Human Rights as a Common Concern

Author(s): Charles R. Beitz

Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 95, No. 2 (Jun., 2001), pp. 269-282
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AmericanPoliticalScience Review Vol. 95, No. 2 June 2001

Human Rights as a Common Concern

CHARLES R. BEITZ BowdoinCollege
hedoctrine
of humanrightshascometoplaya distinctive
rolein international
life.Thisisprimarily
the roleof a moraltouchstone--astandardof assessmentand criticismfor domesticinstitutions,a
standardof aspirationfor theirreform,and increasingly a standardof evaluationfor thepoliciesand
practicesof international economic and political institutions.Internationalpractice has followed the
controllingdocumentsof internationallaw in takinga broadview of the scope of human rights.Many
politicaltheoristsargue,however,thatthis viewis excessivelybroadand thatgenuinehumanrights,if they
are to be regardedas a trulycommonconcernof worldsociety,mustbe construedmorenarrowly.I argue
againstthatperspectiveand in favor of the viewimplicitin contemporary internationalpractice,usingthe
rightto democraticinstitutionsas an example.

orethanfiftyyearshavepassedsincetheU.N. the machineryof coercion typicallyassociated with

General Assembly adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and in that
time the doctrineof humanrightshas come to play a
distinctiveand in some respectsan unexpectedrole in
internationallife. This is primarilythe role of a moral
touchstone-a standardof assessmentand criticismfor
domesticinstitutions,a standardof aspirationfor their
reform, and increasinglya standardof evaluationfor
the policies and practices of internationaleconomic
and politicalorganizations.This role is carriedout in a
varietyof ways.Perhapsthe most visibleis the increas-
ing willingnessto regardconcern about human rights
violations as an acceptable justificationfor various
kinds of internationalintervention,rangingfrom dip-
lomatic and economic sanctionsto militaryaction, in
the domesticaffairsof states.
But coerciveinterventionin any formis exceptional,
and the politicalfunctionsof humanrightsusuallyare
considerablyless dramatic. For example, a govern-
ment's human rights record may determineeligibility
for developmentassistanceprograms,or humanrights
conditions may be attached to internationallyspon-
sored financialadjustmentmeasures.The likely effect
on satisfaction of human rights may function as a
standardof evaluationfor the policies of international
financialand trade institutions.In the United States,
legislationrequiresperiodic reportingby the govern-
ment regardinghumanrightspracticesin other coun-
tries and makes eligibilityfor certainforms of prefer-
ential treatmentin U.S. foreign policy dependent on
satisfactionof minimumhuman rights standards.In
various parts of the world, most notably in Europe,
regional codes have been adopted, and there is a
developing capacity for adjudicationand something
like enforcement(even the EuropeanCourtof Human
Rights'capacityto hold governmentsaccountablelacks
Charles R. Beitz is Professorof Government,Bowdoin College,
Brunswick,ME 04011.
For questionsand commentson earlierversions,I am gratefulto
Brian Barry,Amy Gutmann,Kristen Hessler, Jamie Mayerfield,
Thomas Pogge, Thomas Scanlon, LawrenceSimon, and Dennis
Thompson, as well as to audiences at ColumbiaUniversityand
PrincetonUniversity.
adjudicationwithinthe state).1
The public role of human rights also has been
important-more so perhapsthangenerallyrecognized
in the United States-beyond the sphere of intergov-
ernmental relations. Human rights have served as
bases for standardsetting, monitoring,reporting,and
advocacyby nongovernmentalorganizationsat both
the domestic and the internationallevels of world
politics (Best 1995; Korey 1998). To whateverextent
contemporaryinternationalpoliticallife can be said to
have a "senseof justice,"its languageis the languageof
humanrights.
I do not meanto overstatethe case. Notwithstanding
the hopes of its authors, the Universal Declaration
does not function today as an "internationalbill of
rights."The internationalcapacityto enforce the re-
quirementsof human rights law on states is at best
embryonic.OutsideEurope,most individualvictimsof
human rightsabuses have no effectiveappeal beyond
their domesticcourts,if there. And even in countries
withinthe global "humanrightsculture"there is great
variationin the degree to which internationallyrecog-
nized human rights are embedded in domestic legal
systems.2The juridicalrole of human rights is both
limited and uneven. But none of this shows that the
nationalforeignpolicymeasures,internationalinstitu-
tions, and nongovernmentalorganizationsdedicatedto
the advancementof humanrightsare politicallyincon-
sequential.In fact, the global humanrights regime is
almostcertainlymoreinfluentialtodaythanat anytime
since WorldWar II.3
This fact recalls a longstandingworry about the
doctrineof internationalhumanrights,expressedvar-
iouslyin termsof its allegedpartialityor parochialism.
1 Notwithstanding,governmentsseem to
acknowledgethe court's
authority,as the decisionby the Britishgovernmentregardingthe
treatmentof homosexualsin the militaryillustrates(FinancialTimes
1999). On the varietyof roles playedby humanrightsin intergov-
ernmentalrelations,see, e.g., Forsythe2000, pt. II; Vincent 1986,
esp. chaps.4-6; and the case studiesin Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink
1999.
2 The idea of a humanrightsculturederivesfrom the Argentinean
juristEduardoRabossi(Rorty1993, 115).
3 Preciselywhy this shouldbe true is an interestingquestion.There
is a provocativediscussion that focuses on the growth of the
Europeanhumanrightsregimein Moravcsik2000.

269

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HumanRights as a CommonConcern
In practice,the worryarisesas an objectionto external
measuresthat are intendedto inducea governmentto
comply with the doctrine'srequirements.Such mea-
sures by anothergovernmentor an externalorganiza-
tion are sometimessaid to constitutethe impositionof
foreignvalues upon a culturewhose historyand con-
ventional moral beliefs do not supportthem-in the
extremecase, a kind of postcolonialimperialism.
There is a reflectionof this worryat the theoretical
level in a tension between two conceptionsof human
rights that can be found in philosophical thought.
Accordingto one conception,humanrightsrepresent
the common element in a range of views about social
justice or politicallegitimacyfound amongthe world's
cultures. A variant of this position, which is more
permissiveas to what might be counted as a human
rightbut is motivatedby a similaridea, regardshuman
rightsas politicalstandardsthatwouldbe reasonableto
acceptregardlessof one's (culturallyinfluenced)views
about socialjustice or politicallegitimacy.This notion
mightbe expressedby sayingthat humanrightsstrive
to be nonpartisan,nonparochial,or neutral among
conflictingpoliticalculturesand ideologies.4I shallcall
this the nonpartisanor restrictedconceptionof human
rights.
The other conceptionregardshuman rights as dis-
tinctive of a particularview or family of views about
socialjustice or politicallegitimacy.Althougha list of
humanrights might not be a complete descriptionof
the requirementsof socialjustice for a society,on this
conceptionit wouldbe morethanthe commonelement
found among, or acceptable to, otherwise divergent
views of social justice. That is, human rights identify
conditionsthat society'sinstitutionsshouldmeet if we
are to considerthem legitimate.But because there is
no generalreason to believe that these conditionsare
includedin all the viewsaboutsocialjusticeor political
legitimacy that exist in the world-or even among
those that have achieved widespread acceptance in
individual societies-there is no claim that human
rightsare nonpartisan.On this view, in contrastto the
first, the advocate of human rights takes a stand on
controvertedquestionsof politicaltheory.I call this the
liberalor full conceptionof humanrights.5
Manypeoplewill thinkthatthe restrictedconception
is the more plausiblebecause it seems to embody a
tolerance of culturallyembedded moral differences
4 In an articlewhose title ("HumanRightsas a NeutralConcern")
inspiredthe title of this paper,Scanlon(1979, 83) describeshuman
rightsas "agroundfor actionthatis neutralwithrespectto the main
politicaland economicdivisionsin the world"and as standardsthat
"arenot controversialin the way that other politicaland economic
issues are."He does not suggest,as do some of the writersconsid-
ered below, that human rights aspire to be neutral among all
conceptionsof justice or legitimacy.Rawls (1999a, 65, n. 4 and
accompanyingtext) cites the Scanlon article as a source for the
conceptionof humanrightsin TheLaw of Peoples.
s Donnelly (1999, 81) characterizeshumanrightsas "a distinctive,
historicallyunusualset of socialvalues and practices."Otherswho
haveespouseda liberalviewof humanrightsincludeWaldron(1993,
10-24), Nino (1991, passim), and Rorty (1993). Needless to say,
agreementabout the scope of humanrights can coexist with dis-
agreementin other dimensions.
270
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June 2001
that is missing from the liberal view. But there is
something paradoxicalabout this thought. Once we
begin to describeevaluativestandardsfor social and
politicalinstitutions,it is hardto explainwhywe should
stop shortof a full descriptionof these requirementsas
we see them. Of course, any such standardsshouldbe
appropriatefor the empiricalcircumstancesin which
they are supposedto apply,and it is importantto add
that this will leave some room for variation.But the
intent would still be to state conditionsfor the legiti-
macy of institutions.If this is the intent, then why
should we stop short of a full, liberal conception of
human rights? And what would be the principle of
distinctionbetween the full and the restrictedconcep-
tions?
My purpose here is to explore the thinking that
might lead someone to advocate a nonpartisanor
restrictedview of humanrights.More precisely,I shall
take up one aspect of this subject:Does the nonparti-
sanship, nonparochialism,or neutrality of a set of
rights,in itself,providea reasonto treatthese rights,as
opposed to a more extensive set like that found in
internationaldoctrine, as having a special status in
internationalaffairs?In puttingthe questionthisway,I
mean to distinguishconsiderationsof ideologicaland
culturalpluralismfromvariousother kinds of reasons
for givingsome politicalaimspriorityover others-for
example, reasons of urgency, efficiency,and institu-
tional competence.These other reasons are obviously
importantand mayoften provedecisivein establishing
prioritiesfor political action, but they are also more
easily understood,so for now I lay them aside. I will
conclude-tentatively, because I cannot give the view
an affirmativedefense here-that considerationsof
ideologicaland culturalpluralismneed not, in them-
selves, limit the scope of a plausibledoctrineof inter-
nationalhumanrights,althoughthey may have impor-
tant bearing on reasoning about the connection
between humanrightsand politicalaction.
HUMANRIGHTSAS
INTERNATIONAL
PARTISANSTANDARDS
To place the theoreticalquestion in its political con-
text, I begin with some summaryremarksabout the
historyand content of the doctrineof humanrightsas
we find it in internationallaw and practice.
Although the contemporaryinternationaldoctrine
of humanrightshas manyantecedents,bothphilosoph-
ical andpolitical,it is principallya legacyof WorldWar
II. It arose, on the one hand, from the statement of
alliedwar aims in the AtlanticCharter(1941) and, on
the other, frompersistentpressurebroughtby individ-
uals and groupsoutside governmentfor a declaration
of political principles for the postwar world. The
Preambleto the United Nations Charter(adopted in
1946)affirms"faithin fundamentalhumanrights,"and
Article 1 commits the organizationto encouragere-
spect for "humanrightsand for fundamentalfreedoms
for all." (By contrast,there was no mentionof human
rights or any analogousidea in the Covenantof the
League of Nations [Lauren 1998, chaps. 5-6].) The
AmericanPoliticalScience Review
charter does not give content to the idea of human
rights and fundamentalfreedoms, however. For that
one mustreferto the UniversalDeclaration(1948) and
two internationalcovenants,one on civil and political
rightsand the other on economic, social, and cultural
rights (both 1966). It bears rememberingthat the
declarationis just that, a declarationof the General
Assemblywithout the force of law, whereasthe cove-
nants are treatiesto which nationalgovernmentshave
acceded. Together these documents,which often are
referred to collectively (and, as I suggested earlier,
misleadingly)as the InternationalBill of Rights, con-
stitute an authoritativecatalog of internationallyrec-
ognized humanrights.
There are variouswaysto classifythe rightsenumer-
ated in these documents.For our purposesit is useful
to think of internationallyrecognizedhumanrightsas
falling roughlyinto five categories,althoughit is less
importantto agree aboutcategoriesthan to appreciate
the scope and detail of the enumeratedrights.
1. Rights of the person refer to life, liberty, and
security of the person; privacy and freedom of
movement; ownership of property; freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion, including free-
dom of religious teaching and practice "in public
andprivate";andprohibitionof slavery,torture,and
cruel or degradingpunishment.
2. Rightsassociatedwith the rule of law includeequal
recognitionbefore the law and equal protectionof
the law;effectivelegal remedyfor violationof legal
rights;impartialhearing and trial; presumptionof
innocence;and prohibitionof arbitraryarrest.
3. Political rights encompassfreedom of expression,
assembly,and association;the right to take part in
government;and periodicand genuine elections by
universaland equal suffrage.
4. Economic and social rights refer to an adequate
standardof living;free choice of employment;pro-
tection againstunemployment;"justand favorable
remuneration";the rightto join tradeunions;"rea-
sonable limitationof workinghours";free elemen-
tary education; social security; and the "highest
attainablestandardof physicaland mental health."
5. Rights of communitiesinclude self-determination
and protectionof minoritycultures.
I note, but shall not discuss,that other international
agreementshave elaboratedand enlargedthe scope of
human rights in the areas of genocide, slavery and pursuitof privateinterest.The civil and politicalrights
forced labor,racialdiscrimination,apartheid,discrim- of the declarationwere distinctively"Western"values.
ination againstwomen, and the rightsof children.6
There has been a long-standingdispute in official domestic political reform (exerted, e.g., by means of
internationaldiscourseabouthumanrightsdoctrineon
two majorpoints:whetherthe internationalcommunity
should recognize any priorities,either moral or prag-
matic,amongcategoriesof rights(particularlybetween
civilandpoliticalas againsteconomicand socialrights)
andwhetherhumanrightsdoctrineshouldtake note of
6 These as
agreements, well as the Universal
Declaration
andthe two protection
covenants,are convenientlycollectedin Brownlie1992.
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Vol. 95, No. 2
cultural differences in a way that would make the
content of a person's human rights depend upon
featuresof that person'sculture.The last majorinter-
national conference on human rights, conducted in
Vienna in 1993,consideredthese issues at length.The
final act of the conference declined to set priorities
among categories,holding that "all human rights are
universal,indivisibleand interdependentand interre-
lated."Althoughit recognizedthat "thesignificanceof
nationaland regionalparticularities... mustbe borne
in mind," it declared that "it is the duty of States,
regardless of their political, economic and cultural
systems,to promoteand protect all humanrightsand
fundamentalfreedoms" (United Nations 1993, sec.
1.5).
Human rightsare sometimesthoughtto set a mini-
mal standard,but it is not obviouswhat this can mean.
The rights of the declarationand the two covenants,
taken in their entirety,includerequirementsthat bear
on nearly every significantdimension of a society's
basic institutionalstructure,rangingfrom protections
against the misuse of state power to requirements
concerningthe politicalprocess,welfarepolicy,andthe
organizationof the economy. In scope and detail,
internationalhumanrightsare not more minimalthan,
say, the requirementsof Rawls'sprinciplesof social
justice. And those principlesare not minimal in any
very interestingsense.
Still, one can acknowledgethe scope and detail of
internationallyrecognizedhumanrightswithoutgiving
up the idea that they are or shouldaspireto be neutral
or nonparochialstandards.So it may be useful to
recall, briefly and without critical comment, some
recent instancesin which it has been said that human
rightsare not neutralbecause they conflictwith prac-
tices endorsedby one or anotherof the world'smajor
conventionalmoralities.All of these are familiarin the
human rightsliterature.
One exampleis the disputeabout"Asianvalues."In
the last decadesome East Asian politicalleaders (e.g.,
Lee KwanYew of Singaporeand MahathirMohamad
of Malaysia)arguedthat some of the politicaland civil
rightsfoundin the internationaldoctrine-mainly free-
dom of expression and political participation-are
incompatiblewith traditionalAsian political beliefs,
which value socialharmonyoverpublicdisputeandthe
collectivepursuitof sharedinterestsoverthe individual
For this reason, it was said, internationalpressurefor
the attachmentof politicalconditionsto international
financial arrangements)was inappropriate(Kausikan
1993).
Or consider the question of the subordinationof
women in traditional Islamic doctrine, elements of
which are carriedover into some authoritativemodern
interpretations.There is, for example,no presumption
of equal treatment or equal protection of law, no
againstforcedmarriage,and eitherrequired
or permitted forms of gender discrimination(e.g.,
271
Human Rights as a CommonConcern
mandatoryveiling and sexual seclusion and segrega-
tion). To the extent that these elementsare embodied
in the public law and legally sanctionedpracticesof
Islamicstates, such as Iran and Pakistan(or for that
matterSaudiArabia),there is a clear conflictwith the
requirementsof internationalhuman rights doctrine,
and pressureto conformto these requirementswill be
regardedas partisan.7
Finally,there is the muchdiscussedmatterof female
genital mutilation(FGM), still practicedritualistically
in SahelianAfricanon as manyas two milliongirls,at
or before puberty,each year. FGM, which can take
several forms, is sustained by cultural acceptance
ratherthan the force of law, so it does not obviously
represent a case of a human rights violation by the
state. Yet, where it occurs,FGM is not an aberration;
it is entrenched in local cultures and permitted or
required by local moral codes. And it is subject to
intervention,if not by the state, then by nongovern-
mental agenciesthat claim to be acting to defend the
humanrightsof the women affected.There is contro-
versyaboutthe seriousnessof the harmsbroughtabout
by FGM in comparisonwith variouspracticesfound in
Westerncultures,butwhateverone'sview aboutthat,it
would be hard to argue that interferenceto curtail
FGM constitutesthe applicationof a culturallyneutral
standard.8
In each of these cases it has been said that the local
moralitiesthat permitor requirepracticesinconsistent
with internationalhuman rights are sufficientlycom-
plex to allow for an internalcritiqueof the offending
practices.9This is true and important,but it does not
diminishthe impressionthat human rightsoperate in
all three settings in a nonneutralway. Indeed, the
existenceof disagreementsinternalto a culture,com-
bined with the fact that the weight of human rights
seems usuallyto favor the modernizing,cosmopolitan
side of the disagreement,only strengthensthe view of
internationalhumanrightsas a partisanratherthan a
neutralconcern.Jack Donnelly (1999, 84) has written
that internationallyrecognizedhuman rights"set out
as a hegemonicpolitical model somethingvery much
like the liberal democraticwelfare state of western
Europe."No doubt this overstatesthe case, at least
insofaras it suggeststhere is an unambiguous"liberal"
position about the full range of the subjectmatter of
internationalhuman rights (there is, e.g., no single
liberalview about self-determinationor the rights of
minoritycultures). But Donnelly is correct that the
declarationand covenantscannotreallybe regardedas
setting forth a culturallyor politicallyecumenicalor
syncretisticdoctrine.
7 See the analysis of contemporary sources of Islamic human rights
law, including the 1981 Universal Islamic Declaration of Human
Rights, in Mayer 1995, 95-6 and 117-8. On the extent of officially
sanctioned human rights violations in the countries mentioned, see
U.S. Department of State 1999.
8 Welch 1995, 87-97. For the criticism that concern about FGM is
ethnocentric, see the discussion by Tamir (1996) and the response by
Kamm (1996).
9 See Sen 1999, 231-46, on Asian values, and An-Na'im 1990, chap.
7, esp. pp. 175-7, on gender in Islamic law. In general, compare Perry
1998, 76-8.
272
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June 2001
NEUTRALITY
AND PATERNALISM
The evidentpartisanshipof internationalhumanrights
doctrinehas led some philosophersto suggestthat we
shoulddistinguishbetweenthe full set of values recog-
nized as human rights in internationallaw and a
restrictedsubsetvariouslyreferredto as "basicrights"
(Shue 1996)10or "humanrightsproper"(Rawls1999a,
80, n. 23). For expositorypurposes I shall call the
restricted subset-whatever its contents turn out to
be-"genuine" humanrights.The fact thatthe rightsin
the subset could be regardedas nonpartisan,or ideo-
logicallyor culturallyneutral,mightbe seen as quali-
fying them to play a special role in foreignpolicy for
which internationalhuman rights generally are not
suited.
Among those who believe there are grounds for
restricting genuine human rights to some sort of
nonparochialor neutralcore, it is not alwaysclearwhat
these groundsare or why we should care about them.
In this sectionand the next,I discussthese questionsin
connectionwith each of two distinctinterpretationsof
neutralityor nonparochialism.
Consider first an approachsuggested by some re-
marksof MichaelWalzer(althoughhe does not make
the connectionwith humanrightsexplicit),who distin-
guishesbetween "thin"and "thick"moralities.Walzer
(1994,9-10) speculatesthat a comparisonof the moral
codes found in varioussocieties might produce"a set
of standards to which all societies can be held-
negativeinjunctions,most likely,rules againstmurder,
deceit, torture,oppression,and tyranny."These stan-
dards would constitute "the moral minimum,"not a
complete moral code but, rather,"reiteratedfeatures
of particularthick or maximalmoralities."Someone
influencedby such a distinctionmight regardhuman
rights as part of the "minimum"or "thin"morality,
nonparochialin that they are partof a core of require-
ments shared by all conventionalor "thick"morali-
ties-the common elements in a global moral plural-
ism. Thus, for example, R. J. Vincent (1986, 48-9)
writesof a "coreof basic rightsthat is commonto all
cultures despite their apparentlydivergenttheories,"
which he describesas a "lowestcommon denomina-
tor."11
As Walzer'sspeculationsuggests,this conceptionof
nonparochialism,if treatedas a constrainton whatwe
should count as genuine human rights,would yield a
relatively short list. Among others, rights requiring
democraticpolitical forms, religious toleration, legal
equality for women, and free choice of a marriage
partner would certainly be excluded. Other rights
mightbe excludedif theywere understoodto generate
certainkinds of duties;if, for example,the right to a
high standard of physical and mental health were
Compare Miller 1995, 74-5. There is an interestingly different
10
view in Buchanan 1999, 52-6 and 59-60.
11Similarly, Martin (1993, 75) believes human rights are principles
that "would be regarded as reasonable by persons at different times
or in different cultures. And such principles, again cross-culturally,
would be thought to have connection ... with a fairly wide range of
differing conventional moralities."
AmericanPoliticalScience Review Vol. 95, No. 2

thought to imply that society has an obligation to I believe the reasonmanypeople aspireto a nonpa-
ensure the accessibilityof health care for all, then the rochialor culturallyneutraldoctrineof humanrightsis
existence of disagreementabout distributiveresponsi- connected to this interference-justifying role. Those
bilities outside of familiesor local communitieswould who objectto interferenceto protecthumanrightsmay
presumablyexcludethis right as well.12 claimthat the interferenceis unjustifiably paternalistic.
The narrownessof the resultingconception might It would be paternalisticin that it limits libertyon the
encourageus to think that this interpretationof neu- groundsthat those whose libertyis limited (the "sub-
tralityrelies excessivelyon the metaphorof a "core"of jects")will be better off as a resultof the interference,
rights common to the world'smain conventionalmo- and it wouldbe unjustifiedeitherbecause the subjects
ralities.Perhapsthis is too restrictive;afterall, the idea are capable of makingchoices for themselvesor be-
of a rightis itself culturallyspecific.So one mightshift cause the intervenorjudges "betteroff" by standards
to a more elaborateconceptionthat sees humanrights the subjectshave no reason to accept. A doctrine of
as fallingwithinan "overlappingconsensus"of political humanrightsthat satisfiesa neutralityconstraintmight
moralities.13On such a view, nonparochialhuman seem to offer the best prospectof meetingthe antipa-
rightswould not necessarilybe part of a commoncore ternalism objection because, if the human rights at
in the sense of being recognizedby all conventional stake are neutralin an appropriateway,then it can be
moralities;instead,they would be rightsthat could be replied that the aims of interferenceare ones that its
accepted by a reasonable person consistently with subjects themselves would accept if they were in a
acceptanceof any of the main conceptionsof political positionto bringtheirown moralbeliefs to bearon the
and economicjusticein the world.The idea here is that matterat hand.
human rights should be the objects of a possible The antipaternalismobjection,as interpretedabove,
agreement among the world'spolitical cultures;they faces the followingproblem.When we are concerned
are norms for the conduct of governmentsand inter- abouta violationof humanrightsin anothersociety,we
nationalorganizationsthat anyonewho belongsto one are usually not confrontedwith a situation in which
of these culturescan acceptwithoutrenouncingother people are unanimousin endorsingstandardsof con-
importantpoliticalprinciples.14Such a view would be duct that justifythe behaviorof concern to us.15The
narrowin comparisonwith the present international picture of a "we"who believe in human rightsand a
doctrine,but presumablyit wouldbe broaderthan the "they"who do not is badly misleading.Among the
"commoncore": A value could count as a genuine "they"are oppressorsand victims,and usuallythere is
human right even if it were not explicitlypresent in little reason to believe that the victims all share the
every culture, just in case members of each culture values that the oppressorsthink justifytheir conduct.
could reasonably accept it as consistent with their What this shows is that the perceptionof interference
culture'smoral conventions. to defendhumanrightsas a formof paternalismcan be
There are other forms of this basic idea, but rather a misapprehension.Paternalismis an interventionin a
than proliferateinterpretationsI shall turn instead to person'sself-regardingchoices on the groundsthat the
the questionwhy we should care about a doctrineof interventionis good for that person. The individual
human rightslimited to either a common core or an whose libertyis interferedwith is the same person as
overlappingconsensus.In answeringthis question,we the one whose good the interferenceis intended to
shouldrememberthat one functionof humanrightsin advance. In typical cases of interference based on
internationalpolitics is to justifyexternalinterference human rights, however, some people's liberties are
in a society aimed at changing some aspect of the infringed in order to protect the human rights of
society'sinternallife. Such interferencemightaim, for others. The justificationappropriatelyappeals not to
example,to stop genocide or forcefulpoliticalrepres- paternalisticconsiderationsbut to the desirabilityof
sion, to protectthe innocentagainstcivilviolencewhen preventinga harm or securinga benefit for someone
local authoritiesare unwillingor unable to do so, to threatened by another agent's wrongful actions or
restore a democraticgovernmentremovedby force of omissions.(Althoughnot always:Interferenceto per-
arms, or to deliver humanitarianassistanceto those suade a younggirl not to undergoan FGM procedure
imperiledby naturaldisasteror politicalcollapse. is genuinely paternalistic,but noncoercive interfer-
ence-such as providinginformationand so respecting
12 In Walzer's
(1994, 28-31) view, distributivejustice generally is part
the girl's capacityfor choice-affords a differentde-
of thick but not thin morality; see his suggestive and interesting fense.) That this should not be immediatelyobviousis
remarks on "the cure of souls and the cure of bodies in the medieval evidence of the continuing grip of the analogy of
and modern West." person and state, whichtemptsus to treat the state as
13 The idea of an overlapping consensus is due to Rawls, but he does if it had the moral attributesof an individualrather
not use it in the analysis of human rights. See Nussbaum 1997, 286,
and 1999, 37-9 and passim, for the application of this idea to human than as an aggregateof separatepersonswith wills and
rights. interestsof their own.
14 I think this is consistent with Scanlon 1979, but it does not seem to
In most cases, then, what I have called the antipat-
be consistent with his view in What We Owe to Each Other (1998, ernalismobjection,if it pertainsat all, must be inter-
348). The position taken there allows judgments about the (un)rea-
sonableness of culturally influenced beliefs about value to enter into preted elliptically.It must hold that, for purposesof
bottom-line judgments about right and wrong; there is no guarantee
that these judgments would satisfy the condition in the text. The 15 The point has often been noted. See, e.g., Nussbaum 1999, 10-2;
latter seems to me to be closer to the truth. Scanlon 1979, 88.

273

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HumanRights as a CommonConcern
justifyingexternalinterferencein a society,we should
base our judgmentof what constitutesharmor benefit
to a memberof that societyon standardsof value that
belongto the conventionalmoralityof the society,even
if we havereasonto believe that those on whosebehalf
the interferenceoccurs would reject these values in
their own cases. We might call this the principleof
culturaldeference.
In itself this is not necessarily a form of moral
relativism,since it does not deny that sound cross-
culturalmoral judgmentsare possible. Nevertheless,
taken as a generalprincipleof practicalreasoning,it is
a strange,even a bizarre,view,for it allowsthe content
of the doctrineof genuine humanrights to be deter-
mined by the arrayof political moralitiesor concep-
tions of justice to be found in the world. Suppose a
society with a racist political culture approvesof the
forced sterilizationof a despised minorityrace as a
meansof populationcontrol.If we acceptthe principle
of deference,we are forced to delete the rightagainst
genocide from the catalog of genuine human rights,
because it is neither part of nor consistentwith the
racistconception.But surelywe would resist doing so.
Someone might think that cases like that of a
genocidalsocietyare only theoreticalpossibilities,that
no society would for long support such a horrible
morality.Perhaps,over time, one expects a "normal
distribution"of conventionalmoralities,each with a
distinctivestructureand content,but all convergingon
a substantialcommoncore. This seems to me demon-
strably too optimistic, but even if one regards the
genocide case simplyas a thoughtexperiment,reflec-
tion aboutit suggeststhatthe groundof our belief that,
for example,genocide is a great wrong has to do not
with the fact that other people agree it is so, but with
the nature and consequencesof genocide itself (com-
pare Scanlon1998,337-8).16
Whethera standardshouldbe acceptedas a ground
of action, and a fortiori as a ground of international
action,does not turnon whetherthe standardis a part
of, or implied by, existing conventional moralities.
Actual agreementis too strong a conditionto impose
on any criticalstandard,and I believe it misrepresents
the motivatingidea of humanrights.To saythathuman
rights are "universal"is not to claim that they are
necessarilyeither acceptedby or acceptableto every-
one, given their other political and ethical beliefs.
Humanrightsare supposedto be universalin the sense
that they applyto or may be claimedby everyone.To
hold, also, that a substantivedoctrineof humanrights
shouldbe consistentwith the moralbeliefs and values
found amongthe world'sconventionalmoralitiesis to
say somethingboth more and different,and potentially
subversive,of the doctrine'scriticalaims.
16Brown (1999, 119) claims to the contrary that "there are no
general moral standards that apply" to "Bosnian Serbs who kill
Bosnian Muslims" or "Muslim extremists who think that the death
penalty is an appropriate response to apostasy" because in each case
the agents do not believe the conduct in question is wrong. This
cannot be right. The Bosnian Serbs who killed innocent civilians were
wrong to do so, whether they accept this or not.
274
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June 2001
DECENCYAND MINIMALLEGITIMACY
I shall turn now to a different reason for limiting
genuine human rights to a nonparochialcore (and
therefore a differentidea of the way the core can be
nonparochial).The basicidea is thatwe can distinguish
betweenminimalandfull legitimacy,withhumanrights
servingas necessaryconditionsof minimallegitimacy.
A minimally legitimate regime is one that merits
respect as a cooperating member of international
society, even if it falls short of being (what we would
recognizeas) fully legitimateor reasonablyjust.
Somethinglike this distinctionlies behind the con-
ception of humanrightsfound in Rawls'sTheLaw of
Peoples (1999a). It can be seen as an attempt to
describea view that is significantlynonparochialwith-
out beingneutralin eitherof the senses I distinguished
in the last section.As Rawlsconceivesof humanrights,
they are normativestandardsthatwouldbe satisfiedby
any "decent"regime,whethera liberaldemocracyor a
(nonliberal,nondemocratic)"decenthierarchicalsoci-
ety."For Rawls,"decency"is a term of art that serves
to demarcatethe boundariesof acceptablepluralismin
internationalrelations.Decent societies are those that
liberal societies have reason to recognize as "equal
participatingmembers in good standing"of interna-
tional society (the "Societyof Peoples")(p. 59). Being
so recognized,decent societies are entitled to a pre-
sumptionagainstinterferencein theirinternalaffairs;it
would be wrongfor foreign governmentsto intervene
militarily,to attach political conditions to bilateral
relationshipsand transactions,or to criticize. Rawls
distinguishesdecency from liberaljustice: All liberal
societies are decent, but not all decent societies are
liberal.Human rights are common to all decent soci-
eties, whetherthey satisfythe requirementsof liberal
justice or not. So conceived,humanrights"cannotbe
rejectedas peculiarlyliberalor specialto the Western
tradition.They are not parochial"(p. 65).
Whatshouldcount as genuinehumanrights?Rawls
believes that all decent societies would respect the
rightsof the person,the rightsassociatedwith the rule
of law, freedom of religiousbelief and thought,free-
dom of expression(althoughperhapsnot as extensive
as justice requires in liberal societies), and certain
economic (mainlysubsistence)rights.Decent societies
might, however,divergebeyond this area of overlap;
specifically,they are not requiredto providefor equal
freedomof publicreligiouspractice(but there mustbe
sufficient liberty to allow the practice of minority
religions "in peace and without fear" [Rawls 1999a,
74]), equal access to publicoffice,or a rightto demo-
cratic political participation.Therefore, the corre-
spondingrightsof the declaration-equal freedomof
public religious practice as opposed to freedom of
conscience and privatereligiouspractice,the right to
vote in free and fair elections--do not count as "hu-
man rightsproper";they "seem more aptly described
as statingliberalaspirations"or "appearto presuppose
specifickinds of institutions"(p. 80, n. 23).17
17Freedom of religion can be considered a human right "proper," in
AmericanPoliticalScience Review
Rawls'sview has been criticizedfor being too toler-
ant of illiberal regimes (e.g., Buchanan2000; T6son
1994). This may turn out to be correct,but there is a
danger of overstatement:The scope of international
toleration in Rawls's theory depends on the idea of
"decency,"which as he understandsit is more restric-
tive than it may seem. A decent regime renounces
aggressivewar as an instrumentof policy; follows a
"commongood conceptionof justice,"in whichevery-
one's interests are taken into account (althoughper-
haps not on an equal basis);and respectscertainbasic
rights, including subsistence rights, for all (so that,
among other things, official discriminationagainst
womenis not permitted)(Rawls1999a,64-7). It is true
that decency is compatiblewith a state religion and
with undemocratic,but not nonparticipatory, political
institutions:decencyis, and is intendedto be, a weaker
requirementthan liberal justice.18Even so, the con-
straintsof decencyare hardlyundemandingand, taken
seriously,probablywould exclude many of the non-
democraticregimes in the world today and possibly
some ostensiblydemocraticones as well. In the end this
may not be enough to meet the criticism,but it helps
avoid a distortedpictureof the theory.
It is importantto see that, unlike the commoncore
or overlappingconsensusviews, Rawls'sview does not
requirethe content of the humanrightsdoctrineto be
restrictedby the arrayof political-moralconceptionsin
the world. The content is determinedfrom the begin-
ning by the normativeidea of decency;human rights
are said to be nonparochialin relation to all decent
societies, not all societies simpliciter. This is why
Rawls's view is not open to the objection that it
deprivesthe human rights doctrine of its capacityto
serve as a basis of social criticism.But there is a price
to be paid. As Rawls (1999a, 80-1) observes,human
rights must be consideredas "bindingon all peoples
and societies, including outlaw states" that violate
these rights.But because humanrights are conceived
so that they are necessarilycommon only to decent
societies, it cannot be argued that interference to
protecthumanrightsin othersocietieswouldalwaysbe
consistent with the conventionalmoralities of those
societies.
Of course, much depends on the facts of the case,
particularlyon the relationshipbetweenthe natureof a
governmentand the content of its society's conven-
tionalmorality.The case of a roguetyrannyoppressing
Rawls's sense, only if its scope is interpreted more narrowly than
what some believe to be the intent of Article 18 of the Universal
Declaration. The human right to freedom of religion, as Rawls
understands it, forbids the persecution of minority religions, but it
allows for a state religion that enjoys various political privileges, such
as public offices open only to its members (1999a, 65, n. 2), and the
state religion may, "on some questions, be the ultimate authority
within society and may control government policy on certain impor-
tant matters" (p. 74).
18 In the political sphere, for example, a decent regime need not be
democratic, but it must provide regular opportunities for all citizens
to communicate their views and preferences to those authorized to
make political decisions. Rawls (1999a, 64) calls such an arrange-
ment a "decent consultation hierarchy."The details are complex, and
I pass over them here.
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Vol. 95, No. 2
a populationthat shares a decent politicalmoralityis
different from the earlier example of a genocidal
governmentin a racist society. But the possibilityof
variationdoes not affectthe basicpoint that a doctrine
such as Rawls'smightjustifyinterferencein nondecent
societies that could not easily be defended against
complaints that it imposes alien values. Something
more needs to be said to respondto such a complaint.
The responsemight have to do with the normative
idea of decencyitself,which servesto characterizethe
minimumrequirementsof legitimacy.Where does the
force of this idea come from? The answeris not clear
to me. The underlyingthoughtis that a societyshould
not have to satisfyliberalprinciplesof justice in order
to be regardedby othersocietiesas legitimate;a society
may be deficientby liberalstandardsyet still embody
elementsthat distinguishit from a bandof thieveswho
have achieved a modus vivendi. These elements in-
clude the rule of law, an acceptancethat all persons
have legal personalityand the capacityto participatein
publiclife, and a "commongood idea of justice"that is
shared, at least, by judges and other public officials.
Such a society might be said to embody a form of
reciprocityeven if, from a liberalperspective,it is not
the preferredform.19Unlike liberal societies, such a
society might embodyand promote a single, compre-
hensiveview of the good life; but it would do so under
conditions(includingrespect for "humanrightsprop-
er") that renderthe society tolerableas a cooperating
partnerfor liberalsocieties in the internationalorder.
The question,however,is not whethera societythat
satisfiesthese criteriaof decencyis to be preferredto
one that does not; so muchis clear.At issue is whether,
and if so why, decent but not just societies should be
regardedas legitimateand, therefore,as qualifiedfor
treatmentas "membersin good standing"of the inter-
national order. Why-for the (limited) purposes of
international political life-should decency be re-
gardedas on a par with liberaljustice?20
At one point Rawls (1999a, 67) writes that the
definitionof decencyis simplystipulatedfor the pur-
poses of the theory,andthe readermustjudge"whether
a decent people.., .is to be tolerated and accepted."
But it is a seriousquestionwhetherwe have enoughto
go on intuitivelyto makesuch a judgment.Do we have
a clear enough common-senseidea of decency, as a
standardfor institutionsdistinct from that of social
justice, to judge other than arbitrarily?At another
point he suggests that the content of the idea of
decencyis relatedto the functionthis idea playsin the
conductof liberalforeignpolicy.Liberalstates should
tolerate decent nonliberalstates (which respect "hu-
man rightsproper")becausethey are so structuredand
governed as to be peaceful, cooperatingmembersof
internationalsociety and therefore do not threaten
internationalstability,whereasinterferenceis permis-
sible in "outlaw"states (which do not respect these
19
I am grateful to Amy Gutmann for help in clarifying this thought.
20The restriction to international political life is important. Rawls
need not (and does not) claim that decency and justice are "on a par"
for any other purpose.
275
HumanRights as a CommonConcern
rights) because their internalfeatures cause them to
threaten internationalorder (p. 81). As a practical
matterthis may be true, but it cannot give a plausible
accountof the basis of humanrights,becauseit would
locate the justificationin the wrong place, not in the
significanceof humanrightsfor the rightsholdersbut
in the beneficialconsequencesfor internationalorder
of reducingthe numberof regimesthat do not respect
them.21
Rawls's most perspicuousargumentfor tolerating
decent but illiberal regimes appeals to the conse-
quences of toleration for these societies themselves.
Decent societies, by definition,are open to internal,
nonviolentchange, and Rawls (1999a, 61-2) believes
that the evolution of their institutions in a liberal
directionis more likely if they are treated "withdue
respect" as equal members of internationalsociety.
Thisis an empiricalhypothesisaboutpoliticaldevelop-
ment, and I suspectthat some versionof it is true in a
significantrangeof cases (althoughI am not surewhat
would count as evidence for it). Yet, although the
political developmenthypothesisbears clearlyon the
questionof howwe shouldact towarda society,it does
not bear so obviouslyon the question of the ethical
significanceof a society'spolitical decencyor, deriva-
tively, of the proper scope of a doctrine of human
rights.Perhapsthe connection,in Rawls'sview, is that
humanrightsshouldbe understoodas a class of moral
considerationwhoseonlyrole in politicaldiscourseis to
justifycoerciveinterventionin a society'saffairs.If that
is correct,then the fact that a value is not sufficientto
justifycoerciveinterventioncounts againstidentifying
the value as a humanright.
But whetherRawlsholds this view or not, there are
two reasonsnot to acceptit. First,it is not true that the
only role of humanrightsin internationaldiscourseis
to justify coercive intervention.As I observedat the
beginning,humanrightsare also, for example,invoked
to justify noncoerciveinterferenceby outsiders (gov-
ernments,internationalagencies,nongovernmentalor-
ganizations) and to justify programs of reform by
compatriots.We shouldconceptualizehumanrightsin
a way that is adequateto this largerrole. Second, as
before, the argument against interference does not
easily extend to an argumentfor limitingthe scope of
humanrights.Grantingthe political developmenthy-
pothesisgrantsnothingaboutthe moralstandingof the
values expressed as human rights; the hypothesis is
about the best means of realizing these values, not
about their standingas values. Indeed, the best argu-
ment againstreform interventionin a decent society,
assumingthat the hypothesisis correct,is that inter-
vention is more likely to retard than encourage the
society's movementfrom decency to (liberal)justice.
But such an argumentdependson ratherthan repudi-
ates the claim that the liberalconceptionis an appro-
priate standardfor the society in question.
What is the upshot for humanrights?I believe it is
this. If it were possible to regarda decent society as
21
I do not mean to say that Rawls himself gives such an account of
human rights.
276
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June 2001
minimallylegitimate,in the sense of being, for pur-
poses of its internationalrelations,morallyon a par
with a liberallyjust society,then it wouldbe possibleto
understand"humanrightsproper"as necessarycondi-
tions of minimal legitimacy.There would be a clear
sense in which these humanrights,as againstthe full
catalog of internationallyrecognized human rights,
could be defended as nonparochial.If the ethical
significanceof decency derives from that of liberal
justice, however-for example, if its normativeforce
dependson the hypothesisthat decent societies,left to
their own devices, are likely to develop into liberal
ones-then the hypothesismightyield a reasonnot to
interfere in decent societies, but there would be no
deep distinctionbetween "humanrightsproper"and
other humanrightsthat are part of liberaljustice but
not of decency.Indeed,it is hardto see anydistinction
of principleat all.
PURPOSES AND LIMITSOF
INTERNATIONALHUMANRIGHTS
Notwithstandingthese doubts about Rawls'sinterpre-
tation of humanrights,reflectionabout his view sug-
gests two relatedpreceptsfor anyplausibleconception.
I shall tryto formulatethese preceptsin a generalway
and then explainwhy they seem plausible.22
First, a satisfactoryphilosophicalconceptionof hu-
man rightsshouldbe suited to the publicrole that we
need humanrightsto play in internationalaffairs.The
doctrine of human rights is a political construction
intended for certain political purposes and is to be
understood against the backgroundof a range of
general assumptionsabout the characterof the con-
temporaryinternationalenvironment.23
Second, the conception should interpret human
rightsas "common"in a specialsense, not as the area
of agreementamong all existingpoliticaldoctrinesor
comprehensiveviews, but as principles for interna-
tional affairs that could be accepted by reasonable
personswho hold conflictingreasonableconceptionsof
the good life.
Here are some points of clarification.First, to say
that internationalhuman rights compose a doctrine
adoptedfor certainpoliticalpurposesis to rejectsome
traditionalviews about the characterof humanrights,
such as those that interprethumanrightsas a contem-
poraryrestatementof the (or a) theoryof naturallaw
or naturalrights,or as a statementof a singlecompre-
hensiveview aboutpoliticaljusticeor the politicalgood
that is supposedto applyto all humansocieties at all
times and places.24Human rights are standardsin-
tendedto playa regulativerole for a rangeof actorsin
22 Thomas
Pogge's comments on an earlier draft helped me formu-
late these precepts.
23
Jones (1996, 183-204) emphasizes the political character of
Rawls's interpretation of human rights. Note, however, that Rawls
(1999a, 81, n. 25) has reservations about this interpretation.
24 For
example, Finnis (1980, 198) believes human rights are "a
contemporary idiom" for natural rights (see pp. 210-30 for his view
of the content and limits of the doctrine of international human
rights).
AmericanPoliticalScience Review
the politicalcircumstancesof the contemporaryworld.
Yet, to describehumanrights doctrineas a "political
construction"is not to say that human rights are
unrelatedto these other kindsof views:In adheringto
the doctrineor in criticizingit, one mightbe movedby
beliefs about natural law or natural rights or by a
comprehensiveconceptionof the good. But it wouldbe
an error to identify these more fundamentalmoral
beliefs with a politicaldoctrineof humanrights.
Second, accordingto these precepts,the particulars
of the publicpoliticalrole expectedof humanrightsare
essential to a comprehensionand defense of the doc-
trine. I shall say more about this role below. For now
the essential point is that humanrightsare meant for
certainpoliticalpurposes,and we cannot think intelli-
gently about their content and reach without taking
accountof these purposes.I do not mean to say that
one should accept uncriticallythe conception of the
political role of human rights prevailingin interna-
tional affairs any more than one should accept the
details of prevailingviews of their content. But criti-
cism must begin with some conceptionof the practice
being examined,andthe contoursof thispracticeareto
be found in the doctrineof humanrightsas we have it
in contemporaryinternationallife.
Third, the second precept states that humanrights
should be acceptableto reasonablepersons,not peo-
ples. This is possiblyin contrastto Rawls,who writesof
peoples as corporatewholes with more or less widely
shared conventionalmoralities. I have discussed my
doubts about this elsewhere (Beitz 2000) and here
simplycall attentionto the possible contrastand note
its importancein thinking about the content of the
human rights doctrine.In my view, human rights are
ultimatelyjustifiedby considerationsaboutthe reason-
able interestsof individuals,not those of whole societ-
ies conceivedas corporateentities.
A view of this kind is at odds with some traditional
conceptionsin distinguishingbetween humanrightsas
a politicaldoctrineand variousunderlyingviews about
social justice. Why should we accept the revisionist
view? Partof the answeris that, as a historicalmatter,
internationalhuman rights doctrine is not accurately
interpreted as an effort to fill the same conceptual
space as was filled by naturallaw or naturalrightsin
the Westernpolitical tradition.Those ideas aimed to
supplysomethingdifferent-a comprehensiveconcep-
tion of the good or just society,perhaps,or an account
of the constraintsa governmentshould observein the
use of its monopolyof politicalpower.By contrast,the
internationaldoctrineis a negotiatedagreement(or set
of agreements)that describes"a commonstandardof
achievementfor all peoples and all nations"(Universal
Declaration, Preamble), and it is meant to provide
guidancein the conductof internationalpoliticallife by
actors such as internationalorganizationsand their
member states, nongovernmentalorganizations,and
individuals.
But the argument need not rest on a historical
observation.Contemporaryinternationalsocietyneeds
a doctrineof the kind imaginedby the framersof the
Universal Declaration.One reason, which Rawls no-
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Vol. 95, No. 2
tices, arisesfrom the developinginternationalcapacity
and dispositionto intervenecoercivelyin the affairsof
states to protect the interests of their own people.
Standardsare needed to guide the use of this coercive
power.As I have been urging,however,humanrights
doctrine serves other purposes as well. The most
general, albeit awkward,statementof these purposes
mightbe this.The globalpoliticalstructurecontainsan
arrayof institutionsandpractices,includingthe foreign
policies of states, with the capacity to influence the
conditions of life for individualsin their domestic
societies. In some cases this influence comes about
throughintentionalaction, such as militaryinterven-
tion or the attachmentof politicalconditionsto devel-
opmentaid.In othercasesit occursthroughthe normal
operationof an institution,suchas structuralassistance
providedby internationalfinancialbodies. Moreover,
as I have been emphasizing,transnationalaction that
affectshumanrightsis not limitedto the operationsof
governmentsand internationalorganizations;it may
also be carriedout by nongovernmentalorganizations,
acting in internationalfora or within the internal
politicalprocessesof individualsocieties.The doctrine
of humanrightsis a statementof standardsto guidethe
structuresand conductof globalpoliticallife insofaras
these bear on the conditionsof life for individualsin
their societies.
To be more specific, a doctrine of human rights
suited for contemporaryinternationalpracticeshould
be capableof playingat least threekindsof roles. First,
it constrainsthe domestic constitutionsof states and
the fundamentalrules of internationalorganizations
and regimes.(Whetherthis constraintshould operate
by meansof the embodimentof these normsin consti-
tutions,organizationalcharters,and so forth, I take to
be another question, one not settled by theoretical
considerations.)Second, it describes goals for social
developmentapplicableto all contemporarysocieties,
to the extentthat they are or can be influencedby such
externalforces as the foreign policies of other states
and the practices of internationalinstitutions.(The
degree and kindsof influenceappropriatein particular
cases is againanotherquestion,involvingboth norma-
tive and pragmaticconsiderations.)Third(and deriva-
tively), the doctrine furnishes grounds of political
criticismto whichit would be appropriateto appealin
the settingof globalpoliticsby a rangeof international
and transnationalactors-not only governmentsbut
also officialsof internationalinstitutionsand nongov-
ernmental organizationsacting in their capacity as
citizensof global society.
On this view the doctrineof humanrightsis signifi-
cantly teleological. It is a statement of aspiration
applicableto all contemporarysocieties, but all of its
requirementsmay not be capable of being satisfied
simultaneouslyor in the short run. Humanrightsmay
not bearon politicalchoice as straightforwardlyas they
would if conceived in more traditionalterms as side
constraintsor prohibitions.The actions required to
satisfya humanrightwill depend on the case. This is
not only because achievinga given end may require
differentstrategies in differentsettings, but also be-
277
HumanRights as a CommonConcern
cause prioritieswill have to be set and compromises
reachedwhen, in the short term, the effort to secure
one rightthreatensto block effortsto secure another.
Joel Feinberg(1973, 95) observedlong ago that some
rightsof the declarationsseem to be more accurately
conceived as rights "in an unusual new 'manifesto
sense"'than on the model of legal claim-rights.25
The
view I sketchhere is compatiblewith this observation.
A CASE STUDY:POLITICAL
RIGHTS
Accordingto the formula I suggest, the doctrine of
human rights is "common"in the sense that, consid-
ered in light of the politicalpurposesit is expectedto
serve, reasonablepersons could accept it despite dif-
ferences in their reasonableconceptionsof the good.
Because this formulationdependsfrom the outset on
judgmentsaboutwhichconceptionsto countas reason-
able, its effect is to framethe questionof the justifica-
tion of human rights as a substantive problem of
political theory, comparableto problemssuch as the
justificationof principlesof socialjustice for domestic
society.What distinguishesthe problemabout human
rights from the others is the special characterof the
internationalpoliticalenvironmentin whichthese stan-
dardsmustoperate.Concernsregardingculturalparo-
chialismor politicalbiaswouldarise,if at all,withinthe
substantiveargumentfor each of its elements.
To illustrate,let me considerwhetherthe doctrineof
human rights should recognize a right to democratic
institutions.The Covenanton Civiland PoliticalRights
is unequivocal.It holds that there are humanrightsto
politicalinstitutionsthat affordeverycitizenan oppor-
tunityto participatein public affairseither directlyor
through "freely chosen representatives";to compete
for public office and to vote in "genuine periodic
elections";and to assemblepeaceablywithoutrestric-
tions "other than those.., .which are necessaryin a
democraticsociety in the interestsof nationalsecurity
or publicsafety"(Arts.21, 25). As a purelydescriptive
matter, there is no question that these requirements
are nonneutralin the sense that they are not endorsed
by all the majorpoliticalmoralitiesin the world.What
is the ethicalsignificanceof thisfact?Does it meanthat
we should not regard democraticrights as genuine
humanrights,or thatwe shouldnot acceptthe defense
or promotionof democraticrightsas a justificationfor
interference in a nondemocraticsociety's domestic
life?
These questionsare worthspecialattentionbecause
the element of internationalhuman rights doctrine
most often said to be objectionablyparochialis that
concernedwith democraticrights.At the same time,
there is a discernibletrendin internationallaw toward
recognitionof a universalright to democraticinstitu-
tions (Franck1995,chap.4). So these questionsmarka
25
Feinberg's use of "manifesto sense" is not, as some writers have
thought, derisory; he endorses and expresses sympathy for this usage.
It is also worth noting that one can accept the idea that some human
rights are "manifesto rights" without also accepting Feinberg's view
that it is not possible to assign corresponding duties to them. That, I
believe, is a mistake.
278
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June 2001
specificpointof tensionbetweenthe restrictedconcep-
tion of humanrightsprevalentin philosophicalthought
and the developmentof internationallaw andpractice.
Considera hypotheticalcase. Imaginean authoritar-
ian regime in a society in which historicallythe pre-
dominantpolitical beliefs are not democratic.Citing
the Covenanton Civiland PoliticalRights,a modern-
izing insurgencyfightingfor democraticreformscalls
upon the internationalcommunityfor military and
financial help. Given the society's cultural history,
internationalinterference,if successful,wouldproduce
a result that would be regardedas a change for the
worseby a significantportion,perhapseven a majority,
of the society.The questionis whetherthis fact argues
againstinterferenceto help the reformersand,if so, for
what reason.
One possible reply returnsto the issue of paternal-
ism. Interference in this kind of case, perhaps in
contrastto most interferencesto defendhumanrights,
would be genuinelypaternalistic:It involves coercive
interferencein some people's libertyon the grounds
that the resultswould be in their own interests.But it
would not be justifiedpaternalism.Normally,the jus-
tification of a paternalisticchoice has at least three
elements: (1) a claim that the subject is unable to
choose rationallyfor himself owing to a failure of
reasonor will;(2) evidencethat the choice is guidedby
knowledgeof the subject'sown interests,to the extent
they can be known,or by a reasonableconceptionof
the interests it would be rational for the subject to
have;and (3) a reasonableexpectationthat the subject
will come to agreethatthe agent'schoiceson his behalf
are the best that could be made under the circum-
stances.26In my example,becausea significantportion
or even a majorityof the populationdoes not share
democratic political values, for this portion of the
populationthe secondelement (andpossiblythe third)
of the justificationwould fail. The interferencedoes
not appearto take seriouslythe moralbeliefs of those
whom it coerces.
This reply seems to me to yield the most plausible
accountof the ethicalsignificanceof the fact that many
in our hypotheticalsocietyhold moralbeliefs inconsis-
tent with democracy.Yet, it is open to certaindoubts.
First,it maybe questionedwhetherwhat I describeas
people's "moralbeliefs"accuratelyidentifytheirpolit-
ical interests.This is primarilyan empiricalissue, and I
have not worked out the case in enough detail to
resolve it one way or the other. One would want to
know, for example,about the nature of the evidence
thatmanypeople rejectdemocraticvalues,whetherthe
societyhas anypast experiencewith democraticforms,
and whether there have been occasions for public
politicaldeliberationabout forms of government.
On one set of assumptions,the veryfact thatpolitical
institutionslack the features characteristicof democ-
racy-such as free expression,political competition,
voting-would suggestthat preferencesaboutpolitical
formsare not eitherfullyinformedor freelyarrivedat.
26
I rely here on the discussion in A Theoryof Justice (Rawls 1999b,
218-20).
AmericanPoliticalScience Review
In that case the justificationof paternalisticinterfer-
ence mustfall backon a judgmentaboutwhat it would
be rationalfor people to wantif theywere in possession
of full informationand able to reasonfreely,and here
we have no choice but to engage the substantive
questionof the value of democracy.Telescopinga long
argument, suppose there is reason to believe that
democraticinstitutionsare instrumentalto the enjoy-
ment of certain(nonpolitical)humanrights,including
the rights of the person and subsistencerights.Then,
assumingthese other rightsare not themselvescultur-
allycontroversial,there is an argumentthat it wouldbe
rationalto wantdemocraticrightsas meansof ensuring
the satisfactionof urgent human interests,whatever
the presentpoliticalvaluesin a culture.27(Thereis also
the counterargumentthat some otherconfigurationsof
politicalinstitutions,like Rawls's"decentconsultation
hierarchy,"would be equallyeffectivein securinghu-
man rights. Which is correct depends on a historical
and politicaljudgment,not an ethical one.)
Second, the reply considersonly the perspectiveof
the nondemocraticportion of the population.What
aboutthe democraticinsurgentswho askedfor outside
help? Again,one needs more information,but presum-
ably the insurgencyhas local causes and respondsto
local grievancesand aspirations.From the perspective
of this group,interferenceis not a matterof paternal-
ism at all but of avoidingor reducingharmor protect-
ing againstinjustice.It is hardto see how this issue can
be addressedother than by examiningthe urgencyof
the interestsat stake in relation to the costs of inter-
ference and its probabilityof success. Once again, it
seems that the justifiabilityof interferenceto support
the democraticreformersshould be faced as a free-
standingissue in politicalethicsin whichthe valuesthat
interferencemay achieveare comparedwith the costs
and risksof makingthe attempt.There is no categor-
ical conclusionpossible about the sufficiencyof demo-
craticreformas a justificationof interventionin a case
like this.
These reflectionssuggest an alternativeexplanation
of the ethical significanceof local disagreementover
political values. It may be that this bears on the
feasibilityof constructiveinterference,or on its pros-
pects of success in the long run, rather than on the
nature or scope of human rights themselves. If a
significantportion of the populationlacks democratic
sympathies,then it is not likely that democraticinsti-
tutions will be sustained even if a democraticinsur-
gency attains its immediateobjectives.In that case it
could be true both that there is a human right to
democraticinstitutionsand that interferencein sup-
port of a prodemocraticinsurgencywould be wrong.
Why,then, shouldwe saythere is a rightat all? If the
acceptabilityof interference to promote democratic
institutionseffectivelydependson the extent of demo-
craticcommitmentwithin a culture,have we not con-
27The argumentis madein Shue 1996,74-8, andSen 1999,178-86.
I made a similarargumentabout the value of democracy,concen-
tratingon the circumstancesof developingsocieties,in Beitz 1981,
177-208.
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Vol. 95, No. 2
ceded that there is no universal(and hence no human)
right to democracy?The answeris that we have not.
The question tradeson the idea that there can be no
right without a remedy, or no right without some
feasible strategyfor its realization.But the fact that
interventionis unlikelyto succeedin establishingdem-
ocratic institutionsin a dividedpolitical culture does
not implythat nothingever will;institutionalchangeis
a complexhistoricalprocess, usuallyaccompaniedby
changesin politicalbelief as well. Moreover,a human
rightto democracymay have practicalforce otherwise
thanby licensingcoerciveintervention.For example,it
might call for efforts at persuasionand education or
supportfor the developmentof elements of a demo-
craticsocial infrastructure(associations,labor unions,
and so on). Of course, to accept this as a reply to the
objection,one must accept a conception of a human
right as something different from a legal right or
certain moral rights; for example, although it may
generate duties for various agents, a human right
cannot alwaysbe a groundfor insistingon immediate
compliance.But if humanrightsare regardedas polit-
ical constructionsin the way I have described,this is
unremarkable.
CONCLUSION
The discourse on internationalhuman rights suffers
from a strangejuxtaposition.In majorarenasof inter-
nationalpoliticsconcernsabouthumanrightsare more
prominentlyexpressedthan ever before, and there is
some reasonto believethat these concernsincreasingly
motivate action. Yet, within contemporarypolitical
thought human rights are often regardedwith suspi-
cion. These suspicionsare diverse.Some people think
there is no such thing as universalhuman rights (i.e.,
rights that may be claimed by anyone). Some think
there is no such thing as universal human rights
(possessed by human beings independentlyof their
relationshipswith others and their institutionalmem-
berships).Some thinkthat "internationally recognized
human rights"are not rights(at least not in any sense
that wouldbe familiarto someone influencedby Hoh-
feld). Some thinkthe internationaldoctrineof human
rights is a good idea corrupted by overextension:
Although there may be such a thing as a universal
human right, some (perhapsmany) of the rightsspe-
cificallyenumeratedin the internationalinstruments
fail to qualify.And some believethe doctrineof human
rightsis a cloak for liberalpoliticalvalues,an instance
of partisanshiprather than a neutral basis for global
agreement.
I have only addressedthe last of these suspicions
directly, although I have adverted to some of the
others. I have observed that the doctrine of human
rights,regardedfor the momentas part of the positive
law of internationalsociety, cannot plausiblybe con-
sideredculturallyor politicallynonpartisan.And I have
arguedthat this fact, in itself, does not count against
the doctrine.Whatis distinctiveabouthumanrightsas
a categoryof normativestandardis not their suppos-
279
Human Rights as a Common Concern
edly symmetricalrelationshipto the conceptions of
politicaljusticeor legitimacyto be foundin the world's
culturesbut, rather,the role they play in international
relations.Human rights state conditionsfor political
andsocialinstitutions,the systematicviolationof which
may justify efforts to bring about reform by agents
externalto the society in which the violation occurs.
This interference-justifying role may limit the content
of the doctrine,but there is no reason to suppose the
limitationswill yield a neutral or nonpartisanview.
Indeed,it is hardto see how thingscouldbe otherwise.
In the wordsof the Vienna Declaration,humanrights
specify conditions that institutionsshould satisfy in
orderto respect"thedignityandworthinherentin the
human person" (Preamble); but the concept of a
personwith inherentdignityandworthis a substantive
moralidea andwill almostcertainlybe more congenial
to some thanto otherconceptionsof justiceor political
good.
Is this kind of partisanshipproblematic for the
doctrine? I believe not, provided that each of its
elementscan be defendedby an appropriatelygeneral
argument, as I suggest is possible for the right to
democraticinstitutions.Sucha defensewouldhold that
human rights are "common"in a morallysignificant
way without being, so to speak, empiricallynonparo-
chial. This, of course, is not to say that culturaland
political differences do not come into deliberation
about how to act. These differencesmay enter in a
variety of ways-for example, as factors determining
the feasibilityand cost of a contemplatedinterference
or the risksof collateralharm.They may also enter at
a more basic level, as factors influencinga judgment
about the rightnessof using coercive means of inter-
ference, particularlywhen the purposeof the interfer-
ence is genuinelypaternalistic.
This conceptionof human rightsfaces a varietyof
objections.Here I note three of the most prominent
and simplygesture at the kind of reply that might be
offered to each. First, it may seem excessivelyprag-
matic to regardhuman rights as a "politicalconcep-
tion."Whateverelse they are, humanrightsare surely
moral standards,standardswhose authorityrests on
recognizablymoral considerations.To suggest other-
wise, the objectionholds, fails to take seriouslyboth
the characterand the history of the idea of human
rights.I believe,however,thatthe objectionstartsfrom
a faulty premise. To say that the doctrine of human
rights is a political conception is not to deny that its
authorityrests on moral considerations;humanrights
are political,not in the sourceof theirauthority,but in
their role in public ethical life. As I have described
them,humanrightsare standardsto whichit is reason-
able to hold political institutionsaccountablein the
processesof contemporaryworldpolitics.Theyoperate
as primafacie justificationsof transnational(although
not only transnational) political action aimed at
bringingabout change in the structureand operation
of domestic (and international) institutions. Any
account of the authorityof human rights must take
note of the political contexts in which they operate,
280
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June 2001
but this hardlymeans that the accountwould exclude
moral considerations;in fact, it would depend upon
them.
Second,in some waysa contrastingobjectionis that
a partisanconceptionof humanrightsis insufficiently
realistic.Accordingto this objection,unless a doctrine
of humanrightsis culturallyneutralit cannotpossibly
playthe role thatwe need a doctrineof humanrightsto
play in internationalaffairs.The reason is that if a
violationof human rightsis not regardedas a shared
basis for political action, then the capacityto enlist
internationalsupport when it is most needed will
deteriorate, and the doctrine of human rights will
become little more than a sectarianhope. The latter
propositionseems true enough, but the point about
neutralitydoes not obviouslyfollow from it. It is an
empiricalquestionwhethera politicaldoctrinemustbe
neutralin orderto enlist enoughinternationalsupport
to be influential,a claim that not only has not been
provedbut also is most likelyfalse. The growthof the
global humanrightsregime itself may be evidence to
the contrary.
Third, there is a residualworry that an expansive
doctrineof humanrightscan too easily be used as an
instrumentof neocolonial domination, as a way to
rationalizethe use of coercionby a hegemonicpower
to advanceits own interests.Of course, there is one
sense in whichthis is a legitimateworryif not almosta
necessary truth. If an expansive doctrine of human
rights embraces liberal political values, and if the
hegemonic power identifies its interestswith the ad-
vance of these values, then coercion that is soundly
justifiedby human rights considerationsalso will ad-
vance the interests of the hegemonic power. What
troublespeople, however,seems to be not this kind of
case but one in whichhumanrightsconsiderationsare
abused or distorted in order to make self-interested
politicalaction seem to be justifiedby other-regarding
considerations.The fear is that an expansivedoctrine
will be more open to this sort of abusethan a minimal-
ist one.
This is not an abstractfear. The historyof interven-
tion (e.g., by the United States in CentralAmerica)
includesmanyinstancesof what plausiblycan be seen
as analogousabuses of the values of self-government
and individuallibertyas rationalesfor self-interested
interference.Let us thereforeconcede the hypothesis
that an expansivedoctrineis more open to abuse by a
hegemonicpowerthan a more narrowlydrawnconcep-
tion. Whatfollows?Since we are conceivingof human
rightsas a public,politicaldoctrine,it cannotbe replied
that the possibilityof abuse is irrelevantto the content
of the doctrine.If this possibilitywere significant,and
if unilateral interventionwere the only mechanism
realisticallyavailableto promotehumanrights,then a
narrowingof the doctrine'scontentmightbe appropri-
ate. But there is an alternative:It is to establish
multilateralinstitutionsto protect human rights doc-
trine from unilateralabuse. This is one source of the
argumentfor a world humanrightscourt, and it may
AmericanPoliticalScience Review
also argue for something like the complex voting
systemfound in the SecurityCouncil,which otherwise
might be seen as objectionablyconstrained by its
supermajorityrequirementsand the great-powerveto.
If suchmechanismscan be madeto work,the potential
for neocolonialabuseof humanrightsdoctrinewill not
by itself argue for a limitationof the doctrine'ssub-
stantivescope.
All of this only gesturesat how one might defend a
more robust theory of human rights than that pre-
sumed by those who regardneutralityas a virtue, and
one more in keepingwith the doctrineof humanrights
found in contemporaryinternationalpractice.Plainly,
more needs to be said to developsucha defense and to
explorethe objectionsthat could be broughtagainstit.
And plainly,thatwouldbe beyondthe scope of a single
article.
So I will concludewith an observationon a different
although related point. The question of whether an
expansiveconceptionof internationalhumanrightscan
be defended is differentfrom the questionof whether
we ought to accordhumanrightsa fundamentalplace
in internationalpolitical theory.As a centralelement
in internationalpractice,humanrightsare well estab-
lished, and politicaltheoristsshouldstrivefor a critical
understandingthat takes seriouslytheir practicalrole.
But there are good reasonsto resistthinkingof human
rightsas the fundamentalterms of internationalpolit-
ical theory.For example,rightsare rarelyself-evident
and usually stand in need of justification,and the
justificationseldom terminatesin anotherassertionof
right.And because the satisfactionof a right typically
imposes costs on others, we need a mechanismfor
assigning responsibilityfor bearing those costs. In
itself, however, the concept of a human right is not
much help in designing such a mechanismbecause it
is concerned with the interests of the beneficiaryof
the right rather than with the relationship in which
the right is satisfied.For both reasons it seems likely
that a satisfactory theory of human rights is better
conceived as an aspect of a more general theory of
global justice.
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