POWERS of the COMELEC (POE v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO – CERTIFICATE of CANDIDACY(VILLAROSA v.
COMELEC) PUBOFF
Table of Contents
JESUSA POE v GMA .......................................................................................................... 1
SARMIENTO v. COMELEC ................................................................................................. 2
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Glan vs. COMELEC (internet-sourced) ....................... 3
Arsenio Alvarez v. COMELEC and Abad-Sarmiento (2001) ............................................... 4
VET FED v COMELEC ......................................................................................................... 4
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTION .................. 7
Banat!!! v. COMELEC........................................................................................................ 8
172 Paglaum v COMELEC – digest by LA “Rose Gold” Celebrado .................................. 11
AKBAYAN Youth v. COMELEC ......................................................................................... 15
Romualdez v RTC (supra) ............................................................................................... 15
SIAWAN v. INOPIQUEZ ................................................................................................... 16
Mercado v Dsyangco ...................................................................................................... 16
GADOR v. COMELEC ....................................................................................................... 19
GO v. COMELEC .............................................................................................................. 20
De Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers of La Union ............... Error! Bookmark not defined.
JESUSA POE v GMA
Quisumbing, 2005
Facts:
The case is a presidential electoral protest filed with the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET), with FPJ opposing the presidency of GMA.
Background:
June 24, 2004: GMA was proclaimed as the president, with a vote of
12,905,808 against FPJ's 11,782,232.
1
FPJ filed an election protest, but died on December 14, 2004. a formal Notice
of the Death of the Protestant was filed, and FPJ's wife, Susan Roces, filed
Motion to Intervene as a Substiute for the Deceased.
Susan Roces' argument – that the election protest can surive the death of the
protestant.
Cites the case of De Castro v. Commission on Elections, and Lomugdang v.
Javier, to the effect that the death of the protestant does not constitute a
ground for the dismissal of the contest nor oust the trial court of the
jurisdiction to decide the election contest.
While Roces recognizes that she cannot succeed or be considered entitled to
the office, she argues that the case should still be pursued and GMA be
disallowed from remaining in office, and thus prevented from exercising the
powers, duties, responsibilities and prerogatives reserved only to the duly-
elected president or her legitimate successor.
That the matter is of public interest, and that there will be unrest and turmoil
in the event that GMA is allowed to continue as the president.
Roces argues that there is a difference between an election protest and a quo
nd rd
warranto. In an election protest, the 2 and 3 placesrs in the election may
file. In a quo warranto, any voter may initiate the petition.
The issue is the proper substitute to FPJ, and death does not abate this issue.
GMA's argument -
Cites Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias] a[4nd subsequent cases and asserts that the
widow of a deceased candidate is not the proper party to replace the
deceased protestant since a public office is personal and not a property that
passes on to the heirs.
Widow has no legal right to substitute for her husband in an election protest,
since no such right survives the husband, considering that the right to file an
election protest is personal and non-transmissible.
Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal state that only the registered
nd rd
candidates who obtained the 2 and 3 highest votes for the presidency may
contest the election of the president.
 POWERS of the COMELEC (POE v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO – CERTIFICATE of CANDIDACY(VILLAROSA v. COMELEC)
The PET has no jurisdiction over the action of the surviving spouse, since the
PET's jurisdiction only covers election protests and quo warranto cases.
That public interest, i.e. the need to dispel uncertainty over the real choice of
the electorate, is applicable only in election contests, not in an action to
merely ascertain the true and genuine will of the people. Public interest in said
protest dies with him.
GMA argues that there is a distinction between (a) a right to an office and (b)
right to pursue the process – the first is personal and non-transmissible, the
second is what is imbued with public interest.
Issue:
1. May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the
pendency of the latters protest case? NO.
Ratio:
• Rule 14 of the PET Rules: Rule 14. Election Protest.Only the registered candidate
for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or
third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the
Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the
winner.
nd rd
• Clearly, only the 2 and 3 placers can file the election protest. The PET does not
have any rule on substitution or intervention, but does allow for the analogous and
suppletory application of the Rules of Court and jurisprudence.
• Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court. Under said rule,
a public office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to
the heirs upon death.
• This is not to say that death of the protestant necessarily abates the pending
action. Substitution and intervention is allowed but only by a real party in interest.
A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit.
• In the case at bar, Roces is not the real party in interest.
SARMIENTO v. COMELEC
J. Davide / August 6, 1992
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Digest by the best that no one ever was
FACTS: The COMELEC ruled on several special cases excluding canvasses of election returns in
Catanduanes, Iriga, Camarines Sur, and Davao, dismissing appeals from the ruling of
Municipal Board of Canvassers, and denying an amended pre-proclamation petition. Rodulfo
Sarmiento assails the aforesaid decisions for being issued with grave abuse of discretion
because respondent took cognizance of and decided the appeals without referring them to
any of its Divisions, as mandated by Art. IX(C).3.
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate
its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission
en banc.
ISSUES: Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it took
cognizance of and decided the appeals in the special cases without referring them to any of
its divisions – YES, because it is clear from the abovementioned provision the COMELEC shall
be first heard and decided in division and because Sec. 9 of Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure (Appeals from Rulings of Board of Canvassers) provides that “The division to which
the case is assigned shall immediately set the case for hearing”, implying that election cases
shall first be filed with the COMELEC’s divisions.
1. The COMELEC en banc does not have the authority to hear and decide election cases
(including pre-proclamation controversies) at the first instance
2. Election cases usually follow this procedure: Filing with a division MR within 5 days of
promulgation with the division Clerk of Court of division shall calendar the MR
Notify presiding commissioner Presiding commissioner certifies the case to the
COMELEC en banc
3. The resolutions dismissing the appeals are null and void and said appeals are deemed
pending with the COMELEC for proper referral to a division.
4. HOWEVER, the pre-proclamation cases shall not be pending appeal but must be
dismissed because Sec. 16 of RA 7166 provides “All pre-proclamation cases pending
before the Commission shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of the
office involved...”, and the terms of the offices involved in the Special Cases subject of
these petitions commenced at noon of June 30, 1992. Such cases are rendered moot.
SEPARATE OPINIONS
J. Cruz, concurring
1. He disagrees as to the prescription of the Constitution as to the exercise of the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction in divisions rather than en banc in Feliciano’s dissent (who says it
is merely directory and not jurisdictional). He ratiocinates that
 POWERS of the COMELEC (POE v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO – CERTIFICATE of CANDIDACY(VILLAROSA v. COMELEC)
a. The SC itself cannot consider in the first instance cases coming under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of a lower court, like a petition for declaratory
relief. Even in the speedy interest of justice, only appellate jurisdiction may be
exercised pursuant to Art. VIII.5(2) of the Constitution
J. Feliciano, dissenting and concurring
1. He dissents as to the ratio holding the COMELEC having committed GAD when it
dismissed the appeal without first referring them to any of its divisions
a. COMELEC may sit en banc or in two divisions. The powers and functions of the
COMELEC as specified in Art.IX(C).2 of the Constitution are lodged in the
COMELEC as a whole. Art. IX(C).2 did not distinguish between powers and
functions which are to be exercised en banc and which are exercised by a
division.
b. The fundamental objective of Art.IX(C).3 is the expediting of the disposition of
both election cases and pre-proclamation controversies
c. “Election cases” in Art. IX(C).3 is properly read as referring either to election
contests or election protests, NOT to all proceedings or controversies arising
out of or relating to elections. In its first sentence, Art. IX(C).3 in its first
sentence clearly distinguishes “election cases” from “pre-proclamation
controversies” and extends the constitutional objective of expeditious
disposition not only to election cases but also to pre-proclamation
controversies. There is no indiscriminate lumping of election cases with pre-
proclamation controversies.
d. Rules 3(3) and Rule 27(9)(d) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure were not
intended to establish a wall of separation between the Divisions and the
COMELEC en banc.
i. While election cases are designated “ordinary action”, the COMELEC
Rules authorize the Commission itself to intervene or act in such
ordinary actions
e. Under the COMELEC Rules, not all pre-proclamation controversies are
necessarily assigned to a division. There are certain pre-proclamation
controversies which are to be filed directly with the Commission and decided
by the Commission en banc
f. Appeals were decided by the Commission en banc, which is comprised of
members of the divisions of the COMELEC. Same banana. Following the
COMELEC rules will be an exaltation of form over substance.
g. Most, if not all, of the cases or proceedings at bar, and the 700 plus cases or
proceedings which the Commission en banc summarily disposed of are not
genuine pre-proclamation controversies. Only certain statutorily defined
grounds or issues may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy. Issues
raised by petitioners are so insubstantial to be considered as pre-proclamation
controversies.
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2. His point really is to stop edifying form over substance and expedite the disposition of
election cases, and that the second sentence must be read as encompassing only
election cases and not pre-proclamation controversies; hence, the COMELEC did not
commit GAD.
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Glan vs. COMELEC (internet-
sourced)
A pre- proclamation controversy instituted by respondent Flora Benzonan and COMELEC.
Benzonan who was a mayoralty candidate in the Municipality of Glan, Sarangani during 2001
sought to declare null and void the canvass conducted by the Municipal Board of Canvassers
of Glan and to recall the proclamation of petitioners respectively. Respondent argued here
pre-proclamation case on the ground that :
1. After the original and second Municipal Board of Canvassers had resigned, the third
Municipal Board of Canvassers was illegally constituted as it as its Chairman, Vice Chairman
and Secretary which are not qualified over Omnibus Code.
2. The canvassing proceeding with more initially held in the Session Hall of Sangunian Bayan
were latter transferred to the Provincial Capitol at Danao contrary to COMELEC Resolution.
3. The Secretary of Municipal Board of Canvassers failed to record the minutes of the
canvassing.
4. Neither Benzonan nor her representatives were the last three days of the canvassing
proceeding.
5. A sustancial number of election returns had been tampered with of falsificated.
6. Municipal Board of Canvassers falsificated the Certificate of Canvass Vote.
The COMELEC en banc issued a resolution finding the based on the evidence presented the
proclamation of the winning candidates were declared null and void. And a re-canvass of the
election returns was ordered. Arising from the said decision was a petition for Certiorari filed
to review the COMELEC en banc’s resolution and praying that a Temporary Restraining Order
be given for the reason that COMELEC was not in the proper jurisdiction to render such
resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC en banc has a jurisdiction over the case.
 POWERS of the COMELEC (POE v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO – CERTIFICATE of CANDIDACY(VILLAROSA v. COMELEC)
Held:
Not all cases relating to election laws filed before the comelec are required to be first heard
by a division. Under the constitution the COMELEC exercise both the administrative and
quasi-judicial powers. The COMELEC en banc can act directly on matters falling with in its
administrative powers. It is only when the exercise of quasi-judicial powers are involved that
the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in division. It is clear that this case is one that
involves a pre proclamation controversy that requires the exercise of the COMELEC’s quasi-
judicial powers as the illegality of the composition and proceedings of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers. Also, Benzonan filed her pre proclamation case directly with the COMELEC en
banc. Since COMELEC en banc is without jurisdiction to decide cases involving such, the
procedure taken by Benzonan resulted in a resolution in her favor thus declare null and void.
Arsenio Alvarez v. COMELEC and Abad-Sarmiento (2001)
FACTS:
(1) Alvarez (P) and Abad-Sarmiento (R) were candidates for Punong Barangay of Brgy
Dona Aurora, Quezon City during the 1997 Barangay elections
(2) Alvarez was initially proclaimed winner by 590 votes vs 585 votes for Abad-
Sarmiento
(3) Abad-Sarmiento filed an election protest claiming irregularities in the canvass with
the MTC.
(4) MTC: reopened and recounted ballots in 10 contested precincts.
a. DECLARED Abad-Sarmiento the winner 596 votes to 550 votes.
(5) Alavarez filed appeal with COMELEC Second Division which AFFIRMED the MTC
ruling.
(6) Abad Sarmiento Filed Motion for Execution Pending Appeal
(7) Alvarez filed MR with COMELEC En Banc.
(8) COMELEC En Banc:
a. Denied MR on the basis of Article IX-C, Section 2(2) last paragraph
i. “Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on
election contests involving elective municipal and barangay
offices shall be final, executory, and non-appealable.”
b. Granted Motion for Execution Pending Appeal
(9) Alvarez filed PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with the Supreme Court of COMELEC En
Banc decision
ISSUES:
Procedural
(1) WON COMELEC violated the requirement for preferential disposition of election
cases when it rendered a decision after 4months and 4 days instead of the 90 days
as required by law?
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(2) WON the grant of the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal premature?
Substantive (topical)
(1) WON the decisions of the COMELEC on municipal and barangay election contests
are appealable.
SC HELD: COMELEC decisions on barangay and municipal election contests are appealable
ONLY by way of special civil action for certiorari to the SC where the factual determinations
are marred with grave abuse of discretion.
HOWEVER: In this case, no proof that the COMELEC acted with GAD.
(1) COMELEC meticulously studied all the ballots in question
(2) It is a QJA with expertise in the factual questions before it and is in an
advantageous position to evaluate, appreciate, and decide the factual question.
Such findings are conclusive upon the SC.
RE 90 Day Requirement
No violation of the 90 day requirement (Article IX-C Sec 3 and OEC Sec 257). However, strict
application of the deadline might result in injustice if COMELEC is forced to rush its
investigation given practical limitation on manpower and resources. Since this was not the
intention, Court will be flexible in applying the deadline.
ALSO: the phrase “preferential disposition” with respect to election cases is found in OEC
258. It says regular courts must give preferential treatment to election cases. It does not
refer to the COMELEC [which obviously only handles election cases and by default gives
preference to them].
RE grant of Motion for Execution Pending Appeal
Requisites: (1) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to adverse party
(2) there must be a good reason for the execution pending appeal (3) the good reason must
be stated in a special order.
ITC: all elements were present. The good reason cited was that the case had been pending
for 3 years already, with only 2 years left on the term of office. The SC has upheld
COMELEC’s decision to grant execution pending appeal in prior cases in the best interest of
the electorate.
VET FED v COMELEC
G.R. No. 136781 October 6, 2000 Veterans Fed v COMELEC
G.R. No. 136786 October 6, 2000 AKBAYAN v COMELEC
 POWERS of the COMELEC (POE v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO – CERTIFICATE of CANDIDACY(VILLAROSA v. COMELEC)
G.R. No. 136795 October 6, 2000 Alagad v COMELEC
PANGANIBAN, J.:*
Facts
These involve three petitions for certiorari and application for TRO and writ of preliminary
injuction under Rule 65. The assailed Resolutions ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight
(38) additional party-list representatives "to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the
House of Representatives as provided under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
R.A. 7941.
In the 1998 elections, Comelec proclaimed 13 party-list representatives from 12 parties and
organizations, which had at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system. Two of
the proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5% of the
votes
Meanwhile in July 1998, PAG-ASA filed with the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim Full Number
of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." Nine other party-list
organizations followed suit. They filed their respective Motions for Intervention, seeking the
same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds.
• It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list
representatives in the House of Representatives, was mandatory.
• It further claimed that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement
and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision,
for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list
representatives who should actually sit in the House.
Comelec second division: at all times, the total number of congressional seats must be filled
up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list
representatives. In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote requirement
According to Comelec second division, the system was conceived to enable the marginalized
sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives; that the
system should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society and that it should
encourage multi-party system. It concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51
should have at least one representative, without complying with the 2% requirement
Comelec en Banc affirmed the resolution of the second division:
• to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled the two percent vote
requirement will mean the concentration of representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives .
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• Strict application of the 2% 'threshold' does not serve the essence and object of the
Constitution and the legislature -- to develop and guarantee a full, free and open
party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.
• It will also prevent this Commission from complying with the constitutional and
statutory decrees for party-list representatives to compose 20% of the House of
Representatives."
Background law:
Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of government
-- the party-list method of representation. In effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the
House -- one for a district congressman and another for a party-list representative
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number
of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after
the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Congress enacted RA 7941
Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives
including those under the party-list.
Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847, prescribing the rules and regulations
governing the election of party-list representatives through the party-list system.
Issues
 POWERS of the COMELEC (POE v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO – CERTIFICATE of CANDIDACY(VILLAROSA v. COMELEC) PUBOFF

1. Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling Itis not mandatory ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.
and only a mere ceiling
2. Are 2% threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is
RA 7941 constitutional? YES precise and crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not
3. How then should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined? interpretation or circumvention
Proportional representation
The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit
Ratio Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the
seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means
Whether the Twenty Percent Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory? NO having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of
various interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how
Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.

No. of district representatives Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional Seats

x .20 = No. of party-list representatives
.80
• Rank all parties
• Determine percentage of votes
Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling
• If votes=2% guaranteed seat in HoR
The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in • If votes>2% additional seat
the House of Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.
One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment
Comelec and the court’s task , is not to find fault in the wisdom of the law through
highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical formula , a party that wins at least six percent of the total votes cast will be entitled to three
that can, as far as practicable, implement it within the context of the actual election process. seats; another party that gets four percent will be entitled to two seats; and one that gets
two percent will be entitled to one seat only.
The Two Percent Threshold
The Niemeyer Formula
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those
parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which was
representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the developed by a German mathematician and adopted by Germany.
deliberations on the proposed bill. We quote below a pertinent portion of the Senate
discussion:

The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the No. of remaining seats
No. of additional
Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican to be allocated
No. of votes of seats of party
or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised x =
party concerned concerned
by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected Total no. of votes of
(Integer.decimal)
persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature qualified parties
that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which
are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to
the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the

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 POWERS of the COMELEC (POE v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO – CERTIFICATE of CANDIDACY(VILLAROSA v. COMELEC)
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in the
Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character of the
twenty percent allocation.
The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines
Proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.
s
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzale that a fractional membership
cannot be converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in effect, deprive
another party's fractional membership. It would be a violation of the constitutional mandate
of proportional representation. We said further that "no party can claim more than what it is
entitled to x x x.
The decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left to the legislature. Since
Congress did not provide for it in the present law, neither will this Court. The Supreme Court
does not make the law; it merely applies it to a given set of facts.
Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party
Number of votes
of first party Proportion of votes of
= first party relative to
Total votes for total votes for party-list system
party-list system
Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of
additional seats the first party is entitled to.
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to
at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party
shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall.
If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four
percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of
two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be
entitled to any additional seat.
Art. 6 Sec.1 Exceptions: Delegation to local governments and administrative bodies
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We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled
to the maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of
more than the total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or
more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such
scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum
number of party-list seats reserved in the House of Representatives.
Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties
The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified
parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by
the following complex fraction:
No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
for concerned = x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the
number of votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end
result would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number
of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an
exact whole number is necessary. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional
representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of
two additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a
party may be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional representation. But
the law itself has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such
extant parameter.
 POWERS of the COMELEC (POE v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO – CERTIFICATE of CANDIDACY(VILLAROSA v. COMELEC)
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTION
June 26, 2001
Panganiban, J.
Petition: Petitions challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by COMELEC
Background:
Facts:
Prior to the 2001 Elections, the Comelec received several petitions for registration by
sectoral parties, organizations, and political parties. This is to register their parties and be
able to file their respective Manifestation stating their intentions to participate in the party-
list elections. The Comelec gave due course and approved the Manifestation of 154 parties
and organizations in its assailed March26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
Dissatisfied with how the Comelec handles and approves the registered parties, Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a petition before this court on April 16, 2001. This
petition assailed COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 for the disqualification of some
parties that is not supposed to be registered and included to participate in the party-list
elections. On April 17, 2001, Bayan Muna Party also filed a same petition assailing the
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In the resolution dated May 9, 2001, the court ordered the
consolidation of the two petitions before it. Thus the case at hand.
Issue/s:
1. WON political parties may participate in the party-list elections? YES
P: Contends the inclusion of the major political parties.
C: the court argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all “registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organization.
It is ruled that under the Constitution and RA 7941, the respondents cannot be disqualified
from part-list elections merely on the grounds that they are political parties. Sec 5, Article VI
of the constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may be elected
through a party-list registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organization or coalitions thereof. Section 3 expressly states
that a “party” is either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties. More to
point, the law defines “political parties” as an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and
which, as the most immediate means of securing an adoption, regularly nominates and
supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
Indubitably, political parties, even major ones, may participate in part-list elections.
8
PUBOFF
2. WON party-list system is exclusive to “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors and
organizations? YES
Ruling:
Wherefore, this case is remanded to the COMELEC, which is hereby directed to immediately
conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in
the light of the guidelines enunciated in this decision.
Banat!!! v. COMELEC
Doctrine
There are four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election system:
1. Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the HOR is the
maximum number of seats available to party-list organizations, such that there is
automatically one party-list seat for every four existing legislative districts.
2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections
guarantees a party-list organization one seat. The guaranteed seats shall be
distributed in a first round of seat allocation to parties receiving at least two
percent of the total party-list votes.
3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the
guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to the party-list organizations including those
that received less than two percent of the total votes. The continued operation of
the two percent threshold as it applies to the allocation of the additional seats is
now unconstitutional because this threshold mathematically and physically
prevents the filling up of the available party-list seats. The additional seats shall be
distributed to the parties in a second round of seat allocation according to the two-
step procedure laid down in the Decision of 21 April 2009 as clarified in this Res..
4. The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by the
Legislature to prevent any party from dominating the party-list system. There is no
violation of the Consti because the 1987 Consti does not require absolute
proportionality for the party-list system. The well-settled rule is that courts will not
question the wisdom of the Legislature as long as it is not violative of the Consti.
These four parameters allow the mathematical and practical fulfillment of the Constitutional
provision that party-list representatives shall comprise twenty percent of the members of the
HOR. At the same time, these four parameters uphold as much as possible the Party-List Act,
striking down only that provision of the Party-List Act that could not be reconciled anymore
with the 1987 Consti.
Facts:
 POWERS of the COMELEC (POE v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO – CERTIFICATE of CANDIDACY(VILLAROSA v. COMELEC)
• The HOR, represented by Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, filed a motion for leave to
intervene in G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295. The HOR filed a motion for clarification in
intervention and enumerated the issues for clarification as follows:
A. There are only 219 legislative districts and not 220. The alloted seats for party-
list representation should only be 54 and not 55. The HOR seeks clarification
on which of the party-list representatives shall be admitted to the Roll of
Members considering that the Court declared as winners 55 party-list
representatives.
B. The HOR wishes to be guided on whether it should enroll in its Roll of
Members the 32 named party-list representatives enumerated in Table 3 or
only such number of representatives that would complete the 250 member
maximum prescribed by Art VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Consti. In the event that it is
ordered to admit all 32, will this act not violate the above-cited Constitutional
provision considering that the total members would now rise to 270.
C. The Court declared as unconstitutional the 2% threshold only in relation to the
distribution of additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of
R.A. No. 7941. Yet, it distributed first seats to party-list groups which did not
attain the minimum number of votes that will entitle them to one seat.
Clarification is, therefore, sought whether the term "additional seats" refer to
2nd and 3rd seats only or all remaining available seats. Corollary thereto, the
HOR wishes to be clarified whether there is no more minimum vote
requirement to qualify as a party-list representative.
D. For the guidance of the HOR, clarification is sought as to whether the principle
laid down in Veterans that "the filling up of the allowable seats for party-list
representatives is not mandatory," has been abandoned.1
• Armi Jane Roa-Borje (Roa-Borje), third nominee of Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC), filed a motion for leave for partial reconsideration-in-intervention
o SC , in ruling on the procedure for distribution of seats, has deprived without
due process and in violation of the equal protection clause, parties with more
significant constituencies, such as CIBAC, Gabriela and APEC, in favor of parties
who did not even meet the 2% threshold.
Issue #1: how is the number of the party-list seats computed?
The Number of Members of the HOR in the 2007 Elections
• The 1987 Consti expressly allows for an increase in the number of members of the HOR
provided a law is enacted for the purpose. The Legislature has the option to choose
whether the increase in the number of members of the HOR is done by piecemeal
legislation or by enactment of a law authorizing a general increase.
• For purposes of the 2007 elections, there were only 219 district representatives.
Navotas City became a separate district on 24 June 2007, more than a month after the
14 May 2007 elections.
The Number of Party-List Seats in the 2007 Elections
9
PUBOFF
• Sec 5(2), Art VI of the 1987 Consti reads in part: The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party-list. x x x
Number of seats
available Number of seats
to legislative districts x .20 = available to
party-list representatives
.80
• There is no need for legislation to create an additional party-list seat whenever four
additional legislative districts are created by law. Sec 5(2), Art VI of the 1987 Consti
automatically creates such additional party-list seat.
• The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory. Actual occupancy of the
party-list seats depends on the number of participants in the party-list election. If only
ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list election, then, despite the availability of 54
seats, the maximum possible number of occupied party-list seats would only be 30
because of the three-seat cap. In such a case, the three-seat cap prevents the
mandatory allocation of all the 54 available seats.
• Under Sec 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941, garnering 2% of the total votes cast guarantees a
party one seat. The Court upholds this 2% threshold for the guaranteed seats as a valid
exercise of legislative power.
• In the second round allocation of additional seats, there is no minimum vote
requirement to obtain a party-list seat because the Court has struck down the
application of the 2% threshold in the allocation of additional seats. Specifically, the
provision in Sec 11(b) of the Party-List Act stating that "those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in the proportion to their
total number of votes" can no longer be given any effect. Otherwise, the 20 percent
party-list seats in the total membership of the HOR as provided in the 1987 Consti will
mathematically be impossible to fill up.
• However, a party-list organization has to obtain a sufficient number of votes to gain a
seat in the second round of seat allocation. What is deemed a sufficient number of votes
is dependent upon the circumstances of each election, such as the number of
participating parties, the number of available party-list seats, and the number of parties
with guaranteed seats received in the first round of seat allocation.
Issue #2: How do you distributed the seats?
Doctrine
 POWERS of the COMELEC (POE v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO – CERTIFICATE of CANDIDACY(VILLAROSA v. COMELEC) PUBOFF

There are four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election system: 6 A Teacher 490,853 3.12% 1 1.12 2 N.A.
1. Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the HOR is the
7 AKBAYAN 466,448 2.97% 1 1.07 2 N.A.
maximum number of seats available to party-list organizations, such that there is
automatically one party-list seat for every four existing legislative districts. 85 ALAGAD 423,165 2.69% 1 1 2 N.A.
2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections
guarantees a party-list organization one seat. The guaranteed seats shall be 9 COOP- 409,987 2.61% 1 1 2 N.A.
NATCCO
distributed in a first round of seat allocation to parties receiving at least two
percent of the total party-list votes. 10 BUTIL 409,168 2.60% 1 1 2 N.A.
3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the
guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to the party-list organizations including those 11 BATAS 385,956 2.45% 1 1 2 N.A.
that received less than two percent of the total votes. The continued operation of 12 ARC 374,349 2.38% 1 1 2 N.A.
the two percent threshold as it applies to the allocation of the additional seats is
now unconstitutional because this threshold mathematically and physically 13 ANAKPAWIS 370,323 2.36% 1 1 2 N.A.
prevents the filling up of the available party-list seats. The additional seats shall be
14 AMIN 347,527 2.21% 1 1 2 N.A.
distributed to the parties in a second round of seat allocation according to the two-
step procedure laid down in the Decision of 21 April 2009 as clarified in this Res.. 15 ABONO 340,002 2.16% 1 1 2 N.A.
4. The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by the
Legislature to prevent any party from dominating the party-list system. There is no 16 YACAP 331,623 2.11% 1 1 2 N.A.

violation of the Consti because the 1987 Consti does not require absolute 17 AGAP 328,814 2.09% 1 1 2 N.A.
proportionality for the party-list system. The well-settled rule is that courts will not
question the wisdom of the Legislature as long as it is not violative of the Consti. 18 AN WARAY 321,516 2.04% 1 1 2 N.A.

19 UNI-MAD 251,804 1.60% 0 1 1 N.A.

The Actual Number of Party-List Representatives in the 2007 Elections
Thirty-six is the proper multiplier as it is the difference between 54, the number of available 20 ABS 235,152 1.50% 0 1 1 N.A.
party-list seats, and 18, the number of guaranteed seats. Only the figures in column (C) are
affected. The allocation of seats to the winning party-list organizations, however, remains 21 ALIF 229,267 1.46% 0 1 1 N.A.

the same as in NBC No. 09-001. Our modification of the COMELEC’s computation in NBC No. 22 KAKUSA 229,036 1.46% 0 1 1 N.A.
09-001 is shown below:
23 KABATAAN 228,700 1.45% 0 1 1 N.A.
Votes
Garnered Guaranteed Additional (B) plus
24 ABA-AKO 219,363 1.40% 0 1 1 N.A.
over Seat Seats (C), in Applying the
Votes
Rank Party Total (First (Second whole three seat cap
Garnered 25 SENIOR 213,095 1.36% 0 1 1 N.A.
Votes for Round) Round) integers (E)
CITIZENS
PL, in % (B) (C) (D)
(A)
26 AT 200,030 1.27% 0 1 1 N.A.
1 BUHAY 1,169,338 7.44% 1 2.68 3 N.A.
27 VFP 196,358 1.25% 0 1 1 N.A.
2 BAYAN 979,189 6.23% 1 2.24 3 N.A.
MUNA 28 ANAD 188,573 1.20% 0 1 1 N.A.

3 CIBAC 755,735 4.81% 1 1.73 2 N.A. 29 BANAT 177,068 1.13% 0 1 1 N.A.

4 GABRIELA 621,266 3.95% 1 1.42 2 N.A. 30 ANG 170,594 1.08% 0 1 1 N.A.

KASANGGA
5 APEC 619,733 3.94% 1 1.42 2 N.A.
31 BANTAY 169,869 1.08% 0 1 1 N.A.

10
 POWERS of the COMELEC (POE v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO – CERTIFICATE of CANDIDACY(VILLAROSA v. COMELEC) PUBOFF

32 ABAKADA 166,897 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A. seats for distribution in the second round, gives 1.03 seat, leaving 0.03 fractional seat.
Multiplying TUCP's 1.03% by 37 gives a fractional seat of 0.38, higher than CIBAC's fractional
33 1-UTAK 165,012 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A. seat of 0.03. The fractional seats become material only in the second step of the second
round of seat allocation to determine the ranking of parties. Thus, for purposes of the second
34 TUCP 162,678 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.
step in the second round of seat allocation, TUCP has a higher rank than CIBAC.
35 COCOFED 156,007 0.99% 0 0 0 N.A. Sec 5(1) of Art VI requires that legislative districts shall be apportioned according to
proportional representation. However, this principle of proportional representation applies
Total 18 54
only to legislative districts, not to the party-list system. The allocation of seats under the
To limit the distribution of seats to the two-percenters would mathematically prevent the party-list system is governed by the last phrase of Sec 5(1), which states that the party-list
filling up of all the available party-list seats. representatives shall be "those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-
In the table above, CIBAC cannot claim a third seat from the seat allocated to TUCP, the last list system," giving the Legislature wide discretion in formulating the allocation of party-list
ranked party allocated with a seat. CIBAC's 2.81% (from the percentage of 4.81% less the 2% seats. Clearly, there is no constitutional requirement for absolute proportional
for its guaranteed seat) has a lower fractional seat value after the allocation of its second representation in the allocation of party-list seats in the HOR.
seat compared to TUCP's 1.03%. CIBAC's fractional seat after receiving two seats is only 0.03
compared to TUCP's 0.38 fractional seat. Multiplying CIBAC's 2.81% by 37, the additional
who desire to participate in the party-list system. (Ed.: Please see the original case for the
names of the party-list and the reasons for their disqualification)
FACTS:
172 Paglaum v COMELEC – digest by LA “Rose Gold” Celebrado
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. (4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
G.R. No. 203766 | April 2, 2013 | En Banc | Carpio, J. whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
Note: These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and/or Prohibition filed by 52 party- election purposes;
lists assailing the Resolutions issued by COMELEC disqualifying them from participating in the (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the (6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list (7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
organizations. In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
1 (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency
Bagong Bayani and BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those
in which it has registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or
assisted by, the government. x x x.
xxxx
1
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to "SEC 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. - No person shall be nominated as party-list representative
participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
"Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the HoR." period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write,
x x x. a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
xxxx preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x x. In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
xxxx (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."
enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows: Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes; underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. x x x.
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal; Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
(3) It is a foreign party or organization; appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)
11
 POWERS of the COMELEC (POE v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO – CERTIFICATE of CANDIDACY(VILLAROSA v. COMELEC)
Pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and
manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
ISSUES:
1. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners? (NO)
2. WON the party-list system is only for sectoral parties? (NO)
3. WON the major political parties must be disqualified? (NO)
3. WON the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in BANAT v. COMELEC
should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections? (NO)
HELD; RATIO:
1. NO. While SC held that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following
prevailing SC decisions in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections, the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the
qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby
abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners.
Thus, SC remanded to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine
who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13
May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
2. NO. The framers of the Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only
sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to
constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. The indisputable intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system both sectoral and non-
2
sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution. It’s crystal-
clear that there shall be "a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations." The commas after the words "national," and "regional," separate
national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution
intended national and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral, they would have
stated "national and regional sectoral parties." They did not, precisely because it was never
their intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.
3. NO. Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the HoR at the start of the Tenth Congress"
from participating in the May 1988 party-list elections. Thus, major political parties can
participate in subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is expressly limited only
to the 1988 party-list elections. The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major
political parties to participate in party-list elections so as to encourage them to work
assiduously in extending their constituencies to the "marginalized and underrepresented"
and to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies." The participation of major
2
Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
12
PUBOFF
political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the
HoR, of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies," giving them a voice in law-making. Thus, to participate in party-list elections,
a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must organize
a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth
wing, that can register under the party-list system.
Section 9 3 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision
prescribes a special qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.
4. NO. The COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. We
cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying
petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed
grave abuse of discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must
now impose and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and authorized under
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. For this purpose, we suspend our rule that a party
may appeal to this Court from decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, SC remanded all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC
shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register
under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party,
and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
3
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able
to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at
least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on
the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term.
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to
represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong
to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.
 POWERS of the COMELEC (POE v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO – CERTIFICATE of CANDIDACY(VILLAROSA v. COMELEC)
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or
lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
"marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the
sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined
political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a
track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional
parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some
of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified.
*Some interesting notes*
Different party-list system—
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any
clearer: the party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties
belong to only one of the three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt
that national and regional parties are separate from sectoral parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or
organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along
sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first
three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half
of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for
sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be
open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list
system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and
underrepresented." Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral
parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three
congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for
13
PUBOFF
any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list
system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1)
and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not
for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
Definition of party—
4
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral
party or a coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party.
Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a "political party refers to an organized
group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general
conduct of government." On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a
"sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and
a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional
parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is
to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the
party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win
in legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from
the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from
joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To
4
Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation
in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition
of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate
means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority
of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at
least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated
in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share
similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations for political and/or election purposes. (Emphasis supplied)
 POWERS of the COMELEC (POE v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO – CERTIFICATE of CANDIDACY(VILLAROSA v. COMELEC)
exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently
contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
Ideology-based party—
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly
different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and
need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a
national or regional political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same
ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their
economic status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily "marginalized and
underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by definition "marginalized and
underrepresented," not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth may "lack well-defined political constituencies," and can thus
organize themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy of the special interests and concerns of
their respective sectors.
Section 6 5 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does
not require national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A.
No. 7941, to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Not solely for marginalized and underrepresented—
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in
Section 2 on Declaration of Policy. Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional representation
in the election of representatives to the HoR through the party-list system," which will enable
Filipinos belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
5
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration
of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency
in which it has registered.
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the "marginalized
and underrepresented."
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parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies," to become members of the
HoR. While the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to
"marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties," the specific
implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require that the sectors,
organizations or parties must be "marginalized and underrepresented." On the contrary, to
even interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized and
underrepresented" would lead to absurdities.
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in Section
5 that are, by their nature, economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These
sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a
majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented." The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or
must have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean one must "wallow in poverty,
destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle
class. More specifically, the economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are those
who fall in the low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals,
the elderly, women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will
allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack "well-defined political
constituencies" a chance to win seats in the HoR. On the other hand, limiting to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and
other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the
"marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in the HoR.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise
to a multi-party system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic
and ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the HoR. This
interpretation will also make the party-lisqt system honest and transparent, eliminating the
need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as "wallowing in poverty,
destitution and infirmity," even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.
The national and regional parties—
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections.
Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack
"well-defined political constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors. Thus, the national or regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily
those that do not belong to major political parties. This automatically reserves the national
and regional parties under the party-list system to those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have members in the HoR.
*Dissent*
Sereno, C.J.: I dissent for the following reasons. First, Section 2 of RA 7941 clearly makes the
"lack of a "well-defined political constituency" as a requirement along with "marginalization
and underrepresentation." They are cumulative requirements, not alternative. Thus,
 POWERS of the COMELEC (POE v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO – CERTIFICATE of CANDIDACY(VILLAROSA v. COMELEC)
underrepresentation." They are cumulative requirements, not alternative. Thus, sectoral
parties and organizations intending to run in the party-list elections must meet both. Second,
the ponencia appears to be operating under preconceived notions of what it means to be
"marginalized and underrepresented" and to "lack a well-defined political constituency." For
reasons discussed above, the exact content of these legislative standards should be left to
the COMELEC. They are ever evolving concepts, created to address social disparities, to be
able to give life to the "social justice" policy of our Constitution.
AKBAYAN Youth v. COMELEC
J. Buena
FACTS:
On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other youth movements sought the
extension of the registration of voters for the May 2001 elections.
The voters registration has already ended on December 27, 2000. AKBAYAN-Youth asks
that persons aged 18-21 be allowed a special 2-day registration.
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) denied the petition.
AKBAYAN-Youth the sued COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion for denying the
petition.
AKBAYAN-Youth alleged that there are about 4 million youth who were not able to
register and are now disenfranchised.
COMELEC invoked Section 8 of Republic Act 8189 which provides that no registration shall
be conducted 120 days before the regular election. AKBAYAN-Youth however counters
that under Section 28 of Republic Act 8436, the COMELEC in the exercise of its residual
and stand-by powers, can reset the periods of pre-election acts including voters
registration if the original period is not observed.
ISSUE:
• Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
extension of the voters registration.
HELD:
• No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear provisions of
Section 8, RA 8189 which provides that no voters registration shall be conducted within
120 days before the regular election.
• The right of suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated by measures like voters registration
which is not a mere statutory requirement. The State, in the exercise of its inherent police
power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter’s registration for
the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental
yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the
duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner – one which is not indifferent
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and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of
the times. RA 8189 prevails over RA 8436 in that RA 8189’s provision is explicit as to the
prohibition. Suffice it to say that it is a pre-election act that cannot be reset.
• Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special registration, COMELEC has shown
in its pleadings that if it is allowed, it will substantially create a setback in the other pre-
election matters because the additional voters from the special two day registration will
have to be screened, entered into the book of voters, have to be inspected again, verified,
sealed, then entered into the computerized voter’s list; and then they will have to reprint
the voters information sheet for the update and distribute it – by that time, the May 14,
2001 elections would have been overshot because of the lengthy processes after the
special registration. In short, it will cost more inconvenience than good.
• Further still, the allegation that youth voters are disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere
in AKBAYAN-Youth’s pleading was attached any actual complaint from an individual youth
voter about any inconvenience arising from the fact that the voters registration has ended
on December 27, 2001. Also, AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted in their pleading that they are
asking an extension because they failed to register on time for some reasons, which is not
appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights
Romualdez v RTC (supra)
14 September 1993
Vitug, J.
Facts:
1. Petitioner Philip Romualdez is the nephew of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos. He
established his residence at Brgy. Malbog,, Tolosa. He caused the construction of
his residential house there.
2. He then served as Brgy. Captain.
3. During the 1986 revolution, petitioner and his family sought asylum in the US.
4. In December 1991, he arrived in the Philippines.
5. He registered himself as a voter in February 1992.
6. Respondent Donato Advincula prayed that petitioner be excluded from the list of
registered voters. Respondent argued that petitioner is a resident of
Massachusetts; that he did not have the required 1-year residence in the
Philippines and 6-month residence in Tolosa.
Issue/Held:
1. WON petitioner voluntarily left the country and abandoned his residence in Tolosa.
NO
Ratio:
1. In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous. Domicile
denotes a fixed permanent resident to which when absent for business or pleasure,
or for like reasons, one intends to return.
 POWERS of the COMELEC (POE v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO – CERTIFICATE of CANDIDACY(VILLAROSA v. COMELEC)
In order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur:
a. residence of bodily presence in the new locality
b. an intention to remain there, and
c. an intention to abandon the old domicile.
There must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period
of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place
chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
The People's Power Revolution must have truly caused great
apprehension to the Romualdezes, as well as a serious concern over the safety.
Their sudden departure from the country cannot be described as "voluntary," or
as "abandonment of residence" at least in the context that these terms are used in
applying the concept of "domicile by choice."
On suffrage:
The right to vote is a most precious political right, as well as a bounden duty of
every citizen, enabling and requiring him to participate in the process of government so as to
ensure that the government can truly be said to derive its power solely from the consent of
the governed. The Court must commend respondent Advincula for spending time and effort
even all the way up to this Court, for as the right of suffrage is not to be abridged, so also
must we safeguard and preserve it but only on behalf of those entitled and bound to
exercise it.
SIAWAN v. INOPIQUEZ
DATU INOCENCIO SIAWAN v. JUDGE AQUILINO INOPIQUEZ, JR
Topic: registration of voters
Facts:
- Administrative complaint filed by Datu Siawan against Judge Inopiquez (MTCC
Kananga-Matag-ob, Leyte) for gross ignorance of the law, gross abuse of power,
and misconduct in the handling of a criminal case and 2 election cases for inclusion
of voters
- Criminal Case Nos. 584 and 1181 [People v. Julia Seco]
o Seco was charged with Usurpation of Authority and Official Function (RPC
177), regarding a pakyaw contract where Seco signed as the Brgy Captain
despite not being such official
o Seco filed a Motion for Inhibition of the Judge Inopiquez, because his
father-in-law was conspicuously present during the proceedings, and
even gave consultation to the complainant, Restituto Pedrano, who was
reportedly his protégé – denied
o After the prosecution presented its evidence, Judge Inopiquez dismissed
the case based on the Affidavit of Desistance filed by the complainant
o Seco then filed an action for damages against the complainant;
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o As a response, complainant Pedrano wanted to revive the case against
Seco through an Omnibus Motion
o Seco opposed on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction based on finality and
non-conformity of the public prosecutor to the pleading (private prosec
ang nag-sign)
o Judge Inopiquez reinstated the case, but upon Seco’s insistence,
reconsidered the Motion to Inhibit filed earlier; added a recommendation
that if complainant wants to revive the case, he should just refile
o Pedrano did refile the same case [No. 1181] before the same judge
o Judge Inopiquez inhibited again on the ground that “the counsel (Atty.
Eusebio Otadoy) for the offended party is related to [him]”
o Case dismissed on the ground of non-intervention of the public
prosecutor in the refiling
- Election Case No. 333 [topical]
o Retired RTC Judge Ponciano Inopiquez (herein Judge Inopiquez’s uncle)
filed a petition for inclusion in the list of voters
He was a resident of Brgy. Talisay, Matag-ob, Leyte
He was qualified as a voter
Failed to register only because he could not book a plane on the
last day
He intended to vote in Leyte because he had retired as RTC
Judge in Manila
o Judge Inopiquez did not inhibit because, as he argues, the petition was
meritorious
o The Board of Election Inspectors was not a party to the proceedings;
neither were they notified
o Judge Inopiquez granted the petition
- Election Case No. 292 [topical]
o Petitioners all surnamed Herbas filed a petition for inclusion in the list of
voters
They were residents of Brgy Sebastian, Matag-ob, Leyte for 2
years prior to pet
They were refused registration by the Board of Election
Inspectors
They have not voted for 2 consecutive elections
o The Board of Election Inspectors was not a party to the proceedings;
neither were they notified
o Judge Inopiquez granted the petition
- CONTRAST grounds cited in the election cases to the requirements under Sec. 139
and 143 of the Omnibus Election Code
Issue:
w/n Judge Inopiquez was guilty of the administrative charges
 POWERS of the COMELEC (POE v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO – CERTIFICATE of CANDIDACY(VILLAROSA v. COMELEC)
SC Ratio:
Yes. ORDERED to pay a fine of P20,000.00 for violation of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and
is SUSPENDED without pay for a period of three months for abuse of authority and ignorance
of the law.
Re: Criminal case No. 584
Although Judge Inopiquez admits that his relation to Atty. Otadoy (maternal surname,
Inopiquez) is not within the 4th degree of consanguinity or affinity, the evidence shows that
his relationship to those helping the complainant Pedrano (Guillermo Laurente, his father-in-
law; and Atty. Felix Sun, his brother-in-law), Judge Inopiquez acted with obvious partiality for
complainant in the criminal case.
Accused Seco filed a Motion to Inhibit against Judge Inopiquez on the ground of his
relationship to the participants in the case, their presence during trial, and Pedrano’s status
as Judge Inopiquez’s political protégé. Without addressing the issues raised by Seco, Judge
Inopiquez denied it on the pretext that the motion was filed with the assistance of an Atty.
Superable, who was then not Seco’s counsel of record.
Respondent could have recused himself from the moment his disqualification was sought by
the accused. Apparently, he later realized it was untenable for him to continue hearing the
criminal case not only because of his relationship to Atty. Otadoy but also to Atty. Felix Sun
and Edgardo Laurente, both of whom were his brothers-in-law, who were actively
participating in the prosecution of the criminal case. Respondent hung on to the case as long
as he could until this case was filed against him. It is noteworthy that the order of respondent
finally inhibiting himself from trying Criminal Case No. 584 was issued only after the herein
letter-complaint of Datu Siawan had already been prepared and drafted. Indeed, it is too
much of a coincidence that respondent judge's decision to recuse himself in Criminal Case
No. 584 and Criminal Case No. 1181 came only after the filing of this case against him.
Although the disqualification of judges is limited only to cases where the judge is related to
counsel within the 4th degree of consanguinity or affinity, the Rules nonetheless provide that
a judge may, in the exercise of his discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case for
other just and valid reasons. A judge should not handle a case where he might be perceived,
rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and impartiality, which axiom is intended to
preserve and promote public confidence in the integrity and respect for the judiciary. In this
case, the refusal of respondent to inhibit himself from the conduct of the case and his doing
so only after being threatened with an administrative case could not but create the
impression that he had ulterior motives in wanting to try the case.
Other errors:
- should not have dismissed the case without determining if the affidavit of
desistance was voluntarily executed
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- should not have reinstated the case because it had already become final (1 year
since dismissal) and it constituted double jeopardy (prosecution had already
finished presenting its evidence before dismissal)
Re: Election case Nos. 333 and 292
Judge Inopiquez’s contention that the petition by his uncle was meritorious is unmeritorious.
Judge Inopiquez was disqualified from hearing the petition of his uncle, and it was immaterial
that such petition was meritorious. The purpose of the prohibition is to prevent not only a
conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of a judge. A judge
should take no part in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned
and he should administer justice impartially and without delay. The failure of respondent
judge to inhibit himself constitutes an abuse of his authority and undermines public
confidence in the impartiality of judges.
Under ROC 137.1:
No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law, or in
which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in
which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject
of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and
entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting
in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Similarly under Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct:
A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among others, proceedings where:
xxxx
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the
sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth degree;
TOPICAL ISSUE
w/n Judge Inopiquez should have granted the petitions for inclusion
 POWERS of the COMELEC (POE v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO – CERTIFICATE of CANDIDACY(VILLAROSA v. COMELEC)
SC Ratio:
No! Judge Judge Inopiquez violated provisions of the Omnibus Election Code.
Under Sec. 139 6, a petition for inclusion may be filed only by a person (a) whose application
for registration has been disapproved by the board of election inspectors or (b) whose name
has been stricken out from the list of voters. No exception is provided by the law.
The petition of former Judge Ponciano C. Inopiquez does not fall within the coverage of the
law, since he was neither refused registration by the board nor his name ordered stricken
from the list of voters of Barangay Talisay, Matag-ob, Leyte. Whether or not Ponciano
Inopiquez had good reason for his failure to register as a voter was irrelevant. Otherwise,
every person who is unable to register for whatever reason, i.e., he or she was working in
another province or was out of the country during the registration period, could simply file a
petition for inclusion in order to be able to vote.
The Omnibus Election Code further provides:
Section 143. Common rules governing judicial proceedings in the matter of
inclusion, exclusion, and correction of names of voters. --- (a) Outside of regular
office hours, no petition for inclusion, exclusion, or correction of names of voters
shall be received.
(b) Notices to the members of the board of election inspectors and to challenged
voters shall state the place, day and hour in which such petition shall be heard, and
such notice may be made by sending a copy thereof by registered mail or by
personal delivery or by leaving it in the possession of a person of sufficient
discretion in the residence of the said person or, in the event that the foregoing
procedure is not practicable, by posting a copy in a conspicuous place in the city
hall or municipal building and in two other conspicuous places within the city or
municipality, at least ten days prior to the day set for the hearing.
(c) Each petition shall refer to only one precinct.
6
Sec. 139. Petition for inclusion of voters in the list. – Any person whose application for
registration has been disapproved by the board of election inspectors or whose name has
been stricken out from the list may apply, within twenty days after the last registration days,
to the proper municipal or metropolitan trial court, for an order directing the board of
election inspectors to include or reinstate his name in the list, together with the certificate of
the board of elections inspectors regarding his case and proof of service of notice of his
petition upon a member of the board of election inspectors with indication of the time,
place, and court before which the petition is to be heard.
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(d) No costs shall be assessed in these proceedings. However, if the court should be
satisfied that the application has been filed for the sole purpose of molesting the
adverse party and causing him to incur expenses, it may condemn the culpable
party to pay the costs and incidental expenses.
(e) Any candidate who may be affected by the proceedings may intervene and
present his evidence.
(f) The decision shall be based on the evidence presented. If the question is
whether or not the voter is real or fictitious, his non-appearance on the day set for
hearing shall be prima facie evidence that the registered voter is fictitious. In no
case shall a decision be rendered upon a stipulation of facts.
(g) These applications shall be heard and decided without delay. The decision shall
be rendered within six hours after the hearing and within ten days from the date of
its filing in court. Cases appealed to the regional trial court shall be decided within
ten days from receipt of the appeal in the office of the clerk of court. In any case,
the court shall decide these petitions not later than the day before the election and
the decision rendered thereon shall be immediately final and executory,
notwithstanding the provision of Section 138 on the finality of decisions.
The records show that neither of the petition in Election Case No. 333 and Election Case No.
292 named the board of election inspectors a party to the proceedings. Nor is there any
showing that the board of election inspectors was ever notified of hearings to be conducted
on such inclusion proceedings either by registered mail or by personal delivery, or by notice
posted in a conspicuous place in the city hall or municipal building and in two other
conspicuous places within the city or municipality at least 10 days prior to the day set for the
hearing as required in paragraph (b) of the above provision.
Mercado v Dsyangco
Sandoval-Guiterrez, J:
Facts:
Flordeliza C. Alejo, Arsenio L. Carpio, Cirilo I. Mercado, and Pedro V. Soriano
charged Judge Hector F. Dysangco with grave misconduct.
The complaint alleged that prior to the Barangay Elections 48 people filed with the
said court separate petitions for inclusion in the voters list.
9 were supporters of complainant Cirilo I. Mercado,
39 were supporters of his opponent Alejandro Gonzales.
In relation to the complaint, The first three scheduled hearings were cancelled due
to the absence of either respondent judge or petitioners counsel. The May 8 hearing
proceeded but only the nine (9) petitioners supporting complainant Mercado
 POWERS of the COMELEC (POE v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO – CERTIFICATE of CANDIDACY(VILLAROSA v. COMELEC)
presented their evidence. The thirty-nine (39) petitioners supporting Gonzales
requested the postponement of the hearing to May 9. However, on that day, those
petitioners and their counsel failed to appear in court. Thus, respondent judge
dismissed their petitions in open court.
On May 10 (Saturday), respondent judge, when approached by herein
complainants, assured them that he did not issue any order for the inclusion of the
thirty-nine 39.
However, on the day of the election, complainants were surprised to find thirty-
four (34) of the thirty-nine (39) petitioners with an Order signed by respondent
judge a
Complainants averred that the issuance of the Order by respondent judge was
highly anomalous, illegal, and patently of dubious origin as not one of the thirty-
nine (39) petitioners presented evidence or appeared in the scheduled hearings.
Executive Judge recommended that the judge should be meted a fine of FIVE
THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS with warning that a repetition of the same will be
dealt with more severely. Because the conduct of the judge should have been
avoided if a fair hearing should have been afforded the two (2) lawyers and is
denial of due process.
Issue:
WON the judge is guilty of gross ignorance of law and gross misconduct constituting violation
of the Code of Judicial Conduct? YES
WON there was a violation of the Omnibus Election Code? YES
Ratio:
• SEC. 143. Common rules governing judicial proceedings in the matter of inclusion,
exclusion, and correction of names of voters. –
(e) Any candidate who may be affected by the proceedings may intervene and
present his evidence.
(f) The decision shall be based on the evidence presented. If the question is
whether or not the voter is real or fictitious, his non-appearance on the day
set for hearing shall be prima facie evidence that the registered voter is
fictitious. In no case shall a decision be rendered upon a stipulation of facts.
(g)These applications shall be heard and decided without delay. The decision
shall be rendered within six hours after the hearing and within ten days from
the date of its filing in court.…
• The clear mandate of the law is for the municipal judge a) to decide the petition on
the basis of the evidence presented, b) to conduct a hearing thereon, and c) to
render a decision within 10 days from the filing of the petition. Respondent judge,
unfortunately, does not know the above legal provisions.
• He did not decide the petition on the basis of petitioners evidence. He could not
have done so. Extant in the record is the fact that the thirty-nine (39) petitioners
failed to attend any of the scheduled hearings.
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• The judge claimed that he personally interviewed the thirty-four (34)
petitioners on April 25, 1997 and that this was the basis of his Order. This is
not sufficient as:
• personal interview is different to the hearing required by law. A hearing
means that a party is given the chance to adduce evidence to support his
side of the case.
• The interview merely show that it is a superficial and mechanical inquiry
on each petitioners age, citizenship, residence and years of residence
• Not under oath or to present proof of their residence.
• lawyers were not even notified.
• ALSO, the judge issued the Order beyond the ten-day period required by Section
143.
• Petition was filed prior to April 17, 1997,[16] yet the Order granting them was
issued only on May 9, 1997.
• Respondent judge likewise committed gross misconduct constituting violation of
Canon 2, Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides that, a judge
should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.
• There was indication of partiality because petitions were granted despite their
absence
GADOR v. COMELEC
AHMHADO F. GADOR, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AS REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHAIRMAN, HON. LEONARDO PEREZ (1980)
FERNANDEZ, J.:
FACTS:
1. The petition for mandamus alleges that the petitioner is a candidate for the Office
of Mayor of the City of Ozamiz as Independent on January 30, 1980 local election.
He filed his certificate of candidacy with the Election Registrar of Ozamis City on
January 7, 1980 and his certificate of candidacy for Mayor on January 7, 1980 on
the basis of a news item in the Bulletin Today, January 6, issue.
2. On January 8, 1980, the petitioner wired the Chairman of the COMELEC informing
him of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and at the time requesting him to
release the approval of the said certificate.
 POWERS of the COMELEC (POE v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO – CERTIFICATE of CANDIDACY(VILLAROSA v. COMELEC)
3. On January 11, 1980, the petitioner caused the Election Registrar of Ozamiz City to
wire the Chairman, COMELEC, reiterating the information that the petitioner had
filed a certificate of candidacy on January 7.
4. Petitioner admits that in view of the President's announcement that the resolution
of the respondent, COMELEC, for the extension of time for filing certificates of
candidacy from January 4 to January 10 had been denied, there is a strong
probability that the his name as candidate for Mayor may not be included in the list
of candidates to be voted which is to be printed soon and distributed in Ozamiz
City. He contends that on the grounds of fairness, principles of equity and for the
best interest of the people of Ozamiz City, judgment should be rendered
commanding the respondent, COMELEC, to immediately include the petitioner in
the list of candidates for Mayor.
ISSUE: WON the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner which was filed on January 7, 1980
is valid. HOLDING AND RATIO: It is VOID. The petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
1. Section 7, Batasang Pambansa Bilang 52, provides that "The sworn certificate of
candidacy shall be filed in triplicate not later than January 4, 1980." It is a fact
admitted by the petitioner that the President had not extended the period within
which to file the certificate of candidacy.
2. The SC is powerless to grant the remedy prayed for in the petition. Having been
filed beyond January 4, 1980, the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner is void.
GO v. COMELEC
FACTS:
Representative Catalina Go is the incumbent representative of the Fifth District, province of
Leyte, whose term of office will expire at noon on 30 June 2001.
On 27 February 2001, Go filed with the municipal election officer of the municipality of
Baybay, Leyte, a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte.
On 28 February 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner filed with the provincial election supervisor of
Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, another certificate of candidacy for governor of the
province of Leyte. Simultaneously therewith, she attempted to file with the provincial
election supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal of her candidacy for mayor of the municipality
of Baybay, Leyte.
However, the provincial election supervisor of Leyte refused to accept the affidavit of
withdrawal and suggested that, pursuant to a COMELEC resolution, she should file it with the
municipal election officer of Baybay, Leyte where she filed her certificate of candidacy for
mayor.
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At that late hour, with only minutes left to midnight, the deadline for filing certificates of
candidacy or withdrawal thereof, and considering that the travel time from Tacloban to
Baybay was two (2) hours, petitioner decided to send her affidavit of withdrawal by fax to her
father at Baybay, Leyte and the latter submitted the same to the office of the election officer
of Baybay, Leyte at 12:28 a.m., 01 March 2001. On the same day, at 1:15 p.m., the election
officer of Baybay, Leyte, received the original of the affidavit of withdrawal.
On 05 March 2001, respondent Montejo filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte,
at Tacloban City a petition to deny due course and/or to cancel the certificates of candidacy
of petitioner. Respondent Antoni filed a similar petition to disqualify petitioner.
The petitions were based on the ground that petitioner filed certificates of candidacy for two
positions, namely, that for mayor of Baybay, Leyte, and that for governor of Leyte, thus,
making her ineligible for both.
The Law Department of COMELEC recommended that the name of Go be deleted or
cancelled from the certified list of candidates for Governor of Leyte and Mayoralty
candidates of Baybay, Leyte.
ISSUES:
1. Is Go disqualified to be candidate for governor of Leyte and mayor of Baybay,
Leyte because she filed certificates of candidacy for both positions? NO. She is not
disqualified.
2. Was there a valid withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor
of Baybay, Leyte? YES. There was a valid withdrawal of the COC.
2. a. Must the affidavit of withdrawal be filed with the election officer of the place
where the certificate of candidacy was filed? NOT NECESSARILY. It can be filed
with the office of the provincial election supervisor of the province to which the
municipality involved belongs, as what petitioner Go did.
2. b. May the affidavit of withdrawal be validly filed by fax? YES. Transmission by
fax may be legal.
3. Was there denial to petitioner of procedural due process of law? YES. She was denied
procedural due process of law.
Relevant Provision in the Omnibus Election Code:
 POWERS of the COMELEC (POE v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO – CERTIFICATE of CANDIDACY(VILLAROSA v. COMELEC)
"SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy.- No person shall be eligible
for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate
of candidacy within the period fixed herein.
"A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior
to the election, withdraw the same by submitting to the
office concerned a written declaration under oath.
"No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be
filled in the same election, and if he files his certificate of
candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for
any of them. However, before the expiration of the period
for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who has
filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare
under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and
cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or
offices."
RATIO:
1. NO. She is not disqualified. The filing of the affidavit of withdrawal with the
election officer of Baybay, Leyte, at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001 was a substantial
compliance with the requirement of the law. Go’s withdrawal of her certificate of
candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte was effective for all legal purposes, and left
in full force her certificate of candidacy for governor.
2. YES. There was a valid withdrawal of the COC. The filing of petitioner's affidavit of
withdrawal of candidacy for mayor of Baybay with the provincial election
supervisor of Leyte sufficed to effectively withdraw such candidacy. The
COMELEC thus acted with grave abuse of discretion when it declared petitioner
ineligible for both positions for which she filed certificates of candidacy. While it
may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, adopted on 20
November 2000, requires that the withdrawal be filed before the election officer
of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed, such requirement is
merely directory, and is intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or
jurisdictional. An administrative resolution cannot contradict, much less amend
or repeal a law, or supply a deficiency in the law.
2.a. NOT NECESSARILY. It can be filed with the office of the provincial
election supervisor of the province to which the municipality involved
belongs as what petitioner Go did. Nothing in this Section which mandates
that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same office where the
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certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed
directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the regional
election director concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of
the province to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the
municipal election officer of the said municipality.
2.b. YES. Transmission by fax may be legal. NOTE: This issue was not
resolved directly in the main body of the decision. Footnote 4 however
says, “The municipal election officer, Baybay, Leyte, had no fax machine
(Certification, Rollo, p. 146). With the enactment of the E-Commerce
Law, transmission by fax may be legal. R.A. No. 8792.”
3. YES. Go was denied procedural due process .The Law Department, COMELEC
conducted an ex-parte study of the cases. It did not give petitioner an opportunity to
be heard. She was not required to submit a comment or opposition to the petitions for
cancellation of her certificates of candidacy and/or for disqualification. It did not set
the cases for hearing. After an ex-parte study of the cases, the Law Department
submitted its report and recommendation to the COMELEC en banc.
Director Balbuena candidly admitted that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires
that notice be given to the respondent. Indeed, Section 3, Rule 23 of said Rules on
petition to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy explicitly provides:
"Sec. 3. Summary Proceeding. - The petition shall be heard summarily after due
notice.”
Obviously, the COMELEC en banc in approving the report and recommendation of the
Law Department, deprived the petitioner Go of procedural due process of law. The
COMELEC, acting as a quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the requirements of
procedural due process in resolving cases before it.
De Guzman v. Provincial Board of Canvassers of La Union
Villlamor, J. | November 3, 1925
FACTS
• Petitioner Tomas de Guzman filed this petitioner for mandamus to compel
respondent Board of Canvassers of the Province of La Union to meet and reject and
annul all the votes adjudicated to private respondent Juan Lucero and after
correcting the election return, to proclaim and certify petitioner as elected for the
office of provincial governor of La Union.
• On June 22, 1925, the provincial board of canvassers met for the purpose of
counting the votes cast in the election for provincial officers and certifying the
result of the count, and after gathering all the election returns, it found that the
 POWERS of the COMELEC (POE v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO – CERTIFICATE of CANDIDACY(VILLAROSA v. COMELEC)
petitioner had obtained 7,662 votes and the respondent Juan T. Lucero, 8,771
votes.
• Petitioner claims that the original certificate of candidacy of the respondent Juan T.
Lucero was not duly sworn to, as required by Sec. 404 of the Election Law, while
the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner Tomas de Guzman was prepared and
filed in accordance with the requirements of the law.
• Hence, the respondent provincial board of canvassers willfully and illegally
adjudicated the 8,771 votes to the respondent, and afterwards illegally proclaimed
and certified him as governor-elect of the Province of La Union. Juan T. Lucero has
not, and could not have been a legal candidate for the office in question, and could
not have been certified elected for the office of provincial governor.
• Respondent filed a demurrer on the following grounds:
(a) That the court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter in litigation;
(b) That the court had no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant members
of the extinguished provincial board of canvassers of La Union; and
(c) That the facts alleged in the complaint did not constitute a cause of action.
ISSUE/HELD
WON private respondent has filed a certificate of candidacy in accordance with the law, and
in case he has not, whether the writ applied for should be issued.
NO. Yet the Court is of the opinion that this irregularity does not invalidate the election for
the fundamental reason that after it was proven by the count of the votes that Juan T. Lucero
had obtained the majority of the legal votes, the will of the people cannot be frustrated by a
technicality consisting in that his certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to
RATIO
• Sec. 41 of Act No. 3030, amending Sec. 471 of the Election Law, provides that the
provincial board of canvassers or the Governor-General, as the case may be, shall
certify elected for the offices of senator or member of the House of
Representatives and for provincial officers only those who shall have obtained the
highest number of votes, and filed their certificates of candidacy in accordance
with the provisions of Sec. 404 of this law. Sec. 404, as amended by Sec. 3 of the
same Act No. 3030, provides that no person shall be eligible for the office of
senator, representative or any provincial office, unless within the time fixed by
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the law, he shall file a certificate of candidacy duly verified. The meaning of the
phrase "a certificate of candidacy duly verified," is explained by this court in Viola
vs. Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur and Adolfo,to the effect that "only
when the corresponding receipt has been issued and the certificate filed can it be
presumed that it has been duly verified and filed."
• In the instant case, according to the allegations of the petitioner the respondent
Juan T. Lucero filed his certificate of candidacy in the office of the secretary of the
provincial board of La Union on April 15, 1925, the provincial secretary having
issued the proper receipt for the filing of said certificate, together with a statement
of the expenses attached thereto. It, therefore, seems clear that the respondent
filed his certificate in accordance with the Spanish text of Sec. 404 of the Election
Law, as amended by Sec. 3 of act No. 3030.
• But the petitioner argues that section 404 of the Election Law, as amended by
section 3 of Act No. 3030, is mandatory in its terms, and therefore must be
complied with the provincial board, respondent herein. Granting that the English
text of the law in this case makes clear the Spanish text "Certificado de candidatura
debidamente acreditado" (certificate of candidacy duly verified), it will be seen that
said section 3 of Act No. 3030 requires the candidate to file a "certificate of
candidacy duly verified," indicating by these two words that the certificate of
candidacy must be sworn to. In the case before us the certificate of the respondent
Juan T. Lucero was defective, lacking the formality of the oath. This irregularity
might have justified the elimination of the name of Juan T. Lucero as a legal
candidate for the office of provincial governor, if an objection on the part of the
petitioner Tomas de Guzman had been made in due time. Yet the Court is of the
opinion that this irregularity does not invalidate the election for the fundamental
reason that after it was proven by the count of the votes that Juan T. Lucero had
obtained the majority of the legal votes, the will of the people cannot be
frustrated by a technicality consisting in that his certificate of candidacy had not
been properly sworn to.
• In Gardiner vs. Romulo, following authoritative decisions of the United States,
which establish rules of interpretation of election laws, said:
The provisions of the Election Law declaring that a certain irregularity in
an election procedure is fatal to the validity of the ballot or of the
returns, or when the purpose and spirit of the law would be plainly
defeated by a substantial departure from the prescribed method, are
mandatory.
When the Election Law does not provide that a departure from a
prescribed form will be fatal and such departure has been due to an
 POWERS of the COMELEC (POE v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO – CERTIFICATE of CANDIDACY(VILLAROSA v. COMELEC)
honest mistake or misinterpretation of the Election Law on the part of
him who was obligated to observe it, and such departure has not been
used as a means for fraudulent practices or for the intimidation of voters,
and it is clear that there has been a free and honest expression of the
popular will, the law will be held directory and such departure will be
considered a harmless irregularity.
• In Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, this court laid down the following doctrine:
It has been announced in many decisions that the rules and regulations,
for the conduct of elections, are mandatory before the election, but
when it is sought to enforce them after the election, they are held to be
directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held to be
mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any
fault on their part. The various and numerous provisions of the Election
Law were adopted to assist the voters in their participation in the affairs
of the government and not to defeat that object. When the voters have
honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified simply
because the officers appointed under the law to direct the election and
guard the purity of the ballot have not done their duty. The law provides
a remedy, by criminal action, against them. They should be prosecuted
criminally, and the will of the honest voter, as expressed through his
ballot, should be protected and upheld.
• The legal provision here in question is mandatory and non-compliance therewith
before the election would have been fatal to the recognition of the status of
Juan T. Lucero as candidate. But after the people have expressed their will
honestly, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that the
respondent who was certified by the provincial secretary to be a legal candidate
for the office of provincial governor, has not sworn to his certificate of
candidacy. The situation is somewhat like that of a voter placing his ballot in the
box. There are certain requirements of the law, affecting the vote, which have
been considered by this court as of a mandatory character until the ballot is placed
in the ballot box; but we have held that the validity of the count cannot be
questioned, nor the vote stricken out after the ballots had been placed in the
ballot boxes, simply for non-compliance with such provisions. After the
termination of the election, public interest must be made to prevail over that of
the defeated candidate, and we cannot declare that the election of the
respondent Juan T. Lucero was illegal, and that he should quit the office for which
he was elected, simply by reason of a defect in his certificate of candidacy, which
defect could have been corrected before the election, but which cannot be cured
after its termination, and after the result of the election was published by the
provincial board of canvassers, respondents herein.
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• Hence, the demurrer of the respondent is sustained upon the third ground. Writ of
mandamus denied.
180 Villarosa v COMELEC
Gonzaga-Reyes, J | Nov 29, 1999
Facts:
• Petitioner was a candidate for Representative of the lone district of Occidental
Mindoro in the May 11, 1998 elections and was proclaimed duly elected thereto on
May 27, 1998
• filed her certificate of candidacy in which she stated, among others, that her
nickname is JTV
• respondent Restor filed a letter-petition addressed to COMELEC Chairman
Bernardo Pardo asking for the invalidation or cancellation of JTV as the official
nickname of petitioner, and the nullification of all votes cast in the said nickname,
on the ground that petitioner is not publicly known by that name
o petitioner is publicly known in Occidental Mindoro as Girlie and that the
appellation JTV actually pertains to the initials of her husband and former
Congressman of Occidental Mindoro, Jose Tapales Villarosa
• election day, COMELEC en banc granted respondent’s letter-petition; nickname JTV
is not one by which petitioner is popularly known
o Petitioner received a fax copy of this Resolution at 5:32 in the afternoon
of May 11, 1998, at which time voting has ceased and canvassing of votes
in some precincts has already gone underway.
• May 12, 1998, petitioner filed with the Commission an Urgent Manifestation and
Motion to reconsider the aforesaid Resolution. Denied.
SolGen: petitioner may validly use the same as she is in fact Mrs. Jose Tapales Villarosa, and
hence, there is no misrepresentation. No one among the other candidates had the same
initials as to be prejudiced by her use of the same
ISSUE 1: WoN COMELEC acted in GAD in ruling on the letter-petition without according
notice and hearing to petitioner (YES)
• it is clear that the Commission passed upon the letter-petition without affording
petitioner the opportunity to explain her side and to counter the allegations
• Due process dictates that before any decision can be validly rendered in a case, the
twin requirements of notice and hearing must be observed
• Evidently, the conclusion of the Commission was drawn purely from the allegations
of the letter-petition and for this reason, the Commission acted in excess of its
jurisdiction
 POWERS of the COMELEC (POE v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO – CERTIFICATE of CANDIDACY(VILLAROSA v. COMELEC)
• Deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given
the chance to be heard on his MR.
o However, we find the foregoing rule inapplicable to the circumstances of
the case at bench
• petitioner filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion with the Commission on May
12, 1998, which the Commission promptly denied the following day. By its own
designation, the two-page pleading filed by petitioner is one part manifestation and
one part motion. On the main, it enters appearance of petitioner, who was not
impleaded in the letter-petition, and communicates receipt of the May 11, 1998
Resolution.
o Even as it seeks reconsideration of the said resolution by invoking due
process, it does not purport to embody petitioner’s grounds and
arguments for reconsideration. Rather, it states that (petitioner)
reserve(s) all rights and waive(s) none, including filing a supplemental
MR, pending retaining additional counsel as the lawyer representing
petitioner at the time was saddled with other commitments.
o In filing this Urgent Manifestation and Motion on the second day of
canvassing of votes, and immediately after receipt of the contested
resolution, it is obvious that petitioners immediate concern for doing so
was not mainly to exercise her right to be heard, but to have the
Commission seasonably reconsider the May 11, 1998 Resolution while
canvassing was still at the precinct or municipal level.
o While the filing of a supplemental motion for reconsideration is not a
matter of right, it is believed that the judicious thing for the Commission
to have done, considering the obvious due process issues, was to afford
petitioner a chance to explain why she should be allowed to use the
nickname JTV, such as by requiring her to submit a supplemental motion
for reconsideration.
ISSUE 2: WoN COMELEC acted in GAD in taking cognizance of the letter-petition which was
not filed by a real party in interest (YES)
• COMELEC Rules of Procedure require that all actions filed with the Commission be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest
• letter-petition does not allege that the protestant, herein respondent Restor, is a
candidate for any position in the May 11, 1998 elections, or a representative of a
registered political party or coalition, or at the very least, a registered voter in the
lone district of Occidental Mindoro --- as to stand to sustain any form of injury by
petitioners use of the nickname JTV
ISSUE 3: WoN COMELEC acted in GAD in resolving the letter-petition en banc, instead of first
referring it to one of its Divisions (YES)
• Sarmiento vs. COMELEC interpreted Section 3, Article IX(C) of the Constitution as
requiring all election cases to be first heard and decided by a division of the
Commission, before being brought to the Commission en banc on reconsideration
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o respondents take exception by stating that the subject letter-petition
posed issues which were administrative in character, and, thus, not
subject to the requirement of referral to division which applies only in the
Commissions exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions
• concurring opinion of Justice Antonio in University of Nueva Caceres vs. Martinez
o “administrative” connotes, or pertains, to administration, especially
management, as by managing or conducting, directing or superintending,
the execution, application, or conduct of persons or things. It does not
entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of
evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon
o “quasi-judicial function” applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from
them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a
judicial nature
• A directive by the Commission to disallow petitioners use of the nickname JTV for
purposes of her candidacy, clearly necessitates a determination of whether
petitioner is in fact not generally or popularly known as such in the locality of
Occidental Mindoro. Indubitably, since it involved the application of law or rules to
an ascertained set of facts, it called for the Commissions exercise of its adjudicatory
powers and falls within the concept of an election contest in the sense
contemplated by Section 3, Article IX(C) of the Constitution.
ISSUE 4: WoN COMELEC acted in GAD in disallowing petitioners use of the nickname JTV and
ordering the election officers of Occidental Mindoro to consider invalid all votes cast in that
appellation (no ruling)
• election protest of respondent Quintos is presently pending in the HRET, we leave
this matter to the resolution of the said body as the sole judge of all contests
respecting the election, returns and qualifications of its members
DISPOSITIVE: petition is GRANTED; COMELEC reversed