloody consequences.
The UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) did not be-
gin as a "peace enforcement" mission, much less a civilian
disarmament operation. But by the time it ended, the oper-
ation offered a useful i11ustration of how the world body
will cloak its ambitions in the language of "humanitarian-
ism" - and then, at whim, engage in all-out warfare against
those who resist the world body's wi11. The UN's attempt
to bring Somalia under its heel cost the lives of dozens of
American servicemen, and hundreds, or perhaps thousands,
of Somalis. Most of the deaths resulted from the UN's de-
cision to disarm and "pacify" a Somali clan that had over-
84 Global Gun Grab

thrown a pro-Soviet dictator and would not put up with any

further foreign domination.
When 30,000 American troops, acting under UN Secu-
rity Council Resolution 794, hit Somalia's beaches in De-
cember 1992, their stated goal was to provide "humanitar-
ian relief" to famine victims. "Our mission has a limited
objective - to open the supply routes, to get the food mov-
ing, and to prepare the way for a UN peacekeeping force to
keep it moving," explained then-President George Bush (the
elder) in an address to the nation . II
Speaking two years after the UN-ordered invasion,
William J. van den Heuvel, chairman of the United Nations
Association of the USA and a member of the Council on
Foreign Relations, exulted : "There was never a prouder mo-
ment than when U.S. forces under the UN flag landed on
the shores of Somalia."12 The "humanitarian" focus of the
Somalia invasion made the deployment - which was chris-
tened "Operation Restore Hope" - a relatively easy sell
for both Americans and Somalis, as did assurances from
Bush that American troops would be out two months later
- January 20, 1993, the day a new U.S. President would
be inaugurated.
But, as is almost always the case with UN initiatives,
"Operation Restore Hope" was a bait-and -switch. In March
1993 the UN Security Council, acting on an initiative from
Washington, issued Resolution 814, which transformed the
"humanitarian" mission into an exercise in "nation-build -
ing ." U.S. and other troops were now charged with the task
of "rebuilding" civic institutions (actually, creating West-
ern-style institutions where they hadn't previously existed),
aiding the "political reconciliation" of the country's six ma-
jor clan factions, and creating local and national police
forces. 13 Shortly thereafter, the mission mutated again into
what was called UNOSOM II - which would eventually
become a military campaign to disarm militiamen who were
 "Peace" Through Terror 85

loyal to clan leader Mohammed Farah Aideed.

In Somalia, American troops became tragically acquaint-
ed with the term "mission creep ." The lethal meaning of that
expression was made clear on October 3, 1993, when 18
American troops were killed and 75 were wounded during
a battle in Mogadishu with forces loyal to Aideed. Unbear-
able video footage captured after that battle depicted the
lifeless body of an American pilot being dragged through
Mogadishu's sandy streets as Aideed loyalists cheered
themselves hoarse.
There was also plenty of Somali blood being shed be-
fore the October 1993 "Battle of Mogadishu" - and most
of the bloodshed was precipitated by UN efforts to seize
Somali firearms.

"Bodies All Over the Place"

When UNOSOM II was inaugurated on May 5, 1993, Lieu-
tenant General Robert B. Johnston, the Marine general com-
manding U.S. forces in Somalia, ordered that the U.S. flag
be taken down from the mission 's command headquarters.
Turkish General CevikBir, who took the reins of command
from Gen. Johnston, ordered the UN flag to fly in its
place. 14 Immediately thereafter, relations between the UN
and Aideed degenerated, largely as a result of the "war-
lord's" insistence that Somalis should work out their own
peace settlement, on their own terms , following their own
customs, without outside interference. When Aideed called
a peace conference, the UN organized a competing peace
conference - and pointedly refused to invite Aideed.P
One important source of friction between Aideed's clan
and the UN was found in the fact that Boutros Boutros-
Ghali, the Egyptian socialist who was UN secretary-gener-
al at the time, had been a supporter of pro-Soviet Somali
dictator Barre. As a diplomat in the service of the Egyptian
government, Boutros-Ghali had actively opposed Aideed
86 Global Gun Grab

and his clan during their effort to unseat Barre. 16 Although

Aideed's followers suspected that the UN's policies in So-
malia reflected Boutros-Ghali's personal bias, it is much
more likely that the world body was seeking to punish and
eradicate an effective anti-Communist movement. The task
of neutralizing - and eventually liquidating - anti-Com -
munist opposition will always involve civilian disarmament.
Shortly after the UN "peace conference" snubbed Aideed,
Pakistani "peacekeepers" made an unannoun ced visit to an
ammunition storehouse near Radio Mogadishu, a station
run by Aideed loyalists, and at one point forced their way
into the station. This was done after announcements had
been made over a station loyal to Aideed 's chief rival, Ali
Mahdi - who had emerged as the UN's preferred "war-
lord" - that the UN was going to seize radio stations and
other "institutions which are the causes of present instabil-
ity." That night - June 5, 1993 - militiamen loyal to
Aideed engaged the Pakistani "peacekeepers," killing 24. 17
Two days later, the Security Council issued Resolution
837, calling for the arrest, trial, and punishment of Aideed
and others responsible for "premeditated attacks" on UN
troops. Aideed insisted that the incident was provoked by
the UN's attempt to seize the radio station and called for an
independent international investigation of the incident. 18
The UN 's own internal review, which was later conducted
by Tom Farer, a professor at American University and a
member of the Council on Foreign Relations , provided con-
firmation that the June 5th battle was provoked by UN
troops conducting a "weapons inspection" that may in fact
have been "a cover-up for reconnaissance and subsequent
seizure of Radio Mogadishu."?
The death of 24 "peacekeepers," and the spuriou s arrest
warrant issued for Aideed, gave the UN command a pretext
for commencing an all-out war on his clansmen - both
armed and civilian. Beginning on June 12th, U.S. warplanes
 "Peace" Through Terror 87

bombed positions held by Aideed including Radio Mo-

gadishu, which was subsequently seized by American in-
fantrymen . On the next day a crowd of outraged Somalis
assembled to protest the attacks. Pakistani troops opened
fire on the crowd, killing and wounding scores of civilians.
One of the victims was a two-year-old boy who was stand-
ing a half-mile away; he was killed when a high-velocity
round struck him in the abdomen .P
One American officer involved in the campaign against
Aideed admitted that the purpose of the UN 's apparently ir-
rational campaign was to provoke the "warlord": "The idea
was to draw out his weapons so we can destroy them." The
body count began to rise: A six-hour battle on June 17th re-
sulted in the death of scores of Somalis, five UN soldiers,
and one French relief worker. r! Within a month , guerilla
strikes by Aideed 's forces had killed more than 70 UN
personnel.
On July 12th, U.S. helicopter gunships opened fire on a
residential villa identified as a "command center" for Aideed,
firing more than 2,000 rounds of 20-millimeter cannon fire
and 16 missiles. Following the assault, U.S. infantrymen
swarmed the premises and seized radios , documents, and
- of course - small arms .P This attack could be consid-
ered the critical turning point in the Somalia tragedy.
A UN spokesman insisted that the assault upon the res-
idence had inflicted "no collateral damage whatsoever" and
that "no innocent civilians were injured in the attack." So-
mali casualties , insisted the UN spokesman, totaled 13 dead
and 11 wounded, all of whom were armed adult males. Im-
partial observers on the scene, however, told a different
story. Gary T. Dempsey and Roger W. Fontaine of the Cato
Institute offer this account:

Despite the claim that the attack was carried out with
pinpoint accuracy and that all of the death and de-
88 Global Gun Grab

struction was limited to the villa compound, an Amer-

ican reporter on the scene, Scott Peterson, said that
the raid was far bloodier than UN and U.S. officials
acknowledged. "It was devastating," said Peterson.
"There were bodies all over the place - they were
mincemeat." On the basis of a survey of two of Mo-
gadishu's large hospitals, the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross said at least 54 Somalis were
killed in the attack and 174 wounded. But the actual
casualty toll was likely higher because other medical
facilities in the city were not surveyed, and the So-
mali tradition is to bury their dead without first tak-
ing them to hospitals.P

Shortly before that assault took place, U.S. troops under UN

command "began conducting house to house weapons
searches ...."24 In late August, Washington deployed a group
of 400 elite U.S. Army Rangers to help capture Aideed.
Shortly thereafter, the U.S.-led UN mission made those
areas of Mogadishu controlled by Aideed's forces a free-
fire zone. After an incident in which an American helicop-
ter opened fire on a crowd, killing 200 civilians , U.S. Army
Major David Stockwell, chief spokesman for UNOSOM II,
explained: "There are no sidelines or spectator seats. The
people on the ground are considered combatants/'P
In Black Hawk Down, a mesmerizing account of street
combat in the capital city of Mogadishu, reporter Mark
Bowden points out that after the July 12th attack upon the
suspected "command center," Aideed's clan declared war
on America. The spectacle of a prolonged artillery and mis-
sile barrage conducted by 17 U.S. attack helicopters upon
a private residence made it clear to the members of Aideed's
clan that they were dealing with a merciless foe. Thus when
American Rangers and members of the elite Army Delta
Force were sent to "arrest" Aideed and his top associates
 "Peace" Through Terror 89

on October 3rd , clan ·members were motivated and well-

prepared.
One survivor of the July 12th attack was a witness to the
attempt to "arrest" Aideed. As he saw an armada of Amer-
ican helicop ters assemble near Aideed's suspected redoubt
in downtown Mogadis hu, he and his friends were filled with
rage: " It was one thing for the world to intervene to feed
the starving, and even for the UN to help Somalia form a
peaceful government. But this business of sending U.S.
Rangers swooping down into their city and kidnapping their
leaders , this was too much .,,26 By collaborating in the UN 's
campaign to disarm its Somalia opposition, the U.S . gov-
. ernment set the stage for one of the bloodiest military de-
feats in recent American history .

Up the "Escalation Ladder"

From the UN's actions in Croatia and Somalia, we can piece
together the UN's civilian disarmament "escalation ladder":
First comes the psychological disarmament campaign to
persuade civilians to turn in their guns; then comes a show
of force to intimidate them into giving up their weapons.
Typically, it is only after these efforts fail that what Shake-
speare called "bloody constraint" - lethal military force
- would be used. But the UN does reserve to itself that op-
tion, and it has shed innocent blood in an effort to disarm
civilians. The UN will also cloak its intentions in "human-
itarian" garb or other disguises.
In both Croatia and Somal ia, and in many other nations ,
the UN has used Blue Helmets to carry out gun confiscation
- and American troops were directly involved in the Soma-
lia gun grab. But the Croatia mission also highlights an im-
portant and little-appreciated fact about the UN's long-term
designs for global civilian disarmament: The useable weapons
confiscated from civilians were turned over to the central
government, which was eventually given responsibility for
90 Global Gun Grab

enforcing "internal security" under UN supervision.

The UN's preferred arrangement is to provide a nation-
al monopoly on force to each central government, acting
through its centralized, militarized "internal security" es-
tablishment. As we will see in the next chapter, the creation
of a UN-approved police state apparatus is well underway
in the United States .
Anyone who questions whether or not the UN is anti-gun
should ponder the significance of this statue in front of the
General Assembly building of the UN's New York City
headquarters,
If the photo on the previous page provides one clue as to the
UN's anti-gun bias, this ' work of art' provides 7,000 . At least,
that's the number of 'deactivated crime and war weapons ' it
supposedly contains . Known as TheGunSculpture: TheArt Of
Disarmament, it was unveiled at the UN's July 2001 Small
Arms Conference.

E
"
'6
G3
ci
'"
~
o
s:
>-
The statue of Captain John Parker, who commanded the
Minutemen on the Lexington Green, is a powerful reminder
of our heritage of freedom. That heritage, of course, is
intertwined with the right to bear arms.
 CHAPTER SEVEN

Militarizing Mayberry
[T]he mindset of the soldier is simply not appropri-
ate for the civilian police officer. Police officers con-
front not an "enemy" but individuals who are pro-
tected by the bill ofrights. Confusing the policefunc-
tion with the military function can lead to dangerous
and unintended consequences - such as unnecessary
shootings and killings. 1
- Cato Institute Police Analyst Diane Cecilia Weber

The U.S. government declares a ban on the posses -

sion, sale, transportation, and transfer of all non -
sporting firearms. A thirty (30) day amnesty period is
permitted for these firearms to be turned over to the
local authorities. At the end ofthis period, a number
of citizen groups refuse to turn over their firearms.
Consider the following statement: I would fire upon
U.S. citizens who refuse or resist confiscation of
firearms banned by the U.S. government. 2
- "Question 46" of the "Combat Arms Survey," as
administered to 300 Marines at Twentynine Palms
Marine Base, May 10, 1994

A t least two generations of Americans are familiar with

The Andy Griffith Show, which depicted life in the
idyllic North Carolina town of Mayberry. The star of the
program portrayed easy-going, small -town Sheriff Andy
Taylor. "SheriffAndy" was the fictional embodiment of the
police motto "To Protect and Serve": He wore his author -
ity lightly and was able to defuse most situations without

91
92 Global Gun Grab

violence. His most pressing challenges were to provide

Otis, the town drunk , with a suitable cell in which to sleep
off his habitual indulgences, and to keep high-strung
Deputy Sheriff Barney Fife in line. One of the things Sher-
iff Andy did to rein in his overzealous deputy was to give
him only a single bullet, which was never used.
Granted, The Andy Griffith Show was a television pro-
gram, and a rather whimsical one at that. But it was in some
waysan accurate reflection of small -town American life in
the early 1960s. In that era, SheriffAndy Taylor typified the
face of law enforcement for millions of Americans. Chosen
by and accountable to the citizens of the community in
which he lived, Sheriff Taylor would never allow the office
he held to become a menace to Mayberry 's liberties.

A "Thought Experiment"
Let 's consider how radically different things would be for
SheriffAndy Taylor if we were to update The Andy Griffith
Show for the early 21st century. The following scenario
illustrates how real-life developments in the field of feder-
al control of our local police would affect the fictional town
of Mayberry.
Sheriff Taylor 's police force might be augmented with a
federally subsidized SWATteam, which would be equipped
with cutting-edge firepower provided by the Defense De-
partment. Operating as part of a multi-jurisdictional task
force, the Mayberry SWAT team would be called upon to
carry out "no-knock" raids on the home s of suspected drug
dealers, whose property could be summarily confiscated
without a trial; all that is necessary is an allegation that the
property had somehow been used in the course of criminal
activity.'
While the feds are militarizing Mayberry, they are mak-
ing life miserable for Sheriff Taylor and his associates. In
the late 1990s, the Ju stice Department targeted the May-
 M ilitarizing May berry 93

berry Sheriff's Department for investigation after a local

"civil rights" group accused it of "racial profiling." Ac-
cordingly, Mayberry was forced to sign a "consent decree"
under which a federal "monitor" was appointed to oversee
every aspect of the department's work. This monitor is a
federa l political officer - what the Soviets called a Zam-
polit - whose role is to bring the department firmly under
federal control. Sheriff Taylor, preoccupied with his own
worries, is only vaguely aware that through similar "con -
sent decrees," local police forces across the nation are be-
ing federalized."
Not surprisi ngly, Sheriff Taylor is dealing with a morale
crisis . Hamstru ng by invasive federal scrutiny and wary of
becoming a cause celebre for the media, Taylor's deputies
are simply refusing to enforce the law when doing so would
leave them vulnerable to charges of "racism." Many are just
marking time until retirement. Taylor himse lf would like to
retire, but he can't find a replacement. Talking with other
sheriffs and police chiefs across the nation, Taylor learn s
that the same thing is happening across the country. In fact,
there's a name for it: "De-policing."s
Looking around him, Sheriff Andy recognizes, to his sor-
row, that the "thin blue line" is being erased, and he won-
ders what will replace it: Will it be the anarchy of
unchecked street crime, or the tyranny of consolidated fed-
eral police power?

Too Close for Comfort

This scenario is fictional only in its application to the myth-
ical town of Mayberry. Every significant development in-
corporated into this thought experiment reflects actual fed-
eral policies and their impact upon state and local police
forces. In recent years , parti cularly since the tragic 1993
slaughter of the Branch Davidians in their Waco Mt. Carmel
church, millions of Americans have become disturbed by
94 Global Gun Grab

the proliferation of feder al paramilitary force s, and the ex-

panded federal control over state and local polic e agencies.
This impression is fortified by the obvious hostility to-
ward the public often displayed by federal paramilitary of-
ficers. Tony Cooper, a law enforcement consultant who has
taught courses on negotiation tactic s at the University of
Texas at Dalla s, warns that many federal law enforcement
personnel have succumbed to "a curious crusading mental-
ity" in which the American public is to be feared as a po-
tential enem y, rather than served and protected as law-abid-
ing citizens. Certain federal agencies, observes Cooper, lust
to "stamp out what they see as a threat to'government gen-
erally. It's an exagger ated concern that they are facing a na-
tionwide conspiracy and that somehow this will get out of
control unless it is stamped out at a very early stage,"?
This militaristic mind-set is being transmitted by the feds
to local and state police departments - along with sub-
stantial amounts of military hardware. Notes Diane Cecil-
ia Weber, a law enforcement affairs analyst at the Cato In-
stitute: "Congress has encouraged the U.S. military to sup-
ply intelligence, equipment, and training to civilian police .
That encouragement has spawned a culture of pararnili-
tarism in American law enforcement." By the end of the
1990s, "nearly 90 percent of the police departments sur-
veyed in cities with populations over 50,000 had param ili-
tary units, as did 70 percent of the departments surveyed in
communities with populations under 50,000. The Pentagon
has been equipping those units with M-16s, armored per-
sonnel carriers, and grenade launchers . The polic e para-
military units also conduct training exercises with active
duty Army Rangers and Navy SEALs ."?
As we saw in the previous chapter, U.S. soldiers under
UN command were ordered to act as police and carry out
"arrests" in Somalia. In the streets of America, militarized
police officers increasingly under federal control are often
 Militarizing Mayb erry 95

ordered to behave like soldiers. One member of a metro-

politan police tactical team expressed the mindset of mili-
tarized police:

We're into saturation patrols in hot spots. We do a lot

of our work with the SWAT unit because we have big-
ger guns. We send out two, two -to-four-men cars, we
look for minor violations and do j ump-outs, either on
people or on the street or automobiles. After we jump-
out the second car provides periphery cover with an
ostentatious display of weaponry. We're sending a
clear message: if the shootings don't stop , we 'll shoot
someone.f

Weber (who coined the expression "Militarizing Mayberry")

describes another small Midwestern town who se police
department "sends out patrols dres sed in tactical uniform
in a military personnel carrier. The armored vehicle, ac-
cording to the SWAT commander, stops 'suspicious vehi -
cle s and people. We'll stop anything that mo ves. We'll
sometimes even surround suspicious homes and bring out
the MP5s [machine gun pistols],"?
Because of the co-mingling of military and law en-
forc ement, state and local police agencies "are increasing-
ly accepting the mil itary as a model for their beh avior and
outlook," continued Weber. "The sharing of training and
technology is producing a shared mind set. The problem is
that the mindset of the soldier is simply not appropriate for
the civ ilian police offic er. Police officer s co nfront not an
'enemy' but ind ividu als who are protected by the bill of
rights. Confusing the police function with the military func-
tion can lead to dangero us and unintended consequences -
such as unnecessary shootings and killings."10
What we are witnessi ng is the slow but persistent aboli-
tion of our independent, local police forces, and their amal-
96 Global Gun Grab

gamation into a centralized, militarized "internal security"

force - just as the 1961 Freedom From War blueprint
dictates.
Under the U.S. Constitution, the job of making and en-
forcing criminal laws is reserved almost entirely to the
states. As James Madison explained in The Federalist,
No. 46:

The powers delegated by the ... Constitution to the

federal government are few and well defined . Those
which are to remain in the State governments are nu-
merous and indefinite.... The powers reserved to the
several States will extend to all the objects which, in
the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, lib-
erties, and properties of the people, and the internal
order, improvement, and prosperity of the state.

The Freedom From War proposal dictates, however, that in

the final stage of the disarmament program, "States [that is,
national governments] would retain only those forces, non-
nuclear armaments, and establishments requiredfor the pur-
pose ofmaintaining internal order....»u (Emphasis added.)
One of the highest priorities for such "internal security"
forces would be to carry out the confiscation and destruc -
tion of illicit arms : "The manufacture of armaments would
be prohibited except for those agreed types and quantities
to be used by the UN Peace Force and those required to
maintain internal order. All other armaments would be de-
stroyed or converted to peaceful purposes. v'? (Emphasis
added.)
It is through the "militarization of Mayberry" that the
Power Elite behind the UN seeks to bring about the disar-
mament of American civilians. Those who expect an apoc-
alyptic invasion by blue-helmeted UN troops are fixating
upon the wrong threat. A much more plausible scenario is
 Militarizing Mayberry 97

that UN civilian disarmament policies would be enforced

by Americans against Americans.

Disarmament Through Subversion

It is vitally important to understand that the main threat rep-
resented by the UN is not invasion, but subversion. For the
foreseeable future, the chief impact that the UN will have
upon American institutions and policies will come in the
form of "harmonization" - meaning that our laws and gov-
ernmental policies will be adjusted to conform with our na-
tion's supposed "international obligations" as defined in UN
treaties and conventions.
Michael Scardaville, an international affairs analyst for
the Heritage Foundation, correctly identified one aspect of
this threat as it applies to the right to keep and bear arms.
In an essay published during the UN's July 2001 Small
Arms Conference, Scardaville surmised: "The United Na-
tions ' agenda may not be to overturn the Second Amend-
ment per se, but it has cleared a path for making enforce-
ment of this constitutional protection illegal under interna-
tional law'v''
"Very well," skeptics might persist, "the UN wants to
ban civilian gun possession under 'international law.' It still
doesn't have the means to enforce such a decree, so why
should we be alarmed?"
First of all, we should not assume that the United States
will always be as powerful as at present, or that the UN will
continue to be so (apparently) helpless. But again, in the
immediate term, the threat comes not from the UN itself,
but from American institutions that are being corrupted and
placed at the service of the UN's agenda - particularly the
U.S. military and our law enforcement agencies.
Since our nation became entangled in the UN, we have
incrementally ceded to the UN and its affiliates operational
control over our military. Since Congress approved the
98 Global Gun Grab

United Nations Participation Act in December 1945, our

nation has fought two major wars (Korea and Vietnam), two
minor wars (the Gulf War and the 1999 bombing ofYugo -
slavia), and carried out scores of "peacekeeping" missions
under the UN or its regional affiliates - such as the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the South-East
Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO, which is now desig-
nated the Association of South-East Asian Nation s, or
ASEAN) . Such deployments are now called "Operations
Other Than War" (OOTW), a category that include s non-
traditional role s for the military in both foreign and do-
mestic affairs.
American military personnel continue to serve under UN
comm and in Korea, Macedoni a, Kosovo, and elsewhere.
Literally tens of thousands of American soldiers, sailors,
Marines, and airmen have been trained to carry out UN or-
ders, and in many cases have done so using lethal force.
These deployments are, in effect, training exercises being
used to indoctrinate the future leaders of our military and
police forces.
This is the most dangerous form of "harmonization" con-
ducted by our political elite through the UN. Since the ear-
liest days of our republic, servicemen were required to
swear an oath to protect our Constitution from all enemies
"foreign and domestic" - an oath that many servicemen
are now required to violate by serving the UN. In fact, as is
illustrated by the case of Army Specialist Michael New,
American military personnel who remain true to their oath
by refusing to serve under UN command will be court-mar-
tialed and cashiered from the service. 14
Does this mean that all American military veterans of
UN missions become helpless drones, ready and able to
crush all domestic resistance to world government? Of
course not. But it does mean that there is a large and grow-
ing pool of such personnel who have demonstrated a will-
 Militarizing Mayberry 99

ingness to carry out UN commands - and that those who

are not willing to do so, for reason s of patriotic principle,
are being slowly purged from the ranks or leaving of their
own accord. And it is from the ranks of the military that
many future law enforcement officers will be drawn ; this
will increasingly be the case as the barriers between the mil-
itary and police are broken down.

The Perils of Police Militarization

The 1993 federal massacre of the Branch Davidians at
Waco's Mt. Carmel church illustrates the perils of milita-
rized law enforcement, particularly in the context of civil-
ian disarmament operations. During the notorious final
siege on April 19th, scores of American citizens - includ-
ing 23 small children - were gassed for several hours by
FBI tanks, eventually dying of suffocation, immolation, or
from automatic weapons fire.
The 51-day standoff between the Davidians and federal
authorities began when the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms (ATF) mounted a paramilitary assault on the
church for the supposed purpose of serving an "arrest" war-
rant on firearms charges. (The charges against Davidian
leader David Koresh essentially boiled down to an insignif-
icant irregularity regarding taxes and fees .)
This is not the place to examine in detail the criminal
actions of the ATF and FBI in the Waco tragedy. It is worth
noting, however, that the Army's secretive Delta Force ,
which would later playa key role in the October 1993 Bat-
tle of Mogadishu, reportedly played an active, "trigger-
pulling" role in the bloody final siege against Waco's
Branch Davidians in April of the same year. IS The FBI's
"Hostage Rescue Team" (HRT), which conducted the fatal
final siege at Waco, was essentially a "civilian" spin -off
from the Army's Delta Force; this was done to circumvent
the "Posse Comitatus" statute, which forbids the use of the
100 Global Gun Grab

u.s. military for domestic law enforcement. 16

Waco was not the first time that the FBI's Hostage Res-
cue Team had been mobilized against American citizens ac-
cused of technical violations of firearms laws. The 1992
Ruby Ridge tragedy in Idaho, like the Waco holocaust, was
a result of federal efforts to enforce "gun control" laws . In-
vestigative author James Bovard explains:

In 1989, a BATF undercover agent approached [Randy]

Weaver and sought to get him to sell the agent sawed -
off shotguns. Weaver refused, but the agent was per-
sistent and even showed Weaver exactly where to saw
off a shotgun barrel. Weaver eventually relented to the
undercover agent's pressure and sold him two sawed -
off shotguns for $300 . Because the guns' barrels were
a quarter-inch less than sixteen inches, Weaver was
guilty of violating federal firearms laws .' ?

In August 1992, after Weaver failed to appear at a hearing,

FBI agents were sent to his mountain redoubt to arrest him.
In the gunfight that erupted when a federal agent shot the
family dog, Randy's son Samuel and Federal Marshal
William Degan were killed. IS After an l l-day standoff,
Weaver surrendered to the authorities. He was later acquit-
ted of all charges except for his failure to appear in court
and violating the terms of his bail agreernent.l?
Like Somalian clan leader Mohammed Farah Aideed,
Randy Weaver - a former Green Beret who had dabbled
at the fringe s of the "Christian Identity" movement, a neo-
Nazi sect - was a tainted figure whose arrest could be used
to score easy propaganda points for the Establishment. But
where the "arrest" of Aideed was to be carried out by U .S.
military personnel acting as UN "globo-cops ," the arrest of
Weaver was to be conducted by militarized federal officers
acting as an "internal security" force.
 Militarizing Mayberry 101

The mind-set displayed by the FBI troops at Ruby Ridge

was remarkably similar to that of U.S. Army personnel in
Somalia. After one particularly bloody assault upon a civil-
ian residence in Mogadishu, UN spokesman David Stock-
well defended the indiscriminate killing: "The people on
the ground are considered combatants." Those words were
reminiscent of the illegal "rules of engagement" composed
to govern the federal standoff at Ruby Ridge. The Ruby
Ridge rules of engagement specified that any adult with a
weapon observed in the vicinity of the Weaver cabin dur-
ing the standoff "could and should be the subject of deadly
force,,2o - guidelines that were later described as uncon-
stitutional "shoot-to-kill" orders.
According to a June 1995 Justice Department report
(which was leaked via the internet after being initially sup-
pressed), the rules of engagement illegally made the civil-
ians at Ruby Ridge "'fair game' for deadly force" even
when they posed no immediate threat to law enforcement
agents." As a result of those orders, Kevin Harris, a friend
of the Weaver family, was shot and seriously wounded, and
Vicki Weaver was shot in the head and killed while hold-
ing a l O-monrh-old baby girl.
The Weaver family, which lived on a mountainside they
shared with wild animals, including predators, had a small
collection of weapons - 14 in all. During Randy Weaver's
trial, federal prosecutor Kim Lindquist claimed that this
minuscule arsenal constituted "a quantity of weapons and
ammunition that reflected a resolve to defy government, to
defy laws, and be prepared to resist [the government] in a
significant way." The lawful possession of a handful of
firearms, coupled with the Weaver family's "anti-govern-
ment" beliefs, translated into a criminal "conspiracy"
against the government, according to Lindquist.F
The federal assault at Ruby Ridge displayed the same
lust for overkill that was later evident at Mogadishu - and
102 Global Gun Grab

some of that blood lust was inspired by the desire for re-
venge. One of the UN-commanded U.S . soldiers in Mo-
gadishu , reports Mark Bowde n, described how he resorted
to "mowing down whole crowds" of civilians.P shouting
the names of American soldiers who had been killed every
time he shot a Somal i. The tragic death of Marshal Degan
at Ruby Ridge apparently provoked a similarly vengeful
attitude on the part of his comrades .
Red Cross volunteer Ed Farr, who delivered food to law
enforcement officers during the standoff, heard several fed-
eral agents - clad in black and carrying automatic weapons
- speaking openly about their desire to "waste them all."
The base camp established by the FBI at Ruby Ridge was
called "Base Camp Vicki" - a mocking reference to the
woman who had been killed while cradling her youngest
child .24
As with the Ruby Ridge standoff, a desire for revenge
apparently characterized the FBI's HRT paramilitaries at
Waco. During the 51-day siege, members of the FBI's lead-
ership ranks expressed the view that "these people were
criminals, and you must punish criminals'F' - a statement
which ignores the fact that in our system, police arrest sus-
pects, and court s try defendants, but the penal system pun-
ishes criminals only after they have been found guilty by a
jury of their peers.
About a half-hour after the Davidian church/residence
eru pted into flames , Jeff Jamar, the on-scene FBI com-
mander, had a radio conversation with Dick Rogers, who
comm anded the FBI's HRT troops. At the time, Rogers was
apparently under the impression that fire trucks were on the
way to the scene, but he didn't know that Jamar had made
a decision to hold them back . Jamar asked about efforts by
HRT personnel to resc ue Davidians who survived the in-
ferno: "Our pe ople [are] foc used on the bus area for the
kids, is that what we 're doing?" To which Rogers replied:
 Milita rizing Mayb erry 103

"That' s what we're trying to do." Then comes this chilling

aside from Jamar: "No one else, I hope."26
Investigative author David T. Hardy, a former federal
agency attorney, points out that this radio exchange, a
record of which was pried from the FBI through a Freedom
of Information Act request, "clearly indicates that some FBI
officials did envision leaving the adult Davidians to burn
alive." According to Hardy, "April 19 was not a law en-
forc eme nt opera tion. It was blood vengeance. Indeed, if
simil ar events were acted out between two groups in an-
other nation, we might not be hesitant to apply the label of
'ethnic cleansing.' Some Davidians had killed members of
a rival group, and now all must pay the price in blood."27
Following the final holocaust at Waco, the ATF - which
had been repulsed in its initial attack by armed members of
the Branch Davidian sect - was allowed to run up its flag
over the smoking ruins of the Davidian church. Memb ers
of the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team posed for "trophy" pho-
tos over the charred ruins, in which human remains were
plainly visible." In all of this, we can see federal agents
acting not as peace officers seeking to enforce the law, but
as soldiers prosecuting a war upon a domestic enemy.

"I Would Fire Upon Americans...."

In recent years, especially since the 1995 bombing of the
Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, the Establishment
media has never wasted an opportunity to stir up public anx-
iety about the supposed menace of self-proclaimed militias
and other armed anti-government "conspiracy theorists."
(Interestingly, the man executed for the OKC bombing,
Timothy McVeigh , was a disgruntled former federal em-
ployee - a veteran of the Gulf War, during which he served
as part of a UN-created alliance under a mandate from the
UN Security Counci l.) But no comparable media scrutiny
has been given to the growing army of fede ral law en-
104 Global Gun Grab

forcement officers who - as law enforcement consultant

Tony Cooper pointed out - are in many cases motivated
by anti-citizen conspiracy theories .
This potentially deadly amalgamation of military and
law enforcement has been particularly visible in federal
administrative agencies - not just the FBI, but in many
other executive branch agencies as well. David Hardy
points out that the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team "was su-
perbly trained for war, not for 'law enforcement.' " The
HRT, furthermore, is part of "an elite military force ... of
growing size: nearly 10 percent of the FBI is presently en-
rolled in its HRT Teams or the many other SWAT-likeunits
created by other agencies. As we see at Waco, these units
can draw upon formidable military support - tanks, air-
craft, supplies, manpower, high-tech equipment. While we
were watching out for the danger of military involvement
in civilian affairs, the civilian agencies generated their own
military."
"The damage from this force is probably far greate r than
any true military involvement could have been," continues
Hardy. "These paramilitary units are not, like the military,
bound by a sense of honor and a long tradition of nonin-
volvement in civilian affairs; after all, involvement in civil-
ian affairs is their reaso n for existence. S"
At presen t, the military is forbidden to part icipate di-
rectly in dome stic law enforcement. Nevertheless , as the
Freedom From War strategy unfolds, military strategists and
planners are openly discussing the possibility that this may
soon change.
In his book An Empire Wilde rnes s, liberal journalist
Robert D. Kaplan described a visit to Fort Leavenworth 's
elite Battle Command Training Program, where the mili-
tary's top future leaders are trained. "Many times in the
course of my visit to Leavenworth I heard discussion of the
Posse Comitatus Act, which forbids the National Guard to
 Militarizing Mayberry 105

act as a local police force once it has been federalized by

the army in a civil emergency," recalled Kaplan. "The im-
plication was that turbulence within the United States might
one day require the act to be repealed.v'?
Kaplan later overheard a round-table discussion during
which a group of majors discussed potential domestic use
of the military against dissident elements. One Marine major,
referring to the Oklahoma City bombing, declared: "The
minute I heard about Oklahoma City, I knew who did it -
rednecks, the kind of guys from southern Idaho." (Your
author, incidentally, was born and raised in southeastern
Idaho.) This officer and another major present at the meet-
ing "suggested that 'a time may come when the military
will have to go domestic,' " Kaplan reported."
The potential use of the military to "lower the hammer"
on American dissidents is the most ominous of the poten-
tial "Operations Other Than War" envisioned by current
military planners. What must be understood is that this per-
version of the military is almost entirely a product of our
nation's entanglement in the UN. James J. Schneider, a pro-
fessor of military theory at Leavenworth's U.S . Command
and General Staff College, is among the leading experts on
OOTW doctrine. Schneider puts the matter bluntly: "As an
Army we are fortunate to have . .. a rich web of historical
tradition . But our experience is of little use if it cannot be
interpreted in light offuture operations.... [T]he future will
be dominated by a single overwhelming presence - the
United Nations.,,32
Could U.S. military personnel actually be expected to
fire upon Americans who resisted UN-ordered gun confis-
cation? This question, which would be dismissed by many
as sheer paranoid lunacy, figured very prominently in a no-
torious survey given to a group of Marines in 1994. Signif-
icantly, the Marines chosen for this exercise were all veter-
ans of UN-commanded military ventures in the Persian
106 Global Gun Grab

Gulf and Somalia.

On May 19,1994, this author received a letter from a
young Marine stationed at Twentynine Palms, California.
Attached to the letter was a document entitled "Combat
Arms Survey," a 46-point questionnaire about unconven-
tional missions - "Operations Other Than War" - under
UN command. I called the Marine (who asked not to be
identified) to discuss the content of the survey, which was
carried out on May 10th of that year. After satisfying our
concerns regarding the authenticity of the survey, The New
American broke the story of the survey in its July 11, 1994
issue.
The most provocative element of the survey was the final
question:

The U.S . government declares a ban on the posses-

sion, sale, transportation, and transfer of all non-sport-
ing firearms . A thirty (30) day amnesty period is per-
mitted for these firearms to be turned over to the lo-
cal authorities. At the end of this period, a number of
citizen groups refuse to tum over their firearms. Con-
sider the following statement: I would fire upon U.S.
citizens who refuse or resist confiscation of firearms
banned by the U.S. government.

Lt. Commander Ernest G. Cunningham, the Navy officer

who conducted the survey as part of a Master's thesis proj-
ect, observed: "Though Question 46 was only one question
in the survey, the question caused national consternation
when an unauthorized copy was released by one of the sur-
vey participants to his elected representative and a news me-
dia organization.... This is a testimony of the sensitivity and
concerns of the general public surrounding the issues con-
tained in question 46.'>33
The overwhelming majority of the Marines surveyed
 Militarizing Mayberry 107

(61.66 percent) responded that they would not carry out an

order to shoot Americans.I" Many of them supplemented
this response with such comments as :
• "What about the damn second amendment?"
• "I am fighting for and maintaining the peace that thes e
U.S . citizens have. Why would I want to harm them in any
way? !?"
• "I feel this is a first [step] in communism!"
• "I would not even consider it. The reasons we have
gun s is [sic] so that the people can over throw the govt when
or if the people think the govt is too powerful.l'P
Still, mo re than one-quarter of the respondents (26 .34
percent ) replied in the affirmative: They would shoot Amer-
icans in the course of firearms confiscation. Furthermore,
approximately one-third (33.1 percent) favored involvement
in at least four of the seven proposed missions under UN
command. And 63.8 percent would participate in various
"Operations Other Than War" under U.S. command.F'
The se last two findin gs are, in a way, even more signif-
icant than the response to "Quest ion 46 ," as they indicate
the existence of a personnel pool within the military that
can be shaped into a UN-approved "internal security" force ,
or seconded to UN command as part of a global peace-
keeping apparatus. According to Cunningham, the re-
sponses provoked by "Question 46" illustrate the problems
with "unit cohesion" that would take place "in a unit tasked
to execute this mission" - that is, seizin g guns from Amer-
ican civilians upon pain of death." That is to say, this is a
practical problem to be dealt with through more efficient
indoctrination of military personnel, and perhaps through
the use of better screening techniques to find the critical
26.34 percent who would be willing to carry out such
orders.
Cunningham told the Navy Times that the 79 Marines
who replied "yes" when asked if they would gun down re-
108 Global Gun Grab

calcitrant firearms owners "showed an alarming ignorance _

of the Posse Comitatus Act . .. and of how to treat an un-
lawful order.,,38 But under some circumstances those orders ,
altho ugh manifestly unconstitutional, morally insu pport-
able, and repugnant to our traditions of liberty, would not
be considered "illegal" by the civilian authorities that con-
trol our military.
As we saw earlier, elite military planners have already
referred to the supposed necessity of doing away with the
Posse Comitatus Act in order to deal with the prospect of
civic unrest and domestic terrorism. At present, the Act can
be suspended by a presidential waiver.l? Because of the
"war on drugs," the Posse Comitatus Act has been amend-
edto allow for military aid to law enforcement in counter-
drug operations; it was through the establishment of a spu-
rious "drug nexus " that the ATF was able to receive equip-
ment, training, and tactical support for its assault upon the
Branch David ians.i"

Ominous Evolution
Over the past five decades, our nation's law enforcement
apparatus has been undergoing an ominous evolution. Un-
der the original constitutional scheme it was the states and
their subsidiary units that were to make and enforce nearly
all laws . Police agencies were to be free of central govern-
ment control and locally accountable. Now we see that even
the smallest local police agencies are becoming adminis- .
trative units of the central government, equipped with
SWAT teams and other paramilitary organs.
Many critics of our increasingly militarized law en-
forcement culture insist that this is an outgrowth of the so-
called "War on Drugs" and similar federal initiatives. But
very few observers have pointed out that the trend toward
federalizing the police and outfitting them as a domestic
army of occupation began shortly after the introduction of
 Militarizing Mayberry 109

the Freedom From War document in 1961.

It's really quite simple. In order for the UN to exercise
global dominion, it must have an army (that is, a global
"Peace Force"); it must have some means of regimenting
the inhabitants of each nation (through a domestic "inter-
nal security" force); and, above all, it must disarm every-
body who might interfere with its plans. The symptoms of
police state tyranny that we see emerging in our country
simply reflect the steps we've taken down the path toward
a UN-dominated world.
 CHAPTER EIGHT

Stop the Gun Grab:

Get US Out!
So quietly that even the gun lobby hasn't noticed, the
United Nations is beginnin g to set its sights on glob-
al gun control. The UN Disarmament Commission
has adopted a working paper, a basis for future de-
bate, that proposes tighter controls on the gun trade
in the United States and other member nations as a
way of combating international arms trafficking. 1
- Associated Press story, May 24, 1994

At this moment the NRA and its attorneys have found

no substantial evidence that "one world" groups pose
a direct threat to our Second Am endment rights ....
[T]h ese conspiracy theories have no legal signifi-
cance and really amount to a distraction from the se-
rious legislative attacks that have been laun ched
against fi rearms owners. 2
- Form letter from the Na tional Rifle Associ ation 's
Institute for Legislat ive Acti on, June 23, 1994

The NRA ... has won the right to lobby the United Na-
tions as one of an estimated 1,700 non-governmental
organi zations (NGOs) that advise the international
body on policy issues. 3 .
- CNN, November 24, 1996

There's a new threat to your gun rights looming on

the horizon. It doesn 't come from Washington , but

110
 Stop the Gun Grab: Get US Out! 111

from countries around the world who are now work-

ing through the United Nations.... Without receiving
the UN's "non-governmental organization" (NGO)
status - you'll never know what they 're up to. For
that reason, the National Rifle Associa tion obtained
NGO status....4
- NRA President Charlton Heston

The aims and purposes of[UN-accredited NGOs ] ...

shall be in conformity with the spirit, purposes and
principles ofthe Charter of the United Nations.... 5
- UN Guidelines governing NGO participation

"M r. President," pleaded NRA representative Thomas

Mason during the July 16th session of the UN's
Small Arms Conference, "we would ask the conference to
acknowledge our concerns as legltimate:'"
Mason's plea, which was one of several presented by
pro-gun NGO s during the conference, culminated an inter-
esting journey on behalf of the NRA, an immensely wealthy
and politically poten t organization representing more than
four and a half million American gun owners. As the quo-
tations above illustrate, within a stretch of seven years the
NRA had gone from denying that the UN posed a threat to
the rights of gun owner s to colla borating in the creation of
global gun policy through the UN , presumably because the
world body is too powerful to resist outright.
Some might protest that this characterization of the NRA
is untrue and defam atory. After all, hasn't the NRA loudl y
denounced the UN 's lust to confiscate private firearms? In-
deed, it has. Doesn ' t the NRA do a splendid job publiciz-
ing abuses of innocent firearms owners by federal officials?
It certainly does . Hasn't the NRA produced chilling docu-
mentaries about gun confiscation in both the United States
and abroad? Yes, it has . So why critic ize the NRA for its
112 Global Gun Grab

decision to represent gun owners' rights and interests as an

NOG at the UN?
The chief problem with the NRA's decision to obtain
NOG status is that by doing so, it - like scores of other
"conservative" organizations - has helped to advance the
UN's claim to be a global legislature acting on behalf of the
peoples of the world . When UN critics are lured into such
involvement, they are saying, in effect, that "globalization
with representation" is entirely satisfactory, when in fact
globalization through the UN, however "democratic," will
ultimately lead to the end of our national sovereignty and
the rights protected by our Constitution, including the right
to keep and bear arms .
A brief examination of the NOG approach would be use-
ful in illustrating why it is impossible to protect the rights
of gun owners through the UN, and why the only effective
course would be to get our nation out of the UN.

Engineering Consensus
Mark DeYoung, an activist with the American Life League
(ALL) who has worked as an NOG representative at nu-
merous UN conferences, offers a telling glimpse of how the
UN manipulates the NOG community. "The NOGs are sup-
posed to act as the 'will of the people .. . [but] the UN is
definitely using many of these non-governmental organi -
zations as their way of saying, 'Look we've got the will of
the people on our side.' In fact, it is not the people at all who
are pushing any of these things. It is a small elite group of
people."?
Reporter Susan Martinuk of Canada's National Post de-
scribed how the UN manipulated the "Beijing + 5" confer- .
ence, a follow-up to its 1995 global summit on women :
"The UN gave official NOG status to more than 2,000 fem-
inist and left-wing groups - but conservative groups num-
bered between 15 and 20." The UN isolated conservatives
 Stop the Gun Grab: Get US Out! 113

even further "by reducing the number of official participants

to three per NGO." And those traditionalists who weren't
winnowed out by the UN often found themselves vulnera-
ble to extortion: "A pro-life, pro-family delegate from
Poland was told to support the push for sexual and repro-
ductive rights [that is, abortion] or risk Poland's acceptance
into the European Union," reported Martinuk. A Nicaraguan
delegate who opposed the UN's homosexual agenda "was
fired when the UN threatened to withhold funding to
Nicaragua if this position was not reversed. Humanitarian
aid packages were frequently used as political tools to en-
force compliance with coercive population methods and the
western agenda on sexual rights."
It must also be understood that UN-approved NGOs, as a
condition of their access to UN forums , are required essen-
tially to pledge allegiance to the UN. In the 1996 resolution
that esta blished guidelines for NGO participation, the UN's
Economic and Soc ial Council (ECOSOC) specified: "The
aims and purposes of [approved NGOs] .. . shall be in con-
formity with the spirit, purposes and principles of the Char-
ter of the United Nations ,"? The resolution emphasized that
only NGOs that can make "substantive and sustained con-
tributions .. . to the achievement of the objectives of the
United Nations ... may be accorded consultative status [that
is, official recognition and accreditationl ."?
All UN-accredited NGOs are required to "submit to the
Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations
through the Secretary-General every fourth year a brief re-
port of their activities, specifically as regards the support
they have given to the work of the United Nations." A de-
cision to revoke or modify the NGO 's privileges will be
made by the Committee based on such reports "and other
relevant information...." 11
The accreditation of any NGO - and its access to UN
functions - can be suspended or revoked if the Commit-
114 Global Gun Grab

tee decides that it "did not make any positive or effective

contribution to the work of the United Nations.,,12
To summarize: Althou gh the UN will make use of "con-
servative" NGOs in order to maintain the illusion of "con-
sensus," it will limit both the number and effectiveness of
such NGOs within the UN system - and all NGOs, conser-
vative or radical, must pledge to advance the UN's agenda,
upon pain of expulsion should their performance be deemed
less than satisfactory.
Another important role played by UN-favored radical
NGOs is to create "pressure from below" on behalf of the
world body's agenda. Speaking at the UN's 1999 World
Civil Society Forum in Montre al, Secretary-General Kofi
Annan told assembled NGO leaders that they were "strate-
gic partners in policy - in areas where you can persuade
your Governments to work through the United Nations. You
can tell them that our goals are your goals, and that you
want them to give us the means to achieve those goals."13
Such NGOs act as a UN "fifth column" within various
countries. But the UN is also beginning to use NGO s to
carry out intelligence-gathering and even enforcement roles.
Dr. Richard Wilkins, a professor at Brigham Young Uni-
versity's J. Reuben Clark Law School, is a co-founder of
the World Family Policy Forum, a UN-accredited NGO. 14
Dr. Wilkins is among the most outspoken "conservative"
proponents of working through the United Nations, rather
than seeking to liberate our nation from the UN's incipient
world government. According to Wilkins, "The United Na-
tions sets not only international, but domes tic law and pol-
icy.... The UN now plays an important role in defining
'issues,' establishing 'solutions,' and allocating responsi-
bilities with respect to the international 'answers.' The net
result is that formerly local policies may now be governed
by decisions made at an international confere nce.t'P
The process described by Wilkins has been referred to
 Stop the Gun Grab: Get US Out! 115

as "engineering consensus." Once a UN-appro ved "c on-

sensu s" has been achieved, it must be carried out - and
here, according to Wilkins, is where the "interdependent re-
lationship" between the UN and the "NGO community" has
tangible results:

The most important functions of the NGOs are lobby-

ing, support and as the eventual grantees who often
dispense UN largesse to participating nations, ulti-
mately enforcement.... [NGOs] play an increasingly
important role in policing non-compl iance with sub-
stantive UN demands. The net result is a symbiotic
relationship between the UN bureaucracy and the
NGO community: NGO s inform and support UN
functionaries who in tum rely upon the NGOs to en-
sure the ultimate enforcement of their decrees.... 16

Once again, it should be emphasized that Dr. Wilkins is one

of the most prominent "co nservative" supporters of the
NGO approach . Yet, by his own admission, the UN's NGO-
based so-called "civil society" exists to empower the UN
and to bring communities worldwide under the UN's
dominion.

The UN's Anti-gun "Consensus"

Given the way in which the UN has manipulated its NGO-
centered "civil society" - which was, after all, the UN' s
own creation - it should come as no surprise that the world
body has achieved an international "consensus" that there
is no individual right to own a firearm.
In 1998, Philip Alpers, an anti-gun activist from New
Zealand who works as a researcher for the UN's Interna-
tional Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), produced
a report on four regional workshops convened by the UN
to discuss "Firearm Regulation for the Purposes of Crime
116 Global Gun Grab

Prevention and Public Safety." "At all workshops," report-

ed Alpers , "discussion focused on: 'Civilian firearms and
civilian firearm regulation, with an international perspec-
tive.''' While most of "the official language surrounding this
initiative refers to the UN and Interpol's traditional cross -
border concerns of illicit arms trafficking," continued
Alpers, the real focus of the workshops was "domestic gun
control laws and their role in promoting public safety." Ac-
cordingly, the intention was "for each of the four workshops
to assist in drafting a declaration of principles on domestic
gun controls/"?
"Each workshop reached its own consensus," continued
Alpers, "and these were not always made public" - a
curious course of affairs indeed, if the UN's "civil society"
is a legitimate reflection of "public opinion." At the final,
closed workshop in New Delhi, Alpers reported, the fol-
lowing statements were adopted , through "consensus," by
the NGO representatives:

• "It is not a right to possess a firearm . This was the

consensus."
• "There should be no free availability of firearms ."
• "It is legal firearms which . .. result in many deaths ."
• "The opportunity to commit offenses (gun availabil-
ity) must be reduced."
• "More forceful and stringent regulation of firearms
is required.?"

Here's an important fact about UN procedural rules: A sin-

gle objection by any participant in a conference or summit.
can prevent "consensus." Given that the NRA had, by 1998,
been granted NOO status, and that NRA representative Tom
Mason during this period was visiting Europe nearly every
month to attend the UN workshops, how did the New Dehli
workshop achieve such a resounding anti-gun "consensus"?
 Stop the Gun Grab: Get US Out! 117

Alpers supplies an answer when he notes that Mason was

"ejected from two closed meetings, one at the UN in Vienna
and another at the Organization of American States [OAS]
in Caracas ." In his own account of the OAS meeting, Mason
wrote: "When the attendees found out who I was, they went
absolutely nuclear! The chairman went completely crazy
and said I could not be in there. The [Clinton-era] U.S. del-
egation was distraught, as they said this was an embarrass-
ment as they couldn't have other nations thinking that the
NRA is running things. It was quite an experience and it's
amazing how the NRA has been demonized throughout the
world ." 19
Obviously, while the UN was willing to grant the NRA
the NGO status it sought, and allow the group to participate
in the "civil society" charade, it would not permit the group
to play any role that would have a substantive impact upon
the gun grab agenda.

What Are We Protecting?

"But things have changed since the Clinton administration
left office," some might protest. "Look at the way that the
Bush administration used the UN's Small Arms Conference
to defend the right to keep and bear arms. The administra-
tion's position was so sound that the NRA did little more
than say 'ditto' to Under Secretary John Bolton's official
statement - and the anti-gun mob went haywire, denounc-
ing the 'gun lobby ' for undermining the conference!"
First of all, by simply participating in the conference the
NRA advanced, rather than undermined, the UN's agenda.
A UN press release proudly noted that the conference
would involve 177 NGOs, many of which "are from gun-
affected countries" - thereby obliquely treating firearms
as a plague. (For "gun-affected" one might substitute
"AIDS-infected" to achieve a similar effect .) On the other
hand, continued the UN, the NRA , "a recognized NGO at
118 Global Gun Grab

the United Nations, will be joined by several other organi-

zations particularly concerned about the rights of gun own-
ers in the United States . All NGOs accredited to the Con-
ference have the same rights and privileges.r-"
Of course , as we saw above, the "rights and privileges"
of NGOs are defined entirely by their usefulness in carry-
ing out the UN's "purposes and principles." Furthermore,
only 15 of the 177 NGOs allowed to participate in the con-
ference represented pro-gun organizations - meaning that
the pro-gun faction was large enough to present an illusion
of "diversity," but much too small to have any substantive
impact. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, the
presence of the NRA and several other pro -gun groups
served the valuable purpose of defining the "extreme" pro-
gun position: In the interests of the developing "interna-
tional consensus" on firearms , defenders of gun ownership
could go only as far as the pro-gun NGOs, and no further.
In his presentation at the UN small arms conference, the
NRA's Mason declared:

We view efforts to curtail the illicit trade in Small

Arms and Light Weapons as defined by the U.S. [del-
egation] as legitimate but would be totally remiss not
to express the extreme concern of our membership
over potential outcomes of this conference.

During the conference and the preparatory meeting s that

preceded it, complained Mason, "we have rece ived con-
flicting signals from significant participants" regarding "the
legitimate domestic rights of U.S. citizens to own and use
firearms .... Some assure us that the end result will have no
impact on lawful civilia n ownership, others propose that it
could, should, must and will. We cannot ignore aspects of
the Program of Action that could affect civilian firearms
ownership in the U.S. and in fact, worldwide. Mr. President,
 Stop the Gun Grab: Get US Out! 119

we would ask the conference to acknowledge our concerns

as legit imate.v- '
The official U.S. statement by Under Secretary Bolton,
which was obliquely endorsed by the NRA , drew a dis-
tinction between "strictly military arms," such as fully au-
tomatic weapons, and "firearm s such as hunting rifles and
pistols, which are commonly owned and used by citizens
in many countries.... The United States believes that the re-
sponsible use of firearm s is a legitimate aspect of national
life. Like many countries, the United State s has a cultural
tradition of hunt ing and sport shooting. We, therefore, do
not begin with the presumption that all small arms and light
weapons are the same or that they are all problernatic.v'?
Note this well : Neither the NRA nor the Bush adminis-
tration objected in principle to the propo sal that the UN be-
come the world 's firearm s poli ce - as long as its role was
limited to enforcing inte rnational regulations on "illicit"
firearms. Note furth er that from the Bush administration' s
posi tion, the only "legitimate" uses of firearms are "hunt-
ing and sport shooting" - which are worthy pastimes, to
be sure, but they are by no mean s the reason why the Sec-
ond Amendment was incorp orated into the Bill of Rights.
In his statement, Bolton went on to boast about the Bush
administration's support for the UN Register of Conven-
tional Arms and its work in assisting various countries "to
secure or destroy excess and illicit stocks of small arms and
light weapons"; he protes ted that small arms are some times
used to "endanger the work of peacekeeping forces"; and
he expressed the Bush administration's approval of the 1999
report for the UN Panel of Governmental Exp erts on Small
Arms, which like earlier reports listed civi lian ownership
of firearms as part of the UN's agenda for "general and
complete disarmament/'P
This, remember, was the "righ t-wing extremist" position
at the UN Small Arms Conferenc e. Other pro-gun groups
120 Global Gun Grab

represented at the event were even more accommodating

toward the gun-grabbers.
Gerald Baker of the Single Action Shooting Society
pointedly told the conference that his organization is "con-
cerned about the issues this conference is addressing" and
defended sport shooting - in this case , "cowboy action
shooting" - as a valid representation of American culture. .
"We are part of living history," observed Baker. "[Please]
respect this and [do] not demonize nor negatively catego-
rize us.... We are not part of the problem. r' "
Carlo Peroni of the World Forum on the Future of Sport
Shooting Activities, an international alliance of hunting,
sport shooting, and firearms industry organizations, told the
UN conference that his organization was there "not to op-
pose, but to assist" the UN's efforts "to stop the prolifera-
tion of illegal small arms...." Peroni proudly pointed out that
his organization has "held three workshops to assist the UN
in its efforts" and concluded by offering his "best wishes
and support in your efforts for a successful Conference/'P
The substantive outco me of the July 2001 UN Small
Arms Conference was this: The UN, with the consent of the
Bush administration and the tacit approval of pro-firearms
NGOs, gave itself a global "mandate" to crack down on "il-
licit" firearms. The "extreme" pro-gun side embraced the
notion that "legitimate" firearms ownership is defined by
sports shooting, "Wild West" re-enactmen ts, firearms col-
lecting , or other hobbies - rather than the responsible
preparation for self- and family-d efense against predatory
criminals, be they petty criminals or aspiring tyrants. And
the definition of "illicit" firearm s was left vague, because
the Program of Action produced at the Small Arms Con-
ference repres ent s a f oundation for further UN action
against guns, rather than a ceiling on its ambitions.
In fact, within a month of the Small Arm s Conference,
Kofi Annan was already pushing to expand the UN's anti-
 Stop the Gun Grab: Get US Out! 121

gun campaign. In an August 2nd address to the Security

Co unci l, Annan extolled the "p rogress" made at the con-
ference but demanded that "binding norms" on firearms be
created at both the national and international level, and that
further steps be taken by governments to de-glamorize gun
possession in the eyes of the young.
The Program of Action offers "significant first steps in
alleviating a grave threat to international peace and secu -
rity," asserted Annan. "We must now consolidate these
gains. A program of action is a beginning, not an end in it-
self." The NRA "had no comment on Annan's remarks.Y?

Seize the Offensive!

It is an axiom of military strategy that "the purely defen-
sive is doomed to defeat." The "NGG approach" favored by
the NRA is a purely defensive strategy, focusing on beat -
ing back the UN's incremental efforts at universal civilian
disarmament: It gives the UN the initiative and the luxury
of framing the issues as it sees fit. Furthermore, the NRA's
approach concedes to the UN the privilege of choosing the
battleground - and even gives the UN the power to decide
when and for how long the NRA will be allowed to fight.
Clearly, what is needed is not a rear-guard defense
against the global gun-grabbers, but a vigorous offensive to
take back the enemy's gains . We must find and exploit the
UN's greatest vulnerability - its source of funds. Herein
lies one of the best-kept secrets about the United Nations:
The UN is entirely dependent upon American sufferance
and subsidy. Cut off its access to the U.S . taxpayers, and
the UN will quickly collapse. .
Shortly after the Small Arms Conference had ended, a
wire service story noted that the UN was panicking over the
tardiness of $582 million in "dues" supposedly owed to the
world body by the United States. A deal was reached in
December 2000 to reduce - by an insignificant sum - the
122 Global Gun Grab

"back dues" that the UN insisted were due .

Kofi Annan 's spokesman, Fred Eckhard, speaking on
behalf of his boss, said that UN member states "find it dif-
ficult to understand why, seven months after agreement was
reached .. . no check has been put in the mail.,,27 No doubt
the dictators, potentates, and assorted thugs and tyrants who
compose the UN were mystified by the workings of our (ad-
mittedly corrupted) constitutional system, in which all ap-
propriations have to begin in the House of Representatives
---:... that part of the legislative branch that is most immedi -
ately accountable to the people. From where Annan and his
comrades sit, America simply "owes" the UN the money,
and Congress's job is to carry out its duties to the "interna-
tional community," rather than to protect the wealth and lib-
erties of the American people.
And herein lies a very under-appreciated bit of good
news. Why, after all, has it been difficult for the UN to extort
its "dues" from Congress? It is because there is no signifi-
cant constituency for the UN among the American people.
Moreover, there is an active and growing constituency for
American withdrawal from the world body.
The growing resistance to the UN is largely a reflection
of the tireless work of one organization: The John Birch
Society. Since its founding in December 1958, the JBS has
diligently worked to educate and mobilize the American
people at the grass-roots level, focusing its efforts in con-
gressional districts nationwide. The JBS is not a Washing -
ton-based lobby or a part of the Beltway-based "service in-
dustry" of letterhead groups. It does not mount viscerally
satisfying but strategically impotent protest rallies . And it
rejects entirely the notion that the efforts of patriots should
be channeled through UN-accredited NGOs so that the
American people can enjoy the supposed blessings of
"globalization with representation."
Instead, the JBS devotes its efforts to the strategy em-
 Stop the Gun Grab: Get US Out! 123

ployed by the Founding Fathers in the decades leading up

to American independence: educating the citizenry in sound
principles of government; warning the public about the
existence of an organized, covert threat to our liberties and
free institutions; and mobilizing patriots in an organized,
principle-centered effort to defeat the enemies of freedom.
In order to defeat the UN's global gun grab, we must
bring about U.S . withdrawal from the body, and evict it
from our shores. Once the parasite is deprived of access to
its host, it will quickly die. In order for this to happen, how -
ever, Americans must be mobilized within their congres-
sional districts to bring relentless pressure to bear upon the
House of Representatives todefund the UN and all of its
affiliates and satellite organizations. There is a measure be-
fore the House that would end U.S . membership in the UN,
H.R. 1146 (the "American Sovereignty Restoration Act"),
sponsored by Representative Ron Paul (R-Texas).
We cannot beat the United Nations on its own turf, nor can
we out-bid the denizens of "Gucci Gulch" by concentrating
our efforts on Beltway-based lobbying. But the Power Elite
- formidable as it is - could not control the House of
Representatives if it were reclaimed by constitutionalists.

Get US Out!
On December 9, 1958, during the founding meeting of the
John Birch Society, JBS Founder Robert Welch warned that
the long-term objective of both international Communism
and its allies within the American political elite was "to in-
duce the gradual surrender of American sovereignty, piece
by piece and step by step, to various international organi-
zations - of which the United Nations is the outstanding
but far from the only example...." It was not until 16 years
after Robert Welch uttered this "extremist" statement that
the chief organ of the American political establishment con-
firmed Welch's description of the incremental, conspirato-
124 Global Gun Grab

rial approach to the creation of world government.

In his notorious April 1974 Foreign Affairs essay "The
Hard Road to World Order," Richard N. Gardner, using
terms nearly identical to those used by Welch, wrote that a
"case-by-case approach can produce some remarkable con-
cessions of ' sovereignty' that could not be achieved on an
across-the-board basis." Rather than pursuing "instant
world government;' Gardner explained in the policy jour-
nal of the Council on Foreign Relations, "the 'house of
world order ' will have to be built from the bottom up rather
than from the top down" - by means of "an end run around
national sovereignty, eroding it piece by piece...."
Whether the subject is environmental regulation, "human
rights ," managed trade, control of our military, or civilian
disarmament, the Power Elite has patiently pursued the
strategy described by Gardner. That cabal will continue to
accumulate power through the UN until it has created the
world despotism it so clearly seeks - or until they are
stopped by timely, organized action carried out by freedom-
loving Americans.
For Americans who under stand the paramount impor-
tance of the right to keep and bear arms, and the threat to
that right represented by the UN, the proper course is clear.
Get US out! - cut off the UN's funds - and the threat
will recede and die. Then we can focus on restoring our
own institutions at home . Keep us in the UN, and we'll be
consigned to an endless series of rear-guard battles, suf-
fering the persistent - and, eventually, total-loss of our
freedoms and sovereignty.
 Endnotes
CHAPTER ONE - Citizens or Subjects?
I . David Ramsay, The History ofthe Am erican Revolution , Vol. I
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1990), p. 175.
2. Newspaper article entered in the Sept. 16, 1961 Congression-
al Record by Sen. Thomas Dodd. Quoted in G. Edward Grif-
fin , The Fearful Master: A Second Look at the United Nat ions
(Boston: Western Islands, 1964), p. 49.
3. Murray N. Rothbard , Conceived in Liberty, Vol. 3 of Advance
to Revolution, 1760-1775 (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington
House, 1976), p. 31.
4. Donzella Cross Boyle, Quest of a Hemisphere (Boston: West-
ern Islands, 1970), p. 114.
5. For an on-site report from that conference, see William Nor-
man Grigg, "Disarmament by 'Consensus,' " The New Am eri-
can, Aug. 27, 2001, pp. 21-24.
6. RJ . Rummel, Death by Government (New Brunsw ick, N.J.:
Transaction Publishers, 1994), p. 9.
7. A rmed to the Teeth: The World-Wide Plague of Small Arms (UN
video, 2000).
8. Robert McMahon, "U.N.: US Critical of Small Arms Control,"
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 10, 2001. Posted at
www.referl.org/ncalfeatures/2001/07/l007200 1120404 .asp ;
accessed on Sept. 23, 2001.
9. Sami Faltas, "Weapons Collection Programmes: Question s
to Answer and Challenge s to Face." Posted at www.iansa.org/
documents/researchlres_archiv e/ng03.htm; accessed on June
21,2001.
10. "The Secretary-General, Statement to Open Debate of the Se-
curity Council on the Question of Small Arms," Aug. 2, 200 I ;
Posted at www.un.org/News/dhllatest/sg_sma llarms.htm; ac-
cessed on Aug. 6, 200 I .
11. "UN Arms Conference Reaches Consensu s," Associated Press,
July 21, 2001.
12. Ibid.
13. Dave Kopel, "UN Out of North America," Natio nal Review On-

125
 Endnotes 127

2. Stephane Courtois, et aI., The Black Book of Communism:

Crimes, Terror, Repression (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1999), p. 72.
3. Mark Malloch Brown and Jayantha Dhanapala, "Let's Go Out
Into the World and Gather Up the Small Arms," International
Herald Tribune, Jan. 26, 2000. Posted on the IANSA website
at www.iansa.org/news/2000/jan_00 /dhanapala.htm; accessed
on Jan. 27,2000.
4. John Barron and Anthony Paul, Murder ofa Gentle Land : The
Untold Story ofCommunist Genocide in Cambodia (New York:
Reader's Digest Press, 1977), pp. 2-3.
5. Ibid., p. 9.
6. Code Panel et Lois Penales . Photocopied excerpts with trans-
lation from the French in Jay Simkin, Aaron Zelman, and Alan
M. Rice, Lethal Laws (Milwaukee: Jews for the Preservation
of Firearms Ownership), 1994, pp. 319-321.
7. Simkin, et aI., Lethal Laws, p. 306.
8. Daniel Polsby, "Of Holocausts and Gun Control," Washington
University Law Quarterly, Fall 1997. Posted at
Is.wustI.ed uIWULQ I75-31753-4.html; accessed on Nov. 27,
2000 .
9. Barron and Paul, pp. 11-12.
10. Ibid., p. 19.
11. Ibid., pp. 26-27 .
12. Alec Wilkinson, "A Changed View of God ," The New Yorker,
Jan. 24, 1994,p. 54.
13. Barron and Paul, p. 209.
14. Hans Phillipps, interview with author, June 5,2001.
15. Halbrook, p. 487.
16. Ibid., p. 485 .
17. Ibid., pp. 489-490.
18. Ibid., p. 490 .
19. Ibid., p. 494 .
20. Ibid., p. 536 .
21. Ibid., p. 533 .
22. Decrees of Soviet Power, Volume IV - November 1918-March
1919, photocopied with translation from Russian in Simkin , et
aI., Lethal Laws, p. 119.
23. Ibid., p. 107.
24. Ibid., p. 125.
 Endnotes 129

1962; prepared under a contract [No. SCC 28270] with the U.S.
State Deptartment}. The JBS has posted the entire document
on its website at www.jbs.org/un/bloomfiel d_7.htm.
11. Bloomfield, pp. iv-v.
12. Ibid., p. 2.
13. Ibid., p. 12.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., pp. 2-3.
16. Ibid., p. 4.
17. Ibid., p. 6.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., p. 19.
20. Ibid., p. 15.
21. Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, World Peace Through
World Law, second edition, revised (Cambridge, Mass., 1962).
Bloomfield cites Clark and Sohn on page 9 of A World Effec-
tively Controlled by the United Nations.
22. Clark and Sohn, p. xxix.
23. Ibid., p. xxxi.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., p. xxix.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid. p. xxxiii.
28. Ibid., P xxxii.
29. R.J. Rummel, Death by Government (New Brunswick, N.J.:
Transaction Publishers, 1994), pp. 1-2.
30. Ibid., p. 9.
31. Ibid., p. 27.
32. Alexander Hamilton , The Federalist, No. 29.
33. Stephen Halbrook, That Every Man Be Armed (Oakland, Calif.:
The Independent Institute, 1994), p. 68.

CHAPTER FOUR - Psychological Disarmament

1. Henry Wallace, "The Post War World," address on Woodrow
Wilson's birthday, Dec. 28, 1942. Posted at
www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/421228a.html; accessed on
June 22, 2001.
2. Brief Z, The New Field ofMicro-Disarmament: Addressing the
Proliferation and Buildup of Small Arms and Light Weapons,
Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Sept. 1996, p. 26.
 Endnotes 131

16. "Staff of SAND ." Posted on the group 's website at

sand .miis.edu/about/staff.htm; accessed on June 22, 2001.
17. "SAND History and Accomplishments,': op. cit.
18. Ibid .
19. For the definitive brief history of the CPR, drawn from the pub-
lished writings of the group, see James Perfloff, The Shadows
ofPower: The Council on Foreign Relations andAmerican De-
cline (Boston: Western Islands, 1988).
20. Richard Harwood, "Ruling Class Journalists," Washington Post,
Oct. 30, 1993, p. A21.
21. Ron Scherer and Howard LaFranchi, "New Gun Trade: Turn-
ing them In," Christian Science Monit or, May 4, 2000, p. 1.
Posted on the SAND webs ite at sand .miis.edu/abo ut/news /
newguntrad e.htm; accessed on June 22, 2001.
22. Sue Fishkoff, "Fewer Gun s, Fewe r Death s," Coast Weekly ,
April 23, 1998. Posted on the SAND website at
sand .miis.edu/about/news/coastweekly.htm; accessed on June
22,2001.
23. Thomas R. Eddlem, "Global Gun Grab," The New Am erican ,
Nov. 22, 1999, p. 16.
24. See Jan Kozak, And Not A Shot Is Fired (Appleton, Wis.: Robert
Welch University Press, 1999 ed.) for the definitive discussion
of the "scissors strategy." Jan Kozak, a Communist member of
the Czechoslovak National Asse mbly and Czech Communist
Party official historian, described how this strategy was used to
consolida te Communist control over Czechoslovakia.
25. Bill Sammon, "Democrats get producing credit for march of
moms," Washingto n Times, May 12, 2000.
26. Tom Carter, "Elian 'a possession ' of state, Cuba says," Wash-
ington Times , April 5, 2000.
27. For an in-depth discuss ion of the Elian Gonzalez abduction,
with appropriate contextual citations, see the May 22, 2000 is-
sue of The New American, entitled "Fidel Castro's Amer ika."
28. Statement of Mary Leigh Blek, president, Million Mom March,
May 10, 2001. Posted at www.billionmommarc h.org/m l-
blek.htm ; accesse d on June 22, 200 1.
29. John-Hughes Wilson and Adrian Wilkinson, "Safe and Efficient
Small Arms Collection and Destruct ion Progra mmes: A Pro-
posal for Practical Technical Measures," United Nations De-
velopment Programme, Emergency Response Division, May
 Endnotes 133

4. Alex de Waal, "The Quality of Merc y," Los Angeles Times,

March 19, 2000 , p. BRI.
5. David Johnston, "Rwanda horror revisited in court," Montreal
Gazette, April 8, 2001.
6. "Another Victim of UN 'Peacekeeping,'" The New American,
July 3 1, 2000, page 9.
7. "Senior Canadian Gunner Retires," press release from the Roy-
al Regiment of Canadian Artillery, und ated . Posted at www.
artillery.net/Dallaire.htm; accessed at on May 4, 2001.
8. Journ alist Philip Goure vitch , in his award-wining study, de-
scribes the body count as "at least eight hundred thousand peo-
ple" and notes, "Rwandans often speak of a million deaths , and
they may be right." See Gourevitch, we wish .. ., p. iii.
9. Jenny Manzer, "Since Rwanda, 'I will never be what I used to
be,' " Medical Post, Nov. 7, 2000.
10. Shawcro ss, p. 140.
11. Tina Rosenberg, "The Unbearable Memories of a UN Peace -
keeper," New York Times, Oct. 8,2000, p. AI4.
12. "Another Victim of UN 'Peacekeeping," op. cit.
13. Gourevitch, we wish..., p. 104.
14. Ibid ., p. 105.
15. Gourevitch, "The Genocide Fax ," The New Yorker, May 11,
1998, p. 44.
16. "Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the Unit-
ed Nation s during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda" (hereafter
"Carlsson Report"), Dec. 18, 1999. Posted on the Am sterdam
Post website at www.xs4all.nl-adampost/arcOOOOI5b.html; ac-
cessed on May 7, 2001.
17. Gourevitch, we wish ... , p. 106.
18. Ibid., p. 107.
19. Charles Trueheart, "UN Inaction Cited in Rwanda Slaughter,"
Washingto n Post, Sept. 25, 1997, p. A I.
20. Carlsson Report, op. cit.
21. Ibid.
22. Gourevitch, we wish ... , pp. 64-65.
23 . Ibid., p. 106.
24. Carlsso n Report, op. cit.
25. Gourevitch, we wish... , p. 102.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid ., p. 120.
126 Global Gun Grab

line at www.nationalreview.comlkopel/kopelprint080901 .html.

Posted and accessed on Aug. 9, 2001.
14. John R. Bolton, "U.S. Statement at Plenary Session, UN Con-
ference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons
in All its Aspects," July 9, 2001. Posted at www.un.org/
Depts/ddaiCAB/smalianns/statements/usE.html; accessed on
July 9, 2001.
15. Armed to the Teeth, op. cit.
16. UN General Assembly document N54/258, Item 76 (f) of the
provisional agenda, "General and Complete Disarmament:
Small Arms," Aug. 19, 1999, p. 24.
17. Ibid., p. 1.
18. "NRA Spreads Surreal View of Conference," Disarmament
Times Daily (quasi-official UN daily newspaper published at
the UN Small Arms Conference), July 12,2001, p. 3.
19. Ibid.
20. Mary Leigh Blek, statement at the NGO session, July 16,2001 .
21. "OneWorid U.S. Special Report: U.S . NGOs Blast Govern -
ment Stance on Small Arms," July 20, 2001. Posted at
www.benton.org/OneWoridUS/guns.html; accessed on Sept.
23,2001.
22. "Gun Control Movement Goes International: Victims Shoes
and Big, Angry Puppets Protest Bush's Pro NRA Stance at
UN," press release, July 17,2001.
23. Kofi A. Annan, ' We The Peoples' : The Role of the United Na-
tions in the 21st Century (New York: The United Nations De-
partment of Information, 2000), pp. 52-53.
24. Faltas, p. 5.
25. Ibid., p. 7.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., p. 5.
28. Thomas R. Eddlem , "Global Gun Grab," The New American,
Nov. 22,1999, pp. 16-17.
29. Ramsay, pp. 176-177.
30. Ibid., p. 181.

CHAPTER Two - Disarmament and Democide

1. Stephen P. Halbrook, "Nazi Firearms Law and the Disarming
of the German Jews," Arizona Journal of International and
Comparative Law , Vol. 17 No.3 (2000), p. 483.
 Endnotes 135

the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its As-
pects, by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch,"
July 16,2001.

CHAPTER SIX - "Peace" Through Terror

1. Gary T. Dempsey with Roger W. Fontaine, Fool's Errands :
Ame rica's Recent Encounters with Nation Building (Washing-
ton: Cato Institute, 2001), pp. 35-36.
2. James J. Schneider, "Ambushing the Future," Special Waifare,
April 1995, p. 4.
3. Derek Boothby, "Brief 12 - The UNTAES Experience:
Weapons Buy-Back in Eastern Siavonia, Baranja and Western
Sirmium (Croatia)," Bonn International Center for Conversion,
Oct. 1998; pp. 5, 16.
4. Ibid., p. 6.
5. Ibid., p. 7.
6. Ibid., p. 14.
7. Srdja Trifkovic, USTASA: Croation Separat ism and European
Politics 1929-1945 (London: The Lord Byron Foundat ion for
Balkan Studies, 1998), pp. 10, 273.
8. Boothby, p. 11.
9. Ibid., p. 13.
10. Ibid., p. 21.
11. Dempsey and Fontaine, p. 30.
12. William Norman Grigg, "UN Boosters Plenty Worried," The
New American, Oct. 2,1995 , p. 13.Vanden Heuvel's comments
were transcribed by the author from audiotape.
13. Dempsey and Fontaine , p. 25.
14. Ibid., p. 33.
15. Ibid., p. 34.
16. Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Sto ry of Modern War
(New York: Penguin Books, 1999), p. 72.
17. Dempsey and Fontaine, pp. 34-35 .
18. Ibid., p. 96.
19. Ibid. See also William F. Jasper, "Behind Our Defeat in So-
malia," The New Ameri can, Sept. 5, 1994, p. 8. Jasper 's story
summarizes the Farer Report , which was immediately sup-
pressed by the Clinton Administration and the UN.
20. Dempsey and Fontaine, pp. 35-36.
21. Ibid., p. 36.
128 Global Gun Grab

25. Courto is, et aI., p. 72.

26. Ibid., p. 74.
27 . Ibid ., p. 102.
28. Ibid ., p. 103.
29. Ibid., p. 98.
30. Ibid ., p. 99.
31. Ibid., p. 100.
32. Ibid., p. 116.
33. R.J . Rummel, Death by Governm ent (New Brunswick, N.J. :
Transaction Publi shers , 1994), p. 79.
34. Aleksandr 1. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956:
An Experim ent in Literary Investigation, 1-11 (New York: Harp-
er & Row, 1973), p. 13, fn. 5.

CHAPTER THREE - Blueprint for Global Dictatorship

1. R.J . Rummel, Deat h by Government (New Brunswick, N.J. :
Transaction Publishers, 1994), p. 86.
2. "Lenin's Aim s like UN 's, Thant Says," Los Angeles Times,
April 7, 1970.
3. Transcribed by author from audiotape. For an on-scene report,
see William Norman Grig g, "B uilding World Order," The New
Ame rican, Jul y 3, 2000 , pp. 4-8.
4. Hague Appeal for Peace, The Hague Agenda f or Peace and Jus-
tice in the 21st Century, UN Ref A/54/98, p. 44 .
5. Transcribed by autho r from audiotape, op cit.
6. For more information about the role played by the Council on
Foreign Relations in the crea tion of the UN " see William F.
Jasper, The United Nations Exposed (Appleton, Wis.: The John
Birch Soci ety, 200 1), especially Chapter 3, "The Secret Net -
work of Power." For more information about the Communist
influence, see Chapter 4, " The Communist Dim ension."
7. S. Steven Powell, Covert Cadre: Inside the Institut e f or Policy
Studies (Ottawa , Ill.: Gree n Hill Publi shers, Inc., 1987) , p. 16.
8. William F. Jas per, "Partnering with Terrorists," The New Amer-
ican, Nov. 25, 1996, p. 5.
9. Freedom From War: The United States Program/or Genera l
and Complete Disarmam ent in a Peacef ul World, Department
of State Publication 7277 , 1961 , p. 9.
10. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, A World Effectively Controlled by the
United Nations (Washington: Institute for Defense Analyses,
 Endnotes 137

Aug . 1995. See William Norman Grigg, "I am not a UN Sol-

dier," The New American, Oct. 2, 1995, pp. 5-8.
15. See the on-camera testimonies of military and intelligence per-
sonnel in the video documentary Waco: A New Revelation. See
also William Norman Grigg, "Waco Deception Up In Smoke,"
The New American, Sept. 27, 1999, pp. 12-15.
16. Danny O. Coulson and Elaine Shannon, No Heroes: Inside the
FBI's Secret Counter-Terror Force (New York: Pocket Books,
1999), pp . 135-142.
17. James Bovard, Lost Rights: The Destruction ofAmerican Lib-
erty (New York : St. Martin's Griffin, 1994), p. 224 .
18. The best single account of the Randy Weaver tragedy is Allan
Bock, Ambush at Ruby Ridge: How Government Agents Set
Randy Weaver Up and Took His Family Down (Irvine, Calif.:
Dickens-Press, 1995).
19. Bock, p. 203.
20. Bock, p. 13.
21. James Bovard, "feeling your pain": The Explosion andAbuse
ofGovernment Power in the Clinton-Gore Years (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 2000), pp. 295-296.
22. Bock, p. 189.
23 . Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War
(New York: Penguin Books, 1999), p. 78.
24. Bock, p. 81 .
25. David T. Hardy (with Rex Kimball), This Is Not An Assault:
Penetrating the Web of Official Lies Regarding the Waco Inci-
dent (Xlibris Corporation, 2001), p. 264.
26 . Ibid ., p. 294.
27. Ibid ., pp. 294, 296 .
28. See the final frames of the recent video documentary The FUR
Project (COPS Productions L.C.C., 2001)
29. Hardy, pp. 304 -305 .
30 . Robert D. Kaplan, An Empire Wilderness: Travels into Ameri-
ca's Future (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 7.
31. Ibid., p. 13.
32 . James J . Schneider, "Ambushing the Future," Special Waifare,
April 1995, p. 4 .
33. Ernest G. Cunningham, "Peacekeeping and UN Operational
Control: A Study of their Effect on Unit Cohesion" (Thesis),
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif., March 1995, p.
130 Global Gun Grab

3. Establishment historian Arthur J. Schlesinger writes: "For Roo-

sevelt, the critical task in 1943-45, beyond winning the war,
was to commit the United States to postwar internation al struc-
tures before peace could return the nation to its old habits...
Above all, FDR saw the United Nations ... as 'the only device
that could keep the United States from slipping back into iso-
lationism.' '' Churchill spoke of a UN with the military power
necessary to impose " 'its will against the evil-doer or evil-
planer in good time and by force of arms.' " See "Back to the
Womb? Isolationism's Renewed Threat," Foreign Affairs, July-
Aug. 1995, p. 4. For a useful example of the term "United Na-
tions" to describe the World War II alliance, particularly as ap-
plied to the critical U.S.-Soviet relationship, see George Racey
Jordan, From Major Jordan 's Diaries (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and Company, 1952), p. 31. For a more extensive treat-
ment of these issues, see Thomas Fleming, The New Dealers '
War (New York: Free Press, 2001).
4. Wallace, p. 2.
5. Ibid., p. 3.
6. Some Suggestions on Teaching about the United Nations and
its Specialized Agencies, Vol. 1 of Toward World Understand-
ing (Paris, France, 1948), p. 3.
7. Nasby Slott (Sweden), "The Appea l and Limitations of Practi-
cal Disarmament: Notes for the Presentation by Sami Faltas
(BICC) at the Semin ar on the Removal of Small Arms and
Light Weapons in the Context of Peace Missions," March 11-
12,1999, p. 5.
8. Kevin Howe, "Gun Buy-Back s Questioned : Programs not
proven effective in keeping weapons off street ," Mont erey
Herald, April 8, 2000 . Posted on the SAND website at
sand.miis.edu/about/news/gunbuyback.htm; accessed on June
22,200 1.
9. Brief 7, op cit., p. 26.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., p. 6.
12. Ibid., p. 26.
13. Ibid., p. 7.
14. Ibid., p. 6.
15. "SAND History and Accompli shments." Posted on the group 's
website at sand.miis.edu/about/; accessed on June 22,2001.
 Endnotes 139

treal, Dec. 8, 1999. Posted at www.un.org/MoreIn fo/ngolinkJ

sgmontre.htm; accessed on March 29, 200 I.
14. "B YU's Kennedy Center gains recognition by United Nations,"
press release, May 27, 1999.
15. Richard Wilkins, "The Fight for Famili es at the United Na-
tions," address to Australian Regional Conference for the World
Congre ss of Familie s, Aug. 7, 1999. Abridgement posted on
northernli fe.senet.com. au/9 sept99 .htm; accessed on July 27,
2000.
16. Ibid.
17. Philip Alper s, "Rapid Progress in UN's Worldwide Effort to
Harmonize Gun Control Laws - Full Report," Feb. 1998. Post-
ed at www.chambana.com/-eCG/unfeb98.htm; acces sed on
Aug. 3, 2001.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. "Setting the Record Straight: UN Conference on the Illicit
Trade in Small Arm s and Light Weapons in All Its Aspect s,
New York, 9-20 July, 2001 ," pres s release . Posted at
www.un.orglDepts/dda/CAB/smallarms/facts.htm; accessed on
Aug. 3, 2001.
21. "United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms
and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects," NRA statement, op cit.
22. John R. Bolton, "U.S. Statement at Plenary Session, UN Con-
ference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons
in All its Aspect s," July 9, 2001. Posted at www.un.org/
Depts/dda/C AB/smallarmslstatements/usE.htm1; accessed on
July 9, 2001.
23. Ibid., pp. 1-4.
24. "Statement of the Single Action Shooting Society," July 16,
2001.
25. "The World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities
- NGO Statement for the UN Conference on Small Arms, July
16, 2001."
26. Jim Burns, "UN Secretary-General Believes Gun Glorification
Is Bad for Children," CNSNews .com, Aug. 3, 2001; Posted at
www.cnsnews.com/ViewPrint.a...s\archive\200 108\For200 108
03a.html; accessed on Aug. 3, 2001.
27. "UN members waiting anxiously for U.S. dues," AP story pub-
lished in App leton [Wis.] Post-Crescent, August 2, 2001.
132 Global Gun Grab

2001, p. 3 and Annex B.

30. John O. Kohler, Stasi: The Untold Story of the East German
Secret Police (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999), p. 9.
31. For Cuba's use of "Committee for Defense of the Revolution,"
see Stephane Courtois, et a!., The Black Book of Communism:
Crimes, Terror; Repression, pp. 661-662. Communist China's
use of Red Guards as "block committees" during the Cultural
Revolution is described by former Red Guard Zhai Zhenhua in
her memoir Red Flower ofChina (New York: Soho, 1992), par-
ticularly pp. 92-93. For National Socialist Germany's use of
similar enforcement mechanisms, see Blair R. Holmes and Alan
F. Keele, eds., When Truth Was Treason: German Youth Against
Hitler (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1995),
p. 335, n. 6.
32. Posted at www.snipersparadise.com/gungrabbers/pax.htm; ac-
cessed on June 22,2001.
33. "Asking about weapons could save a child's life: Many Maine
homes have guns, and the risk is real," Portland [Maine} Press-
Herald, June 4, 2000, p. 4C.
34. HUD press release No. 00-226, "Secretary Cuomo Voices Sup-
port for Joint Campaign to Save Children ," Aug. 23, 2000.
35. John R. Lott Jr., "Zero Tolerance Equals Zero Thinking," Los
Angeles Times, June 13,2001, p. B13.
36 . Dave Kopel, Dr. Paul Gallant, and Dr. Joanne Eisen, "Zero
Good Sense," National Review Online, June 6, 2001. Posted at
01.html; accessed on June 25, 2001.
37. Armed to the Teeth: The World-Wide Plague ofSmall Arms (UN
video, 2000).
38. William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall ofthe Third Reich: A His-
tory ofNazi Germany (New York: Crest Books, 1961), p. 249.

CHAPTER FIVE - The Rwandan Genocide

1. Jay Simkin, Aaron Zelman, and Alan M. Rice, Rwanda's Geno-
cide 1994: Supplement to Lethal Laws (Milwaukee, Wis.: Jews
for the Preservation of Firearms Ownership, 1997), p. I.
2. Philip Gourevitch , we wish to inform you that tomorrow we will
be killed with our families (New York: Picador, 1998), p. 102.
3. William Shawcross, Deliver Usfrom Evil: Peacekeepers, War-
lords and a World of Endless Conflict (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2000), p. 145.
 Index
Africa, 13
Aideed, Mohammed Farah, 85-
89,100
Alper s, Philip, 115-117
America , see United States
American(s), 25, 37, 39,43,52,
62, 87-88, 94, 107, 122- 124
America n Life League, 112
America n Sovere ignty Restora-
tion Act, 123
American University, 86
American War for Independence ,
7-8, 17,21 ,78
Amin, Idi, 22
Andy Griffith Show , 9 1-92
Angka Loeu , 25, 27
Annan, Kofi, 3, 11, 16, 67,70,
76-78, 114, 120-122
Arizona Journal of International
and Comparati ve Law, 30
AIm ed to the Teeth, 13-14,62,72
Army Delta Force, 88, 99
Army Ranger s, 88-89, 94
ASEAN (Association of South-
East Asian Natio ns), 98
Asia, 13
A.S.K. (Asking Saves Kids), 59,
60
Associated Press, 110
ATF, 99, 103, 108
Australia, 19
Axworthy, Lloyd, 14
Baker, Gerald, 120
Barre , Moham med Siad, 85-86
Barron, John, 24-26
141
Bea udoin, Stephane, 64
Beijing+5, 112
Belgium , 67, 70
Berlin, 27
Bill of Rights, 119
Billion Mom March , 56, 58
Bir, Cevik, 85
Black Hawk Down , 88
Blek, Mary Leigh, 15
Bloomfie ld, Lincoln P., 4, 41-44
Blueprint for the Peace Race,
40-41
Bolshevism, 31-35
Bolton , John, 11, 13, 117, 119
Bonn International Centre for
Conversio n (BICC) , 16, 5 1
Boothby, Derek, 81, 83
Bosnia, 77
Boston, 2 1
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 53, 67-
68,85-86
Boutwell , Jeffrey, 74
Bowden, Mark, 88,102
Branch Davidians, 93, 99, 102-
103,108
Brigham Young University, 114
British, 7-8, 21-22 , 78
British-American Security Infor-
mation Council, 53
Brown, Lindsay, 6 1
Brown, Mark Malloch, 23
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco , and
Firearm s, 99, 103, 108
Burgh, James, 78
Bush adminis tration, 13, 1l7 ,
119- 120
134 Global Gun Grab

28. Carlsson Report, op. cit.

29. "UN Chief Apologizes for Rwanda ," Deseret News, Dec. 17,
1999.
30. See Our Global Neighborhood: The Report ofthe Commis sion
on Global Governance (London: Oxford University Pres s,
1995), p. 80, for a discussion of "human security."
31. Ibid., p. 131.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., p. 88.
34. Ibid., p. 98.
35. Carlsson Report, op cit.
36. Gourevitch , we wish . .. , p. iii.
37. Arm ed to the Teeth: The World-Wide Plague of Small Arms (UN
video, 2000).
38. Gourevitch, we wish ..., p. 59.
39. Simkin, et aI., p. 1.
40. Ibid., p. 9.
4 1. Gourevitch, we wish . . ., p. 17.
42. Ibid., p. 95.
43. Ibid., p. 81.
44. Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T. Klare, "A Scourge of Small
Arms," Scientific American, June 2000.
45. Simkin, et al.
46. Ibid., p. 22.
47. Don Melvi n, "Suit targets UN inaction that allowed two
deaths," Washington Times, March 2,2000, p. A 13.
48. Mark Riley, "UN to Seek Immunit y on Rwanda, Sydney Mo rn-
ing Hera ld, Jan. 12,2000.
49. Melvin, op. cit.
50. Riley, op. cit.
51. Dana Durbin, "Annan Delivers Strong Message: Speech Out-
lines World Conflict Changes, Rice News , Vol. 7 No. 7, April
30,1998.
52. "Kofi Annan Says U.S. debts to UN hurting peacekeeping."
Posted at www.cnn.com/US/9804124/annan; accessed on May
9,200l.
53. Daniel Lazare, "Your Constitution is Killing You," Harper's,
Oct. 1999, p. 62.
54. Shawcross , p. 133.
55. Isaac Lappia, "Address to the United Nations Conferenc e on
 Index
NATO, 42, 98
Navy, 94,106
Navy Times, 107
Nazi Germany (National Social-
ist), 2, 27-31, 33, 59, 77
NBC, 57
Netherlands, 15
New Delhi , 116
New, Michael, 98
New York City, 39
New York Times, 31
New Zealand, 115
Newark, N.J., 55
Nicaragua, 54, 113
Night of Broken Glass, 30
Nineteen Eighty-Four, 62
Niwemutesi, Jeanne, 63
Nizhni Novgorod, 23, 31
Non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), 5, 15,39,53,55,
71,111 -118,120-122
North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion , 42,98
North Vietnamese Communists,
40
Northwestern University, 25
Nyiramilimo, Odette, 63
Oklahoma City bombing, 103-
104
Oldsmar Elementary School, 61
Operation Restore Hope, 84
Operations Other Than War
(OOTW), 98, 105-107
Organization of American
States, 117
Orwell, George, 62
Our Global Neighborhood, 70
Pakistani "peacekeepers," 86-87
Parker, John, 7, 21
145
Pashayan, Charles, 16
Paul, Anthony, 24-26
Paul, Ron, 123
Pentagon, 94
Peroni, Carlo, 120
Persian Gulf, 98, 103, 105-106
Peterson, Scott, 88
Phillips, Hans, 27, 28
Phnom Penh, 23, 26
Pitcairn, John, 7
Poland, 113
Politboro, 34
Polsby, Daniel D., 25
Posse Comitatus Act, 99, 104,
108
Powell, S. Steven, 39
Program on Security and Devel-
opment (SAND), 54-55
Pulitzer Prize, 57
Ramsay, David, 21
Red Cross, 88, 102
Register of Conventional Arms ,
19,54,119
Reno, Janet, 57
Revere , Paul, 7
Revolutionary War, see American
War for Independence
Reyes, Camilo, 12
Rice University, 77
Riza, Iqbal, 78
Rogers, Dick, 102
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 50
Rubin, Samuel, 39
Ruby Ridge, Idaho, 100-102
Rummel, R.J., 2, 9-10, 46-47
Russia, 2, 22, 31-35, 77
Rwanda, 3, 22, 63-78
Rwandan Patriotic Front, 64
81. Petersburg, Fla., 61
136 Global Gun Grab

22. Ibid., p. 38.

23. Ibid., pp. 38-39.
24. Ibid., p. 37.
25. Ibid., p. 40.
26. Bowden, p. 74.

CHAPTER SEVEN - Militarizing Mayberry

I. Diane Cecelia Weber, "Warrior Cops: The Ominous Growth of
Paramilitarism in American Police Departments," Cato Brief-
ing Papers, No. 50, Aug. 26, 1999, p. 1.
2. The "Combat Arms Survey," composed by Navy Lt. Comman-
der Ernest G. Cunningham as part of a Master's Thesis project,
was leaked to The New American by one of the Marine partic -
ipants in a letter dated May IS, 1994. The New American broke
the story of the survey in its July II , 1994 issue, page 10. The
handwritten letter and the sole original copy of the much-
reprod uced survey are in the possession of the Robert Welch
University Research Department.
3. For a discussion of the practice of "civil forfeitur e," see John
Perna, "Forfeiting Freedom," The New American, May 17,
1993, p. 71, and Perna, "Government on the Take," The New
American, May 31, 1993, pp. 23-27.
4. William F. Jasper, "Signposts to a Police State," The New Amer-
ican, Sept. 11, 2000, p. 16.
5. William Norman Grigg, "Erasing the Thin Blue Line," The New
American, Sept. 24, 2001, pp. 10-12.
6. Allan Bock, Ambush at Ruby Ridge: How Government Agents
Set Randy Weaver Up and Took His Family Down (Irvine,
Calif.: Dickens Press, 1995), p. 205 .
7. Weber, op. cit.
8. Ibid., p. 8.
9. Ibid .
10. Ibid.
11. Freedom From War: The United States Program for General
and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World, State De-
partme nt Publication 7222 (1961), p. 9.
12. Ibid., p. 10.
13. Michael Scardaville, "Anti-gun lobby now turns to the UN for
help," syndicated column, July 16,2001.
14. The author was the first jo urnalist to interview Michael New in
138 Global Gun Grab

79.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., pp. 192-193; spelling in the original.
36. Ibid., p. 38.
37. Ibid., p. 79.
38. Margaret Roth, "Some Marines would shoot first, ask questions
later," Navy Times, Aug . 28, 1995, p. 16.
39. See Coulson and Shannon , p. 357, for a discussion of a Posse
Comitatus waiver issued in 1987 by President Ronald Reagan.
40. Hardy, pp. 247-248.

CHAPTER EIGHT - Stop the Gun Grab: Get US Out!

I. "For 1st Time, UN Turns Focus to Gun Control," Manchest er
{N.H.] Union-Leader, May 24, 1994, p. 3.
2. Letter from Thomas Hodgkins , NRA-ILA Grassroots Division,
June 23, 1994.
3. "National Rifle Association goes global," CNN news report.
Posted on Nov. 24, 1996 at asia.cnn.comlUS/9611124/nra.125/;
accessed on Aug . 3,2001.
4. Charlton Heston , "Can the UN Disarm the U.S.?" Posted at the
Guns and Ammo Website at www.gunsandammomag.com/
dynamic .asp?intSectionID=21 O&intArticleID= 1423; accessed
on Aug. 3, 2001.
5. The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC),
ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 : "Arrangements for Consulta-
tion with Non-Governmental Organizations," I:I; Posted at
www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngolResolution_1996_3I/Part_1
.htm; accessed on Aug . 3,2001.
6. "United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms
and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects," New York, July 16,
200 I : Statement of the National Rifle Association of America .
7. Thomas R. Eddlem, "Conservatives Deceived by NGOs," The
New American, July 16,2001, p. 28.
8. Susan Martinuk, "Radical Feminists Only Need Apply," Na-
tional Post, June 12,2000.
9. UN /ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, op. cit.
10. Ibid., III:22,26.
II. Ibid., IX:61 (c).
12. Ibid., VIII:57 (c).
13. KofiAnnan, address to World Conference on Civil Society, Mon-
 Index
of Action, 11, 120-121; Small
Arms Destruction Day, 10
UN social development summit,
12
United States (or America), 15,
18-19,43,48,50-51 ,53-55,
61-62 ,90,94,97, 105, 110-
111,118-119,121 -122
U.S. Arms Control and Disanna-
ment Agency, 40
U.S. Command and Staff College
(Fort Leavenworth), 80, 105
U.S. Constitution, 37, 47, 96,
112; Bill of Rights, 119; Sec-
ond Amendment, 107, 110,
119
U.S. government (or policy), 3-4,
18,37,40-42,53,89,91 ,106,
119; Bush admini stration , 13,
117,119-120 ; Clinton admin-
istration, 57, 60, 117
U.S. government agencies, see
agency name
U.S. military, 19,84-89, 94, 97,
99-10 2, 105-107
University of Hawaii, 46
University of Texas at Dallas, 94
UNOSOM 83-84, 88
UNTAES,8 1-83
Ustashe Fascist regime, 82
van Aartsen, lovias, 15
van den Heuvel, William l ., 84
Vienna, 117
Vietnam War, 39, 98
VVaco,93, 99-100 ,102-103
Wallace, Henry, 49, 50
Washington, D.C., 56, 84, 88
Washington Post, 54
Watson, Paul, 80
147
'We the Peoples ,' 16
Weaver, Randy & family mem-
bers, 100-102
Weber, Diane Cecilia, 91, 94-95
Webster, Noah, 48
Weimar government, 29-30
Weiss, Cora, 37- 40
Weiss, Peter, 39
Welch, Robert , 123-124
Werth, Nicholas, 32-33
Wilkins, Richard , 114-115
World Civil Society Forum , 114
World Effectively Controlled by
the United Nation s, 4, 41
World Family Policy Forum , 114
World Federalist Association , 44
World Forum on the Future of
Sport Shooting Activities, 120
World Peace Through World Law,
44
World War II, 50, 82
Ya le University Law School, 6 1
Yugoslav(ia), 81, 98
Z ampolit, 93
142 Global Gun Grab
Bush, George, 84
Bush, George w., 18
Cambodia, 3, 22-28, 34, 77
Canada, 65
CAP, 54
Carlsson, Ingvar, 67
Carnegie Commission on the
Prevention of Deadly Con-
flicts,54
Cas tro , Fidel, 22
Cato Institute, 87, 91, 94
Cato's Letters, 77
CBC-TV,65
CBS, 57
Center for Preventative Action, 54
Cheka, 32, 34
Ch ina, 22 , 59
Christian Scie nce Monitor, 55
Cl ark , Grenville, 44 , 46
Clinton administration, 57 , 60,
117
CNN, 11O
Colombia, 12
Columbine High School, 60
Co mba t Arms Survey, 9 1, 106-
108
Commission on Global Gover-
nance, 51 , 67, 70-71
Communism, 36,42, 123; Cam-
bodian, 23 -27; Soviet, 31 -35
Communist(s), 23-24, 29, 39-40,
42
Communist Part y, U.S.A., 39
Concord, Ma ss., 7-8, 21
Conference on the lllicit Trade in
Small Arms and Light
Weap ons In All Its Aspects,
see UN Small Arms Confer-
ence
Congo, 7
Co ngress, 1, 97; Ho use of Rep -
resentatives, 122-123
Co nnecticut, 59
Co nsti tution, see U.S. Co nstitu-
tion
Conve ntional Arms Pro liferat ion,
54
Coo per, Tony, 94, 104
Co ssac ks , 32-3 4
Co uncil on Foreig n Relations,
39 ,4 1,54,86, 124
Covert Cadre, 39
Croatia, 8 1-82, 89
Cuba, 22, 59
Cu nning ham, Ernest G., 106- 107
Cuomo, Andrew, 59 -60
Dag Hammerskjold Plaza , 15
Da llaire, Romeo, 63-69
Da lrymple, Don ato, 57
de Waa l, Alex, 63
Death by Government, 2, 46
Declaration ofIndepende nce, 37
Dee s-Thomases, Donna, 56 -57
Degan, William, 100
Democrat Party, 57
Dempsey, Gary T., 87
Destexhe, Alain, 67
DeYo ung, Mark, 112
DGI,39
Dhanapala, Jayantha, 23
Disarmament (statue), 9, 10;
photo, opposite 90
Dominican Republic, 54
Don River , 33
Dzherzhinsky, Fel iks, 32
Eastern Slovenia, 19
Eckhard, Fred, 76, 122
El Salvador, 20, 54
Emp ire Wilderness, 104
144 Global Gun Grab
Irvington, N.J ., 61
Jamar, Jeff, 102-103
Japa n, 50
Jews, 30, 72
Jews for the Preserva tion of
Firea rms Ownership, 25, 73-
74
John Birch Society, 5, 4 1, 122-
123
John ston, Robert B., 85
Justice Department, 92, 101
Kaplan, Robert D., 104- 105
Kennedy, John F., 40
KGB, 32, 39
Khan, Shaharyar, 75
Khmer Rouge , 22-27, 34
Khrushchev, Nik ita, 4 1
Kiga li, Rwa nda, 66, 75
Kitson, Henry Hudson, 7
Klare, Michael T., 74
Korea, 98
Koresh, David, 99
Kosovo,98
Krasni Mech (The Red Sword),
32
Kristallnacht, 30
Kuban River, 33
Lappia, Isaac, 78-79
Latin America, 13
Latsis, Martin, 34
Laurance, Edward J., 19,49,51 -
52,54-55
Lenin , Vladimir, 23, 31, 34-37
Leningrad, 35
Lexington, Mass ., 7-8, 21
Linder, Karl, 34
Lindq uist, Kim, 101
Lon Nol, 23
London Times, 30
Lott , John R, Jr., 6 1
Louisiana, 61
Luxembourg, 9
Macedonia, 98
Maikop,34
Mao Tse-tung, 18
Marines, 105- 107
Mart inuk, Susan, 112-1 13
Maso n, Thomas, 111, 116-118
May berry, 9 1-93, 95
McMa nus, John F., 5
McVeigh, Timothy, 103
Miami, 57
Million Mom Marc h, 15,53,56-
58
Minuteman statue, 7-8; photo,
oppos ite 9 1
Minutemen, 7-8, 2 1
Mississ ippi, 61
MIT, 41
Moga dishu Radio, 86-87
Moga dish u, Soma lia, 85, 88-89,
101- 102
Monterey Institute of Interna-
tional Studies, 54
Montreal, 114
Moscow, 34
Mt. Carmel church, 93, 99
Moza mbique, 54
Murder ofa Gent le Land, 24
Murra h Building, 103
Nagasaki, 72
National Guard, 104
National Merit Scholar, 61
National Post, 112
National Press Club, 42
National Rifle Association, 5,
110- 112, 116- 119,1 2 1
146 Global Gun Grab

SAND,54-55 Toward World Understanding, 50

Scardaville, Michael , 97
Schneider, Jam es J., 80, 105
SEATO ,98
Second Amendment, 107, 110,
119
Serb,82-83
Shakespeare, 89
Sierra Leone , 79
Single Action Shooting Society,
120
Small Arm s Conference, see UN
Small Arms Conference
Smith, Franc is, 7-8, 21
Smit h, Winston, 62
Sohn, Loui s B., 44, 46
Solzhenit syn, Alek sandr, 34-35
Som alia, 80, 83-89 , 94,100-102 ,
106
South- Ea st Asian Treat y Organi-
zation,98
Soviet Russia 2,22,3 1-35, 77;
Soviet(s), 36, 93
Stalin, 18,34-35
Stasi,58
State Department, 3-4
State Depart ment Publication
7277, see Freedom From War
Stockwell, David,'88
Supp lement to An Age nda for
Peace, 53
SWAT, 92, 95, 108
Tambov,34
Tampa, Fla ., 61
Taylor, Andy, 91-93
Texas, 6 1
Thant , U, 36
Thessalonians, 63
Third Reich, 34
Tomb elaine, Mic hel, 7
Tukhachevsky, Mikhail, 34
Tutsi(s), 63-66, 68-69, 72-73 , 77
Twentynine Palms Marine Base,
91, 106
Uganda, 15,22
UNAMIR, 63, 68-69
United Kingdom, 19
United Nations Association of
the USA, 84
UN Centre for Disarmament
Affair s (UNCDA), 19
UN Chart er, 36-38, 44, 63
UN Deve lopment Program, 23,
58
UN Disarmament Commission,
52,110
UN Economic and Social Coun -
cil, 113
UN Education, Scientific, and
Cultural Organizat ion
(UNESCO), 50
UN General Assembl y, 40-4 1,
44,64
UN Military Staff Commi ttee, 38
UN Military Supply and Re-
search Age ncy, 44
UN Mille nnium Forum , 3
UN Panel of Gove rnmental Ex-
perts on Small Arm s, 8 1, 119
UN Participation Act, 98
UN pop ulation contro l summit,
12
UN Register of Co nventional
Arms, 19,54, 119
UN Security Cou nc il, 19,38,8 1,
84,86, 103, 121
UN Small Arms Conference, 3,
9- 11,13- 14,56,59,78,97,
111,1 17,119-121; Program
 Recommended Reading and Action
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drive to disarm the world. But how
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