B.

Rules on privacy of communication and correspondence

Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or
the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC January 22, 2008

THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

RESOLUTION

Acting on the recommendation of the Chairperson of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of
Court submitting for this Court’s consideration and approval the proposed Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.

This Resolution shall take effect on February 2, 2008, following its publication in three (3)
newspapers of general circulation.

January 22, 2008.

THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

SECTION 1. Habeas Data. - The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.
SEC. 2. Who May File. - Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data.
However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:

(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children
and parents; or

(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding
paragraph; or

SEC. 3. Where to File. - The petition may be filed with the Regional Trial Court where the petitioner
or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is
gathered, collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner.

The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan
when the action concerns public data files of government offices.

SEC. 4. Where Returnable; Enforceable. - When the writ is issued by a Regional Trial Court or any
judge thereof, it shall be returnable before such court or judge.

When issued by the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, it may be
returnable before such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where
the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or
information is gathered, collected or stored.

When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such Court or
any justice thereof, or before the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, or to
any Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has
jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored.

The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.

Sec. 5. Docket Fees. - No docket and other lawful fees shall be required from an indigent petitioner.
The petition of the indigent shall be docked and acted upon immediately, without prejudice to
subsequent submission of proof of indigency not later than fifteen (15) days from the filing of the
petition.

SEC. 6. Petition. - A verified written petition for a writ of habeas data should contain:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;

(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to
life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;

(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;

(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in
charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known;

(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent.
 In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act
complained of; and

(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.

SEC. 7. Issuance of the Writ. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall
immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall
issue the writ under the seal of the court and cause it to be served within three (3) days from the
issuance; or, in case of urgent necessity, the justice or judge may issue the writ under his or her own
hand, and may deputize any officer or person serve it.

The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later
than ten (10) work days from the date of its issuance.

SEC. 8. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. - A clerk of court who refuses to issue
the writ after its allowance, or a deputized person who refuses to serve the same, shall be punished
by the court, justice or judge for contempt without prejudice to other disciplinary actions.

SEC. 9. How the Writ is Served. - The writ shall be served upon the respondent by a judicial officer
or by a person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to make a
return of service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent, the rules on
substituted service shall apply.

SEC. 10. Return; Contents. - The respondent shall file a verified written return together with
supporting affidavits within five (5) working days from service of the writ, which period may be
reasonably extended by the Court for justifiable reasons. The return shall, among other things,
contain the following:

(a) The lawful defenses such as national security, state secrets, privileged communications,
confidentiality of the source of information of media and others;

(b) In case of respondent in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information

subject of the petition;

(i) a disclosure of the data or information about the petitioner, the nature of such data
or information, and the purpose for its collection;

(ii) the steps or actions taken by the respondent to ensure the security and
confidentiality of the data or information; and,

(iii) the currency and accuracy of the data or information held; and,

(c) Other allegations relevant to the resolution of the proceeding.

A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.

SEC. 11. Contempt. - The court, justice or judge may punish with imprisonment or fine a respondent
who commits contempt by making a false return, or refusing to make a return; or any person who
otherwise disobeys or resist a lawful process or order of the court.
SEC. 12. When Defenses May be Heard in Chambers. - A hearing in chambers may be conducted
where the respondent invokes the defense that the release of the data or information in question
shall compromise national security or state secrets, or when the data or information cannot be
divulged to the public due to its nature or privileged character.

Sec. 13. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings and motions are prohibited:

(a) Motion to dismiss;

(b) Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper and other
pleadings;

(c) Dilatory motion for postponement;

(d) Motion for a bill of particulars;

(e) Counterclaim or cross-claim;

(f) Third-party complaint;

(g) Reply;

(h) Motion to declare respondent in default;

(i) Intervention;

(j) Memorandum;

(k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and

(l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order.

SEC. 14. Return; Filing. - In case the respondent fails to file a return, the court, justice or judge
shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte, granting the petitioner such relief as the petition may
warrant unless the court in its discretion requires the petitioner to submit evidence.

SEC. 15. Summary Hearing. - The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court,
justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the
possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.

SEC. 16. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the
petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence,
the court shall enjoin the act complained of, or order the deletion, destruction, or rectification of the
erroneous data or information and grant other relevant reliefs as may be just and equitable;
otherwise, the privilege of the writ shall be denied.

Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any lawful officers as may be
designated by the court, justice or judge within five (5) working days.
SEC. 17. Return of Service. - The officer who executed the final judgment shall, within three (3)
days from its enforcement, make a verified return to the court. The return shall contain a full
statement of the proceedings under the writ and a complete inventory of the database or information,
or documents and articles inspected, updated, rectified, or deleted, with copies served on the
petitioner and the respondent.

The officer shall state in the return how the judgment was enforced and complied with by the
respondent, as well as all objections of the parties regarding the manner and regularity of the service
of the writ.

SEC. 18. Hearing on Officer’s Return. - The court shall set the return for hearing with due notice to
the parties and act accordingly.

SEC. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme Court
under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.

The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of notice of the judgment or final
order.

The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus and amparo cases.

SEC. 20. Institution of Separate Actions. - The filing of a petition for the writ of habeas data shall
not preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative actions.

SEC. 21. Consolidation. - When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a petition for the
writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.

When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a petition for a writ
of habeas data, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action.

After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to govern the disposition of the
reliefs in the petition.

SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. - When a criminal action has been commenced, no
separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The relief under the writ shall be available to an aggrieved
party by motion in the criminal case.

The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ
of habeas data.

SEC. 23. Substantive Rights. - This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.

SEC. 24. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. - The Rules of Court shall apply
suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with this Rule.

SEC. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on February 2, 2008, following its publication in
three (3) newspapers of general circulation.

[PUBLISHED IN THE MANILA BULLETIN, THE PHILIPPINE STAR AND THE PHILIPPINE DAILY
INQUIRER ON 25 JANUARY 2008]
REPUBLIC ACT No. 4200

AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING AND OTHER RELATED VIOLATIONS OF THE
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described:

It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding
sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof,
of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner
prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof,
either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other
person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or
trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.

Section 2. Any person who willfully or knowingly does or who shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of the acts
declared to be unlawful in the preceding section or who violates the provisions of the following section or of any order
issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such violation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than six months or more than six years and with the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification from public office if the offender be a public official at the time of the commission of the
offense, and, if the offender is an alien he shall be subject to deportation proceedings.

Section 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it unlawful or punishable for any peace officer, who is
authorized by a written order of the Court, to execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the two preceding
sections in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy,
mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition,
conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code, and violations
of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage and other offenses against national security: Provided, That
such written order shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds
to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being committed or is about to
be committed: Provided, however, That in cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to
commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such authority
shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or
are being committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be obtained essential to the
conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3) that there are no
other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.

The order granted or issued shall specify: (1) the identity of the person or persons whose communications,
conversations, discussions, or spoken words are to be overheard, intercepted, or recorded and, in the case of
telegraphic or telephonic communications, the telegraph line or the telephone number involved and its location; (2)
the identity of the peace officer authorized to overhear, intercept, or record the communications, conversations,
discussions, or spoken words; (3) the offense or offenses committed or sought to be prevented; and (4) the period of
the authorization. The authorization shall be effective for the period specified in the order which shall not exceed sixty
(60) days from the date of issuance of the order, unless extended or renewed by the court upon being satisfied that
such extension or renewal is in the public interest.

All recordings made under court authorization shall, within forty-eight hours after the expiration of the period fixed in
the order, be deposited with the court in a sealed envelope or sealed package, and shall be accompanied by an
affidavit of the peace officer granted such authority stating the number of recordings made, the dates and times
covered by each recording, the number of tapes, discs, or records included in the deposit, and certifying that no
duplicates or copies of the whole or any part thereof have been made, or if made, that all such duplicates or copies
are included in the envelope or package deposited with the court. The envelope or package so deposited shall not be
opened, or the recordings replayed, or used in evidence, or their contents revealed, except upon order of the court,
which shall not be granted except upon motion, with due notice and opportunity to be heard to the person or persons
whose conversation or communications have been recorded.
The court referred to in this section shall be understood to mean the Court of First Instance within whose territorial
jurisdiction the acts for which authority is applied for are to be executed.

Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of
the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.

Section 5. All laws inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or accordingly amended.

Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: June 19, 1965

G.R. No. L-20387 January 31, 1968

JESUS P. MORFE, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AMELITO R. MUTUC, as Executive Secretary, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Jesus P. Morfe for and his own behalf as plaintiff-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for defendants-appellants.

FERNANDO, J.:

Congress in 1960 enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act 1 to deter public officials and
employees from committing acts of dishonesty and improve the tone of morality in public service. It
was declared to be the state policy "in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to
repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt
practices or which may lead thereto." 2 Nor was it the first statute of its kind to deal with such a grave
problem in the public service that unfortunately has afflicted the Philippines in the post-war era. An
earlier statute decrees the forfeiture in favor of the State of any property found to have been
unlawfully acquired by any public officer or employee. 3

One of the specific provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 is that every public
officer, either within thirty (30) days after its approval or after his assumption of office "and within the
month of January of every other year thereafter", as well as upon the termination of his position,
shall prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, "a true detailed and sworn
statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income,
the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next
preceding calendar: . . ." 4

In this declaratory relief proceeding, the periodical submission "within the month of January of every
other year thereafter" of such sworn statement of assets and liabilities after an officer or employee
had once bared his financial condition upon assumption of office was challenged for being violative
of due process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the
constitutional right to privacy, implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed
together with the prohibition against self-incrimination. The lower court in the decision appealed from
sustained plaintiff, then as well as now, a judge of repute of a court of first instance. For it, such
requirement of periodical submission of such sworn statement of assets and liabilities exceeds the
permissible limit of the police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause.

We do not view the matter thus and accordingly reverse the lower court.
1. The reversal could be predicated on the absence of evidence to rebut the presumption of validity.
For in this action for declaratory relief filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan on January
31, 1962, plaintiff, after asserting his belief "that it was a reasonable requirement for employment
that a public officer make of record his assets and liabilities upon assumption of office and thereby
make it possible thereafter to determine whether, after assuming his position in the public service, he
accumulated assets grossly disproportionate to his reported incomes, the herein plaintiff [having]
filed within the period of time fixed in the aforesaid Administrative Order No. 334 the prescribed
sworn statement of financial condition, assets, income and liabilities, . . ." 5 maintained that the
provision on the "periodical filing of sworn statement of financial condition, assets, income and
liabilities after an officer or employee had once bared his financial condition, upon assumption of
office, is oppressive and unconstitutional." 6

As earlier noted, both the protection of due process and the assurance of the privacy of the
individual as may be inferred from the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure and self-
incrimination were relied upon. There was also the allegation that the above requirement amounts to
"an insult to the personal integrity and official dignity" of public officials, premised as it is "on the
unwarranted and derogatory assumption" that they are "corrupt at heart" and unless thus restrained
by this periodical submission of the statements of "their financial condition, income, and expenses,
they cannot be trusted to desist from committing the corrupt practices defined. . . ." 7 It was further
asserted that there was no need for such a provision as "the income tax law and the tax census law
also require statements which can serve to determine whether an officer or employee in this
Republic has enriched himself out of proportion to his reported income." 8

Then on February 14, 1962, came an Answer of the then Executive Secretary and the then
Secretary of Justice as defendants, where after practically admitting the facts alleged, they denied
the erroneous conclusion of law and as one of the special affirmative defenses set forth: "1. That
when a government official, like plaintiff, accepts a public position, he is deemed to have voluntarily
assumed the obligation to give information about his personal affair, not only at the time of his
assumption of office but during the time he continues to discharge public trust. The private life of an
employee cannot be segregated from his public life. . . ." 9 The answer likewise denied that there was
a violation of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination as well as unreasonable search and
seizure and maintained that "the provision of law in question cannot be attacked on the ground that it
impairs plaintiff's normal and legitimate enjoyment of his life and liberty because said provision
merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of insuring the interest or general welfare in honest
and clean public service and is therefore a legitimate exercise of the police power." 10

On February 27, 1962, plaintiff filed a Motion for judgment on the pleadings as in his opinion all his
material allegations were admitted. Then on March 10, 1962, an order was issued giving the parties
thirty days within which to submit memoranda, but with or without them, the case was deemed
submitted for decision the lower court being of the belief that "there is no question of facts, . . . the
defendants [having admitted] all the material allegations of the complaint." 11

The decision, now on appeal, came on July 19, 1962, the lower court declaring "unconstitutional, null
and void Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, insofar as it required periodical submittal of sworn
statements of financial conditions, assets and liabilities of an official or employee of the government
after he had once submitted such a sworn statement upon assuming office; . . . ." 12

In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. The Mayor of Manila, 13 it was the holding
of this Court that in the absence of a factual foundation, the lower court deciding the matter purely
"on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail." In the present
case likewise there was no factual foundation on which the nullification of this section of the statute
could be based. Hence as noted the decision of the lower court could be reversed on that ground.
A more extended consideration is not inappropriate however, for as likewise made clear in the above
Ermita-Malate Hotel case: "What cannot be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were
freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more
rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider."

Moreover, in the Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration in the above case, we expressly
affirmed: "This is not to discount the possibility of a situation where the nullity of a statute, executive
order, or ordinance may not be readily apparent but the threat to constitutional rights, especially
those involving the freedom of the mind, present and ominous." 14 In such an event therefore, "there
should not be a rigid insistence on the requirement that evidence be presented." Also, in the same
Resolution, Professor Freund was quoted thus: "In short, when freedom of the mind is imperiled by
law, it is freedom that commands a momentum of respect; when property is imperiled, it is the
lawmakers' judgment that commands respect. This dual standard may not precisely reverse the
presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of
values within the due process clause. 15

2. We inquire first whether or not by virtue of the above requirement for a periodical submission of
sworn statement of assets and liabilities, there is an invasion of liberty protected by the due process
clause.

Under the Anti-Graft Act of 1960, after the statement of policy, 16 and definition of terms, 17 there is an
enumeration of corrupt practices declared unlawful in addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law. They include persuading, inducing, or influencing another public
officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by
competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing
himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense; requesting or
receiving directly or indirectly any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself, or for any
other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the government and any other
party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity, has to intervene under the law; requesting or
receiving directly or indirectly any gift, present, or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or
for another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or
obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for the help
given or to be given; accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private
enterprise which has pending official business with him during the pendency thereof or within one
year after its termination; causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act
within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or
indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage,
or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating
against any other interested party; entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or
transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer
profited or will profit thereby; having directly or indirectly financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official
capacity or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interests;
becoming interested directly or indirectly, for personal gain, or having a material interest in any
transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a member, and
which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not
participate in such action; approving or granting knowingly any license, permit, privilege or benefit in
favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or
advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled and
divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account
of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its
authorized release date. 18

After which come the prohibition on private individuals, 19 prohibition on certain relatives, 20 and
prohibition on Members of Congress. 21 Then there is this requirement of a statement of assets and
liabilities, that portion requiring periodical submission being challenged here. 22 The other sections of
the Act deal with dismissal due to unexplained wealth, reference being made to the previous
statute, 23 penalties for violation, 24 the vesting of original jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance as
the competent court, 25 the prescription of offenses, 26 the prohibition against any resignation or
retirement pending investigation, criminal or administrative or pending a prosecution, 27suspension
and loss of benefits, 28 exception of unsolicited gifts or presents of small or insignificant value as well
as recognition of legitimate practice of one's profession or trade or occupation, 29 the separability
clause, 30 and its effectivity. 31

Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the Anti-Graft Act of 1960 like the earlier statute 32 was
precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a
standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended to further promote morality in public
administration. A public office must indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the
goal to be pursued commands the assent of all. The conditions then prevailing called for norms of
such character. The times demanded such a remedial device.

The statute was framed with that end in view. It is comprehensive in character, sufficiently detailed
and explicit to make clear to all and sundry what practices were prohibited and penalized. More than
that, an effort was made, so evident from even a cursory perusal thereof, to avoid evasions and plug
loopholes. One such feature is the challenged section. Thereby it becomes much more difficult by
those disposed to take advantage of their positions to commit acts of graft and corruption.

While in the attainment of such public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is permissible,
there must be a showing, clear, categorical, and undeniable, that what the Constitution condemns,
the statute allows. More specifically, since that is the only question raised, is that portion of the
statute requiring periodical submission of assets and liabilities, after an officer or employee had
previously done so upon assuming office, so infected with infirmity that it cannot be upheld as valid?

Or, in traditional terminology, is this requirement a valid exercise of the police power? In the
aforesaid Ermita-Malate Hotel decision, 33 there is a reaffirmation of its nature and scope as
embracing the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order,
safety, or the general welfare of the people. It has been negatively put forth by Justice Malcolm as
"that inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society." 34

Earlier Philippine cases refer to police power as the power to promote the general welfare and public
interest; 35 to enact such laws in relation to persons and property as may promote public health,
public morals, public safety and the general welfare of each inhabitant; 36 to preserve public order
and to prevent offenses against the state and to establish for the intercourse of citizen with citizen
those rules of good manners and good neighborhood calculated to prevent conflict of rights. 37 In his
work on due process, Mott 38 stated that the term police power was first used by Chief Justice
Marshall. 39

As currently in use both in Philippine and American decisions then, police power legislation usually
has reference to regulatory measures restraining either the rights to property or liberty of private
individuals. It is undeniable however that one of its earliest definitions, valid then as well as now,
given by Marshall's successor, Chief Justice Taney does not limit its scope to curtailment of rights
whether of liberty or property of private individuals. Thus: "But what are the police powers of a State?
They are nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the
extent of its dominions. And whether a State passes a quarantine law, or a law to punish offenses, or
to establish courts of justice, or requiring certain instruments to be recorded, or to regulate
commerce within its own limits, in every case it exercises the same power; that is to say, the power
of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits of its domain." 40 Text writers like
Cooley and Burdick were of a similar mind. 41

What is under consideration is a statute enacted under the police power of the state to promote
morality in public service necessarily limited in scope to officialdom. May a public official claiming to
be adversely affected rely on the due process clause to annul such statute or any portion thereof?
The answer must be in the affirmative. If the police power extends to regulatory action affecting
persons in public or private life, then anyone with an alleged grievance can invoke the protection of
due process which permits deprivation of property or liberty as long as such requirement is
observed.

While the soundness of the assertion that a public office is a public trust and as such not amounting
to property in its usual sense cannot be denied, there can be no disputing the proposition that from
the standpoint of the security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution the mantle of protection
afforded by due process could rightfully be invoked. It was so implicitly held in Lacson v.
Romero, 42 in line with the then pertinent statutory provisions 43 that procedural due process in the
form of an investigation at which he must be given a fair hearing and an opportunity to defend
himself must be observed before a civil service officer or employee may be removed. There was a
reaffirmation of the view in even stronger language when this Court through Justice Tuason
in Lacson v. Roque 44 declared that even without express provision of law, "it is established by the
great weight of authority that the power of removal or suspension for cause can not, except by clear
statutory authority, be exercised without notice and hearing." Such is likewise the import of a
statement from the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion, speaking for the Court in Meneses
v. Lacson; 45 "At any rate, the reinstatement directed in the decision appealed from does not bar
such appropriate administrative action as the behaviour of petitioners herein may warrant, upon
compliance with the requirements of due process."

To the same effect is the holding of this Court extending the mantle of the security of tenure
provision to employees of government-owned or controlled corporations entrusted with
governmental functions when through Justice Padilla in Tabora v. Montelibano, 46 it stressed: "That
safeguard, guarantee, or feeling of security that they would hold their office or employment during
good behavior and would not be dismissed without justifiable cause to be determined in an
investigation, where an opportunity to be heard and defend themselves in person or by counsel is
afforded them, would bring about such a desirable condition." Reference was there made to
promoting honesty and efficiency through an assurance of stability in their employment relation. It
was to be expected then that through Justice Labrador in Unabia v. City Mayor, 47 this Court could
categorically affirm: "As the removal of petitioner was made without investigation and without cause,
said removal is null and void. . . ."

It was but logical therefore to expect an explicit holding of the applicability of due process guaranty
to be forthcoming. It did in Cammayo v. Viña, 48 where the opinion of Justice Endencia for the Court
contained the following unmistakable language: "Evidently, having these facts in view, it cannot be
pretended that the constitutional provision of due process of law for the removal of the petitioner has
not been complied with."
Then came this restatement of the principle from the pen of Justice J.B.L. Reyes "We are thus
compelled to conclude that the positions formerly held by appellees were not primarily confidential in
nature so as to make their terms of office co-terminal with the confidence reposed in them. The
inevitable corollary is that respondents-appellees, Leon Piñero, et al., were not subject to dismissal
or removal, except for cause specified by law and within due process. . . ." 49 In a still later
decision, Abaya v. Subido, 50 this Court, through Justice Sanchez, emphasized "that the vitality of the
constitutional principle of due process cannot be allowed to weaken by sanctioning cancellation" of
an employee's eligibility or "of his dismissal from service — without hearing — upon a doubtful
assumption that he has admitted his guilt for an offense against Civil Service rules." Equally
emphatic is this observation from the same case: "A civil service employee should be heard before
he is condemned. Jurisprudence has clung to this rule with such unrelenting grasp that by now it
would appear trite to make citations thereof."

If as is so clearly and unequivocally held by this Court, due process may be relied upon by public
official to protect the security of tenure which in that limited sense is analogous to property, could he
not likewise avail himself of such constitutional guarantee to strike down what he considers to be an
infringement of his liberty? Both on principle, reason and authority, the answer must be in the
affirmative. Even a public official has certain rights to freedom the government must respect. To the
extent then, that there is a curtailment thereof, it could only be permissible if the due process
mandate is not disregarded.

Since under the constitutional scheme, liberty is the rule and restraint the exception, the question
raised cannot just be brushed aside. In a leading Philippine case, Rubi v. Provincial Board, 51 liberty
as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and
the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into
mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right
of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such
restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." In accordance with this case therefore, the
rights of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to
earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, are all deemed embraced in the
concept of liberty. This Court in the same case, however, gave the warning that liberty as
understood in democracies, is not license. Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the
individual and for the greater good, the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No
one can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. In the words of
Mabini as quoted by Justice Malcolm, "liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever
guided by reason and the upright and honorable conscience of the individual."

The liberty to be safeguarded is, as pointed out by Chief Justice Hughes, liberty in a social
organization, 52 implying the absence of arbitrary restraint not immunity from reasonable regulations
and prohibitions imposed in the interest of the community. 53 It was Linton's view that "to belong to a
society is to sacrifice some measure of individual liberty, no matter how slight the restraints which
the society consciously imposes." 54 The above statement from Linton however, should be
understood in the sense that liberty, in the interest of public health, public order or safety, of general
welfare, in other words through the proper exercise of the police power, may be regulated. The
individual thought, as Justice Cardozo pointed out, has still left a "domain of free activity that cannot
be touched by government or law at all, whether the command is specially against him or generally
against him and others." 55

Is this provision for a periodical submission of sworn statement of assets and liabilities after he had
filed one upon assumption of office beyond the power of government to impose? Admittedly without
the challenged provision, a public officer would be free from such a requirement. To the extent then
that there is a compulsion to act in a certain way, his liberty is affected. It cannot be denied however
that under the Constitution, such a restriction is allowable as long as due process is observed.
The more crucial question therefore is whether there is an observance of due process. That leads us
to an inquiry into its significance. "There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It
furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation
of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due
process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free the challenged
ordinance, or any action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its
doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.
Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process
requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result
in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of
reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment
of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty 'to those strivings for justice' and judges the act of
officialdom of whatever branch 'in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that
reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought.' It is not a narrow or 'technical conception
with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,' decisions based on such a clause
requiring a 'close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society.' Questions of due
process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases." 56

It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities of
public service with its ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice to condemn as
arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that imposed on public officials and employees to file such
sworn statement of assets and liabilities every two years after having done so upon assuming office.
The due process clause is not susceptible to such a reproach. There was therefore no
unconstitutional exercise of police power.

4. The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a
long way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the provision on the periodical
submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to
privacy. There is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the constitutional sense
must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well,
if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all
freedom." 57 As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." 58

The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his personality
as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. As Laski so very
aptly stated: "Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his
isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic
obligations are built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly
speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out of that experience personal to himself.
If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders his personality. If his will is set by the will of others,
he ceases to be master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer master of himself is in any
real sense free." 59

Nonetheless, in view of the fact that there is an express recognition of privacy, specifically that of
communication and correspondence which "shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of Court or
when public safety and order" 60may otherwise require, and implicitly in the search and seizure
clause, 61 and the liberty of abode 62 the alleged repugnancy of such statutory requirement of further
periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities deserves to be further looked
into.
In that respect the question is one of first impression, no previous decision having been rendered by
this Court. It is not so in the United States where, in the leading case of Griswold v.
Connecticut, 63 Justice Douglas, speaking for five members of the Court, stated: "Various guarantees
create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment
is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers 'in
any house' in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The
Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its Self-
Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force
him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." After referring to various American Supreme Court decisions, 64 Justice Douglas continued:
"These cases bear witness that the right of privacy which presses for recognition is a legitimate one."

The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a
criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy
of married persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by
several fundamental constitutional guarantees." 65 It has wider implications though. The constitutional
right to privacy has come into its own. 1äw phï1.ñët

So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently
of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language
of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the
idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and
pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In
contrast, a system of limited government, safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the
individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this
private sector — protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual — has
become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological
age — industrialization, urbanization, and organization — operate to narrow the area of privacy and
facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of
private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society." 66

Even with due recognition of such a view, it cannot be said that the challenged statutory provision
calls for disclosure of information which infringes on the right of a person to privacy. It cannot be
denied that the rational relationship such a requirement possesses with the objective of a valid
statute goes very far in precluding assent to an objection of such character. This is not to say that a
public officer, by virtue of a position he holds, is bereft of constitutional protection; it is only to
emphasize that in subjecting him to such a further compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities,
including the statement of the amounts and sources of income, the amounts of personal and family
expenses, and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year, there is no
unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a private sphere.

5. Could it be said, however, as plaintiff contends, that insofar as the challenged provision requires
the periodical filing of a sworn statement of financial condition, it would be violative of the guarantees
against unreasonable search and seizure and against self-incrimination?

His complaint cited on this point Davis v. United States. 67 In that case, petitioner Davis was
convicted under an information charging him with unlawfully having in his possession a number of
gasoline ration coupons representing so many gallons of gasoline, an offense penalized under a
1940 statute. 68 He was convicted both in the lower court and in the Circuit Court of Appeals over the
objection that there was an unlawful search which resulted in the seizure of the coupons and that
their use at the trial was in violation of Supreme Court decisions. 69 In the District Court, there was a
finding that he consented to the search and seizure. The Circuit Court of Appeals did not disturb that
finding although expressed doubt concerning it, affirming however under the view that such seized
coupons were properly introduced in evidence, the search and seizure being incidental to an arrest,
and therefore reasonable regardless of petitioner's consent.

In affirming the conviction the United States Supreme Court, through Justice Douglas emphasized
that the Court was dealing in this case "not with private papers or documents, but with gasoline
ration coupons which never became the private property of the holder but remained at all times the
property of the government and subject to inspection and recall by it." 70 He made it clear that the
opinion was not to be understood as suggesting "that officers seeking to reclaim government
property may proceed lawlessly and subject to no restraints. Nor [does it] suggest that the right to
inspect under the regulations subjects a dealer to a general search of his papers for the purpose of
learning whether he has any coupons subject to inspection and seizure. The nature of the coupons
is important here merely as indicating that the officers did not exceed the permissible limits of
persuasion in obtaining them." 71

True, there was a strong dissenting opinion by Justice Frankfurter in which Justice Murphy joined,
critical of what it considered "a process of devitalizing interpretation" which in this particular case
gave approval "to what was done by arresting officers" and expressing the regret that the Court
might be "in danger of forgetting what the Bill of Rights reflects experience with police excesses."

Even this opinion, however, concerned that the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure "does not give freedom from testimonial compulsion. Subject to familiar
qualifications every man is under obligation to give testimony. But that obligation can be exacted
only under judicial sanctions which are deemed precious to Anglo-American civilization. Merely
because there may be the duty to make documents available for litigation does not mean that police
officers may forcibly or fraudulently obtain them. This protection of the right to be let alone except
under responsible judicial compulsion is precisely what the Fourth Amendment meant to express
and to safeguard." 72

It would appear then that a reliance on that case for an allegation that this statutory provision offends
against the unreasonable search and seizure clause would be futile and unavailing. This is the more
so in the light of the latest decision of this Court in Stonehill v. Diokno, 73 where this Court, through
Chief Justice Concepcion, after stressing that the constitutional requirements must be strictly
complied with, and that it would be "a legal heresy of the highest order" to convict anybody of a
violation of certain statutes without reference to any of its determinate provisions delimited its scope
as "one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution," safeguarding "the sanctity, of
the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence. . . ." Such is precisely the evil
sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called
general warrants.

It thus appears clear that no violation of the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure has
been shown to exist by such requirement of further periodical submission of one's financial condition
as set forth in the Anti-Graft Act of 1960.

Nor does the contention of plaintiff gain greater plausibility, much less elicit acceptance, by his
invocation of the non-incrimination clause. According to the Constitution: "No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself." 74 This constitutional provision gives the accused
immunity from any attempt by the prosecution to make easier its task by coercing or intimidating him
to furnish the evidence necessary to convict. He may confess, but only if he voluntarily wills it. He
may admit certain facts but only if he freely chooses to.75 Or he could remain silent, and the
prosecution is powerless to compel him to talk. 76 Proof is not solely testimonial in character. It may
be documentary. Neither then could the accused be ordered to write, when what comes from his pen
may constitute evidence of guilt or innocence. 77 Moreover, there can be no search or seizure of his
house, papers or effects for the purpose of locating incriminatory matter. 78

In a declaratory action proceeding then, the objection based on the guaranty against self-
incrimination is far from decisive. It is well to note what Justice Tuason stated: "What the above
inhibition seeks to [prevent] is compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts." 79 Necessarily then, the
protection it affords will have to await, in the language of Justice J. B. L. Reyes, the existence of
actual cases, "be they criminal, civil or administrative." 80 Prior to such a stage, there is no pressing
need to pass upon the validity of the fear sincerely voiced that there is an infringement of the non-
incrimination clause. What was said in an American State decision is of relevance. In that case, a
statutory provision requiring any person operating a motor vehicle, who knows that injury has been
caused a person or property, to stop and give his name, residence, and his license number to the
injured party or to a police officer was sustained against the contention that the information thus
exacted may be used as evidence to establish his connection with the injury and therefore compels
him to incriminate himself. As was stated in the opinion: "If the law which exacts this information is
invalid, because such information, although in itself no evidence of guilt, might possibly lead to a
charge of crime against the informant, then all police regulations which involve identification may be
questioned on the same ground. We are not aware of any constitutional provision designed to
protect a man's conduct from judicial inquiry or aid him in fleeing from justice. But, even if a
constitutional right be involved, it is not necessary to invalidate the statute to secure its protection. If,
in this particular case, the constitutional privilege justified the refusal to give the information exacted
by the statute, that question can be raised in the defense to the pending prosecution. Whether it
would avail, we are not called upon to decide in this proceeding." 81

6. Nor could such a provision be nullified on the allegation that it constitutes "an insult to the
personal integrity and official dignity" of public officials. On its face, it cannot thus be stigmatized. As
to its being unnecessary, it is well to remember that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel,
"does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." 82 As expressed by
Justice Tuason: "It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the
bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative
concern." 83 There can be no possible objection then to the observation of Justice Montemayor: "As
long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them
regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary." 84 For they, according to Justice Labrador,
"are not supposed to override legitimate policy and . . . never inquire into the wisdom of the law." 85

It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on

Elections, 86 that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken may
be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of
powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its
jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on
a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there
be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to
which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of
legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar
as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent on its wisdom cannot be sustained.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of July 19, 1962 "declaring unconstitutional, null and
void Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, insofar as it requires periodical submittal of sworn statements
of financial conditions, assets and liabilities of an official or employee of the government after he had
once submitted such a sworn statement . . . is reversed." Without costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Sanchez, J., reserves his vote.
Castro, J., concurs in the result.

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accused-appellant.

BIDIN, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial
Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation
to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:

On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law wife,
Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the
Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages.
Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The
appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich,
Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his
name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee,
namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland" (Decision, p. 6)

Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages.
Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars,
and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita
Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were then
placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed
at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was sealed with masking tape, thus
making the box ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8).

Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job
Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure,
opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor
emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly
containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a
cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening
 on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof (tsn, pp.
29-30, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).

Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a
laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-
6, October 6, 1987).

He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that
date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes
informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes
and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila
(tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).

Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the
presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the
cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have
been contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987; Emphasis
supplied).

The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He
discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The
package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that
dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6,
1987).

The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof,
after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7,
1987).

Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his
passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the latter's
Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was
invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same
day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section
for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as
certified by the forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).

Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act.

After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.

In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED

AND SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED

FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL
PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT OBSERVED.
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF
THE APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION
(Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 55)

1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should be
held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).

Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.

Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had
its origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Sec. 1 [3], Article III)

was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United States Constitution.
As such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court
and State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.

Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme
Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA
383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search and
seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's
Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the admissibility of evidence was not affected by the illegality of its
seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is carried
over up to the present with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.

In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the
admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable
searches and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de
Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA
687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990).
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were
invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized
government agencies.

On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be
excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and
without the intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can
accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation
of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State?

We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by
the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.

As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:

1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity
of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which
is his residence, his papers, and other possessions. . . .

. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is
his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon
to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. . . . (Cf.
Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616
[1886]; Emphasis supplied).

In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in
construing the right against unreasonable searches and seizures declared that:

(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as
shown in previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and history
clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and
was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies; as against such
authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of
unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his property, subject to the right
of seizure by process duly served.

The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking attendant
who searched the automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana instead, without the
knowledge and participation of police authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal
possession of narcotics.

And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search and
seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals
(citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391
S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).

Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there said:
 The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private citizen — the
owner of a motel in which appellant stayed overnight and in which he left behind a travel
case containing the evidence***complained of. The search was made on the motel owner's
own initiative. Because of it, he became suspicious, called the local police, informed them of
the bag's contents, and made it available to the authorities.

The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of evidence
obtained through a search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes
governmental action."

The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter
transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent
reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.

Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and
seizure of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction.

The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In both instances,
the argument stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.

First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents
conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly
indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made
search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating
procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the
Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8; Original
Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).

It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the
same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened the
parcel containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI
agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to
the postulate of accused/appellant.

Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by
Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and
look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no
trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135).
Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer,
there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202
[1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122
[1968]).

In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the property was
taken into custody of the police at the specific request of the manager and where the search was
initially made by the owner there is no unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional
meaning of the term.

That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties
guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection. But protection
against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the
query which he himself posed, as follows:

First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of
constitutional democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of
Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the
relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill
of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any
power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas , Record of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis supplied)

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the
law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if
it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of
the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and
without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure
cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been modified by
the present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any
evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it
matters not whether the evidence was procured by police authorities or private individuals
(Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62).

The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the
government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between
individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications introduced in the 1987
Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of
arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof (See Soliven v. Makasiar, 167
SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987]. The
modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against
unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed with the State and did not
shift to anyone else.

Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against
the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with
appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed
as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the
constitution.

Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private seizure
equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant's
constitutional rights to privacy and communication.
2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred in convicting him
despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while under custodial investigation
were not observed.

Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully examined the records of the case and
found nothing to indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not informed of his
constitutional rights or that he gave statements without the assistance of counsel. The law enforcers
testified that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is presumed that they
have regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given full
faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear from the records, on the
other hand, is that appellant refused to give any written statement while under investigation as
testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI, Thus:

Fiscal Formoso:

You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What about the accused here, did
you investigate the accused together with the girl?

WITNESS:

Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the accused availed of his
constitutional right not to give any written statement, sir. (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 62;
Original Records, p. 240)

The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the defense on
cross-examination. As borne out by the records, neither was there any proof by the defense that
appellant gave uncounselled confession while being investigated. What is more, we have examined
the assailed judgment of the trial court and nowhere is there any reference made to the testimony of
appellant while under custodial investigation which was utilized in the finding of conviction.
Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore misplaced.

3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to believe that he was
not the owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael, a
German national, whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30-
minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the
cost of the shipment since the German national was about to leave the country the next day
(October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).

Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, self-
serving and contrary to human experience. It can easily be fabricated. An acquaintance with a
complete stranger struck in half an hour could not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four
(4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to comply
with the undertaking without first ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial court, "(a) person
would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering
tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on
the other hand, would not simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship
the same from a complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he
readily agreed to do the errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, are negative self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot
be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237
[1989]).
Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of the Interpol,
he was previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of
Germany on January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a
Swiss national, was likewise convicted for drug abuse and is just about an hour's drive from
appellant's residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p. 244;
Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).

Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke,
37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327
[1983]); Castañares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As records further show, appellant did not even
bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed,
the German national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the
contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant signed the
contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a
person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At
this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.

Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the assailed
judgment.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr. and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 135882. June 27, 2001]

LOURDES T. MARQUEZ, in her capacity as Branch Manager, Union Bank of

the Philippines, petitioners, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, (in his
capacity as OMBUDSMAN, Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation
Bureau, Office of the Ombudsman, ANGEL C. MAYOR-ALGO, JR.,
MARY ANN CORPUZ-MANALAC and JOSE T. DE JESUS, JR., in
their capacities as Chairman and Members of the Panel,
respectively, respondents.

DECISION
PARDO, J.:

In the petition at bar, petitioner seeks to--

 a. Annul and set aside, for having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, respondents
order dated September 7, 1998 in OMB-0-97-0411, In Re: Motion to Cite Lourdes
T. Marquez for indirect contempt, received by counsel of September 9, 1998, and
their order dated October 14, 1998, denying Marquezs motion for reconsideration
dated September 10, 1998, received by counsel on October 20, 1998.

b. Prohibit respondents from implementing their order dated October 14, 1998, in
proceeding with the hearing of the motion to cite Marquez for indirect contempt,
through the issuance by this Court of a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction.[1]

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Sometime in May 1998, petitioner Marquez received an Order from the
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto dated April 29, 1998, to produce several bank
documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts
maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where petitioner is
the branch manager. The accounts to be inspected are Account Nos. 011-37270, 240-
020718, 245-30317-3 and 245-30318-1, involved in a case pending with the
Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v. Amado
Lagdameo, et. al. The order further states:

It is worth mentioning that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and to require
the production and inspection of records and documents is sanctioned by the 1987
Philippine Constitution, Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman
Act of 1989 and under existing jurisprudence on the matter. It must be noted that R.
A. 6770 especially Section 15 thereof provides, among others, the following powers,
functions and duties of the Ombudsman, to wit:

xxx

(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum and take testimony in
any investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank
accounts and records;

(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same
procedure and with the same penalties provided therein.

Clearly, the specific provision of R.A. 6770, a later legislation, modifies the law on
the Secrecy of Bank Deposits (R.A. 1405) and places the office of the Ombudsman in
the same footing as the courts of law in this regard.[2]
 The basis of the Ombudsman in ordering an in camera inspection of the accounts
is a trail of managers checks purchased by one George Trivinio, a respondent in OMB-
0-97-0411, pending with the office of the Ombudsman.
It would appear that Mr. George Trivinio, purchased fifty one (51) Managers
Checks (MCs) for a total amount of P272.1 Million at Traders Royal Bank, United
Nations Avenue branch, on May 2 and 3, 1995. Out of the 51 MCs, eleven (11) MCs
in the amount of P70.6 million, were deposited and credited to an account
maintained at the Union Bank, Julia Vargas Branch.[3]
On May 26, 1998, the FFIB panel met in conference with petitioner Lourdes T.
Marquez and Atty. Fe B. Macalino at the banks main office, Ayala Avenue, Makati
City. The meeting was for the purpose of allowing petitioner and Atty. Macalino to
view the checks furnished by Traders Royal Bank. After convincing themselves of the
veracity of the checks, Atty. Macalino advised Ms. Marquez to comply with the order
of the Ombudsman. Petitioner agreed to an in camera inspection set on June 3, 1998.[4]
However, on June 4, 1998, petitioner wrote the Ombudsman explaining to him that
the accounts in question cannot readily be identified and asked for time to respond to
the order. The reason forwarded by petitioner was that despite diligent efforts and from
the account numbers presented, we can not identify these accounts since the checks are
issued in cash or bearer. We surmised that these accounts have long been dormant,
hence are not covered by the new account number generated by the Union Bank
system. We therefore have to verify from the Interbank records archives for the
whereabouts of these accounts.[5]
The Ombudsman, responding to the request of the petitioner for time to comply
with the order, stated: firstly, it must be emphasized that Union Bank, Julia Vargas
Branch was the depositary bank of the subject Traders Royal Bank Managers Checks
(MCs), as shown at its dorsal portion and as cleared by the Philippine Clearing House,
not the International Corporate Bank.
Notwithstanding the fact that the checks were payable to cash or bearer,
nonetheless, the name of the depositor(s) could easily be identified since the account
numbers x x x where said checks were deposited are identified in the order.
Even assuming that the accounts xxx were already classified as dormant accounts,
the bank is still required to preserve the records pertaining to the accounts within a
certain period of time as required by existing banking rules and regulations.
And finally, the in camera inspection was already extended twice
from May 13, 1998 to June 3, 1998, thereby giving the bank enough time within which
to sufficiently comply with the order.[6]
 Thus, on June 16, 1998, the Ombudsman issued an order directing petitioner to
produce the bank documents relative to the accounts in issue. The order states:

Viewed from the foregoing, your persistent refusal to comply with Ombudsmans
order is unjustified, and is merely intended to delay the investigation of the case. Your
act constitutes disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order issued by this office and
is punishable as Indirect Contempt under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6770. The same may
also constitute obstruction in the lawful exercise of the functions of the Ombudsman
which is punishable under Section 36 of R.A. 6770.[7]

On July 10, 1998, petitioner together with Union Bank of the Philippines, filed a
petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and injunction [8] with the Regional Trial
Court, Makati City, against the Ombudsman.
The petition was intended to clear the rights and duties of petitioner. Thus,
petitioner sought a declaration of her rights from the court due to the clear conflict
between R. A. No. 6770, Section 15 and R. A. No. 1405, Sections 2 and 3.
Petitioner prayed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) because the Ombudsman
and other persons acting under his authority were continuously harassing her to produce
the bank documents relative to the accounts in question. Moreover, on June 16, 1998,
the Ombudsman issued another order stating that unless petitioner appeared before the
FFIB with the documents requested, petitioner manager would be charged with indirect
contempt and obstruction of justice.
In the meantime,[9] on July 14, 1998, the lower court denied petitioners prayer for a
temporary restraining order and stated thus:

After hearing the arguments of the parties, the court finds the application for a
Temporary Restraining Order to be without merit.

Since the application prays for the restraint of the respondent, in the exercise of his
contempt powers under Section 15 (9) in relation to paragraph (8) of R.A. 6770,
known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, there is no great or irreparable injury from
which petitioners may suffer, if respondent is not so restrained. Respondent should he
decide to exercise his contempt powers would still have to apply with the court. x x
x Anyone who, without lawful excuse x x x refuses to produce documents for
inspection, when thereunto lawfully required shall be subject to discipline as in case
of contempt of Court and upon application of the individual or body exercising the
power in question shall be dealt with by the Judge of the First Instance (now RTC)
having jurisdiction of the case in a manner provided by law (section 580 of the
Revised Administrative Code). Under the present Constitution only judges may issue
warrants, hence, respondent should apply with the Court for the issuance of the
warrant needed for the enforcement of his contempt orders. It is in these proceedings
where petitioners may question the propriety of respondents exercise of his contempt
powers. Petitioners are not therefore left without any adequate remedy.

The questioned orders were issued with the investigation of the case of Fact-Finding
and Intelligence Bureau vs. Amado Lagdameo, et. el., OMB-0-97-0411, for violation
of R.A. 3019. Since petitioner failed to show prima facie evidence that the subject
matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman,
no writ of injunction may be issued by this Court to delay this investigation pursuant
to Section 14 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.[10]

On July 20, 1998, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration based on the
following grounds:
a. Petitioners application for Temporary Restraining Order is not only to restrain the Ombudsman
from exercising his contempt powers, but to stop him from implementing his Orders dated
April 29,1998 and June 16,1998; and
b. The subject matter of the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman at petitioners
premises is outside his jurisdiction.[11]
On July 23, 1998, the Ombudsman filed a motion to dismiss the petition for
declaratory relief[12] on the ground that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to
hear a petition for relief from the findings and orders of the Ombudsman, citing R. A.
No. 6770, Sections 14 and 27. On August 7, 1998, the Ombudsman filed an opposition
to petitioners motion for reconsideration dated July 20, 1998.[13]
On August 19, 1998, the lower court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration,[14] and also the Ombudsmans motion to dismiss.[15]
On August 21, 1998, petitioner received a copy of the motion to cite her for
contempt, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman by Agapito B. Rosales, Director,
Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB).[16]
On August 31, 1998, petitioner filed with the Ombudsman an opposition to the
motion to cite her in contempt on the ground that the filing thereof was premature due
to the petition pending in the lower court.[17] Petitioner likewise reiterated that she had
no intention to disobey the orders of the Ombudsman. However, she wanted to be
clarified as to how she would comply with the orders without her breaking any law,
particularly R. A. No. 1405.[18]
Respondent Ombudsman panel set the incident for hearing on September 7,
1998.[19] After hearing, the panel issued an order dated September 7, 1998, ordering
petitioner and counsel to appear for a continuation of the hearing of the contempt
charges against her.[20]
 On September 10, 1998, petitioner filed with the Ombudsman a motion for
reconsideration of the above order.[21] Her motion was premised on the fact that there
was a pending case with the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, [22] which would
determine whether obeying the orders of the Ombudsman to produce bank documents
would not violate any law.
The FFIB opposed the motion,[23] and on October 14, 1998, the Ombudsman denied
the motion by order the dispositive portion of which reads:

Wherefore, respondent Lourdes T. Marquezs motion for reconsideration is hereby

DENIED, for lack of merit. Let the hearing of the motion of the Fact Finding
Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) to cite her for indirect contempt be intransferrably set to
29 October 1998 at 2:00 oclock p.m. at which date and time she should appear
personally to submit her additional evidence. Failure to do so shall be deemed a
waiver thereof.[24]

Hence, the present petition.[25]

The issue is whether petitioner may be cited for indirect contempt for her failure to
produce the documents requested by the Ombudsman. And whether the order of the
Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed as
an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R. A. No. 1405).
An examination of the secrecy of bank deposits law (R. A. No. 1405) would reveal
the following exceptions:
1. Where the depositor consents in writing;
2. Impeachment case;
3. By court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases against public officials;
4. Deposit is subject of litigation;
5. Sec. 8, R. A. No. 3019, in cases of unexplained wealth as held in the case of PNB vs.
Gancayco[26]

The order of the Ombudsman to produce for in camera inspection the subject
accounts with the Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, is based on a
pending investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo, et.
al. for violation of R. A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture
Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI.
We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a
pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be
clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before
the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be
notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the
account identified in the pending case.
In Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, we held that Section 2 of the Law on
Secrecy of Bank Deposits, as amended, declares bank deposits to be absolutely confidential
except:
(1) In an examination made in the course of a special or general examination of a bank that is
specifically authorized by the Monetary Board after being satisfied that there is reasonable
ground to believe that a bank fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being committed and
that it is necessary to look into the deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity,
(2) In an examination made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to conduct its regular
audit provided that the examination is for audit purposes only and the results thereof shall be
for the exclusive use of the bank,
(3) Upon written permission of the depositor,
(4) In cases of impeachment,
(5) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials,
or
(6) In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation[27]

In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent
authority. What is existing is an investigation by the office of the Ombudsman. In short,
what the Office of the Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence
to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there
was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for
inspection.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides
that "[e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of
his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts for
meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or
employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights
and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private
communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime of the violation of secrets by
an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling.
Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the Intellectual Property Code.[28]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we GRANT the petition. We order the Ombudsman to
cease and desist from requiring Union Bank Manager Lourdes T. Marquez, or anyone
in her place to comply with the order dated October 14, 1998, and similar orders. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-
Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION G.R. No. 160792

FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
CAPT. GARY ALEJANO, PN (MARINES)
CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN (MARINES)
CAPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, PA
LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, PN
CAPT. MILO MAESTRECAMPO, PA
LT. SG ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, PN
HOMOBONO ADAZA, and
ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL) PULIDO,
Petitioners,
Present:
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Puno,
Panganiban,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
- versus - Carpio,
Austria-Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, and
Garcia, JJ.
GEN. PEDRO CABUAY,
GEN. NARCISO ABAYA,
SEC. ANGELO REYES, and Promulgated:
SEC. ROILO GOLEZ,
Respondents. August 25, 2005
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This petition for review[1] seeks to nullify the Decision[2] of the Court of
Appeals dated 17 September 2003 and Resolution dated 13 November 2003 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 78545. The Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution dismissed the
petition for habeas corpus filed by lawyers Homobono Adaza and Roberto Rafael
Pulido (petitioners) on behalf of their detained clients Capt. Gary Alejano (PN-
Marines), Capt. Nicanor Faeldon (PN-Marines), Capt. Gerardo Gambala (PA), Lt.
SG James Layug (PN), Capt. Milo Maestrecampo (PA), and Lt. SG Antonio
Trillanes IV (PN) (detainees).

Petitioners named as respondent Gen. Pedro Cabuay (Gen. Cabuay), Chief of

the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), who has
custody of the detainees. Petitioners impleaded Gen. Narciso Abaya (Gen. Abaya),
Sec. Angelo Reyes and Roilo Golez, who are respectively the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Secretary of National Defense and National
Security Adviser, because they have command responsibility over Gen. Cabuay.

Antecedent Facts
Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained
junior officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury
Apartments (Oakwood), an upscale apartment complex, located in the business
district of Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and
planted explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly
renounced their support for the administration and called for the resignation of
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members.

Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities after several negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later
defused the explosive devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to
their barracks.

On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to
all the Major Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the
ISAFP Detention Center. The transfer took place while military and civilian
authorities were investigating the soldiers involvement in the Oakwood incident.

On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup detat with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in
the 27 July 2003 Oakwood incident. The government prosecutors accused the
soldiers of coup detat as defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised
Penal Code of the Philippines, as amended. The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 03-2784. The trial court later issued the Commitment Orders giving custody of
junior officers Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV (Trillanes) and Capt. Gerardo Gambala
to the Commanding Officers of ISAFP.

On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service Commanders
to take into custody the military personnel under their command who took part in
the Oakwood incident except the detained junior officers who were to remain under
the custody of ISAFP.

On 11 August 2003, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme
Court. On 12 August 2003, the Court issued a Resolution, which resolved to:

(a) ISSUE the WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; (b) require respondents to make
a RETURN of the writ on Monday, 18 August 2003, at 10:00 a.m. before the Court
of Appeals; (c) refer the case to the Court of Appeals for RAFFLE among the
Justices thereof for hearing, further proceedings and decision thereon, after which
a REPORT shall be made to this Court within ten (10) days from promulgation of
the decision.[3]

Thus, the Court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus dated 12 August 2003
directing respondents to make a return of the writ and to appear and produce the
persons of the detainees before the Court of Appeals on the scheduled date for
hearing and further proceedings.

On the same date, the detainees and their other co-accused filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which
the trial court granted.

On 18 August 2003, pursuant to the directives of the Court, respondents

submitted their Return of the Writ and Answer to the petition and produced the
detainees before the Court of Appeals during the scheduled hearing. After the parties
filed their memoranda on 28 August 2003, the appellate court considered the petition

submitted for decision.

 On 17 September 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing
the petition. Nonetheless, the appellate court ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in
charge of implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center, to uphold
faithfully the rights of the detainees in accordance with Standing Operations
Procedure No. 0263-04. The appellate court directed Gen. Cabuay to adhere to his
commitment made in court regarding visiting hours and the detainees right to
exercise for two hours a day.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals found the petition bereft of merit. The appellate court
pointed out that the detainees are already charged of coup detat before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees
confinement is under a valid indictment, the legality of which the detainees and
petitioners do not even question.

The Court of Appeals recognized that habeas corpus may also be the
appropriate remedy to assail the legality of detention if there is a deprivation of a
constitutional right. However, the appellate court held that the constitutional rights
alleged to have been violated in this case do not directly affect the detainees liberty.
The appellate court ruled that the regulation of the detainees right to confer with their
counsels is reasonable under the circumstances.

The appellate court declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes
letter is an abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does
not justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to
illegal restraint, which is the proper subject of habeas corpus proceedings.

The Court of Appeals thus dismissed the petition and ordered Gen. Cabuay to
fulfill the promise he made in open court to uphold the visiting hours and the right
of the detainees to exercise for two hours a day. The dispositive portion of the
appellate courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED. Respondent Cabuay is hereby ORDERED to faithfully adhere to his
commitment to uphold the constitutional rights of the detainees in accordance with
the Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04 regarding visiting hours and the
right of the detainees to exercise for two (2) hours a day.

SO ORDERED.[4]

The Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues for resolution:

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

REVIEWING AND REVERSING A DECISION OF THE
SUPREME COURT;

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT

ACKNOWLEDGING THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE
REMEDY PETITIONERS SEEK; and

C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASSERTING THE

LEGALITY OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE DETAINED
JUNIOR OFFICERS DETENTION.[5]

The Ruling of the Court

 The petition lacks merit.

Petitioners claim that the Courts 12 August 2003 Order granted the petition
and the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals only for a factual hearing.
Petitioners thus argue that the Courts Order had already foreclosed any question on
the propriety and merits of their petition.

Petitioners claim is baseless. A plain reading of the 12 August 2003 Order

shows that the Court referred to the Court of Appeals the duty to inquire into the
cause of the junior officers detention. Had the Court ruled for the detainees release,
the Court would not have referred the hearing of the petition to the Court of Appeals.
The Court would have forthwith released the detainees had the Court upheld
petitioners cause.

In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual before the court
is a preliminary step in the hearing of the petition.[6] The respondent must produce
the person and explain the cause of his detention.[7] However, this order is not a
ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on the substantive matters covered by the
remedy. Thus, the Courts order to the Court of Appeals to conduct a factual hearing
was not an affirmation of the propriety of the remedy of habeas corpus.
For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas
corpus necessarily includes the determination of the propriety of the remedy. If a
court finds the alleged cause of the detention unlawful, then it should issue the writ
and release the detainees. In the present case, after hearing the case, the Court of
Appeals found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After actively participating in the
hearing before the Court of Appeals, petitioners are estopped from claiming that the
appellate court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of their petition.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not
the proper remedy to address the detainees complaint against the regulations and
conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy of habeas corpus has one
objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person. [8] The purpose of the
writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty. [9] If
the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the
person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas
corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is
not a writ of error.[10] Neither can it substitute for an appeal.[11]

Nonetheless, case law has expanded the writs application to circumstances

where there is deprivation of a persons constitutional rights. The writ is available
where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional
freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely
involuntary but are also unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally
valid has later become arbitrary.[12]

However, a mere allegation of a violation of ones constitutional right is not

sufficient. The courts will extend the scope of the writ only if any of the following
circumstances is present: (a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting
in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the
sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as to the
excess.[13] Whatever situation the petitioner invokes, the threshold remains high. The
violation of constitutional right must be sufficient to void the entire proceedings.[14]

Petitioners admit that they do not question the legality of the detention of the
detainees. Neither do they dispute the lawful indictment of the detainees for criminal
and military offenses. What petitioners bewail is the regulation adopted by Gen.
Cabuay in the ISAFP Detention Center preventing petitioners as lawyers from seeing
the detainees their clients any time of the day or night. The regulation allegedly
curtails the detainees right to counsel and violates Republic Act No. 7438 (RA
7438).[15] Petitioners claim that the regulated visits made it difficult for them to
prepare for the important hearings before the Senate and the Feliciano Commission.

Petitioners also point out that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center
violated the detainees right to privacy of communication when the ISAFP officials
opened and read the personal letters of Trillanes and Capt. Milo Maestrecampo
(Maestrecampo). Petitioners further claim that the ISAFP officials violated the
detainees right against cruel and unusual punishment when the ISAFP officials
prevented the detainees from having contact with their visitors. Moreover, the
ISAFP officials boarded up with iron bars and plywood slabs the iron grills of the
detention cells, limiting the already poor light and ventilation in the detainees cells.

Pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon

confinement.[16] However, the fact that the detainees are confined makes their rights
more limited than those of the public.[17] RA 7438, which specifies the rights of
detainees and the duties of detention officers, expressly recognizes the power of the
detention officer to adopt and implement reasonable measures to secure the safety
of the detainee and prevent his escape. Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides:

Section 4. Penalty Clause. a) x x x

b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member
of the immediate family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister or by his
counsel, from visiting and conferring privately chosen by him or by any
member of his immediate family with him, or from examining and treating
him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or,
in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four
thousand pesos (P4,000.00).

The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer

with custodial responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake
such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his safety and
prevent his escape. (Emphasis supplied)

True, Section 4(b) of RA 7438 makes it an offense to prohibit a lawyer from

visiting a detainee client at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night.
However, the last paragraph of the same Section 4(b) makes the express qualification
that notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4(b), the detention officer has the
power to undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the
safety of the detainee and prevent his escape.

The last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 prescribes a clear standard.

The regulations governing a detainees confinement must be reasonable measures x
x x to secure his safety and prevent his escape. Thus, the regulations must be
reasonably connected to the governments objective of securing the safety and
preventing the escape of the detainee. The law grants the detention officer the
authority to undertake such reasonable measures or regulations.

Petitioners contend that there was an actual prohibition of the detainees right
to effective representation when petitioners visits were limited by the schedule of
visiting hours. Petitioners assert that the violation of the detainees rights entitle them
to be released from detention.

Petitioners contention does not persuade us. The schedule of visiting hours
does not render void the detainees indictment for criminal and military offenses to
warrant the detainees release from detention. The ISAFP officials did not deny, but
merely regulated, the detainees right to counsel. The purpose of the regulation is not
to render ineffective the right to counsel, but to secure the safety and security of all
detainees. American cases are instructive on the standards to determine whether
regulations on pre-trial confinement are permissible.

In Bell v. Wolfish,[18] the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court held that
regulations must be reasonably related to maintaining security and must not be
excessive in achieving that purpose. Courts will strike down a restriction that is
arbitrary and purposeless.[19] However, Bell v. Wolfish expressly discouraged courts
from skeptically questioning challenged restrictions in detention and prison
facilities.[20] The U.S. Supreme Court commanded the courts to afford
administrators wide-ranging deference in implementing policies to maintain
institutional security.[21]

In our jurisdiction, the last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides the
standard to make regulations in detention centers allowable: such reasonable
measures as may be necessary to secure the detainees safety and prevent his
escape. In the present case, the visiting hours accorded to the lawyers of the
detainees are reasonably connected to the legitimate purpose of securing the safety
and preventing the escape of all detainees.

While petitioners may not visit the detainees any time they want, the fact that
the detainees still have face-to-face meetings with their lawyers on a daily
basisclearly shows that there is no impairment of detainees right to
counsel. Petitioners as counsels could visit their clients between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00
p.m. with a lunch break at 12:00 p.m. The visiting hours are regular business hours,
the same hours when lawyers normally entertain clients in their law offices. Clearly,
the visiting hours pass the standard of reasonableness. Moreover, in urgent cases,
petitioners could always seek permission from the ISAFP officials to confer with
their clients beyond the visiting hours.

The scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable access to the detainees,

giving petitioners sufficient time to confer with the detainees. The detainees right to
counsel is not undermined by the scheduled visits. Even in the hearings before the
Senate and the Feliciano Commission,[22] petitioners were given time to confer with
the detainees, a fact that petitioners themselves admit.[23] Thus, at no point were the
detainees denied their right to counsel.

Petitioners further argue that the bars separating the detainees from their
visitors and the boarding of the iron grills in their cells with plywood amount to
unusual and excessive punishment. This argument fails to impress us. Bell v.
Wolfish pointed out that while a detainee may not be punished prior to an
adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law, detention inevitably
interferes with a detainees desire to live comfortably.[24] The fact that the restrictions
inherent in detention intrude into the detainees desire to live comfortably does not
convert those restrictions into punishment.[25] It is when the restrictions are arbitrary
and purposeless that courts will infer intent to punish.[26] Courts will also infer intent
to punish even if the restriction seems to be related rationally to the alternative
purpose if the restriction appears excessive in relation to that purpose. [27] Jail
officials are thus not required to use the least restrictive security measure.[28] They
must only refrain from implementing a restriction that appears excessive to the
purpose it serves.[29]

We quote Bell v. Wolfish:

One further point requires discussion. The petitioners assert, and

respondents concede, that the essential objective of pretrial confinement is to insure
the detainees presence at trial. While this interest undoubtedly justifies the original
decision to confine an individual in some manner, we do not accept respondents
argument that the Governments interest in ensuring a detainees presence at trial is
the only objective that may justify restraints and conditions once the decision is
lawfully made to confine a person. If the government could confine or otherwise
infringe the liberty of detainees only to the extent necessary to ensure their presence
at trial, house arrest would in the end be the only constitutionally justified form of
detention. The Government also has legitimate interests that stem from its need to
manage the facility in which the individual is detained. These legitimate operational
concerns may require administrative measures that go beyond those that are, strictly
speaking, necessary to ensure that the detainee shows up at trial. For example, the
Government must be able to take steps to maintain security and order at the
institution and make certain no weapons or illicit drugs reach detainees. Restraints
that are reasonably related to the institutions interest in maintaining jail security do
not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they are
discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee would not have experienced had
he been released while awaiting trial. We need not here attempt to detail the precise
extent of the legitimate governmental interests that may justify conditions or
restrictions of pretrial detention. It is enough simply to recognize that in addition to
ensuring the detainees presence at trial, the effective management of the detention
facility once the individual is confined is a valid objective that may justify
imposition of conditions and restrictions of pretrial detention and dispel any
inference that such restrictions are intended as punishment.[30]
 An action constitutes a punishment when (1) that action causes the inmate to
suffer some harm or disability, and (2) the purpose of the action is to punish the
inmate.[31] Punishment also requires that the harm or disability be significantly
greater than, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of confinement.[32]

Block v. Rutherford,[33] which reiterated Bell v. Wolfish, upheld the blanket

restriction on contact visits as this practice was reasonably related to maintaining
security. The safety of innocent individuals will be jeopardized if they are exposed
to detainees who while not yet convicted are awaiting trial for serious, violent
offenses and may have prior criminal conviction.[34] Contact visits make it possible
for the detainees to hold visitors and jail staff hostage to effect escapes.[35]Contact
visits also leave the jail vulnerable to visitors smuggling in weapons, drugs, and
other contraband.[36] The restriction on contact visits was imposed even on low-risk
detainees as they could also potentially be enlisted to help obtain contraband and
weapons.[37] The security consideration in the imposition of blanket restriction on
contact visits was ruled to outweigh the sentiments of the detainees.[38]

Block v. Rutherford held that the prohibition of contact visits bore a rational
connection to the legitimate goal of internal security.[39] This case reaffirmed the
hands-off doctrine enunciated in Bell v. Wolfish, a form of judicial self-restraint,
based on the premise that courts should decline jurisdiction over prison matters in
deference to administrative expertise.[40]

In the present case, we cannot infer punishment from the separation of the
detainees from their visitors by iron bars, which is merely a limitation on contact
visits. The iron bars separating the detainees from their visitors prevent direct
physical contact but still allow the detainees to have visual, verbal, non-verbal and
limited physical contact with their visitors. The arrangement is not unduly
restrictive. In fact, it is not even a strict non-contact visitation regulation like
in Block v. Rutherford. The limitation on the detainees physical contacts with
visitors is a reasonable, non-punitive response to valid security concerns.
 The boarding of the iron grills is for the furtherance of security within the
ISAFP Detention Center. This measure intends to fortify the individual cells and to
prevent the detainees from passing on contraband and weapons from one cell to
another. The boarded grills ensure security and prevent disorder and crime within
the facility. The diminished illumination and ventilation are but discomforts inherent
in the fact of detention, and do not constitute punishments on the detainees.
We accord respect to the finding of the Court of Appeals that the conditions
in the ISAFP Detention Center are not inhuman, degrading and cruel. Each detainee,
except for Capt. Nicanor Faeldon and Capt. Gerardo Gambala, is confined in
separate cells, unlike ordinary cramped detention cells. The detainees are treated
well and given regular meals. The Court of Appeals noted that the cells are relatively
clean and livable compared to the conditions now prevailing in the city and
provincial jails, which are congested with detainees. The Court of Appeals found the
assailed measures to be reasonable considering that the ISAFP Detention Center is
a high-risk detention facility. Apart from the soldiers, a suspected New Peoples
Army (NPA) member and two suspected Abu Sayyaf members are detained in the
ISAFP Detention Center.

We now pass upon petitioners argument that the officials of the ISAFP
Detention Center violated the detainees right to privacy when the ISAFP officials
opened and read the letters handed by detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo to one
of the petitioners for mailing. Petitioners point out that the letters were not in a sealed
envelope but simply folded because there were no envelopes in the ISAFP Detention
Center. Petitioners contend that the Constitution prohibits the infringement of a
citizens privacy rights unless authorized by law. The Solicitor General does not deny
that the ISAFP officials opened the letters.
Courts in the U.S. have generally permitted prison officials to open and read
all incoming and outgoing mail of convicted prisoners to prevent the smuggling of
contraband into the prison facility and to avert coordinated escapes.[41] Even in the
absence of statutes specifically allowing prison authorities from opening and
inspecting mail, such practice was upheld based on the principle of civil
deaths.[42] Inmates were deemed to have no right to correspond confidentially with
anyone. The only restriction placed upon prison authorities was that the right of
inspection should not be used to delay unreasonably the communications between
the inmate and his lawyer.[43]

Eventually, the inmates outgoing mail to licensed attorneys, courts, and court
officials received respect.[44] The confidential correspondences could not be
censored.[45] The infringement of such privileged communication was held to be a
violation of the inmates First Amendment rights.[46] A prisoner has a right to consult
with his attorney in absolute privacy, which right is not abrogated by the legitimate
interests of prison authorities in the administration of the institution.[47]Moreover,
the risk is small that attorneys will conspire in plots that threaten prison security.[48]

American jurisprudence initially made a distinction between the privacy rights

enjoyed by convicted inmates and pre-trial detainees. The case of Palmigiano v.
Travisono[49] recognized that pre-trial detainees, unlike convicted prisoners, enjoy a
limited right of privacy in communication. Censorship of pre-trial detainees mail
addressed to public officials, courts and counsel was held impermissible. While
incoming mail may be inspected for contraband and read in certain instances,
outgoing mail of pre-trial detainees could not be inspected or read at all.

In the subsequent case of Wolff v. McDonnell,[50] involving convicted

prisoners, the U.S. Supreme Court held that prison officials could open in the
presence of the inmates incoming mail from attorneys to inmates. However, prison
officials could not read such mail from attorneys. Explained the U.S. Supreme Court:
The issue of the extent to which prison authorities can open and inspect incoming mail
from attorneys to inmates, has been considerably narrowed in the course of this
litigation. The prison regulation under challenge provided that (a)ll incoming and
outgoing mail will be read and inspected, and no exception was made for attorney-
prisoner mail. x x x

Petitioners now concede that they cannot open and read mail from attorneys to
inmates, but contend that they may open all letters from attorneys as long as it is done
in the presence of the prisoners. The narrow issue thus presented is whether letters
determined or found to be from attorneys may be opened by prison authorities in the
 presence of the inmate or whether such mail must be delivered unopened if normal
detection techniques fail to indicate contraband.

xxx
x x x If prison officials had to check in each case whether a communication was from
an attorney before opening it for inspection, a near impossible task of administration
would be imposed. We think it entirely appropriate that the State require any such
communications to be specially marked as originating from an attorney, with his name
and address being given, if they are to receive special treatment. It would also certainly
be permissible that prison authorities require that a lawyer desiring to correspond with
a prisoner, first identify himself and his client to the prison officials, to assure that the
letters marked privileged are actually from members of the bar. As to the ability to
open the mail in the presence of inmates, this could in no way constitute censorship,
since the mail would not be read. Neither could it chill such communications, since
the inmates presence insures that prison officials will not read the mail. The possibility
that contraband will be enclosed in letters, even those from apparent attorneys, surely
warrants prison officials opening the letters. We disagree with the Court of Appeals
that this should only be done in appropriate circumstances. Since a flexible test,
besides being unworkable, serves no arguable purpose in protecting any of the possible
constitutional rights enumerated by respondent, we think that petitioners, by acceding
to a rule whereby the inmate is present when mail from attorneys is inspected, have
done all, and perhaps even more, than the Constitution requires.[51]

In Hudson v. Palmer,[52] the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an inmate has no
reasonable expectation of privacy inside his cell. The U.S. Supreme Court explained
that prisoners necessarily lose many protections of the Constitution, thus:
However, while persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many protections of the
Constitution, it is also clear that imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or
loss of many significant rights. These constraints on inmates, and in some cases the
complete withdrawal of certain rights, are justified by the considerations underlying
our penal system. The curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a practical matter,
to accommodate a myriad of institutional needs and objectives of prison facilities,
chief among which is internal security. Of course, these restrictions or retractions also
serve, incidentally, as reminders that, under our system of justice, deterrence and
retribution are factors in addition to correction.[53]

The later case of State v. Dunn,[54] citing Hudson v. Palmer,

abandoned Palmigiano v. Travisono and made no distinction as to the detainees
limited right to privacy. State v. Dunn noted the considerable jurisprudence in the
United States holding that inmate mail may be censored for the furtherance of a
substantial government interest such as security or discipline. State v.
Dunn declared that if complete censorship is permissible, then the lesser act of
opening the mail and reading it is also permissible. We quote State v. Dunn:

[A] right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally

incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells
required to ensure institutional security and internal order. We are satisfied that
society would insist that the prisoners expectation of privacy always yield to what
must be considered a paramount interest in institutional security. We believe that it
is accepted by our society that [l]oss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent
incidents of confinement.

The distinction between the limited privacy rights of a pre-trial detainee and
a convicted inmate has been blurred as courts in the U.S. ruled that pre-trial detainees
might occasionally pose an even greater security risk than convicted inmates. Bell
v. Wolfish reasoned that those who are detained prior to trial may in many cases be
individuals who are charged with serious crimes or who have prior records and may
therefore pose a greater risk of escape than convicted inmates.[55]Valencia v.
Wiggins[56] further held that it is impractical to draw a line between convicted
prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security.

American cases recognize that the unmonitored use of pre-trial detainees non-
privileged mail poses a genuine threat to jail security. [57] Hence, when a detainee
places his letter in an envelope for non-privileged mail, the detainee knowingly
exposes his letter to possible inspection by jail officials.[58] A pre-trial detainee has
no reasonable expectation of privacy for his incoming mail.[59] However, incoming
mail from lawyers of inmates enjoys limited protection such that prison officials can
open and inspect the mail for contraband but could not read the contents without
violating the inmates right to correspond with his lawyer.[60] The inspection of
privileged mail is limited to physical contraband and not to verbal contraband. [61]
 Thus, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening and reading
of the detainees letters in the present case violated the detainees right to privacy of
communication. The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the
folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed
letters for the inspection of contraband.

The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not
confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who
received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting
as the detainees personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters
for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the
ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked
confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention
officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the
presence of the detainees.

That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizens

privacy rights[62] is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to
persons who are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those detained is
subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful
detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees
and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights.

In assessing the regulations imposed in detention and prison facilities that are alleged
to infringe on the constitutional rights of the detainees and convicted prisoners, U.S.
courts balance the guarantees of the Constitution with the legitimate concerns of
prison administrators.[63] The deferential review of such regulations stems from the
principle that:
[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict
scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security
problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison
administration.[64]
 The detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading 300
soldiers in committing coup detat, a crime punishable with reclusion
perpetua.[65]The junior officers are not ordinary detainees but visible leaders of the
Oakwood incident involving an armed takeover of a civilian building in the heart of
the financial district of the country. As members of the military armed forces, the
detainees are subject to the Articles of War.[66]

Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other high-risk persons from
the Abu Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus, we must give the military custodian a wider
range of deference in implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center.
The military custodian is in a better position to know the security risks involved in
detaining the junior officers, together with the suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA
members. Since the appropriate regulations depend largely on the security risks
involved, we should defer to the regulations adopted by the military custodian in the
absence of patent arbitrariness.

The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of detainees and
convicted prisoners from petitioning the courts for the redress of grievances.
Regulations and conditions in detention and prison facilities that violate the
Constitutional rights of the detainees and prisoners will be reviewed by the courts
on a case-by-case basis. The courts could afford injunctive relief or damages to the
detainees and prisoners subjected to arbitrary and inhumane conditions.
However, habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of
confinement.[67] The writ of habeas corpus will only lie if what is challenged is the
fact or duration of confinement.[68]

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78545.

No pronouncement as to costs.
 SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 179736 June 26, 2013

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners,

vs.
ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

"The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for one's
personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and non-interference demands respect."1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the July 10, 2007
Decision3 and the September 11, 2007 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP
No. 01473.

Factual Antecedents

On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaint5 for Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case
MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan
Choachuy.

Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B) covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue,
Cebu;6 that respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at
Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners;7 that respondents constructed an
auto-repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed a
case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO,
docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5125;8 that in that case, Aldo claimed that petitioners were
constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said construction would destroy the wall of its
building, which is adjacent to petitioners’ property;9 that the court, in that case, denied Aldo’s
application for preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its allegations;10 that, in order to get
evidence to support the said case, respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on the
building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras facing petitioners’ property;11 that
respondents, through their employees and without the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of
petitioners’ on-going construction;12 and that the acts of respondents violate petitioners’ right to
privacy.13 Thus, petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the video surveillance
cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.14

In their Answer with Counterclaim,15 respondents claimed that they did not install the video
surveillance cameras,16nor did they order their employees to take pictures of petitioners’
construction.17 They also clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders.18
 Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order19 granting the application for a TRO. The dispositive
portion of the said Order reads:

WHEREFORE, the application for a Temporary Restraining Order or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
is granted. Upon the filing and approval of a bond by petitioners, which the Court sets at P50,000.00,
let a Writ of Preliminary Injunction issue against the respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan
Choachuy. They are hereby directed to immediately remove the revolving camera that they installed
at the left side of their building overlooking the side of petitioners’ lot and to transfer and operate it
elsewhere at the back where petitioners’ property can no longer be viewed within a distance of about
2-3 meters from the left corner of Aldo Servitec, facing the road.

IT IS SO ORDERED.20

Respondents moved for a reconsideration21 but the RTC denied the same in its Order22 dated
February 6, 2006.23Thus:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Issue a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction in consonance with the Order dated 18 October 2005.

IT IS SO ORDERED.24

Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari25 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with application for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision26 granting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled that
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion because petitioners
failed to show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive writ.27 The CA explained that the right
to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated since the property
subject of the controversy is not used as a residence.28 The CA alsosaid that since respondents are
not the owners of the building, they could not have installed video surveillance cameras.29 They are
mere stockholders of Aldo, which has a separate juridical personality.30 Thus, they are not the proper
parties.31 The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING

the petition filed in this case. The assailed orders dated October 18, 2005 and February 6, 2006
issued by the respondent judge are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.32

Issues

Hence, this recourse by petitioners arguing that:

I.
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE THE
ORDERS OF THE RTC DATED 18 OCTOBER 2005 AND 6 FEBRUARY 2006 HOLDING THAT
THEY WERE ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

II.

THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER

SPOUSES HING ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ON THE
GROUND THAT THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHT TO
PRIVACY DESPITE THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE RTC, WHICH RESPONDENTS
CHOACHUY FAILED TO REFUTE, THAT THE ILLEGALLY INSTALLED SURVEILLANCE
CAMERAS OF RESPONDENTS CHOACH[U]Y WOULD CAPTURE THE PRIVATE ACTIVITIES OF
PETITIONER SPOUSES HING, THEIR CHILDREN AND EMPLOYEES.

III.

THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT SINCE THE

OWNER OF THE BUILDING IS ALDO DEVELOPMENT AND RESOURCES, INC. THEN TO SUE
RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY CONSTITUTES A PURPORTEDLY UNWARRANTED PIERCING
OF THE CORPORATE VEIL.

IV.

THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT IGNORED THE SERIOUS

FORMAL DEFICIENCIES OF BOTH THE PETITION AND THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION DATED 15 MARCH 2006 OF RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY AND GAVE X X
X THEM DUE COURSE AND CONSIDERATION.33

Essentially, the issues boil down to (1) whether there is a violation of petitioners’ right to privacy, and
(2) whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction because
respondents’ installation of a stationary camera directly facing petitioners’ property and a revolving
camera covering a significant portion of the same property constitutes a violation of petitioners’ right
to privacy.34 Petitioners cite Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, which enjoins persons from prying into the
private lives of others.35 Although the said provision pertains to the privacy of another’s residence,
petitioners opine that it includes business offices, citing Professor Arturo M. Tolentino.36 Thus, even
assuming arguendo that petitioners’ property is used for business, it is still covered by the said
provision.37

As to whether respondents are the proper parties to implead in this case, petitioners claim that
respondents and Aldo are one and the same, and that respondents only want to hide behind Aldo’s
corporate fiction.38 They point out that if respondents are not the real owners of the building, where
the video surveillance cameras were installed, then they had no business consenting to the ocular
inspection conducted by the court.39

Respondents’ Arguments
Respondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA that petitioners cannot invoke their right
to privacy since the property involved is not used as a residence.40 Respondents maintain that they
had nothing to do with the installation of the video surveillance cameras as these were installed by
Aldo, the registered owner of the building,41as additional security for its building.42 Hence, they were
wrongfully impleaded in this case.43

Our Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.

The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution44 and in our laws. It is defined as "the right to be
free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in
such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities."45 It is the right of an
individual "to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the
public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned."46 Simply put, the right to privacy is
"the right to be let alone."47

The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects them against the State’s
abuse of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their
houses. No one, not even the State, except "in case of overriding social need and then only under
the stringent procedural safeguards," can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.48

The right to privacy under Article 26(1)

of the Civil Code covers business offices

where the public are excluded

therefrom and only certain individuals

are allowed to enter.

Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individual’s right to privacy and
provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals. It
states:

Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;

xxxx

This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be
denied or even restricted by others. It includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering
inquisitively into the residence of another without the consent of the latter."49 The phrase "prying into
the privacy of another’s residence," however, does not mean that only the residence is entitled to
privacy. As elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:
Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of another’s residence." This does not mean,
however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also "similar acts." A
business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such
individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. x x x50 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to
his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or
deny them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence," therefore, covers
places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his
right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA,
therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.

The "reasonable expectation of

privacy" test is used to determine
whether there is a violation of the right
to privacy.

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy and whether the expectation has been violated.51 In Ople v. Torres,52 we enunciated that "the
reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his
conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that
society recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit
or extend an individual’s "reasonable expectation of privacy."53 Hence, the reasonableness of a
person’s expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the
factual circumstances surrounding the case.54

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the
protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover
places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose
right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the
privacy of another’s residence or business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping,
which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction, ruled that:

After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary restraining order.
The operation by respondents of a revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their building,
violated the right of privacy of petitioners, who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The camera does
not only focus on respondents’ property or the roof of the factory at the back (Aldo Development and
Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a good portion of the land of petitioners.

Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why petitioner Hing was so unyielding in
asserting that the revolving camera was set up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going construction in
his property. The monitor showed only a portion of the roof of the factory of Aldo. If the purpose of
respondents in setting up a camera at the back is to secure the building and factory premises, then
the camera should revolve only towards their properties at the back. Respondents’ camera cannot
be made to extend the view to petitioners’ lot. To allow the respondents to do that over the objection
of the petitioners would violate the right of petitioners as property owners. "The owner of a thing
cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person."55
The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in their
property, whether they use it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of video
surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners’ property or covering a significant portion thereof,
without their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the issuance of a
preliminary injunction was justified. We need not belabor that the issuance of a preliminary injunction
is discretionary on the part of the court taking cognizance of the case and should not be interfered
with, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the court.56 Here, there is no indication
of any grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred in finding that petitioners are not entitled to an
injunctive writ.

This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

A real party defendant is one who has a

correlative legal obligation to redress a
wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of
the defendant's act or omission which
had violated the legal right of the
former.

Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. — A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or

injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest.

A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the
plaintiff by reason of the defendant’s act or omission which had violated the legal right of the
former."57

In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that since they do not own the
building, they could not have installed the video surveillance cameras.58 Such reasoning, however, is
erroneous. The fact that respondents are not the registered owners of the building does not
automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of the video surveillance cameras.

In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video surveillance cameras in
order to fish for evidence, which could be used against petitioners in another case.59 During the
hearing of the application for Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that when respondents
installed the video surveillance cameras, he immediately broached his concerns but they did not
seem to care,60 and thus, he reported the matter to the barangay for mediation, and eventually, filed
a Complaint against respondents before the RTC.61 He also admitted that as early as 1998 there has
already been a dispute between his family and the Choachuy family concerning the boundaries of
their respective properties.62 With these factual circumstances in mind, we believe that respondents
are the proper parties to be impleaded.

Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its stockholders,
records show that it is a family-owned corporation managed by the Choachuy family.63

Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim that they are not owners of
the building, allowed the court to enter the compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection. The
counsel for respondents even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the building and answered all
her questions regarding the set-up and installation of the video surveillance cameras.64 And when
respondents moved for reconsideration of the Order dated October 18, 2005 of the RTC, one of the
arguments they raised is that Aldo would suffer damages if the video surveillance cameras are
removed and transferred.65 Noticeably, in these instances, the personalities of respondents and Aldo
seem to merge.

All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents are merely using the
corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield to protect themselves from this suit. In view of the foregoing, we
find that respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 10, 2007 and the
Resolution dated September 11, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 18,2005 and February 6, 200[6] of
Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-5223 are hereby
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014

DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, Petitioner, v. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated August 30, 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 (RTC) in SP No. 12-71527, which extended the privilege of
the writ of habeas data in favor of respondent Police Superintendent Neri A. Ilagan (Ilagan).

The Facts

In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data3 dated June 22, 2012, Ilagan alleged that he and
petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee (Lee) were former common law partners. Sometime in July 2011, he visited
Lee at the latter’s condominium, rested for a while and thereafter,proceeded to his office. Upon arrival,
Ilagan noticed that his digital camera was missing.4 On August 23, 2011, Lee confronted Ilagan at the
latter’s office regarding a purported sex video (subject video) she discovered from the aforesaid camera
involving Ilagan and another woman. Ilagan denied the video and demanded Lee to return the camera, but
to no avail.5 During the confrontation, Ilagan allegedly slammed Lee’s head against a wall inside his office
and walked away.6Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video as evidence in filing various complaints against
Ilagan, namely: (a) a criminal complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 9262,7otherwise known as the
“Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004,” before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Makati; and (b) an administrative complaint for grave misconduct before the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM).8 Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of reproducing the subject video and threatening to distribute
the same to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated not only his right
to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other woman, and thus, the issuance of a writ
of habeas data in his favor is warranted.9

Finding the petition prima facie meritorious, the RTC issued a Writ of Habeas Data10 dated June 25, 2012,
directing Lee to appear before the court a quo, and to produce Ilagan’s digital camera, as well as the
negative and/or original of the subject video and copies thereof, and to file a verified written return within
five (5) working days from date of receipt thereof.
In her Verified Return11 dated July 2, 2012, Lee admitted that she indeed kept the memory card of the
digital camera and reproduced the aforesaid video but averred that she only did so to utilize the same as
evidence in the cases she filed against Ilagan. She also admitted that her relationship with Ilagan started
sometime in 2003 and ended under disturbing circumstances in August 2011, and that she only happened to
discover the subject video when Ilagan left his camera in her condominium. Accordingly, Lee contended that
Ilagan’s petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data should be dismissed because: (a) its filing was
only aimed at suppressing the evidence against Ilagan in the cases she filed; and (b) she is not engaged in
the gathering, collecting, or storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan.12

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision13 dated August 30, 2012, the RTC granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data in Ilagan’s
favor, and accordingly, ordered the implementing officer to turn-over copies of the subject video to him, and
enjoined Lee from further reproducing the same.14

The RTC did not give credence to Lee’s defense that she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan, finding that her acts of reproducing the subject video and
showing it to other people, i.e., the NAPOLCOM officers, violated the latter’s right to privacy in life and
caused him to suffer humiliation and mental anguish. In this relation, the RTC opined that Lee’s use of the
subject video as evidence in the various cases she filed against Ilagan is not enough justification for its
reproduction. Nevertheless, the RTC clarified that it is only ruling on the return of the aforesaid video and
not on its admissibility before other tribunals.15

Dissatisfied, Lee filed this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the RTC correctly extended the privilege of
the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as a
response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number
of killings and enforced disappearances.16 It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to
privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals,17 which is defined as “the right
to control the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself.”18

As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as “a remedy available
to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence
of the aggrieved party.” Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of
the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “[t]he
manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or
security of the aggrieved party.” In other words, the petition must adequately show that there exists a
nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on
the other .19 Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial
evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the
victim.20 In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely
property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are
vague and doubtful.21

In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life,
liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened
dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this
video – which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public
consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life,
liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the
rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between
one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much
so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case.

In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally be dismissible due to
the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his
petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as
prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would indicate that Lee actually
proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life, liberty or
security. Nor would anything on record even lead a reasonable mind to conclude22 that Lee was going to use
the subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends – say for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin
Ilagan’s reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason why she
reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence in the criminal and
administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan.23 Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well
as the glaring absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC Decision and
dismiss the habeas data petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 30, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 224 in SP No. 12-71527is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data filed by respondent P/Supt. Neri A. Ilagan
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perez, JJ., concur.