Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2017) 1e10

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Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/shpsa

The history of science as the progress of the human spirit: The

historiography of astronomy in the eighteenth century

Daniel Spelda
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, Masaryk University, Arna Nováka 1, Brno 602 02, Czech Republic

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: In the eighteenth century, the historiography of astronomy was part of a wider discussion concerning the
Received 22 November 2016 history of the human spirit. The concept of the human spirit was very popular among Enlightenment
Received in revised form authors because it gave the history of human knowledge continuity, unity and meaning. Using this
17 April 2017
concept, scientists and historians of science such as Montucla, Lalande, Bailly and Laplace could present
Available online xxx
the history of astronomy in terms of a progress towards contemporary science that was slow and could
be interrupted at times, but was still constant, regular, and necessary. In my paper I intend to explain
Keywords:
how the originally philosophical concept of the human spirit was transferred to the history of astronomy.
Historiography of astronomy
The history of the human spirit
I also introduce the basic principles to which the development of the spirit is subject in astronomy,
The idea of scientific progress according to historians of astronomy. The third part of the paper describes how historians of astronomy
Montucla took into account the effect of social and natural factors on the history of astronomy.
Bailly Ó 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction explications of astronomical theories or discoveries. Works that

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, accounts of the
history of astronomy used to be published as part of the in-
troductions to astronomical treatises. These came mostly in the
form of brief overviews. The first monographs focusing exclusively
on the history of astronomy, or including a particular section
dedicated to it, were not published until the eighteenth century.
Until then, surveys of the history of astronomy had appeared
mainly in prefaces to writings on astronomy and in celebratory
orations.1 In this paper, I intend to focus on a set of historical works
on astronomy and science that is not complete, but which I hope
will provide at least a representative sample. These works may be
categorised in three groups.
The first group of texts epitomise a doxographical exposition of
the history of astronomy presenting mainly biographical and
bibliographical data. Typical examples of such works are the books
of Weidler, Heilbronner, the entry “Astronomie” in the French
Encyclopedia and the work of the author C. F. G. from the end of the
eighteenth century.2 These texts endeavour to present mere lists of
astronomers and their works, and they do not contain any
contain a historical overview of astronomical facts also belong here.
A typical example of this approach is Flamsteed’s preface to the
third volume of his Historia coelestis britannica (1725), which
summarises extant and important astronomical observations from
classical times to the present.3
The second group comprises texts presenting the history of
astronomy as the history of the human spirit. The aim of these texts
is to introduce astronomical theories, to trace the origins of their
discoveries and their subsequent development and, in so doing, to
shed light on the laws of scientific knowledge. Typical examples of
these texts are the work of Estève, Montucla, Savérien, Costard,
Lalande, Bailly and Laplace.4
The publications in the third group may be called philo-
sophical texts. These texts were not intended primarily to
chronicle the history of astronomy. They deal with the history,
the laws, and the progress of science (or sciences) in philo-
sophical terms. The history of astronomy appears here for the
most part in the context of descriptions of the development of
other sciences or the development of the human spirit. They are
important for the purposes of this paper because they enable a

3
Flamsteed (1725).
4
E-mail address: spelda@phil.muni.cz. Estève (1755); Montucla (1758); Savérien (1766); Costard (1767); Lalande
1
Cf. Goulding (2010); Byrne (2006). (1771); Bailly (1781), (1787a), (1778b), (1778-1783), (1779); Laplace (1796). I have
2
Keill (1739); Weidler (1741); Heilbronner (1742); Anonymous (1751); C. F. G. consulted several prefaces as well: Cassini (1740); Le Monnier (1746); Fontaine des
(1792). Crutes (1746).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.05.004
0039-3681/Ó 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.


Please cite this article in press as: Spelda, D., The history of science as the progress of the human spirit: The historiography of astronomy in the
eighteenth century, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.05.004
2 D. Spelda / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2017) 1e10
better understanding of the texts of the second group, which
sometimes refer to philosophical works.5 Works by Hume,
Smith, Goguet, Turgot, D’Alembert, Voltaire and Irwing belong to
this group.6 In this paper, I will above all deal with the works of
the second group, which consider the history of astronomy as
part of the history of the human spirit. The category of the hu-
man spirit on which they were based made it possible to express
a new understanding of science. In the eighteenth century, in
place of the traditional metaphysical conviction that true
knowledge is static and definitive, a dynamic concept estab-
lished itself, according to which science submits itself to devel-
opment and progress. With the category of the evolving human
spirit, time enters natural philosophy and the mathematical
sciences as a condition of knowledge, and the idea of a gradual
development of knowledge that necessarily runs in successive
phases is born.
The historiography of astronomy in the eighteenth century
perfectly illustrates this change in the understanding of science.
Astronomy was considered the oldest science, and its long his-
tory provided enough material for the magnificent story of its
rise. Its successes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
provided enough examples for emphasizing its accelerating
progress, which transferred itself to contemporary science in
general, but also to the whole epoch e the Enlightenment itself.
The triumph of astronomy documented the victory of reason
over superstition. Astronomy was no longer considered to be the
revelation of the hidden mathematical order of the world
authorised by God, as Kepler and Newton still supposed. The
successes of astronomy were explained exclusively as the
outcome of human reason and industry, whose gradual shaping
could be reconstructed historically to a relatively precise extent
because it was a work of the human spirit, which is always the
same and universal and thus links people of all countries and all
times. The historiography of astronomy therefore did not serve
merely for the presentation of the history of astronomy, but also
as a celebration of human inventiveness: the man of the age of
Enlightenment found in the history of astronomy the image of
his progress up to his current perfection. In this, paper I do not
want to deal with the historical details described by historians of
astronomy of the eighteenth century, nor do I want to asses the
historical reliability of their texts. Instead, I would like to present
the main concepts, categories and regularities with whose help
they tried to interpret the course of the history of astronomy.
Unlike other scholars7 I do not intend to interpret the Enlight-
enment historiography of astronomy as an early phase of our
own historiography. My purpose is rather to affirm that the
historiography of astronomy in the eighteenth century perfectly
corresponds to the intellectual discourse of the Enlightenment,
and that it is only in this context that it can be appropriately
understood.
The historiography of astronomy did not have as its aim a mere
description of the past. It was part of a more comprehensive
discourse about the history and progress of the human spirit and, as
such, it shared its agenda and aim. The concept of the human spirit
made it possible to incorporate astronomy into the great story of
the progress of science, emancipation, and the overthrow of su-
perstitions. The philosophers of the Enlightenment often referred
5 13
Montucla puts explicit stress on D’Alembert’s Discours préliminaire (Montucla,
1758, p. 31) and writes about Goguet’s work: “in general I agree with its author”
(Montucla, 1758, p. xxv).
6 15
Hume (1994); Smith (1980); Turgot (1913); D’Alembert (1821a); Goguet (1758);
Voltaire (1963); Irwing (1781).
7 16
Cf. Swerdlow (1993); Laudan (1993).

Please cite this article in press as: Spelda, D., The history of science as the progress of the human spirit: The historiography of astronomy in the
eighteenth century, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.05.004
to the history of astronomy, to document their conviction about the
development of human knowledge with its help. Some philoso-
phers, such as D’Alembert, judged that the history of science
actually presents the best and most shining model of progress of
the human spirit, and that it perfectly illustrates the logic of its
development.8 Historians of astronomy shared his opinion. Thanks
to the concept of the human spirit, the historians of astronomy
could surmount the merely technical and empirical dimensions of
astronomy and emphasise its civilizational and emancipational task
in the history of mankind. According to them, the history of as-
tronomy embodied the gradual history of mankind’s emancipation
from prejudice and superstitions, the insatiability of human curi-
osity, the mastery of nature, technological development, and the
gradual creation of social and political conditions appropriate for
the development of knowledge. In this way they helped to create a
picture of modern European culture as a culture built on human
science rather than on religion.
2. The human spirit and astronomy
The origin of the concept of the human spirit and its progress
is usually traced back to the works of Bernard de Fontenelle in
the late seventeenth century.9 In the early eighteenth century,
the concept of the human spirit fast permeated French, English
and German philosophy of the age of the Enlightenment. No
later than by the mid-eighteenth century, it had also been
adopted by historians of science and astronomy. Like historians
of philosophy,10 they too started to identify the history of science
with the progress of the human spirit. Montucla states that his
work should “represent history and the progressions of human
spirit”.11 Lalande characterizes the aim of his work thus: “The
method of this work aims to show the progressions of spirit.”12
The first sentence of Bailly’s Histoire de l’astronomie ancienne
(1775) reads: “The history of astronomy is an important part of
the history of human spirit.”13 Other historians and astronomers
similarly identify the history of the mathematical disciplines,
including astronomy, with les progrès de l’esprit humain.14 In his
work, Goguet identified all human learning with the history of
the progress of the human spirit, and thus made it plain that
astronomy was also a part of it.15
Bailly defines the human spirit as “the sum of ideas of all
educated men that genius added to genius from the beginning of
things.”16 The human spirit was perceived as an aggregation of
human knowledge passing through history while constantly being
cultivated and perfected. The agents of this progress are individuals
and generations of mankind, whose work and diligence makes the
spirit grow and improve. The concept of the human spirit was so
popular mainly because it eliminated the factor of chance and
meaninglessness, typical of political history. The historians of as-
tronomy drew attention to the fact that the history of astronomy
understood as the history of the spirit represents a development
with meaning and aim, unlike political history, which is a display of
8
D’Alembert (1821a), p. 27; cf. Irwing (1781), p. 69; Estève (1755), vol. I, p. 5.
9
Dagen (1980), p. 18; Gusdorf (1977), p. 56f.
10
Piaia & Santinello (2011), Israel (2004).
11
Montucla (1758), vol. I, p. 8 (Unless otherwise attributed, all translations are my
own).
12
Lalande (1771), vol. I, p. v.
Bailly (1781), p. iii. cf. Bailly (1778-1783), vol. I, pp. vi, xiv.
14
Estève (1755), vol. I, pp. v, xviii, vol. II, p. 129; Savérien (1766), p. 12; Laplace
(1796), vol. I, 8, vol. II, p. 199.
Goguet (1758), vol. I, p. v. Cf. on Goguet’s historiography see Zedelmaier (2003),
pp. 193e215; Wolloch (2007).
Bailly (1778-1783), vol. I, p. xiv.
 D. Spelda / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2017) 1e10
vanity and bloodbath.17 The concept of the human spirit thus
endowed the history of the human race with continuity, unity,
content, meaning and the pathos of civilisation. The effort of iso-
lated individuals turned into a long-term, transgenerational and
triumphalist process of accumulating knowledge of humankind.
Astronomy, seen as the part of the history of the human spirit,
evolves across historical periods, countries and nations, never dis-
appearing, and gradually improving thanks to human effort. The
aim of the historian was to describe the path of astronomy to the
contemporary state. The historiography of astronomy had to pre-
sent the steps leading from primitive knowledge to the advanced
celestial mechanics. The development of the spirit in astronomy
had to be portrayed as a teleological process aiming towards the
present. That is why these histories of astronomy also have a strong
whiggish nature.
The concept of the human spirit was taken over by historians
of science from empirical philosophy.18 Empiricists such as
Locke, Condillac and D’Alembert repeatedly described how
knowledge was gradually shaped in the human mind from
simple ideas to complex and abstract concepts. D’Alembert in his
Discours préliminaire introduced a distinction between the
metaphysical and the historical approach to the origin of
learning, The metaphysical interpretation of the origin of science
connects partial scientific findings with individual abilities and
functions of the mind. It makes possible an a priori, ahistorical,
and non-contextual rational reconstruction of the forming of
scientific knowledge in thinking subjects. In opposition to this
stands the historical interpretation that describes the genealogy
of human learning in specific historical context. The meta-
physical interpretation deduces a systematic structure of science
that is expressed in the fundamentals of each science. The his-
torical interpretation describes the gradual discovering of these
truths, which however are in a different order from that in the
metaphysical interpretation.19
D’Alembert introduced this distinction because the history of
the spirit does not always proceed completely logically. Errors often
appear, and blind alleys open up. Laplace, bearing this distinction in
mind, introduces it right at the outset of his description of the
history of astronomy: “The order in which I have treated the
principal results of the system of the world, is not that which the
human intellect (l’esprit humain) has followed in the investigation.
Its progress has been embarrassed and uncertain. Mankind has
frequently failed to arrive at the true cause of these phenomena,
until all the hypotheses that imagination could suggest have been
exhausted; and the truths that have been discovered, have almost
always been combined with errors, which only time and observa-
tion have separated out.”20
However, the historical triumph of reason must not have been
supposed to be the result of mere chance. Hence, the historians of
astronomy strove to show that right from the start, the history of
astronomy did not occur at random but followed a specific logic
derived from the empirical genealogy of ideas. The history of as-
tronomy was intended to be the historical embodiment of the
development of the sentient and reasoning subject as described by
the empirical philosophers. But how was it possible to apply epis-
temology to history? How could sensory and mental operations be
17
Cf. Montucla (1758), vol. I, p. vi; Estève (1755), vol. I, p. v.
18
This process has been convincingly presented by Jean Dagen whose results I
follow here partially; see Dagen (1980), pp. 33e107, 363e405.
19
D’Alembert (1821a), p. 54.
20
Laplace (1796), vol. II, p. 199; quoted from Laplace (1830), vol. II, p. 239; simi-
larly Bailly (1778-1783), vol. I, p. xi.

Please cite this article in press as: Spelda, D., The history of science as the progress of the human spirit: The historiography of astronomy in the
eighteenth century, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.05.004
3
related to the progress of time? I believe it was possible, thanks to
four properties ascribed to the human spirit.
1. The spirit’s dependency on experience. The empirical genealogy
of learning assumes that all human learning derives from experi-
ence. With the help of analysis, all concepts, including the abstract
and the metaphysical, can be reduced to the original sensory data of
their origin. No idea is inborn; no true knowledge exists which does
not have its basis in experience. In the eighteenth century, the idea
of astronomy was in perfect conformity with this ideal. Astronomy
was considered primarily as an empirical and observational disci-
pline whose progress counted on collecting data, refining param-
eters, and inductive generalisation. In the historiography of
astronomy, that led to a lack of interest in historical astronomical
models and systems. “Observation was seen as the part of astron-
omy whose history was worth recounting. Astronomical theory
and, perhaps surprisingly, cosmology were, with the exception of
Montucla, dealt with very superficially.”21 A typical feature of the
Enlightenment methodology of science was a lack of interest in
theoretical systems, maybe even going as far as a resistance to-
wards them. Their marginalisation in the history of astronomy is
apparently a reflection of this methodological attitude, targeting
primarily the Cartesian type of science. According to contemporary
conviction, astronomy makes advances in the form of a cumulative
growth of experience. Its progress depends on the quality and
amount of empirical data. Its advance is hindered by the shaping of
systems and hypotheses without support from dates.22 That also
meant that the Enlightenment historians of astronomy valued
theoretical astronomers, such as Copernicus or Kepler, less than the
patient observers such as the representatives of the Alexandrian
school, Tycho Brahe and Flamsteed: “Copernicus is not in the same
category as Tycho; he was a greater philosopher than he was an
astronomer.”23 In an effort to emphasise the empirical nature of
astronomical progress, some authors then interpreted Copernicus’s
introduction of the heliocentric system as the outcome of thirty
years of “experience and observation”.24
2. The spirit’s dependency on time. Empiricist epistemology
assumed that the human mind was entirely empty at the start of
its development, and only slowly it became filled with experi-
ence and ideas. The mind was not capable of immediate un-
derstanding but needed time to put its experience together.
Learning is not something immediately attainable, but the pa-
tient collecting of experience. When this epistemological idea
was transferred to history, it meant two important things. The
first was that the human spirit starts out empty and gathers
knowledge together only slowly. In terms of the history of as-
tronomy, this implied that astronomy could not have existed as a
perfect and developed system. This stood in opposition to long-
standing tradition based on the Bible. In this traditional account
of the origin of astronomy, the role of the historically first
astronomer was attributed to Adam. Thanks to Adam’s knowl-
edge and his longevity, his descendants could rely on a very
advanced astronomical system. Some early modern astronomers,
basing their thinking on references to Adam’s astronomical
perceptions, have imagined the progress of astronomy to be the
restoration of Adam’s long-lost knowledge. The history of as-
tronomy was even occasionally understood as part of the plans
21
Steele (2012), p. 51.
22
Montucla (1758), vol. II, p. 529; Bailly (1778-1783), vol. I, p. 243.
23
Bailly (1778-1783), vol. I., p. 378; cf. similarly Laplace (1796), vol. II, p. 263;
Lalande (1771), vol. I, 192f.; Montucla (1758), vol. I, p. 444; Estève (1755), vol. I, p.
192f.; Goguet (1758), vol. II, p. 749.
24
Montucla (1758), vol. I, 509; Savérien (1766), p. 138.
4 D. Spelda / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2017) 1e10
of divine providence for the world.25 The Enlightenment phi-
losophers did not believe that knowledge was initially perfect,
due to the supernatural action of God.26 The first people were
inexperienced and simple and that was why their knowledge of
astronomy was initially very simple e this knowledge only very
slowly improved over the course of time. The history of as-
tronomy thus liberated itself from biblical history. The entire
history of astronomy was seen as the result of human diligence
over a long period of time.
Secondly, philosophers were in agreement that the advance of
the human spirit was from the beginning very slow, laborious, and
leading through many mistakes and errors, and that it had to assert
itself against prejudices and superstition. They believed that it took
human beings a very long time to extricate themselves from
childish imaginings and therefore they judged that the human race
had spent by far the greater part of their history in the shackles of
superstition and error.27 With the passing of time, human experi-
ence increases and mankind succeeds in extricating itself from the
power of superstition. For example, Voltaire wrongly supposed that
it was thanks to the fact that they had devoted themselves to as-
tronomy for 1900 years that the ancient Chaldeans had matured to
accept the heliocentric worldview.28 This motive repeats itself
relatively frequently in the historiography of science; the advanced
astronomical knowledge of various cultures was interpreted as an
outcome of their long history.29
Astronomy was the embodiment of the kind of knowledge that
requires time, patience, slow and gradual pace and collective
collaboration. Goguet states that “there is no science which de-
pends so much on the length of time as astronomy, it must have
been very long before it arrived to any great perfection.”30 And
Laplace opens his Exposition in a very similar spirit:
Of all the natural sciences, astronomy is that which presents the
longest series of discoveries. The first appearance of the heavens is
indeed far removed from that enlarged view, by which we
comprehend at the present day, the past and future states of the
system of the world. To arrive at this, it was necessary to observe
the heavenly bodies during a long succession of ages . “.31
Historians understood the long passage of time of astronomy as
a natural environment in which the human spirit gradually
approached perfection by acquiring experience and generalising it.
The passage of time itself contributed towards bringing the spirit
closer to perfection: “Time passes, and its passing is to the advantage
of science that grows with the age of world”.32
3. The collective spirit follows ontogeny in its development. His-
torians and philosophers of the Enlightenment often specified that
the human spirit goes through the same development stages as an
individual. It begins with the ignorance of childhood, continues
25 
Cf. Spelda (2013).
26
Weidler (1741), pp. 14e18; C. F. G. (1792), pp. 6e8; Heilbronner (1742), pp. 54e
56; Montucla (1758), vol. I, p. 54f.; Estève (1755), vol. I, p. 15f.; Cassini (1740), iv.
27
Turgot (1913), p. 219f.; Irwing (1781), pp. 36e37, 58,139.
28
Voltaire (1963), vol. I, p. 34; cf. I, p. 68, vol. II, pp. 306,724.
29
The equivalent to this in astronomy is the 600 year long lunisolar period
discovered by Cassini. Historians were convinced that a knowledge of this period
was possible only on the assumption of a developed astronomy, and again, ac-
cording to them, a developed astronomy assumes long centuries of previous
observation. On the Cassini period see Swerdlow (1990); see further Estève (1755),
vol. I, pp. 18e21; Bailly (1781), pp. 69, 76, 84, 89f; Bailly (1787a), p. 50; Costard
(1767), p. 124; Lalande (1771), vol. I, p. 123; Buffon (2007), p. 1328, cf. p. 1644,
note 3.
30
Goguet (1758), vol. I, p. 213. Quoted from Goguet (1775), vol. I, p. 226.
31
Laplace (1796), vol. I, p. 7. Quoted from Laplace (1830), vol. I, p. 1.
32
Bailly (1781), pp. v, vi-vii. Bailly stressed the role of time many times, see Bailly
(1778-1783), vol. I, p. 281; vol. II, pp. 328, 579, vol. III, pp. 173, 176, 187, 209f.; Bailly
(1787a), p. 220; Bailly (1787b), pp. ii,xxi, xxiiif.

Please cite this article in press as: Spelda, D., The history of science as the progress of the human spirit: The historiography of astronomy in the
eighteenth century, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.05.004
with the indiscretion of puberty, and arrives at a virile maturity
culminating in the present time. The history of the human spirit
thus resembles the process of coming of age.33 The history of col-
lective human knowledge corresponds to the process by which an
individual comes of age. Knowledge of the human species develops
in the wake of the knowledge of the individual: phylogeny follows
ontogeny. This parallelization of phylogeny and ontogeny can be
observed quite often in the thought of the Enlightenment. For
example, Turgot writes: “. mankind considered from its origin
seems to the eyes of a philosopher to be a great whole which, like
every individual, has its own childhood and progress.”34
The history of astronomy was conceived in line with this idea,
often expressed by means of the metaphor of the human ages. The
progress of astronomy had started in its infancy and continued to
its current mature state.35 Just as the individual begins with simple
assurances and information, the beginnings of astronomy were
simple, but with experiences acquired later, it shaped for itself ever
more complex ideas, until in the end it grasped the simplicity of
nature. This concept should indicate primarily the unity, inevita-
bility and irreversibility of scientific progress. The human spirit
represents the collective of the human race that maintains conti-
nuity in historical change, thanks to the joint efforts of individuals.
Phylogenesis can repeat ontogenesis only because science is un-
derstood as the efforts of individuals connected to each other. “Even
if mankind can be considered as an everlasting individual that em-
braces centuries by the life and intelligence of the species, this indi-
vidual has moments of inertia and sleep[.] when her/his inequal
march is interrupted, individuals renew the course of work and
research .”36
4. The identity of human spirit. The empiricist philosophers were
convinced that their description of genealogy applied universally to
every member of the human race because everyone had the same
mind. If it was influenced by the environment, every individual
would pass through the same epistemological development.
Thanks to this conviction, historians could launch themselves into a
hypothetical reconstruction of the beginnings of science. Historians
of astronomy attempted to imitate the mentality of primitive
people looking up at the sky. Their aim was to reproduce the
experience and thought processes of primitive people ranging from
the first observations of the sky to abstract astronomical concepts.
Montucla, Lalande, Estève, Fontaine and Bailly describe what
ancient farmers and herders could see in the sky and how they
understood it.37 In Lalande’s words, historians make the readers
assume the role of discoverers: “we put the reader in the position of
someone who will make a great discovery”.38 This transport into the
past is possible thanks to the firm conviction of historians that the
intellect is universal and remains the same in every time period e
which is why identical epistemological processes that can be
reconstructed take place therein. On the other hand, this rational
reconstruction was specifically only probable and hypothetical, in
harmony with contemporary historiography. According to Mon-
tucla, “we will develop some thoughts that could lead these ancient
astronomers in their discoveries. If it is not the true march of the
33
Irwing (1781), p. 20.
34
Turgot (1913), p. 215.
35
Montucla (1758), vol. I, p. 152; Bailly (1787), p. 191f; Laplace (1796), vol. II, p.
199; Costard (1767), p. 307.
36
Bailly (1778-1783), vol. I, p. xvi.
37
Montucla (1758), pp. 145e170; similarly Fontaine des Crutes (1746), pp. xi-xiv;
Lalande (1771), vol. I, p. 1e70; Bailly (1781), pp. 34e54; Estève (1755), vol. II, p.
124e151.
38
Lalande (1771), vol. I, p. iv.
 D. Spelda / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2017) 1e10 5

human spirit, it is at least so natural we could believe it is very close to development from complexity to simplicity. According to empiri-
this march.”39 cist philosophers, the knowledge of the sentient mind gradually
expands and improves together with its growing experience. The
subject gradually proceeds towards more and more abstract con-
3. The development of the spirit
cepts. The mind goes through a period when complex, confused,
metaphysical ideas about the functioning of the world are created,
I have tried to show how astronomical accounts of the history of
and in the end comes to understand that the world is governed by a
the human spirit attempted to transpose epistemology onto his-
few simple laws, symbolised for the Enlightenment by Newton’s
tory. This also implied that the history of science unfolded in line
law of gravity.49
with established epistemological principles. Empiricist philoso-
Astronomy progresses along the same lines. Just like philos-
phers were convinced that the development of the cognising mind
ophers, astronomers believed that nature was a unified system
does not happen randomly, but according to laws and principles.40
governed by simple laws (la simplicité des loix prescrites à cet
Likewise, historians of astronomy believed that, being part of the
univers).50 Therefore, they believed that science in its prime
history of the human spirit, the history of astronomy was a
would consist of several simple truths, principles and laws that
necessary process governed by certain principles.
would explain everything. For astronomy too, the model was
1. The march of the human spirit. In formal terms, the necessary
Newton, whose law of gravity Laplace valued as a simple prin-
progress of astronomy was seen as an unchangeable sequence of
ciple capable of explaining a great many phenomena.51 Accord-
individual steps. “Nature has imprinted an unchanging order on
ing to Bailly, Newton arrived at his results in the end precisely
things that succeed one another. All truths are related, we successively
just because in his life and thinking he copied the simplicity of
pass from one to another.”.41 The metaphor of a chain of discoveries
nature.52
was very popular but there was another, more widespread meta-
However, these simple truths were the result of a long process.
phor that derived from the idea that the human spirit always de-
Epistemologists were convinced that in the beginning only chaotic
velops in gradual steps. According to Lalande, “the spirit always
ideas inhabited the mind. The mind was susceptible to illusions and
moves step by step”.42 It is from here that the immensely popular
prejudices. This epistemological premise also applied to the history
idea, the “march of the human spirit”, is derived. “It is reasonable for
of astronomy: The first people were confused, blinded by illusions
us to talk figuratively about the march of the human spirit; it advances
and prejudices. They were frightened of the gods in the heavens
by related ideas, just as we move by successive and consistent steps.”43
and believed in astrology, explaining the movements of the planets
This metaphor is supposed to indicate primarily that astronomical
using complex theories. Over the course of time, astronomy pro-
discoveries do not occur at random, chaotically, but that they
gressed from complex and incorrect structures to more simple and
consistently follow each other: “each former discovery hath paved
accurate ones. Complexity and confusion were attributed to in-
the way to a succeeding improvement.”44 Each subsequent dis-
fancy. Simplicity was an indication of intellectual maturity that was
covery takes the previous one further in a logical sequence. Truths
the result of a long-term development. “Simplicity is not in essence
follow in a firm and unchangeable succession.
a principle, an axiom, it is the result of working; it is not an idea
The metaphor of the marching spirit also indicates that the
from the childhood of the world, it belongs to the maturity of
transition from one discovery to another does not occur as a rev-
mankind.”53
olutionary and sudden change. Historians of astronomy rather
The history of astronomy has also experienced not only
advocated the idea of a gradual improvement of the human spirit,
simplicity in the sense of a small number of laws with a large range,
one that is slow and takes place in almost imperceptible stages or
but also the concept of the simplicity of astronomic systems. His-
steps: “Most discoveries reach their perfection only by impercep-
torians again saw progress in this transition from the more complex
tible increases.”45 This was crucial for the preservation of the idea
to the simpler. Copernicus’s heliocentric system was a typical
of the continuity in the development of the human spirit: even
example of such progress. For instance, Lalande accentuated the
small discoveries play their important role, because they function
admirable simplicity of the accurate ideas designed by Copernicus
as links and prepare the ground for great achievements. All dis-
as opposed to the complex system elaborated by Ptolemy.54 It also
coveries represent individual steps on the ladder of progress.46
applied in Copernicus’s case that the simple nature of his system
According to Bailly, “the human spirit does not advance by (.)
testified to its accuracy in the eyes of all those who wanted to free
graduated ideas, at first simple, then composed.”47 Historians of
themselves from prejudices adopted in infancy.55 Estève defined
astronomy did not anticipate the concept of scientific revolution in
this difference between astronomical systems quite clearly. Those
the Kuhnian sense, as I. B. Cohen believes.48 They believed in a
persistent accumulation of knowledge and its gradual system-
atisation, simplification, and transference into general regularities
and causes. 49
D’Alembert (1821a), pp. 27f., 68e71.
2. From complexity to simplicity. From the formal point of view, 50
Bailly (1781), p. xxiv, cf. Bailly (1778-1783), vol. I, p. 138.
the march of the human spirit represents an uninterrupted 51
Laplace (1796), vol. II, p. 283.
52
sequence of small steps. At the same time, the march represents Bailly (1778-1783), vol. II, p. 469.
53
Bailly (1778-1783), vol. II, p. 4. Laplace reproached Kepler for his dependence on
Pythagorean metaphysics of perfect forms and numbers writes: “Instead of passing
39 slowly by successions of inductions, from insulated phenomena, to others more
Montucla (1758), p. 145; cf. Estève (1755), vol. I, p. 128; Irwing (1781), 13f.;
extended, and from these to the general laws of nature; it was more easy and more
Bailly (1787a), p. 224; Bailly (1778-1783), vol. I, p. 154.
40
agreeable to subject all phenomena to the relations of convenience and harmony
Irwing (1781), pp. 20e22; Turgot (1913), pp. 219e220. .” Laplace (1796), vol. II, p. 263; quoted from Laplace (1830), vol. II, p. 315.
41
Bailly (1787a), p. 192. 54
Lalande (1771), vol. I, p. 511; cf. Smith (1980), p. 71; Montucla (1758), vol. I, p.
42
Lalande (1771), vol. I. p. iv; cf. Irwing (1781), p. 58. 516; Estève (1755), vol. I, p. 257f. “Copernicus, proposing a system simpler than that
43
Bailly (1778-1783), vol. I., p. 26. of Ptolemy . The system of Copernicus, though making astronomy more simple
44
Costard (1767), p. 307; Lalande (1771), vol. I, p. iv. .” Modern research denies the unambiguous simplicity of Copernicus’ astronomy
45
Montucla (1758), vol. I, p. 434. and that it would be the result of observation e see e.g. Gingerich (1993), pp. 193e
46
Montucla (1758), vol. I, p. 43; cf. vol. II, p. 431. 201; Lerner, Segonds, Luna, Pantin, and Savoie (2015), pp. 331e353, 373e390.
47 55
Bailly (1778-1783), vol. I, p. ix. Lalande (1771), vol. I, p. 515: “simplicity of this hypotheis [heliocentrism] is
48
Cohen (1995), pp. 202e208, 217e224. sufficient for making it probable.” Cf. Bailly (1778-1783), vol. I, pp. 348,364.


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6 D. Spelda / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2017) 1e10
systems that lack simplicity are bad systems: “if it is not simple, it is
wrong.”56 Adam Smith put it similarly: “the first systems [.] are
always the most complex”.57 Hence, as Bailly noted, simplicity al-
ways comes last to surmount the development of the human
spirit.58
3. From phenomena to their causes. We have seen that in the
history of astronomy, the human spirit marches in a continuous
sequence of small steps towards simplicity. The third rule gov-
erning the development of the human spirit says that the spirit
works its way from the knowledge of facts to a knowledge of
their causes. This idea again derives from empiricist philosophy
and methodology. The human spirit, like the sentient mind,
initially only distinguishes between simple ideas, collecting and
sorting them, and preserving them by means of traditions. Only
much later and on the basis of facts aggregated over centuries it
is capable of inducing the real causes of phenomena e the true
system of the world. “The search for causes is an idea that came to
men very late.”59 This rule again applies to the coming of age of
each individual, for each scientific branch as well as for the
knowledge of the humankind. In terms of astronomy, this im-
plies that accurate and casual knowledge of the universe can
only be attained in the present day. This had been denied to the
astronomers of the past because they did not have sufficient
empirical data at their disposal.
This leads to an important conclusion. If ancient astronomers
attempted to comprehend the causes of heavenly phenomena, they
were bound to fail. Their explanations were always mistaken, based
on errors and prejudices stemming from doctrines such as
astrology and anthropocentrism. Historians of astronomy even
believed that the ancient astronomers were methodologically un-
disciplined when trying to find the causes of things. Such a belief
played a crucial role in the assessment of early Greek astronomy.
According to the historians of astronomy, ancient nations, such as
the Chaldeans, limited themselves to the collection of data and
predictions of heavenly phenomena, and it was not their ambition
to try to understand the laws of the universe. There was nothing
wrong with that. The Greeks, on the other hand, did not respect the
pace of the march of the human spirit. They were too undisciplined
and wanted to understand the system of the universe too quickly.
Early Greek astronomy was deficient in that it was too impatient,
and too rash in its theoretical pronouncements. Early Greek
thinkers, especially the Pre-Socratics, did not have sufficient
empirical data at their disposal. Instead of patiently observing the
sky, they ventured into metaphysical speculation.
. mixed mathematics demands lot of facts, of observations, and
that was the problem in Antiquity. In general, there were not
enough observations; they insisted too much on reasoning and
metaphysics, while it was necessary only to watch and observe
with exactitude. Exited by impatient curiosity [.] the Ancients
wanted to explain nature before they understood its basic
procedures.60
Laplace speaks in a similar way about Greek astronomy before
the foundation of the School of Alexandria: “They treated astron-
omy as a science purely speculative, often indulging in the most
56
Estève (1755), vol. II, p. 68.
57
Smith (1980), p. 66.
58
Bailly (1781), p. 211: “But natural ideas, simple systems, are always the last
which present themselves to the human mind.”
59
Bailly (1781), p. 239.
60
Montucla (1758), vol. I, p. 6.
61
Laplace (1796), vol. II, p. 211; quoted from Laplace (1830), vol. II, p. 253.

Please cite this article in press as: Spelda, D., The history of science as the progress of the human spirit: The historiography of astronomy in the
eighteenth century, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.05.004
frivolous conjectures”61 Keill reproaches the Greeks in that, instead
of devoting themselves patiently to observation, they “spent their
Time about Trifles, and Disputes of no Value, and in endeavouring
to find out Sophisms .”.62
The condemnation of Greek impatience and theoretical ambi-
tions63 was a reflection of a more general rule of the historiography
of astronomy. The speculative systems and hypotheses produced
obstacles and hindrances in the progress of the human spirit:
“Sometimes, always putting hypotheses in the place of facts is a
way of slowing down the progress of science.”64 Real astronomy
was slow, empirical and inductive. Hypotheses and systems were
primarily the expression of the impatience and hastiness of an
intellect that could not wait to uncover the ultimate causes of
things. Therefore the true beginning of astronomy is represented
for more or less all historians of astronomy by the school of Alex-
andria. Bailly actually inaugurates his three-volume history of
“modern” astronomy by presenting this school.65 This is in fact
where astronomy rid itself of the ties of philosophy, and concen-
trated on observing and gathering empirical data for future
evaluation.66
The laws of the gradual progress of the human spirit mentioned
earlier lead to another remarkable conclusion: that each generation
of scientists should acknowledge their place in the history of the
progress of the spirit without aspiring to gain knowledge that does
not pertain to this particular developmental stage. Historical find-
ings emerge in a logical order which cannot be changed. Therefore
the Greeks could not in their time aspire to some pieces of
knowledge, because it was still early: “If, nevertheless, they have
sometimes hit upon the truth, we ought to attribute it to pure
chance.”67 It also implies that one cannot attribute developed sci-
entific knowledge to the Greeks. According to Montucla, doxo-
graphical reports about such knowledge are “contrary to the march
of the human spirit”.68
I would like to present two examples of this faith of historians of
astronomy in the immutable logic of progress.
Historians of astronomy considered Greek heliocentrism to be
a mistake e a disregard for the principles of development of the
human mind. We have some evidence that the Pythagorean
philosopher Philolaos and the Hellenist astronomer Aristarchus
postulated a heliocentric system of the world as early as in
Antiquity. The Positivist historiography of astronomy of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries mostly presented Greek
heliocentrism as a discovery by a genius, forcefully suppressed
by prejudices, backwardness and the clergy.69 Historians of as-
tronomy in the Enlightenment period saw heliocentrism as an
illegitimate discovery, as it did not respect the rules of the
progress of the human spirit. The historians of astronomy
believed that it was absurd for a heliocentric system to be
advocated in antiquity. It was just an unfounded assumption that
could not successfully defy the astronomical arguments of
62
Keill (1739), p. ix. Cf. similarly Goguet (1758), vol. III, pp. 205e213.; Estève
(1755), vol. I, pp. 158, 334, 336; Bailly (1778-1783), vol. II, pp. 181, 91; Bailly
(1781), pp. 257e9; Bailly (1787b), p. clxix.
63
Apart from the Greeks, such hasty reasoning can be exemplified by Descartes’
vortex theory of planetary motion and his hypothetical natural philosophy. See e. g.
Bailly (1778-1783), vol. II, p. 181; Montucla (1758), vol. II, p. 371.
64
Bailly (1778-1783), vol. I, p. 243.
65
See Fontaine des Crutes (1746), p. xvi; P. Ch. Le Monnier (1746), pp. xiii, xviif.;
Lalande (1771), vol. I, pp. 147ff., 192; Weidler (1741), p. 383; Montucla (1758), vol. I,
pp. 444, 557; Goguet (1758), vol. III, p. 209; Estève (1755), vol. I, p. 182; Bailly (1778-
1783), vol. I, p. 378; Laplace (1796), vol. II, p. 259f.
66
Montucla (1758), vol. I, p. 215.
67
Goguet (1775), vol. III, p. 212f.
68
Montucla (1758), vol. I, p. 108.
69
See e. g. White (2009), vol. I, p. 21f.
 D. Spelda / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2017) 1e10
scholars and the prejudices of the unenlightened living at the
time. The Pythagoreans “spotted the real system of the universe;
nevertheless, the truth, apparently not well enough established,
was suffocated by prejudice.“. Greek heliocentrism was only an
unfounded idea. For heliocentrism to be convincing, many cen-
turies of careful measurement and observation were still
necessary.70 “An advanced opinion in astronomy means nothing
if it is not based on calculation and geometrical operations”71 In
antiquity heliocentrism was a confused, unfounded, unprovable
hypothesis that did not rely on empirical data and was ration-
alised only metaphysically so that Aristotle had no problem in
disproving it. According to Bailly, the most important astron-
omer of classical times, Hipparchus of Nicaea, inclined towards
geocentrism simply because all the facts testified to this system,
and because it appeared quite natural.72 The right time for the
presentation and defence of heliocentrism came 1700 years later.
The time of Copernicus was the first to be so enlightened and
equipped with knowledge that it could accept the new system.73
If the development of the human spirit follows its own strict
regularity, what is then the role of human genius, human creativity
and inventiveness? The history of the human spirit consists of a
regular succession of discoveries that cannot be skipped or cir-
cumvented even by a mind of genius.74 In philosophical and as-
tronomical treatises published during the Enlightenment, this
belief in inevitable temporal succession took the form of a meta-
phorical expression which I call “genius trapped in its own time”:
“Everyone is formed by his century”.75 What does it mean? The
progress of the human spirit follows a necessary order of discov-
eries, so that the genius remains trapped in its century and culture.
Not even a mind of genius is capable of transgressing the un-
changeable order of progress e for one or other of the two
following reasons: a) it is unable to defy the thoughts of its con-
temporaries; b) although making a discovery, genius is unable to
defend the discovery as it lacks the requisite data, concepts and
theories. Genius cannot be ahead of the time and the thought of its
century.76
In Enlightenment literature, this idea was often exemplified by
Isaac Newton. According to Laplace, Newton was not only endowed
with profound genius, but “nature [.] placed his existence in a
most fortunate period”.77 In his outline of the history of science, the
German chemist Friedrich Gren wrote that if Newton had been born
among Indians, “all of his mental power would have been
exhausted by counting to ten”. Had Newton lived in a more distant
past, or on the banks of Orinoco, he would not have been able to
create an accurate system of the world based on the universal law
of gravity.78 Bailly writes in the same spirit, that if Newton and
Descartes had been born among the Hottentots, their genius would
have been exhausted in building huts.79
However, this concept of trapped genius resulted in indifference
towards individual intellectual achievements. It is not the
70
Montucla (1758), vol. I, p. 212.
71
Estève (1755), vol. I, p. 249.
72
Bailly (1778-1783), vol. I, p. 24.
73
Montucla (1758), vol. I, pp. 205,115; Bailly (1778-1783), vol. I, p. 365; Bailly
(1781), p. 220f., 247; Goguet (1758), vol. III, pp. 182e184.; C. F. G. (1792), p. 26;
Estève (1755), vol. I, p. 250f.
74
Bailly (1778-1783), vol. I, p. 355: “There is therefore a true succession of ideas,
which is impossible to reverse. The genius itself can do nothing.”
75
Voltaire (1963), vol. I, p. 774.
76
Bailly (1778-1783), vol. I, p. 27 (Aristarchus of Samus), p. 418 (Tycho Brahe);
Montucla (1758), vol. II, p. 215 (Kepler).
77
Laplace (1796), vol. II, p. 276; quoted from Laplace (1830), vol. II, p. 332; cf.
similarly Bailly (1778-1783), vol. II, p. 679.
78
Gren (1799), p. 195.
79
Bailly (1787a), p. 147.

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7
intellectual capacities of an individual that are decisive any longer,
but rather his or her position on the time axis, on the regular line of
progress of the human spirit. For instance, D’Alembert noted that
Duns Scotus, a Scholastic philosopher, produced in his day
numerous chimeras admired by his contemporaries. In a more
enlightened century, he may have become another Newton.80 The
same applied to astronomy; had ancient advocates of geocentrism,
such as Hipparchus, been transposed to modern times and con-
fronted with numerous observations and modern hypotheses, they
would have become the followers of heliocentrism.81
That also means that learning is distributed in history according
to its age and civilisation. The present represents the culmination
and immediate summit of perfection. Preceding civilisations
represent only a certain stage in the development of the spirit,
which is allowed only particular knowledge, as this quotation from
Bailly makes clear: “In the course of this long formation [of the
spirit], every period has its education, its own ideas, and discoveries
that are permissible.”82
4. The social and natural conditions of progress
The Enlightenment philosophers believed that knowledge itself
undergoes constant improvement. The mind gains more and more
new experiences, and uses them to perform increasingly more
complex operations. However, its epistemological development is
hampered by external influences of a social and natural character:
religion, cultural prejudices, customs, cultural inertia, etc. Likewise,
it is in the nature of the collective human spirit constantly to
improve itself. However, its epistemological progress is repeatedly
hampered by social and natural influences. It is hindered by prej-
udices, superstition, barbarianism, floods, earthquakes, volcanos
etc. Hence, the actual history of the human spirit, according to
philosophers, historians and scientists, did not take the form of a
continuous progress, but of cycles of “blossoming and decline”.83
The Enlightenment philosophers often talked about the history
of the sciences being interrupted by reversals (révolutions), mainly
natural disasters and periods of barbarianism,84 or its progress
being accelerated or slowed down, as illustrated by a quote from
Turgot: “the arts and sciences are successively discovered and
improved; successively slowed down and accelerated in their
progress”.85
This applied similarly to astronomy. In the purely epistemo-
logical sense, astronomy would be slowly but constantly
improving. However, its progress was repeatedly interrupted and
decelerated by natural and social circumstances. That meant that
the history of astronomy was characterised by fluctuations and the
resulting curve of the astronomical progress had the form of a
sinusoid. The history of astronomy thus consists of alternating
periods of activity and inactivity, periods of discoveries, and periods
of stagnation. In Laplace’s words, we shall see that astronomy
remained during a great many ages in its infancy, that it increased
and flourished in the school of Alexandria, became stationary
80
D’Alembert (1821b), p. 37; quoted in Dagen (1980), p. 394.
81
Bailly (1778-1783), vol. I, p. 365.
82
Bailly (1787a), p. 192.
83 
See Spelda (2015); Schlobach (1976); cf. Schlobach (1980), pp. 317e324. The
cyclic concept of the history of civilisation and learning led to the situation that
many of the Enlightenment, including those who made the encyclopedias, feared
the arrival of other natural catastrophes accompanied by a new cycle of barbarism.
That is excellently and very richly demonstrated in Seguin (2001), pp. 431e463; cf.
Poulouin (1998), pp. 375e405.
84
D’Alembert (1821a), p. 55; similarly Voltaire (1963), vol. I, p. 202f.; Buffon
(2007), p. 1330.
85
Turgot (1913), p. 215.
8 D. Spelda / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2017) 1e10
(stationnaire) till the time of the Arabs, who improved it by their
observations, and lastly that it is within the three last centuries, it
has rapidly risen (s’élever) to that state of perfection, in which we
behold it at the present day.86
Montucla thought that the history of astronomy may be divided
into periods of stagnation, or even backwardness:
It was observed that it (mixed mathematics) often proceeds
slowly: it is stationary now and then, even for whole centuries, I
mean that it was somehow stopped in its march and did not make
any significant progress; however, it was considered less retrograde
than others, i. e. taking mistake for truth; because in the march of
the human spirit, one mistake is a step backward.87
Even in Weidler’s unimaginative enumeration of authors and
books, signs of the interruption and the re-blossoming of as-
tronomy (restitutiones astronomiae) are sometimes found.88
Bailly believed that in the course of history, the human spirit
has to take time out and create a pause. Its progress (marche) is
irregular and interrupted.89 And sometimes even the advances of
human science get lost: “Barbarism that now and then takes
over the earth, several times caused the footprints of human
industry to be lost.”90 The most typical example of a period of
stagnation and decline was the Middle Ages, siècle d’ignorance:
“the shadows were victorious, all Western science was reduced
to one stupid superstition.”91
Various causes have been offered for the uneven advance of
astronomy. Historians have sometimes argued that nature did not
distribute genius equally in history. Montucla writes, for example,
that science has its periods of prosperity and decadence because
nature becomes exhausted after having created genius, and needs a
long rest in order to restore her original fertility.92 This idea was
obviously however no sort of explanation, but more of a metaphor
for the irregular course of the spirit’s advance.
To gain a true explanation of the march of the human spirit,
philosophers and historians have tried to create a theoretical sys-
tem that would explain the cyclic alternation of phases of blos-
soming and decline as a manifestation of regularity. The historical
interpretation of the advances of the human spirit, rooted in the
social and natural context, must not be changed into chaos.
Enlightenment philosophers and historians hence searched for a
method of systematically interconnecting the social and natural
context with the intellectual processes of the human spirit. This
implies that they intended to connect empiricist epistemology with
social history. They fundamentally drew on the empiricist idea that
the human mind could attain true knowledge only if given some
freedom e i.e. if not blinded by prejudices and controlled by au-
thorities.93 Writers who, like Goguet, strove to capture the history
of learning in the broader cultural context, applied this knowledge
to the history of the spirit too: “. in all nations, the state of the arts
and sciences has at all times been intimately connected with, and
greatly influenced by the political institutions and form of
86
Laplace (1796), vol. II, p. 199f.; quoted from Laplace (1830), vol. II, p. 240.
87
Montucla (1758), vol. I, p. xxv.
88
Weidler (1741), pp. 272, 292.
89
Bailly (1778-1783), vol. I, pp. xiv, 25; Bailly (1787a), pp. 17, 34, 46.
90
Bailly (1781), p. vi (mistaken pagination iv).
91
Estève (1755), vol. I, pp. 242, 226. Cf. in different variations Savérien (1766), pp.
130, 132; Laplace (1796), vol. II, p. 238; Le Monnier (1746), p. xv; Bailly (1778-1783),
vol. II, pp. 228, 356; Montucla (1758), vol. I, pp. 20, 34; Lalande (1771), vol. I, p. 159.
92
Montucla (1758), vol. I, p. 284, cf. 429. Cf. similarly Bailly (1778-1783), vol. I, p.
45; Bailly (1787a), p. 46; Bailly (1779), p. 16; Estève (1755), vol. I, p. 224; Savérien
(1766), p. 132.
93
E. g. D’Alembert (1821a), p. 55: “. it is only freedom to act and think that is
capable of producing great things .”
94
Goguet (1758), vol. I, p. vi; quoted from Goguet (1775), vol. I, p. v.

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government.”94 This idea also found its way into historiography and
astronomy. Astronomical knowledge was partially dependent on
political systems and forms of government.
Historians of astronomy very often mention the activity of
enlightened rulers as a positive factor in the development of the
spirit. These rulers supported science, above all facilitating the
establishment of astronomical observatories and the composition
of astronomical tables e typical examples of such rulers were the
caliphs of Baghdad, Alfonso X of Castille and Rudolph II. This
conviction is in part connected with the empiricist concept of as-
tronomy as a field existentially dependent on observation: “ob-
servations sometimes need considerable expenditure and direct
protection by the ruler.”95
The assurance of conditions for observation was not sufficient
for the long-term advance of astronomy. Science also needs
freedom e political and intellectual. According to this idea, the
development of the human spirit is hindered mainly by despotism.
Political despotism breeds intellectual despotism. The political rule
of a single authority brings about a respect for authorities in science
that hinders the development of original research. Political slavery
implies the impossibility of scientific creativity and innovation.
According to David Hume: “A people, governed after such a manner
[sc. despotic power] are slave in the full and proper sense of the
word; and it is impossible they can ever aspire to any refinements
of taste or reason.”96 As a result, according to Hume, science thrived
best in a political arrangement that is the opposite of despotism, i.e.
in a civilisation composed of numerous democratic republics.97 The
men of the Enlightenment agreed that the great Asian empires are
not suitable for the development of science; preferable are small
democracies or constitutional monarchies of the European type.
People can actually fight better against authority and force in small
states and therefore gain here the intellectual freedom that is
beneficial for the development of science. A long scientific tradition
can exist in despotic empires, but not a permanently innovative
progress of the spirit.
Social conditions formed merely one type of circumstances
affecting the history of the human spirit. The second was repre-
sented by natural circumstances. Some historians of astronomy,
such as Bailly, associated the theory of despotic government with
the theory of climate. This produced a closed explanatory system
that combined politics, nature, the progress of the spirit and
knowledge just as Voltaire did in his Essai sur les moeurs et l’esprit
des nations.98 This system consequently allowed for a comprehen-
sive causal account of the history of the human spirit.
During the Enlightenment it was widely believed that each
nation had its own spirit. This spirit of the nation manifested itself
in the mentality, morals, customs and laws of the nation concerned.
It is a spirit that is substantially determined by the climate. The
most notable representative of this theory was Montesquieu but its
variations can also be found in the works of other philosophers.99
This theory was also adopted by many astronomers and histo-
rians of astronomy, most notably by Bailly. They assumed that the
development of astronomical knowledge was affected by the spirit
of nation, and consequently also by the climate. The substance of
this theory may succinctly be expressed as follows: There are
northern and southern nations. By the northern nations Europeans
95
Estève (1755), vol. I, p. 282, cf. 52f; similarly Montucla (1758), vol. I, pp. 344,
417; vol. II, p. 416; Weidler (1741), p. 272; Lalande (1771), vol. I, p.,xxix, 146; Le
Monnier (1746), p. xxviii.
96
Hume (1994), p. 62.
97
Hume (1994), p. 65.
98
Voltaire (1963), vol. I, pp. 197, 236; Cf. Engelhardt (1979), pp. 52e56.
99
On the history and origin of the theory of climate see Couzinet (1996), pp. 163e
187; Staszak and Couzinet (1998).
 D. Spelda / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2017) 1e10
are usually meant; the southern are mainly inhabitants of the
Orient. Northern nations must constantly cope with the adverse
conditions posed by nature and hence they are rational, laborious,
courageous, virtuous and honest. On the other hand, Southerners
are well provided for by nature in the material sense, but their spirit
suffers due to the stupefying effect of heat; hence they are licen-
tious, fearful, cowardly, sensual, indolent, lacking self-control and
succumbing easily to their passions. They lack tenacity and are
incapable of long-term intellectual activity. Northerners live in re-
publics or monarchies, whereas Southerners suffer under despotic
regimes because they are too weak, indolent and tired from the
heat to fight against authorities:
When I visualise the southern nations weakened by the heat of the
sun, weakened even more by the idleness of abundance; losing,
with the strength of the body, the courage of the soul and the
boldness of the spirit: and, on the contrary, I see in the North, na-
tions hardened by active life, prepared for war by the exercise of
hunting, by the need to work, to be industrious.100
How does this affect the history of astronomy? Southerners are
able to collect and pass on astronomical data over thousands of
years. Thanks to the length of time, they are able to discover various
periodicities of celestial phenomena, and can thus to predict these
occurrences e even without sufficient theoretical and mathemat-
ical background. However, they lack natural inquisitiveness and
intellectual obstinacy. They are unable to overcome the rule of
authority and prejudices in astronomy. They do not initiate prog-
ress, being unable to expand the knowledge gained and they are
satisfied with what has been achieved. Original ideas were always
produced by the creative and laborious Northerners, be it the
Greeks or modern Europeans, because in fact the optimal condi-
tions for innovative development of astronomy are found in the
North. “The facts show that astronomy adopted in good climates did
not progress [.]while the European, especially from the North, fights
against the inclemency of seasons and multiplies his works and efforts
.” 101 According to Bailly, there was never evidence of genius in hot
climates. The human spirit achieves progress in regions between
the frozen waste of the far north and the fiery climate of the south e
in temperate zones where the major European countries now lie.
The latitude around 49 where France and Germany lie is best for
the advance of human science and the development of enlightened
civilisation.102
The climatic theory of the history of science efficiently facili-
tated the explanation of one problem; the historians of astronomy
were well aware that the development of astronomy required the
collection of astronomical observations over a long period. In that
case, however, great oriental cultures such as China would have
developed a more elaborate astronomical system as their obser-
vations would have delved much deeper into the past. However, in
the age of the Enlightenment, it was already clear that European
astronomy was on a higher level: “the missionaries [.] discovered
that the state in which this science [astronomy] found itself with the
Chinese did not correspond to the long duration of their observa-
tions.”103 Such discrepancy was explained with reference to the
climatic theory for example by Voltaire as follows:
100
Bailly (1787a), p. 263. Bailly’s idea of the history of science and astronomy was
inspired by Buffon’s concept of the history of the world and is based on the in-
fluence of natural conditions on the development of human thought e see in detail
Smith (1954), pp. 454e499; Petri (1990), pp. 121e146.
101
Bailly (1778-1783), vol. II, p. 282; similarly vol. III, p. 322; Bailly (1781), p. 362.
102
Bailly (1778-1783), vol. I, p. 7; Bailly (1781), p. 323; Bailly (1779), p. 249.
103
Anonymous (1751), p. 789.

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9
It is surprising that [.] that their [Chinese] astronomy and all their
sciences were at the same time so ancient and so limited. It seems
as if nature had given to this species of men so different from ours,
organs formed for discovering all at once whatever was necessary
for them, and incapable of going any further. We on the contrary
have made our discoveries very late; but we have been quick in
bringing things to perfection.104
The Enlightenment historians referred to China and India as
prime examples of lands that used to have a developed astronomy.
As a result of the despotic government and the stupefying climate,
the Chinese and Indian astronomy stagnated, as it were preserved
itself: “. the scrupulous attachement of the Chinese for their
ancient customs, which extended even to their astronomical rules,
has contributed with them, to keep this science in a perpetual state
of infancy.”105 The Chinese and Indians are fearful and superstitious
and although they had a long tradition in observation, their intel-
lectual development came to an end. They only pass their astro-
nomical knowledge on from generation to generation without
understanding it.106
The climate theory and the despotic government theory also
made it possible to explain the continuity of the human spirit: the
great oriental civilisations gave birth to the human spirit, as this
was where the first astronomical facts could be ascertained. How-
ever, oriental states gradually came under despotic rule and their
scientific progress stopped. Intellectual development relocated to
the north, its holders becoming the Greeks, then the Arabs, and
finally modern Western Europeans. Thus in the end the theory of
the progress of the human spirit confirmed the requisite develop-
ment of the spirit, as well as the civilisation and intellectual su-
periority of the Europeans. The Enlightenment could declare itself
the climax of the entire previous progress of the human spirit.
5. Conclusions
In the eighteenth century, the history of astronomy formed an
integral part of the Enlightenment agenda. Biblical history was
either neutralised as mere pre-history that was not accessible to
secular historians, or reduced to the level of myths and legends. The
history of human knowledge does not feature any supernatural
influence. The entire modern, scientific and enlightened worldview
is the work of human ingenuity, patience and obstinacy. Being an
important part of the broader discourse on the human spirit, the
historiography of astronomy helped to elucidate the development
of scientific thought and highlight the necessity of its modern Eu-
ropean triumph. In identifying the history of astronomy with the
story of mankind’s freeing itself from illusions, prejudices, super-
stition; the historiography of astronomy became the story of
freedom endowed with a political and pedagogical pathos. Its goal
was never the simple depiction of the past but a convincing
delineation of the slow but necessary path of science towards its
modern European version.
This kind of historiography of science became dominant in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the last decades of the
twentieth century, historians of science decisively rejected this so-
called triumphalist whiggish account of the history of sciences.
104
Voltaire (1963), vol. I, p. 215, quoted from Voltaire (1759) vol. I, p. 19. Cf.
similarly Buffon (2007), p. 1229f.
105
Laplace (1796), p. 208; quoted from Laplace (1830), vol. II, p. 249.
106
See e.g. Hume (1994), p. 66; Montucla (1758), vol. I, p. 382e386; Bailly (1781),
p. 362; Bailly (1778-1783), vol. I, pp. 235,262f., vol. III, p. 322; Bailly (1787b), p. cxlv;
Bailly (1787a), pp. 22e30, 263e265.
10 D. Spelda / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2017) 1e10
Nevertheless, in all this legitimate criticism only seldom did it occur
to them to ask about the story’s initial motivation and purpose. Had
they engaged in this kind of questioning, contemporary critics of
whiggism and presentism would perhaps have seen that in those
days, historiography was never meant as an objectivized and
standardized historiographical endeavor. Its purpose was to extract
science and its history from the religious context, to confirm his-
torically the ideals of Enlightenment, and to motivate the further
progress of science.
Funding
This article is the product or research supported by the Dean’s
Grant for Research Enhancement, Faculty of Arts, Masaryk Univer-
sity (MUNI/21/SPE/2016).
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my gratitude to Laurens Schlicht and to
the anonymous reviewers for their helpful and detailed comments.
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