CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 1
II. CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL
LAWS OF THE STATE
A. ARBITRARY DETENTION AND
EXPULSION
Art. 124. Arbitrary detention. — Any public
officer or employee who, without legal grounds,
detains a person, shall suffer;
1. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, if the detention has not exceeded three
days;
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, if the detention
has continued more than three but not more
than fifteen days;
3. The penalty of prision mayor, if the detention
has continued for more than fifteen days but not
more than six months; and
4. That of reclusion temporal, if the detention
shall have exceeded six months.
The commission of a crime, or violent insanity or
any other ailment requiring the compulsory
confinement of the patient in a hospital, shall be
considered legal grounds for the detention of
any person.
CONSTITUTION
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
RULE 113, RULES OF COURT
Section 1. Definition of arrest. — Arrest is the
taking of a person into custody in order that he
may be bound to answer for the commission of
an offense. (1)
Section 2. Arrest; how made. — An arrest is
made by an actual restraint of a person to be
arrested, or by his submission to the custody of
the person making the arrest.
No violence or unnecessary force shall be used
in making an arrest. The person arrested shall
not be subject to a greater restraint than is
necessary for his detention. (2a)
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.
— A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed,
and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Republic Act No. 7438 April 27, 1992
AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF
PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR
UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS
WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING,
DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING
OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES
FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
Section 1. Statement of Policy. – It is the
policy of the Senate to value the dignity of every
human being and guarantee full respect for
human rights.
Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested,
Detained or Under Custodial Investigation;
Duties of Public Officers.–
(a) Any person arrested detained or under
custodial investigation shall at all times be
assisted by counsel.
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone
acting under his order or his place, who arrests,
detains or investigates any person for the
commission of an offense shall inform the latter,
in a language known to and understood by him,
of his rights to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, preferably
of his own choice, who shall at all times be
allowed to confer privately with the person
arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation. If such person cannot afford the
services of his own counsel, he must be
provided with a competent and independent
counsel by the investigating officer.lawphi1Ÿ
(c) The custodial investigation report shall be
reduced to writing by the investigating officer,
provided that before such report is signed, or
thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained
does not know how to read and write, it shall be
read and adequately explained to him by his
counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by
the investigating officer in the language or
dialect known to such arrested or detained
person, otherwise, such investigation report
shall be null and void and of no effect
whatsoever.
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a
person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation shall be in writing and signed by
such person in the presence of his counsel or in
the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 2
the presence of any of the parents, elder
brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal
mayor, the municipal judge, district school
supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as
chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial
confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in
any proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained
under the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, or under custodial
investigation, shall be in writing and signed by
such person in the presence of his counsel;
otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and
of no effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under
custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by
or conferences with any member of his
immediate family, or any medical doctor or
priest or religious minister chosen by him or by
any member of his immediate family or by his
counsel, or by any national non-governmental
organization duly accredited by the Commission
on Human Rights of by any international non-
governmental organization duly accredited by
the Office of the President. The person's
"immediate family" shall include his or her
spouse, fiancé or fiancée, parent or child,
brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild,
uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or
ward.
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation"
shall include the practice of issuing an
"invitation" to a person who is investigated in
connection with an offense he is suspected to
have committed, without prejudice to the liability
of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.
Section 3. Assisting Counsel. – Assisting
counsel is any lawyer, except those directly
affected by the case, those charged with
conducting preliminary investigation or those
charged with the prosecution of crimes.
The assisting counsel other than the
government lawyers shall be entitled to the
following fees;

(a) The amount of One hundred fifty pesos
(P150.00) if the suspected person is chargeable
with light felonies;lawphi1©alf
(b) The amount of Two hundred fifty pesos
(P250.00) if the suspected person is chargeable
with less grave or grave felonies;
(c) The amount of Three hundred fifty pesos
(P350.00) if the suspected person is chargeable
with a capital offense.
The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid
by the city or municipality where the custodial
investigation is conducted, provided that if the
municipality of city cannot pay such fee, the
province comprising such municipality or city
shall pay the fee: Provided, That the Municipal
or City Treasurer must certify that no funds are
available to pay the fees of assisting counsel
before the province pays said fees.
In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial
investigation shall be conducted and the
suspected person can only be detained by the
investigating officer in accordance with the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Section 4. Penalty Clause. – (a) Any arresting
public officer or employee, or any investigating
officer, who fails to inform any person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own
choice, shall suffer a fine of Six thousand pesos
(P6,000.00) or a penalty of imprisonment of not
less than eight (8) years but not more than ten
(10) years, or both. The penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification shall also be imposed
upon the investigating officer who has been
previously convicted of a similar offense.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon a
public officer or employee, or anyone acting
upon orders of such investigating officer or in his
place, who fails to provide a competent and
independent counsel to a person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation for the
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 3
commission of an offense if the latter cannot
afford the services of his own counsel.
(b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or
prohibits any lawyer, any member of the
immediate family of a person arrested, detained
or under custodial investigation, or any medical
doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by
him or by any member of his immediate family
or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring
privately with him, or from examining and
treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual
needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent
cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor
more than six (6) years, and a fine of four
thousand pesos (P4,000.00).lawphi1©
The provisions of the above Section
notwithstanding, any security officer with
custodial responsibility over any detainee or
prisoner may undertake such reasonable
measures as may be necessary to secure his
safety and prevent his escape.
Section 5. Repealing Clause. – Republic Act
No. No. 857, as amended, is hereby repealed.
Other laws, presidential decrees, executive
orders or rules and regulations, or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 6. Effectivity. – This Act shall take
effect fifteen (15) days following its publication
in the Official Gazette or in any daily
newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines.
Approved: April 27, 1992.lawphi1Ÿ
G.R. No. L-37007 July 20, 1987
RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as Assistant
Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, and
ARMANDO VALDEZ,petitioners,
vs.

ANGELITO C. SALANGA, in his capacity as
Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan (Branch IV), and JUAN TUVERA,
SR., respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of an
order of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Third Judicial District, in Criminal
Case No. D-529 entitled "The People of the
Philippines versus Juan Tuvera, Sr., et al.,"
granting the motion to quash the information
filed by accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., herein
respondent. The issue is whether a barrio
captain can be charged of arbitrary detention.
The facts are as follows:
On October 12, 1972, an information for
Arbitrary Detention was filed against Juan
Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo
Mangsat, in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, which reads as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial
Fiscal accuses Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas
Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat alias
Rudy, all of Manaoag, Pangasinan, of the
crime of ARBITRARY DETENTION,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of April
1973, at around 10:00 o'clock in the
evening, in barrio Baguinay, Manaoag,
Pangasinan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., a barrio
captain, with the aid of some other
private persons, namely Juan Tuvera,
Jr., Bertillo Bataoil and one Dianong,
maltreated one Armando Valdez by
hitting with butts of their guns and fists
blows and immediately thereafter,
without legal grounds, with deliberate
intent to deprive said Armando Valdez of
his constitutional liberty, accused Barrio
captain Juan Tuvera, Sr., Cpl. Tomas
Mendoza and Pat. Rodolfo Mangsat,
members of the police force of Mangsat,
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 4
Pangasinan conspiring, confederating
and helping one another, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
lodge and lock said Armando Valdez
inside the municipal jail of Manaoag,
Pangasinan for about eleven (11)
hours. (Emphasis supplied.)
CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 124 of the
R.P.C.
Dagupan City, October 12, 1972.
(SGD.) VICENTE C. CALDONA
Assistant Provincial Fiscal
All the accused, including respondent Juan
Tuvera, Sr., were arraigned and pleaded not
guilty.
On April 4, 1973, Tuvera filed a motion to quash
the information on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense and that
the proofs adduced at the investigation are not
sufficient to support the filing of the information.
Petitioner Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon S.
Milo filed an opposition thereto.
Finding that respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr. was
not a public officer who can be charged with
Arbitrary Detention, respondent Judge Angelito
C. Salanga granted the motion to quash in an
order dated April 25, 1973.
Hence, this petition.
Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public
officer who, without legal grounds, detains a
person.1 The elements of this crime are the
following:
1. That the offender is a public officer or
employee.
2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal
grounds.2

The ground relied upon by private respondent
Tuvera for his motion to quash the information
which was sustained by respondent Judge, is
that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense,3 that is, that the facts alleged in the
information do not constitute the elements of
Arbitrary Detention.
The Information charges Tuvera, a barrio
captain, to have conspired with Cpl. Mendoza
and Pat. Mangsat, who are members of the
police force of Manaoag, Pangasinan in
detaining petitioner Valdez for about eleven (11)
hours in the municipal jail without legal ground.
No doubt the last two elements of the crime are
present.
The only question is whether or not Tuvera, Sr.,
a barrio captain is a public officer who can be
liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention.
The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention
must be vested with authority to detain or order
the detention of persons accused of a crime.
Such public officers are the policemen and other
agents of the law, the judges or mayors.4
Respondent Judge Salanga did not consider
private respondent Tuvera as such public officer
when the former made this finding in the
questioned order:
Apparently, if Armando Valdez was ever
jailed and detained more than six (6)
hours, Juan Tuvera, Sr., has nothing to
do with the same because he is not in any
way connected with the Police Force of
Manaoag, Pangasinan. Granting that it
was Tuvera, Sr., who ordered Valdez
arrested, it was not he who detained and
jailed him because he has no such
authority vested in him as a mere Barrio
Captain of Barrio Baguinay, Manaoag,
Pangasinan. 5
In line with the above finding of respondent
Judge Salanga, private respondent Tuvera
asserts that the motion to quash was properly
sustained for the following reasons: (1) That he
did not have the authority to make arrest, nor jail
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 5
and detain petitioner Valdez as a mere barrio
captain;6 (2) That he is neither a peace officer
nor a policeman,7 (3) That he was not a public
official;8 (4) That he had nothing to do with the
detention of petitioner Valdez;9 (5) That he is not
connected directly or indirectly in the
administration of the Manaoag Police
Force;10 (6) That barrio captains on April 21,
1972 were not yet considered as persons in
authority and that it was only upon the
promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 299
that Barrio Captain and Heads of Barangays
were decreed among those who are persons in
authority;11 and that the proper charge was
Illegal Detention and Not Arbitrary Detention.12
We disagree.
Long before Presidential Decree 299 was
signed into law, barrio lieutenants (who were
later named barrio captains and now barangay
captains) were recognized as persons in
authority. In various cases, this Court deemed
them as persons in authority, and convicted
them of Arbitrary Detention.
In U.S. vs. Braganza,13 Martin Salibio, a barrio
lieutenant, and Hilario Braganza, a municipal
councilor, arrested Father Feliciano Gomez
while he was in his church. They made him pass
through the door of the vestry and afterwards
took him to the municipal building. There, they
told him that he was under arrest. The priest had
not committed any crime. The two public
officials were convicted of Arbitrary Detention.14
In U.S. vs. Gellada,15 Geronimo Gellada, a
barrio lieutenant, with the help of Filoteo
Soliman, bound and tied his houseboy Sixto
Gentugas with a rope at around 6:00 p.m. and
delivered him to the justice of the peace. Sixto
was detained during the whole night and until
9:00 a.m. of the next day when he was ordered
released by the justice of the peace because he
had not committed any crime, Gellada was
convicted of Arbitrary Detention.16
Under Republic Act No. 3590, otherwise known
as The Revised Barrio Charter, the powers and
duties of a barrio captain include the following:

to look after the maintenance of public order in
the barrio and to assist the municipal mayor and
the municipal councilor in charge of the district
in the performance of their duties in such
barrio;17 to look after the general welfare of the
barrio;18 to enforce all laws and ordinances
which are operative within the barrio;19and to
organize and lead an emergency group
whenever the same may be necessary for the
maintenance of peace and order within the
barrio.20
In his treatise on Barrio Government Law and
Administration, Professor Jose M. Aruego has
this to say about the above-mentioned powers
and duties of a Barrio Captain, to wit:
"Upon the barrio captain depends in the main
the maintenance of public order in the barrio.
For public disorder therein, inevitably people
blame him.
"In the event that there be a disturbing act to
said public order or a threat to disturb public
order, what can the barrio captain do?
Understandably, he first resorts to peaceful
measures. He may take preventive measures
like placing the offenders under surveillance and
persuading them, where possible, to behave
well, but when necessary, he may subject them
to the full force of law.
"He is a peace officer in the barrio considered
under the law as a person in authority. As
such, he may make arrest and detain persons
within legal limits.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
One need not be a police officer to be
chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is
accepted that other public officers like judges
and mayors, who act with abuse of their
functions, may be guilty of this crime.22 A
perusal of the powers and function vested in
mayors would show that they are similar to
those of a barrio captain23 except that in the
case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is
smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining
peace and order, both must be and are given
the authority to detain or order detention.
Noteworthy is the fact that even private
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 6
respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with
the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain,
could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez.24
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a
barrio captain, like private respondent Tuvera,
Sr., can be held liable for Arbitrary Detention.
Next, private respondent Tuvera, Sr. contends
that the motion to quash was validly granted as
the facts and evidence on record show that
there was no crime of Arbitrary Detention;25 that
he only sought the aid and assistance of the
Manaoag Police Force;26 and that he only
accompanied petitioner Valdez to town for the
latter's personal safety.27
Suffice it to say that the above allegations can
only be raised as a defense at the trial as they
traverse what is alleged in the Information. We
have repeatedly held that Courts, in resolving a
motion to quash, cannot consider facts contrary
to those alleged in the information or which do
not appear on the face of the information. This
is because a motion to quash is a hypothetical
admission of the facts alleged in the
information.28 Matters of defense cannot be
proved during the hearing of such a motion,
except where the Rules expressly permit, such
as extinction of criminal liability, prescription,
and former jeopardy.29 In the case of U.S. vs.
Perez,30 this Court held that a motion to quash
on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense cannot allege new facts
not only different but diametrically opposed to
those alleged in the complaint. This rule admits
of only one exception and that is when such
facts are admitted by the prosecution.31 lawphi1
Lastly, private respondent claims that by the
lower court's granting of the motion to quash
jeopardy has already attached in his favor32 on
the ground that here, the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
Respondent's contention holds no water. An
order granting a motion to quash, unlike one of
denial, is a final order. It is not merely
interlocutory and is therefore immediately

appealable. The accused cannot claim double
jeopardy as the dismissal was secured not only
with his consent but at his instance.33
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The
questioned Order of April 25, 1973 in Criminal
Case No. D-529 is hereby set aside. Let this
case be remanded to the appropriate trial court
for further proceedings. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 7
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-
appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, 11 th
Judicial Region, Digos, Davao del Sur
convicting defendant- appellant Ruben Burgos y
Tito of The crime of Illegal Possession of
Firearms in Furtherance of Subversion. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of
accused Ruben Burgos
sufficiently established beyond
reasonable doubt, of the offense
charges , pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 9, in relation to
General Order No. 6, dated
September 22, 1972, and General
Order No. 7, dated September 23,
1972, in relation further to
Presidential Decree No. 885, and
considering that the firearm
subject of this case was not used
in the circumstances as embraced
in paragraph I thereof, applying
the provision of indeterminate
sentence law, accused Ruben
Burgos is hereby sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment of twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal
maximum, as minimum penalty, to
reclusion perpetua, as maximum
penalty, pursuant to sub-
paragraph B, of Presidential
Decree No. 9, as aforementioned,
with accessory penalties, as
provided for by law.
As a result of this judgment, the
subject firearm involved in this
case (Homemade revolver,
caliber .38, Smith and Wesson,
with Serial No. 8.69221) is hereby
ordered confiscated in favor of the
government, to be disposed of in

accordance with law. Likewise,
the subversive documents,
leaflets and/or propaganda seized
are ordered disposed of in
accordance with law.
The information charged the defendant-
appellant with the crime of illegal possession of
firearm in furtherance of subversion in an
information which reads as follows:
That in the afternoon of May 13,
1982 and thereabout at Tiguman,
Digos, Davao del Sur, Philippines,
within the jurisdiction of this Court,
the above- named accused with
intent to possess and without the
necessary license, permit or
authority issued by the proper
government agencies, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously keep, possess, carry
and have in his possession,
control and custody one (1)
homemade revolver, caliber .38,
make Smith and Wesson, with
Serial No. 8.69221, which firearm
was issued to and used by the
accused at Tiguman, Digos,
Davao del Sur, his area of
operations by one Alias
Commander Pol for the New
People's Army (NPA),
subversive organization
organized for the purpose of
overthrowing the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines
through lawless and violent
means, of which the accused had
knowledge, and which firearm
was used by the accused in the
performance of his subversive
tasks such as the recruitment of
New Members to the NPA and
collection of contributions from the
members.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 8
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized
in the decision of the lower court as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Through the testimony of Pat.
Pepito Bioco, and Sgt. Romeo
Taroy, it appears that by virtue of
an intelligent information obtained
by the Constabulary and INP
units, stationed at Digos, Davao
del Sur, on May 12, 1982, one
Cesar Masamlok personally and
voluntarily surre0ndered to the
authorities at about 9:00 o'clock
A.M. at Digos, Davao del Sur
Constabulary Headquarters,
stating that he was forcibly
recruited by accused Ruben
Burgos as member of the NPA,
threatening him with the use of
firearm against his life, if he
refused.
Along with his recruitment,
accused was asked to contribute
one (1) chopa of rice and one
peso (P1.00) per month, as his
contribution to the NPA TSN, page
5, Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Immediately, upon receipt of said
a information, a joint team of PC-
INP units, composed of fifteen
(15) members, headed by Captain
Melchesideck Bargio, (PC), on the
following day, May 13, 1982, was
dispatched at Tiguman; Davao del
Sur, to arrest accused Ruben
Burgos. The team left the
headquarter at 1:30 P.M., and
arrived at Tiguman, at more or
less 2:00 o'clock PM where
through the help of Pedro Burgos,
brother of accused, the team was
able to locate accused, who was
plowing his field. (TSN, pages 6-7,
Hearing-October 14, 1982).

Right in the house of accused, the
latter was caned by the team and
Pat. Bioco asked accused about
his firearm, as reported by Cesar
Masamlok. At first accused denied
possession of said firearm but
later, upon question profounded
by Sgt. Alejandro Buncalan with
the wife of the accused, the latter
pointed to a place below their
house where a gun was buried in
the ground. (TSN, page 8,
Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Pat. Bioco then verified the place
pointed by accused's wife and dug
the grounds, after which he
recovered the firearm, Caliber .38
revolver, marked as Exhibit "A" for
the prosecution.
After the recovery of the firearm,
accused likewise pointed to the
team, subversive documents
which he allegedly kept in a stock
pile of qqqcogon at a distance of
three (3) meters apart from his
house. Then Sgt. Taroy
accordingly verified beneath said
cogon grass and likewise
recovered documents consisting
of notebook colored maroon with
spiral bound, Exhibit "B" for the
prosecution; a pamphlet
consisting of eight (8) leaves,
including the front and back
covers entitled Ang Bayan,
Pahayagan ng Partido Komunista
ng Pilipinas, Pinapatnubayan ng
Marxismo, Leninismo Kaisipang
Mao qqqZedong dated December
31, 1980, marked as Exhibit "C",
and another pamphlet Asdang
Pamantalaang Masa sa
Habagatang Mindanao, March
and April 1981 issue, consisting of
ten (10) pages, marked as Exhibit
"D" for the prosecution.
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 9
Accused, when confronted with
the firearm Exhibit "A", after its
recovery, readily admitted the
same as issued to him by Nestor
Jimenez, otherwise known as a
certain Alias Pedipol, allegedly
team leader of the sparrow unit of
New People's Army, responsible
in the liquidation of target
personalities, opposed to NPA
Ideological movement, an
example was the killing of the late
Mayor Llanos and Barangay
Captain of Tienda Aplaya Digos,
Davao del Sur. (TSN, pages 1-16,
Hearing-October 14,1982).
To prove accused's subversive
activities, Cesar Masamlok, a
former NPA convert was
presented, who declared that on
March 7, 1972, in his former
residence at Tiguman Digos,
Davao del Sur, accused Ruben
Burgos, accompanied by his
companions Landrino Burgos,
Oscar Gomez and Antonio
Burgos, went to his house at about
5:00 o'clock P.M. and called him
downstair. Thereupon, accused
told Masamlok, their purpose was
to ask rice and one (1) peso from
him, as his contribution to their
companions, the NPA of which he
is now a member. (TSN, pages
70, 71, 72, Hearing-January 4,
1983).
Accused and his companions told
Masamlok, he has to join their
group otherwise, he and his family
will be killed. He was also warned
not to reveal anything with the
government authorities. Because
of the threat to his life and family,
Cesar Masamlok joined the group.
Accused then told him, he should
attend a seminar scheduled on
April 19, 1982. Along with this
invitation, accused pulled gut from
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 10
his waistline a .38 caliber revolver
which Masamlok really saw, being
only about two (2) meters away
from accused, which make him
easily Identified said firearm, as
that marked as Exhibit "A" for the
prosecution. (TSN, pages 72, 73,
and 74, Hearing-January 4, 1983).
On April 19, 1982, as previously
invited, Masamlok, accompanied
by his father, Matuguil Masamlok,
Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides went to
the house of accused and
attended the seminar, Those
present in the seminar were:
accused Ruben Burgos, Antonio
Burgos, Oscar Gomez, Landrino
Burgos, alias Pedipol and one
alias Jamper.
The first speaker was accused
Ruben Burgos, who said very
distinctly that he is an NPA
together with his companions, to
assure the unity of the civilian.
That he encouraged the group to
overthrow the government,
emphasizing that those who
attended the seminar were
already members of the NPA, and
if they reveal to the authorities,
they will be killed.
Accused, while talking, showed to
the audience pamphlets and
documents, then finally shouted,
the NPA will be victorious.
Masamlok likewise Identified the
pamphlets as those marked as
Exh. exhibits "B", "C", and "D" for
the prosecution. (TSN, pages 75,
76 and 77, Hearing-January 4,
1983)
Other speakers in said meeting
were Pedipol, Jamper and Oscar
Gomez, who likewise expounded
their own opinions about the NPA.
It was also announced in said
seminar that a certain Tonio
Burgos, will be responsible for the
collection of the contribution from
the members. (TSN, pages 78-79,
Hearing- January 4, 1983)
On May 12, 1982, however, Cesar
Masamlok surrendered to Captain
Bargio of the Provincial
Headquarters of the Philippine
Constabulary, Digos, Davao del
Sur.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Panfilo
Lovitos was presented t prove that
on May 19, 1982, he administered
the subscription of th extra-judicial
confession of accused Ruben
Burgos, marked as Exhibit "E " for
the prosecution, consisting of five
(5) pages.
Appearing voluntarily in said
office, for the subscription of his
confession, Fiscal Lovitos,
realizing that accused was not
represented by counsel,
requested the services of Atty.
Anyog, whose office is adjacent to
the Fiscal's Office, to assist
accused in the subscription of his
extra-judicial statement.
Atty. Anyog assisted accused in
the reading of his confession from
English to Visayan language,
resulting to the deletion of
question No. 19 of the document,
by an inserted certification of Atty.
Anyog and signature of accused,
indicating his having understood,
the allegations of his extra-judicial
statement.
Fiscal Lovitos, before accused
signed his statement, explained to
him his constitutional rights to
remain silent, right to counsel and
right to answer any question
propounded or not.
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 11
With the aid of Atty. Anyog,
accused signed his confession in
the presence of Atty. Anyog and
Fiscal Lovitos, without the
presence of military authorities,
who escorted the accused, but
were sent outside the cubicle of
Fiscal Lovitos while waiting for the
accused. (TSN, pages 36-40,
nearing November 15, 1982)
Finally, in order to prove illegal
possession by accused of the
subject firearm, Sgt. Epifanio
Comabig in-charge of firearms
and explosives, NCO
Headquarter, Philippine
Constabulary, Digos, Davao del
Sur, was presented and testified,
that among the lists of firearm
holders in Davao del Sur, nothing
was listed in the name of accused
Ruben Burgos, neither was his
name included among the lists of
persons who applied for the
licensing of the firearm under
Presidential Decree No. 1745.
After the above-testimony the
prosecution formally closed its
case and offered its exhibits,
which were all admitted in
evidence, despite objection
interposed by counsel for
accused, which was accordingly
overruled.
On the other hand, the defendant-appellant's
version of the case against him is stated in the
decision as follows:
From his farm, the military
personnel, whom he said he
cannot recognize, brought him to
the PC Barracks at Digos, Davao
del Sur, and arrived there at about
3:00 o'clock, on the same date. At
about 8:00 o'clock P.M., in the
evening, he was investigated by
soldiers, whom he cannot Identify
because they were wearing a
civilian attire. (TSN, page 14 1,
Hearing-June 15, 1983)
The investigation was conducted
in the PC barracks, where he was
detained with respect to the
subject firearm, which the
investigator, wished him to admit
but accused denied its ownership.
Because of his refusal accused
was mauled, hitting him on the left
and right side of his body which
rendered him unconscious.
Accused in an atmosphere of
tersed solemnity, crying and with
emotional attachment, described
in detail how he was tortured and
the ordeals he was subjected.
He said, after recovery of his
consciousness, he was again
confronted with subject firearm,
Exhibit "A", for him to admit and
when he repeatedly refused to
accept as his own firearm, he was
subjected to further prolong (sic)
torture and physical agony.
Accused said, his eyes were
covered with wet black cloth with
pungent effect on his eyes. He
was undressed, with only
blindfold, pungent water poured in
his body and over his private
parts, making his entire body,
particularly his penis and testicle,
terribly irritating with pungent pain.
All along, he was investigated to
obtain his admission, The process
of beating, mauling, pain and/or
ordeal was repeatedly done in
similar cycle, from May 13 and 14,
1982. intercepted only whenever
he fell unconscious and again
repeated after recovery of his
senses,
Finally on May 15, 1982, after
undergoing the same torture and
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 12
physical ordeal he was seriously
warned, if he will still adamantly
refuse to accept ownership of the
subject firearm, he will be
salvaged, and no longer able to
bear any further the pain and
agony, accused admitted
ownership of subject firearm.
After his admission, the mauling
and torture stopped, but accused
was made to sign his affidavit
marked as Exhibit "E" for the
prosecution, consisting of five (5)
pages, including the certification
of the administering officer, (TSN,
pages 141-148, Hearing-June 15,
1983)
In addition to how he described
the torture inflicted on him,
accused, by way of explanation
and commentary in details, and
going one by one, the allegations
and/or contents of his alleged
extrajudicial statement, attributed
his answers to those questions
involuntarily made only because
of fear, threat and intimidation of
his person and family, as a result
of unbearable excruciating pain
he was subjected by an
investigator, who, unfortunately
he cannot Identify and was able to
obtain his admission of the subject
firearm, by force and violence
exerted over his person.
To support denial of accused of
being involved in any subversive
activities, and also to support his
denial to the truth of his alleged
extra-judicial confession,
particularly questions Nos. 35, 38,
41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47,
along with qqqs answers to those
questions, involving Honorata
Arellano ahas Inday Arellano, said
Honorata Arellano appeared and
declared categorically, that the
above-questions embraced in the
numbers allegedly stated in the
extrajudicial confession of
accused, involving her to such
NPA personalities, as Jamper,
Pol, Anthony, etc., were not true
because on the date referred on
April 28, 1982, none of the
persons mentioned came to her
house for treatment, neither did
she meet the accused nor able to
talk with him. (TSN, pages 118-
121, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
She, however, admitted being
familiar with one Oscar Gomez,
and that she was personally
charged with subversion in the
Office of the Provincial
Commander, Philippine
Constabulary, Digos, Davao del
Sur, but said charge was
dismissed without reaching the
Court. She likewise stated that her
son, Rogelio Arellano, was
likewise charged for subversion
filed in the Municipal Trial Court of
Digos, Davao del Sur, but was
likewise dismissed for lack of
sufficient evidence to sustain his
conviction. (TSN, pages 121-122,
in relation to her cross-
examination, Hearing-May 18,
1983)
To support accused's denial of the
charge against him, Barangay
Captain of Tiguman, Digos,
Davao del Sur, Salvador
qqqGalaraga was presented, who
declared, he was not personally
aware of any subversive activities
of accused, being his neighbor
and member of his barrio. On the
contrary, he can personally attest
to his good character and
reputation, as a law abiding citizen
of his barrio, being a carpenter
and farmer thereat. (TSl pages
128-129, Hearing-May 18, 1983)

He however, admitted in cross-
examination, that there were a lot
of arrests made by the authorities
in his barrio involving subversive
activities but they were released
and were not formally charged in
Court because they publicly took
their oath of allegiance with the
government. (TSN, pages 133-
134, in relation to page 136,
Hearing-May 18, 1983)
Finally, to support accused's
denial of the subject firearm, his
wife, Urbana Burgos, was
presented and who testified that
the subject firearm was left in their
house by Cesar Masamlok and
one Pedipol on May 10, 1982. It
was night time, when the two left
the gun, alleging that it was not in
order, and that they will leave it
behind, temporarily for them to
claim it later. They were the ones
who buried it. She said, her
husband, the accused, was not in
their house at that time and that
she did not inform him about said
firearm neither did she report the
matter to the authorities, for fear of
the life of her husband. (TSN,
page 24, November 22, 1983)
On cross-examination, she said,
even if Masamlok during the
recovery of the firearm, was
wearing a mask, she can still
Identify him. (TSN, page 6,
Hearing-November 22, 1983)
After the above-testimony,
accused through counsel formally
rested his case in support of
accused's through counsel
manifestation for the demurrer to
evidence of the prosecution, or in
the alternative for violation merely
of simple illegal possession of
firearm, 'under the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 13
by Republic Act No. 4, reflected in
the manifestation of counsel for
accused. (TSN, pages 113-114,
Hearing-May 18, 1983)
Accused-appellant Ruben Burgos now raises
the following assignments of error, to wit:
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT (SIC) THE
ARREST OF ACCUSED-
APPELLANT WITHOUT VALID
WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THE SEARCH IN THE
HOUSE OF ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FOR FIREARM
WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO
BE LAWFUL.
III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT FOR
VIOLATION OF P.D. No. 9 IN
RELATION TO GENERAL
ORDERS NOS. 6 AND 7
Was the arrest of Ruben Burgos lawful? Were
the search of his house and the subsequent
confiscation of a firearm and documents
allegedly found therein conducted in a lawful
and valid manner? Does the evidence
sustaining the crime charged meet the test of
proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
The records of the case disclose that when the
police authorities went to the house of Ruben
Burgos for the purpose of arresting him upon
information given by Cesar Masamlok that the
accused allegedly recruited him to join the New
People's Army (NPA), they did not have any
warrant of arrest or search warrant with them
(TSN, p. 25, October 14, 1982; and TSN, p. 61,
November 15, 1982).
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall not be
violated, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such
other responsible officer as may
be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
The constitutional provision is a safeguard
against wanton and unreasonable invasion of
the privacy and liberty of a citizen as to his
person, papers and effects. This Court
explained in Villanueva vs. Querubin (48 SCRA
345) why this right is so important:
It is deference to one's personality
that lies at the core of this right,
but it could be also looked upon as
a recognition of a constitutionally
protected area, primarily one's
home, but not necessarily thereto
confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United
States, 385 US 293 [19661) What
is sought to be guarded is a man's
prerogative to choose who is
allowed entry to his residence. In
that haven of refuge, his
individuality can assert itself not
only in the choice of who shall be
welcome but likewise in the kind of
objects he wants around him.
There the state, however
powerful, does not as such have
access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in
the traditional formulation, his
house, however humble, is his
castle. Thus is outlawed any
unwarranted intrusion by
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 14
government, which is called upon
to refrain from any invasion of his
dwelling and to respect the
privacies of his life, (Cf.
Schmerber v. California, 384 US
757 [1966], Brennan, J. and Boyd
v. United States, 116 US 616, 630
[1886]). In the same vein,
Landynski in his authoritative work
(Search and Seizure and the
Supreme Court [1966], could fitly
characterize this constitutional
right as the embodiment of a
'spiritual concept: the belief that to
value the privacy of home and
person and to afford its
constitutional protection against
the long reach of government is no
legs than to value human dignity,
and that his privacy must not be
disturbed except in case of
overriding social need, and then
only under stringent procedural
safeguards.' (Ibid, p. 47).
The trial court justified the arrest of the accused-
appelant without any warrant as falling under
one of the instances when arrests may be
validly made without a warrant. Rule 113,
Section 6 * of the Rules of Court, provides the
exceptions as follows:
a) When the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is about to
commit an offense in his presence;
b) When an offense has in fact been committed,
and he has reasonable ground to believe that
the person to be arrested has committed it;
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending
or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
The Court stated that even if there was no
warrant for the arrest of Burgos, the fact that
"the authorities received an urgent report of

accused's involvement in subversive activities
from a reliable source (report of Cesar
Masamlok) the circumstances of his arrest,
even without judicial warrant, is lawfully within
the ambit of Section 6-A of Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court and applicable jurisprudence on the
matter."
If the arrest is valid, the consequent search and
seizure of the firearm and the alleged
subversive documents would become an
incident to a lawful arrest as provided by Rule
126, Section 12, which states:
A person charged with an offense
may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may
be used as proof of the
commission of the offense.
The conclusions reached by the trial court are
erroneous.
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer
arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense
must have personal knowledge of that fact. The
offense must also be committed in his presence
or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80
Phil. 859).
There is no such personal knowledge in this
case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by
the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from
the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok.
The location of the firearm was given by the
appellant's wife.
At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not
in actual possession of any firearm or
subversive document. Neither was he
committing any act which could be described as
subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at
the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any
unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and
fundamental one. The statute or rule which
allows exceptions to the requirement of
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 15
warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any
exception must clearly fall within the situations
when securing a warrant would be absurd or is
manifestly unnecessary as provided by the
Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on
arrests without warrant or extend its application
beyond the cases specifically provided by law.
To do so would infringe upon personal liberty
and set back a basic right so often violated and
so deserving of full protection.
The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that
the arrest may still be considered lawful under
Section 6(b) using the test of reasonableness.
He submits that. the information given by Cesar
Masamlok was sufficient to induce a reasonable
ground that a crime has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b),
however, it is not enough that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the person to
be arrested has committed a crime. A crime
must in fact or actually have been committed
first. That a crime has actually been committed
is an essential precondition. It is not enough to
suspect that a crime may have been committed.
The fact of the commission of the offense must
be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground
applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the
sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report.
Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the
accused had committed a crime. They were still
fishing for evidence of a crime not yet
ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the
subject firearm on the basis of information from
the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the
arrest lawful, If an arrest without warrant is
unlawful at the moment it is made, generally
nothing that happened or is discovered
afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of a
poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted.
More important, we find no compelling reason
for the haste with which the arresting officers
sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why
they failed to first go through the process of
obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 16

reasonable ground to believe that the accused or seizure is not a consent or an

had truly committed a crime. There is no invitation thereto, but is merely a
showing that there was a real apprehension that demonstration of regard for the
the accused was on the verge of flight or supremacy of the law. (56 C.J.,
escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the pp. 1180, 1181).
whereabouts of the accused were unknown,
We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every
The basis for the action taken by the arresting reasonable presumption against waiver of
officer was the verbal report made by Masamlok fundamental constitutional rights and that we do
who was not required to subscribe his not presume acquiescence in the loss of
allegations under oath. There was no fundamental rights." (Johnson v. Zerbst 304
compulsion for him to state truthfully his charges U.S. 458).
under pain of criminal prosecution. (TSN, p. 24,
October 14, 1982). Consequently, the need to That the accused-appellant was not apprised of
go through the process of securing a search any of his constitutional rights at the time of his
warrant and a warrant of arrest becomes even arrest is evident from the records:
more clear. The arrest of the accused while he
was plowing his field is illegal. The arrest being A CALAMBA:
unlawful, the search and seizure which
transpired afterwards could not likewise be Q When you went to
deemed legal as being mere incidents to a valid the area to arrest
arrest. Ruben Burgos, you
were not armed with
Neither can it be presumed that there was a an arrest warrant?
waiver, or that consent was given by the
accused to be searched simply because he A None Sir.
failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must
appear first that the right exists; secondly, that Q Neither were you
the person involved had knowledge, actual or armed with a search
constructive, of the existence of such a right; warrant?
and lastly, that said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de A No Sir.
Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the
accused failed to object to the entry into his Q As a matter of
house does not amount to a permission to make fact, Burgos was not
a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. present in his house
770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the when you went
case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia V. Locsin (supra) there?

xxx xxx xxx A But he was twenty

meters away from
. . . As the constitutional guaranty his house.
is not dependent upon any
affirmative act of the citizen, the Q Ruben Burgos
courts do not place the citizen in was then plowing
the position of either contesting an his field?
officer's authority by force, or
waiving his constitutional rights; A Yes Sir.
but instead they hold that a
peaceful submission to a search
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 17

Q When you called A It was buried

for Ruben Burgos down in his horse.
you interviewed
him? Q As a matter of
fact, Burgos did not
A Yes Sir. point to where it was
buried?
Q And that you told
him that Masamlok A Yes Sir.
implicated him?
(TSN, pp. 25-26,
A No Sir. Hearing-October 14,
1982)
Q What did you tell
him? Considering that the questioned firearm and the
alleged subversive documents were obtained in
A That we received violation of the accused's constitutional rights
information that you against unreasonable searches and seizures, it
have a firearm, you follows that they are inadmissible as evidence.
surrender that
firearm, first he There is another aspect of this case.
denied but when
Sgt. Buncalan In proving ownership of the questioned firearm
interviewed his wife, and alleged subversive documents, the
his wife told him that prosecution presented the two arresting officers
it is buried, I dug the who testified that the accused readily admitted
firearm which was ownership of the gun after qqqs wife pointed to
wrapped with a the place where it was buried. The officers
cellophane. stated that it was the accused himself who
voluntarily pointed to the place where the
Q In your interview alleged subversive documents were hidden.
of Burgos you did
not remind him of Assuming this to be true, it should be recalled
his rights under the that the accused was never informed of his
constitution constitutional rights at the time of his arrest. So
considering that he that when the accused allegedly admitted
was purposely ownership of the gun and pointed to the location
under arrest? of the subversive documents after questioning,
the admissions were obtained in violation of the
A I did not. constitutional right against self-incrimination
under Sec. 20 of Art. IV of the Bill of Rights
Q As a matter of winch provides:
fact, he denied that
he has ever a gun? No person shall be compelled to
be a witness against himself. Any
A Yes Sir. person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall
Q As a matter of have the right to remain silent and
fact, the gun was not to counsel, and to be informed of
in his possession? such right.. . .

The Constitution itself mandates that any
evidence obtained in violation of this right is
inadmissible in evidence. Consequently, the
testimonies of the arresting officers as to the
admissions made by the appellant cannot be
used against him.
The trial court validly rejected the extra-judicial
confession of the accused as inadmissible in
evidence. The court stated that the appellant's
having been exhaustively subjected to physical
terror, violence, and third degree measures may
not have been supported by reliable evidence
but the failure to present the investigator who
conducted the investigation gives rise to the
"provocative presumption" that indeed torture
and physical violence may have been
committed as stated.
The accused-appellant was not accorded his
constitutional right to be assisted by counsel
during the custodial interrogation. The lower
court correctly pointed out that the securing of
counsel, Atty. Anyog, to help the accused when
he subscribed under oath to his statement at the
Fiscal's Office was too late. It could have no
palliative effect. It cannot cure the absence of
counsel at the time of the custodial investigation
when the extrajudicial statement was being
taken.
With the extra-judicial confession, the firearm,
and the alleged subversive documents
inadmissible in evidence against the accused-
appellant, the only remaining proof to sustain
the charge of Illegal Possession of Firearm in
Furtherance of Subversion is the testimony of
Cesar Masamlok.
We find the testimony of Masamlok inadequate
to convict Burgos beyond reasonable doubt. It is
true that the trial court found Masamlok's
testimony credible and convincing. However, we
are not necessarily bound by the credibility
which the trial court attaches to a particular
witness. As stated in People vs.. Cabrera (100
SCRA 424):
xxx xxx xxx
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 18
. . .Time and again we have stated
that when it comes to question of
credibility the findings of the trial
court are entitled to great respect
upon appeal for the obvious
reason th+at it was able to
observe the demeanor, actuations
and deportment of the witnesses
during the trial. But we have also
said that this rule is not absolute
for otherwise there would be no
reversals of convictions upon
appeal. We must reject the
findings of the trial court where the
record discloses circumstances of
weight and substance which were
not properly appreciated by the
trial court.
The situation under which Cesar Masamlok
testified is analogous to that found in People vs.
Capadocia (17 SCRA 98 1):
. . . The case against appellant is
built on Ternura's testimony, and
the issue hinges on how much
credence can be accorded to him.
The first consideration is that said
testimony stands uncorroborated.
Ternura was the only witness who
testified on the mimeographing
incident. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . .He was a confessed Huk under
detention at the time. He knew his
fate depended upon how much he
cooperated with the authorities,
who were then engaged in a
vigorous anti-dissident campaign.
As in the case of Rodrigo de
Jesus, whose testimony We
discounted for the same reason,
that of Ternura cannot be
considered as proceeding from a
totally unbiased source. . . .
In the instant case, Masamlok's testimony was
totally uncorroborated. Considering that

Masamlok surrendered to the military certainly
his fate depended on how eagerly he
cooperated with the authorities. Otherwise, he
would also be charged with subversion. The
trade-off appears to be his membership in the
Civil Home Defense Force. (TSN, p. 83, January
4, 1983). Masamlok may be considered as an
interested witness. It can not be said that his
testimony is free from the opportunity and
temptation to be exaggerated and even
fabricated for it was intended to secure his
freedom.
Despite the fact that there were other persons
present during the alleged NPA seminar of April
19, 1982 i.e., Masamlok's father ,Matuguil
Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides (TSN, p.
74, January 4, 1983) who could have
corroborated Cesar Masamlok's testimony that
the accused used the gun in furtherance of
subversive activities or actually engaged in
subversive acts, the prosecution never
presented any other witness.
This Court is, therefore, constrained to rule that
the evidence presented by the prosecution is
insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
As held in the case of People vs. Baia (34
SCRA 347):
It is evident that once again,
reliance can be placed on People
v. Dramayo (42 SCRA 59), where
after stressing that accusation is
not, according to the fundamental
law, synonymous with guilt, it was
made clear: 'Only if the judge
below and the appellate tribunal
could arrive at a conclusion that
the crime had been committed
precisely by the person on trial
under such an exacting test
should the sentence be one of
conviction. It is thus required that
every circumstance favoring his
innocence be duly taken into
account. The proof against him
must survive the test of reason;
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 19
the strongest suspicion must not
be permitted to sway judgment.
The conscience must be satisfied
that on the defendant could be laid
the responsibility for the offense
charged; that not only did he
perpetrate the act but that it
amounted to a crime. What is
required then is moral certainty.'
(Ibid, 64. Cf. People v. Alvarez, 55
SCRA 81; People v. Joven, 64
SCRA 126; People vs. Ramirez,
69 SCRA 144; People vs. Godov
72 SCRA 69; People v. Lopez, 74
SCRA 205; People v. Poblador,
76 SCRA 634; People v. Quiazon,
78 SCRA 513; People v.
Nazareno, 80 SCRA 484; People
vs. Gabilan 115 SCRA 1; People
v. Gabiana, 117 SCRA 260; and
People vs. Ibanga 124 SCRA
697).
We are aware of the serious problems faced by
the military in Davao del Sur where there
appears to be a well-organized plan to
overthrow the Government through armed
struggle and replace it with an alien system
based on a foreign ideology. The open defiance
against duly constituted authorities has resulted
in unfortunate levels of violence and human
suffering publicized all over the country and
abroad. Even as we reiterate the need for all
freedom loving citizens to assist the military
authorities in their legitimate efforts to maintain
peace and national security, we must also
remember the dictum in Morales vs. Enrile (1 21
SCRA 538, 569) when this Court stated:
While the government should
continue to repel the communists,
the subversives, the rebels, and
the lawless with an the means at
its command, it should always be
remembered that whatever action
is taken must always be within the
framework of our Constitution and
our laws.
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 20

Violations of human rights do not help in

overcoming a rebellion. A cavalier attitude
towards constitutional liberties and protections
will only fan the increase of subversive activities
instead of containing and suppressing them.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction

rendered by the trial court is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is hereby
ACQUITTED, on grounds of reasonable doubt,
of the crime with which he has been charged. G.R. No. 81567 July 9, 1990

The subject firearm involved in this case IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
(homemade revolver, caliber .38, Smith and HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL,
Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221) and the ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO
alleged subversive documents are ordered VILLANUEVA. MANOLITA O. UMIL, and
disposed of in accordance with law. NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V.
SESE, petitioners,
Cost de oficio. vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE
SO ORDERED. VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO,
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84581-82 July 9, 1990

AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO

BUENAOBRA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN. RAMON
MONTANO, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84583-84 July 9, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR

HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T.
ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE.
DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON
CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE
VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARINO, LT. COL.
REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE
TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and
Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention
Center, Camp Crame, Quezon
City, respondents.

G.R. No. 83162 July 9, 1990


IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND
DANNY RIVERA. VIRGILIO A.
OCAYA, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL.
HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR
MARIANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 85727 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS OF: DEOGRACIAS
ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO S. LIM, COL.
RICARDO REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 86332 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B.
NAZARENO. ALFREDO
NAZARENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE
MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION,
Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO
MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT.
LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MAURO
AROJADO, respondents.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No.
81567.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos.
84581-82.
Ramon S. Esguerra, Barbara Anne C. Migallos
and Agripino G. Morga for petitioners in G.R.
Nos. 84583-84.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioner in G.R. No.
83162.
Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy, Taquio
& Association for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.
Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in
G.R. No. 86332.
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 21
The Solicitor General for the respondents.
PER CURIAM:
The are eight (8) petitioners for habeas
corpus filed before the Court, which have been
consolidated because of the similarity of issues
raised, praying for the issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus, ordering the respective
respondents to produce the bodies of the
persons named therein and to explain why they
should not be set at liberty without further delay.
In their respective Returns, the respondents
uniformly assert that the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is not available to the
petitioners as they have been legally
arrested and are detained by virtue of valid
informations filed in court against them.
The petitioners counter that their detention is
unlawful as their arrests were made without
warrant and, that no preliminary
investigation was first conducted, so that the
informations filed against them are null and void.
The Court has carefully reviewed the
contentions of the parties in their respective
pleadings, and it finds that the persons detained
have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily
deprived of their constitutional right to liberty,
and that the circumstances attending these
cases do not warrant their release on habeas
corpus.
The arrest of a person without a warrant of
arrest or previous complaint is recognized in
law. The occasions or instances when such an
arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out in
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without
warrant; when lawful. — A peace
officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing,

or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact
just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs
(a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail, and he shall
be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7.
An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under
Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court, as amended, is justified
when the person arrested is caught in flagranti
delicto, viz., in the act of committing an offense;
or when an offense has just been committed
and the person making the arrest has personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the person
arrested has committed it. The rationale behind
lawful arrests, without warrant, was stated by
this Court in the case of People vs. Kagui
Malasugui 1 thus:
To hold that no criminal can, in
any case, be arrested and
searched for the evidence and
tokens of his crime without a
warrant, would be to leave society,
to a large extent, at the mercy of
the shrewdest, the most expert,
and the most depraved of
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 22
criminals, facilitating their escape
in many instances.
The record of the instant cases would show that
the persons in whose behalf these petitions
for habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly
committed or were actually committing an
offense, when apprehended, so that their
arrests without a warrant were clearly justified,
and that they are, further, detained by virtue of
valid informations filed against them in court.
A brief narration of the facts and events
surrounding each of the eight (8) petitions is in
order.
I
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil vs. Ramos), the record
shows that, on 1 February 1988, the Regional
Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital
Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received
confidential information about a member of the
NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being
treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes
Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City.
Upon verification, it was found that the wounded
person, who was listed in the hospital records
as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a
member of the NPA liquidation squad,
responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM
soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988,
in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan
City. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural
was transferred to the Regional Medical
Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons.
While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988,
Rolando Dural was positively identified by
eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top
of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car,
and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers
seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos
Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot.
As a consequence of this positive identification,
Rolando Dural was referred to the Caloocan
City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and
thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City an information charging Rolando
Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 23
"Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of
Persons in Authority." The case was docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. C-30112 and no
bail was recommended. On 15 February 1988,
the information was amended to include, as
defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing
of the original information, was still unidentified.
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition
for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on
behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural,
and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the
writ of habeas corpus on 9 February 1988 and
the respondents filed a Return of the Writ on 12
February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were
heard on 15 February 1988.
On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto
Umil and Renato Villanueva posted bail before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where
charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act
had been filed against them, and they were
accordingly released. The petition for habeas
corpus, insofar as Umil and Villanueva are
concerned, is now moot and academic and is
accordingly dismissed, since the writ of habeas
corpus does not lie in favor of an accused in a
criminal case who has been released on bail. 2
As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he
was not arrested while in the act of shooting the
two (2) CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor
was he arrested just after the commission of the
said offense for his arrest came a day after the
said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest
without warrant is unjustified.
However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being
a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an
outlawed subversive organization. Subversion
being a continuing offense, the arrest of
Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it
can be said that he was committing an offense
when arrested. The crimes of rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit
such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed
in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith
constitute direct assaults against the State and
are in the nature of continuing crimes. As stated
by the Court in an earlier case:
From the facts as above-narrated,
the claim of the petitioners that
they were initially arrested illegally
is, therefore, without basis in law
and in fact. The crimes of
insurrection or rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes,
and other crimes and offenses
committed in the furtherance, on
the occasion thereof, or incident
thereto, or in connection therewith
under Presidential Proclamation
No. 2045, are all in the nature of
continuing offenses which set
them apart from the common
offenses, aside from their
essentially involving a massive
conspiracy of nationwide
magnitude. Clearly then, the
arrest of the herein detainees was
well within the bounds of the law
and existing jurisprudence in our
jurisdiction.
2. The arrest of persons involved
in the rebellion whether as its
fighting armed elements, or for
committing non-violent acts but in
furtherance of the rebellion, is
more an act of capturing them in
the course of an armed conflict, to
quell the rebellion, than for the
purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a
statutory offense. The arrest,
therefore, need not follow the
usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses which
requires the determination by a
judge of the existence of probable
cause before the issuance of a
judicial warrant of arrest and the
granting of bail if the offense is
bailable. Obviously, the absence
of a judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or
capturing persons committing
overt acts of violence against
government forces, or any other

milder acts but equally in
pursuance of the rebellious
movement. The arrest or capture
is thus impelled by the exigencies
of the situation that involves the
very survival of society and its
government and duly constituted
authorities. If killing and other acts
of violence against the rebels find
justification in the exigencies of
armed hostilities which is of the
essence of waging a rebellion or
insurrection, most assuredly so in
case of invasion, merely seizing
their persons and detaining them
while any of these contingencies
continues cannot be less justified.
...3
The record, moreover, shows that the criminal
case filed against Rolando Dural and Bernardo
Itucal, Jr. for "Double Murder, etc." was tried in
the court below and at the conclusion thereof, or
on 17 August 1988, Rolando Dural and
Bernardo Itucal, Jr. were found guilty of the
charge and sentenced accordingly. Rolando
Dural is now serving the sentence imposed
upon him by the trial court. Thus, the writ
of habeas corpus is no longer available to him.
For, as held in the early case
of U.S. vs. Wilson: 4
In this case, whatever may be said
about the manner of his arrest, the
fact remains that the defendant
was actually in court in the
custody of the law on March 29,
when a complaint sufficient in form
and substance was read to him.
To this he pleaded not guilty. The
trial followed, in which, and in the
judgment of guilty pronounced by
the court, we find no error.
Whether, if there were
irregularities in bringing him
personally before the court, he
could have been released on a
writ of habeas corpus or now has
a civil action for damages against
the person who arrested him we
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 24
need not inquire. It is enough to
say that such irregularities are not
sufficient to set aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint and after a
trial free from error.
II
In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque vs. De Villa), the
arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo
Buenaobra, without warrant, is also justified.
When apprehended at the house of Renato
Constantino in Marikina Heights, Marikina,
Metro Manila, Wilfredo
Buenaobra admitted that he was an NPA
courier and he had with him letters to Renato
Constantino and other members of the rebel
group. Amelia Roque, upon the other hand, was
a member of the National United Front
Commission, in charge of finance,
and admitted ownership of subversive
documents found in the house of her sister in
Caloocan City. She was also in possession of
ammunition and a fragmentation grenade for
which she had no permit or authority to possess.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that on
27 June 1988, one Rogelio Ramos y Ibanes, a
member of the NPA, who had surrendered to
the military authorities, told military agents about
the operations of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) and the New Peoples Army
(NPA) in Metro Manila. He identified some of his
former comrades as "Ka Mong", a staff member
of the Communications and Transportation
Bureau; "Ka Nelia", a staff member in charge of
finance; "Ka Miller", an NPA courier from
Sorsogon and Lopez, Quezon; "Ka Ted", and
"Ka Totoy". He also pointed to a certain house
occupied by Renato Constantino located in the
Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina
Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, which is used
as a safehouse of the National United Front
Commission (NUFC) of the CPP-NPA.
In view of these revelations, the Constantino
house was placed under military surveillance
and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search
warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the

Regional Trial Court of Pasig, a search of the
house was conducted at about 5:00 o'clock in
the afternoon, by a combined team of the
Criminal Investigation Service, National Capital
District (CIS-NCD) and the Constabulary
Security Group (CSG). In the course of the
search, the following articles were found and
taken under proper receipt:
a) One (1) Colt M16A1 long rifle with defaced
serial number;
b) One (1) Cal. .380 ACT/9mm Model PPK/8
SN: 260577 & 2605778;
c) Two (2) fragmentation hand grenades;
d) Fifty-six (56) live ammunition for Cal. 5.56
mm;
e) Five (5) live ammunition for Cal. .380;
f) One (1) ICOM VHF FM Radio Transciever SN:
14903
g) One (1) Regulated power supply 220V AC;
h) One (1) Antennae (adjustable);
i) One (1) Speaker with cord ALEXAR;
j) Voluminous Subversive documents.
When confronted, Renato Constatino could not
produce any permit or authority to possess the
firearms, ammunition, radio and other
communications equipment. Hence, he was
brought to the CIS Headquarters for
investigation. When questioned, he refused to
give a written statement, although
he admitted that he was a staff member of the
executive committee of the NUFC and a ranking
member of the International Department of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of the same
day (12 August 1988), Wilfredo Buenaobra
arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in
the Villaluz Compound. When accosted, he
readily admitted to the military agents that he is
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 25
a regular member of the CPP/NPA and that he
went to the place to deliver letters to "Ka Mong",
referring to Renato Constatino, and other
members of the rebel group. On further
questioning, he also admitted that he is known
as "Ka Miller" and that he was from Barangay
San Pedro, Lopez, Quezon. Among the items
taken from him were the following:
(1) Handwritten letter addressed
to "Ka Bing & Co. from A & Co."
dated August 11, 1988;
(2) Handwritten letter addressed
to "ROD from VIC (Schell datre)"
dated August 11, 1988;
(3) Handwritten letter addressed
to "Suzie" from "Vic", dated
August 11, 1988.
Also found Buenaobra's possession was a
piece of paper containing a written but jumbled
telephone number of Florida M. Roque, sister of
Amelia Roque alias "Ka Nelia", at 69 Geronimo
St., Caloocan City. Acting on the lead provided
as to the whereabouts of Amelia Roque, the
military agents went to the given address the
next day (13 August 1988). They arrived at the
place at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning.
After identifying themselves as military agents
and after seeking permission to search the
place, which was granted, the military agents
conducted a search in the presence of the
occupants of the house and the barangay
captain of the place, one Jesus D. Olba.
The military agents found the place to be
another safehouse of the NUFC/CPP. They
found ledgers, journals, vouchers, bank deposit
books, folders, computer diskettes, and
subversive documents as well as live
ammunition for a .38 SPL Winchester, 11
rounds of live ammunition for a cal. .45, 19
rounds of live ammunition for an M16 Rifle, and
a fragmentation grenade. As a result, Amelia
Roque and the other occupants of the house
were brought to the PC-CIS Headquarters at
Camp Crame, Quezon City, for investigation.
Amelia Roque admitted to the investigators that

the voluminous documents belonged to her and
that the other occupants of the house had no
knowledge of them. As a result, the said other
occupants of the house were released from
custody.
On 15 August 1988, Amelia Roque was brought
to the Caloocan City Fiscal for inquest after
which an information charging her with violation
of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City. The case is docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. C-1196. Another
information for violation of the Anti-Subversion
Act was filed against Amelia Roque before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, which
is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-
150458.
An information for violation of the Anti-
Subversion Act was filed against Wilfredo
Buenaobra before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Marikina, Metro Manila. The case is docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. 23715. Bail was
set at P4,000.00.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas
corpus was filed before this Court on behalf of
Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra. At the
hearing of the case, however, Wilfredo
Buenaobra manifested his desire to stay in the
PC-INP Stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon
City. According, the petition for habeas
corpus filed on his behalf is now moot and
academic. Only the petition of Amelia Roque
remains for resolution.
The contention of respondents that petitioners
Roque and Buenaobra are officers and/or
members of the National United Front
Commission (NUFC) of the CPP was not
controverted or traversed by said petitioners.
The contention must be deemed admitted. 5 As
officers and/or members of the NUFC-CPP,
their arrest, without warrant, was justified for the
same reasons earlier stated vis-a-vis Rolando
Dural. The arrest without warrant of Roque was
additionally justified as she was, at the time of
apprehension, in possession of ammunitions
without license to possess them.
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 26
III
In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo vs. Ramos),
the arrest of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon
Casiple, without warrant, is also justified under
the rules. Both are admittedly members of the
standing committee of the NUFC and, when
apprehended in the house of Renato
Constatino, they had a bag containing
subversive materials, and both carried firearms
and ammunition for which they had no license to
possess or carry.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that at
about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of 13 August
1988, Domingo T. Anonuevo and Ramon
Casiple arrived at the house of Renato
Constatino at Marikina Heights, Marikina, which
was still under surveillance by military agents.
The military agents noticed bulging objects on
their waist lines. When frisked, the agents found
them to be loaded guns. Anonuevo and Casiple
were asked to show their permit or license to
possess or carry firearms and ammunition, but
they could not produce any. Hence, they were
brought to PC Headquarters for investigation.
Found in their possession were the following
articles:
a) Voluminous subversive
documents
b) One (1) Cal. 7.65 MOD 83 2C
Pistol SN: 001412 with one (1)
magazine for Cal. 7.65 containing
ten (10) live ammunition of same
caliber;
c) One (1) Cal. 7.65 Pietro Barreta
SN; A18868 last digit tampered
with one (1) magazine containing
five (5) live ammunition of same
caliber.
At the PC Stockade, Domingo Anonuevo was
identified as "Ka Ted", and Ramon Casiple as
"Ka Totoy" of the CPP, by their comrades who
had previously surrendered to the military.

On 15 August 1988, the record of the
investigation and other documentary evidence
were forwarded to the Provincial Fiscal at Pasig,
Metro Manila, who conducted an inquest, after
which Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple
were charged with violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1866 before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The cases are
docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 74386
ad 74387, respectively. No bail was
recommended.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas
corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of
Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple,
alleging that the said Anonuevo and Casiple
were unlawfully arrested without a warrant and
that the informations filed against them are null
and void for having been filed without prior
hearing and preliminary investigation. On 30
August 1988, the Court issued the writ
of habeas corpus, and after the respondents
had filed a Return of the Writ, the parties were
heard.
The petitioners' (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim
that they were unlawfully arrested because
there was no previous warrant of arrest, is
without merit The record shows that Domingo
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were carrying
unlicensed firearms and ammunition in their
person when they were apprehended.
There is also no merit in the contention that the
informations filed against them are null and void
for want of a preliminary investigation. The filing
of an information, without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, is
sanctioned by the Rules. Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, reads:
Sec. 7. When accused lawfully
arrested without a warrant. —
When a person is lawfully arrested
without a warrant for an offense
cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court the complaint or information
may be filed by the offended party,
peace officer or fiscal without a
preliminary investigation having
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 27
been first conducted, on the basis
of the affidavit of the offended
party or arresting officer or person.
However, before the filing of such
complaint or information, the
person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation by a
proper officer in accordance with
this Rule, but he must sign a
waiver of the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, with the assistance
of a lawyer and in case of non-
availability of a lawyer, a
responsible person of his choice.
Notwithstanding such waiver, he
may apply for bail as provided in
the corresponding rule and the
investigation must be terminated
within fifteen (15) days from its
inception.
If the case has been filed in court
without a preliminary investigation
having been first conducted, the
accused may within five (5) days
from the time he learns of the filing
of the information, ask for a
preliminary investigation with the
same right to adduced evidence in
his favor in the manner prescribed
in this Rule.
The petitioners Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon
Casiple, however, refused to sign a waiver of
the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. In the informations
filed against them, the prosecutor made
identical certifications, as follows:
This is to certify that the accused
has been charged in accordance
with Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, that
no preliminary investigation was
conducted because the accused
has not made and signed a waiver
of the provisions of Art. 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, as

amended; that based on the
evidence presented, there is
reasonable ground to believe that
the crime has been committed,
and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof.
Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary
investigation after the informations had been
filed against them in court. Petitioners cannot
now claim that they have been deprived of their
constitutional right to due process.
IV
In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the
arrest without warrant, of Vicky Ocaya is
justified under the Rules, since she had with her
unlicensed ammunition when she was arrested.
The record of this case shows that on 12 May
1988, agents of the PC Intelligence and
Investigation of the Rizal PC-INP Command,
armed with a search warrant issued by Judge
Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Metro Manila, conducted a search of a
house located at Block 19, Phase II, Marikina
Green Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila,
believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson,
head of the CPP-NPA. In the course of the
search, Vicky Ocaya arrived in a car driven by
Danny Rivera. Subversive documents and
several rounds of ammunition for a .45 cal. pistol
were found in the car of Vicky Ocaya. As a
result, Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera were
brought to the PC Headquarters for
investigation. When Vicky Ocaya could not
produce any permit or authorization to possess
the ammunition, an information charging her
with violation of PD 1866 was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The
case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No.
73447. Danny Rivera, on the other hand, was
released from custody.
On 17 May 1988, a petition for habeas
corpus was filed, with this Court on behalf of
Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera. It was alleged
therein that Vicky Ocaya was illegally arrested
and detained, and denied the right to a
preliminary investigation.
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 28
It would appear, however, that Vicky Ocaya was
arrested in flagranti delicto so that her arrest
without a warrant is justified. No preliminary
investigation was conducted because she was
arrested without a warrant and she refused to
waive the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule
112 of the Rule of Court, as amended.
V
The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo
Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Amelia Roque
claim that the firearms, ammunition and
subversive documents alleged to have been
found in their possession when they were
arrested, did not belong to them, but were
"planted" by the military agents to justify their
illegal arrest.
The petitioners, however, have not introduced
any evidence to support their aforesaid claim.
On the other hand, no evil motive or ill-will on
the part of the arresting officers that would
cause the said arresting officers in these cases
to accuse the petitioners falsely, has been
shown. Besides, the arresting officers in these
cases do not appear to be seekers of glory and
bounty hunters for, as counsel for the petitioners
Anonuevo and Casiple say, "there is absolutely
nothing in the evidence submitted during the
inquest that petitioners are on the 'AFP Order of
Battle with a reward of P150,000.00 each on
their heads.'" 6 On the other hand, as pointed
out by the Solicitor General, the arrest of the
petitioners is not a product of a witch hunt or a
fishing expedition, but the result of an in-depth
surveillance of NPA safehouses pointed to by
no less than former comrades of the petitioners
in the rebel movement.
The Solicitor General, in his Consolidated
Memorandum, aptly observes:
. . . . To reiterate, the focal point in
the case of petitioners Roque,
Buenaobra, Anonuevo and
Casiple, was the lawful search
and seizure conducted by the
military at the residence of Renato
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 29
Constantino at Villaluz
Compound, Molave St., Marikina
Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila.
The raid at Constantino's
residence, was not a witch hunting
or fishing expedition on the part of
the military. It was a result of an in-
depth military surveillance
coupled with the leads provided by
former members of the
underground subversive
organizations. That raid produced
positive results. to date, nobody
has disputed the fact that the
residence of Constantino when
raided yielded communication
equipment, firearms and
ammunitions, as well as
subversive documents.
The military agents working on the
information provided by
Constantino that other members
of his group were coming to his
place, reasonably conducted a
"stake-out" operation whereby
some members of the raiding
team were left behind the place.
True enough, barely two hours
after the raid and Constantino's
arrest, petitioner Buenaobra
arrived at Constantino's
residence. He acted suspiciously
and when frisked and searched by
the military authorities, found in
his person were letters. They are
no ordinary letters, as even a
cursory reading would show. Not
only that, Buenaobra admitted
that he is a NPA courier and was
there to deliver the letters to
Constantino.
Subsequently, less than twenty
four hours after the arrest of
Constantino and Buenaobra,
petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple
arrived at Constantino's place.
Would it be unreasonable for the
military agents to believe that
petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple
are among those expected to visit
Constantino's residence
considering that Constatino's
information was true, in that
Buenaobra did come to that
place? Was it unreasonable under
the circumstances, on the part of
the military agents, not to frisk and
search anyone who should visit
the residence of Constantino,
such as petitioners Anonuevo and
Casiple? Must this Honorable
Court yield to Anonuevo and
Casiple's flimsy and bare
assertion that they went to visit
Constantino, who was to leave for
Saudi Arabia on the day they were
arrested thereat?
As to petitioner Roque, was it
unreasonable for the military
authorities to effect her arrest
without warrant considering that it
was Buenaobra who provided the
leads on her identity? It cannot be
denied that Buenaobra had
connection with Roque. Because
the former has the phone number
of the latter. Why the necessity of
jumbling Roque's telephone
number as written on a piece of
paper taken from Buenaobra's
possession? Petitioners Roque
and Buenaobra have not offered
any plausible reason so far.
In all the above incidents,
respondents maintain that they
acted reasonably, under the time,
place and circumstances of the
events in question, especially
considering that at the time of
petitioner's arrest, incriminatory
evidence, i.e, firearms,
ammunitions and/or subversive
documents were found in their
possession.

Petitioners, when arrested, were
neither taking their snacks nor
innocently visiting a camp, but
were arrested in such time, place
and circumstances, from which
one can reasonably conclude tat
they were up to a sinister plot,
involving utmost secrecy and
comprehensive conspiracy.
IV
In. G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the
release on habeas corpus of the petitioner
Deogracias Espiritu, who is detained by virtue of
an Information for Violation of Article 142 of the
Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition) filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is
similarly not warranted.
The record of the case shows that the said
petitioner is the General Secretary of the
Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at
Operators Nationwide (PISTON), an
association of drivers and operators of public
service vehicles in the Philippines, organized for
their mutual aid and protection.
Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o'clock in the
morning of 23 November 1988, while he was
sleeping in his home located at 363 Valencia
St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, he was awakened by his
sister Maria Paz Lalic who told him that a group
of persons wanted to hire his jeepney. When he
went down to talk to them, he was immediately
put under arrest. When he asked for the warrant
of arrest, the men, headed by Col. Ricardo
Reyes, bodily lifted him and placed him in their
owner-type jeepney. He demanded that his
sister, Maria Paz Lalic, be allowed to
accompany him, but the men did not accede to
his request and hurriedly sped away.
He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the
Western Police District at Blumentritt, Manila
where he was interrogated and detained. Then,
at about 9:00 o'clock of the same morning, he
was brought before the respondent Lim and,
there and then, the said respondent ordered his
arrest and detention. He was thereafter brought
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 30
to the General Assignment Section,
Investigation Division of the Western Police
District under Police Capt. Cresenciano A.
Cabasal where he was detained, restrained and
deprived of his liberty. 7
The respondents claim however, that the
detention of the petitioner is justified in view of
the Information filed against him before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed therein
as Criminal Case No. 88-683-85, charging him
with violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal
Code (Inciting to Sedition).
The respondents also claim that the petitioner
was lawfully arrested without a judicial warrant
of arrest since petitioner when arrested had in
fact just committed an offense in that in the
afternoon of 22 November 1988, during a press
conference at the National Press Club.
Deogracias Espiritu through tri-
media was heard urging all drivers
and operators to go on nationwide
strike on November 23, 1988, to
force the government to give into
their demands to lower the prices
of spare parts, commodities,
water and the immediate release
from detention of the president of
the PISTON (Pinag-isang
Samahan ng Tsuper Operators
Nationwide). Further, we heard
Deogracias Espiritu taking the
place of PISTON president
Medardo Roda and also
announced the formation of the
Alliance Drivers Association to go
on nationwide strike on November
23, 1988. 8
Policemen waited for petitioner outside the
National Pres Club in order to investigate him,
but he gave the lawmen the slip. 9 He was next
seen at about 5:00 o'clock that afternoon at a
gathering of drivers and symphatizers at the
corner of Magsaysay Blvd. and Valencia Street,
Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was heard to say:

Bukas tuloy ang welga natin,
sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol na
kasali sila, at hindi tayo titigil
hanggang hindi binibigay ng
gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto nating
pagbaba ng halaga ng spare
parts, bilihin at and pagpapalaya
sa ating pinuno na si Ka
Roda hanggang sa magkagulo
na. 10 (emphasis supplied)
The police finally caught up with the petitioner
on 23 November 1988. He was invited for
questioning and brought to police headquarters
after which an Information for violation of Art.
142 of the Revised Penal Code was filed against
him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 11
Since the arrest of the petitioner without a
warrant was in accordance with the provisions
of Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of the Rules of Court and
that the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid
information filed with the competent court, he
may not be released on habeas corpus. He
may, however be released upon posting bail as
recommended. However, we find the amount of
the recommended bail (P60,000.00) excessive
and we reduce it to P10,000.00 only.
VII
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno vs. Station
Commander), we also find no merit in the
submission of Narciso Nazarenothat he was
illegally arrested and is unlawfully detained. The
record of this case shows that at about 8:30
o'clock in the morning of 14 December 1988,
one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of
men near the corner of T. Molina and Mendiola
Streets in Alabang, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila.
One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil
Regal who was arrested by the police on 28
December 1988. Upon questioning, Regal
pointed to Narciso Nazareno as on of his
companions in the killing of the said Romulo
Bunye II. In view thereof, the police officers,
without warrant, picked up Narciso Nazareno
and brought him to the police headquarters for
questioning. Obviously, the evidence of
petitioner's guilt is strong because on 3 January
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 31
1989, an information charging Narciso
Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and two (2) others,
with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Manila. The case is docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a
motion to post bail, but the motion was denied
by the trial court in an order dated 10 January
1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier
filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was
granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas
corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of
Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the
Court issued the writ of habeas corpus,
returnable to the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch
24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30
January 1989 and thereafter resolve the
petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1
February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued a
resolution denying the petition for habeas
corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso
Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents
by reason of an information filed against him
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Manila which had taken cognizance of said case
and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed
by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because
of the strength of the evidence against him).
The findings of the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna are based
upon the facts and the law. Consequently, we
will not disturb the same. Evidently, the arrest of
Nazareno was effected by the police without
warrant pursuant to Sec. 5(b), Rule 113, Rules
of Court after he was positively implicated by his
co-accused Ramil Regala in the killing of
Romulo Bunye
II; and after investigation by the police
authorities. As held in People vs. Ancheta: 12

The obligation of an agent of
authority to make an arrest by
reason of a crime, does not
presuppose as a necessary
requisite for the fulfillment thereof,
the indubitable existence of a
crime. For the detention to be
perfectly legal, it is sufficient that
the agent or person in authority
making the arrest has reasonably
sufficient grounds to believe the
existence of an act having the
characteristics of a crime and that
the same grounds exist to believe
that the person sought to be
detained participated therein.
VIII
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here
considered, criminal charges have been filed in
the proper courts against the petitioners. The
rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained
of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court judge, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process or make the order, of if such person is
charged before any court, the writ of habeas
corpus will not be allowed. Section 4, Rule 102,
Rules of Court, as amended is quite explicit in
providing that:
Sec. 4. When writ is allowed or
discharge authorized. — If it
appears that the person alleged to
be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge
or by virtue of a judgment or order
of a court of record, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order, the
writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ
is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the
process, judgment, or order. Nor
shall anything in this rule be held
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 32
to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with a convicted
of an offense in the Philippines or
of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful
judgment. (emphasis supplied)
At this point, we refer to petitioner's plea for the
Court of re-examine and, thereafter, abandon its
pronouncement in Ilagan vs. Enrile, 13 that a
writ of habeas corpus is no longer available
after an information is filed against the person
detained and a warrant of arrest or an order of
commitment, is issued by the court where said
information has been filed. 14 The petitioners
claim that the said ruling, which was handed
down during the past dictatorial regime to
enforce and strengthen said regime, has no
place under the present democratic
dispensation and collides with the basic,
fundamental, and constitutional rights of the
people. Petitioners point out that the said
doctrine makes possible the arrest and
detention of innocent persons despite lack of
evidence against them, and, most often, it is
only after a petition for habeas corpus is filed
before the court that the military authorities file
the criminal information in the courts of law to be
able to hide behind the protective mantle of the
said doctrine. This, petitioners assert, stands as
an obstacle to the freedom and liberty of the
people and permits lawless and arbitrary State
action.
We find, however, no compelling reason to
abandon the said doctrine. It is based upon
express provision of the Rules of Court and the
exigencies served by the law. The fears
expressed by the petitioners are not really
unremediable. As the Court sees it, re-
examination or reappraisal, with a view to its
abandonment, of the Ilagan case doctrine is not
the answer. The answer and the better practice
would be, not to limit the function of the habeas
corpus to a mere inquiry as to whether or not the
court which issued the process, judgment or
order of commitment or before whom the
detained person is charged, had jurisdiction or
not to issue the process, judgment or order or to
take cognizance of the case, but rather, as the

Court itself states in Morales,
15
Jr. vs. Enrile, "in all petitions for habeas
corpus the court must inquire into every phase
and aspect of petitioner's detention-from the
moment petition was taken into custody up to
the moment the court passes upon the merits of
the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny can
the court satisfy itself that the due process
clause of our Constitution has in fact been
satisfied." This is exactly what the Court has
done in the petitions at bar. This is what should
henceforth be done in all future cases of habeas
corpus. In Short, all cases involving deprivation
of individual liberty should be promptly brought
to the courts for their immediate scrutiny and
disposition.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby
DISMISSED, except that in
G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond
for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby
ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to
P10,000.00. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154130 October 1, 2003
BENITO ASTORGA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of a
Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001,1 as well as
its Resolutions dated September 28, 2001 and
July 10, 2002.
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 33
On October 28, 1998, the Office of the
Ombudsman filed the following Information
against Benito Astorga, Mayor of Daram,
Samar, as well as a number of his men for
Arbitrary Detention:
That on or about the 1st day of September,
1997, and for sometime subsequent thereto, at
the Municipality of Daram, Province of Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a
public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of
Daram, Samar, in such capacity and committing
the offense in relation to office, conniving,
confederating and mutually helping with
unidentified persons, who are herein referred to
under fictitious names JOHN DOES, who were
armed with firearms of different calibers, with
deliberate intent, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously detain Elpidio Simon,
Moises dela Cruz, Wenifredo Maniscan, Renato
Militante and Crisanto Pelias, DENR
Employees, at the Municipality of Daram, by not
allowing them to leave the place, without any
legal and valid grounds thereby restraining and
depriving them of their personal liberty for nine
(9) hours, but without exceeding three (3) days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
On September 1, 1997, Regional Special
Operations Group (RSOG) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Office No. 8, Tacloban City sent a team to the
island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct
intelligence gathering and forest protection
operations in line with the government’s
campaign against illegal logging. The team was
composed of Forester II Moises dela Cruz,
Scaler Wenifredo Maniscan, Forest Ranger
Renato Militante, and Tree Marker Crisanto
Pelias, with Elpidio E. Simon, Chief of the Forest
Protection and Law Enforcement Section, as
team leader. The team was escorted by SPO3
Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo
Capoquian.3
The team stopped at Brgy. Bagacay, Daram,
Western Samar at 2:00 p.m., where they saw
two yacht-like boats being constructed. After

consulting with the local barangay officials, the
team learned that the boats belonged to a
certain Michael Figueroa. However, since
Figueroa was not around at the time, the team
left Brgy. Bagacay.4
En route to Brgy. Manungca, Sta. Rita, Samar,
the team spotted two more boats being
constructed in the vicinity of Brgy. Lucob-Lucob,
Daram, Samar, between 4:30-5:00 p.m.,
prompting them to stop and investigate. Thus,
Maniscan and Militante disembarked from the
DENR’s service pump boat and proceeded to
the site of the boat construction. There, they met
Mayor Astorga. After conversing with the mayor,
Militante returned to their boat for the purpose of
fetching Simon, at the request of Mayor
Astorga.5
When Simon, accompanied by dela Cruz, SPO3
Cinco, and SPO1 Capoquian, approached
Mayor Astorga to try and explain the purpose of
their mission, Simon was suddenly slapped hard
twice on the shoulder by Mayor Astorga, who
exclaimed, "Puwede ko kamo papaglanguyon
pag-uli ha Tacloban. Ano, di ka maaram nga
natupa ako? Natupa baya ako. Diri kamo
makauli yana kay puwede kame e charge ha
misencounter." (I can make you swim back to
Tacloban. Don’t you know that I can box? I can
box. Don’t you know that I can declare this a
misencounter?)6 Mayor Astorga then ordered
someone to fetch "reinforcements," and forty-
five (45) minutes later, or between 5:00-6:00
p.m., a banca arrived bearing ten (10) men,
some of them dressed in fatigue uniforms. The
men were armed with M-16 and M14 rifles, and
they promptly surrounded the team, guns
pointed at the team members.7At this, Simon
tried to explain to Astorga the purpose of his
team’s mission.8 He then took out his handheld
ICOM radio, saying that he was going to contact
his people at the DENR in Catbalogan to inform
them of the team’s whereabouts. Suddenly,
Mayor Astorga forcibly grabbed Simon’s radio,
saying, "Maupay nga waray kamo radio bis diri
somabut an iyo opisina kon hain kamo, bis diri
kamo maka aro hin bulig." (It’s better if you have
no radio so that your office would not know your
whereabouts and so that you cannot ask for
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 34
help).9 Mayor Astorga again slapped the right
shoulder of Simon, adding, "Kong siga kamo ha
Leyte ayaw pagdad-a dinhi ha Samar kay diri
kamo puwede ha akon." (If you are tough guys
in Leyte, do not bring it to Samar because I will
not tolerate it here.)10Simon then asked Mayor
Astorga to allow the team to go home, at which
Mayor Astorga retorted that they would not be
allowed to go home and that they would instead
be brought to Daram.11 Mayor Astorga then
addressed the team, saying, "Kon magdakop
man la kamo, unahon an mga dagko. Kon
madakop niyo an mga dagko, an kan Figueroa
dida ha Bagacay puwede ko liwat ipadakop an
akon." (If you really want to confiscate anything,
you start with the big-time. If you confiscate the
boats of Figueroa at Brgy. Bagacay, I will
surrender mine.)12 Simon then tried to reiterate
his request for permission to leave, which just
succeeded in irking Mayor Astorga, who angrily
said, "Diri kamo maka uli yana kay dad on ko
kamo ha Daram, para didto kita mag uro
istorya." (You cannot go home now because I
will bring you to Daram. We will have many
things to discuss there.)13
The team was brought to a house where they
were told that they would be served dinner. The
team had dinner with Mayor Astorga and
several others at a long table, and the meal
lasted between 7:00-8:00 p.m.14 After dinner,
Militante, Maniscan and SPO1 Capoquian were
allowed to go down from the house, but not to
leave the barangay.15On the other hand, SPO3
Cinco and the rest just sat in the house until 2:00
a.m. when the team was finally allowed to
leave.16 1awphi1.nét
Complainants filed a criminal complaint for
arbitrary detention against Mayor Astorga and
his men, which led to the filing of the above-
quoted Information.
Mayor Astorga was subsequently arraigned on
July 3, 2000, wherein he pleaded not guilty to
the offenses charged.17 At the trial, the
prosecution presented the testimonies of SPO1
Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, as well as their
Joint Affidavit.18 However, the presentation of
Simon’s testimony was not completed, and

none of his fellow team members came forward
to testify. Instead, the members of the team sent
by the DENR RSOG executed a Joint Affidavit
of Desistance.19
On July 5, 2001, the Sandiganbayan
promulgated its Decision, disposing of the case
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
is hereby rendered finding accused BENITO
ASTORGA Y BOCATCAT guilty of Arbitrary
Detention, and in the absence of any mitigating
or aggravating circumstances, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4)
months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1)
year and eight (8) months of prision correctional
as maximum.
SO ORDERED.20
The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration
dated July 11, 200121 which was denied by the
Sandiganabayan in a Resolution dated
September 28, 2001.22 A Second Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 24, 200123 was
also filed, and this was similarly denied in a
Resolution dated July 10, 2002.24
Hence, the present petition, wherein the
petitioner assigns a sole error for review:
5.1. The trial court grievously erred in finding the
accused guilty of Arbitrary Detention as defined
and penalized under Article 124 of the Revised
Penal Code, based on mere speculations,
surmises and conjectures and, worse,
notwithstanding the Affidavit of Desistance
executed by the five (5) complaining witnesses
wherein the latter categorically declared
petitioner’s innocence of the crime charged.25
Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to
establish the required quantum of evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused,26 especially in
light of the fact that the private complainants
executed a Joint Affidavit of
Desistance.27Petitioner asserts that nowhere in
the records of the case is there any competent
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 35
evidence that could sufficiently establish the fact
that restraint was employed upon the persons of
the team members.28 Furthermore, he claims
that the mere presence of armed men at the
scene does not qualify as competent evidence
to prove that fear was in fact instilled in the
minds of the team members, to the extent that
they would feel compelled to stay in Brgy.
Lucob-Lucob.29
Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public
officer or employee who, without legal grounds,
detains a person.30The elements of the crime
are:
1. That the offender is a public officer or
employee.
2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal
grounds.31
That petitioner, at the time he committed the
acts assailed herein, was then Mayor of Daram,
Samar is not disputed. Hence, the first element
of Arbitrary Detention, that the offender is a
public officer or employee, is undeniably
present.
Also, the records are bereft of any allegation on
the part of petitioner that his acts were spurred
by some legal purpose. On the contrary, he
admitted that his acts were motivated by his
"instinct for self-preservation" and the feeling
that he was being "singled out."32 The detention
was thus without legal grounds, thereby
satisfying the third element enumerated above.
What remains is the determination of whether or
not the team was actually detained.
In the case of People v. Acosta,33 which
involved the illegal detention of a child, we found
the accused-appellant therein guilty of
kidnapping despite the lack of evidence to show
that any physical restraint was employed upon
the victim. However, because the victim was a
boy of tender age and he was warned not to
leave until his godmother, the accused-

appellant, had returned, he was practically a
captive in the sense that he could not leave
because of his fear to violate such instruction.34
In the case of People v. Cortez,35 we held that,
in establishing the intent to deprive the victim of
his liberty, it is not necessary that the offended
party be kept within an enclosure to restrict her
freedom of locomotion. At the time of her
rescue, the offended party in said case was
found outside talking to the owner of the house
where she had been taken. She explained that
she did not attempt to leave the premises for
fear that the kidnappers would make good their
threats to kill her should she do so. We ruled
therein that her fear was not baseless as the
kidnappers knew where she resided and they
had earlier announced that their intention in
looking for her cousin was to kill him on sight.
Thus, we concluded that fear has been known
to render people immobile and that appeals to
the fears of an individual, such as by threats to
kill or similar threats, are equivalent to the use
of actual force or violence.36
The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and
illegal detention is that the curtailment of the
victim’s liberty need not involve any physical
restraint upon the victim’s person. If the acts and
actuations of the accused can produce such
fear in the mind of the victim sufficient to
paralyze the latter, to the extent that the victim
is compelled to limit his own actions and
movements in accordance with the wishes of
the accused, then the victim is, for all intents and
purposes, detained against his will.
In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from
fear is evident. Inspite of their pleas, the
witnesses and the complainants were not
allowed by petitioner to go home.37 This refusal
was quickly followed by the call for and arrival of
almost a dozen "reinforcements," all armed with
military-issue rifles, who proceeded to encircle
the team, weapons pointed at the complainants
and the witnesses.38 Given such circumstances,
we give credence to SPO1 Capoquian’s
statement that it was not "safe" to refuse Mayor
Astorga’s orders.39 It was not just the presence
of the armed men, but also the evident effect
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 36
these gunmen had on the actions of the team
which proves that fear was indeed instilled in the
minds of the team members, to the extent that
they felt compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-
Lucob. The intent to prevent the departure of the
complainants and witnesses against their will is
thus clear.
Regarding the Joint Affidavit of Desistance
executed by the private complainants, suffice it
to say that the principles governing the use of
such instruments in the adjudication of other
crimes can be applied here. Thus, in People v.
Ballabare, it was held that an affidavit of
desistance is merely an additional ground to
buttress the defenses of the accused, not the
sole consideration that can result in acquittal.
There must be other circumstances which,
when coupled with the retraction or desistance,
create doubts as to the truth of the testimony
given by the witnesses at the trial and accepted
by the judge. Here, there are no such
circumstances.40 Indeed, the belated claims
made in the Joint Affidavit of Desistance, such
as the allegations that the incident was the
result of a misunderstanding and that the team
acceded to Mayor Astorga’s orders "out of
respect," are belied by petitioner’s own
admissions to the contrary.41 The Joint Affidavit
of Desistance of the private complainants is
evidently not a clear repudiation of the material
points alleged in the information and proven at
the trial, but a mere expression of the lack of
interest of private complainants to pursue the
case.1awphi1.nét This conclusion is supported
by one of its latter paragraphs, which reads:
11. That this affidavit was executed by us if only
to prove our sincerity and improving DENR
relations with the local Chiefs Executive and
other official of Daram, Islands so that DENR
programs and project can be effectively
implemented through the support of the local
officials for the betterment of the residence living
conditions who are facing difficulties and are
much dependent on government support.42
Petitioner also assails the weight given by the
trial court to the evidence, pointing out that the
Sandiganbayan’s reliance on the testimony of

SPO1 Capoquian is misplaced, for the reason
that SPO1 Capoquian is not one of the private
complainants in the case.43 He also makes
much of the fact that prosecution witness SPO1
Capoquian was allegedly "not exactly privy to,
and knowledgeable of, what exactly transpired
between herein accused and the DENR team
leader Mr. Elpidio E. Simon, from their alleged
‘confrontation,’ until they left Barangay Lucob-
Lucob in the early morning of 2 September
1997."44
It is a time-honored doctrine that the trial court’s
factual findings are conclusive and binding upon
appellate courts unless some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance have
been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted.45 Nothing in the case at bar
prompts us to deviate from this doctrine. Indeed,
the fact that SPO1 Capoquian is not one of the
private complainants is completely irrelevant.
Neither penal law nor the rules of evidence
requires damning testimony to be exclusively
supplied by the private complainants in cases of
Arbitrary Detention. Furthermore, Mayor
Astorga’s claim that SPO1 Capoquian was "not
exactly privy" to what transpired between Simon
and himself is belied by the evidence. SPO1
Capoquian testified that he accompanied Simon
when the latter went to talk to petitioner.46 He
heard all of Mayor Astorga’s threatening
remarks.47 He was with Simon when they were
encircled by the men dressed in fatigues and
wielding M-16 and M-14 rifles.48 In sum, SPO1
Capoquian witnessed all the circumstances
which led to the Arbitrary Detention of the team
at the hands of Mayor Astorga.
Petitioner submits that it is unclear whether the
team was in fact prevented from leaving Brgy.
Lucob-Lucob or whether they had simply
decided to "while away the time" and take
advantage of the purported hospitality of the
accused.49 On the contrary, SPO3 Cinco clearly
and categorically denied that they were simply
"whiling away the time" between their dinner
with Mayor Astorga and their departure early the
following morning.50 SPO1 Capoquian gave
similar testimony, saying that they did not use
the time between their dinner with Mayor
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 37
Astorga and their departure early the following
morning to "enjoy the place" and that, given a
choice, they would have gone home.51
Petitioner argues that he was denied the "cold
neutrality of an impartial judge", because the
ponente of the assailed decision acted both as
magistrate and advocate when he propounded
"very extensive clarificatory questions" on the
witnesses. Surely, the Sandiganbayan, as a trial
court, is not an idle arbiter during a trial. It can
propound clarificatory questions to witnesses in
order to ferret out the truth. The impartiality of
the court cannot be assailed on the ground that
clarificatory questions were asked during the
trial.52
Thus, we affirm the judgment of the
Sandiganbayan finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Arbitrary Detention. Article
124 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides
that, where the detention has not exceeded
three days, the penalty shall be arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, which has a range of four (4)
months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four
(4) months. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, petitioner is entitled to a
minimum term to be taken from the penalty next
lower in degree, or arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods, which has a range of one
(1) month and one (1) day to four (4) months.
Hence, the Sandiganbayan was correct in
imposing the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one
(1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional, as maximum.
Before closing, it may not be amiss to quote the
words of Justice Perfecto in his concurring
opinion in Lino v. Fugoso, wherein he decried
the impunity enjoyed by public officials in
committing arbitrary or illegal detention, and
called for the intensification of efforts towards
bringing them to justice:
The provisions of law punishing arbitrary or
illegal detention committed by government
officers form part of our statute books even
before the advent of American sovereignty in
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 38

our country. Those provisions were already in

effect during the Spanish regime; they remained
in effect under American rule; continued in effect
under the Commonwealth. Even under the
Japanese regime they were not repealed. The
same provisions continue in the statute books of
the free and sovereign Republic of the
Philippines. This notwithstanding, and the
complaints often heard of violations of said
provisions, it is very seldom that prosecutions
under them have been instituted due to the fact
that the erring individuals happened to belong to
the same government to which the prosecuting
officers belong. It is high time that every one
must do his duty, without fear or favor, and that
prosecuting officers should not answer with cold
shrugging of the shoulders the complaints of the
victims of arbitrary or illegal detention.

Only by an earnest enforcement of the

provisions of articles 124 and 125 of the
Revised Penal Code will it be possible to reduce
to its minimum such wanton trampling of
personal freedom as depicted in this case. The
responsible officials should be prosecuted,
without prejudice to the detainees’ right to the
indemnity to which they may be entitled for the
unjustified violation of their fundamental rights.53

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the

petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986,
dated July 5, 2001 finding petitioner BENITO
ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Arbitrary Detention and sentencing
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in
toto.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

2. DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED
PERSONS TO THE PROPER JUDICIAL
AUTHORITIES
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained
persons to the proper judicial authorities. —
The penalties provided in the next preceding
article shall be imposed upon the public officer
or employee who shall detain any person for
some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such
person to the proper judicial authorities within
the period of; twelve (12) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by light penalties, or their
equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by correctional penalties,
or their equivalent and thirty-six (36) hours, for
crimes, or offenses punishable by afflictive or
capital penalties, or their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be
informed of the cause of his detention and shall
be allowed upon his request, to communicate
and confer at any time with his attorney or
counsel. (As amended by E.O. Nos. 59 and 272,
Nov. 7, 1986 and July 25, 1987, respectively).
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 39
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 272 July 25, 1987
FURTHER AMENDING ARTICLE 125 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED
WHEREAS, in the interest of public safety and
order, it is imperative that a reasonable and
sufficient period be given within which to
conduct adequate and thorough investigation of
persons detained for some legal grounds.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO,
President of the Philippines, do hereby order:
Sec. 1. Article one hundred twenty-five of Act
Numbered Three Thousand Eight Hundred
Fifteen (Act No. 3815) otherwise known as the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
"Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained
persons to the proper judicial authorities. The
penalties provided in the next preceding article
shall be imposed upon the public officer or
employee who shall detain any person for some
legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person
to the proper judicial authorities within the period
of twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent;
eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by correctional penalties, or their
equivalent, and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes
or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital
penalties, or their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be
informed of the caused of his detention and shall
be allowed, upon his request, to communicate
and confer at any time with his attorney or
counsel."
Sec. 2. All laws, orders, issuances, rules and
regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with this
Executive Order are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly. lawphi1.net
Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect
thirty (30) days following its publication in the
Official Gazette.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 25th day of July,
in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
eighty-seven.
RULE 112, SEC 7 RULES OF COURT
Section 7. When accused lawfully arrested
without warrant. — When a person is lawfully
arrested without a warrant involving an offense
which requires a preliminary investigation, the
complaint or information may be filed by a
prosecutor without need of such investigation
provided an inquest has been conducted in
accordance with existing rules. In the absence
or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the
complaint may be filed by the offended party or
a peace office directly with the proper court on
the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or
arresting officer or person.
Republic Act No. 9372 March 6, 2007
AN ACT TO SECURE THE STATE AND
PROTECT OUR PEOPLE FROM TERRORISM
SEC. 18. Period of Detention Without
Judicial Warrant of Arrest. - The provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to the
contrary notwithstanding, any police or law
enforcement personnel, who, having been duly
authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism
Council has taken custody of a person charged
with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the
crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall,
without incurring any criminal liability for delay in
the delivery of detained persons to the proper
judicial authorities, deliver said charged or
suspected person to the proper judicial authority
within a period of three days counted from the
moment the said charged or suspected person
has been apprehended or arrested, detained,
and taken into custody by the said police, or law
enforcement personnel: Provided, That the
arrest of those suspected of the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism
must result from the surveillance under Section
7 and examination of bank deposits under
Section 27 of this Act.
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 40
The police or law enforcement personnel
concerned shall, before detaining the person
suspected of the crime of terrorism, present him
or her before any judge at the latter's residence
or office nearest the place where the arrest took
place at any time of the day or night. It shall be
the duty of the judge, among other things, to
ascertain the identity of the police or law
enforcement personnel and the person or
persons they have arrested and presented
before him or her, to inquire of them the reasons
why they have arrested the person and
determine by questioning and personal
observation whether or not the suspect has
been subjected to any physical, moral or
psychological torture by whom and why. The
judge shall then submit a written report of what
he/she had observed when the subject was
brought before him to the proper court that has
jurisdiction over the case of the person thus
arrested. The judge shall forthwith submit
his/her report within three calendar days from
the time the suspect was brought to his/her
residence or office.
Immediately after taking custody of a person
charged with or suspected of the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, the
police or law enforcement personnel shall notify
in writing the judge of the court nearest the place
of apprehension or arrest: Provided ,That where
the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays,
holidays or after office hours, the written notice
shall be served at the residence of the judge
nearest the place where the accused was
arrested.
The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to
twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be
imposed upon the police or law enforcement
personnel who fails to notify and judge as
Provided in the preceding paragraph.
SEC. 19. Period of Detention in the Event of
an Actual or Imminent Terrorist Attack. - In
the event of an actual or imminent terrorist
attack, suspects may not be detained for more
than three days without the written approval of a
municipal, city, provincial or regional official of a
Human Rights Commission or judge of the

municipal, regional trial court, the
Sandiganbayan or a justice of the Court of
Appeals nearest the place of the arrest. If the
arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays,
holidays or after office hours, the arresting
police or law enforcement personnel shall bring
the person thus arrested to the residence of any
of the officials mentioned above that is nearest
the place where the accused was arrested. The
approval in writing of any of the said officials
shall be secured by the police or law
enforcement personnel concerned within five
days after the date of the detention of the
persons concerned: Provided, however, That
within three days after the detention the
suspects, whose connection with the terror
attack or threat is not established, shall be
released immediately.
G.R. No. L-2128 May 12, 1948
MELENCIO SAYO and JOAQUIN
MOSTERO, petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF POLICE and THE OFFICER IN
CHARGE OF MUNICIPAL JAIL, BOTH OF
CITY OF MANILA,respondents.
Enrique Q. Jabile for petitioners.
Acting City Fiscal A. P. Montesa, Assistant City
Fiscal Arsenio Nañawa and D. Guinto Lazaro for
respondents.
FERIA, J.:
Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao,
charging the petitioners with having committed
the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a
policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the
petitioners on April 2, 1948, and presented a
complaint against them with the fiscal's office of
Manila. Until April 7, 1948, when the petition
for habeas corpus filed with this Court was
heard, the petitioners were still detained or
under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet
released or filed against them an information
with the proper courts justice.
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 41
This case has not been decided before this time
because there was not a sufficient number of
Justices to form a quorum in Manila, And it had
to be transferred to the Supreme Court acting in
division here in Baguio for deliberation and
decision. We have not until now an official
information as to the action taken by the office
of the city fiscal on the complaint filed by the
Dumlao against the petitioners. But whatever
night have been the action taken by said office,
if there was any, we have to decide this case in
order to lay down a ruling on the question
involved herein for the information and guidance
in the future of the officers concerned.
The principal question to be determined in the
present case in order to decide whether or not
the petitioners are being illegally restrained of
their liberty, is the following: Is the city fiscal of
manila a judicial authority within the meaning of
the provisions of article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code?
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that "the penalties provided in the next
proceeding article shall be imposed upon the
public officer or employee who shall detain any
person for some legal ground and shall fail to
deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of six hours."
Taking into consideration the history of the
provisions of the above quoted article, the
precept of our Constitution guaranteeing
individual liberty, and the provisions of Rules of
Court regarding arrest and habeas corpus, we
are of the opinion that the words "judicial
authority", as used in said article, mean the
courts of justices or judges of said courts vested
with judicial power to order the temporary
detention or confinement of a person charged
with having committed a public offense, that is,
"the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as
may be established by law". (Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution.)
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was
substantially taken from article 202 of the old
Penal Code formerly in force of these Islands,
which penalized a public officer other than a

judicial officer who, without warrant, "shall arrest
a person upon a charge of crime and shall fail to
deliver such person to the judicial authority
within twenty four hours after his arrest." There
was no doubt that a judicial authority therein
referred to was the judge of a court of justice
empowered by law, after a proper investigation,
to order the temporary commitment or detention
of the person arrested; and not the city fiscals or
any other officers, who are not authorized by law
to do so. Because article 204, which
complements said section 202, of the same
Code provided that "the penalty of suspension
in its minimum and medium degrees shall be
imposed upon the following persons: 1. Any
judicial officer who, within the period prescribed
by the provisions of the law of criminal
procedure in force, shall fail to release any
prisoner under arrest or to commit such prisoner
formally by written order containing a statement
of the grounds upon which the same is based."
Although the above quoted provision of article
204 of the old Penal Code has not been
incorporated in the Revised Penal Code the
import of said words judicial authority or officer
can not be construed as having been modified
by the mere omission of said provision in the
Revised Penal Code.
Besides, section 1 (3), Article III, of our
Constitution provides that "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons...against
unreasonable seizure shall not be violated, and
no warrant [of arrest, detention or confinement]
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after the examination
under oath or affirmation of the complaint and
the witness he may produce." Under this
constitutional precept no person may be
deprived of his liberty, except by warrant of
arrest or commitment issued upon probable
cause by a judge after examination of the
complainant and his witness. And the judicial
authority to whom the person arrested by a
public officers must be surrendered can not be
any other but court or judge who alone is
authorized to issue a warrant of commitment or
provisional detention of the person arrested
pending the trial of the case against the latter.
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 42
Without such warrant of commitment, the
detention of the person arrested for than six
hours would be illegal and in violation of our
Constitution.
Our conclusion is confirmed by section 17, Rule
109 of the Rules of court, which, referring to the
duty of an officer after arrest without warrant,
provides that "a person making arrest for legal
ground shall, without unnecessary delay, and
within the time prescribed in the Revised Penal
Code, take the person arrested to the
proper court or judge for such action for they
may deem proper to take;" and by section 11 of
Rule 108, which reads that "after the arrest by
the defendant and his delivery to the Court, he
shall be informed of the complaint or information
filed against him. He shall also informed of the
substance of the testimony and evidence
presented against him, and, if he desires to
testify or to present witnesses or evidence in his
favor, he may be allowed to do so. The
testimony of the witnesses need not be reduced
to writing but that of the defendant shall be taken
in writing and subscribed by him.
And it is further corroborated by the provisions
of section 1 and 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court. According to the provision of said section,
"a writ of habeas corpus shall extend any
person to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is illegally
deprived of his liberty"; and "if it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is
in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a
judgement or order of a court of record, and that
the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render judgment, or make the order,
the writ shall not be allowed. "Which a contrario
sensu means that, otherwise, the writ shall be
allowed and the person detained shall be
released.
The judicial authority mentioned in section 125
of the Revised Penal Code can not be construed
to include the fiscal of the City of Manila or any
other city, because they cannot issue a warrant
of arrest or of commitment or temporary
confinement of a person surrendered to legalize

the detention of a person arrested without
warrant. (Section 7, Rule 108; Hashim vs.
Boncan, 40 Off. Gaz. 13th Supp., p.13; Lino vs.
Fugoso, L-1159, promulgated on January 30,
1947, 43 Off. Gaz., 1214). The investigation
which the city of fiscal of Manila makes is not the
preliminary investigation proper provided for in
section 11, Rule 108, above quoted, to which all
person charged with offenses cognizable by the
Court of First Instance in provinces are entitled,
but it is a mere investigation made by the city
fiscal for the purpose of filing the corresponding
information against the defendant with the
proper municipal court or Court of First Instance
of Manila if the result of the investigation so
warrants, in order to obtain or secure from the
court a warrant of arrest of the defendant. It is
provided by a law as a substitute, in a certain
sense, of the preliminary investigation proper to
avoid or prevent a hasty or malicious
prosecution, since defendant charged with
offenses triable by the courts in the City of
Manila are not entitled to a proper preliminary
investigation.
The only executive officers authorized by law to
make a proper preliminary investigation in case
of temporary absence of both the justice of the
peace and the auxiliary justice of the peace from
the municipality, town or place, are the
municipal mayors who are empowered in such
case to issue a warrant of arrest of the caused.
(Section 3, Rule 108, in connection with section
6, Rule 108, and section 2 of Rule 109.) The
preliminary investigation which a city fiscal may
conduct under section 2, Rule 108, is the
investigation referred to in the proceeding
paragraph.
Under the law, a complaint charging a person
with the commission of an offense cognizable by
the courts of Manila is not filed with municipal
court or the Court of First Instance of Manila,
because as above stated, the latter do not make
or conduct a preliminary investigation proper.
The complaint must be made or filed with the
city fiscal of Manila who, personally or through
one of his assistants, makes the investigation,
not for the purpose of ordering the arrest of the
accused, but of filing with the proper court the
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 43
necessary information against the accused if the
result of the investigation so warrants, and
obtaining from the court a warrant of arrest or
commitment of the accused.
When a person is arrested without warrant in
cases permitted bylaw, the officer or person
making the arrest should, as abovestated,
without unnecessary delay take or surrender the
person arrested, within the period of time
prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, to the
court or judge having jurisdiction to try or make
a preliminary investigation of the offense
(section 17, Rule 109); and the court or judge
shall try and decide the case if the court has
original jurisdiction over the offense charged, or
make the preliminary investigation if it is a
justice of the peace court having no original
jurisdiction, and then transfer the case to the
proper Court of First Instance in accordance
with the provisions of section 13, Rule 108.
In the City of Manila, where complaints are not
filed directly with the municipal court or the
Court of First Instance, the officer or person
making the arrest without warrant shall
surrender or take the person arrested to the city
fiscal, and the latter shall make the investigation
above mentioned and file, if proper, the
corresponding information within the time
prescribed by section 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, so that the court may issue a warrant of
commitment for the temporary detention of the
accused. And the city fiscal or his assistants
shall make the investigation forthwith, unless it
is materially impossible for them to do so,
because the testimony of the person or officer
making the arrest without warrant is in such
cases ready and available, and shall,
immediately after the investigation, either
release the person arrested or file the
corresponding information. If the city fiscal has
any doubt as to the probability of the defendant
having committed the offense charged, or is not
ready to file the information on the strength of
the testimony or evidence presented, he should
release and not detain the person arrested for a
longer period than that prescribed in the Penal
Code, without prejudice to making or continuing
the investigation and filing afterwards the proper
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 44

information against him with the court, in order acted in good faith, in the absence of a clear cut
to obtain or secure a warrant of his arrest. Of ruling on the matter in believing that he had
course, for the purpose of determining the complied with the mandate of article 125 by
criminal liability of an officer detaining a person delivering the petitioners within six hours to the
for more than six hours prescribed by the office of the city fiscal, and the latter might have
Revised Penal Code, the means of ignored the fact that the petitioners were being
communication as well as the hour of arrested actually detained when the said policeman filed
and other circumstances, such as the time of a complaint against them with the city fiscal, we
surrender and the material possibility for the hold that the petitioners are being illegally
fiscal to make the investigation and file in time restrained of their liberty, and their release is
the necessary information, must be taken into hereby ordered unless they are now detained by
consideration. virtue of a process issued by a competent court
of justice.
To consider the city fiscal as the judicial
authority referred to in article 125 of the Revised SO ORDERED.
Penal Code, would be to authorize the detention
of a person arrested without warrant for a period
longer than that permitted by law without any
process issued by a court of competent
jurisdiction. The city fiscal, may not, after due
investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an
information or prosecuting the person arrested
and release him, after the latter had been
illegally detained for days or weeks without any
process issued by a court or judge.

A peace officer has no power or authority to

arrest a person without a warrant upon
complaint of the offended party or any other
person, except in those cases expressly
authorized by law. What he or the complainant
may do in such case is to file a complaint with
the city fiscal of Manila, or directly with the
justice of the peace courts in municipalities and
other political subdivisions. If the City Fiscal has
no authority, and he has not, to order the arrest
even if he finds, after due investigation, that
there is a probability that a crime has been
committed and the accused is guilty thereof, a
fortiori a police officer has no authority to arrest
and detain a person charged with an offense
upon complaint of the offended party or other
persons even though, after investigation, he
becomes convinced that the accused is guilty of
the offense charged.

In view of all the foregoing, without making any

pronouncement as to the responsibility of the
officers who intervened in the detention of the
petitioners, for the policeman Dumlao may have

G.R. No. L-26723 December 22, 1966
ARTHUR MEDINA Y YUMUL, petitioner,
vs.
MARCELO F. OROZCO, JR., Acting City
Warden of Caloocan City, respondent.
Federico Magdangal for petitioner.
Francisco A. Garcia for respondent.
SANCHEZ, J.:
On application for habeas corpus. The facts are:
At about 12:00 p.m. on November 7, 1965,
petitioner Arthur Medina y Yumul was arrested
and thereafter incarcerated in the Caloocan City
jail, allegedly as one of those responsible for the
death of one Marcelo Sangalang y Diwa which
occurred on October 31, 1965 in said city. At
about 9:00 o'clock in the morning of the same
day, November 7, 1965, the case against
Medina and two others for Sangalang's murder
was referred to a fiscal, who forthwith conducted
a preliminary investigation in petitioner's
presence. At about 3:40 p.m. on November 10,
1965, an information for murder was filed
against petitioner Arthur Medina y Yumul, and
Antonio Olivar y Flores and Alexander Enriquez
y Raginio in the Caloocan branch of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, docketed as Criminal
Case No. C-1197 of said court. By court order,
they were promptly committed to jail. Arraigned,
Medina and his co-accused stood trial — which
has not yet terminated.
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 45
1. First to be considered is the charge of
arbitrary detention. Petitioner claims violation of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. The
crime — for which petitioner is detained — is
murder, a capital offense. The arresting officer's
duty under the law1 was either to deliver him to
the proper judicial authorities within 18 hours, or
thereafter release him. The fact however is that
he was not released. From the time of
petitioner's arrest at 12:00 o'clock p.m. on
November 7 to 3:40 p.m. on November 10 when
the information against him for murder actually
was in court, over 75 hours have elapsed.
But, stock should be taken of the fact that
November 7 was a Sunday; November 8 was
declared an official holiday; and November 9
(election day) was also an official holiday. In
these three no-office days, it was not an easy
matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk and
stenographer, draft the information and search
for the Judge to have him act thereon, and get
the clerk of court to open the courthouse, docket
the case and have the order of commitment
prepared. And then, where to locate and the
certainty of locating those officers and
employees could very well compound the
fiscal's difficulties. These are considerations
sufficient enough to deter us from declaring that
Arthur Medina was arbitrarily detained. For, he
was brought to court on the very first office day
following arrest.2
2. Nor could discharge from custody, by now, be
justified even on the assumption that detention
was originally arbitrary.
Petitioner at present is jailed because of the
court's order of commitment of November 10,
1965 upon a murder indictment. No bail was
provided for him, because he is charged with a
capital offense. Such detention remains
unaffected by the alleged previous arbitrary
detention. Because, detention under a valid
information is one thing, arbitrary detention
anterior thereto another. They are separate
concepts. Simply because at the inception
detention was wrong is no reason for letting
petitioner go scot-free after the serious charge
of murder has been clamped upon him and his
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 46

detention ordered by the court. The first is petitioner of the right to speedy trial. Delay of his
illegal; but the second is not.3 Thus, the petition own making cannot be oppressive to him.7
for habeas corpus came too late.4
For the reasons given, the petition herein to set
3. As unavailing is petitioner's claim that no petitioner Arthur Medina y Yumul at liberty is
preliminary investigation was conducted by the hereby denied. Costs against petitioner.
fiscal before the criminal charge against him
was registered in court. Other than that SO ORDERED
averment in the petition herein, petitioner has
nothing whatsoever to show for it. Upon the
other hand, the assertion that such investigation
was made on the very day of petitioner's arrest
and in his presence, is confirmed by the fact that
on November 12, 1965 he moved the office of
the city fiscal for a reinvestigation of his case.
And that reinvestigation was held on December
1, 1965. Thereafter, the case against him
proceeded to trial. Add to all of these the legal
presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties,5 and the question of lack of
preliminary investigation is well nailed down.

4. Besides, the proper forum before which

absence of preliminary investigation should be
ventilated is the Court of First Instance, not this
Court. Reason is not wanting for this view.
Absence of preliminary investigation does not
go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to
the regularity of the proceedings. It could even
be waived. Indeed, it is frequently
waived.6 These are matters to be inquired into
by the trial court, not an appellate court.

5. The cry of deprivation of a speedy trial merits

but scant consideration. The arraignment of
petitioner set for December 1, 1965 was
postponed to December 20, 1965, thence to
February 28, 1966, to March 14, 1966, all on
petition of counsel for the accused, including
petitioner. Then, on April 14, 1966, petitioner's
counsel moved to reset the date of hearing on
the merits. And again, the hearing scheduled on
July 26, 1966 was transferred to September 6,
1966 on motion of defendant Alexander
Enriquez with the conformity of petitioner's
counsel. Finally, on motion of petitioner's
counsel, the hearing on September 6, 1966 was
recalendared for December 6, 1966. In this
factual environment, we do not see denial to

G.R. No. 134503 July 2, 1999
JASPER AGBAY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN
FOR THE MILITARY, SPO4 NEMESIO
NATIVIDAD, JR. and SPO2 ELEAZAR M.
SOLOMON, respondent.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify the
Resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military dated 19 January 19981 which
recommended the dismissal of the criminal
complaint filed by petitioner against herein
private respondents for violation of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code for delay in the delivery
of detained persons, and the Order of April 13,
19982 which denied his motion for
reconsideration.
The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the
petition at bar are as follows:
On September 7, 1997, petitioner, together with
a certain Sherwin Jugalbot, was arrested and
detained at the Liloan Police Station, Metro
Cebu for an alleged violation of R.A. 7610, the
"Special Protection of Children Against Child
abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act."3 The following day, or on September 8,
1997, a Complaint for violation of R.A. 7610 was
filed against petitioner and Jugalbot before the
7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro
Cebu by one Joan Gicaraya for and in behalf of
her daughter Gayle4 . The complaint, insofar as
pertinent, reads as follows:
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 47
That on the 7th day of September
1997 at Sitio Bonbon, Brgy.
Catarman, Liloan, Metro Cebu,
Philippines and within the
Preliminary Jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and
there, willfully, feloniously and
unlawfully, conspiring,
confederating, helping with one
another, while accused JASPER
AGBAY manipulating to finger the
vagina of GAYLE FATIMA
AMIGABLE GICAYARA, his
companion block the sight of the
Private Complainant, Mrs. JOAN
A. GICAYARA, while on board a
tricycle going their destinations.
Upon initial investigation of the
Bgy, Captain of Bgy. Catarman,
accused SHERWIN JUGALBOT
was released and accused
JASPER AGBAY is presently
detain Liloan Police Station Jail.
Medical Certificate issued from
Don Vicente Sotto Memorial
Medical Center, Cebu City is
hereto attached.
On September 10, 1997, counsel for petitioner
wrote the Chief of Police of Liloan demanding
the immediate release of petitioner considering
that the latter had "failed to deliver the detained
Jasper Agbay to the proper judicial authority
within thirty-six (36) hours from September 7,
1997."5 Private respondents did not act on this
letter and continued to detain petitioner.6
On September 12; 1997, the 7th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro Cebu issued
an order, denominated as "Detention During the
Pendency of the Case", committing petitioner to
the jail warden of Cebu City.7 Five (5) days later,
or on September 17, 1997, petitioner was
ordered released by the said court after he had
posted bond.8
On September 26, 1997, petitioner filed a
complaint for delay in the delivery of detained
persons against herein private respondents
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 48

SPO4 Nemesio Natividad, Jr., SPO2 Eleazar M. MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO.

Salomon and other unidentified police officers 14, SERIES OF 1995, DATED 10
stationed at the Liloan Police Substation, before OCTOBER 1995, OF THE
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
Visayas.9 IN HOLDING THAT IT HAS
COMPETENCE TO ACT ON THE
Regarding the complaint for violation of R.A. ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE
7610, it is alleged by petitioner that on BEFORE IT, THE SAID
November 10, 1997, the 7th MCTC of Liloan, CIRCULAR BEING
Metro Cebu issued a resolution containing the UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
following dispositive portion: ILLEGAL, HENCE, NULL AND
VOID.
WHEREFORE, finding probable
cause for the crime in Violation of II.
Republic Act 7610, it is hereby
recommended that an THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT
INFORMATION be filed against GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
the two aforenamed accused. DISCRETION IN NOT HOLDING
THAT IT IS BEYOND ITS
Forward the record of this case to COMPENCE TO DETERMINE
the Provincial Fiscal's Office for WHETHER OR NOT THE
appropriate action.10 MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURT OF LILOAN-
By virtue of Memorandum Circular No. 14, COMPOSTELA HAS IN FACT NO
Series of 1995, dated 10 October 1995 of the JURISDICTION TO TRY THE
Office of the Ombudsman,11 the case for delay CASE FILED AGAINST HEREIN
in delivery filed by petitioner against herein PETITIONER.
private respondents before the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas was transferred to III.
the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military for its
proper disposition. Thus, it was this office which THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT
acted on the complaint, now denominated as GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
OMB-VIS-CRIM-97-0786, and which issued the DISCRETION IN NOT HOLDING
questioned Resolution dated January 19, 1998 THAT THE MCTC, WHILE
recommending its dismissal against herein HAVING AUTHORITY TO
private respondents. Petitioner moved for CONDUCT A PRELIMINARY
reconsideration of this Resolution but this INVESTIGATION, IS NOT THE
motion was denied in an Order dated April 13, "PROPER JUDICIAL
1998. AUTHORITY " CONTEMPLATED
IN ARTICLE 125 OF THE
Hence, this petition for certiorari. REVISED PENAL CODE AND,
HENCE, THE FILING OF THE
The grounds relied upon in the present COMPLAINT BEFORE IT FOR
petition12 are as follows: THE PURPOSE OF
CONDUCTING A PRELIMINARY
I. INVESTIGATION DID NOT
INTERRUPT THE PERIOD
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT PRESCRIBED BY ART. 125.
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN RELYING ON IV.

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN HOLIDING
THAT THE ISSUE OF THE
VALIDITY OF THE ORDER OF
DETENTION IS IRRELEVANT
TO THE ISSUE OF CRIMINAL
LIABILITY OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS FOR DELAY IN
THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED
PERSONS.
V.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT
THE DUTY OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS TO FILE THE
NECESSARY COMPLAINT IN
COURT WAS FULFILLED WHEN
THEY FILED A FORMAL
COMPLAINT ON 8 SEPTEMBER
1997 WITH THE 7TH MCTC OF
LILOAN-COMPOSTELA.
On the first issue, petitioner argues that due to
the civilian character of the Philippine National
Police, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
the Military, by virtue of the description of the
Office, has no competence or jurisdiction to act
on his complaint against private respondents
who are members of the PNP. Petitioner also
questions the constitutionality of Memorandum
Circular No. 14 insofar as it purports to vest the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Military
Affairs with jurisdiction to investigate all cases
against personnel of the Philippine National
Police.1âwphi1.nêt
There is no dispute as to the civilian character
of our police force. The 1987 Constitution, in
Section 6, Article XVI, has mandated the
establishment of "one police force, which shall
be national in scope and civilian
character (emphasis supplied)." Likewise, R.A.
697513 is categorical in describing the civilian
character of the police force.14The only question
now is whether Memorandum Circular No. 14,
in vesting the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 49
for the Military with jurisdiction to investigate
complaints against members of the PNP,
violates the latter's civilian character.
As opined by the Office of the Solicitor General
in its Comment dated 7 December 199815, the
issue as to whether the Deputy Ombudsman for
the Military has the authority to investigate
civilian personnel of the government was
resolved in the affirmative in the case of Acop v.
Office of the Ombudsman.16 In that case, the
petitioners, who were members of the Philippine
National Police questioned the jurisdiction of the
Deputy Ombudsman to investigate the alleged
shootout of certain suspected members of the
"Kuratong Baleleng" robbery gang; this Court
held that:
The deliberations on the Deputy
for the military establishment do
not yield conclusive evidence that
such deputy is prohibited from
performing other functions or
duties affecting non-military
personnel. On the contrary, a
review of the relevant
Constitutional provisions reveal
otherwise.
As previously established, the
Ombudsman "may exercise such
other powers or perform such
functions or duties" as Congress
may prescribe through legisiation.
Therefore, nothing can prevent
Congress from giving the
Ombudsman supervision and
control over the Ombudsman's
deputies, one being the deputy for
the military establishment. In this
light, Section 11 of R.A. No. 6770
provides:
Sec. 11. Structural
Organization. —
The authority and
responsibility for the
exercise of the
mandate of the
Office of the
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 50

Ombudsman and for at bar18. Petitioner states that the doctrine laid
the discharge of its down in the said case is simply that "the
powers and Ombudsman may refer cases involving non-
functions shall be military personnel for investigation by the
vested in the Deputy for Military Affairs. This doctrine,
Ombudsman, who petitioner argues, "applies only to isolated or
shall have individual cases involving non-military
supervision and personnel referred by the Ombudsman to the
control of the said Deputy for Military Affairs" and does not apply
Office. when, as in this case, there is a wholesale or
indiscriminate referral of such cases to the
While Section 31 thereof declares: Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs in the
form of an Office Memorandum Circular.
Sec. 31.
Designation of Petitioner's arguments do not convince as there
Investigators and is no basis for the distinction.
Prosecutors. — The
Ombudsman may There is no basis in the above-cited decision to
utilize the personnel limit the referral of cases involving non-military
of his office and/or personnel to the Deputy Ombudsman for
designate or Military Affairs to isolated or individual cases.
deputize any fiscal, The Office of the Ombudsman, in issuing
state prosecutor to Memorandum Circular No. 15, is simply
assist in the exercising the power vested in the Ombudsman
investigation and "to utilize the personnel of his office and/or
prosecution of designate or deputize any fiscal, state
certain cases. prosecutor or the or lawyer in the government
Those designated or service to act as special investigator or
deputized to assist prosecutor to assist in the investigation and
him herein shall be prosecution of certain cases." This Court,
under his absent any grave abuse of discretion, may not
supervision and enterfere with the exercise by the Ombudsman
control. of his power of supervision and control over the
said Office.
Accordingly, the Ombudsman
may refer cases involving non- Petitioner further argues that Memorandum
military personnel for investigation Circular No. 14 violates the clear intent and
by the Deputy for Military Affairs. policy of the Constitution and of R.A. 6975 to
In these cases at bench, maintain the civilian character of the police force
therefore, no irregularity attended and "would render nugatory and meaningless
the referral by the Acting the distinction between cases involving civilian
Ombudsman of the Kurutong and military personnel and the creation of
Baleleng case to respondent separate divisions of the Ombudsman."19
Casaclang who, in turn, created a
panel of investigators.17 Said contentions are misplaced.

The cited case is determinative of the issue. The Deputy Ombudsman for the Military,
However, petitioner, in his Reply to Comment despite his designation as such, is by no means
dated February 1, 1999, argues that the ruling a member of the military establishment. The
in the Acop case is not on all fours with the case said Office was established "to extend the Office

of the Ombudsman to the military establishment
just as it champions the common people against
bureaucratic indifference". The Office was
intended to help the "ordinary foot soldiers" to
obtain redress for their grievances against
higher authorities and the drafters of the
Constitution were aware that the creation of the
Office, which is seemingly independent of the
President, to perform functions which
constitutionally should be performed by the
President, might be in derogation of the powers
of the President as Commander-In-Chief of the
Armed Forces20.
It must be borne in mind that the Office of the
Ombudsman was envisioned by the framers of
the 1987 Constitution as the "eyes and ears of
the people"21 and "a champion of the citizen.22"
Sec. 12, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution
describes the Ombudsman and his deputies as
"protectors of the people." Thus, first and
foremost, the Ombudsman and his deputies,
including the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military owe their allegiance to the people and
ordinary citizens, it is clearly not a part of the
military. We fail to see how the assumption of
jurisdiction by the said office over the
investigation of cases involving the PNP would
detract from or violate the civilian character of
the police force when precisely the Office of the
Ombudsman is a civilian office.
The other issues raised by petitioner concerns
the application of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides as follows:
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of
detained persons to the proper
judicial authorities. — The
penalties provided in the next
preceding article shall be imposed
upon the public officer or
employee who shall detain any
person for some legal ground and
shall fail to deliver such person for
the proper judicial authorities
within the period of: twelve (12)
hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by light penalties, or
their equivalent; eighteen (18)
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 51
hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by correctional
penalties, or their equivalent; and
thirty-six hours (36) hours, for
crimes or offenses punishable by
afflictive or capital penalties, or
their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained
shall be informed of the cause of
his detention and shall be allowed,
upon his request, to communicate
and confer at any time with his
attorney or counsel.
In the case at bar, petitioner was arrested and
detained at the Liloan Police Station on 7
September 1997 for an alleged violation of R.A.
7610, specifically section 5 (b) thereof23. This
crime carries a penalty of reclusion temporalin
its medium period to reclusion perpetua, an
afflictive penalty. Under these circumstances, a
criminal complaint or information should be filed
with the proper judicial authorities within thirty
six (36) hours of his arrest.
As borne by the records before us the mother of
private complainant, Joan Gicaraya, filed a
complaint on 8 September 1997 against
petitioner for violation of R.A. 7610 before the
7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro
Cebu.
Petitioner contends that the act of private
complainant in filing the complaint before the
MCTC was for purposes of preliminary
investigation as the MCTC has no jurisdiction to
try the offense. This act of private complainant
petitioner argues, was unnecessary, a
surplusage which did not interrupt the period
prescribed by Art. 12524 considering that under
the Rules it is the Regional Trial Court which has
jurisdiction to try the case against him. As such,
upon the lapse of the thirty-six hours given to the
arresting officers to effect his delivery to the
proper Regional Trial Court, private
respondents were already guilty of violating Art.
125. Thus, petitioner argues, when the Judge-
Designate of the 7th MCTC issued a
Commitment Order on September 12, 1997, he

was acting contrary to law since by then there
was no basis for the continued detention of
petitioner.25
In addressing the issue, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military in its 13 April 1998
Order, stated that the duty of filing the
corresponding complaint in court was "fulfille by
respondent when the formal complaint was filed
on September 8, 1997 with the 7th MCTC of
Liloan-Compostela, barely 20 hours after the
arrest of herein complainant of September 7,
1997."26 The Solicitor General, for his part,
argues that while a municipal court judge may
conduct preliminary investigations as an
exception to his normal judicial duties, he still
retains the authority to issue an order of release
or commitment. As such, upon the filing of the
complaint with the MCTC, there was already
compliance with the very purpose and intent of
Art. 12527.
The core issue is whether the filing of the
complaint with the Municipal Trial Court
constitutes to a "proper judicial authority" as
contemplated by Art. 125 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code is intended
to prevent any abuse resulting from confining a
person without informing him of his offense and
without permitting him to go on bail28. More
specifically, it punishes public officials or
employees who shall detain any person for
some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such
person to the proper judicial authorities within
the periods prescribed by law. The continued
detention of the accused becomes illegal upon
the expiration of the periods provided for by Art.
125 without such detainee having been
delivered to the corresponding judicial
authorities29.
The words "judicial authority" as contemplated
by Art. 125 mean "the courts of justices or
judges of said courts vested with judicial power
to order the temporary detention or confinement
of a person charged with having committed a
public offense, that is, the Supreme Court and
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 52
other such inferior courts as may be established
by law.30"
Petitioner takes great pains in arguing that when
a municipal trial court judge, as in the instant
case, conducts a preliminary investigation, he is
not acting as a judge but as a fiscal. In support,
petitioner cites the cases of Sangguniang
Bayan ng Batac, Ilocos Norte vs. Albano, 260
SCRA 561, and Castillo vs. Villaluz, 171 SCRA
39, where it was held that "when a preliminary
investigation is conducted by a judge, he
performs a non-judicial function as an exception
to his usual duties." Thus, petitioner opines, the
ruling in Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila, 80
Phil. 862, that the city fiscal is not the proper
judicial authority referred to in Art. 125 is
applicable.
Petitioner's reliance on the cited cases is
misplaced. The cited cases of Sangguniang
Bayan and Castillo dealt with the issue of
whether or not the findings of the Municipal
Court Judge in a preliminary investigation are
subject to review by provincial and city fiscals.
There was no pronoucement in these cases as
to whether or not a municipal trial court, in the
exercise of its power to conduct preliminary
investigations, is a proper judicial authority as
contemplated by Art. 125.
Neither can petitioner rely on the doctrine
enunciated in Sayo vs. Chief of Police, supra,
since the facts of this case are different. In Sayo,
the complainant was filed with the city fiscal of
Manila who could not issue an order of release
or commitment while in the instant case, the
complaint was filed with a judge who had the
power to issue such an order. Furthermore, in
the Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Sayo case31, this Court
even made a pronouncement that the delivery
of a detained person "is a legal one and consists
in making a charge or filing a complaint against
the prisoner with the proper justice of the peace
or judge of Court of First Instance in provinces,
and in filing by the city fiscal of an information
with the corresponding city courts after an
investigation if the evidence against said person
warrants."
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 53

The power to order the release or confinement

of an accused is determinative of the issue. In
contrast with a city fiscal, it is undisputed that a
municipal court judge, even in the performance
of his function to conduct preliminary
investigations, retains the power to issue an
order of release or commitment32. Furthermore,
upon the filing of the complaint with the
Municipal Trial Court, the intent behind art. 125
is satisfied considering that by such act, the
detained person is informed of the crime
imputed against him and, upon his application
with the court, he may be released on bail33.
Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of
the MCTC to order his release when he applied
for and was granted his release upon posting
bail34. Thus, the very purpose underlying Article
125 has been duly served with the filing of the
complaint with the MCTC. We agree with the
postion of the Ombudsman that such filing of the
complaint with the MCTC interrupted the period
prescribed in said Article.

Finally, we note that it was the mother of private

complainant who filed the complaint against
petitioner with the 7th MCTC of Liloan, Metro
Cebu. If tere was any error in this procedure,
private respondents should not be held liable. In
the same manner, petitioner's argument that the
controversial orders issued by the MCTC are
contrary' to law does not give rise to criminal
liability on the part of the respondents.
Respondent police officers may have rendered
themselves open to sanctions if they had
released petitioners without the order of the
court, knowing fully well that a complainant was
a already filed with it.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of

discretion in the issuance of the assailed
January 19, 1998 Resolution and the April 13,
1998 Order of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military, the Court resolves
to DISMISS the petition. No pronouncement as
to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 153524-25 January 31, 2005
RODOLFO SORIA and EDIMAR
BISTA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANIANO DESIERTO in his capacity as
Head of the Office of the Ombudsman, HON.
ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO in his capacity as
Deputy Ombudsman for Military, P/INS.
JEFFREY T. GOROSPE, SPO2 ROLANDO G.
REGACHO, SPO1 ALFREDO B. ALVIAR, JR.,
PO3 JAIME D. LAZARO, PO2 FLORANTE B.
CARDENAS, PO1 JOSEPH A. BENAZA,
SPO1 FRANKLIN D. CABAYA and SPO4
PEDRO PAREL, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Yet again, we are tasked to substitute our
judgment for that of the Office of the
Ombudsman in its finding of lack of probable
cause made during preliminary investigation.
And, yet again, we reaffirm the time-honored
practice of non-interference in the conduct of
preliminary investigations by our prosecutory
bodies absent a showing of grave abuse of
discretion on their part.
Petitioners, thru a special civil action
for certiorari,1 contend precisely that the public
respondents herein – officers of the Office of the
Ombudsman – gravely abused their discretion
in dismissing the complaint for violation of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code (Delay in
the delivery of detained persons) against private
respondents herein, members of the Philippine
National Police stationed at the Municipality of
Santa, Ilocos Sur.
From the respective pleadings2 of the parties,
the following facts appear to be indubitable:
1. On or about 8:30 in the evening of 13
May 2001 (a Sunday and the day before
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 54
the 14 May 2001 Elections3 ), petitioners
were arrested without a warrant by
respondents police officers for alleged
illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition;
2. Petitioner Soria was arrested for
alleged illegal possession of .38 cal.
revolver (a crime which carries with it the
penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period) and for violation of
Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus
Election Code in relation to the
Commission on Election Resolution No.
3328 (which carries the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than one [1]
year but not more than six [6] years);
3. Petitioner Bista was arrested for
alleged illegal possession of sub-
machine pistol UZI, cal. 9mm and a .22
cal. revolver with ammunition;
4. Immediately after their arrest,
petitioners were detained at the Santa,
Ilocos Sur, Police Station. It was at the
Santa Police Station that petitioner Bista
was identified by one of the police
officers to have a standing warrant of
arrest for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 6 issued by the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 12272;
5. The next day, at about 4:30 p.m. of
14 May 2001 (Monday and election day),
petitioners were brought to the residence
of Provincial Prosecutor Jessica Viloria in
San Juan, Ilocos Sur, before whom a
"Joint-Affidavit" against them was
subscribed and sworn to by the arresting
officers. From there, the arresting officers
brought the petitioners to the Provincial
Prosecutor’s Office in Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
and there at about 6:00 p.m. the "Joint-
Affidavit" was filed and docketed;
6. At about 6:30 in the evening of the
same day, 14 May 2001, petitioner
Soria was released upon the order of

Prosecutor Viloria to undergo the
requisite preliminary investigation, while
petitioner Bista was brought back and
continued to be detained at the Santa
Police Station. From the time of petitioner
Soria’s detention up to the time of his
release, twenty-two (22) hours had
already elapsed;
7. On 15 May 2001, at around 2:00 in the
afternoon, petitioner Bista was brought
before the MTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
where the case for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 6 was pending. Petitioner
Bista posted bail and an Order of
Temporary Release was issued
thereafter;
8. At this point in time, no order of release
was issued in connection with petitioner
Bista’s arrest for alleged illegal
possession of firearms. At 4:30 in the
afternoon of the same day (15 May
2001), an information for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 4413-S,
was filed against petitioner Bista with the
4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Narvacan, Ilocos Sur. At 5:00 in the
afternoon, informations for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition
and violation of Article 261 par. (f) of the
Omnibus Election Code in relation to
COMELEC Resolution No. 3328,
docketed as Criminal Cases No. 2269-N
and No. 2268-N, respectively, were filed
in the Regional Trial Court at Narvacan,
Ilocos Sur;
9. On 08 June 2001, petitioner Bista was
released upon filing of bail bonds in
Criminal Cases No. 2268-N and No.
4413-S. He was detained for 26 days.
10. On 15 August 2001, petitioners filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman for
Military Affairs a complaint-affidavit for
violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal
Code against herein private
respondents.
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 55
11. After considering the parties’
respective submissions, the Office of the
Ombudsman rendered the first assailed
Joint Resolution dated 31 January 2002
dismissing the complaint for violation of
Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code for
lack of merit; and
12. On 04 March 2002, petitioners then
filed their motion for reconsideration
which was denied for lack of merit in the
second assailed Resolution dated 25
March 2002.
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained
persons to the proper judicial authorities. - The
penalties provided in the next preceding article
shall be imposed upon the public officer or
employee who shall detain any person for some
legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person
to the proper judicial authorities within the period
of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent;
eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by correctional penalties, or their
equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes
or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital
penalties, or their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be
informed of the cause of his detention and shall
be allowed, upon his request, to communicate
and confer at any time with his attorney or
counsel.
It is not under dispute that the alleged crimes for
which petitioner Soria was arrested without
warrant are punishable by correctional penalties
or their equivalent, thus, criminal complaints or
information should be filed with the proper
judicial authorities within 18 hours of his arrest.
Neither is it in dispute that the alleged crimes for
which petitioner Bista was arrested are
punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or
their equivalent, thus, he could only be detained
for 36 hours without criminal complaints or
information having been filed with the proper
judicial authorities.

The sole bone of contention revolves around the
proper application of the 12-18-36 periods. With
respect specifically to the detention of petitioner
Soria which lasted for 22 hours, it is alleged that
public respondents gravely erred in construing
Article 1254 as excluding Sundays, holidays and
election days in the computation of the periods
prescribed within which public officers should
deliver arrested persons to the proper judicial
authorities as the law never makes such
exception. Statutory construction has it that if a
statute is clear and unequivocal, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without any
attempts at interpretation.5 Public respondents,
on the other hand, relied on the cases of Medina
v. Orozco, Jr.,6 and Sayo v. Chief of Police of
Manila7 and on commentaries8 of jurists to
bolster their position that Sundays, holidays and
election days are excluded in the computation of
the periods provided in Article 125,9 hence, the
arresting officers delivered petitioners well
within the allowable time.
In addition to the foregoing arguments and with
respect specifically to petitioner Bista,
petitioners maintain that the filing of the
information in court against petitioner Bista did
not justify his continuous detention. The
information was filed at 4:30 p.m. of 15 May
2001 but the orders for his release were issued
by the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial
Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on 08 June
2001. They argued that based on law and
jurisprudence, if no charge is filed by the
prosecutor within the period fixed by law, the
arresting officer must release the detainee lest
he be charged with violation of Article
125.10 Public respondents countered that the
duty of the arresting officers ended upon the
filing of the informations with the proper judicial
authorities following the rulings in Agbay v.
Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military ,11 and People v. Acosta.12
From a study of the opposing views advanced
by the parties, it is evident that public
respondents did not abuse their discretion in
dismissing for lack of probable cause the
complaint against private respondents.
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 56
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part
of the public officer concerned which is
equivalent to an excess or lack of
jurisdiction.1awphi1.nét The abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion or hostility.13
No grave abuse of discretion, as defined, can be
attributed to herein public respondents. Their
disposition of petitioners’ complaint for violation
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot
be said to have been conjured out of thin air as
it was properly backed up by law and
jurisprudence. Public respondents ratiocinated
thus:
As aptly pointed out by the respondents insofar
as the complaint of Rodolfo Soria is concerned,
based on applicable laws and jurisprudence, an
election day or a special holiday, should not be
included in the computation of the period
prescribed by law for the filing of
complaint/information in courts in cases of
warrantless arrests, it being a "no-office day."
(Medina vs. Orosco, 125 Phil. 313.) In the
instant case, while it appears that the
complaints against Soria for Illegal Possession
of Firearm and Violation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the
Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of
Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on May 15, 200[1] at
4:30 p.m., he had already been released the day
before or on May 14, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m. by
the respondents, as directed by Prov.
Prosecutor Jessica [Viloria]. Hence, there could
be no arbitrary detention or violation of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code to speak of.14
Indeed, we did hold in Medina v. Orozco,
Jr.,15 that —
. . . The arresting officer’s duty under the law
was either to deliver him to the proper judicial
authorities within 18 hours, or thereafter release
him. The fact however is that he was not

released. From the time of petitioner’s arrest at
12:00 o’clock p.m. on November 7 to 3:40 p.m.
on November 10 when the information against
him for murder actually was in court, over 75
hours have elapsed.
But, stock should be taken of the fact that
November 7 was a Sunday; November 8 was
declared an official holiday; and November 9
(election day) was also an official holiday. In
these three no-office days, it was not an easy
matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk and
stenographer, draft the information and search
for the Judge to have him act thereon, and get
the clerk of court to open the courthouse, docket
the case and have the order of commitment
prepared. And then, where to locate and the
uncertainty of locating those officers and
employees could very well compound the
fiscal’s difficulties. These are considerations
sufficient enough to deter us from declaring that
Arthur Medina was arbitrarily detained. For, he
was brought to court on the very first office day
following arrest.
And, in Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila16 --
. . . Of course, for the purpose of determining the
criminal liability of an officer detaining a person
for more than six hours prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code, the means of
communication as well as the hour of arrest and
other circumstances, such as the time of
surrender and the material possibility for the
fiscal to make the investigation and file in time
the necessary information, must be taken into
consideration.
As to the issue concerning the duty of the
arresting officer after the information has
already been filed in Court, public respondents
acted well within their discretion in ruling thus:
In the same vein, the complaint of Edimar Bista
against the respondents for Violation of Article
125, will not prosper because the running of the
thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law for
the filing of the complaint against him from the
time of his arrest was tolled by one day (election
day). Moreover, he has a standing warrant of
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 57
arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and it was only
on May 15, 2001, at about 2:00 p.m. that he was
able to post bail and secure an Order of
Release. Obviously, however, he could only be
released if he has no other pending criminal
case requiring his continuous detention.
The criminal Informations against Bista for
Violations of Article 125, RPC and COMELEC
Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the
Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of
Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, on May 15, 2001
(Annexes "G" and "I", Complaint-Affidavit of
Edimar Bista) but he was released from
detention only on June 8, 2001, on orders of the
RTC and MTC of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur
(Annexes "J" and "K", Complaint-Affidavit). Was
there a delay in the delivery of detained person
to the proper judicial authorities under the
circumstances? The answer is in the negative.
The complaints against him was (sic)
seasonably filed in the court of justice within the
thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law as
discussed above. The duty of the detaining
officers is deemed complied with upon the filing
of the complaints. Further action, like issuance
of a Release Order, then rests upon the judicial
authority (People v. Acosta [CA] 54 O.G.
4739).17
The above disposition is in keeping with Agbay
v. Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military, wherein we ordained that –
18
. . . Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint
with the Municipal Trial Court, the intent behind
Art. 125 is satisfied considering that by such act,
the detained person is informed of the crime
imputed against him and, upon his application
with the court, he may be released on bail.
Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of
the MCTC to order his release when he applied
for and was granted his release upon posting
bail. Thus, the very purpose underlying Article
125 has been duly served with the filing of the
complaint with the MCTC. We agree with the
position of the Ombudsman that such filing of
the complaint with the MCTC interrupted the
period prescribed in said Article.

All things considered, there being no grave
abuse of discretion, we have no choice but to
defer to the Office of the Ombudsman’s
determination that the facts on hand do not
make out a case for violation of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code.l^vvphi1.net
As we have underscored in numerous decisions
--
We have consistently refrained from interfering
with the investigatory and prosecutorial powers
of the Ombudsman absent any compelling
reason. This policy is based on constitutional,
statutory and practical considerations. We are
mindful that the Constitution and RA 6770
endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with a
wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutorial
powers, virtually free from legislative, executive
or judicial intervention, in order to insulate it from
outside pressure and improper influence.
Moreover, a preliminary investigation is in effect
a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the
case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused
must be adduced so that when the case is tried,
the trial court may not be bound, as a matter of
law, to order an acquittal. Hence, if the
Ombudsman, using professional judgment,
finds the case dismissible, the Court shall
respect such findings, unless clothed with
grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the
functions of the courts will be grievously
hampered by innumerable petitions assailing
the dismissal of investigatory proceedings
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with
regard to complaints filed before it. In much the
same way, the courts will be swamped with
cases if they will have to review the exercise of
discretion on the part of fiscals or prosecuting
attorneys each time the latter decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a
private complainant.19 (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition dated 27 May 2002 is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Joint
Resolution dated 31 January 2002 and the
Order dated 25 March 2002 of the Office of the
Ombudsman are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 58
SO ORDERED.
Art. 126. Delaying release. — The penalties
provided for in Article 124 shall be imposed
upon any public officer or employee who delays
for the period of time specified therein the
performance of any judicial or executive order
for the release of a prisoner or detention
prisoner, or unduly delays the service of the
notice of such order to said prisoner or the
proceedings upon any petition for the liberation
of such person.
Art. 127. Expulsion. — The penalty of prision
correccional shall be imposed upon any public
officer or employee who, not being thereunto
authorized by law, shall expel any person from
the Philippine Islands or shall compel such
person to change his residence.
ART III, SEC 7 CONSTITUTION
SECTION 7. The right of the people to
information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
B. VIOLATION OF DOMICILE
Art. 128. Violation of domicile. — The penalty
of prision correccional in its minimum period
shall be imposed upon any public officer or
employee who, not being authorized by judicial
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 59

order, shall enter any dwelling against the will of
the owner thereof, search papers or other
effects found therein without the previous
consent of such owner, or having surreptitiously
entered said dwelling, and being required to
leave the premises, shall refuse to do so.
If the offense be committed in the night-time, or
if any papers or effects not constituting evidence
of a crime be not returned immediately after the
search made by the offender, the penalty shall
be prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods.
RULES OF COURT RULE 126 SEC 8
Section 8. Search of house, room, or
premise to be made in presence of two
witnesses. — No search of a house, room, or
any other premise shall be made except in the
presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any
member of his family or in the absence of the
latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. (7a)

Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously

obtained and abuse in the service of those
legally obtained. — In addition to the liability
attaching to the offender for the commission of
any other offense, the penalty of arresto mayor
in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its minimum period and a fine not exceeding
P1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public
officer or employee who shall procure a search
warrant without just cause, or, having legally
procured the same, shall exceed his authority or
use unnecessary severity in executing the
same.

CONSTI ART III SECTION 2. The right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

SECTION 3. (1) The privacy of communication
and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public
safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed
by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or
the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P.
BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL
BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN,
in his capacity as Acting Director, National

Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL
PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON,
EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL,
JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES;
JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of
Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO,
Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE
HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First
Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and
JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court
of Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and
Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for
petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz,
Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de
Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C.
Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and
Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the
government named on the margin1 —
hereinafter referred to as Respondents-
Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter
referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued,
on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants
against petitioners herein4 and/or the
corporations of which they were
officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to
search the persons above-named and/or the
premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences, and to seize and take possession of
the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records,
vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance sheets
and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or
embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the
offense," or "used or intended to be used as the
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 60
means of committing the offense," which is
described in the applications adverted to above
as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search
warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court —
because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to
be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the
warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants
were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases
filed against them; (4) the searches and
seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money
seized were not delivered to the courts that
issued the warrants, to be disposed of in
accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said
petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this
original action for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and
prayed that, pending final disposition of the
present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors,
their agents and /or representatives from using
the effects seized as aforementioned or any
copies thereof, in the deportation cases already
adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter,
decision be rendered quashing the contested
search warrants and declaring the same null
and void, and commanding the respondents,
their agents or representatives to return to
petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3,
Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents,
papers, things and cash moneys seized or
confiscated under the search warrants in
question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors
alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants
are valid and have been issued in accordance
with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if
any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3)
that, in any event, the effects seized are
admissible in evidence against herein
petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of
the aforementioned searches and seizures.

On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962,
the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar
as the papers, documents and things seized
from the offices of the corporations above
mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction
was maintained as regards the papers,
documents and things found and seized in the
residences of petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized
under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups,
namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices
of the aforementioned corporations, and (b)
those found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that
petitioners herein have no cause of action to
assail the legality of the contested warrants and
of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for
the simple reason that said corporations have
their respective personalities, separate and
distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares
of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold
therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the
legality of a seizure can be contested only by
the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third
parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may
not validly object to the use in evidence against
them of the documents, papers and things
seized from the offices and premises of the
corporations adverted to above, since the right
to object to the admission of said papers in
evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked by the
corporate officers in proceedings against them
in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has
been held:
. . . that the Government's action in
gaining possession of papers belonging
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 61
to the corporation did not relate to nor did
it affect the personal defendants. If these
papers were unlawfully seized and
thereby the constitutional rights of or any
one were invaded, they were the rights of
the corporation and not the rights of
the other defendants. Next, it is clear that
a question of the lawfulness of a seizure
can be raised only by one whose rights
have been invaded. Certainly, such a
seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the
constitutional rights of defendants whose
property had not been seized or the
privacy of whose homes had not been
disturbed; nor could they claim for
themselves the benefits of the Fourth
Amendment, when its violation, if any,
was with reference to the rights
of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It
follows, therefore, that the question of the
admissibility of the evidence based on an
alleged unlawful search and seizure
does not extend to the personal
defendants but
embraces only the corporation whose
property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer
& Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F.
2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and
things seized in the residences of petitioners
herein, the aforementioned resolution of June
29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in
effect, restraining herein Respondents-
Prosecutors from using them in evidence
against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and
things, two (2) important questions need be
settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants
in question, and the searches and seizures
made under the authority thereof, are valid or
not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding
question is in the negative, whether said
documents, papers and things may be used in
evidence against petitioners herein.1äwphï1.ñët

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned
search warrants are in the nature of general
warrants and that accordingly, the seizures
effected upon the authority there of are null and
void. In this connection, the
13
Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge
after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with
this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to
be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be
seized.
None of these requirements has been complied
with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the
same were issued upon applications stating that
the natural and juridical person therein named
had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other
words, no specific offense had been alleged in
said applications. The averments thereof with
respect to the offense committed were abstract.
As a consequence, it was impossible for the
judges who issued the warrants to have found
the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent
proof that the party against whom it is sought
has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of
fact, the applications involved in this case do not
allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the
highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 62
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned
applications — without reference to any
determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question
would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our
Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims
caprice or passion of peace officers. This is
precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the
constitutional provision above quoted — to
outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not
difficult to imagine what would happen, in times
of keen political strife, when the party in power
feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even
though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities
committed in connection with the disputed
search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to
amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former
Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart,
under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a
search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific
offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the
Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that
"no search warrant shall issue for more than one
specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in
the application for the contested search
warrants was compounded by the description
therein made of the effects to be searched for
and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records,
vouchers, journals, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets
and related profit and loss statements.

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for
and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all
records of the petitioners and the
aforementioned corporations, whatever their
nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
command of our Bill of Rights — that the things
to be seized be particularly described — as well
as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80
Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain
that, even if the searches and seizures under
consideration were unconstitutional, the
documents, papers and things thus seized are
admissible in evidence against petitioners
herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we
are unanimously of the opinion that the position
taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned.
Said position was in line with the American
common law rule, that the criminal should not be
allowed to go free merely "because the
constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory
that the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is
protected by means other than the exclusion of
evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the
common-law action for damages against the
searching officer, against the party who
procured the issuance of the search warrant and
against those assisting in the execution of an
illegal search, their criminal punishment,
resistance, without liability to an unlawful
seizure, and such other legal remedies as may
be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have
already given up this approach and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this
is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures. In the language of
Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the
exclusion of evidence competent as
such, which has been unlawfully
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 63
acquired, is that exclusion is the only
practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times
the action of trespass against the
offending official may have been
protection enough; but that is true no
longer. Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials,
knows that it cannot profit by their wrong
will that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal
Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus
be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense,
the protection of the 4th Amendment,
declaring his rights to be secure against
such searches and seizures, is of no
value, and, so far as those thus placed
are concerned, might as well be stricken
from the Constitution. The efforts of the
courts and their officials to bring the guilty
to punishment, praiseworthy as they are,
are not to be aided by the sacrifice of
those great principles established by
years of endeavor and suffering which
have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also,
broadened in subsequent decisions on the
same Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous
decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs.
Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the
Wolf's constitutional documentation of
the right of privacy free from
unreasonable state intrusion, and after its
dozen years on our books, are led by it to
close the only courtroom door remaining
open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that
basic right, reserved to all persons as a
specific guarantee against that very
same unlawful conduct. We hold that all
evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is,

by that same authority, inadmissible in a
State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of
privacy has been declared enforceable
against the States through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is
enforceable against them by the same
sanction of exclusion as it used against
the Federal Government. Were it
otherwise, then just as without the Weeks
rule the assurance against unreasonable
federal searches and seizures would be
"a form of words," valueless and
underserving of mention in a perpetual
charter of inestimable human liberties, so
too, without that rule the freedom from
state invasions of privacy would be so
ephemeral and so neatly severed from its
conceptual nexus with the freedom from
all brutish means of coercing evidence as
not to permit this Court's high regard as
a freedom "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty." At the time that the Court
held in Wolf that the amendment was
applicable to the States through the Due
Process Clause, the cases of this Court
as we have seen, had steadfastly held
that as to federal officers the Fourth
Amendment included the exclusion of the
evidence seized in violation of its
provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered"
to that proposition. The right to when
conceded operatively enforceable
against the States, was not susceptible of
destruction by avulsion of the sanction
upon which its protection and enjoyment
had always been deemed dependent
under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne
Cases. Therefore, in extending the
substantive protections of due process to
all constitutionally unreasonable
searches — state or federal — it was
logically and constitutionally necessarily
that the exclusion doctrine — an
essential part of the right to privacy — be
also insisted upon as an essential
ingredient of the right newly recognized
by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission
of the new constitutional Right by Wolf
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 64
could not tolerate denial of its most
important constitutional privilege,
namely, the exclusion of the evidence
which an accused had been forced to
give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To
hold otherwise is to grant the right but in
reality to withhold its privilege and
enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself
recognized that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule to "is to deter — to
compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available
way — by removing the incentive to
disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left
open to the State tends to destroy the
entire system of constitutional restraints
on which the liberties of the people rest.
Having once recognized that the right to
privacy embodied in the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the
States, and that the right to be secure
against rude invasions of privacy by state
officers is, therefore constitutional in
origin, we can no longer permit that right
to remain an empty promise. Because it
is enforceable in the same manner and to
like effect as other basic rights secured
by its Due Process Clause, we can no
longer permit it to be revocable at the
whim of any police officer who, in the
name of law enforcement itself, chooses
to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision,
founded on reason and truth, gives to the
individual no more than that which the
Constitution guarantees him to the police
officer no less than that to which honest
law enforcement is entitled, and, to the
courts, that judicial integrity so necessary
in the true administration of justice.
(emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary,
not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures. To be sure, if the
applicant for a search warrant has competent
evidence to establish probable cause of the
commission of a given crime by the party

against whom the warrant is intended, then
there is no reason why the applicant should not
comply with the requirements of the
fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has
no such competent evidence, then it is not
possible for the Judge to find that there is
probable cause, and, hence, no justification for
the issuance of the warrant. The only possible
explanation (not justification) for its issuance is
the necessity of fishing evidence of the
commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing
expedition is indicative of the absence of
evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal
prosecution of those who secure an illegal
search warrant and/or make unreasonable
searches or seizures would suffice to protect the
constitutional guarantee under consideration,
overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in
general, committed By agents of the party in
power, for, certainly, those belonging to the
minority could not possibly abuse a power they
do not have. Regardless of the handicap under
which the minority usually — but,
understandably — finds itself in prosecuting
agents of the majority, one must not lose sight
of the fact that the psychological and moral
effect of the possibility 21 of securing their
conviction, is watered down by the pardoning
power of the party for whose benefit the illegality
had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment of the Resolution of this Court
dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that
Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments,
House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No.
1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the
Army-Navy Club, should be included among the
premises considered in said Resolution as
residences of herein petitioners, Harry S.
Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and
Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore,
the records, papers and other effects seized in
the offices of the corporations above referred to
include personal belongings of said petitioners
and other effects under their exclusive
possession and control, for the exclusion of
which they have a standing under the latest
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 65
rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of
the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory,
regarding their alleged possession of and
control over the aforementioned records, papers
and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature
thereof, has Been Advanced, not in their
petition or amended petition herein, but in the
Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of
the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words,
said theory would appear to be readjustment of
that followed in said petitions, to suit the
approach intimated in the Resolution sought to
be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some
of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits
attached to said motion for reconsideration, or
submitted in support thereof, contain either
inconsistent allegations, or allegations
inconsistent with the theory now advanced by
petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that
the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the
aforementioned affidavits and other papers
submitted in support of said motion, have
sufficiently established the facts or conditions
contemplated in the cases relied upon by the
petitioners; to warrant application of the views
therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At
any rate, we do not deem it necessary to
express our opinion thereon, it being best to
leave the matter open for determination in
appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in
the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of
three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are
null and void; that the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal; that the writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in
connection with the documents, papers and
other effects thus seized in said residences of
herein petitioners is hereby made permanent;
that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as
the documents, papers and other effects so
seized in the aforementioned residences are
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 66

concerned; that the aforementioned motion for

Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as
it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein
is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as
regards the documents, papers and other
effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places,
offices and other premises enumerated in the
same Resolution, without special
pronouncement as to costs.

It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR.,

BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA
SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL
OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY
COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.

Lorenzo M. Tañada, Wigberto E. Tañada,

Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P.
Arroyo, Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for
petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.


ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2]
search warrants issued on December 7, 1982
by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano,
Executive Judge of the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the
premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6,
Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail"
and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively,
were searched, and office and printing
machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor
vehicles and other articles used in the printing,
publication and distribution of the said
newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature
alleged to be in the possession and control of
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of
the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued
for the return of the seized articles, and that
respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal
Officer, Presidential Security Command, the
Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal
of Quezon City, their representatives,
assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute
or successors" be enjoined from using the
articles thus seized as evidence against
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other
accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983,
respondents were required to answer the
petition. The plea for preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on
June 28, 1983, later reset to July 7, 1983, on
motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of
respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor
General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 67
manifested that respondents "will not use the
aforementioned articles as evidence in the
aforementioned case until final resolution of the
legality of the seizure of the aforementioned
articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer
for preliminary prohibitory injunction was
rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the
petition on the ground that petitioners had come
to this Court without having previously sought
the quashal of the search warrants before
respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before
impugning the validity of the warrants before this
Court, should have filed a motion to quash said
warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But this
procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take
cognizance of this petition in view of the
seriousness and urgency of the constitutional
issues raised not to mention the public interest
generated by the search of the "We Forum"
offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and
widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The
existence of this special circumstance justifies
this Court to exercise its inherent power to
suspend its rules. In the words of the revered
Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda.
de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the
power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend
its rules or to except a particular case from its
operation, whenever the purposes of justice
require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the
petition on ground of laches. Considerable
stress is laid on the fact that while said search
warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the
instant petition impugning the same was filed
only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a
period of more than six [6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to
do that which, by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier. It is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5

Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply,
explained the reason for the delay in the filing of
the petition thus:
Respondents should not find fault,
as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3,
Manifestation] with the fact that
the Petition was filed on June 16,
1983, more than half a year after
the petitioners' premises had been
raided.
The climate of the times has given
petitioners no other choice. If they
had waited this long to bring their
case to court, it was because they
tried at first to exhaust other
remedies. The events of the past
eleven fill years had taught them
that everything in this country,
from release of public funds to
release of detained persons from
custody, has become a matter of
executive benevolence or
largesse
Hence, as soon as they could,
petitioners, upon suggestion of
persons close to the President,
like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter
to President Marcos, through
counsel Antonio Coronet asking
the return at least of the printing
equipment and vehicles. And after
such a letter had been sent,
through Col. Balbino V. Diego,
Chief Intelligence and Legal
Officer of the Presidential Security
Command, they were further
encouraged to hope that the latter
would yield the desired results.
After waiting in vain for five [5]
months, petitioners finally decided
to come to Court. [pp. 123-124,
Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may
not be flattering to our judicial system, We find
no ground to punish or chastise them for an
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 68
error in judgment. On the contrary, the
extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite
evidently negate the presumption that they had
abandoned their right to the possession of the
seized property, thereby refuting the charge of
laches against them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and
marked as evidence some of the seized
documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he
is now estopped from challenging the validity of
the search warrants. We do not follow the logic
of respondents. These documents lawfully
belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can
do whatever he pleases with them, within legal
bounds. The fact that he has used them as
evidence does not and cannot in any way affect
the validity or invalidity of the search warrants
assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been
advanced by petitioners to nullify the search
warrants in question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his
alleged failure to conduct an examination under
oath or affirmation of the applicant and his
witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted
constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court .6 This objection,
however, may properly be considered moot and
academic, as petitioners themselves conceded
during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an
examination had indeed been conducted by
respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his
witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20-
82[b] were used to search two distinct places:
No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784
Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, respectively. Objection is
interposed to the execution of Search Warrant
No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground
that the two search warrants pinpointed only
one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was
allegedly keeping and concealing the articles
listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6,
Quezon City. This assertion is based on that

portion of Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which
states:
Which have been used, and are
being used as instruments and
means of committing the crime of
subversion penalized under P.D.
885 as amended and he is
keeping and concealing the same
at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon
City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a
typographical error. Precisely, two search
warrants were applied for and issued because
the purpose and intent were to search two
distinct premises. It would be quite absurd and
illogical for respondent judge to have issued two
warrants intended for one and the same place.
Besides, the addresses of the places sought to
be searched were specifically set forth in the
application, and since it was Col. Abadilla
himself who headed the team which executed
the search warrants, the ambiguity that might
have arisen by reason of the typographical error
is more apparent than real. The fact is that the
place for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b]
was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which
address appeared in the opening paragraph of
the said warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same
place that respondent judge had in mind when
he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search
warrant describes the premises to be searched
with sufficient particularity, it has been held "that
the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the
place intended in the warrant is relevant. This
would seem to be especially true where the
executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit
the warrant had issued, and when he knows that
the judge who issued the warrant intended the
building described in the affidavit, And it has
also been said that the executing officer may
look to the affidavit in the official court file to
resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the
place to be searched." 8
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 69
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the
search warrants is the fact that although the
warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr.
alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners
Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J.
Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
enumerates the personal properties that may be
seized under a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be
seized. — A search warrant may
be issued for the search and
seizure of the following personal
property:
[a] Property subject
of the offense;
[b] Property stolen
or embezzled and
other proceeds or
fruits of the offense;
and
[c] Property used or
intended to be used
as the means of
committing an
offense.
The above rule does not require that the
property to be seized should be owned by the
person against whom the search warrant is
directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In
fact, under subsection [b] of the above-quoted
Section 2, one of the properties that may be
seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen
property must be owned by one other than the
person in whose possession it may be at the
time of the search and seizure. Ownership,
therefore, is of no consequence, and it is
sufficient that the person against whom the
warrant is directed has control or possession of
the property sought to be seized, as petitioner
Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation
to the articles and property seized under the
warrants.

4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion
that real properties were seized under the
disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery,
receptables, instruments or implements
intended by the owner of the tenement for an
industry or works which may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land and which tend
directly to meet the needs of the said industry or
works" are considered immovable property.
In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo9 where this
legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that
machinery which is movable by nature becomes
immobilized when placed by the owner of the
tenement, property or plant, but not so when
placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other
person having only a temporary right, unless
such person acted as the agent of the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be
the owners of the land and/or building on which
the machineries were placed. This being the
case, the machineries in question, while in fact
bolted to the ground remain movable property
susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued
by respondent judge upon application of Col.
Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the
P.C. Metrocom.10 The application was
accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro
M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members
of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security
Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a
surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of
the application for the search warrants on
December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the
abovementioned documents could not have
provided sufficient basis for the finding of a
probable cause upon which a warrant may
validly issue in accordance with Section 3,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which
provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 70
other responsible officer as may
be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched. And
when the search warrant applied for is directed
against a newspaper publisher or editor in
connection with the publication of subversive
materials, as in the case at bar, the application
and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a
specification, stating with particularity the
alleged subversive material he has published or
is intending to publish. Mere generalization will
not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col.
Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in
possession or has in his control printing
equipment and other paraphernalia, news
publications and other documents which were
used and are all continuously being used as a
means of committing the offense of subversion
punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as
amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and
does not satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify
a finding of the existence of probable cause,
said allegation cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave
error for respondent judge to have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the
determination of probable cause is the
statement contained in the joint affidavit of
Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango,
"that the evidence gathered and collated by our
unit clearly shows that the premises above-
mentioned and the articles and things above-
described were used and are continuously
being used for subversive activities in
conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of,
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 71

illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement for Free Philippines,

Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6
April 6 Movement." 13 Movement; and,

In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except 3] Motor vehicles used in the
upon probable cause to be determined by the distribution/circulation of the "WE
judge, ... after examination under oath or FORUM" and other subversive
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses materials and propaganda, more
he may produce; 14 the Constitution requires no particularly,
less than personal knowledge by the
complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon 1] Toyota-Corolla,
which the issuance of a search warrant may be colored yellow with
justified. In Alvarez v. Court of First Plate No. NKA 892;
Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within 2] DATSUN pick-up
the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his colored white with
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to Plate No. NKV 969
convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the 3] A delivery truck
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of with Plate No. NBS
probable cause." As couched, the quoted 524;
averment in said joint affidavit filed before
respondent judge hardly meets the test of 4] TOYOTA-
sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez TAMARAW, colored
case. white with Plate No.
PBP 665; and,
Another factor which makes the search warrants
under consideration constitutionally 5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux,
objectionable is that they are in the nature of pick-up truck with
general warrants. The search warrants describe Plate No. NGV 427
the articles sought to be seized in this wise: with marking
"Bagong Silang."
1] All printing equipment,
paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search
(equipment, typewriters, cabinets, warrant which authorized the search for "books,
tables, communications/recording records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists,
equipment, tape recorders, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other
dictaphone and the like used written instruments concerning the Communist
and/or connected in the printing of Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S.
the "WE FORUM" newspaper and Supreme Court for being too general. In like
any and all documents manner, directions to "seize any evidence in
communication, letters and connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703 or
facsimile of prints related to the otherwise" have been held too general, and that
"WE FORUM" newspaper. portion of a search warrant which authorized the
seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be
2] Subversive documents, used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut
pamphlets, leaflets, books, and General Statutes [the statute dealing with the
other publication to promote the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a general
objectives and piurposes of the warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The
subversive organization known as description of the articles sought to be seized

under the search warrants in question cannot be
characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts
calls to mind a notable chapter in English
history: the era of disaccord between the Tudor
Government and the English Press, when
"Officers of the Crown were given roving
commissions to search where they pleased in
order to suppress and destroy the literature of
dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference
herein to such historical episode would not be
relevant for it is not the policy of our government
to suppress any newspaper or publication that
speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but
poses no clear and imminent danger to state
security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched
were the business and printing offices of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum
newspapers. As a consequence of the search
and seizure, these premises were padlocked
and sealed, with the further result that the
printing and publication of said newspapers
were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous
restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom
of the press guaranteed under the fundamental
law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of
petitioners' freedom to express themselves in
print. This state of being is patently anathematic
to a democratic framework where a free, alert
and even militant press is essential for the
political enlightenment and growth of the
citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing
of the printing machines on the ground that they
have been sequestered under Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended,
which authorizes "the sequestration of the
property of any person, natural or artificial,
engaged in subversive activities against the
government and its duly constituted authorities
... in accordance with implementing rules and
regulations as may be issued by the Secretary
of National Defense." It is doubtful however, if
sequestration could validly be effected in view of
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 72
the absence of any implementing rules and
regulations promulgated by the Minister of
National Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of
the Daily Express, it was reported that no less
than President Marcos himself denied the
request of the military authorities to sequester
the property seized from petitioners on
December 7, 1982. Thus:
The President denied a request
flied by government prosecutors
for sequestration of the WE
FORUM newspaper and its
printing presses, according to
Information Minister Gregorio S.
Cendana.
On the basis of court orders,
government agents went to the
We Forum offices in Quezon City
and took a detailed inventory of
the equipment and all materials in
the premises.
Cendaña said that because of the
denial the newspaper and its
equipment remain at the disposal
of the owners, subject to the
discretion of the court. 19
That the property seized on December 7, 1982
had not been sequestered is further confirmed
by the reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P.
Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of
U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to
President Marcos, expressing alarm over the
"WE FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated
February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:
2. Contrary to reports, President
Marcos turned down the
recommendation of our authorities
to close the paper's printing
facilities and confiscate the
equipment and materials it
uses. 21

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search
Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by
respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are
hereby declared null and void and are
accordingly set aside. The prayer for a writ of
mandatory injunction for the return of the seized
articles is hereby granted and all articles seized
thereunder are hereby ordered released to
petitioners. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Art. 131. Prohibition, interruption and
dissolution of peaceful meetings. — The
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon any public officer
or employee who, without legal ground, shall
prohibit or interrupt the holding of a peaceful
meeting, or shall dissolve the same.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon a
public officer or employee who shall hinder any
person from joining any lawful association or
from attending any of its meetings.chanrobles
virtual law library
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any
public officer or employee who shall prohibit or
hinder any person from addressing, either alone
or together with others, any petition to the
authorities for the correction of abuses or
redress of grievances.chanrobles virtu
CONSTI ART IIII SECTION 4. No law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
SECTION 5. No law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.
SECTION 6. The liberty of abode and of
changing the same within the limits prescribed
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 73
by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel
be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may
be provided by law.
SECTION 7. The right of the people to
information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
SECTION 8. The right of the people, including
those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged.
CRIMES AGAINST RELIGIOUS WORSHIP
Art. 132. Interruption of religious worship. —
The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any
public officer or employee who shall prevent or
disturb the ceremonies or manifestations of any
religion.
If the crime shall have been committed with
violence or threats, the penalty shall be prision
correccional in its medium and maximum
periods.
CONSTI ART III SECTION 5. No law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religious test shall be required for the exercise
of civil or political rights.
OFFENDING THE RELIGIOUS FEELINGS
Art. 133. Offending the religious feelings. —
The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum

period shall be imposed upon anyone who, in a
place devoted to religious worship or during the
celebration of any religious ceremony shall
perform acts notoriously offensive to the
feelings of the faithful.
PEOPLE VS. MANDORIAO, JR.
C.A., 51 O.G. 4619
FACTS: The Iglesiani Cristo held a religious
rally at a public place in Baguio. About 200
people attended the meeting, about 50 of whom
were members of the Iglesiani Cristo but the rest
were outsiders and curious listeners. While
Salvio, a minister of Iglesiani Cristo, was
expounding on his topic to the effect that Christ
is not God, but only man, the crowd became
unruly. Some people urged Mandoriao to go up
the stage and have a debate with Salvio.
Mandoriao however, was not able to speak
before the microphone because the wire
connecting it was abruptly disconnected.
ISSUE: Whether or not the meeting was a
religious ceremony.
HELD: The meeting here was not a religious
ceremony. A religious meeting is an
“assemblage of people meeting for the purpose
of performing acts of adoration to the Supreme
Being, or to perform religious services in
recognition of God as an object of worship…”
The meeting here was not limited to the
members of the Iglesiani Cristo. The supposed
prayers and singing of hymns were merely
incidental because the principal object of the
rally was to persuade new converts to their
religion. Assuming that the rally was a religious
ceremony, the appellant cannot be said to have
performed acts or uttered words offensive to the
feelings of the faithful. The act complained of
must be directed against a dogma or ritual, or
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 74
upon an object of veneration. There was no
object of veneration at the meeting.
Reyes Book II, page 80:
When the application of the Iglesiani Cristo was
to hold the meeting at a public place and the
permit expressly stated that the purpose was to
hold a religious rally, what was held on that
occasion was not a religious ceremony, even if
a minister was then preaching (“that Jesus
Christ was not God but only a man”). The rally
was attended by persons who are not members
of the sect.
Reyes Book II, page 81:
Remarks that those who believed that Christ is
God are anti-Christ, that all the members of the
Roman Catholic Church are marked by the
demon, and that the Pope is the Commander of
Satan are notoriously offensive to the feelings of
the faithful.
G.R. No. L-46000 May 25, 1939
THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
JOSE M. BAES, appellant.
Crispin Oben for appellant.
Guillermo B. Guevarra for defendants-
appellees.
No appearance for plaintiff-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This appeal was given due course by the Court
of First Instance of Laguna by virtue of a writ
of mandamus issued by this court in G.R. No.
45780. The facts are the following: In the justice
of the peace court of the municipality of
Lumban, Province of Laguna, a complaint was
filed of the following tenor:

The undersigned Parish Priest of the
Roman Catholic Church in the parish and
municipality of Lumban, Province of
Laguna, upon being duly sworn, charges
Enrique Villaroca, Alejandro Lacbay and
Bernardo del Rosario with an offense
against religion committed as follows:
That on April 14, 1937, at about 9 o'clock
a.m., in this municipality of Lumban,
Province of Laguna, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this court, the
aforesaid accused, while holding the
funeral of one who in life was called
Antonio Macabigtas, in accordance with
the rites of religious sect known as the
"Church of Christ", willfully, unlawfully,
and criminally caused the funeral to pass,
as it in fact passed, through the
chruchyard fronting the Roman Catholic
Church, which churchyard belongs to the
said Church, which churchyard belongs
to the said Church and is devoted to the
religious worship thereof, against the
opposition of the undersigned
complainant who, through force and
threats of physical violence by the
accused, was compelled to allow the
funeral to pass through the said
churchyard. An act committed in grave
profanation of the place, in open
disregard of the religious feelings of the
Catholics of this municipality, and in
violation of article 133 of the Revised
Penal Code.
(Sgd.) JOSE M.A. BAES
Parish Priest
Complainant
(Here follow the affidavit and the list of
witnesses.)
The accused pleaded not guilty and waived the
preliminary investigation. Before the case was
remanded to the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, the complainant filed a sworn
statement regarding other points so that the
provincial fiscal may have full knowledge of the
facts and of the witnesses who could testify
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 75
thereon. Upon the remand of the case to the
court, the fiscal, instead of filing the
corresponding information, put in the following
motion for dismissal:
The complainant is the parish priest of
the Roman Catholic Church of Lumban,
Laguna. The said priest charges the
accused with having caused, through
force, intimidation and threats, the
funeral of one belonging to the Church of
Christ to pass through the churchyard of
the Church. Apparently, the offense
consists in that the corpse was that of
one who belonged to the Church of
Christ.
The undersigned is of the opinion that the
fact act imputed to the accused does not
constitute the offense complained of
considering the spirit of article 133 of the
Revised Penal Code. At most they might
be chargeable with having threatened the
parish priest, or with having passed
through a private property without the
consent of the owner. Justice Albert,
commenting on the article, has this to
say: "An act is said to be notoriously
offensive to the religious feelings of the
faithful when a person ridicules or makes
light of anything constituting a religious
dogma; works or scoffs at anything
devoted to religious ceremonies; plays
with or damages or destroys any object
of veneration by the faithful." The mere
act of causing the passage through the
churchyard belonging to the Church, of
the funeral of one who in life belonged to
the Church of Christ, neither offends nor
ridicules the religious feelings of those
who belong to the Roman Catholic
Church.
Sustaining the foregoing motion, the court by an
order of August 31, 1937, dismissed the case,
reserving, however, to the fiscal the right to file
another information for the crime found to have
been committed by the accused.

From this order, the plaintiff appealed, which
appeal was denied but thereafter given due
course by the court by virtue of an order of this
court.
The appealed order is based upon the motion to
dismiss filed by the fiscal. This officer questions
the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint, but omits an essential part thereof, to
wit, that the churchyard belongs to the church,
and is devoted to the religious services of said
church, and it is through this churchyard that the
accused, over the objection of the parish priest
and through force and intimidation, caused to
pass the funeral of one under the rites of the
religious sect known as the Church of Christ.
Had the fiscal not omitted this essential part, he
would not have come to the conclusion that the
acts complained of do not constitute the crime
defined and penalized by article 133 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Moreover, the fiscal, in his aforesaid motion,
denies that the unlawful act committed by the
accused had offended the religious feelings of
the Catholics of the municipality in which the act
complained of took place. We believe that such
ground of the motion is indefensible. As the
fiscal was discussing the sufficiency of the facts
alleged in the complaint, he cannot deny any of
them, but must admit them, although
hypothetically, as they are alleged. The motion
raises a question of law, not one of fact. In the
second place, whether or of the act complained
of is offensive to the religious feelings of the
Catholics, is a question of fact which must be
judged only according to the feelings of the
Catholics and not those of other faithful ones, for
it is possible that certain acts may offend the
feelings of those who profess a certain religion,
while not otherwise offensive to the feelings of
those professing another faith. We, therefore,
take the view that the facts alleged in the
complaint constitute the offense defined and
penalized in article 133 of the Revised Penal
Code, and should the fiscal file an information
alleging the said facts and a trial be thereafter
held at which the said facts should be
conclusively established, the court may find the
accused guilty of the offense complained of, or
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 76
that of coercion, or that of trespass under article
281 of the Revised Penal Code, as may be
proper, pursuant to section 29 of General
Orders, No. 58.
The appealed order is reversed and the fiscal is
ordered to comply with his duty under the law,
without pronouncement as to the costs.
People of the Philippines vs. Epifanio Nanoy,
alias Nanie (02-24-1972)
GR No. 10365-CR
Ponente: Santiago B. Buslon, J.
Action: APPEAL from a judgment of the MTC of
Jetafe, Bohol
SHORT STORY: Nanoy, who was allegedly
drunk, entered into the chapel of the
congregation of the Assembly of God while it
was having its afternoon services and attempted
to grab the song leader. As a result, everyone
ran out of the church and the religious services
were discontinued. He was charged with the
crime of offending religious feelings. After
appeal, the court held that he was only guilty of
unjust vexation
FACTS:
 While the congregation of the Assembly
of God was having its afternoon services
in its chapel, accused EpifanioNanoy,
who was drunk, entered with uplifted
hands, approached LevitaLapura, the
song leader, and attempted to grab her.
 LevitaLepura ran away from Nanoy.
Romeo Zafra, also a member of said
congregation, held the accused and led
him outside the church.
 The other members of the sect also ran
out of the church and the religious
services were discontinued.
 Accused was charged with the crime of
offending religious feelings penalized
under Art. 133 of the RPC. The complaint
alleged that he had the intention of
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 77

stopping the said rite in an unholy CONCLUSION/HELD/DISPOSITIVE:

manner. Decision MODIFIED. Accused-appellant guilty
 Trial court found Nanoy guilty of of only unjust vexation and sentenced to pay a
disturbance or interruption of a religious fine of Php100 with subsidiary imprisonment in
ceremony, penalized under A153 of the case of insolvency.
RPC and sentenced him to 10 months
and 21 days of imprisonment, plus a fine
of Php50 with subsidiary imprisonment in
the case of insolvency.
 Accused appealed, arguing that the
offense, if any is unjust vexation.

ISSUE/S
1. WON the TC erred in convicting Nanoy of
disturbance or interruption of a religious
ceremony.
 WON the offense was unjust
vexation.

RULES
 Art. 133. Offending the religious
feelings. The penalty of arresto mayor in
its maximum period to
prisioncorreccional in its minimum period
shall be imposed upon anyone who, in a
place devoted to religious worship or
during the celebration of any religious
ceremony, shall perform acts notoriously
offensive to the feelings of the faithful.
 There must be deliberate intent to hurt
the feelings of the faithful.

ANALYSIS
1. YES. The appellant did NOT perform
acts notoriously offensive to the feelings
of the faithful. Neither did he cause such
a serious disturbance as to interrupt or
disturb the services of the said
congregation. That he had no intention
of interrupting the services was shown
by the fact that appellant allowed himself
to be led outside the church by
ZomeoZafra.