Gandiongco vs Penaranda
innocent spouse. Decree of legal separation may be issued upon
Gandionco vs Penaranda
GR No. 72984, November 27, 1987
FACTS:
Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against
herein petitioner, Froilan Gandionco for legal separation on the
ground of concubinage as a civil case. Teresita also filed a
criminal complaint of concubinage against her husband. She
likewise filed an application for the provisional remedy of support
pendent elite which was approved and ordered by the respondent
judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal separation
and the incidents consequent thereto such as the support for
pendent elite, in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed
against him. He contends that the civil action for legal separation
is inextricably tied with the criminal action thus, all proceedings
related to legal separation will have to be suspended and await the
conviction or acquittal of the criminal case.
ISSUE: Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can
proceed pending the resolution of the criminal case for
concubinage.
HELD:
Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner were
incorrect. A civil action for legal separation on the ground of
concubinage may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a
criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not
one to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, even if
both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the
same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right
to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof including
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of the
children, support and disqualifications from inheriting from the
proof by preponderance of evidence, where no criminal proceeding
or conviction is necessary.
Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed
of in an action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of
the judge. If in case, the petitioner finds the amount of support
pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to
modify or reduce the same.
WILLIAM H. BROWN, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JUANITA YAMBAO, defendant-appellee.
Jimenez B. Buendia for appellant.
Assistant City Fiscal Rafel A. Jose for appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to obtain legal separation from his lawful wife
Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while interned by the
Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto.
Tomas internment camp, his wife engaged in adulterous relations
with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl that Brown
learned of his wifes misconduct only in 1945, upon his release
from internment; that thereafter the spouse lived separately and
later executed a document (Annex A ) liquidating their conjugal
partnership and assigning certain properties to the erring wife as
her share. The complaint prayed for confirmation of the liquidation
agreement; for custody of the children issued of the marriage; that
the defendant be declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and
for their remedy as might be just and equitable.
Upon petition of the plaintiff, the court subsequently declared the
wife in default, for failure to answer in due time, despite service of
summons; and directed the City Fiscal or his representatives to—
investigate, in accordance with Article 101 of the Civil Code,
whether or not a collusion exists between the parties and to report
to this Court the result of his investigation within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of copy of this order. The City Fiscal or his
representative is also directed to intervene in the case in behalf of
the State. (Rec. App. p. 9).
As ordered, Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose appeared at the trial,
and cross-examined plaintiff Brown. His questions (strenuously
objected to by Brown's counsel) elicited the fact that after
liberation, Brown had lived maritally with another woman and had
begotten children by her. Thereafter, the court rendered judgment
denying the legal separation asked, on the ground that, while the
wife's adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a
misconduct of similar nature that barred his right of action under
Article 100 of the new Civil Code, providing:
ART. 100. The legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation or of
consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are
offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them.
Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause
the dismissal of the petition.
that there had been consent and connivance, and because Brown's
action had prescribed under Article 102 of the same Code:
ART. 102 An action for legal separation cannot be filed except
within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff
became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after
date when such cause occurred.
since the evidence showed that the learned of his wife's infidelity
in 1945 but only filed action in 1945.
Brown appeared to this Court, assigning the following errors:
The court erred in permitting the Assistant Fiscal Rafel Jose of
Manila to act as counsel for the defendant, who defaulted.
The court erred in declaring that there was condonation of or
consent to the adultery.
The court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.
Appellant Brown argues that in cross-examining him with regard
to his marital relation with Lilia Deito, who was not his wife, the
Assistant Fiscal acted as consel for the defaulting wife, "when the
power of the prosecuting officer is limited to finding out whether
or not there is collusion, and if there is no collusion, which is the
fact in the case at bar, to intervene for the state which is not the
fact in the instant case, the truth of the matter being that he
intervened for Juanita Yambao, the defendant-appellee, who is
private citizen and who is far from being the state.".
The argument is untenable. Collusion in matrimonial cases being
"the act of married persons in procuring a divorce by mutual
consent, whether by preconcerted commission by one of a
matrimonial offense, or by failure, in pursuance of agreement to
defend divorce proceedings" (Cyclopedia Law Dictionary; Nelson,
Divorce and Separation, Section 500), it was legitimate for the
Fiscal to bring to light any circumstances that could give rise to the
inference that the wife's default was calculated, or agreed upon, to
enable appellant to obtain the decree of legal separation that he
sought without regard to the legal merits of his case. One such
circumstance is obviously the fact of Brown's cohabitation with a
woman other than his wife, since it bars him from claiming legal
separation by express provision of Article 100 of the new Civil
Code. Wherefore, such evidence of such misconduct, were proper
subject of inquiry as they may justifiably be considered
circumstantial evidence of collusion between the spouses.
The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the
intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested
proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages,
under Article 88), is to emphasize that marriage is more than a
mere contract; that it is a social institution in which the state is
vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption cannot be
made depend upon the parties themselves (Civil Code, Article 52;
Adong vs. Cheong Gee, 43 Phil., 43; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil.
855; Goitia vs. Campos, 35 Phil. 252). It is consonant with this
policy that the injury by the Fiscal should be allowed to focus upon
any relevant matter that may indicate whether the proceedings for
separation or annulment are fully justified or not.
no such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon
the record.
Hence, there being at least two well established statutory grounds
for denying the remedy sought (commission of similar offense by
petitioner and prescription of the action), it becomes unnecesary to
delve further into the case and ascertain if Brown's inaction for ten
years also evidences condonation or connivance on his part. Even
if it did not, his situation would not be improved. It is thus needless
to discuss the second assignment of error.
The third assignment of error being a mere consequence of the
others must necessarily fail with them.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
appellant. So ordered.

The court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's
action was already barred, because Brown did not petition for legal
separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's
adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945.
Under Article 102 of the new Civil Code, action for legal
separation can not be filed except within one (1) year from and
after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five
years from and after the date when such cause occurred.
Appellant's brief does not even contest the correctness of such
findings and conclusion.

It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense.

Nevertheless, the courts can take cognizance thereof, because
actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of
marriage, involve public interest and it is the policy of our law that
De Ocampo vs Florenciano on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff.
What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on
De Ocampo vs. Florenciano defendant’s confession. The petition should be granted based on
107 Phil 35 the second adultery, which has not yet prescribed.

FACTS:

Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938.

They begot several children who are not living with plaintiff. In
March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that his wife
was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose
Arcalas. Having found out, he sent the wife to Manila in June
1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed for one year. Again
plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several other
man other than Arcalas. In 1952, when the wife finished her
studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately.
In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit
relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention of filing
a petition for legal separation to which defendant manifested
conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal
action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation
in 1955.

ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes

the confession of judgment disallowed by the Family Code.

HELD:

Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she

committed adultery, in the existence of evidence of adultery other
than such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed
by Article 48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a
confession of judgment, a confession done in court or through a
pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery independent of
the defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal separation, the
decree of separation should be granted since it would not be based
Tenchavez vs Escano
FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino
Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with
Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer
before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a
culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered
in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their
match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship
with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where
she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to
renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicenta’s
parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicenta’s dad ,
he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with
her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and
when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a
complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved
and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada.
She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the
Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an
American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired
citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against
Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded
Vicenta from joining her husband.
ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid
and binding upon courts of the Philippines.
HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine
courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute
divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation
of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in
favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries.
The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband
is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez.
In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still
married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed
is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee
entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and
securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the
other for damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as
follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a
decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-
appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and
attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee,
Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena
Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
PROPERTY RELATIONS CASES
Matabuena v. Cervantes Case Digest
FACTS:
Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During
this period, Felix Matabuena donated to Respondent a
parcel of land. Later the two were married. After the death
of Felix Matabuena, his sister, Petitioner, sought the
nullification of the donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code
“Every donation between the spouses during the marriage
shall be void.”
The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the
prohibition because the donation was made at the time the
deceased and Respondent were not yet married and were
simply cohabitating.
ISSUE:
W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in
partners.
HELD:
Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction
that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of
the law as what is written. Since the reason for the ban on
donations between spouses during the marriage is to
prevent the possibility of undue influence and improper
pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other, there is
no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to
common-law relationships.The court, however, said that
the lack of the donation made by the deceased to
Respondent does not necessarily mean that the
Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the disputed property
because the relationship between Felix and Respondent
were legitimated by marriage.
Agapay vs Palang
FACTS:
Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on
1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding.
Their only child Herminia was born in May 1950. The trial court
found evident that as early as 1957, Miguel attempted to Divorce
Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, he refused
to lived with Carlina and stayed alone in a house in Pozzorubio
Pangasinan.
The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19
year old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 months earlier, they
jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at Binalonan
Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same place was likewise
purchased. On the other hand, Miguel and Carlina executed a
Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement and agreed
to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to
their child Herminia.
Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son named
Kristopher. In 1979, they were convicted of concubinage upon
Carlina’s complaint. 2 years later, Miguel died. Carlina and her
daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership and
possession with damages against petitioner. They sought to get
back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan allegedly
purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. The
lower court dismissed the complaint but CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should
be awarded in favor of Erlinda Agapay.
HELD: Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee.

The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a
Miguel and Erlinda. However, their marriage is void because of donation and which was clearly void and inexistent by express
the subsisting marriage with Carlina. Only the properties acquired provision of the law because it was made between persons guilty
by both parties through their actual joint contribution shall be of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation. Moreover,
owned by them in proportion to their respective contributions. It is Article 87 of the Family Code, expressly provides that the
required that there be an actual contribution. If actual contribution prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to
is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of donations between persons living together as husband and wife
equal shares. without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who
incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.
Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the
business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store. However, she
failed to persuade the court that she actually contributed money to
but the subjected riceland. When the land was acquired, she was
only around 20 years old compared to Miguel who was already 64
years old and a pensioner of the US Government. Considering his
youthfulness, its unrealistic how she could have contributed the
P3,750 as her share. Thus, the court finds no basis to justify the
co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Hence, the Riceland
should, as correctly held by CA, revert to the conjugal partnership
property of the deceased and Carlina.

It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to

donate their conjugal property in favor of Herminia. Separation of
property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place
except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there
is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment
resulted from the compromise was not specifically for separation
of property and should not be so inferred.

With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who
prepared the deed of conveyance for the property revealed the
falshood of Erlinda’s claim that she bought such property for
P20,000 when she was 22 years old. The lawyer testified that
Miguel provided the money for the purchase price and directed
Harding vs Commercial Union Assurance