STRONGWORLD CONSTRUCTION v PERELLO
alia, that: in 1996, Rizal Cement Company, Inc.
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
seeking to set aside the Decision[1] and
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP.
No. 49462, dated 24 May 2000and 2 April 2001,
respectively.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Strongworld Construction
Corporation (Strongworld) is a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of construction. Petitioners
Leo Cleto A. Gamolo (Gamolo) and Reynold P. Molo
(Molo) are members of the Board of Directors of
petitioner Strongworld. On 31 October 1997,
petitioners filed a Complaint[3] for Sum of Money and
Damages with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Muntinlupa City, Branch 276, presided over by the
Hon. N. C. Perello, and docketed as Civil Case No.
97-222, against private respondents First Peoples
Bank (formerly known as Rural Bank of San
Teodoro), Bank of Commerce, Orlando O. Francisco
(Francisco), and Editha Lizarda (Lizarda).
In their Complaint, petitioners alleged, inter
delivered to petitioner Strongworld four (4)
checks[4] as payment for the construction of housing
units;[5] at the time of the issuance of the aforesaid
checks, petitioner Strongworld maintained a single
account with private respondent Bank of Commerce,
San Pedro Branch,[6] with private respondents
Francisco, former president of petitioner Strongworld,
and its incumbent president, petitioner Gamolo as
authorized signatories; the subject checks were not
deposited to the account of petitioner Strongworld;
instead, private respondents Francisco and Lizarda,
conspiring and confederating between themselves and
with the employees of private respondent First
Peoples Bank, maliciously and fraudulently diverted
the checks to their personal accounts, specifically
First Peoples Bank Savings Account No. 51-03025-5,
without the knowledge and consent of petitioners
Gamolo and Molo, and without authority from the
Board of Directors of petitioner Strongworld;[7] and
that repeated demands against the private respondents
were not heeded resulting in the damage and prejudice
of petitioners.
The petitioners prayed for the following reliefs:
1

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that
judgment be rendered as follows:
1. Ordering the defendants to pay
plaintiff Strongworld, jointly and
severally, the amount of P5,085,615.22
constituting the value of plaintiff
corporations checks, and P3,000,000.00,
constituting lost profits, interest and other
expenses which resulted by reason of the
illegal acts of defendants.
2. Ordering defendants to pay
plaintiffs, jointly and severally, a)
P3,000,000.00 by way of moral damages
divided as follows: i) plaintiff
Gamolo P1,500,000.00, ii) plaintiff
Molo P750,000.00, and iii) plaintiff
Strongworld P750,000.00; b) P100,000.00
exemplary damages; and c) P200,000.00
attorneys fees.
Other reliefs just and equitable
under the premises are likewise prayed
for.[8]
On 2 December 1997, private respondent Bank
of Commerce filed an Answer with Cross-
Claim,[9] praying for the dismissal of the
Complaint. Subsequent thereto, private respondent
Lizarda filed an Answer with Counterclaim and
Cross-Claim,[10] dated 12 December 1997. On 11
December 1997, private respondent First Peoples
Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss[11] on the grounds that
petitioners Gamolo and Molo had no legal capacity to
sue, and that the Complaint stated no cause of
action. On 9 January 1998, petitioners filed an
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss.[12]
On 9 January 1998, the court a quo rendered an
[13]
Order dismissing the Complaint. We quote the
pertinent portion hereunder:
From the allegations of the
COMPLAINT, it appears that money
sought to be recovered belongs to the
Corporation and who allegedly was
damaged due to the unauthorized
expenditure of this sum. Therefore,
Plaintiff Leo Cleto A. Gamolo and
Reynaldo P. Molo, although, admittedly
are officers of the corporation appear to
have instituted this action for and in behalf
2
 of the corporation, yet their authority to
sue or defend the corporation has not been
shown in this COMPLAINT. No Board
Resolution for this purpose has been
attached or recited in it. Thus this
complaint is not prosecuted by the proper
property in interest.[14]
On 30 January 1998, petitioners filed a Motion
for Reconsideration[15] which was opposed by private
respondent First Peoples Bank.[16]
On 30 March 1998, the trial court granted
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, and
consequently, ordered the case
[17]
reinstated. According to the court a quo, the board
resolution authorizing petitioner Gamolo to prosecute
the case in behalf of petitioner Strongworld was
defective for not having been authenticated by the
proper officer.[18]However, notwithstanding the defect
in the resolution, the court a quo held that the
intention of petitioner Strongworld to authorize
Gamolo to prosecute the case against private
respondents is clear.[19] On 30 April 1998, private
respondent First Peoples Bank filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[20] of the 30 March 1998 Order,
praying for the dismissal of the Complaint. On 25
May 1998, petitioners belatedly filed an
Opposition[21] thereto.
In the interim, on 7 May 1998, the court a
quo issued an Order,[22] recalling its Order of 30
March 1998. The trial court declared that the case
should remain dismissed on the ground that
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated 9 January 1998, dismissing the Complaint, was
not served on private respondents Bank of Commerce,
Francisco and Lizarda.[23] Moreover, the trial court
opined that it was in error when it considered
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, as no proof of
service to private respondents was shown therein, and
the same lacked a notice of hearing, which defects
rendered the aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration, a
mere scrap of paper.[24]
Subsequently, petitioners apparently filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the 7 May 1998 Order,
a copy of which cannot be found on the
records. On 29 May 1998, the court a quo rendered an
Order,[25] denying the motion and finding no reason to
reconsider its Order of 7 May 1998.
3
On 15 June 1998, petitioners filed a Motion for
Clarification and/or Reconsideration and for
Declaration of Default.[26] They sought, inter alia, for
clarification of the Order dated 7 May 1998, positing
that the dismissal should only pertain to private
respondent First Peoples Bank. They also prayed that
the 7 May 1998 Order be declared as superseded by
the Order of 29 May 1998. In the alternative, they
prayed that the 7 May 1998 Order be reconsidered and
set aside, that the Complaint be reinstated, and that
private respondents First Peoples Bank and Francisco
be declared in default.[27]
Resolving petitioners Motion for Clarification, the
trial court issued an Order[28] in open court, dated 17
July 1998, reiterating that the case should remain
dismissed as petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
was defective, and hence, unbinding against the Order
of 7 May 1998. Similarly, the trial court corrected the
Order of 29 May 1998 to refer to the Order of 7 May
1998, which sustained the dismissal of the
case.[29] The court a quo reasoned, thus:
Even as the MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION by the Plaintiff
was not assailed by the other Defendant,
but due to lack of notification, this Motion
should not have been received by the
Court at all, therefore [it] is a mere scrap
of paper which requires no ruling.
1. A motion that does not contain a
notice of hearing is a mere scrap of paper,
it represents no question which merits the
attention of the Court. (Goldloop
Properties, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 212
SCRA 498).
2. Rule 15, Sec. 4. Hearing of
motion- Except for motions which the
Court may act upon without prejudicing
the rights of the adverse party, every
written motion shall be set for hearing by
the applicant.
3. Every written motion required to
be heard and the notice of the hearing
thereof shall be served in such a manner to
ensure its receipt by the other party at least
three (3) days before the date of hearing
unless the Court for good cause sets the
hearing on shorter notice.
4. Sec. 5, Notice of hearing The
notice of hearing shall be addressed to all
parties concerned, and shall specify the
4
 time and date of the hearing which must
not be later than ten (10) days after the
filing of the motion.
5. Sec. 6, Proof of service
necessary No written motion set for
hearing shall be acted upon by the Court
without proof of service thereof.
6. Any motion that does not contain
proof of service of notice to the other party
is not entitled to judicial cognizance. (Cui
vs. Madayag, 245 SCRA 1).[30]
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition
for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, assailing the
Orders of the RTC dated 7 May 1998 and 17 July
1998. The Petition likewise sought to annul the Order
of the RTC dated 9 January 1998, dismissing the
Complaint, which was later revived by the Order of 7
May 1998.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners Petition
for Certiorari for utilizing the wrong recourse
of certiorari, instead of an ordinary appeal. The
appellate court said that the Complaint was finally
dismissed on 17 July 1998. Thus, citing Denso
(Phils.), Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[31] it
held that the dismissal of the Complaint is a final
order which disposed of the action, and the remedy of
a party aggrieved of a final order or judgment is
appeal under Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, and not a special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65 thereof.[32]
In dismissing the Petition, the Court of Appeals, in
part, declared:
As earlier said, however Our Supreme
Court has held that if a party essays a
course by the wrong procedure, the only
recourse of action open is to dismiss the
case (Murillo vs. Rodolfo Consul, UDK
9748, 182 SCRA XI (sic)). The remedy of
appeal being available to the petitioners, it
cannot resort to Certiorari (Felizardo vs.
Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 220).
It is settled that a special civil action for
certiorari will not lie as a substitute for the
last (sic) remedy of appeal (Dela Paz v.
Panis, 245 SCRA 242) and we find no
special nor compelling reasons why we
5
 should make out this case as an
exception.[33] IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
NOT REINSTATING THE
Petitioners moved for Reconsideration[34] thereon, but COMPLAINTS (sic) AND IN FAILING
the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in the TO CONSIDER THAT THE TRIAL
COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN: 1)
assailed Order promulgated on 2 April 2001.
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON
THE GROUND THAT A BOARD
Assignment of Errors RESOLUTION WAS NOT RECITED IN
OR ATTACHED TO THE COMPLAINT;
Hence, petitioners come to us via the instant Petition 2) IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT
for Review, submitting that the Court of Appeals EVEN AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS
erred, viz: WHO DID NOT FILE A MOTION TO
DISMISS AND WHO DID NOT RAISE
THE SAME GROUNDS RELIED UPON
I. BY THE TRIAL COURT IN
IN RULING THAT APPEAL IS THE DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT; 3) IN
PROPER REMEDY AND PETITION REINSTATING ITS JANUARY 9, 1998
FOR CERTIORARI IS NOT AVAILABLE ORDER AND IN NOT RECALLING
IN THE PRESENT CASE; THE JANUARY 9, 1998.[35]

II.
Issue
IN NOT FINDING THAT APPEAL IS
NOT THE REMEDY WITH RESPECT
TO PETITIONERS (sic) MOTION FOR For our resolution is whether the appellate court was
CLARIFICATION; in error when it dismissed petitioners Petition
for Certiorari on the ground that appeal was the
III. appropriate remedy under Rule 41 of the 1997
6
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, and not a Petition (d) An order disallowing or
for Certiorari, under Rule 65 thereof. dismissing an appeal;

(e) An order denying a

The Courts Ruling motion to set aside a
judgment by consent,
At the outset, attention must be called to Section 1, confession or compromise
Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, on the ground of fraud,
to wit: mistake or duress, or any
other ground vitiating
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal consent;
may be taken from a judgment or final
(f) An order of execution;
order that completely disposes of the case,
or of a particular matter therein when
declared by these Rules to be appealable: (g) A judgment or final order
for or against one or more
No appeal may be taken from: of several parties or in
separate claims,
(a) An order denying a counterclaims, cross-
motion for new trial or claims and third-party
complaints, while the
reconsideration;
main case is pending,
(b) An order denying a unless the court allows an
appeal therefrom; and
petition for relief or any
similar motion seeking
relief from judgment; (h) An order dismissing an action
without prejudice;
(c) An interlocutory order;
In all the above instances
where the judgment or final order is
7
 not appealable, the aggrieved party
may file an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65.
From the foregoing, it is evident that under
Section 1(h), Rule 41, no appeal may be taken from
an order dismissing an action without prejudice. In
such a case, the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure states that the remedy available to the
aggrieved party is to file an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65.
Jurisprudence has similarly underscored that
with the advent of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, an order of dismissal without prejudice is
no longer appealable, as expressly provided by
Section 1(h), Rule 41 thereof. In Philippine Export
and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation v.
Philippine Infrastructures, Inc.,[36] this Court had the
opportunity to resolve whether an order dismissing a
petition without prejudice should be appealed by way
of ordinary appeal, petition for review on certiorari or
a petition for certiorari. The Court said that, indeed,
prior to the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, an
order dismissing an action may be appealed by
ordinary appeal.[37] Verily, Section 1, Rule 41 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure recites the
instances when appeal may not be taken, specifically,
in case of an order dismissing an
action without prejudice, in which case, the remedy
available to the aggrieved party is Rule 65.
Thus, the question is: was the Order of
the RTC, dated 7 May 1998, reviving the 9 January
1998 Order, which dismissed the Complaint, an order
dismissing an action without prejudice?
We distinguish a dismissal with prejudice from
a dismissal without prejudice. The former disallows
and bars the refiling of the complaint; whereas, the
same cannot be said of a dismissal without
prejudice.[38] Likewise, where the law permits, a
dismissal with prejudice is subject to the right of
appeal.[39]
To resolve the issue before us, it is critical to
examine the Order of dismissal rendered by the
court a quo. It can be recalled that on 9 January 1998,
the trial court issued an Order dismissing petitioners
Complaint, on the ground that petitioners Gamolo and
Molo had not shown their authority to sue for and in
8
behalf of petitioner Strongworld. Subsequently, on
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC
reconsidered its 9 January 1998 Order of
dismissal. Hence, on 30 March 1998, the RTC ordered
the case reinstated. However, on 7 May 1998, upon
Motion for Reconsideration of private respondent
First Peoples Bank, the court a quo recalled the Order
of 30 March 1998. The recall by the court a quo of the
Order dated 30 March 1998 reinstated the Order
dated 9 January 1998, which dismissed the
Complaint. Finally, on 17 July 1998, the court a quo,
upon petitioners Motion for Clarification, enunciated
that the Order of 7 May 1998, dismissing the case, is
sustained.
As can be gleaned therefrom, the trial courts
order of dismissal of 9 January 1998, was founded on
the ground that the action was not instituted by the
proper party in interest.[40] The trial court held that
petitioners Gamolo and Molo, although admittedly
officers of petitioner Strongworld, appear to have
instituted the action for and in behalf of petitioner
Strongworld, yet, their authority to sue or defend the
corporation had not been shown in the
Complaint.[41] No board resolution for the purpose had
been attached or recited in the Complaint.[42]
Jurisprudence states that if the suit is not
brought in the name of, or against, the real party in
interest, a Motion to Dismiss may be filed on the
ground that the Complaint states no cause of
action.[43] Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure allows the filing of a Motion
to Dismiss on the ground that the Complaint states no
cause of action. Thus, in Aguila, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals,[44] we pronounced:
A real party in interest is one who
would be benefited or injured by the
judgment, or who is entitled to the avails
of the suit. This ruling is now embodied in
Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. Any decision
rendered against a person who is not a real
party in interest in the case cannot be
executed. Hence, a complaint filed against
such a person should be dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action.[45]
9
Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure enumerates the grounds for which a Motion (g) That the pleading asserting the
claim states no cause of action;
to Dismiss may be filed, viz.:
(h) That the claim or demand set forth
SECTION 1. Grounds. Within the
in the plaintiffs pleading has been
time for but before filing the answer to the
paid, waived, abandoned, or
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a
otherwise extinguished;
motion to dismiss may be made on any of
the following grounds:
(i) That the claim on which the action
is founded is unenforceable under
(a) That the court has no jurisdiction
the provisions of the statute of
over the person of the defending
frauds; and
party;
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction
claim has not been complied with.
over the subject matter of the claim;

(c) That venue is improperly laid;

Section 5 of the same Rule, recites the effect of
(d) That the plaintiff has no legal a dismissal under Sections 1(f),[46] (h),[47] and
capacity to sue; (i),[48] thereof, thus:

(e) That there is another action SEC. 5. Effect of dismissal. Subject

pending between the same parties
for the same cause;
(f) That the cause of action is barred
by a prior judgment or by the statute
of limitations;
to the right of appeal, an order granting a
motion to dismiss based on paragraphs (f),
(h), and (i) of section 1 hereof shall bar the
refiling of the same action or claim.

10
 Briefly stated, dismissals that are based on the
following grounds, to wit: (1) that the cause of action
is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of
limitations; (2) that the claim or demand set forth in
the plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waived,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and (3) that the
claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable
under the provisions of the statute of frauds, bar the
refiling of the same action or claim. Logically, the
nature of the dismissal founded on any of the
preceding grounds is with prejudice because the
dismissal prevents the refiling of the same action or
claim. Ergo, dismissals based on the rest of the
grounds enumerated are without prejudice because
they do not preclude the refiling of the same action.
Verily, the dismissal of petitioners Complaint
by the court a quo was not based on any of the
grounds specified in Section 5, Rule 16 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure; rather, it was
grounded on what was encapsulated in Section 1(g),
Rule 16 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. As the trial court ratiocinated in its 9
January 1998 Order, the Complaint is not prosecuted
by the proper party in interest.[49] Considering the
heretofore discussion, we can say that the order of
dismissal was based on the ground that the Complaint
states no cause of action. For this reason, the dismissal
of petitioners Complaint cannot be said to be a
dismissal with prejudice which bars the refiling of the
same action.
As has been earlier quoted, Section 1(h), Rule
41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
mandates that no appeal may be taken from an order
dismissing an action without prejudice. The same
section provides that in such an instant where the final
order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file
an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
The appellate court erred, thus, when it
pronounced in its Decision of 24 May 2000 that
petitioners remedy is appeal under Section 1, Rule 41
of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is
available in cases when there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. In the case at bar, appeal of the 7 May
1998 Order, reviving the Order of 9 January 1998,
which dismissed petitioners Complaint, and as
11
reiterated in the 17 July 1998 Order is not a remedy REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 194880
available to petitioners as aggrieved parties. and NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION, both represented Present:
by the PRIVATIZATION
In sum, the appellate court erred when it ruled CARPIO, J., Chairp
MANAGEMENT OFFICE,
that petitioners Petition for Certiorari filed before it Petitioners, BRION,
was not the proper remedy. The dismissal of the PEREZ,
Complaint being without prejudice, the remedy - versus - SERENO, and
available to the aggrieved party is Rule 65. REYES, JJ.

WHEREFORE, the petition

is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent. Promulgated:
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 49462, dated 24
May 2000 and 2 April 2001 are June 20, 2012
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals which is - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
directed to hear
DECISION

SERENO, J.:
and decide petitioners Petition for Certiorari with
utmost dispatch. No costs against petitioners.
This is a Rule 45 Petition questioning the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
SO ORDERED.
City, which ordered the dismissal of the Complaint
for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners herein with
the Metropolitan Trial Court.

12
 Petitioners Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) and National Power Corporation (NPC)
are registered co-owners of several parcels of land
located along Pasong Tamo Extension and Vito Cruz
in Makati City, and covered by four Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCTs).[1] The main subject
matter of the instant Petition is one of these four
parcels of land covered by TCT No. 458365, with an
area of approximately 22,294 square meters
(hereinafter, the subject property). Eighty percent
(80%) of the subject property is owned by petitioner
Republic, while the remaining twenty percent (20%)
belongs to petitioner NPC.[2] Petitioners are being
represented in this case by the Privatization
Management Office (PMO), which is the agency
tasked with the administration and disposal of
government assets.[3] Meanwhile, respondent Sunvar
Realty Development Corporation (Sunvar) occupied
the subject property by virtue of sublease agreements,
which had in the meantime expired.
The factual antecedents of the case are
straightforward. On 26 December 1977,[4] petitioners
leased the four parcels of land, including the subject
property, to the Technology Resource Center
Foundation, Inc., (TRCFI) for a period of 25 years
beginning 01 January 1978 and ending on 31
December 2002.[5] Under the Contract of Lease (the
main lease contract), petitioners granted TRCFI the
right to sublease any portion of the four parcels of
land.[6]
Exercising its right, TRCFI consequently
subleased a majority of the subject property to
respondent Sunvar through several sublease
agreements (the sublease agreements).[7] Although
these agreements commenced on different dates, all of
them contained common provisions on the terms of
the sublease and were altogether set to expire on 31
December 2002, the expiration date of TRCFIs main
lease contract with petitioners, but subject to renewal
at the option of respondent:[8]
The term of the sublease shall be for an
initial period of [variable] years and [variable]
months commencing on [variable], renewable
for another twenty-five (25) years at SUNVARs
exclusive option.[9]
According to petitioners, in all the sublease
agreements, respondent Sunvar agreed to return or
surrender the subleased land, without any delay
whatsoever upon the termination or expiration of the
sublease contract or any renewal or extension
thereof.[10]
13
 During the period of its sublease, respondent
Sunvar introduced useful improvements, consisting of
several commercial buildings, and leased out the
spaces therein.[11] It also profitably utilized the other
open spaces on the subject property as parking areas
for customers and guests.[12]
In 1987, following a reorganization of the
government, TRCFI was dissolved. In its stead, the
Philippine Development Alternatives Foundation
(PDAF) was created, assuming the functions
previously performed by TRCFI.[13]
On 26 April 2002, less than a year before the
expiration of the main lease contract and the sublease
agreements, respondent Sunvar wrote to PDAF as
successor of TRCFI. Respondent expressed its desire
to exercise the option to renew the sublease over the
subject property and proposed an increased rental rate
and a renewal period of another 25 years.[14] On even
date, it also wrote to the Office of the President,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
and petitioner NPC. The letters expressed the same
desire to renew the lease over the subject property
under the new rental rate and renewal period.[15]
On 10 May 2002, PDAF informed respondent
that the notice of renewal of the lease had already
been sent to petitioners, but that it had yet to receive a
response.[16] It further explained that the proposal of
respondent for the renewal of the sublease could not
yet be acted upon, and neither could the proposed
rental payments be accepted.[17]Respondent
acknowledged receipt of the letter and requested
PDAF to apprise the former of any specific actions
undertaken with respect to the said lease arrangement
over the subject property.[18]
On 03 June 2002, six months before the main
contract of lease was to expire, petitioner NPC
through Atty. Rainer B. Butalid, Vice-President and
General Counsel notified PDAF of the formers
decision not to renew the contract of lease.[19] In turn,
PDAF notified respondent of NPCs decision.[20]
On the other hand, petitioner Republic through
then Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Waldo Q.
Flores likewise notified PDAF of the formers decision
not to renew the lease contract.[21] The Republic
reasoned that the parties had earlier agreed to shorten
the corporate life of PDAF and to transfer the latters
assets to the former for the purpose of selling them to
raise funds.[22] On 25 June 2002, PDAF duly informed
14
respondent Sunvar of petitioner Republics decision On 02 April 2009, the PMO issued an
not to renew the lease and quoted the Memorandum of Inspection and Appraisal Report to determine the fair
Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Flores.[23] rental value of the subject property and petitioners lost
income a loss arising from the refusal of respondent
On 31 December 2002, the main lease contract Sunvar to vacate the property after the expiration of
with PDAF, as well as its sublease agreements with the main lease contract and sublease
[28]
respondent Sunvar, all expired. Hence, petitioners agreements. Using the market comparison
recovered from PDAF all the rights over the subject approach, the PMO determined that the fair rental
property and the three other parcels of land. value of the subject property was ₱10,364,000 per
Thereafter, petitioner Republic transferred the subject month, and that respondent Sunvar owed petitioners a
property to the PMO for disposition. Nevertheless, total of ₱630,123,700 from 01 January 2002 to 31
respondent Sunvar continued to occupy the property. March 2009.[29]

On 22 February 2008, or six years after the
main lease contract expired, petitioner Republic,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
advised respondent Sunvar to completely vacate the
subject property within thirty (30) days.[24] The latter
duly received the Notice from the OSG through
registered mail,[25] but failed to vacate and remained
on the property.[26]
On 03 February 2009, respondent Sunvar
received from respondent OSG a final notice to vacate
within 15 days.[27] When the period lapsed, respondent
Sunvar again refused to vacate the property and
continued to occupy it.
On 23 July 2009, petitioners filed the
Complaint dated 26 May 2009 for unlawful detainer
with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati
City. Petitioners prayed that respondent Sunvar be
ordered to vacate the subject property and to pay
damages for the illegal use and lost income owing to
them:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES
CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed
that after proper proceedings, judgment be
rendered:
1. Ordering defendant SUNVAR
REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION and all persons, natural and

15
 juridical, claiming rights under it, to vacate considering that the petitioners supposed
the subject property and peacefully surrender dispossession of the subject property by respondent
the same, with the useful improvements
therein, to the plaintiffs or to their authorized
had already lasted for more than one year.
representative; and
In its Order dated 16 September 2009, the
2. Ordering defendant SUNVAR MeTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and directed
REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION to pay plaintiffs damages in respondent Sunvar to file an answer to petitioners
the amount of SIX HUNDRED THIRTY Complaint.[32] The lower court likewise denied the
MILLION ONE HUNDRED TWENTY Motion for Reconsideration[33] filed by
THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED [34]
respondent. Respondent later on filed its
PESOS (₱630,123,700.00) for the illegal and Answer[35] to the Complaint.[36]
unauthorized use and occupation of the
subject property from January 1, 2003 to
March 31, 2009, and the amount of TEN Despite the filing of its Answer in the summary
MILLION THREE HUNDRED SIXTY- proceedings for ejectment, respondent Sunvar filed a
FOUR THOUSAND PESOS Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with the RTC of
(₱10,364,000.00) per month from April 1,
2008 until the subject property, together with Makati City to assail the denial by the MeTC of
its improvements, are completely vacated and respondents Motion to Dismiss.[37]
peacefully surrendered to the plaintiffs or to
their authorized representative.[30]
In answer to the Rule 65 Petition of respondent,
petitioners placed in issue the jurisdiction of the RTC
Respondent Sunvar moved to dismiss the
and reasoned that the Rules on Summary Procedure
Complaint and argued that the allegations of
expressly prohibited the filing of a petition
petitioners in the Complaint did not constitute an
for certiorari against the interlocutory orders of the
action for unlawful detainer, since no privity of
MeTC.[38] Hence, they prayed for the outright
contract existed between them.[31] In the alternative, it
dismissal of the certiorari Petition of respondent
also argued that petitioners cause of action was more
Sunvar.
properly an accion publiciana, which fell within the
jurisdiction of the RTC, and not the MeTC,
16
 The RTC denied the motion for dismissal and
ruled that extraordinary circumstances called for an
exception to the general rule on summary
proceedings.[39] Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,[40] which was subsequently denied
by the RTC.[41] Hence, the hearing on
the certiorari Petition of respondent proceeded, and
the parties filed their respective Memoranda.[42]
In the assailed Order dated 01 December 2010,
which discussed the merits of the certiorari Petition,
the RTC granted the Rule 65 Petition and directed the
MeTC to dismiss the Complaint for unlawful detainer
for lack of jurisdiction.[43] The RTC reasoned that the
one-year period for the filing of an unlawful detainer
case was reckoned from the expiration of the main
lease contract and the sublease agreements on 31
December 2002. Petitioners should have then filed
an accion publiciana with the RTC in 2009, instead of
an unlawful detainer suit.
Hence, the instant Rule 45 Petition filed by
petitioners.[44]
I Court, in case only questions of law are raised or
Petitioners Resort to a Rule 45 Petition
Before the Court proceeds with the legal
questions in this case, there are procedural issues that
merit preliminary attention.
Respondent Sunvar argued that petitioners
resort to a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari
before this Court is an improper mode of review of
the assailed RTC Decision. Allegedly, petitioners
should have availed themselves of a Rule 65 Petition
instead, since the RTC Decision was an order of
dismissal of the Complaint, from which no appeal can
be taken except by a certiorari petition.
The Court is unconvinced of the arguments of
respondent Sunvar and holds that the resort by
petitioners to the present Rule 45 Petition is perfectly
within the bounds of our procedural rules.
As respondent Sunvar explained, no appeal
may be taken from an order of the RTC dismissing an
action without prejudice,[45] but the aggrieved party
may file a certioraripetition under Rule
[46]
65. Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of
the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this
involved.[47] This latter situation was one that
17
petitioners found themselves in when they filed the
instant Petition to raise only questions of law.
In Republic v. Malabanan,[48] the Court
clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of
the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by
writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was
rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a
petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment
was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review
on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45.
The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of
Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of
fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to
the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal
is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions
of law.[49] (Emphasis supplied.)
There is a question of law when the issue does
not call for an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of
the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the
correct application of law and jurisprudence on the
matter.[50] The resolution of the issue must rest solely
on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances.[51]
In the instant case, petitioners raise only
questions of law with respect to the jurisdiction of the
RTC to entertain a certiorari petition filed against the
interlocutory order of the MeTC in an unlawful
detainer suit. At issue in the present case is the correct
application of the Rules on Summary Procedure; or,
more specifically, whether the RTC violated the Rules
when it took cognizance and granted
the certiorari petition against the denial by the MeTC
of the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent Sunvar.
This is clearly a question of law that involves the
proper interpretation of the Rules on Summary
Procedure. Therefore, the instant Rule 45 Petition has
been properly lodged with this Court.
II
Propriety of a Rule 65 Petition in Summary
Proceedings
Proceeding now to determine that very question
of law, the Court finds that it was erroneous for the
RTC to have taken cognizance of the Rule 65 Petition
of respondent Sunvar, since the Rules on Summary
Procedure expressly prohibit this relief for
18
unfavorable interlocutory orders of the MeTC.
Consequently, the assailed RTC Decision is annulled.
Under the Rules on Summary Procedure,
a certiorari petition under Rule 65 against an
interlocutory order issued by the court in a summary
proceeding is a prohibited pleading.[52] The
prohibition is plain enough, and its further exposition
is unnecessary verbiage.[53] The RTC should have
dismissed outright respondent Sunvars Rule 65
Petition, considering that it is a prohibited pleading.
Petitioners have already alerted the RTC of this legal
bar and immediately prayed for the dismissal of
the certiorari Petition.[54] Yet, the RTC not only
refused to dismiss the certiorari Petition,[55] but even
proceeded to hear the Rule 65 Petition on the merits.
Respondent Sunvars reliance on Bayog v.
Natino[56] and Go v. Court of Appeals[57] to justify
a certiorari review by the RTC owing to
extraordinary circumstances is misplaced. In both
cases, there were peculiar and specific circumstances
that justified the filing of the mentioned prohibited
pleadings under the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure conditions that are not availing in the case
of respondent Sunvar.
In Bayog, Alejandro Bayog filed with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Patnongon-
Bugasong-Valderama, Antique an ejectment case
against Alberto Magdato, an agricultural tenant-lessee
who had built a house over his property. When
Magdato, an illiterate farmer, received the Summons
from the MCTC to file his answer within 10 days, he
was stricken with pulmonary tuberculosis and was
able to consult a lawyer in San Jose, Antique only
after the reglementary period. Hence, when the
Answer of Magdato was filed three days after the
lapse of the 10-day period, the MCTC ruled that it
could no longer take cognizance of his Answer and,
hence, ordered his ejectment from Bayogs land. When
his house was demolished in January 1994, Magdato
filed a Petition for Relief with the RTC-San Jose,
Antique, claiming that he was a duly instituted tenant
in the agricultural property, and that he was deprived
of due process. Bayog, the landowner, moved to
dismiss the Petition on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC, since a petition for
relief from judgment covering a summary proceeding
was a prohibited pleading. The RTC, however, denied
his Motion to Dismiss and remanded the case to the
MCTC for proper disposal.
In resolving the Rule 65 Petition, we ruled that
although a petition for relief from judgment was a
19
prohibited pleading under the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure, the Court nevertheless allowed
the filing of the Petition pro hac vice, since Magdato
would otherwise suffer grave injustice and irreparable
injury:
We disagree with the RTCs holding that
a petition for relief from judgment (Civil Case
No. 2708) is not prohibited under the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure, in light of
the Jakihaca ruling. When Section 19 of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure bars a
petition for relief from judgment, or a
petition for certiorari, mandamus, or
prohibition against any interlocutory order
issued by the court, it has in mind no other
than Section 1, Rule 38 regarding petitions
for relief from judgment, and Rule 65
regarding petitions for certiorari, mandamus,
or prohibition, of the Rules of Court,
respectively. These petitions are cognizable by
Regional Trial Courts, and not by Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, or
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. If Section 19 of
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and
Rules 38 and 65 of the Rules of Court are
juxtaposed, the conclusion is inevitable that no
petition for relief from judgment nor a
special civil action of certiorari, prohibition,
or mandamus arising from cases covered by
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
may be filed with a superior court. This is but
consistent with the mandate of Section 36 of
B.P. Blg. 129 to achieve an expeditious and
inexpensive determination of the cases subject
of summary procedure.
Nevertheless, in view of the unusual
and peculiar circumstances of this case,
unless some form of relief is made available
to MAGDATO, the grave injustice and
irreparable injury that visited him through
no fault or negligence on his part will only be
perpetuated. Thus, the petition for relief
from judgment which he filed may be
allowed or treated, pro hac vice, either as an
exception to the rule, or a regular appeal to
the RTC, or even an action to annul the order
(decision) of the MCTC of 20 September
1993. As an exception, the RTC correctly held
that the circumstances alleged therein and the
justification pleaded worked in favor of
MAGDATO, and that the motion to dismiss
Civil Case No. 2708 was without merit.
xxx [58] (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, in Go v. Court of Appeals,
the Court was confronted with a procedural void in
the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure that
justified the resort to a Rule 65 Petition in the RTC. In
that case, the preliminary conference in the subject
ejectment suit was held in abeyance by the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City until after
20
the case for specific performance involving the same
parties shall have been finally decided by the RTC.
The affected party appealed the suspension order to
the RTC. In response, the adverse party moved to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that it concerned an
interlocutory order in a summary proceeding that was
not the subject of an appeal. The RTC denied the
Motion to Dismiss and subsequently directed the
MTCC to proceed with the hearing of the ejectment
suit, a ruling that was upheld by the appellate court.
In affirming the Decisions of the RTC and CA,
the Supreme Court allowed the filing of a petition for
certiorari against an interlocutory order in an
ejectment suit, considering that the affected party was
deprived of any recourse to the MTCCs erroneous
suspension of a summary proceeding. Retired Chief
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban eloquently explained
the procedural void in this wise:
Indisputably, the appealed [suspension]
order is interlocutory, for it does not dispose of
the case but leaves something else to be done by
the trial court on the merits of the case. It is
axiomatic that an interlocutory order cannot be
challenged by an appeal. Thus, it has been held
that the proper remedy in such cases is an
ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment on
the merits incorporating in said appeal the
grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.
Allowing appeals from interlocutory orders
would result in the sorry spectacle of a case
being subject of a counterproductive ping-pong
to and from the appellate court as often as a trial
court is perceived to have made an error in any
of its interlocutory rulings. However, where the
assailed interlocutory order is patently
erroneous and the remedy of appeal would
not afford adequate and expeditious relief,
the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of
redress.
Clearly, private respondent cannot
appeal the order, being interlocutory. But
neither can it file a petition for certiorari,
because ejectment suits fall under the Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure, Section 19(g) of
which considers petitions
for certiorari prohibited pleadings:
xxxxxxxxx
Based on the foregoing, private
respondent was literally caught between Scylla
and Charybdis in the procedural void observed
by the Court of Appeals and the RTC. Under
these extraordinary circumstances, the Court
is constrained to provide it with a remedy
consistent with the objective of speedy
resolution of cases.
21
 As correctly held by Respondent Court
of Appeals, the purpose of the Rules on
Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious
and inexpensive determination of cases without
regard to technical rules. (Section 36, Chapter
III, BP Blg. 129) Pursuant to this objective, the
Rules prohibit petitions for certiorari, like a
number of other pleadings, in order to prevent
unnecessary delays and to expedite the
disposition of cases. In this case, however,
private respondent challenged the MTCC
order delaying the ejectment suit, precisely to
avoid the mischief envisioned by the Rules.
Thus, this Court holds that in
situations wherein a summary proceeding is
suspended indefinitely, a petition
for certiorari alleging grave abuse of
discretion may be allowed. Because of the
extraordinary circumstances in this case, a
petition for certiorari, in fact, gives spirit and
life to the Rules on Summary Procedure. A
contrary ruling would unduly delay the
disposition of the case and negate the rationale
of the said Rules.[59] (Emphasis supplied.)
Contrary to the assertion of respondent Sunvar,
the factual circumstances in these two cases are not
comparable with respondents situation, and our
rulings therein are inapplicable to its cause of action
in the present suit. As this Court explained in Bayog,
the general rule is that no special civil action for
certiorari may be filed with a superior court from
cases covered by the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure. Respondent Sunvar filed
a certiorari Petition in an ejectment suit pending
before the MeTC. Worse, the subject matter of the
Petition was the denial of respondents Motion to
Dismiss, which was necessarily an interlocutory
order, which is generally not the subject of an appeal.
No circumstances similar to the situation of the
agricultural tenant-lessee in Bayog are present to
support the relaxation of the general rule in the instant
case. Respondent cannot claim to have been deprived
of reasonable opportunities to argue its case before a
summary judicial proceeding.
Moreover, there exists no procedural void akin
to that in Go v. Court of Appeals that would justify
respondents resort to a certiorari Petition before the
RTC. When confronted with the MeTCs adverse
denial of its Motion to Dismiss in the ejectment case,
the expeditious and proper remedy for respondent
should have been to proceed with the summary
hearings and to file its answer. Indeed, its resort to
a certiorari Petition in the RTC over an interlocutory
order in a summary ejectment proceeding was not
only prohibited. The certiorari Petition was already a
superfluity on account of respondents having already
22
taken advantage of a speedy and available remedy by
filing an Answer with the MeTC.
Respondent Sunvar failed to substantiate its
claim of extraordinary circumstances that would
constrain this Court to apply the exceptions obtaining
in Bayog and Go. The Court hesitates to liberally
dispense the benefits of these two judicial precedents
to litigants in summary proceedings, lest these
exceptions be regularly abused and freely availed of
to defeat the very goal of an expeditious and
inexpensive determination of an unlawful detainer
suit. If the Court were to relax the interpretation of the
prohibition against the filing of certiorari petitions
under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the
RTCs may be inundated with similar prayers from
adversely affected parties questioning every order of
the lower court and completely dispensing with the
goal of summary proceedings in forcible entry or
unlawful detainer suits.
III
Reckoning the One-Year Period in Unlawful
Detainer Cases
We now come to another legal issue underlying
the present Petition whether the Complaint filed by
petitioners is properly an action for unlawful detainer
within the jurisdiction of the MeTC or an accion
publiciana lodged with the RTC. At the heart of the
controversy is the reckoning period of the one-year
requirement for unlawful detainer suits.
Whether or not petitioners action for unlawful
detainer was brought within one year after the
unlawful withholding of possession will determine
whether it was properly filed with the MeTC. If, as
petitioners argue, the one-year period should be
counted from respondent Sunvars receipt on 03
February 2009 of the Final Notice to Vacate, then
their Complaint was timely filed within the one-year
period and appropriately taken cognizance of by the
MeTC. However, if the reckoning period is pegged
from the expiration of the main lease contract and/or
sublease agreement, then petitioners proper remedy
should have been an accion publiciana to be filed
with the RTC.
The Court finds that petitioners correctly
availed themselves of an action for unlawful detainer
and, hence, reverses the ruling of the RTC.
Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom
possession of any land is unlawfully withheld after the
23
expiration of the right to hold possession may by
virtue of any express or implied contract, and within
one year after the unlawful deprivation bring an action
in the municipal trial court against the person
unlawfully withholding possession, for restitution of
possession with damages and costs.[60] Unless
otherwise stipulated, the action of the lessor shall
commence only after a demand to pay or to comply
with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made
upon the lessee; or after a written notice of that
demand is served upon the person found on the
premises, and the lessee fails to comply therewith
within 15 days in the case of land or 5 days in the case
of buildings.[61]
In Delos Reyes v. Spouses Odenes,[62] the Court
recently defined the nature and scope of an unlawful
detainer suit, as follows:
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover
possession of real property from one who
illegally withholds possession after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or
implied. The possession by the defendant in
unlawful detainer is originally legal but became
illegal due to the expiration or termination of the
right to possess. The proceeding is summary in
nature, jurisdiction over which lies with the
proper MTC or metropolitan trial court. The
action must be brought up within one year
from the date of last demand, and the issue in
the case must be the right to physical
possession. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause
of action for unlawful detainer if it states the
following elements:
1. Initially, the possession of the
property by the defendant was by
contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff.
2. Eventually, the possession
became illegal upon the plaintiffs notice
to the defendant of the termination of the
latters right of possession.
3. Thereafter, the defendant
remained in possession of the property
and deprived the plaintiff of the latters
enjoyment.
4. Within one year from the
making of the last demand on the
defendant to vacate the property, the
24
 plaintiff instituted the Complaint for
ejectment.[63]
On the other hand, accion publiciana is the
plenary action to recover the right of possession
which should be brought in the proper regional trial
court when dispossession has lasted for more than one
year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine
the better right of possession of realty independently
of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of
the complaint, more than one year had elapsed
since defendant had turned plaintiff out of
possession or defendants possession had become
illegal, the action will be, not one of forcible entry
or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana.[64]
There are no substantial disagreements with
respect to the first three requisites for an action for
unlawful detainer. Respondent Sunvar initially
derived its right to possess the subject property from
its sublease agreements with TRCFI and later on with
PDAF. However, with the expiration of the lease
agreements on 31 December 2002, respondent lost
possessory rights over the subject property.
Nevertheless, it continued occupying the property for
almost seven years thereafter. It was only on 03
February 2009 that petitioners made a final demand
upon respondent Sunvar to turn over the property.
What is disputed, however, is the fourth requisite of
an unlawful detainer suit.
The Court rules that the final requisite is
likewise availing in this case, and that the one-year
period should be counted from the final demand made
on 03 February 2009.
Contrary to the reasoning of the RTC,[65] the
one-year period to file an unlawful detainer case is not
counted from the expiration of the lease contract on
31 December 2002. Indeed, the last demand for
petitioners to vacate is the reckoning period for
determining the one-year period in an action for
unlawful detainer. Such one year period should be
counted from the date of plaintiffs last demand on
defendant to vacate the real property, because only
upon the lapse of that period does the possession
become unlawful.[66]
In case several demands to vacate are made, the
period is reckoned from the date of the last
demand.[67] In Leonin v. Court of Appeals,[68] the
Court, speaking through Justice Conchita Carpio
Morales, reckoned the one-year period to file the
unlawful detainer Complaint filed on 25 February
25
1997 from the latest demand letter dated 24 October
1996, and not from the earlier demand letter dated 03
July 1995:
Prospero Leonin (Prospero) and five
others were co-owners of a 400-square meter
property located at K-J Street, East Kamias,
Quezon City whereon was constructed a two-
storey house and a three-door apartment
identified as No. 1-A, B, and C.
Prospero and his co-owners allowed his
siblings, herein petitioners, to occupy
Apartment C without paying any rentals.
xxxxxxxxx
Petitioners further contend that
respondents remedy is accion
publiciana because their possession is not de
facto, they having been authorized by the true
and lawful owners of the property; and that one
year had elapsed from respondents demand
given on July 3, 1995 when the unlawful
detainer complaint was filed.
The petition fails.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the
allegations in the complaint make out a case for
unlawful detainer. Thus, respondent
alleged, inter alia, that she is the registered
owner of the property and that petitioners, who
are tenants by tolerance, refused to vacate the
premises despite the notice to vacate sent to
them.
Likewise, contrary to petitioners
contention, the one-year period for filing a
complaint for unlawful detainer is reckoned
from the date of the last demand, in this case
October 24, 1996, the reason being that the
lessor has the right to waive his right of action
based on previous demands and let the lessee
remain meanwhile in the premises. Thus, the
filing of the complaint on February 25, 1997
was well within the one year reglementary
period.[69] (Emphasis supplied.)
From the time that the main lease contract and
sublease agreements expired (01 January 2003),
respondent Sunvar no longer had any possessory right
over the subject property. Absent any express
contractual renewal of the sublease agreement or any
separate lease contract, it illegally occupied the land
or, at best, was allowed to do so by mere tolerance of
the registered owners petitioners herein. Thus,
respondent Sunvars possession became unlawful upon
service of the final notice on 03 February 2009.
Hence, as an unlawful occupant of the land of
petitioners, and without any contract between them,
respondent is necessarily bound by an implied
26
promise that it will vacate upon demand, failing
which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against them.[70] Upon service of the final
notice of demand, respondent Sunvar should have
vacated the property and, consequently, petitioners
had one year or until 02 February 2010 in which to
resort to the summary action for unlawful detainer. In
the instant case, their Complaint was filed with the
MeTC on 23 July 2009, which was well within the
one-year period.
The Court is aware that petitioners had earlier
served a Notice to Vacate on 22 February 2008, which
could have possibly tolled the one-year period for
filing an unlawful detainer suit. Nevertheless, they can
be deemed to have waived their right of action against
respondent Sunvar and continued to tolerate its
occupation of the subject property. That they sent a
final Notice to Vacate almost a year later gave
respondent another opportunity to comply with their
implied promise as occupants by mere tolerance.
Consequently, the one-year period for filing a
summary action for unlawful detainer with the MeTC
must be reckoned from the latest demand to vacate.
In the past, the Court ruled that subsequent
demands that are merely in the nature of reminders of
the original demand do not operate to renew the one-
year period within which to commence an ejectment
suit, considering that the period will still be reckoned
from the date of the original demand.[71] If the
subsequent demands were merely in the nature of
reminders of the original demand, the one-year period
to commence an ejectment suit would be counted
from the first demand.[72] However, respondent failed
to raise in any of the proceedings below this question
of fact as to the nature of the second demand issued
by the OSG. It is now too late in the proceedings for
them to argue that the 2009 Notice to Vacate was a
mere reiteration or reminder of the 2008 Notice to
Vacate. In any event, this factual determination is
beyond the scope of the present Rule 45 Petition,
which is limited to resolving questions of law.
The Court notes that respondent Sunvar has
continued to occupy the subject property since the
expiration of its sublease on 31 December 2002. The
factual issue of whether respondent has paid rentals to
petitioners from the expiration of the sublease to the
present was never raised or sufficiently argued before
this Court. Nevertheless, it has not escaped the Courts
attention that almost a decade has passed without any
resolution of this controversy regarding respondents
possession of the subject property, contrary to the aim
of expeditious proceedings under the Revised Rules
27
on Summary Procedure. With the grant of the instant
Petition and the remand of the case to the MeTC for
continued hearing, the Court emphasizes the duty of
the lower court to speedily resolve this matter once
and for all, especially since this case involves a prime
property of the government located in the countrys
business district and the various opportunities for
petitioners to gain public revenues from the property.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the
Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 14 February
2011, filed by petitioners Republic and National
Power Corporation, which are represented here by the
Privatization Management Office. The assailed
Decision dated 01 December 2010 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134, is
herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63,
is DIRECTED to proceed with the summary
proceedings for the unlawful detainer case in Civil
Case No. 98708.
SO ORDERED.
Baares II vs Balising
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71
dated August 26, 1997.[1]
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioners Fidel M. Baares II, Lilia C. Valeriano, Edgar M. Baares,
Emilia Gatchialian and Fidel Besarino were the accused in sixteen
criminal cases for estafa[2] filed by the private respondents. The
cases were assigned to the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal,
Branch II. Ncm
After the petitioners were arraigned and entered their plea of not
guilty,[3] they filed a Motion to Dismiss the aforementioned cases
on the ground that the filing of the same was premature, in view of
the failure of the parties to undergo conciliation proceedings before
the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Dalig, Antipolo, Rizal.[4]
Petitioners averred that since they lived in the same barangay as
private respondents, and the amount involved in each of the cases
did not exceed Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00), the said cases were
required under Section 412 in relation to Section 408 of the Local
Government Code of 1991[5] and Section 18 of the 1991 Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure.[6] to be referred to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo of the barangay
concerned for conciliation proceedings before being filed in
court.[7]
28

The municipal trial court issued an Order, dated July 17, 1995[8]
denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss on the ground that they
failed to seasonably invoke the non-referral of the cases to the
Lupong Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. It added
that such failure to invoke non-referral of the case to the Lupon
amounted to a waiver by petitioners of the right to use the said
ground as basis for dismissing the cases.[9]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
aforementioned Order, claiming that nowhere in the Revised Rules
of Court is it stated that the ground of prematurity shall be deemed
waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss.[10]
On November 13, 1995, the municipal trial court issued an Order
dismissing the sixteen criminal cases against petitioners without
prejudice, pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure.[11] Scncm
More than two months later, on February 26, 1996, private
respondents through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the
abovementioned criminal cases against petitioners, stating that the
requirement of referral to the Lupon for conciliation had already
been complied with.[12] Attached to the motion was a Certification
dated February 13, 1996 from the Lupong Tagapamayapa of
Barangay Dalig, Antipolo, Rizal[13] stating that the parties appeared
before said body regarding the charges of estafa filed by private
respondents against petitioners but they failed to reach an amicable
settlement with respect thereto. Petitioners filed a Comment and
Opposition to Motion to Revive claiming that the Order of the
municipal trial court, dated November 13, 1995 dismissing the cases
had long become final and executory; hence, private respondents
should have re-filed the cases instead of filing a motion to
revive.[14]
On March 18, 1996, the municipal trial court issued an Order[15]
granting private respondents Motion to Revive. Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration[16] of the aforementioned Order which
was denied by the municipal trial court.[17]
Petitioners thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal, a petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition assailing
the Order dated March 18, 1996 of the municipal trial court. They
claimed that the said Order dated November 13, 1995 dismissing
the criminal cases against them had long become final and
executory considering that the prosecution did not file any motion
for reconsideration of said Order.[18] In response thereto, private
respondents filed their Comment,[19] arguing that the motion to
revive the said cases was in accordance with law, particularly
Section 18 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.[20]
29
After the parties submitted additional pleadings to support their
respective contentions,[21] the Regional Trial Court rendered the
assailed Decision denying the petition for certiorari, injunction and
prohibition, stating as follows:
Evaluating the allegations contained in the petition and respondents
comment thereto, the Court regrets that it cannot agree with the
petitioner(sic). As shown by the records the 16 criminal cases were
dismissed without prejudice at the instance of the petitioners for
failure of the private respondent to comply with the mandatory
requirement of PD 1508. Since the dismissal of said cases was
without prejudice, the Court honestly believes that the questioned
order has not attained finality at all.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit. Sdaamiso
SO ORDERED.[22]
The Regional Trial Court, likewise, denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration[23] of the aforementioned Decision for lack of
merit.[24]
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioners raise the following questions of law:
1. Whether or not an order dismissing a case or action without
prejudice may attain finality if not appealed within the
reglementary period, as in the present case;
2. Whether or not the action or case that had been dismissed
without prejudice may be revived by motion after the order of
dismissal had become final and executory; and
3. Whether or not the court that had originally acquired jurisdiction
of the case that was dismissed without prejudice still has
jurisdiction to act on the motion to revive after the order of
dismissal has become final and executory.[25]
Petitioners contend that an order dismissing a case or action
without prejudice may attain finality if not appealed within the
reglementary period. Hence, if no motion to revive the case is filed
within the reglementary fifteen-day period within which to appeal
or to file a motion for reconsideration of the courts order, the order
of dismissal becomes final and the case may only be revived by the
30
filing of a new complaint or information.[26] Petitioners further
argue that after the order of dismissal of a case attains finality, the
court which issued the same loses jurisdiction thereon and, thus,
does not have the authority to act on any motion of the parties with
respect to said case.[27]
On the other hand, private respondents submit that cases covered
by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure such as the
criminal cases against petitioners are not covered by the rule
regarding finality of decisions and orders under the Revised Rules of
Court. They insist that cases dismissed without prejudice for non-
compliance with the requirement of conciliation before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo of the barangay
concerned may be revived summarily by the filing of a motion to
revive regardless of the number of days which has lapsed after the
dismissal of the case.[28]
Petitioners contentions are meritorious. Sdaad
A "final order" issued by a court has been defined as one which
disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but
to enforce by execution what has been determined by the
court.[29] As distinguished therefrom, an "interlocutory order" is
one which does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves
something more to be adjudicated upon.[30]
This Court has previously held that an order dismissing a case
without prejudice is a final order[31] if no motion for
reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed.
In Olympia International vs. Court of Appeals,[32] we stated thus:
The dismissal without prejudice of a complaint does not however
mean that said dismissal order was any less final. Such order of
dismissal is complete in all details, and though without prejudice,
nonetheless finally disposed of the matter. It was not merely an
interlocutory order but a final disposition of the complaint.
The law grants an aggrieved party a period of fifteen (15) days from
his receipt of the courts decision or order disposing of the action or
proceeding to appeal or move to reconsider the same.[33]
After the lapse of the fifteen-day period, an order becomes final and
executory and is beyond the power or jurisdiction of the court
which rendered it to further amend or revoke.[34] A final judgment
or order cannot be modified in any respect, even if the modification
sought is for the purpose of correcting an erroneous conclusion by
the court which rendered the same.[35]
31

After the order of dismissal of a case without prejudice has become
final, and therefore becomes outside the courts power to amend
and modify, a party wishes to reinstate the case has no other
remedy but to file a new complaint.
This was explained in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership vs.
Velasco,[36] where we ruled thus: Scsdaad
The dismissal of the case, and the lapse of the reglementary period
to reconsider or set aside the dismissal, effectively operated to
remove the case from the Courts docket. Even assuming the
dismissal to be without prejudice, the case could no longer be
reinstated or "revived" by mere motion in the original docketed
action, but only by the filing of another complaint accompanied, of
course, by the payment of the corresponding filing fees prescribed
by law.
xxx
[S]ince theoretically every final disposition of an action does not
attain finality until after fifteen (15) days therefrom, and
consequently within that time the action still remains within the
control of the Court, the plaintiff may move and set aside his notice
of dismissal and revive his action before that period lapses. But
after dismissal has become final after the lapse of the fifteen-day
reglementary period, the only way by which the action may be
resuscitated or "revived" is by the institution of a subsequent action
through the filing of another complaint and the payment of fees
prescribed by law. This is so because upon attainment of finality of
the dismissal through the lapse of said reglementary period, the
Court loses jurisdiction and control over it and can no longer make a
disposition in respect thereof inconsistent with such dismissal.[37]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Contrary to private respondents claim, the foregoing rule applies
not only to civil cases but to criminal cases as well. In Jaca vs.
Blanco,[38] the Court defined a provisional dismissal of a criminal
case as a dismissal without prejudice to the reinstatement thereof
before the order of dismissal becomes final or to the subsequent
filing of a new information for the offense."[39] Supremax
Thus, the Regional Trial Court erred when it denied the petition for
certiorari, injunction and prohibition and ruled that the order of the
municipal trial court, dated November 13, 1995 dismissing without
prejudice the criminal cases against petitioners had not attained
finality and hence, could be reinstated by the mere filing of a
motion to revive.
32
Equally erroneous is private respondents contention that the rules
regarding finality of judgments under the Revised Rules of Court[40]
do not apply to cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. Private respondents claim that Section 18 of
the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure allows the revival of
cases which were dismissed for failure to submit the same to
conciliation at the barangay level, as required under Section 412 in
relation to Section 408 of the Local Government Code. The said
provision states:
Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for
conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1508[41] where there is no showing of compliance with such
requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be
revived only after such requirement shall have been complied with.
This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused
was arrested without a warrant.[42]
There is nothing in the aforecited provision which supports private
respondents view. Section 18 merely states that when a case
covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is
dismissed without prejudice for non-referral of the issues to the
Lupon, the same may be revived only after the dispute subject of
the dismissed case is submitted to barangay conciliation as required
under the Local Government Code. There is no declaration to the
effect that said case may be revived by mere motion even after the
fifteen-day period within which to appeal or to file a motion for
reconsideration has lapsed.
Moreover, the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure expressly
provides that the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to cases
covered by the former:
Sec. 22. Applicability of the regular rules. The regular procedure
prescribed in the Rules of Court shall apply to the special cases
herein provided for in a suppletory capacity insofar as they are not
inconsistent therewith.[43]
A careful examination of Section 18 in relation to Section 22 of the
1991 Revised Rule of Summary Procedure and Rule 40, Section 2 in
relation to Rule 13, Sections 9 and 10,[44] and Rule 36, Section
2[45] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, leads to no
other conclusion than that the rules regarding finality of judgments
also apply to cases covered by the rules on summary procedure.
Nothing in Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure conflicts with the prevailing rule that a judgment or order
which is not appealed or made subject of a motion for
reconsideration within the prescribed fifteen-day period attains
finality.[46] Hence, the principle expressed in the maxim
interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi, or
that every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other
33
statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence [47] applies in
interpreting both sets of Rules.
The rationale behind the doctrine of finality of judgments and
orders, likewise, supports our conclusion that said doctrine applies
to cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure:
The doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of
occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final at
some definite date set by law.[48] Misjuris
It is but logical to infer that the foregoing principle also applies to
cases subject to summary procedure especially since the objective
of the Rule governing the same is precisely to settle these cases
expeditiously.[49] To construe Section 18 thereof as allowing the
revival of dismissed cases by mere motion even after the lapse of
the period for appealing the same would prevent the courts from
settling justiciable controversies with finality,[50] thereby
undermining the stability of our judicial system.
The Court also finds it necessary to correct the mistaken impression
of petitioners and the municipal trial court that the non-referral of a
case for barangay conciliation as required under the Local
Government Code of 1991[51] may be raised in a motion to dismiss
even after the accused has been arraigned.
It is well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay
conciliation when so required under the law[52] is not jurisdictional
in nature[53] and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised
seasonably in a motion to dismiss.[54] The Court notes that
although petitioners could have invoked the ground of prematurity
of the causes of action against them due to the failure to submit the
dispute to Lupon prior to the filing of the cases as soon as they
received the complaints against them, petitioners raised the said
ground only after their arraignment.
However, while the trial court committed an error in dismissing the
criminal cases against petitioners on the ground that the same were
not referred to the Lupon prior to the filing thereof in court
although said ground was raised by them belatedly, the said order
may no longer be revoked at present considering that the same had
long become final and executory, and as earlier stated, may no
longer be annulled[55] by the Municipal Trial Court, nor by the
Regional Trial Court or this Court.[56] Scjuris
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II dated August 26,
1997 and its Order dated January 29, 1998 in SCA Case No. 96-4092
are hereby SET ASIDE and Criminal Cases Nos. 94-0829, 94-0830, 94-
34
0831, 94-0832, 94-0833, 94-0836, 94-0838, 94-0839, 94-0841, 94-
0843, 94-0847, 94-0848, 94-0850, 94-0854 and 94-0058 of the
Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo are ordered DISMISSED, without
prejudice, pursuant to Sec. 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
Cabreza vs Cabreza
Before us is a Petition seeking to annul the Court of Appeals’
Decision that reversed a lower court’s dismissal of a Complaint for
declaration of nullity of the Deed of Sale of a conjugal dwelling on
the ground of litis pendentia.
On 3 January 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig Branch 70 (RTC
Br. 70) in JDRC Case No. 3705 declared void ab initio the marriage
between Ceferino Cabreza, Jr. (Ceferino) and Amparo Cabreza
(Amparo) and ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the
conjugal partnership in
accordance with Article 129 of the Family Code.1 When this
Decision became final, Ceferino moved that their only conjugal
property, the conjugal home, be sold and the proceeds distributed
as mandated by law. RTC Br. 70 granted his Motion in a 26 May
2003 Order which became final when the Supreme Court (SC)
dismissed, on technicalities,2 Amparo’s Petition questioning the
said Order.
Ceferino thereafter filed an Omnibus Motion (1) to approve the
Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed of Sale); (2) to authorize petitioner-
movant to sign the Deed of Sale for and on behalf of Amparo; and
(3) to order the occupants of the premises to vacate the property.
Despite notice to Amparo, only Ceferino and his counsel appeared
during the scheduled hearing on the Motion. The Omnibus Motion
of Ceferino was granted by RTC Br. 70 on 2 October 2003.3 Hence,
for himself and on behalf of Amparo, he executed the Deed of Sale
in favor of BJD Holdings Corporation. He then filed a Motion for
Writ of Possession and to Divide the Purchase Price, which RTC
Pasig Branch 70 granted in its 12 May 2004 Order.
In response to RTC Br. 70’s issuance of a Writ of Possession,
followed by a 30 June 2004 Notice to Vacate, Amparo filed a Motion
to Hold in Abeyance the Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate,
arguing that (1) the parties had another conjugal lot apart from the
conjugal dwelling; and (2) under Article 129 of the Family Code,4
the conjugal dwelling should be adjudicated to her as the spouse,
with whom four of the five Cabreza children were staying. RTC Br.
70 denied her Motion and the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the
35
denial, prompting her to file with the SC a Petition for Review of this
CA Decision, docketed as G.R. No. 171260.
On 11 September 2009, the SC in G.R. No. 171260 denied Amparo’s
Petition5 on the ground that granting it would modify the already
final 26 May 2003 Order of RTC Br. 70 authorizing the sale of the
family home. As the facts upon which Amparo based her argument
against RTC Br. 70’s issuances (Order of Possession, Writ of
Possession and Notice to Vacate) were already operative when she
questioned the 26 May 2003 Order, she should have raised her
argument then. It would be unfair to allow her to raise the said
argument now in the guise of questioning the subsequent
implementing Orders of RTC Br. 70. Meanwhile, her allegation that
there is another conjugal property other than the subject property
is a question of fact not proper for a Rule 45 petition. Also, the
factual finding of both RTC Br. 70 and the CA that there was only
one conjugal property was conclusive upon the parties. The SC
Decision in G.R. No. 171260 became final and executory on 5
January 2010.
On 26 January 2005 or during the pendency of the CA Petition,
which culminated in G.R. No. 171260, Amparo filed with the Pasig
RTC, Branch 67 (RTC Br. 67) a Complaint (docketed as Civil Case No.
70269) to annul the Deed of Absolute Sale for being void due to lack
of her consent thereto.6 RTC Br. 67 dismissed the Complaint with
prejudice, on the basis of litis pendentia and forum shopping.7
Amparo appealed to the CA, which reversed the Resolution of RTC
Br. 67. Holding that there was no litis pendentia and therefore no
forum shopping, the appellate court directed that the case be
remanded for trial on the merits.8
Ceferino moved for reconsideration of the CA ruling. When his
Motion was denied, he filed the present Petition for Review under
Rule 45, docketed as G.R. No. 181962, arguing that the CA erred in
reversing RTC Br. 67’s dismissal of the Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of the Deed of Absolute Sale filed by Amparo during the
pendency of her Petition for Certiorari to nullify the Writ of
Possession on the grounds of litis pendentia and forum shopping.
We find merit in the Petition.
The following requisites must be present for the proper invocation
of litis pendentia as a ground for dismissing an action:
Identity of parties or representation in both cases;
Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts and the same basis; and
36
Identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment
that may be rendered in the other action will, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.9
Regarding the first requisite, there is no dispute that the two cases
have substantially the same parties.
Anent the second requisite, the CA correctly noted that to
determine whether there is identity of the rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for grounded on the same facts and bases, the
following tests may be utilized: (1) whether the same evidence
would support and sustain both the first and the second causes of
action; or (2) whether the defenses in one case may be used to
substantiate the complaint in the other.10
However, we do not agree with the CA’s conclusion that there is no
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in the two cases
following the application of these tests. Instead, we find that there
is substantial identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for
between the two cases.
The CA held that using the first test, the evidence in the Complaint
for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale would be the Deed of
Sale itself; while in the case impugning the Writ of Possession, it
would be the trial court’s Order applying Article 129 of the Family
Code.
We disagree. The CA failed to consider that RTC Br. 70 issued an
Order dated 2 October 2003, which granted authority to Ceferino to
sign the Deed of Sale on Amparo’s behalf. This same Order also
contained, in its dispositive portion, a directive that “(a)fter the sale
of the subject property shall have been consummated, all the
occupants thereof shall vacate and clear the same to enable the
buyer to take complete possession and control of the property.”
Thus, using the first test, the same evidence – the 2 October 2003
Order of RTC Br. 70 – would defeat both Amparo’s Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale and her Petition
impugning the Writ of Possession. Notably, Amparo failed to timely
question RTC Br. 70’s Order dated 2 October 2003.
The CA also held that, using the second test, the defenses raised in
one case will not necessarily be used in the other. It reasoned that
although the grant of the Petition impugning the Writ of Possession
would result in the nullification of the Deed of Sale, the denial of the
Petition would not bar a ruling on the Complaint for nullification of
the Deed of Sale, which was based on Amparo’s lack of consent
thereto.
Again, we do not agree. Amparo seeks to prevent the sale and
thereby maintain ownership of the conjugal dwelling, both in her
37
Petition to nullify the Writ of Possession and in her Complaint for
declaration of nullity of the Deed of Sale. In both cases, she
theorized that (1) since the 3 January 2001 Decision of RTC Br. 70
merely directed the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal
partnership in accordance with Article 129 of the Family Code, its
subsequent Orders directing the sale of the conjugal dwelling
improperly modified its own final Decision; and (2) because she was
the spouse with whom a majority of the common children chose to
remain, the conjugal dwelling should be adjudicated to her in
accordance with the mandate of Article 129 (9) of the Family Code.
Accordingly, using the second test, the same defense (i.e., the 2
October 2003 Order of RTC Br. 70) will defeat both the Complaint to
nullify the Deed of Sale and the Petition to impugn the Writ of
Possession. In fact, the subsequent Writ of Possession issued by RTC
Br. 70 was the logical consequence of, and merely gave effect to,
the Deed of Sale which it had previously approved. Basically, the
two cases belatedly impugn the 2 October 2003 Order of RTC Br. 70
implementing its 23 May 2003 Order, which had long become final,
following the earlier failed attempts of Amparo to impugn the latter
Order.
As to the last requisite, a final judgment on the merits by a court
that has jurisdiction over the parties and over the subject matter in
the Petition to nullify the Writ of Possession would have barred
subsequent judgment on the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
the Deed of Sale based on the principle of res judicata.11
At the time Amparo filed her Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
the Deed of Sale with RTC Br. 67, her Petition impugning the Writ of
Possession was already pending with the CA. Thus, from the point of
view of RTC Br. 67, the CA’s final judgment on the merits of the case
before it would have barred a subsequent judgment on the
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale.
When the CA eventually upheld the propriety of the Writ of
Possession, it necessarily upheld the validity of the Deed of Sale,
which the Writ of Possession sought to implement. On the other
hand, had the CA declared null and void the Writ of Possession
based on the grounds cited by Amparo, the Complaint to annul the
Deed of Sale would have been barred. This is because upholding her
position would necessarily include a ruling that the RTC Br. 70 Order
directing the sale itself of the conjugal dwelling was improper. Such
impropriety would then extend to subsequent orders merely
implementing the sale of the conjugal dwelling, including RTC Br.
70’s grant of authority to Ceferino to sign the Deed of Sale on behalf
of Amparo.
In fine, the CA erred in reversing the dismissal by RTC Br. 67 of the
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale on the ground
of the pendency of the Petition impugning the Writ of Possession
before another Division of the CA.
38
Having ruled that litis pendentia was properly invoked below,
Amparo was necessarily also guilty of forum-shopping, as correctly
ruled by RTC Br. 67. As we held in Buan v. Lopez,12 “forum shopping
exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.”
Nevertheless, we take time to stress a point to avoid doctrinal
confusion on litis pendentia and res judicata in this case.
Despite our pronouncement on the propriety of the dismissal of the
Complaint for nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the
ground of litis pendencia by RTC Br. 67, and the finality of the
dismissal of G.R. No. 171260, we clarify that res judicata cannot be
said to apply herein, simply because we dismissed Amparo’s
Petition in G.R. No. 171260. While the dismissal of G.R. No. 171260
is now final, having been rendered by this Court which had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties thereto, it was
not a judgment “on the merits” of the case.
A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits
“when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on
the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory
objections”;13 or when the judgment is rendered “after a
determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a
judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely
technical point.”14 In American jurisdiction, it is recognized that
“(i)nstances in which dismissals are not considered to be on the
merits for purposes of the application of the doctrine of res judicata
include … dismissal based on court’s procedural inability to consider
a case.”15
A reading of our Decision in G.R. No. 171260 shows that the Petition
was dismissed upon a procedural inability to consider the case,
based on the principle of finality of judgments. The Court’s reason
for denying Amparo’s G.R. No. 171260 Petition seeking to nullify the
Writ of Possession was that the said writ was merely a subsequent
Order implementing that which was issued on 26 May 2003 by RTC
Br. 70 authorizing the sale of the family home. Meanwhile, the
latter Order can no longer be modified, as it has long become final.
We also take time to stress that the Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of the Deed of Sale cannot prosper, because, like the Petition
to nullify the Writ of Possession, it effectively seeks the modification
of an already final Order of RTC Br. 70. In view of this Court’s
consistent ruling that Amparo cannot be allowed to impugn the
already final Order of RTC Br. 70 directing the sale of the conjugal
dwelling, we deny the prayer for preliminary injunction to hold in
abeyance the implementation of the Notice to Vacate.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated 25 October 2007 and Resolution dated 27 February
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86511 are
39
REVERSED. The 5 May 2005 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court
Branch 67, Pasig City in Civil Case No. 70269, which dismissed the
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale on the ground
of the litis pendencia and forum shopping, is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

40