Volume 18, Issue 1 January 12, 2018

In a Fortnight: China-Russia Relations Reality Check

What is “Xiconomics”?
By Willy Lam

China’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy: Will China Drop “No First Use?”
By Nan Li

CPEC: “Iron Brothers,” Unequal Partners

By Sudha Ramachandran

The PLA Accelerates Modernization Plans

By Kevin McCauley

In a Fortnight: China-Russia Su Xiaohui, a scholar at the Ministry of For-

eign Affairs-affiliated China Institute of Inter-
Relations Reality Check national Studies has argued that Sino-Russian
relations were a “model” or “show-room” of
In 2017, China and Russia trumpeted the
“New Type International Relations” (People’s
Daily Overseas Edition, October 31, 2017).
closeness of their relationship, calling it a his-
toric highpoint. Xi Jinping has made good re-
Though Chinese characterizations of the rela-
lations with Russian President Vladimir Putin
tionship present a united front, they also
a priority, visiting Russia six times and meet-
highlight China as the leader in the partner-
ing with Putin on 21 occasions since taking
ship. In October of last year, Chinese Ambas-
office.
sador to Russia, Li Hui (李辉), wrote an article
in the Russian newspaper Izvestia describing
Authoritative statements by Chinese govern-
the implications of the 19th Party Congress
ment mouthpieces, officials and think tank re-
and Xi Jinping’s leadership for the Sino-Rus-
searchers suggest that China views Russia as
sian relationship (Guangming Daily, October
a key partner in advocating its view of the in-
29, 2017; People’s Daily Online, October 27,
ternational system.
ChinaBrief January 12, 2018

2017). Behind the platitudes and glossing

over of a complicated history was a clear mes-
sage: Russia is open to following China’s lead.
Indeed, while Putin articulates his own poli-
cies—sometimes in contradiction of
China’s—when it comes to key votes in the
United Nations, Russia follows China (Eurasia
Daily Monitor, January 8).

The shift in relative power is particularly clear

when examining China and Russia’s economic
relationship. The new year appears to have
begun on a good note for Sino-Russian trade
relations; trade jumped in 2017, and based on
third-quarter projections will rise to over $80
billion (Chinese Ministry of Commerce, No-
vember 30, 2017). Since oil exports represent
the majority of Russian exports to China (52
percent in 2016), the recent uptick in previ-
ously flat oil prices is likely to further pad Rus-
sia’s export tally (OEC, 2016). Chinese and
Russian cooperation in the oil sector contin-
ues to expand, with joint oil and gas pipelines
snaking across China's western and northern
borders.
Chinese investment has also rescued several
Russian oil and gas projects, such as the
Yamal Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) plant (pic-
tured below), which received an infusion of
needed cash from China National Petroleum
Corporation (Xinhua, December 27, 2017).
Another project, a pipeline in northeastern
China, will transport 38 billion cubic meters of
natural gas from the border in Heilongjiang
province across eastern China to Shanghai
(Xinhua, December 13).
The Yamal LNG Plant in Sabetta, Yamalo-Nenets Au-
tonomous Okrug, Russia. Image courtesy of Planet Labs.
China’s winter energy crisis in 2017 and its
drive to replace its coal-fired electricity gen-
erating plants with natural gas may further in-
centivize Chinese companies to invest in Rus-
sian oil projects (China Brief, December 22,
2017).
However, while the rise in bilateral trade
might seem dramatic, it is important to keep
a couple of structural factors in mind. In real-
ity, both countries trade more with the Euro-
pean Union than with each other. Germany,
for example, exported $85 billion to China
alone in 2016 (OEC, 2016). It is also far from
certain that China even needs Russian energy
in a strategic capacity. Bobo Lo, an Australian
expert on Sino-Russian relations has noted
China has great flexibility to use the open
markets and replace Russian oil and gas if
need be. [1] Chinese investments throughout
Central Asia mean that it has also has access
to Turkmen, Tajik and Kazak natural gas pipe-
lines (SCMP Infographic).

2
ChinaBrief
Sino-Russian trade has traditionally been a
hedging strategy for both partners—used to
make better deals with other more lucrative
partners. For Russia that increasingly may no
longer be the case. In December 2017, Russia
used the remaining cash in its “rainy day” Re-
serve Fund that was meant to offset tempo-
rary budget shortfalls due to changes in the
price of oil (Meduza, January 10; Russian Min-
istry of Finance January 10 [Russian]). With the
Brent price of crude oil up around $70, Rus-
sia’s economy may benefit for the short term,
but long-term trends in the price of petro-
leum and alternative energy sources promise
oil prices far below the comfort zone of Rus-
sian companies.
The strategic calculus is changing as well.
Russia could once rest easy at thought of a
military confrontation with China. However, a
once-ineffective and bloated Chinese military
has reformed, reorganized and retrained.
While the disposition of China’s troops has re-
mained largely the same since tensions with
Russia were high, the sophistication, equip-
ment and ability of their troops have im-
proved (China Brief, May 15, 2017).
Even China’s small but potent nuclear forces
are now prioritizing penetration of advanced
missile defenses in a move that has implica-
tions for Russia as well as the United States
(China Brief, January 12; China Brief, April 21,
2016). In other technological domains, includ-
ing quantum computing and artificial intelli-
gence, China is poised to leave cash-strapped
Russia far behind (China Brief, December 22,
2017; China Brief, December 21, 2016).
China’s rise has been profoundly disruptive
for Russia across the breadth and length of
3
January 12, 2018
Eurasia. Traditional spheres of influence have
been challenged or completely supplanted.
Russian enthusiasm for Belt and Road pro-
jects that do not go through Russia, or for
Chinese Arctic ambitions that avoid the Rus-
sian-controlled route, are muted (Eurasia
Daily Monitor, October 3, 2017). However,
Russia remains optimistic it can project power
and influence into Central Asia—using infra-
structure paid for by China. Even if Chinese
economic growth slows, its eclipse of the Rus-
sian Federation—and memories of the Soviet
Union—is complete. Russia has been con-
signed to being a politically useful junior part-
ner, not an equal.
While both countries have eagerly promoted
the image of Sino-Russian cooperation at a
grand scale, a degree of skepticism is war-
ranted. In the end, Moscow and Beijing’s rela-
tions are predicated on the old Maoist adage
“If you don’t attack me, I won’t attack you” (
人不犯我，我不犯人). Their self-interest does
not make them allies.
Notes
1. Lo, Bobo. A Wary Embrace: A Lowy In-
stitute Paper: Penguin Special: What
the China-Russia Relationship Means
for the World. Penguin Books Ltd, 2017.
Kindle edition. Location 574.
Peter Wood is the Editor of China Brief. You
can follow him on Twitter @PeterWood_PDW
***
ChinaBrief
What is “Xiconomics”?
By Willy Lam
In 2017, Xi Jinping consolidated his control
over much of the Party and State apparatus,
culminating in October when “Xi Jinping
Thought on Socialism with Chinese Charac-
teristics in the New Era” was inserted into the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) constitution.
In late December, Xi’s leadership was ex-
tended into yet another domain: economics.
At the Central Economic Work Meeting
(CEWM) held December 18–20, Party author-
ities saluted “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialist
Economy with Chinese Characteristics for a
New Era” (习近平新時代中国特色社会主义经
济思想) as the sole guiding principle for finan-
cial and economic decision-making (Xinhua;
Global Times, December 20, 2017). The
CEWM, which is convened every December to
set directives for the new year, said in its com-
muniqué that all cadres were committed to
“upholding the party’s concentrated and uni-
fied leadership over economic work.” Xi’s eco-
nomic thought—dubbed “Xiconomics” by
some Hong Kong and foreign media—must
be closely followed so as to ensure a “correct
development direction” for the economy
(South China Morning Post, December 22,
2017; Nikkei Asian Review, October 26, 2017).
This is the first time since the establishment
of the CCP almost a hundred years ago that
the party chief has been designated the high-
est-level designer and arbitrator of economic
matters. Even the apparently omnipotent
Chairman Mao Zedong mainly focused on
political and military issues; finance and eco-
nomics were left to experts such as economic
planners Chen Yun and Li Xiannian, as well as
4
January 12, 2018
Premier Zhou Enlai (CCP News Net, Septem-
ber 19, 2012; People’s Daily, March 21, 2011).
Xi’s anointment of himself as virtual “eco-
nomic tsar” follows the marginalization of
Premier Li Keqiang as the top decision-maker
in this field. In a departure from tradition es-
tablished since the beginning of the Reform
and Open Door Policy forty years ago, Li has
failed to become head the party’s Central
Leading Group on Finance and Economics in
the years since the 18th Party Congress in
2012. That position has been taken up by Xi,
who also chairs another top policymaking
body, the Central Leading Group on Compre-
hensively Deepening Reforms, which he set
up in 2013 (Gov.cn, November 20, 2017;
Xinhua, February 28, 2017).
Xiconomics Means “Mixing Politics With
Economics”
While the CEWM noted that “Xi Jinping
Thought on Socialist Economy with Chinese
Characteristics for a New Era” would be elab-
orated during Xi’s second term as party chief
(2017-2022), it seems clear that Xiconomics
has resurrected the Maoist tradition of “mix-
ing politics with economics.” This essentially
means that while the leadership is, at least in
theory, pursuing Deng Xiaoping’s path of
market liberalization, a balance must be
struck between reformist measures and polit-
ical stability. In other words, financial and eco-
nomic policy must correspond with the polit-
ical goals of the top leadership.
Xi’s main political and economic concerns in-
clude stable, medium-level growth (at least 6
percent) and party-state control over key sec-
tors of the economy. China’s GDP expanded
6.9 percent year on year in the first three
ChinaBrief
quarters of 2017. The objective for economic
expansion in 2018 will likely be set at around
6.5 percent (United Daily News [Taipei], Janu-
ary 1; Wall Street Journal Chinese Edition, No-
vember 28, 2017). However, growth has been
achieved at the expense of heavy borrowing,
underpinning government investments in real
estate and infrastructure. Both Chinese and
foreign economists have cited debt as the
biggest problem facing the world’s second
largest economy. The Moody’s rating agency
regarded debt as such a large problem it
downgraded China’s credit rating in 2017
(Moodys.com, May 24, 2017; Reuters, May 23,
2017). For the sake of stability, however, the
Xi team will not cut debt drastically. And de-
spite a big bubble forming in the property
market, Beijing will prevent a hard-landing in
this sector because this could cause massive
instability.
Promoting “High-Quality Growth”
A major thrust of Xiconomics for the “new
era” is promoting high-quality growth. Spe-
cifically, this entails the expansion of high-
tech and high-end manufacturing and ser-
vices that have benefited from the country’s
impressive achievements in information and
communications technology (ICT), AI, cloud
computing, big data and other cutting-edge
sectors. High-quality growth is intimately tied
to “supply side reforms” (another hallmark of
Xi’s “new normal” economics), which consists
of curtailing zombie firms, reducing inven-
tory, promoting the efficiency of state-owned
enterprise (SOE) groupings, and creating
symbiotic links between civilian and military
enterprises. “Supply side reforms” also in-
clude more spending on education and social
5
January 12, 2018
welfare, the reduction of poverty, and pro-
tecting the environment (Caixinglobal.com
[Beijing], December 21, 2017; Ming Pao
[Hong Kong], December 21, 2017; See China
Brief, December 8, 2017).
Elements of “high-quality growth” and related
goals such as “Made in China 2025” and
“mass entrepreneurship and innovation,”
have actually been raised by the Xi admin-
istration for the past five years. The effective-
ness of this new deal remains in doubt. It is
true that China has made spectacular pro-
gress in sectors such as artificial intelligence,
financial technology (fintech), robotics, bio-
tech and green technology; but these ad-
vanced sectors do not yet make up a signifi-
cantly large portion of either the country’s
GDP or its exports (China Economics Weekly
[Beijing], October 9, 2017; MIIT.gov.cn, August
21, 2017). Moreover, high-tech industries and
services usually employ fewer people than
traditional manufacturing. Given Xi’s commit-
ment to low unemployment and poverty re-
duction, “high-quality growth” is a tall order.
Moreover, SOE conglomerates are poor inno-
vators partly because of Xi’s insistence that
their top management must be under tight
party-state control.
Meanwhile, China’s corporate debt is about
175 percent of GDP, one of the highest in
emerging market economies, according to
the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), and SOE conglom-
erates account for roughly 75 percent of this
debt pile (China Daily, December 11, 2017;
CNBC, July 26, 2017; People’s Daily, October
12, 2016).
ChinaBrief
The Debt Conundrum
Other goals that are a part of “high quality
growth,” such as boosting spending on social
amenities, augmenting SOE efficiency and
cutting down on inventory cannot be
achieved quickly. The party-state apparatus
therefore has little choice but to continue re-
lying on debt to maintain a minimum 6 per-
cent growth in the near to medium term. The
CEWM’s recommendations for cutting debt
are relatively moderate. The communiqué
merely noted that Beijing would “fight the
critical battle of addressing major risks with
the priority on managing and preventing fi-
nancial risk” over the next three years. More-
over, there will not be thoroughgoing
changes in monetary policy, which is closely
related to the level of leveraging.
The CEWM document noted that the author-
ities would “adopt a proactive fiscal policy
and a prudent and neutral monetary policy.”
However, no aggressive measures have been
adopted to curb borrowing. In fact, “delever-
aging” is not mentioned in the CEWM com-
muniqué (Finance.sina.com.cn, December 21,
2017). The clause “credit and social financing
should see reasonable growth” also seems to
indicate that there would be no drastic steps
to curtail “credit and social financing,” which
is essential to maintaining a relatively high-
level development of the infrastructure and
housing sectors.
Analysts have compared the CEWM commu-
niqué with the wording used in a Politburo
meeting held in early December. The Polit-
buro statement said that Beijing must “pre-
vent and resolve major risks through effec-
tively controlling the macro-level leveraging
6
January 12, 2018
rate.” The CEWM document, however, used
much more general and less hard-hitting
terms regarding the debt crisis. It said the Xi
leadership would “perform well in the hard
battle to prevent and resolve major [financial]
risks, put emphasis on preventing and con-
trolling financial risk… and determinedly com-
bat financial activities that are illegal and
against regulation” (Eastmoney.com [Beijing],
December 12, 2017; Xinhua, December 8,
2017). According to Li Qilin and Zhang Deli,
both experts at the Guangdong-based
Lianxun Securities, “the future pace of eco-
nomic deleveraging may be loosened up” (Fi-
nance.sina.com.cn, December 21, 2017). Lu
Zhengwei, chief economist with Industrial
Bank Co. Ltd., also said the CEWM’s message
of spreading the measures to tackle financial
difficulties over three years was a reflection of
Xi’s preference for “making progress while
ensuring stability” (South China Morning
Post, December 21, 2017). [1]
While no official explanation has been given
for a more relaxed pace of deleveraging, a
number of factors are clearly at play. Most im-
portantly, Chinese authorities have underre-
ported the extent of total debt. Usually cited
as 256 percent of GDP, credible estimates by
credit rating agencies and foreign financial in-
stitutions have put the debt-to-GDP ratio at
around 300 percent (Cj.sina.com.cn, June 29,
2017; Wall Street Journal Chinese Edition, Jan-
uary 24, 2017). Given the size of the debt pile,
deleveraging cannot be accomplished
quickly. A related problem is shadow banking,
which has received little coverage from offi-
cial media. In late 2017, Moody’s credit
agency recently estimated that assets lodged
with China’s informal and underground banks
had soared to 82.6 percent of GDP. While in
ChinaBrief
theory illegal, the practice is often tolerated
because many companies, including major
employers, could go under in the event of a
major crackdown on non-registered loan pro-
viders (Asia Times, November 7, 2017).
While over the past decade the growth of
debt has been driven mainly by enterprises
and local governments, individual consumers
have begun to borrow heavily. Debt owed by
ordinary citizens, particularly related to mort-
gages, has risen dramatically. Western econ-
omists note that outstanding household debt
has reached 44.4 percent of GDP—triple the
level in 2008 (South China Morning Post, Au-
gust 6, 2017). The governments’ hands are
therefore tied, since rapid de-leveraging
could cause a crisis in the housing sector,
leading to social instability.
Conclusion
Xiconomics will receive a boost at the Na-
tional People’s Congress in March, when top
officials in the State Council will be confirmed.
A triumvirate of Xi protégés are expected to
entrusted with handling financial and eco-
nomic issues. They include long-time eco-
nomics adviser Liu He, who was inducted into
the Politburo at the 19th Party Congress. Liu,
who went to the same high school as Xi, is ex-
pected to become a vice-premier in charge of
finance. He Lifeng, one of Xi’s underlings
when the latter served in Fujian Province from
1985 to 2002, is set to remain Minister at the
powerful National Development and Reform
Commission. Zhong Shan, who worked with
Xi in Zhejiang Province, will remain Com-
merce Minister (United Daily News, December
12, 2017; Hong Kong Economic Times, Octo-
7
January 12, 2018
ber 25, 2017). Given the likelihood that Prem-
ier Li will be further marginalized from top-
level policy-making in finance and economics,
Xi will have a near-absolute say on the deli-
cate balancing act of promoting stability
while pushing forward market-oriented re-
forms that will not impinge upon orthodox
socialism.
Note:
1. In an effort to defend the government
against accusations that deleveraging
is no longer a top priority, People’s
Bank of China Vice-Governor Yi Gang
noted in a conference on December 24
that curtailing debt was still a major
task. “We must unswervingly do well in
the tough battle of preventing and
controlling [financial] risk,” he said. Yi
added that “we must control well the
overall rate of leveraging, and we must
insist upon enthusiastic and stable
deleveraging and stabilizing the lever-
aging rate.” In particular, the Vice-Gov-
ernor highlighted the urgency of re-
ducing debt incurred by state-owned
enterprises and local-level administra-
tions (Tech.sina.com.cn, December 24,
2017). The apparent spin doctoring by
Yi, however, does not alter the fact that
out of political considerations, the Xi
administration favors gradualist
measures to curb debt so as to pre-
serve a moderately high growth rate of
at least 6 percent for 2018.
Dr. Willy Wo-Lap Lam is a Senior Fellow at The
Jamestown Foundation. He is an Adjunct Pro-
fessor at the Center for China Studies, the His-
tory Department and the Program of Master’s
ChinaBrief January 12, 2018

in Global Political Economy at the Chinese

University of Hong Kong. He is the author of The Evolution of China’s Nuclear Strategy
five books on China, including “Chinese Politics
in the Era of Xi Jinping (Routledge 2015).” According to Chinese nuclear strategists, two
major concepts best describe the evolution of
*** China’s nuclear strategy. The first, overarching
drive for China’s development of a nuclear
China’s Evolving Nuclear weapon was to “curb and stop nuclear black-
mail” (遏止核讹诈), and secondly to maintain
Strategy: Will China Drop “effective counter-nuclear attack deterrence”
“No First Use?” (有效反核威慑).
By Nan Li
China’s first nuclear strategy, adopted during
the 1960s and 70s, is based on the premise
The PLA Rocket Force is continuing to up- that a country must possess nuclear weapons
in order to prevent nations with nuclear
grade its missile forces and shift its emphasis
weapons from “blackmailing” those without
from a posture of immobile and vulnerable
them. [1] China’s lack of nuclear weapons
positions hidden deep in mountains to a
during the Korean War and the Taiwan Strait
highly mobile and more survivable mode. A
Crisis of 1958 motivated Chinese leadership
new CCTV documentary also reveals that
to accelerate research and development of
China’s multiple independently targetable re-
nuclear weapons, resulting in China’s first nu-
entry vehicle (MIRV)-capable intercontinental
clear test in 1964. But because this strategy
ballistic missile (ICBM) DF-41 will begin active
has “no clear requirements for the quantity
service in 2018 (PLA Daily, December 25,
and quality of nuclear weapons” due to tech-
2017; People's Daily Online, November 28,
nological and financial constraints, it could
2017).
only meet the “minimum goal” of symbolic
possession to prevent nuclear blackmail. This
While China’s strategic nuclear capabilities
crude strategy may also account for the Bei-
are changing, there is still a high level of un-
jing’s lack of strategic communication with
certainty among analysts about the specifics
other powers, which was generally construed
of China’s nuclear strategy. Though China vig-
by analysts outside China as a strategy of al-
orously censors information about its missile
most total ambiguity. [2]
forces, examination of a body of relatively au-
thoritative military texts provides useful con-
The second concept, which is understood as
text to help understand China’s nuclear strat-
China’s nuclear strategy from the 1980s up to
egy beyond the more visible changes in
present, is “effective counter-nuclear attack
equipment. Importantly, it is evident that as
deterrence.” This strategy is an outgrowth of
China modernizes its nuclear forces, it is also
China’s development of more effective (or
debating a shift in strategy, including the
credible) second-strike nuclear capabilities
abandonment of its No First Use (NFU) policy.
since the 1980s. This strategy requires China

8
ChinaBrief
to possess nuclear counter-attack capabilities
that can survive the first nuclear attack and
launch retaliatory nuclear strikes (报复性核打
击). These nuclear counter-attack capabilities
“can be limited, but must be effective” (可以
有 限 , 但 必 须 有 效 ), and capable of being
launched on command if an enemy attack is
detected. [3] Such a requirement also implies
that surveillance satellite and radar capabili-
ties need to be enhanced to provide sufficient
early warning.
Moreover, this strategy requires China’s stra-
tegic nuclear forces to have survival and pro-
tection capabilities, so that sufficient capabil-
ities can survive the enemy’s first nuclear at-
tack. Similarly, China’s nuclear counter-strike
capabilities “must include effective defense-
penetration capabilities including the oppo-
nent’s missile defense system.” These require-
ments may account for China’s efforts in re-
cent years to develop its own missile defense
system and counter-missile defense capabili-
ties, develop and deploy more solid-fuel, road
and rail-mobile strategic missiles and nuclear
ballistic missile submarines, and test MIRV-
capable ICBMs and hypersonic glide vehicles
(China Brief, April 21, 2016; July 21, 2017).
Another requirement of this strategy is that
China’s nuclear forces must be able to “cause
unbearable damage effects to the enemy”—
destroying 20–30 percent of an opponent’s
“important strategic targets,” which likely re-
fers to major cities and other “value” targets
as opposed to enemy nuclear forces.
China’s nuclear strategists are then faced with
the problem of building sufficient capabilities
to achieve these effects and deter, but which
are also financially sustainable.
9
January 12, 2018
Finally, for this strategy to be effective and
credible, China’s nuclear strategists believe
that effective strategic communication is in-
dispensable. This communication must in-
clude the demonstration of credible quantity
and quality of nuclear capabilities, and of the
“will and resolve” (意志和决心) to use them,
and letting potential opponents to be “abso-
lutely convinced” (确信不疑) of Chinese will-
ingness to use nuclear weapons. This may ac-
count for Chinese media coverage of strategic
missile force and submarine exercises, discus-
sion of advanced space, air, sea, and land-
based advanced surveillance capabilities and
acknowledgement of ongoing tests of anti-
missile systems, MIRV-capable ICBMs, and
hypersonic glide vehicles.
Debating No First Use
China’s nuclear policy can be understood as
following the principle of No First Use, which
is consistent with its second strike-based nu-
clear strategy of “effective counter-nuclear at-
tack deterrence.” But there appears to have
been increasing discontent with this policy
from within China’s analytical community on
nuclear policy and strategy in recent years.
This discontent has been reflected in several
critical views of NFU.
One view is that NFU may impose certain lim-
itations on the strategic use of China’s Rocket
Force, implying reduced crisis response flexi-
bility due to the highly centralized decision-
making in employing nuclear weapons.
Moreover, some believe that NFU reduces the
credibility of China’s already small nuclear
ChinaBrief
forces, and that abandoning NFU may en-
hance China’s nuclear deterrent. These ana-
lysts are particularly impressed by Russia’s
abandonment of NFU to compensate for its
inferiority in conventional capabilities. Aban-
doning NFU, they argue, is the most cost-ef-
fective way to free up scarce resources from
defending China’s vital strategic targets for
offensive capabilities to realize China’s pri-
mary strategic objectives.
Chinese analysts have also suggested that
China abandon NFU in a number of threaten-
ing scenarios:
Conditions for China to Launch a First
Strike [4]
China’s conventional forces are unable to
defend against a “large-scale foreign inva-
sion” (“大规模外敌入侵”)
If “the enemy attacks our nuclear bases with
conventional arms, posing enormous threat
to our strategic nuclear forces”
PLA’s operational objectives face an “enor-
mous threat”
(“巨大威胁”) by a “large-scale foreign mili-
tary intervention” (“大规模军事干预”) in a
“war of safeguarding national unity”—re-
ferring to a Taiwan conflict scenario
Escalation indicating an opponent’s “inten-
tion” to cross the nuclear threshold
Attacks with conventional arms against nu-
clear bases and targets of life-and-death
value like the Three-Gorges Dam causing
destruction comparable to or larger than a
nuclear attack.”
Supporters of NFU offer a number of rebut-
tals. Rather than hampering crisis response
flexibility, they argue, the decision to employ
nuclear weapons has always been “controlled
10
January 12, 2018
in the hands of the state’s top leadership”
which would be unaffected regardless of
whether China continues the NFU policy.
Regarding whether abandoning NFU may en-
hance the credibility of China’s nuclear deter-
rence, it is argued that some countries may
follow a policy of “first-use,” but that “does
not mean that they would engage easily in
nuclear adventure.” Chinese analysts carefully
note that Russia’s abandonment of NFU in
1993 neither deterred NATO from its east-
ward expansion nor stopped the U.S. from
waging a war in Kosovo. An additional con-
cern is that if the gap in nuclear capability is
too large, if the weaker side abandons NFU, it
may trigger a pre-emptive nuclear strike by a
superior opponent.
Supporters of NFU also argue that a “large-
scale foreign invasion” of China is unlikely due
to the rapid increase in the destructiveness of
modern warfare, which has forced major pow-
ers to pursue limited objectives with limited
wars. The difficulty large powers have faced in
invasions (such as Vietnam and Afghanistan)
further demonstrates the low likelihood of
success of such a strategy.
Moreover, according to the pro-NFU view, the
United States has less incentive to intervening
in a war over Taiwan, and abandoning NFU
may have little impact on U.S. decision
whether to intervene because the U.S. has
“absolute nuclear superiority” over China.
With a tradition of “inferior fighting superior,”
they argue, China should build up its conven-
tional capabilities to deter Taiwan independ-
ence and U.S. intervention.
ChinaBrief
Finally, in regard to attacks on China’s nuclear
bases and strategic targets of “life-and-death
value” (such as the Three-Gorges Dam) with
conventional arms, supporters of NFU argue
that recent wars demonstrate that attacks
meant to cause civilian casualties and eco-
nomic losses—instead of achieving opera-
tional objectives—are unlikely. Moreover,
China can deter these strikes because China
possesses long-range, conventional preci-
sion-strike capabilities that can retaliate in
kind by striking both the opponent’s home-
land targets and its overseas bases. As a re-
sult, foreign conventional attacks of these
Chinese targets are highly unlikely if not com-
pletely impossible.
Conclusion
China’s nuclear forces are undergoing an im-
portant transformation into an effective, sur-
vivable force. As these new capabilities come
online, China’s leaders will have to reassess
the full scope of their nuclear strategies.
While No First Use is likely to remain China’s
official nuclear policy in the near future, in the
meantime, the dynamic evolution of China’s
nuclear policy, strategy, and capabilities re-
quires careful analysis. Such analysis is partic-
ularly necessary if NFU begins to have great
popular support within the PLA, if China de-
velops a more grim view of its regional secu-
rity environment, or if China believes that its
economy is sufficient to support a more ro-
bust nuclear capability along the lines of Rus-
sia or the United States.
Notes
1. For a discussion of this strategy, see Lt.
Col. Li Shaohui (李韶辉) and Captain
11
January 12, 2018
Tao Yongqiang (陶永强), “Capabilities
Foundation and Policy and Strategy
Space for Nuclear Deterrence” (核威慑
的实力基础和 策略空间), Military Art (
军事学术), June 2006. Both authors are
graduate students at China’s Second
Artillery Command College in Wuhan.
See also Military Strategy Department
of Academy of Military Science, Science
of Military Strategy (战略学) (Beijing:
Military Science Press, 2013), p. 172.
2. Chong-pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weap-
ons Strategy: Tradition within Evolution
(Lexington Books, 1988). At this time,
China had air-dropped weapons and
later missiles, and it had also begun an
ambitious program to build SSBNs.
3. For a discussion of this strategy, see Li
and Tao, “Capabilities Foundation,”
and Colonel Li Xianrong (李显荣), On
Nuclear Strategy (论核战略) (Beijing:
People’s Press, 2014), p. 366. Li was a
lecturer at Qingzhou Campus of Sec-
ond Artillery Command College, and is
currently a professor at Strategy
Teaching and Research Department of
China’s National Defense University in
Beijing. See also Science of Military
Strategy, p. 175.
4. For a summary of anti-NFU views, see
Major Generals Jin Yi’nan (金一南 lec-
ture at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c
Ypj3OsoOSw
ChinaBrief
Dr. Nan Li is a visiting senior fellow at the East
Asian Institute of the National University of
Singapore. He is the editor of Chinese Civil-
Military Relations (Routledge, 2006).
***
CPEC: “Iron Brothers,”
Unequal Partners
By Sudha Ramachandran
Serious differences have come to the fore be-
tween China and Pakistan over the $60-billion
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). At
a Joint Working Group (JWG) meeting at Is-
lamabad in November 2017, China an-
nounced its decision to suspend funding for
at least three road projects in Pakistan, pend-
ing the release of “new guidelines” (Dawn,
December 5, 2017). Only a few days earlier,
Pakistan rejected Chinese funding for the
$14-billion Diamer-Bhasha dam project and
withdrew its request for inclusion of this pro-
ject in CPEC. Pakistan objected to Chinese
conditions, which included Chinese owner-
ship of the project, operation and mainte-
nance costs and securitization of the project
by pledging another operational dam. Ac-
cording to Pakistan’s Water and Power De-
velopment Authority Chairman Muzammil
Hussain, these requirements “were not doa-
ble” and against Pakistan’s interests (Express
Tribune, November 15, 2017). China has de-
nied these allegations (Global Times, Decem-
ber 12, 2017).
12
January 12, 2018
China and Pakistan often hold up CPEC, a
flagship venture of China’s Belt and Road Ini-
tiative (BRI), as a symbol of their co-operative
partnership. Recent developments indicate
serious differences between the two coun-
tries. Differences are inevitable between part-
ners, even those that claim to be ‘iron broth-
ers.’ However, the Sino-Pakistani relationship
in CPEC is an unequal one. Not only will CPEC
benefit China more than Pakistan, Beijing also
calls the shots. It is even cracking the whip to
ensure Islamabad concedes its demands on
contentious issues. Islamabad’s vulnerability
to Chinese pressure can be expected to in-
crease especially after the US’ decision to sus-
pend security aid amounting to around $1.3
billion annually to Pakistan in early January.
Corridor and More
Although CPEC is widely seen primarily as a
“connectivity corridor”, power plants and spe-
cial economic zones (SEZs) are also being de-
veloped. The project is envisioned as linking
China’s economically underdeveloped Xin-
jiang Uighur Autonomous Region with the
deep-sea port of Gwadar in Pakistan’s Balu-
chistan province through a network of high-
ways, railways, oil and gas pipelines and fiber
optic cables (China Brief, July 31, 2015).
However, little was known about its massive
plans for Pakistani agriculture. Original docu-
ments of CPEC’s long-term plan, whose de-
tails were disclosed by the Pakistani English
daily Dawn in May, reveal that Chinese enter-
prises will lease thousands of acres of Paki-
stani agricultural land to set up ‘demonstra-
tion projects’ to introduce new seed varieties,
pesticides and irrigation technologies. Facili-
ties for processing, storing and transporting,
ChinaBrief
grains, fruits and vegetables are also being set
up, indicating that access to the full supply
chain of Pakistan’s agriculture is an important
goal of CPEC (Dawn, June 21, 2017). China
appears to be using CPEC to strengthen its
food security, a key priority of President Xi
Jinping (China Brief, March 2, 2017).
CPEC’s scope is breathtaking. In addition to
opening up Pakistan’s domestic economy to
Chinese participation on an unprecedented
level, it will result in China’s deep penetration
of Pakistan’s security, society and culture. The
cross-border fiber optic cable project, for in-
stance, will establish fast and reliable connec-
tivity routed through China. It will facilitate
terrestrial distribution of broadcast TV that is
envisioned as carrying Chinese culture into
Pakistani homes (Dawn, October 3, 2017). In
addition, China is promoting the study of
Mandarin and has set up dozens of language
schools across Pakistan. In fact, under a Mem-
orandum of Understanding between the gov-
ernments of Sichuan and Sindh provinces,
Mandarin was made a compulsory subject for
school children in Sindh. The number of Chi-
nese nationals working and living in Pakistan
has also surged in recent years, transforming
entire neighborhoods in Pakistani towns into
‘Chinatowns’ (Herald, January 28, 2017; Dawn,
June 4, 2017). Pakistan faces a sinicization of
its economy, population and culture.
Pakistani Expectations and Apprehensions
Often described as a ‘game changer’, CPEC is
expected to boost Pakistan’s Gross Domestic
Product growth rate from 5 to 7.5 percent and
create 2 million direct and indirect jobs be-
tween 2015–2030 (The Nation, October 8,
13
January 12, 2018
2016). Pakistan’s government speaks glow-
ingly of its potential to transform Pakistan
into a regional economic powerhouse, and
even make it the next “Asian Tiger” economy
(CPEC, Government of Pakistan). In the
months following CPEC’s inauguration in April
2015, opinion pieces were effusive in their
praise of China. Beijing was hailed for going
out of its way to “substantially strengthen”
bonds with Pakistan. Its economic aid was
looked upon as largesse and indicative of “the
commitment of the Chinese leadership to-
wards Pakistan” and its 207 million people
(The News, April 27, 2015; Pakistan Bureau of
Statistics, 2017).
Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
has said that Baluchistan will be CPEC’s “big-
gest beneficiary” (The Nation, May 5, 2017).
Baluchis, however, are not convinced. CPEC
evoked little optimism among them from the
start, and they fear that CPEC would benefit
outsiders rather than locals. An additional
concern is that migration of workers to
Gwadar will change the demographic profile
of the province, leaving the group a minority
(The News, June 4, 2016). Baluch opposition
to the project is strong and has even been ex-
pressed violently. Baluch militants have car-
ried out several attacks on workers from out-
side the province, includes those from China
(Gandhara, September 29, 2016; Herald, July
14, 2017).
Over the past year, a small but vocal group of
analysts have begun expressing unease over
what CPEC will bring Pakistan. In particular,
they are calling for transparency on deals
(Dawn, July 30, 2017; Daily Times, November
5, 2017). In Dec 2017, the Pakistani govern-
ment released a summary of CPEC’s Long-
ChinaBrief
Term Plan (The News, December 20, 2017).
But even this sheds no light on the terms and
conditions of agreements, project timelines
or the exact nature of Chinese funding.
Documents disclosed by Dawn and infor-
mation trickling out of official meetings point
to troubles ahead. The most important is the
looming debt trap. Economists have high-
lighted the estimated $90 billion in debt that
Pakistan will have to repay China over 30
years (Express Tribune, March 12, 2017). The
consequences if Pakistan is unable to repay
are unclear, though it is possible it would
meet the fate of Tajikistan and Sri Lanka,
which ended up ceding territory to China in
lieu of unpaid debts (Dawn, March 23, 2017).
CPEC’s terms and benefits disproportionately
favor China. The state-run China Overseas
Port Holding Company, for example, which
will operate Gwadar port for a period of 40
years, is set to take 91 percent of gross reve-
nue collection from terminal and marine op-
erations and 85 percent of gross operations
revenue from the Gwadar free zone (The Na-
tion, April 20, 2017). SEZs are being are being
set up exclusively for Chinese companies
where they will be exempted from taxes
(Dawn, March 9, 2017). The CPEC plan pro-
vides the Chinese with visa-free access to Pa-
kistan. There is no such reciprocal arrange-
ment for Pakistanis and China's visa rules for
Pakistanis have in fact tightened (Dawn, Sep-
tember 2, 2017). There is even little clarity re-
garding who will run or supervise the elabo-
rate electronic surveillance system that China
will install in Pakistani cities (Hindustan Times,
June 13). With such free rein over debt, polic-
ing and tax collection, there is concern over
14
January 12, 2018
CPEC’s implications for Pakistan’s sover-
eignty. It could turn Pakistan into a Chinese
colony (Economic Times, June 12, 2017). Par-
allels are being drawn between CPEC and the
East India Company, the forerunner of British
colonial rule in the Indian sub-continent
(Dawn, October 18, 2016).
China’s Concerns
Although the Chinese government has
avoided publicizing its concerns over political
instability in Pakistan, there is apprehension
in China over the implications of unrest and
insecurity for CPEC (Global Times, September
9, 2016 and China Daily, December 12, 2016).
Indeed, protests at project sites about issues
like compensation for land, environmental
concerns and exclusion of locals from project
benefits delayed projects (Dawn, July 7, 2017).
Another concern is violence targeting CPEC
projects and Chinese nationals in Pakistan.
The corridor links Xinjiang with Baluchistan,
both turbulent regions, and runs through the
insurgency-wracked Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
and disputed Gilgit-Baltistan territories. Bomb
blasts and grenade attacks have killed scores
of Pakistani workers and Chinese nationals
employed in CPEC projects (Global Times,
May 25, 2017). China is worried that Uighur
militants will attack Chinese targets in Paki-
stan. In December 2017, the Chinese Embassy
in Islamabad warned its nationals of a “series
of terror attacks” targeting “Chinese-invested
organizations and Chinese citizens” in Paki-
stan (Dawn, December 8, 2017). In October
2017, it raised concern over a possible terror-
ist threat to its ambassador in Islamabad from
the East Turkestan Independence Movement
(ETIM) (Dawn, October 22, 2017).
ChinaBrief
The unsettled status of Gilgit-Baltistan, terri-
tory that is part of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir
(POK) over which India lays claim, worries
China as it raises questions about the legality
of CPEC projects here (Express Tribune, Janu-
ary 7, 2016). Pakistan’s upcoming parliamen-
tary elections are an additional cause for con-
cern. While Pakistan’s main political parties
are not opposed to CPEC, there are differ-
ences in their priorities. The ruling Pakistan
Muslim League—Nawaz (PML-N) prioritizes
projects along CPEC’s relatively calm eastern
route, which runs through its stronghold,
Punjab. However, should the Pakistan
Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) form or be part of the
next government it can be expected to shift
focus to the turbulent western route. A
change in government could lead to a review
and or change in the deals (Global Times, Aug
3, 2017).
Pressure on Pakistan
To reassure China on the safety of it nationals
and investments, Pakistan has set up a
15,000-strong Special Security Division and
raised a naval contingent to protect Gwadar
port (China Daily, March 15, 2017). At China’s
urging it has also cracked down on ETIM, and
Baluch and other militants opposed to CPEC
(Pakistan Today, October 18, 2015).
Under Chinese pressure Pakistan has taken
decisions that are not in its interest. Chinese
prodding has forced it to begin taking steps
to formally integrate Gilgit-Baltistan (Express
Tribune, January 7, 2016). While this may pro-
vide legal cover for Chinese projects in Gilgit-
Baltistan it will cost Pakistan the goodwill of
15
January 12, 2018
Kashmiri separatists (The Wire, March 20,
2017).
China's decision to suspend funding for the
three road projects is another example of
such pressure and is possibly aimed at disci-
plining Pakistan for its defiance of Beijing over
the Diamer-Bhasha project (FirstPost, Decem-
ber 7, 2017). China is reportedly keen to have
the Pakistani Army put in charge of CPEC pro-
jects as its involvement is expected to im-
prove efficiency and speed up execution of
projects, guaranteeing CPEC’s success (Euro-
pean Foundation for South Asian Studies, De-
cember 8, 2017). Formalizing the army’s role
in CPEC could become part of the new guide-
lines.
Pakistan’s defiance of China on the Diamer-
Bhasha project is likely to be short-lived. Its
economy and military are far too dependent
on China for Islamabad to resist Beijing’s
pressure for long. This dependence has deep-
ened following the United States’ decision to
cut aid to Pakistan. In a sign of things to come,
the Pakistani government reacted to the US
announcement by allowing the renminbi to
be used for bilateral trade and investment ac-
tivities, reversing an earlier decision in No-
vember barring the use of renminbi on the
grounds that it would undermine Pakistan’s
economic sovereignty (Business Recorder,
January 8; Express Tribune, November 21,
2017). China’s grip over Pakistan in CPEC has
tightened.
Conclusions
China and Pakistan are likely to continue to
differ on issues related to CPEC. However,
these are unlikely to derail the initiative, given
ChinaBrief
their strong relationship, Pakistan’s deepen-
ing dependence on China and Beijing’s deter-
mination to make a success of BRI’s flagship
venture. Other countries participating in BRI
can draw lessons from Pakistan’s experience
with CPEC. They can expect massive Chinese
investment but not on generous terms. Chi-
nese funding is not largesse and will extract a
heavy price. As in Pakistan, they can expect si-
nicization of their economy, population and
culture. Countries weighing the costs of Chi-
nese investment should factor in Chinese in-
terference in their political system.
Dr. Sudha Ramachandran is an independent
researcher and journalist based in Bangalore,
India. She has written extensively on South
Asian peace and conflict, political and security
issues for The Diplomat, Asia Times and Geo-
politics.
***
The PLA Accelerates
Modernization Plans
By Kevin McCauley
China is moving up plans for the completion
of its military reforms and modernization.
Shortly after the close of the 19th National
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party,
CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping announced
that the modernization of the People’s Liber-
ation Army’s (PLA) would essentially complete
by 2035. Subsequent reporting confirmed
that this announcement represented an ac-
celeration of the military modernization plan,
shortening the original plan’s third stage by
15 years from 2049 to 2035 (Xinhua Novem-
ber 24, 2017). However, Xi added that the PLA
16
January 12, 2018
would not transform into a world-class mili-
tary until mid-century (Xinhua, October 27,
2017).
This shortened timeline is a sign of both suc-
cesses of the reforms and recognition of con-
tinuing areas of weakness for the PLA. Even
more importantly, however, is the fact that
this accelerated timeline is being accompa-
nied by reform of military education and
training which are necessary complements to
the equipment modernization. Cultivating
military talents as part of the military educa-
tional reforms, and enhancing training to ap-
proach actual combat conditions are im-
portant components of military moderniza-
tion.
Background
President Xi’s current reform efforts, first an-
nounced in November 2013, are scheduled
for completion by the end of 2020 (Govern-
ment of the PRC, November 15, 2013; Xinhua,
September 13, 2017). These reforms seek to
lay a strong foundation by completing several
long-term projects: mechanization of the
force by incorporating information and com-
puter technologies, significantly increasing
key combat capabilities, improving military
education and training, and making adjust-
ments and refinements to the restructured
force and command systems (Xinhua, May 13,
2016).
President Xi has initiated the most expansive
military reforms and reorganization in at least
three decades, breaking institutional barriers
that had impeded the required command and
structural changes proposed by PLA academ-
ChinaBrief
ics. President Xi appears to have removed im-
pediments to initiating the tough, but needed
changes through personnel promotions, cor-
ruption charges to remove opposed officers,
as well as populist appeals to the collective
interest and party loyalty to build a strong
modern military (China Brief, February 4,
2015; Xinhua August 11, 2014; China Military
Online February 28, 2014).
Accelerating Modernization based on Key
Concepts
Past PLA media and defense white papers
have identified the requirement to accelerate
various components of PLA modernization,
improvements in training and exercises, as
well as accelerating the modernization of na-
tional defense and the armed forces in gen-
eral. The need to accelerate military modern-
ization is in part a response to China’s com-
plex security environment. But it is also a re-
sponse to the perception that the speed of
technological change, and modernization of
advanced militaries in the world is threaten-
ing to leave the PLA further behind (Infor-
mation Office of the State Council, March 31,
2011; Information Office of the State Council,
April 16, 2013 [English]; Information Office of
the State Council, May 26, 2015; PLA Daily Au-
gust 31, 2014).
In 2012, an Air Force colonel, Dong Zifeng (董
子峰), who held numerous operational and
academic positions, as well as serving as a
joint operations expert at the Academy of
Military Sciences published a book Transfor-
mation of Generating Mode of Warfighting Ca-
pability. Dong advocated an accelerated
modernization effort focused on implement-
17
January 12, 2018
ing system of systems operations and inte-
grated joint operations, two dominant theo-
retical subjects impacting all aspects of PLA
transformation (China Brief, July 17, 2014). [1]
It is not known if the new accelerated military
modernization plan announced by President
Xi incorporates proposals from this publica-
tion, the author does highlight many require-
ments prominent in PLA publications, sug-
gesting that Dong’s book provides useful in-
sights. The author views transformation of the
method for generating combat effectiveness
as key to overcoming difficult issues threaten-
ing to leave the PLA behind the world’s ad-
vanced militaries. His intent is to accelerate
modernization by focusing the effort on the
areas that will allow the services and branches
of the PLA to work together in a networked,
cohesive way.
Dong takes a holistic and interactive ap-
proach including development of personnel,
weapons and equipment, organizations,
training, military research, operational inno-
vation and experimentation, as well as the im-
pact of technology and the international situ-
ation. The feedback process allows for revi-
sion and refinements of the modernization
process (China Brief, July 17, 2014). [2]
Endless Modernization
Although the revised PLA modernization plan
focuses completion of the current military re-
form plan by 2035, no military can afford to
stagnate. The PLA is already focused on seiz-
ing the commanding heights of science and
technology through innovation in research
that can bring about profound changes in
warfare (PLA Daily, May 12, 2017). The PLA,
ChinaBrief
believing scientific and technological innova-
tion is the core engine of combat effective-
ness, has identified new and disruptive tech-
nologies leading to a new revolution in mili-
tary affairs based on intelligent technologies.
These areas include artificial intelligence, big
data, quantum communications and compu-
ting, nanotechnology, hypersonic vehicles, di-
rected energy weapons, battlefield robotics,
and weapons based on new physical princi-
pals that can dramatically change warfare
(PLA Daily, August 17, 2017).
A key area the PLA is researching is artificial
intelligence as one of the most significant of
the disruptive technologies. The incorpora-
tion of intelligent technologies into weapons
and equipment, what the PLA refers to as “in-
telligence-ization” (zhiyehua; 智 能 化 ), is
viewed as a new revolution in military affairs
and a key to warfare in the post information
age. The PLA views this technology as a po-
tential game changer providing an oppor-
tunity for less advanced countries to overtake
the world’s advanced militaries. The 19th
Party Congress which accelerated the military
modernization plan also placed a priority on
speeding up the development of military in-
telligent technologies (PLA Daily, November
14, 2017).
PLA theorists view the development of dis-
ruptive technologies as a nonlinear process
that can lead to a shock wave causing a tech-
nological avalanche. This will lead dramatic
changes in industry and economies, society,
and the power of countries (PLA Daily, Febru-
ary 10, 2017). However, technological devel-
opment and equipment modernization could
be the easy part of the PLA’s modernization
effort. Ongoing reforms of military education,
18
January 12, 2018
training and exercises, and development of
joint operations are critical areas where they
cannot fail if the PLA hopes to optimize the
employment of new technologies through in-
novative operational methods. PLA is defi-
cient in these areas by its own estimates.
The incorporation of artificial intelligence (AI)
into the PLA will prove insightful, as the incor-
poration of autonomous systems collides
with the PLA’s preference for centralized, uni-
fied command and control. Decentralized
command is only employed in secondary di-
rections, or temporarily when required by an
unforeseen battlefield situation. PLA theorists
have already stated that military artificial in-
telligence must be human controlled, which
could protect against the dangers of AI, but
also degrade its advantages. The PLA contin-
ues to maintain that while science and tech-
nology provide the core for a combat effec-
tive force, man remains decisive to the out-
come of wars (PLA Daily, December 8, 2017;
PLA Daily, December 12, 2017).
Conclusion
The decision to accelerate the current PLA
modernization plan promises an upward
change in the trajectory of the PLA’s increas-
ing combat capabilities as it ventures toward
global operational capabilities. The acceler-
ated modernization plan combined with
China’s emphasis on developing key disrup-
tive technologies that could allow the PLA to
leap frog past the current advanced militaries
represents a significant course correction. Re-
form of military education and training, and
innovation in doctrine and tactics are critical
to the success of this effort. President Xi’s pro-
motion of fundamental change in all aspects
ChinaBrief January 12, 2018

of the PLA is long overdue, but should be a For comments and questions about China
cause for future concern when combined with Brief, please contact us at wood@jame-
a more aggressive strategy in Beijing. stown.org

Notes: Interested in contributing to China Brief? Read

our author guidelines here first.
1. For an overview of how Dong Zifeng
envisioned transformation, see the
translated chart here.

2. Lectures on Joint Combat, (Beijing: Mil-

itary Science Press, 2013), p. 6.

Kevin McCauley has served as senior intelli-

gence officer for the Soviet Union, Russia,
China and Taiwan during 31 years in the fed-
eral government. He has written numerous in-
telligence products for decision makers, com-
batant commands, combat and force develop-
ers, and contributions to the annual Report to
Congress on China’s military power. Mr.
McCauley currently writes on PLA and Taiwan
military affairs.

*** *** ***

China Brief is a bi-weekly journal of infor-

mation and analysis covering Greater China in
Eurasia.

China Brief is a publication of The Jamestown

Foundation, a private non-profit organization
based in Washington D.C. and is edited by Pe-
ter Wood.

The opinions expressed in China Brief are

solely those of the authors, and do not neces-
sarily reflect the views of The Jamestown Foun-
dation.

19