IRTB Module 07 PG 01.2017

Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings
Training Support Package Participant Guide
Table of Contents
Table of Contents .......................................................................................................... 1
MODULE 7 RESPONDING TO POST-DETONATION INCIDENTS – Administration
Page................................................................................................................................ 2
Duration ....................................................................................................................... 2
Scope Statement ......................................................................................................... 2
Terminal Learning Objectives (TLO) ............................................................................ 2
Enabling Learning Objectives (ELO)............................................................................ 2
Resources ................................................................................................................... 2
Instructor to Participant Ratio ...................................................................................... 3
Reference List ............................................................................................................. 3
Assessment Strategy ................................................................................................... 3
ICON MAP ...................................................................................................................... 4
MODULE INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 5
EXPLOSIVE PROCESS AND EFFECTS ..................................................................... 11
EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE ................................................................................... 15
STRUCTURAL HAZARDS ........................................................................................... 33
FIRST RESPONDER PRIORITIES ............................................................................... 44
RESCUE AND RECOVERY ......................................................................................... 56
EVIDENCE PRESERVATION ....................................................................................... 68
CASE STUDY: BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING...................................................... 83
SUMMARY .................................................................................................................. 127
January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 7-1

Emergency Operations Sensitive
MODULE 7 RESPONDING TO POST-DETONATION

INCIDENTS – Administration Page
Duration
2.75 Hours
Scope Statement
This module presents information concerning first responder actions at post-detonation
incidents—situations where the response occurs after detonation of an explosive or
activation of an incendiary device. The presentation includes discussion of priorities,
critical response actions (rescue, scene control, and evidence collection) using
examples from past incidents and includes a comprehensive performance exercise in
which participants are required to apply skills and knowledge acquired during the
module.
Terminal Learning Objectives (TLO)
At the conclusion of this module, participants will be able to identify safe and effective
response procedures to a post-detonation incident.
Enabling Learning Objectives (ELO)
7-1 Identify the impact of explosive effects on response operations in post-
detonation situations.
7-2 Categorize post-blast injuries common among victims of bombing

incidents.
7-3 Identify hazards typically encountered in structures by first responders

after a bombing incident.
7-4 Identify response priorities and critical decisions and actions required
during the initial response to a post-detonation incident.
7-5 Identify first responder responsibilities for evidence preservation during the
initial response to a post-detonation incident.
Resources
• Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings (IRTB) Course Handouts, including
course evaluation forms, pre-test forms, registration forms, self-evaluation forms,
and travel reimbursement forms (one per participant).
• Pencil or pen, protective glasses, badge, and nameplate (one per participant).
• Flash drive containing Participant Guide, Video Library, Case Study Library, and
Additional Resources (one per participant).

• Digital projectors, flip-chart, and whiteboard.

• Slides and video clips.
Instructor to Participant Ratio
Conference (Classroom–2:50; Range–3:50).
Reference List
See Appendices.
Assessment Strategy
• Observation of the level and quality of classroom participation.
• Participation and quality of performance on the performance exercise.
• Administration of the post-test to assess mastery of module objectives (TLO and
ELOs).

ICON MAP
Question: Used when there is an opportunity to ask a question or start a class
discussion.
Key Points/Learning Objectives: Used to highlight each time lesson content is

directly relevant to an Enabling Learning Objective.
First Responder Safety: Used to highlight information that relates directly to the
personal safety of first responders.

MODULE INTRODUCTION
Slide 7-1 IRTB Module 7: Responding to Post-Detonation

Incidents
This slide displays the Module 7 title slide.
Terrorists and terrorist groups have demonstrated the ability to plan

and conduct complex attacks, simultaneously and against multiple
targets. Despite aggressive prevention and deterrence programs,
inevitably at some point an attack will be executed. Communities
must be prepared to respond if such an attack occurs within their
jurisdiction.

Slide 7-2 Terminal Learning Objective
This slide contains the Terminal Learning Objective for the module.
At the conclusion of this module, participants will be able to identify

safe and effective response procedures to a post-detonation
incident.
This module provides participants with a foundation of knowledge

explaining how to safely and effectively respond to post-detonation
incidents.

Slide 7-3 Enabling Learning Objectives
Slide 7-4 Enabling Learning Objectives, cont.
These slides contain the Enabling Learning Objectives.

The Enabling Learning Objectives (ELOs) for this module are:
7-1 Identify the impact of explosive effects on response

operations in post-detonation situations.
7-2 Categorize post-blast injuries common among victims of

bombing incidents.
7-3 Identify hazards typically encountered in structures by

first responders after a bombing incident.
7-4 Identify response priorities and critical decisions and

actions required during the initial response to a post-
detonation incident.
7-5 Identify first responder responsibilities for evidence

preservation during the initial response to a post-
detonation incident.

Slide 7-5 Course Map
This slide depicts the Course Map.
Module 7 is the second of three modules that focus on response to

terrorist attacks involving explosives and incendiaries. The skills
and knowledge about the terrorist threat and introductory materials
on energetic materials acquired during previous modules will be
used in performing tasks associated with the objectives in this
module.

Slide 7-6 The Bottom Line
This module was developed using lessons learned from previous

bombing incidents and represents best practices derived from
those lessons learned. Local policies and procedures should, in
most cases, be consistent with the materials in the module. Where
those policies and procedures differ from those in the module,
participants are advised to perform in accordance with
departmental or agency policies and procedures.
It is recommended, however, that agencies carefully review such

policies and consider modifying them so they are consistent with
what is presented in this course. The material in this course was
developed from research and best practices learned during
thousands of incidents, and has been reviewed and approved by
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

EXPLOSIVE PROCESS AND EFFECTS
Slide 7-7 Explosive Effects
ELO 7-1
Identify the impact of explosive effects on response
operations in post-detonation situations.
Explosive effects will determine the scene landscape after the fact.
Understanding these will assist the responder in anticipating what
he or she may encounter in post-detonation situations.
Incendiary or Thermal Effect

The incendiary effect occurs with both high and low explosives. The
effect will vary greatly from one compound to another. Generally,
low explosives will produce a thermal effect for a longer period of
time, creating a higher threat of fire in a post-detonation situation.
High explosives will produce higher temperatures for a shorter
period of time. The greater blast effect with high explosives
commonly will extinguish fire. Some high-explosive devices are
designed to start fire by utilizing magnesium or aluminum in their
mixtures.

Blast-pressure Effect or Shock Front

The blast effect is the resulting bubble surrounding the seat of an
explosion. As the shock wave travels from the seat, it creates an
overpressure situation.
Fragmentation or Shrapnel Effect

Fragmentation is material projected from the actual device itself.
Normally it is the casing, but can also include components such as
batteries and switches. Some casings may add to the blast effect of
a device such as aluminum. Aluminum can enhance the reaction of
a device because aluminum is a form of fuel that when added to an
explosive will increase its heat and sensitivity.
Other casings may detract from the functioning of a device. Heavy

steel piping may reduce the fragmentation effect. Some casings
may be scored to ensure proper fragmentation and maximum
distribution. Shrapnel differs from fragmentation in that shrapnel is
not a working part of the bomb.
Shrapnel could include nails or shot placed in or around a device.

In the case of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building bombing,
window blinds were one of the many objects that became
projectiles1 (shrapnel) that were propelled by the force of the
detonation. Any device designed to produce fragmentation or
shrapnel is considered anti-personnel.
What Explosive Effects Mean for First Responders at a Post-

Blast Scene
1
Oklahoma City Bombing Injuries, (1998). Oklahoma State Department of Health.

Slide 7-8 What Factors Influence Blast Effects?
A number of factors influence the blast effects of explosive charges:

• The type, weight, and shape of the explosive charge
• Distance from the point of detonation (keep out or standoff
distance)
• Orientation of the structural component (with respect to the
explosive device)
• Blast-wave reflection from other surfaces
• Focusing of the blast wave
• Type and strength of a structure
• Thickness, length, and height of wall or glazing panels
• Type of window frames or support for glass panels or walls
All can work either to increase or decrease the effects of a blast.
Individuals and structures closest to the seat of the explosion

(ground zero) typically experience the most significant injuries and
damage. However, shock waves that are reflected from or off a
surface can be channeled to produce injuries and damage in
unexpected places for greater distances than normally
experienced. Some structures may collapse, while adjacent
structures remain largely intact due to inherent structural
differences.

Slide 7-9 Video: IRA Truck Bomb, 1996
This slide contains a series of video clips of the 1996 truck bombing
of a shopping center in Manchester, England, by the Irish
Republican Army (IRA). The bombers called in warnings 90
minutes prior to detonation, so the area was evacuated, but the
bomb squad was unable to defuse the 3,300-pound (1,500 kg)
mixture of Semtex, a military-grade plastic explosive, and
ammonium nitrate fertilizer. This bomb was approximately half the
size in weight of the bomb utilized at the Alfred P. Murrah Building
in Oklahoma City in 1995.
In the slow-motion footage of this video, the full range of explosive

effects, from positive pressure to negative pressure, can be seen
as the bomb explodes outside a shopping center.
The shock front or wave can be visually likened to the outer ring of
ripples created when you toss a pebble into a pond. The shock
front is the front line of the blast effect. The shock wave can often
be seen from a distance traveling across the earth. The shock wave
is present in both air and ground. In the ground, effects are similar
to an earthquake. In the air, the shock wave is a front of hot,
compressed gases. The shock wave causes damage by exerting
an intense wind and overpressure on persons and structures.

EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE
Slide 7-10 Categories of Blast Injuries
ELO 7-2
Categorize post-blast injuries common among victims of
bombing incidents.
Blast injuries are categorized in one of five ways: primary,

secondary, tertiary, quaternary, and quinary. Each type represents
a unique form of physical damage.2 As was previously discussed in
the beginning of this module, a victim from a blast may exhibit all
five types of blast injuries. Primary injuries from the blast pressure,
secondary injuries from the fragmentation and shrapnel, tertiary
injuries from the shock front/pressure wave moving them or objects
toward them, quaternary injuries from a fire or structural collapse as
a result of the blast damage, and quinary injuries from chemical or
biological additives in the explosives.
2
CDC. (2008). Blast Injuries: Essential Facts. Retrieved from
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/masscasualties/pdf/blastinjuries.pdf

The visible indications of internal blast injuries are not as obvious

as what is visible from other types of injuries that involve the impact
of objects that have mass.
All primary blast injuries are a result of the effect of the blast-
pressure wave on the body. Blast-pressure waves are nothing more
than fast moving pulses of compressed air. As such, they are
compressive forces. Understanding their interaction with the body is
relatively easy once this is recognized.3
3
(2009). Chapter 17: Trauma Systems and Mechanism of Injury. Retrieved from
http://samples.jbpub.com/9780763773991/73991_CH17_002_029.pdf

Slide 7-11 Primary Blast Injuries
This slide shows illustrations of the organs most susceptible to

primary blast injuries. The photograph shows an eye globe that
ruptured due to blast pressures.
Primary blast injuries are caused by the blast wave interacting with
the body. As the blast wave passes through the body, it causes
damage through spalling, implosion, and inertia. Spalling occurs
when a shock wave reaches a fluid gas interface. It causes the
surface to break up into small particles or fragments. Implosion is
the momentary contraction of an air bubble that occurs when a
high-pressure blast wave passes through it. As the overpressure
falls, the bubble again expands rapidly. Inertia (or acceleration) is
the movement of the body wall in the direction of the blast wave.
Solid organs vibrate as the shock wave passes through them;
however, adjacent structures have different properties and may
collide with the organs—thus stretching and tearing them.
The ears are most sensitive to blasts because they are organs
designed to detect weak pressure waves (sound) in air. Therefore,
ear injuries are the most common injury seen in post-detonation
incidents. Rupture of the eardrum may occur at about five pounds
per square inch (psi) above atmospheric. From fifteen to thirty psi

above atmospheric, irreversible inner ear damage may occur,

causing permanent deafness.
It is important to remember this phenomenon, because first

responders may encounter blast survivors suffering from hearing
impairment who may not be able to hear commands. The
consequence is often unresponsive survivors, who do not do what
they are directed to do.
The lung is the second most likely organ to suffer as a result of a

blast; lung damage is a major cause of death among bombing
victims. The lung damage threshold is 30 psi above atmospheric
with progressively higher levels of spalling, pulmonary hemorrhage,
air embolism, and pulmonary contusions at higher levels of
pressure.
Historically, gastrointestinal (GI) tract injuries have been considered

a consequence of underwater explosions only. However, such
injuries may occur in air blasts as well and may be more common
than reported. Injuries to the gastrointestinal tract involve tearing,
internal hemorrhages, and perforations.
It should be noted that people exposed to air blast in enclosed

spaces (such as a car, the interior of a trailer, or a small room)
would be more prone to GI injury. In enclosed spaces, the blast
pressure has more time to build up before being vented. This time
increases the relative impulse (or duration) an individual is
exposed.
Air blast injuries severe enough to cause injuries to the

gastrointestinal tract, liver, or spleen normally produce fatal lung
damage. These injuries are likely to have observable symptoms
less dramatic than the other more common life-threatening injuries.
Neurotrauma, or injuries to the nervous system, are very common

in bombing incidents and one of the major causes of death. As the
pressure wave passes through a human body, cortical vessels may
rupture because of shearing forces and inertial-type injuries,
resulting in hemorrhages. Neurotrauma injuries can be seen in all
levels of blast injuries.
Cerebral air embolism, along with concussion, may also occur.

Many patients with head injuries have deceptively lucid intervals,

with only slight mental deterioration, and then collapse and die later
from the injuries.
The term “polytrauma” is used to describe patients who have

multiple types of traumatic injuries.
Remember, medical personnel should evaluate all persons close to

the seat of an explosion before they are allowed to leave the area,
because many primary body injuries are not readily apparent.

Slide 7-12 Secondary Blast Injuries
This slide lists the most frequent types of secondary blast injuries
and shows a photo of first responders attending to a man injured
during the Boston Marathon bombings.
Fragments of the bomb container or surrounding materials

(shrapnel) cause secondary injuries. These fragments are
shattered by the explosion and projected at high velocities, but the
speed at which they are propelled rapidly decreases. While in the
high-velocity phase, however, these fragments or missiles cause
multiple large, complex, and contaminated wounds.
Additionally, survivors may suffer all the typical effects of

conventional injuries from being thrown off balconies and being hit
by large pieces of falling debris.
In many explosions, secondary injuries are responsible for the

majority of casualties. For example, the glass facade of the Alfred
P. Murrah Federal Building shattered into thousands of heavy glass
chunks, which were propelled through inhabited areas of the
building with devastating results.4
4

The types of wounds associated with secondary injuries are varied

and include abrasions, contusions, and/or lacerations. If the
propelled objects are traveling at sufficient speed, they may also
cause blunt trauma, fractures, or penetrate the extremities and vital
organs. These types of injuries result in a high degree of lethality.

Slide 7-13 Tertiary Blast Injuries
This slide lists the most frequent types of tertiary blast injuries and
shows a photo of a compound fracture.
When a victim is propelled through the air by the force of a blast

and strikes other objects, tertiary injuries occur. These injuries are
generally only seen with high-energy explosions. Unless the
explosion is of extremely high energy or is focused in some way—
such as through a door or hatch—generally the survivor must be
very close to the explosion source.
Most of the pediatric casualties at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal

Building involved secondary and tertiary injuries. There was a very
high incidence of skull fractures (including 17 children with open
brain injuries) and long bone injuries including traumatic
amputations.5 Impact with a rigid surface will produce multiple types
of injury, with bone fractures being predominant. You can expect to
see blunt trauma injuries, and possibly traumatic amputations.
Traumatic amputations can result from primary, secondary, or

tertiary blast injuries, and include the non-surgical removal of the
fingers, toes, hands, feet, arms, legs, and ears from the body.
5

There are three types of amputation: complete where the body part
is completely torn off (severed), partial where more than fifty
percent of the body part is torn off, and, de-gloving where skin and
tissue are torn away from a body part.

Slide 7-14 Quaternary Blast Injuries
This slide shows the palm of a hand with extensive burns.
Quaternary injuries include all other injuries caused by the

explosion. They may include toxic inhalations and exposures,
radiation exposure and burns (chemical or thermal), asphyxiation in
fires, dust inhalation, and crushing injuries from collapsed
structures and displaced heavy objects. The most common
quaternary injuries are thermal burns. Overall, clothing offers a
moderate degree of protection from the short-lived fireball produced
by an explosion, but some types of fabrics can either increase the
intensity of the burn injury or help mitigate it. Those individuals
positioned close to the seat of detonation normally suffer burns on
exposed areas of the body.

Slide 7-15 Quinary Blast Injuries
This slide contains a photograph from July 2004 of a schoolboy in

northeastern China who was injured by an abandoned chemical
bomb from WWII.6
Quinary injuries (the fifth type) are caused by additives to the

explosives, such as radiation or chemicals (as might be used in a
“dirty bomb”). This could include contamination bacteria, radiation,
chemical agents, or contaminated tissue from bystanders or
assailant (HIV or Hepatitis C).7 Though this is rare, it must be
considered with each patient evaluation.
6
(2004, July 28). WWII Chemical Weapons Injure Boys. China Through A Lens. Retrieved from
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2004/Jul/102425.htm.
7 (2015, October 7). Blast Injury Research Program. Retrieved from
https://blastinjuryresearch.amedd.army.mil/index.cfm?f=application.introduction.

Slide 7-16 Challenges with Patients after a Blast
Now that you know about the categories of blast injuries, let’s
discuss what that means for first responders trying to help
individuals and control a scene after a blast. Some of the specific
medical-related challenges that can complicate a post-blast scene
include:
 The overwhelming number of casualties

 People with hearing loss who are unable to hear instructions
about evacuations or how to access medical care
 Individuals with traumatic brain injury or in shock who cannot
follow directions or make sound decisions, yet who do not
have visible injuries
 Injured people self-transporting away from the scene
 Excess of volunteer medical personnel; this is a benefit, but
sometimes it can result in multiple/conflicting triage practices
 Survivors and loved ones trying to find one another at the
scene
 Transportation considerations for all categories of injured
people

Slide 7-17 Example: Madrid Train Bombings, March 2004
This slide shows some of the Madrid train bombing wreckage and a
few of the 1,800 wounded victims shortly after the explosions.
A series of terrorist bombings on March 11, 2004 in the Cercanías

commuter train system of Madrid, Spain, killed 191 people and
wounded 1,800. An after-action report by Spanish authorities
provided insight into the types of things that can go wrong in a post-
blast situation, as well as the things that can go right. After-action
report findings are summarized below and can also be found on the
IRTB Flash Drive in the additional resources section8.
What Went Wrong/Areas of Weakness:

1. Initial chaos due to over triage and uneven distribution of
casualties to hospitals
2. Difficulties in communicating with the scenes of the blasts
3. Initial deficiencies in security (excess of voluntary personnel
outside), identification of casualties and record-keeping
4. Initial problems with the information given to the families
8
Overall Assessment and Response to Terrorist Bombing in Trains, Madrid, 11 March 2004, (2008). European
Journal of Trauma Emergency Surgery.

5. Hospital staff not acquainted with patterns of blast injuries

6. In retrospect, care was provided to some ‘‘expectant injuries’’ at
Gregorio Marañón University General Hospital (GMUGH), which
was the closest to the blasts and is the largest hospital in
Madrid in terms of the number of beds and manpower
7. Excessive number of blood donations
What Went Right/Areas of Strength:

1. Rapid EMS response (except for one site) and evacuation
2. Hospital triage by trained staff
3. The sizes and resources of the closest hospitals probably
helped (no secondary transfers from GMUGH)
4. Appropriate measures were taken to maximize surge capacity
5. Early online database of patients admitted to GMUGH
6. Spontaneous, selfless, and determined collaboration by all
hospital personnel

Slide 7-18 Tactical Medicine Best Practices
This slide shows a police officer as he transports an injured woman

away from the finish line of the Boston Marathon shortly after the
bombings. Note that a scarf is being used as a tourniquet on the
woman’s leg.
“Tactical medicine” can be defined as both emergent and non-

emergent care provided to victims of illness or injury related to law
enforcement or military operations, often in a hostile environment. A
post-blast scene may call for the rapid application of tactical
medicine best practices, and first responders should be prepared
with both knowledge and equipment.
In recent years, tourniquets carried by law enforcement and fire

personnel have saved many lives of civilians and first responders.
First responder agencies/departments are encouraged to invest in
trauma kits for all personnel, and to ensure personnel are
sufficiently trained on the correct use of tactical medicine gear.
There is no substitute for training and the practical application of

equipment and supplies that first responders could be called upon
to use. First responders should be familiar with equipment and
supplies and follow their organization’s applicable use for supplies
and equipment.

Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (TECC) has an established set

of guidelines for the Provision of Prehospital Trauma Care in a High
Threat Environment, and should only be conducted by those that
are qualified to deliver TECC9.
9
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (June 2015). First Responder Guide for Improving Survivability in
Improvised Explosive Device and/or Active Shooter Incidents. Retrieved from http://c-
tecc.org/images/content/First_Responder_Guidance_June_2015_FINAL_2_0.pdf

Slide 7-19 Emergency Medical Care
Response to a bombing incident presents several threats to first

responders and such hazards could include biological, chemical
and radiological. Caution has to be taken regarding such hazards
and appropriate PPE must be utilized to protect first responders.
Selection and screening of the triage area is one of the first steps in
providing medical treatment. The location should be close enough
for easy transport, preferably by foot, yet far enough away to
preclude further injury from building collapse or detonation of
additional devices. The site should be close to roads accessible by
ambulances. Screening is important to ensure that victims are free
of other hazards and additional devices.
Triage is one of the most important aspects of survivor identification

of medical needs. If possible and time allows, survivors should be
moved to a private area for more extensive triage measures. Those
who have received mortal wounds should be covered as soon as
possible. When movement of survivors to a private area is not
possible, covering victims serves two purposes—one, mitigation of
shock symptoms and two, providing a privacy curtain from those
not providing medical support.

Documentation is important to facilitate accountability in post-

detonation incidents. It is critical in determining who has been
rescued and who is still missing. Documentation also assists in the
future identification of suspects and witnesses. Furthermore, once
survivors are transported to a medical treatment facility, movement
must be recorded so family members can be notified.
Coordination with medical treatment facilities is essential so

survivors can be transported to facilities that can provide the best
care, such as trauma and burn survivors to trauma and burn units.
Be aware that transportation to a single facility can soon overwhelm
its capabilities.
Medical personnel and doctors should be alert to evidence that

might be on survivors’ clothing or even embedded in their skin. Any
clothing items collected by emergency responders or medical
personnel should be placed in a biohazard bag with the initials of
the person collecting the items and the survivor’s name written on
the bag. These items should be turned over to law enforcement as
soon as possible.
Immediately after a bombing incident occurs, there is a tendency

for emergency-room personnel to self-dispatch to the incident
scene. Plans should prescribe that such personnel report to their
respective hospitals. In some past bombing incidents, emergency
rooms were initially understaffed because physicians and nurses
were at the site of the bombing, attempting to support evacuation
and treatment that could better be accomplished by paramedics
and other medical emergency responders.
First responders should always beware of their surrounding at a

post detonation scene. Individuals being treated or in close
proximity to the scene may also be involved in the bombing.
Secondary devices can be deployed by one of these individuals.
The suicide bombing in Dimona, Israel on February 4, 2008
demonstrates this point when two suicide bombers attacked a
shopping center. The first suicide bomber detonated his suicide
belt, which injured the second suicide bomber and killed one other
person. As police Officer Kobi Mor was responding to the scene he
approached the second bomber who appeared to be injured.
Officer Mor said the injured man began to reach for a suicide belt
and this is when Officer Mor shot and killed the second suicide
bomber.

STRUCTURAL HAZARDS
Slide 7-20 Common Structural Hazards
This slide contains two photos--The top photo shows a damaged

building and potential glass hazards; the bottom photo shows a fire
at the Pentagon shortly after the September 11, 2001 suicide
attack.
ELO 7-3
Identify hazards typically encountered in structures by first
responders after a bombing incident.
The devastation created by even a moderately sized explosive

event will leave in its wake a variety of hazards to survivors who
remain in damaged and collapsed structures and to first
responders. Some hazards are obvious, while others are not.
Hazardous materials and conditions impact all operations at the
bombing-incident scene in one way or another. Safe response
requires a comprehensive knowledge of potential hazards.
Structural Hazards
There are three common types of structural hazards: glass,
fragments, and collapse and fire hazards.

Glass Hazards
The primary sources of glass hazards are windows. Glass hazards
come in one of three forms: projected, falling, and static glass.
Projected or flying glass shards are due to the positive pressure
phase of the blast wave. Normally, glass is not a substantial hazard
during post-detonation operations unless multiple devices detonate
in the vicinity of the target location.
Falling or guillotine glass poses a hazard during detonation of the

device, but can also linger as a hazard to first responders operating
in damaged structures. Static glass can be present throughout a
damaged structure and cause additional injuries to victims of the
initial explosion and to first responders attempting rescue
operations in the structure.
Fragment Hazards
Blast-pressure forces applied to reinforced concrete can cause
fragment hazards due to spalling (fragmentation) or breaching. In
post-detonation situations, first responders can be injured by
concrete and steel that dislodges from intact structures or a debris
field. A nurse responding to the bombing at the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building was killed by a piece of concrete that dislodged
and fell from the structure.10
Collapse and Fire Hazards

Collapse hazards occur due to catastrophic failure of structural
components caused by the blast pressure, which may result in a
progressive collapse (pancaking) of a structure, or intense fire that
weakens structural supports causing a progressive collapse. As
buildings collapse, fire will spread and perhaps intensify due to the
presence of additional fuel, such as ruptured gas lines.
Effects of Fire
Be aware that blast pressure fires started by a bomb can
weaken the integrity of a building, affecting even concrete and
steel. First responders should be aware of these hazards and
follow local policies and procedures, including the
recommendations of structural engineers, when responding to
post-detonation incidents.
10

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National

Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)
The Department of Homeland Security’s National Infrastructure
Protection Plan (NIPP) provides the unifying structure for the
integration of a wide range of efforts for the enhanced protection
and resiliency of the nation's critical infrastructure and key
resources (CIKR) into a single national program.
For more information on NIPP, visit the DHS website at

http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/editorial_0827.shtm
For more information on CIKR, visit the DHS website at

http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1189168948944.shtm

Slide 7-21 Progressive Structure Collapse
Placing an abnormal load on a structure either through an explosive

blast (external or internal), impact by a vehicle, hurricane-force
winds, or earthquake can initiate progressive collapse of a
structure. The initial damage may be to only a small portion of the
structure, but a chain reaction of failures begins that eventually
results in extensive damage. Collapse due to an explosion will
probably begin prior to the arrival of first responders at the incident
scene.
However, progressive collapse of the remaining structure can occur

for up to twelve days. Keep in mind that the twelve days is a
subjective measurement of time, and that twelve-day period of time
re-starts every time an event occurs that changes the stability of the
structure or rubble pile. Those events can include removal of debris
by first responders as well as additional collapses at different
locations within the structure. Therefore, first responders must be
extremely cautious when responding to a bombing incident that has
caused building collapse.

Slide 7-22 Video: Progressive Collapse
This slide contains a graphic animation that demonstrates how a

progressive collapse occurs. Collapse is a result of forces that work
against structural components, exceeding the design
characteristics of those components.

Slide 7-23 Loss of Columns and Beams
This slide shows a graphic illustrating how sideways and upward

force impacts a structure that was designed to support weight from
the top. Notice the arrows, indicating the directional force of a blast
pressure from an explosive detonation.
Generally, there are two ways in which a building will collapse—

implode or explode. The method of collapse depends on the
direction of force applied to the materials in the structure.
In an explosion, a building collapses to the exterior of the structure.

Implosion causes a building to collapse into itself. Implosion is a
technique used by demolition specialists to destroy buildings and
minimize the spread of debris. Implosion is likely to be caused
when the interior load bearing structures lose their integrity and pull
exterior walls into the center of the building. The World Trade
Center, North Tower, is a good example of this type of collapse.
The density and depth of debris is generally greater when a
building has imploded.
An outward rush of force caused by natural, mechanical, or

chemical forces—such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and
bombings—cause structures to explode. Because the building

collapses outward, it is likely that debris will be more widespread

and thus, of lesser density and depth. In explosions, survivors are
likely to be found under debris at greater distance from a structure.

Slide 7-24 Effects of Fire/Heat
This slide lists some of the effects of intense fire on structural

components.
In addition to building collapses, explosions often cause fire. The

heat generated by fire also weakens a structure. For instance, at
1000 degrees Fahrenheit, steel beams and columns can lose sixty
percent of their strength, soften or lose stiffness to seventy percent
of their strength, and elongate to sixty-five-hundredths percent of
their strength.11 They can also conduct heat. Concrete beams,
columns, panels, and slabs can absorb heat (heat sink) that can
cause them to crack, craze (produce minute cracks), and spall due
to heat associated with a fire.
11
(2010, Nov. 16). Engineers Test Effects of Fire on Steel Structures. Purdue University. Retrieved from
http://www.purdue.edu/newsroom/research/2010/101116VarmaFire.html.

Slide 7-25 Other Hazards
Secondary Device / Multiple Devices

All responders should be alert for anything that could be an
additional explosive device or any material that could have
been used to conceal an additional explosive device. Law
enforcement officers, firefighters, emergency medical
personnel, and other emergency response personnel should
continually observe their operational areas for any signs of
additional explosives. If a suspected device is observed, the
incident commander should be notified and recall procedures
implemented immediately.
Responders should also be alert for the presence of unexploded

ordnance. Additional devices and unexploded ordnance can
complicate all response operations; sometimes this hazard is the
intent of the bomber.
The search for additional devices should include more than just
operational areas; it should also include staging areas, command
posts, rest and rehab areas, and triage areas.
Natural Gas, Electrical Lines and Related Hazards

Explosions can sever gas lines, water pipes, electrical cables,
and other potentially hazardous materials in the building.

While active, these present a danger to both responders and

survivors in the structure. Utilities should be turned off as
soon as possible.
Other WMDs
Responders must commence monitoring for other WMD
hazards immediately on arrival at the incident scene.
Conventional explosives can be used to disseminate biological,
chemical, and radiological agents. Any sign of contamination by
such materials should cause an immediate adjustment in
operations, including additional evacuations and a change to
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), that you are trained to wear,
required for operations in the immediate vicinity of the seat of the
explosion (or ground zero) and downwind from that point.
Obviously, the presence of other WMD requires the wearing of

additional items of PPE. However, even for operations where only
conventional explosives are used, responders must be equipped
with appropriate PPE, including helmets to protect the head and
neck area, gloves to protect from cuts and exposure to body fluids,
and heavy boots or shoes to protect ankles and feet from sharp
objects and uneven ground support.
Other Hazardous Materials

Hazardous materials, such as dangerous chemicals, are often at
the bombing incident scene or in the immediate vicinity of that
location. During the initial response to any bombing incident,
the presence of any hazardous materials must be determined
and actions taken to protect survivors and responders from
those hazards.
Body Fluids
Pathogens present in blood and other body fluids create risks
for those first responders who come into direct contact with
survivors. Pathogens may be a particular concern in a suicide-
bombing incident, where bombers may attempt to spread
dangerous pathogens on bone fragments and body parts that
come in contact and often penetrate survivors. It is believed
that terrorists are actively recruiting bombers who may be infected
with communicable diseases, to increase the physical and
psychological impacts of suicide-bombing attacks.

Toxic Fumes (gases) and Smoke

The naked eye detects particle sizes greater than 7 micrometers
and that is one of the observable physical characteristics that
differentiate fumes from smoke. Toxic fumes (gases) present
their own set of dangers to first responders because they are
invisible particles to the naked eye, but contain toxic
chemicals.
Visible particles emitted from a fire are referred to as smoke, which

can contain a significant concentration of compounds that are
flammable. A cloud of smoke, in contact with atmospheric oxygen,
has the potential of being ignited – like backdraft and flashover.
Smoke inhalation can cause serious injury and death. Smoke can
obscure visibility, impeding occupants exiting from fire areas.
Smoke contains a wide variety of chemicals, many of them
aggressive in nature. Examples are hydrochloric acid, hydrofluoric
acid, sulfuric acid, nitric acid, nitrous oxide and phosphoric acid.

FIRST RESPONDER PRIORITIES
Slide 7-26 Initial Response Priorities
This slide lists safety as a critical action for first responders.
ELO 7-4
Identify response priorities and critical decisions and actions
required during the initial response to a post-detonation
incident.
The priorities listed on this slide are consistent with National

Incident Management System (NIMS) priorities on life safety,
incident stabilization, and protection of property. 12
Safety
During the initial response to a post-detonation incident, the first
priority is safety of the public and first responders. Every effort must
12
(2005). NIMS—Incident Command System for the Fire Service. U. S. Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved
from: http://www.dleg.state.mi.us/ccfs/bcc/pdf/dleg_bccfs_manual_nims_ics.pdf.

be made to avoid additional casualties among the public. In

addition, first responders must act in a manner that minimizes risk
to them, including using the PPE that the individual is trained on
and provided.
There is an understandable tendency for emergency responders to

conduct rescue operations without regard to personal safety.
However, dead or injured responders cannot contribute to
subsequent rescue operations, and they increase the workload for
other responders. Emergency responders must reduce risks to
themselves and others, including risks associated with building
collapse, utility fires and explosions, booby traps, and multiple
devices.
Rescue and Emergency Medical Care

Rescue operations are the next priority during initial post-detonation
response. Every effort must be made to identify survivors who are
still alive and provide appropriate treatment, either at the incident
scene or after evacuation to a receiving emergency room.
At a post-detonation scene, injuries are likely and in large-scale

incidents, there could be hundreds of deaths and injuries. First
responders can expect to encounter a variety of injuries including
burns, open wounds from shrapnel, crushing injuries, amputations,
and smoke inhalation. First responders may also encounter fire,
smoke, partial or complete building collapse, and broken glass in
the vicinity of the seat of the explosion, as well as ruptured utility
and electrical systems. Although evidence collection is a lower
priority, rescue operations should be conducted, whenever
possible, using techniques that minimize contamination or
destruction of evidence.
Scene Control
Control of the scene is a critical step in supporting all other
operations. Traffic flow must be controlled so that emergency
vehicles (fire apparatus and ambulances) can move to perform
critical rescue functions and provide appropriate medical treatment
and evacuation. Survivors must be identified and medically
evaluated before they depart the area. Witnesses and potential
terrorists must be identified for further processing by law
enforcement. Evidence must be protected from contamination or
theft. In addition, curious citizens and untrained volunteers must be
kept out of harm’s way. Scene control is an essential task that is

the principal responsibility of law enforcement during the initial

phases of a response.

Slide 7-27 Critical Decisions and Actions
First responders are required to use the NIMS, Incident Command

System (ICS), and Unified Command System (UCS). Use of these
systems will aid in the overall coordination of the incident, prevent
additional confusion, and provide a framework for all disciplines.
Responding to post-detonation incidents involves making numerous

difficult decisions and performing a myriad complex actions or
tasks. No one task list, algorithm, or checklist captures everything
that must be accomplished. Many of the response activities may be
contained in the responders’ jurisdiction's plans, policies, and
SOPs; however, it is impossible to foresee all of the potential issues
that could arise in a post-detonation response. Some resources
could be immediately overwhelmed while others might need to be
called in to assist in the response.
Module 7 supplies an introduction to those decisions and actions

that can serve as a basis for formulating comprehensive policies
and procedures and guiding response operations. We will discuss
each of the items on this slide in greater detail in the coming
section.

Slide 7-28 Responding Agencies
Post-detonation incidents typically involve response from multiple

agencies. Normally, law enforcement personnel, firefighters,
emergency medical personnel, and others respond to post-
detonation situations. The initial first responders must quickly
assess the situation and inform their respective command elements
of conditions at the incident scene and of resources needed to
execute a safe and effective response.
Some resources will be needed immediately such as firefighters,

emergency medical technicians, Hazardous Material (HazMat)
technicians, and enough police officers to establish control over the
scene. Others will be needed as the incident progresses, such as
investigators and medical examiners. Depending on the situation,
structural engineers should be consulted early in the response to
determine the stability of the structure. Likewise, technicians from
utility providers must be consulted concerning potential hazards in
the area.
Effective response requires the coordinated efforts of all responding

agencies. If one agency fails to execute its responsibilities, the
overall response can be jeopardized.

Slide 7-29 Command, Control, and Communications
This slide contains a photograph of the temporary headquarters

established by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) after
the terrorist attacks in New York City on September 11, 2001.
Command and Control

During the early phases of response, positive measures must be
taken to establish command, control, and communications. The
most qualified first responder arriving on the scene, who will
function as the Incident Commander until he/she is relieved by a
higher authority, should establish Incident Command. Post-
detonation incidents typically involve response from multiple
agencies, unlike bomb threats that may initially involve response
only from law enforcement personnel.
It is essential that the command and control structure be firmly

established at the beginning of a bombing incident. The command
and control structure should be clearly defined by policies and
procedures developed as part of the pre-planning process. In most
post-detonation incidents, the fire service is the lead agency for the
response during initial phases. That determination is normally
based on the initial task prioritization.

The primary responsibility for crisis management of a terrorist

incident rests with the federal government (Title 18, Section
233b(f)).13 The Department of Justice, through the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), is the Lead Federal Agency (LFA).
Responsibility for consequence management (protection of public
health and safety, the environment, restoration of services, and
emergency relief) rests with local and state officials as well as the
federal government, through the Emergency Preparations and
Response Directorate of DHS, a consolidation of many federal
emergency authorities and resources, including FEMA. FEMA
serves as the LFA for coordinating federal activities in support of
consequence management.
Crisis management and consequence management will likely be

occurring simultaneously; however, the FBI will remain in charge of
a terrorist incident until such time as the Attorney General (AG)
transfers the LFA responsibility to DHS/FEMA. It is important to
note that federal resources are not likely to be present during the
initial phases of response to a major bombing incident. State and
local authorities must carry the full burden of response until federal
resources arrive and can begin augmenting those efforts.
Once there has been a detonation and the incident progresses in

complexity, the NIMS model should be implemented. The NIMS-
compliant ICS is the recognized Incident Management System
(IMS) for all types of emergencies. The FBI and DHS/FEMA use
ICS to facilitate incident management. Furthermore, a bombing
may be considered a HazMat incident and as such will be covered
by Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
Regulation 1910.120.14 This regulation mandates the use of ICS.
If multi-agency and/or multi-jurisdictional issues are involved, a

unified command may be needed. A unified command is a form of
NIMS ICS that is used for large, multi-agency and large incidents
involving multiple agencies or multiple incidents. Decision-making
representatives from the primary agencies—fire, law enforcement,
emergency medical services (EMS), and FBI—form a team at the
incident command post. These agency representatives and the
incident commander serve as the incident’s board of directors.
13
18 U.S. Code 2332b- Acts of Terrorism Transcending National Boundaries. Cornell University Law School.
Retrieved from https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2332b.
14
Occupational Safety & Health Administration. United States Department of Labor. Retrieved from
https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9765.

Representatives from specialty units such as the bomb squad and

Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team will also be present at
the command post.
Participants can find additional information about NIMS on the

Internet at http://www.fema.gov/national-incident-management-
system.
Communications
Communication is essential, both in recalling emergency
responders to their agencies and ensuring a coordinated effort at
the incident scene. Typically, standard forms of communication in a
community—landlines and cellular telephones—fail during initial
phases of a response to a major bombing incident. Networks are
overloaded and it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to place
phone calls.
For that reason, recall procedures should be established and

clearly communicated to emergency responders before an incident
occurs. Those procedures should include code words that direct
specific actions and can be communicated using mass
communications media (radio and television stations) and specific
policies governing reporting procedures. In most situations,
emergency responders should report to their precinct stations,
firehouses or other designated locations—not to the incident scene.
Once on the scene, first responders must be able to communicate.

Initially, much of the communication may occur person-to-person.
However, as the response operation grows, radio networks and
other electronic media must be used to ensure coordinated actions.
The first step in building an effective communications infrastructure
is to ensure that each major agency in the response can
communicate with other agencies. Secondly, provisions must be
made to support radio communications in areas that pose
significant terrain or structural barriers. For example, during the
9/11 attacks in New York City, Fire Department of the City of New
York (FDNY) found that their radios’ effectiveness was drastically
reduced in the high-rise environment. The number of units
attempting to use one of the tactical channels overwhelmed the
system.

Slide 7-30 Scene Control
This slide contains a photo showing the immediate aftermath of the

Boston Marathon bombings.
Establish Perimeters
The most critical initial responsibility of law enforcement at the
incident scene is to establish a perimeter. It is absolutely essential
to do so as soon as possible to protect people, preserve the
integrity of the crime scene, and recover evidence. The perimeter
should encompass danger areas in the immediate vicinity of the
target and larger areas required to protect evidence and support
response operations.
Implement Access Controls

Large terrorist bombings are characterized by chaos. Good
Samaritans try to enter the area to rescue survivors. People in
close proximity to the blast flee the area. Some of those trying to
leave are injured and require immediate medical care; others are
witnesses who may have important information about the event; still
others may be terrorists.
Law enforcement must quickly gain control over movements into

and out of the incident scene. It is critical that the principal law
enforcement agency in the response gain control over the area

quickly to prevent outsiders from disrupting emergency operations

or tampering with evidence.
Once a perimeter has been established, access-control points must

be designated and rosters established and maintained identifying
personnel and equipment permitted (and needed) in operational
areas. A system for identifying personnel and vehicles that exit the
area is essential in accounting for victims and survivors. It is
important not to risk emergency personnel in searching for a
potential survivor who may have already left the scene.
Additionally, such controls are essential for post-incident
investigations. The quicker one gains control of the perimeter, the
better.
Suspect identification is of critical importance at bombing scenes. A

bomber who escapes initial detection is often extremely difficult to
identify later.
All emergency responders should be alert for suspicious behavior.

Anyone departing the incident scene quickly (normally, without
evidence of injury or psychological distress) should be stopped and
questioned. At a minimum, their descriptions should be recorded
including license plate numbers of vehicles and any other
information that could be used in their identification.
Witnesses should be questioned concerning any suspicious

persons or suspicious behavior.
The identities of all survivors should be recorded. Note that in some

cases, the perpetrator can be among the injured.
Manage Traffic Flow

Traffic problems can prevent the deployment of critical equipment
and impede the rapid evacuation of the injured. Vehicles in the
high-risk zone that block traffic flow through designated ingress and
egress routes should also be moved.
Positive controls should be implemented immediately to prevent

unauthorized vehicles from entering the three control zones. Only
those emergency vehicles required to access the control zones
should be permitted to enter. Designated staging areas for first
responders in the controlled zone should have sufficient parking to
accommodate emergency vehicles out of the flow of traffic.

Control Panic and Disorder

Panic and disorder will most likely occur. Survivors and others will
attempt to flee. Survivors will often try to flee despite suffering
injuries requiring treatment. Some of these injuries may not be
readily apparent, therefore medical personnel should screen all
potential survivors. Survivors and witnesses can also have valuable
information that should be captured for the investigation. Whenever
possible, their information should be documented before they are
authorized to leave the scene.
Handle Victims’/Survivors’ Families and Friends

Many family members and friends of potential victims and survivors
will respond to a bombing-incident scene with the intention of
providing assistance in the search and obtaining current information
on the status of their friend or loved one. These people are likely to
be highly emotional and in an agitated state. Handling them is
typically a sensitive and difficult task. Although law enforcement
officers may have to restrain and arrest some of them, alternative
actions should be taken, when possible.
One technique that has proven effective in previous incidents is

designating a family resource center for victims’ and survivors’
families. At the family resource center, the designated Public
Information Officer (PIO) provides family members with up-to-date
information concerning the rescue operation and status of victims
and survivors, away from the pressure of press and bystanders.
Frequent briefings should be held regarding rescue operations.
Response plans should include an on-call psychologist to deal with
family members in the early stages of a bombing incident.

Slide 7-31 Perimeters
Hot (Critical) Zone

This is the portion of the crime scene where there is high potential
for hazards from multiple devices as well as structural and utility
instability. It may also be an area where there is the potential for
additional suicide bomber attacks. Only those personnel who have
the training and equipment to work the incident should be allowed
in this area. Force protection issues will exist.
Warm (High Risk) Zone

This is the outer portion of the crime scene where structural and
utility hazards do not exist; however, there is the possibility of
additional devices existing in this area. It may also include those
areas where restricted access cannot be controlled. Only those
personnel who have the training and equipment to work the incident
should be allowed in this area. Force protection issues will exist.
Cold (Controlled) Zone

This is a separate area where the security can be maintained and
there is either physical or manpower barriers that will interdict an
incoming threat. This is the area where the command post and
resource staging will be positioned. The size of the controlled zone
is as large as needed, but ultimately as large as resources will
allow.

RESCUE AND RECOVERY
Slide 7-32 Rescue and Recovery
This slide lists some of the considerations that may have an impact
on initial rescue efforts. The photo on this slide shows first
responders engaged in rescue operations at the site of the
Oklahoma City bombing in 1995.
Rescue efforts should start as soon as possible, but emergency

responders should not rush headlong into a situation without
assessing the hazards. Such hazards may include fire, glass
hazards, and structural integrity. Multiple devices may have been
planted for the expressed purpose of killing first responders. The
building may contain hazardous materials that could quickly disable
first responders. Personal Protective Equipment should be utilized
immediately, until it has been proven that it is not needed.
Rescue efforts should be prioritized based on an assessment of

where injured or otherwise trapped individuals may be present.
Area of coverage should be determined based on this assessment.
Time is of the essence in rescuing trapped survivors. All rescues

are working against the clock. Time constraints are also imposed

by limited hours of daylight and weather conditions that hamper or

prevent rescue operations.
Jurisdictions should have memoranda of understanding, mutual

support agreements, or equivalent documents so support from
surrounding jurisdictions can be accessed quickly..

Slide 7-33 Collapse Rescue Operations
This slide displays general information about collapse rescue

operations and a photo of first responder rescue efforts at the site
of the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995.
As mentioned, rescue operations are a race against time to save

those trapped in a collapsed structure. However, fatalities or
injuries to rescue workers caused by inadequate shoring in the
structure or excessive speed can defeat the fundamental purpose
of the rescue operation and slow down the rescue attempt.
The most important factor in planning and executing response

operations is the level of acceptable risk. Defining the level of risk
for first responders and trapped survivors is not a simple task.
Different organizations, such as law enforcement and fire service,
often differ on their views of acceptable risk.
To further complicate matters, the level of acceptable risk changes

as time passes from the onset of the event; it decreases as the
chance of finding survivors decreases. Therefore, discussions on
what risks are acceptable can be frustrating.
Every effort should be made to rescue trapped individuals within

the first seventy-two hours after a detonation. Therefore, the focus

should be on methods to expedite rescue operations safely within

that time frame.
As the level of risk increases at an event, the number of first

responders who operate in harm’s way should normally be
reduced. When risk of death or injury in a structure or area
approaches one hundred percent, incident commanders must
reduce the number of responders operating in the structure or area
to minimal levels, or withdraw responders altogether until risks can
be mitigated.
The Murrah Federal Building Bombing resulted in the first and

second floors blown against the southern portion of the building.
The third through ninth floors of the building were initially razed by
the blast and then proceeded to pancake one atop the other at
street level. Within the first hour, 50 people were rescued from the
Murrah Federal Building. At the end of the first day of rescue
efforts, 153 individuals had been treated at St. Anthony Hospital
(eight blocks from the blast), over 70 at Presbyterian, 41 at
University, and 18 at Children's Hospital. Temporary silences were
observed so that sensitive listening devices capable of detecting
human heartbeats could be used to locate survivors. In some
cases, limbs had to be amputated without anesthetics (avoided
because of its potential to cause a deadly coma) in order to free
those trapped under rubble. Periodically, the scene had to be
evacuated after police received tips claiming that other bombs had
been planted in the building. The last survivor, a fifteen-year-old girl
found under the base of the collapsed building, was rescued at
around 7:00 pm.15
15
After Action Report for the Response to the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings, (2014). Massachusetts Emergency
Management Agency.

Slide 7-34 Vertical vs. Horizontal Rescue
This slide contains a photo of a man being rescued from the rubble
after the 1983 bombing of the U.S. barracks in Beirut.
The structural effects evident in a post-detonation incident will

determine the methodology for rescuing and removing victims of
the blast.
Most experts agree that extricating survivors from building

collapses should involve vertical removal rather than horizontal
movement of debris. Therefore, the safest way to remove debris
from buried survivors is to lift debris from above the survivor and
continually shore the sides of the excavation to prevent further
collapse. This method of rescue is consistent with practices used in
trench rescue.
Vertical rescue techniques are favored over horizontal rescue

techniques. This is because vertical rescue techniques are more
likely to preserve the void spaces providing a location where
survivors can and have been located and rescued after a building-
collapse. Horizontal movement of debris will normally cause further
collapse of these void spaces, thereby resulting in additional
deaths.

Shoring efforts and the types of equipment required when

conducting building-collapse rescues differ significantly from those
needed for common extrications.
Vertical removal of debris will require locating and utilizing various

types of cranes and an overhead lift apparatus. In addition to this lift
capability, rescuers must have equipment for cutting through rebar
found in most commercial buildings. In addition, consider cutters for
phones, computers, and utility cables.
As a part of emergency planning, identify these types of equipment

and have first responders trained in their use. Local construction
companies are the primary contacts for much of the required
equipment, and dispatchers or emergency management should
have their phone numbers so they can be contacted quickly.
Regardless of whether a building has imploded or exploded, there

are four basic types of collapse: pancake, lean-to, V-shape, and
cantilever. The location of void spaces varies by the type of
collapse. The void spaces are created where parts of the building
or its debris have struck a solid object, creating a space (void
space) in which someone could survive. They will typically be next
to furniture and not under it.

Slide 7-35 Types of Collapse
This slide shows illustrations of the four different types of collapse,

indicating where the probability of voids would exist.
When structures collapse for whatever reason, debris falls in

different patterns, forming various types of collapse. Types of
collapse that are of importance to first responders include Lean-to,
V, Pancaked, and Cantilever. The importance of understanding the
types of collapse relates to areas within the structure where
survivors might be trapped. The history of building collapses has
shown that void spaces resulting from Lean-to, V, and Cantilever
collapses can provide spaces where survivors of building collapses
have been located. However, the danger it poses to first
responders in rescue efforts mandates the need to constantly
consult with or have structural engineers on-scene who can advise
the best methodology to locate and extract survivors.
A lean-to collapse can occur when one exterior wall collapses,

leaving a floor supported on only one end. Notice where the void
space is created – this is the location where a person is most likely
to survive the event.
A “V” collapse can occur when an interior supporting wall or column

fails. Notice the two void areas that are created by the collapse.

Pancake collapse can occur when some or all vertical supporting

members or columns fail, causing floors to collapse upon one
another. As with other forms of collapse, void spaces may be
created by objects in the structure preventing the floor from
dropping all the way to the lower floor.
A cantilever collapse is caused when the outer wall is destroyed,

leaving the roof and/or upper floors dangling in thin air as
unsupported members. Cantilever collapses have also been
described as a pancake collapse with floors extending as
unsupported planes. They are among the most dangerous and
unpredictable collapse situations because a serious amount of
weight be may be suspended in midair, with overloaded and
unsupported floors or the roof ready to snap and fall without
warning, or debris on the upper floors ready to cascade down if the
floors begin to sag.16
A cantilever collapse is similar to a pancake collapse with the

additional problem of some of the floor plains extending,
unsupported, from the debris pile. The void area is created under
the supported floor, and it poses extreme safety hazards to
survivors and first responders.
16
Fire Engineering Magazine. (1 November 20016). Assessing Structural Collapse from Acts of Terror. Retrieved
from http://www.fireengineering.com/articles/print/volume-159/issue-11/features/assessing-structural-
collapse-from-acts-of-terror.html.

Slide 7-36 Search & Rescue Structure Marking
During the initial stages of response, it is not likely that a building

will be posted with markings to indicate structural integrity and
location of victims or survivors. However, such markings could be
encountered shortly after initiation of response operations, and all
responders should be familiar with them. Two marking systems are
used: (1) to indicate dangers associated with entering a structure,
and (2) to indicate locations of victims or survivors.
First responders should have basic knowledge to recognize such

markings, and should then follow the directions of Search and
Rescue teams. First responders should know the marking system
in their own locale, and if one does not exist, recommend that one
be created and communicated to all surrounding agencies.
Additional information about Search and Rescue Structure

Markings can be found in the Reports and Studies/Terrorism folder
in the Additional Resources section of the IRTB participant flash
drive.

Slide 7-37 First Responder Health and Welfare
This slide contains a photograph of a firefighter as he copes with

the stress of rescue operations after the 1995 Oklahoma City
bombing.
One often-overlooked area of post-detonation response is the

health and welfare of responders.
Most emergency responders say that they are largely immune from
most stressors—with the possible exception of intense, brief
periods of stress associated with physical confrontations for law
enforcement and unexpected, life-threatening situations during
firefighting operations.
However, emergency responders seldom experience a level of

stress equivalent to that experienced during response to major,
post-detonation situations, particularly where there are multiple
deaths and injuries. The devastation of a major bombing scene,
such as the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, simply cannot be
communicated in words. Even pictures and videotape do not do an
adequate job of communicating the intense personal impact of
these situations.

Adrenaline will carry first responders during the first few hours of
major incident response operations, perhaps for as many as 12 to
15 hours. However, at a certain point, fatigue overcomes the ability
of the body to produce adrenaline and exhaustion sets in.
It is critical that first responders be prepared, to the extent possible,

for what they will experience. This includes personal dangers, the
sight of the dead and injured, the dust, debris, and environmental
elements (such as heat, cold, wind, and rain), and the
overwhelming sense of out-of-control, chaotic conditions all take a
toll on responders.
Although training, by itself, will not totally prepare anyone for the
stressors they will experience, agencies should provide detailed
descriptions of those stressors and alternative coping strategies
before incidents occur. Frank, open discussion of what first
responders can anticipate is an important element in their
preparation.
The initial response to a major post-detonation incident is normally

all-out. Every available first responder is dispatched to the scene to
support operations. However, at the outset, planning must begin for
scaling operations to reflect available resources. Personnel should
be withheld from the initial response and programmed to assume
operational responsibilities beginning about 12 hours into the
response.
Those who initially respond should be relieved as soon as possible

after the 12-hour mark and given an opportunity to rest and
recuperate. Subsequent operations should be planned on a shift
basis to ensure that responders receive rest adequate to sustain
their performance over days, weeks, or months.
Some first responders will need counseling to deal with their

experiences. There is often initial resistance to counseling,
particularly if provided by counselors who do not understand the
culture of the first responder community. However, counseling
should be offered, not imposed, initially. Counseling opportunities
should be offered until all responders feel they have adequately
addressed the psychological effects of performance.
In some cases, individual law enforcement officers, firefighters,

emergency medical personnel, and other responders will require
counseling for years after the incident to meet their needs.

Counseling programs should not be terminated at the conclusion of

response operations, because psychological problems can linger
for extensive periods afterward. Leaders of first responder
organizations should develop policies that are cognizant of
behavioral health issues, including post-traumatic stress disorder
and suicide risk. These topics will be discussed in greater detail in
Module 8.
Hundreds of first responders who helped the injured after the

Boston Marathon Bombing received counseling immediately after
the incident. Public health officials and trauma therapists caution
that first responders who take part in rescue efforts should remain
watchful of symptoms such as increased anxiety, inability to relax,
increased irritability, and feeling detached. These symptoms could
lead to more significant, long-term psychological issues.
The Journal of the American Medical Association conducted a

study of World Trade Center rescue workers and found that 12
percent of those who participated in the rescue efforts had signs of
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) two to three years after the
September 11, 2001 attacks. Nearly 20 percent of the rescue
workers showed symptoms five to six years later.17 It is likely that
some of the first responders who were at the Boston Marathon
Bomb incident will struggle psychologically for years to come as
they cope with the gruesome scenes they witnessed.18
A later portion of this module will take a closer look at the Boston
Marathon Bombing incident and the scenes that linger in the minds
of the dedicated first responders who aided in the rescue efforts.
17
Smith, R., Katz, C., Herbert, R., Levin, S. (2005). Mental Health Status of World Trade Center Rescue
Recovery =Workers and Volunteers-New York City, July 2002-August 2004. The Journal of the American
Medical and Association. 293. 30-31. Retrieved from
http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=200104&resultClick=3.
18
Abel, David. (2013, October 15). First responders still in grip of Marathon’s horror. Boston Globe. Retrieved from
http://www.bostonglobe.com.

EVIDENCE PRESERVATION
Slide 7-38 Evidence
ELO 7-5
Identify first responder responsibilities for evidence
preservation during the initial response to a post-detonation
incident.
Slides 7-38 through 7-45 present information about evidence

collection. This slide contains an image of the key from the Ryder
truck used to carry out the 1995 bombing attack at the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. This key was found
blocks away from the incident.
Evidence at a bombing incident scene can take many forms.

Firsthand accounts of witnesses and survivors can help identify
terrorists, assist in identifying energetic materials (color of smoke),
and identify the delivery method. Each jurisdiction has different
methods as to how they want evidence collected and processed.
Physical evidence includes any object that can establish that a

crime was committed or can provide a link between a crime and the
survivors or the terrorist.

Physical items of evidence can include bomb components and

explosive residue; vehicle components that can be used to identify
the type vehicle and, ultimately, the specific vehicle used to deliver
the device; items and materials that can identify the bomber (such
as fingerprints, shoe prints, and personal items of identification);
and other resources, such as a videotape from security systems
operating in close proximity to the targeted location.
In most investigations, no one piece of evidence supports final

resolution of the investigation. Multiple evidentiary sources, some of
which may appear inconsequential, often are pieced together to
supply answers to investigatory questions that would otherwise not
be available. Conducting a criminal investigation involves
connecting the dots. The absence of one critical dot may prevent
identification of the full picture required to complete the
investigation. For that reason, no potential item of evidence is too
insignificant to treat as an important component of the investigation.

Slide 7-39 Example: Pan Am Flight 103 Bombing, 1988
This slide shows a piece of cloth that was recovered from the plane
wreckage and police walking around the wreckage of the Boeing
aircraft as it lies in a field outside the Scottish town of Lockerbie.
After the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in

1988, investigators had to search a crime scene area of
approximately 2,000 square miles. The piece of clothing pictured
below with the name “Yorkie” on it was recovered from the scene
and led police to a store called Mary’s House in Malta, where the
bomber purchased the clothing. It was a crucial piece of evidence
in eventually identifying the source of the bomb and the bomber.19
19
(2012). Terrorist Bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. Central Intelligence Agency. Retrieved from
https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/cia-museum/experience-the-collection/text-version/stories/terrorist-bombing-
of-pan-am-flight-103.html.

Slide 7-40 Example: Oklahoma City Bombing, 1995
This slide contains a photo of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building

in Oklahoma City, approximately two days after the bombing.
After the 1995 bombing, the first key piece of evidence to be

discovered at the bombsite in Oklahoma City was the vehicle
identification number on the frame of the rented Ryder truck used to
contain the bomb. It was found about 100 yards away from the
center of the blast. The rental information for that truck was the first
link in a chain that eventually led investigators to Timothy McVeigh
and Terry Nichols.20
20
After Action Report: Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building Bombing. The Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency
Management.

Slide 7-41 Importance of Evidence
This slide contains a photo of the evidence collection after the 2010
Times Square Bombing attempt.
A bomber who is not apprehended and prosecuted will continue to

pose a threat to citizens and responders. For that reason, it is
critically important to develop evidence that will lead to a successful
prosecution.
Evidence is used to develop leads for further investigation. Items of

evidence can assist in that process by helping identify potential
suspects for further investigation and eliminate others who warrant
no further investigative effort. Physical evidence, such as bomb
fragments, can be examined to assist in identifying their source and
in relating one bombing incident to another. Ultimately, evidence is
used to support prosecution of those responsible for the bombing
attack.

Slide 7-42 Signature
The pictures on this slide show some of the signature bomb

materials used by the Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski. The top photo
shows a homemade gun, a homemade bomb, and his manifesto.
The second image shows Kaczynski’s workbench in his Montana
cabin when he was apprehended in 1996. The final image shows
another homemade bomb.
Bombers frequently strike multiple targets and they typically

construct bombs using the same types of components or design.
For that reason, identifying similarities between two or more
bombing incidents is sometimes critical to the successful resolution
of criminal investigations. Commonalities between incidents—in
terms of bomb design, similarity of components, and common
delivery methods—constitutes a bomber's signature. That signature
can serve as an important source of information for focusing
investigative efforts.
Some items that a bomber may possibly repeat in all of his/her

devices might include:
 A particular type of phone
 Timers
 Containers
 Size of materials

 Added shrapnel
 Similar explosive materials

Slide 7-43 Responders and Evidence
This slide contains an image of evidence collection after the 1996

Centennial Park in Atlanta, GA.
Although bomb technicians and other investigators (including FBI

and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (BATFE)
personnel) have principal responsibility for identifying, protecting,
and collecting evidence at a bombing scene, all first responders
share in that responsibility.
Protect physical evidence from contamination and removal.

Whenever possible, first responders should avoid contact with any
item that could constitute evidence. Items should not be moved
until their locations have been documented, normally by sketch and
photograph. Firefighters should limit the amount of water used in
close proximity to the seat of the explosion (ground zero) to avoid
washing away items of evidence and chemical residue. No one
should be permitted to remove anything within the crime scene until
all investigative processing has been completed. If heavy rain or
snow is anticipated, action should be taken to cover any obvious
pieces of evidence to protect them from moisture.
Observe and report evidence. Responders should observe their

operational areas for signs of evidence. Any responder who

identifies an obvious or suspected piece of evidence should report

its location as soon as possible to a representative of the
investigative team. Procedures should be established to facilitate
such reporting. Such reports should include a description of the
item along with a detailed description of the location.
Report destruction or movement of evidence. Obvious or suspected

items of evidence that are accidentally shifted out of place,
deliberately moved due to rescue requirements, unknowingly
transported from the scene, damaged or destroyed should be
reported to a representative of the investigative team. Reports
should include a description of the item along with a detailed
description of its current and/or previous locations. Evidence that
has not been destroyed should be protected from further movement
and contamination.
Report survivor information. Investigators should be informed of

destinations for survivors undergoing medical evacuation from the
incident scene. In major bombing incidents, law enforcement
personnel should be posted at supporting emergency rooms to
assist in performing this function.
Identify witnesses and potential suspects. Immediately after a

bombing, most people in close proximity to the target location will
attempt to leave the area. Witnesses with critical information
concerning the incident will be among them. It is important to hold
them in a safe area until they are interviewed or, if that is not
possible, obtain name, address, phone number, and contact
information so that investigators can contact them at a later date.
Also, the terrorists who planned and carried out the bombing may
be among those leaving the area. The names of individuals
departing the area can serve as important investigative leads.
Be prepared to testify. All first responders should be aware that

they might be called as witnesses to provide testimony in court
proceedings. When time permits, observations and activities that
relate evidence and other aspects of the criminal investigation
should be recorded in a notebook for future reference.
In addition, photos and video of the crime scene, whether taken as

part of the formal investigation or for personal reasons, are
potential evidence. Non-investigative personnel who take
photographs or videos should report their activity through their

supervisory chain and be prepared to have photographs and videos

taken as evidence until the completion of criminal prosecutions.

Slide 7-44 Evidence Perimeter Formula
The diameter of the evidence perimeter is determined by identifying

the distance from the seat of the explosion “S” to the farthest point
where evidence can be visually identified “X”, then adding half that
distance “Y”. The formula is X+Y = Evidence Perimeter.
Once operations have been stabilized, routes through the perimeter

should be identified for use by responders entering and exiting the
blast scene. These routes should be examined for the presence of
multiple explosive devices and evidence. Travel within the blast
scene other than on those routes should be limited to personnel
involved in the identification, collection, and preservation of
evidence.
Determining the size of each area is normally a difficult task,

especially in the minutes and hours immediately after a bombing
occurs. It is usually better to overestimate the size of the scene.
Extending an established perimeter is always more difficult than
reducing one. In addition, items of evidence in unprotected areas
have a habit of walking away from the scene as curious bystanders
start arriving at the scene.

Slide 7-45 Types of Evidence
This slide contains images of different types of evidence, including

(lower left) a picture of a small piece of circuit board found at the
scene of the Boston Marathon bombings, which might have been
part of the timer or receiver used to detonate a device; drawings of
nails and screws; photos of explosive device components; a
footprint; and security camera footage.
All evidence can be categorized as primary, secondary, and other.

Physical evidence associated with bombing incidents are
categorized in accordance with these criteria:
• Primary items include fragments or parts of the actual
explosive device and its container.
• Secondary items include parts and fragments of an object or
structure that was close to the seat of the explosion.
• Other items include any physical object (other than primary
or secondary items) that could assist in identification of the
individual who delivered or manufactured the device. An
example of items in this category is clothing on survivors
who are treated for injuries or on deceased victims.
Procedures must be established to collect clothing items and
place them in evidence containers with appropriate
information concerning the circumstances of collection.

Fragments and parts of explosive devices are critical items of

evidence in bombing investigations. At the time of detonation,
components of the explosive device are shattered into hundreds or
thousands of small pieces. Many of these pieces bear no
resemblance to their form prior to the explosion. Batteries are
shattered into small pieces of metal and plastic, as are blasting
caps and other common components.

Slide 7-46 Evidence Examples
Slides 7-46 and 7-47 depict how bomb components can be

transformed during an explosion. This slide shows an Ammonium
Nitrate and Fuel Oil (ANFO)-based source explosive device
containing a battery, clock, and egg timer.

Slide 7-47 Evidence Examples (cont.)
These are fragments from the same device shown on the previous
slide and could be recovered as evidence. The circular flat metal in
the middle of the photo is the winding coil of the egg timer, the red
piece in the lower left is a piece of the battery, and the other items
are various pieces of the bomb components. This image illustrates
how evidence collected after a blast will likely look very different
from the original materials and components.

CASE STUDY: BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING
Slide 7-48 Case Study: Boston Marathon Double Bombing
The class will now review a case study about the Boston Marathon
Double Bombing that occurred on April 15, 2013.

Slide 7-49 Video: News Coverage of Blasts
This slide contains video footage of the bombings to help the

students understand the event and how the training hopes to collect
information to benefit first responders for future potential attacks.

Slide 7-50 Bombing Details
This slide contains basic details about the bombing and a photo of
the first detonation.

Slide 7-51 Aerial View of Crime Scene
This slide provides an aerial view of the crime scene.
The first bomb exploded closest to the finish line, which was
located in front of Marathon Sports and Lens Crafters, the second
bomb was about a block before the finish line in front of Forum
Restaurant, Atlantic Fish Company, and Starbucks.21
21
Management Agency.

Slide 7-52 Seat of the Detonation
This slide shows an image of the seat of the detonation in Boston.
This picture of the seat of the detonation gives an idea of what

Ground Zero looked like, the damage, death, and destruction, and
the tasks that would follow.

Slide 7-53 Hospitals and Types of Injuries
27 local hospitals treated the bombing survivors, addressing a

variety of injuries from minor abrasions and cuts to severe trauma
and amputations.

Slide 7-54 Injured Survivors
This slide shows survivor Jeff Bauman, who lost his legs as a result
of the bombing.
The man who lost his legs is Jeff Bauman, who was cheering for
his girlfriend at the Boston Marathon. The 28-year-old describes the
terrifying moment:22
April 15, 2013: It was 2:48 p.m.—one minute before the most
high-profile terrorist event on American soil since Sept. 11—
and he (Tamerlan) was standing right beside me. We were
half a block from the finish line, two in a crowd of half a
million. I was there with my friends to support my girlfriend,
Erin Hurley, who was running for charity. We were just like
everyone else that day: cheering and clapping, laughing.
Then, suddenly, I noticed Tsarnaev. He had on a hooded
jacket that was too much, even on a cool day. The thing that
struck me, though, was his demeanor. Everyone was
enjoying themselves. Except this guy. He was all business.
We stared at each other for eight, maybe 10 seconds, then
my friend said something, and I looked away. When I looked
22
Management Agency.

back, he (Tamerlan) was gone. But I noticed his backpack

sitting on the ground near my feet. And then I heard the
explosion.

Slide 7-55 Injuries at the Scene
This slide shows a photo of the injuries at the scene, just after the
bombing.

Slide 7-56 Injuries
This slide illustrates some of the injuries that occurred as a result of

the bombing.

Slide 7-57 Injuries, cont.

This slide shows a photo of a marathon runner who also appears to

have been injured rendering aid.

This slide shows patients being transported, some of which appear

to have be in shock.

This slide shows a photo of Jeff Bauman being wheeled away from
the scene in a wheelchair.
The individual in the cowboy hat is Carlos Arredondo. Just after the
first detonation, Arrendondo immediately sprinted into action and he
can be seen in a series of photos and videos of the aftermath
pulling debris and fencing away from the bloody survivors and
clearing the way for emergency personnel to tend the wounded. He
saw Jeff Bauman, missing both of his legs and losing blood rapidly,
and knew Jeff needed the most help. Arredondo lifted Bauman and
put him into a wheelchair, and when the fabric used as a tourniquet
kept getting caught in its wheels, he held the fabric (this was initially
mistaken for Arredondo pinching Bauman's femoral artery).

Slide 7-61 Broken Glass
This slide shows the glass that was broken by the force of the blast.

Slide 7-62 Before the Attack
This slide provides information about the movement of the suspects

prior to the bombings.
2:38 pm – Surveillance video showing Tamerlan and Dzhokhar

turning onto Boylston Street.
2:42 pm – Tamerlan is seen walking past the Forum Restaurant,

toward the location of the first explosion.
2:45 pm – Dzhokhar is seen stopping in front of the restaurant and

slipping his knapsack onto the ground. He remains for about four
minutes, occasionally looking at his cell phone. After the first
explosion, Dzhokhar walks away without his bag.23
23
Management Agency.

Slide 7-63 First Bomb

prior to and after the first bombing.
A few seconds after Dzhokhar finished the call, at about 2:49 pm,
the first bomb exploded about 100 feet before the finish line. A
quarter of the marathon’s 23,000 runner had yet to complete the
race.
Bruce Mendelsohn, 44, was in the office building above the first
explosion. The windows were open, and he said the blast blew him
off the couch. He ran downstairs and saw 10 to 12 people with
gruesome lower-body injuries.24
A survivor who was lying next to the fencing here had severe
lacerations behind both knees, and the skin on her back had turned
black.
24
Criminal Complaint: United Stated of America V. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, (2013). United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts.

Many survivors in this area suffered injuries to the backs of their

legs. The bomb appeared to detonate behind spectators watching
the finish from behind security fencing.25
25
Management Agency.

Slide 7-64 Second Bomb

prior to and after the second bombing.
The second bomb exploded about 10 seconds after the first.
At least one child was carried away, and other people with injuries
walked or were helped along. The explosion shredded pants and
injured people’s legs.
Deirdre Hatfield, 27, witnessed the second blast. She saw glass
shattering and a large fireball. Ms. Hatfield saw a woman and two
children thrown back by the blast and flesh and bone scattered on
the ground.
Several people were injured in front of Forum, a restaurant, and a

large crowd gathered to help them. Others were treated in the
street.
Some of the injured may have moved by the time photographs

were taken in this area.26
26
Management Agency.

Slide 7-65 After the Attack

after the bombings.
Shortly after the first explosion, Dzhokhar was seen heading away
from the blasts without his bag. A marathon participant who had
already finished the race took this photo at 2:50 pm.

Slide 7-66 Bombing Suspects Biographies
This slide shows images of the bombing suspects, Tamerlan

Tsarnaev and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.

Slide 7-67 Surveillance Photos of Suspects
This slide contains various surveillance photos taken of the

suspects during their approach on the bombing locations and on
the placement of the devices.
The picture in the bottom right hand corner shows the younger of
the two terrorists; the placed IED; and the youngest fatality in the
bombing, Martin Richard, circled in blue.27
27

Slide 7-68 Tracking Down Suspects
This slide contains a map of the events leading up to the capture of

the bombing suspects28.
The map on this slide provides an illustration of the locations and

distances of the various events that occurred during the bombing
and the subsequent capture of the bombing suspects.
1. Campus police officer shot

Stata Center, M.I.T. – On April 18, at about 10:30 p.m., two
men approached a campus police officer from behind and
shot him to death. The officer was found with multiple
gunshot wounds and was taken to Massachusetts General
Hospital in Boston, where he is pronounced dead. Police
believe the officer was killed after a failed attempt by the
suspects to steal his gun.
28
The Hunt for the Boston Bombing Suspects. (2013). [Interactive map illustrating how the police tracked down the
Boston Bombing suspects]. The New York Times. Retrieved from
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/04/19/us/boston-marathon-manhunt.html?_r=1&.

2. Armed carjacking
Allston – A short time after shooting the campus officer, a
man who officials believe was Tamerlan Tsarnaev
approached a parked Mercedes-Benz SUV, climbed in and
pointed a gun at the driver, stating, "Did you hear about the
Boston explosion?" and "I did that," according to a criminal
complaint filed April 22. The gunman forced the victim to
drive to another location, where they picked up another man,
who officials believe was Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.
3. Carjacking victim escapes

Cambridge – The two suspects and the carjacking victim
drove to a Shell gas station on Memorial Drive in Cambridge.
The two men got out of the car, allowing the victim to
escape.
4. Car chase, explosives thrown

Watertown – The police immediately begin to search for the
Mercedes, pursuing it into Watertown. During the chase,
explosives were thrown from the vehicle.
5. Shootout and killing of one suspect

Watertown – Police were able to locate the suspects in
Watertown. Officers attempted to stop the suspects who
were in a stolen SUV when a firefight ensued. The suspects
and the police exited their vehicles and exchanged gunfire. A
Watertown resident, Andrew Kitzenberg, 29, said he saw two
men engaged in “constant gunfire” with police officers. A
police SUV “drove towards the shooters,” he said, and was
shot at until it was severely damaged. Mr. Kitzenberg said he
saw the shooters throw a bomb at the police, but it “went 20
yards at most.” One of the suspects, Tamerlan Tsarnaev,
was tackled by the police in an attempt to place his under
arrest, when Dzhokhar Tsarnaev drove the stolen vehicle
towards the officers and his brother. The officers were able
to move out of the vehicle’s path but Tamerlan was hit and
drug underneath the vehicle. Tamerlan’s was critically

injured and was pronounced dead at a hospital at 1:35 a.m.

His brother, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was able to leave the area
in the stolen vehicle.
6. Manhunt continues for second suspect

Watertown – The police began a door-to-door search for
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. At a press conference about 12:30
p.m., Massachusetts State Police said that they had
completed over “60 to 70 percent of what we want to cover.”
Suspect taken into custody

Watertown – Friday evening, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was taken
into custody after a standoff with authorities in a residential
area. Following a day of door-to-door searches, officers
came to a residential block, focusing their attention on the
backyard of a specific home there. Several blasts were
heard around 7:50 p.m.
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev wrote the following inside the boat

where he was hiding before being captured:
The U.S. Government is killing our innocent civilians. ... I

can't stand to see such evil go unpunished. ... We Muslims
are one body, you hurt one you hurt us all. ... Now I don't like
killing innocent people it is forbidden in Islam but due to said
[unintelligible] it is allowed. ... Stop killing our innocent
people and we will stop.29,30
29
Winter, T., Thibault, A., & Schuppe, J. (2015, March 16). Cops Recall Deadly Shootout with Boston Bombing
Suspects. NBC News. Retrieved from http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/boston-bombing-trial/boston-
bombing-trial-jury-inspects-boat-where-dzhokhar-tsarnaev-hid-n324231.
30
Levenson, E. (2015, March 10). Here’s the Note Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Wrote Inside the Boat Where He Was
Captured. Boston.com. Retrieved from https://www.boston.com/news/local-news/2015/03/10/heres-the-note-
dzhokhar-tsarnaev-wrote-inside-the-boat-where-he-was-captured.

Slide 7-69 Investigation Details
This slide contains information from the FBI on the bombings

regarding the design and components of the IED. Early on in the
investigation, the FBI knew that the suspects used pressure
cookers inside of backpacks, the pressure cookers contained low
explosives and a remote control switch. Nails and BBs were also
used as added shrapnel in this incident.

Slide 7-70 Crime Scene Investigation
This slide shows a photograph of the crime scene.
The photograph on this slide illustrates how detailed and thorough

the crime scene investigation was in Boston.

Slide 7-71 Explosive Devices
This slide goes into some detail on information gained from the
investigation.
The picture of the pressure cooker on the top of the slide is the
same brand and style that was used by the bombers. The brand is
“Fagor” and the pressure cooker is a mid-size pressure cooker with
a volume of approximately 6 quarts. On the bottom left is a picture
of “Flash Powder” or firecracker fill. Reports from authorities leaned
toward this type of low explosive material used in the bombs. The
bottom two center pictures are commercial clip art of nails similar to
the ones used in the device and commercial BB’s. The picture on
the bottom right is shrapnel recovered from the scene. The initiator
was improvised from a Christmas tree light bulb.

Slide 7-72 Visual Evidence (2nd Blast)
This slide shows a photograph of the detonation of the second

bomb.
Visible in the pictures is a large amount of heat and fluffy white

smoke.

Slide 7-73 Recovered Evidence
This slide shows evidence or parts of the pressure cooker lid, and
possibly the bottom, which were located at the scene.
The photo on the bottom left hand corner is part of the backpack,
which would have concealed the IED. The bottom right hand picture
shows a piece of a zipper that may have come from the backpack,
which concealed the devices. The bottom right photo also shows
some of the shrapnel that was added to the devices: common BB’s
and what appear to be carpet 5/8-inch nails.
Pieces from one of the pressure cookers were found on top of a 6-

story building31.
31

Slide 7-74 IED Switch Components
This slide contains information released by the FBI on the possible

fusing of the Boston IEDs.
The FBI released information on the possible fusing of the Boston

IEDs, specifically outlining remote control car transmitters and
receivers as the likely firing mechanism. The remote control would
activate the pressure cooker bomb by using an improvised initiator
made from a Christmas tree light.32
32

Slide 7-75 Power Source for RC Vehicles
This slide shows photos of the power source for RC vehicles.
The RC components for the Boston Marathon Bombing consisted

of a Duratrax RC vehicle that was powered by a battery pack made
from Tenergy 3000 rechargeable batteries33.
33

Slide 7-76 Initiator for Pressure Cooker Bombs
This slide shows a photo of Christmas tree lights.

Slide 7-77 Remote Control Initiation
The FBI provided additional details on the RC fusing of the devices,

specifically 2.4 GHz frequency Hobby Grade RC cars.

Slide 7-78 Phantom Fireworks – Seabrook, NH
This slide shows images of Phantom Fireworks in Seabrook, NH.
Phantom Fireworks in Seabrook, NH is reported to be the location

where the Boston Bombing suspects purchased the fireworks that
may have been used in the bombing. The owner of New
Hampshire's Phantom Fireworks confirmed that the older brother
suspected in the Boston bombing, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, bought two
large re-loadable mortar kits from the store, an illegal item in the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The elder Tsarnaev crossed
state lines in February, making the purchase at the Seabrook, NH
store on February 6. Tsarnaev purchased two 'lock-and-load' kits in
total that were part of a BOGO deal, costing him about $200. The
store worker recalled her interaction with Tsarnaev and told her
manager of the encounter. "He asked her to point him directly to the
most powerful and loudest fireworks that we had," said
April Walton, store manager. This isn't the first time Phantom has
made news because of items bought in their stores. The infamous
Times Square Bomber was also seen on surveillance buying
fireworks from a Phantom store in Pennsylvania34.
34

Slide 7-79 Bomb Explosive Material
This slide gives more detail from the evidence the FBI recovered
from the younger suspect.
This photo contains empty fireworks containers containing

perchlorate types of flash powders and other low explosives, which
were part of the evidence in this case. It was confirmed that
Tamerlan Tsarnaev purchased $200 worth of fireworks from
Phantom Fireworks in Seabrook, NH. Petroleum jelly was also
recovered, which was reportedly used by the bombers to coat the
inside of the pressure cookers to prevent the explosive material
from coming in contact with the metal. Petroleum jelly can be used
in the production of an explosive material called “Poor Man’s C-4,”
which mixes petroleum jelly with chlorates. This type of explosive
also creates a similar visual signature to the one seen during the
blasts.

Slide 7-80 Video: Pressure Cooker Test Detonation
This slide contains a regular-speed video followed by a slow-motion

replay of the pressure cooker test detonation using five pounds of
black powder and added shrapnel.
NMT conducted tests on reconstructed devices similar to those

used in the Boston Bombing at the NMT-EMRTC testing range in
Socorro, NM.

Slide 7-81 Evidence/Debris Comparison
This slide shows a comparison of what was found at the bombing

scene and what was recovered in Socorro, very similar evidentiary
remains.

Slide 7-82 Training and Preparation
This slide explains some of the training and preparation the Boston
Marathon bombers received. This slide also contains a photograph
of the 11th edition of Inspire magazine commemorating the Boston
Marathon bombers.
Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the older brother, traveled to Russia where he

may have been further radicalized and potentially trained for the
attacks. This slide also lists and shows the cover of the first issue of
al-Qaeda’s Inspire magazine. This issue goes into detail on low
explosive IEDs as well as discussing the use of pressure cookers
as a container for an IED. The first issue of Inspire was found on
Dzhokhar’s computer. The 11th edition was a commemorative to the
Boston Marathon Bombing.

Slide 7-83 The Tactic of Pressure Cooker IEDs
This slide contains photos of the bombers wearing the backpacks

that contained the pressure cooker bombs used in the Boston
Marathon attack.
Terrorists and violent extremists can exploit the innocuous

appearance of backpacks and bags by using them to conceal an
IED contained in a pressure cooker. Carefully placed, such devices
may provide little to no external indication of an impending attack.
Alertness and quick reaction to discovery of such concealment
devices in unusual locations or circumstances can improve
chances of early detection and prevention of an attack.

Slide 7-84 Potential Indicators of a Pressure Cooker

Configured as an IED
This slide explains visual recognition indicators for IEDs that might
employ the use of pressure cookers.
Potential indicators of a pressure cooker configured as an IED

include:
 Protruding wires or fuses from a pressure cooker
 Unusual smells such as chemical odors
 Unusual wetness or stains on a container outside of a
pressure cooker
 Apparent abandonment of a pressure cooker in a high traffic
or otherwise strategic location
 Purchases of multiple pressure cookers in conjunction with
explosive precursor materials

Slide 7-85 Causalities and Victims
This slide lists the casualties and victims of the bombers. The five
photos show the victims killed during the bombings and related
incidents (clockwise from the top right): Lingzi Lu, Krystle Campbell,
Martin Richard, Sean Collier, and Dennis Simmonds.

Slide 7-86 Hospitals
This slide shows a photo of tactical police officers guarding a

hospital entrance, which could potentially be a high value target for
additional attacks. This is a mindset that is taught in the Medical
Preparedness and Response for Bombing Incidents (MPRBI) class
(MPRBI was taught in Boston in December of 2012).

Slide 7-87 Boston Paramedic Testimonial
This slide contains a testimonial from a Boston Paramedic that

responded to the bombings. He was a graduate of both IRTB and
PRSBI.
Herb Simpson, a Boston Paramedic said:
“…What I learned from taking “Incident Response to Terrorist

Bombing” and “Prevention of and Response to Suicide Bombing
Incidents” has been a valuable tool for me first hand yesterday. I
was one of many Paramedics who responded to madness in
Boston. …The worst I’ve seen, more traumatic than my 13 months
as a medic in Vietnam and my 44 years in the medical field. The
training I got through EMRTC made me aware of secondary
explosions and what I needed to do to keep myself safe as well as
my co-workers.”

SUMMARY
Slide 7-88 Summary
This slide contains a summary and conclusion of the case study.
The value of researching contemporary bombing events, collecting

information, and developing training strategies and resources
cannot be understated. Tactics, techniques, and procedures used
by terrorists will continue to evolve based on our ability to interdict
and deter attacks. It is our responsibility to continually update our
training materials and information to prevent future attacks from
occurring.

Slide 7-89 Questions?


IRTB Module 07 PG 01.2017

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Оригинальное название

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

IRTB Module 07 PG 01.2017

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings

Training Support Package Participant Guide

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 7-1

MODULE 7 RESPONDING TO POST-DETONATION

7-2 Categorize post-blast injuries common among victims of bombing

7-3 Identify hazards typically encountered in structures by first responders

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 7-2

• Digital projectors, flip-chart, and whiteboard.

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 7-3

Key Points/Learning Objectives: Used to highlight each time lesson content is

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 7-4

Slide 7-1 IRTB Module 7: Responding to Post-Detonation

This slide displays the Module 7 title slide.

Terrorists and terrorist groups have demonstrated the ability to plan

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 7-5

Slide 7-2 Terminal Learning Objective

At the conclusion of this module, participants will be able to identify

This module provides participants with a foundation of knowledge

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 7-6

Slide 7-3 Enabling Learning Objectives

Slide 7-4 Enabling Learning Objectives, cont.

These slides contain the Enabling Learning Objectives.

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 7-7

The Enabling Learning Objectives (ELOs) for this module are:

7-1 Identify the impact of explosive effects on response

7-2 Categorize post-blast injuries common among victims of

7-3 Identify hazards typically encountered in structures by

7-4 Identify response priorities and critical decisions and

7-5 Identify first responder responsibilities for evidence

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 7-8

Slide 7-5 Course Map

This slide depicts the Course Map.

Module 7 is the second of three modules that focus on response to

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 7-9

Slide 7-6 The Bottom Line

This module was developed using lessons learned from previous

It is recommended, however, that agencies carefully review such

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 7-10

EXPLOSIVE PROCESS AND EFFECTS

Slide 7-7 Explosive Effects

Incendiary or Thermal Effect

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 7-11

Blast-pressure Effect or Shock Front

Fragmentation or Shrapnel Effect

Other casings may detract from the functioning of a device. Heavy

Shrapnel could include nails or shot placed in or around a device.

What Explosive Effects Mean for First Responders at a Post-

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 7-12

Slide 7-8 What Factors Influence Blast Effects?

A number of factors influence the blast effects of explosive charges:

Individuals and structures closest to the seat of the explosion

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 7-13

Slide 7-9 Video: IRA Truck Bomb, 1996

In the slow-motion footage of this video, the full range of explosive

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 7-14

EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE

Slide 7-10 Categories of Blast Injuries

Blast injuries are categorized in one of five ways: primary,

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 7-15

The visible indications of internal blast injuries are not as obvious

January 2017 Version 01.2017 Page 7-16

Slide 7-11 Primary Blast Injuries

This slide shows illustrations of the organs most susceptible to