HEIRS OF ALBERTO SUGUITAN vs.

CITY OF MANDALUYONG

Facts: Mayor Benjamin Abalos was authorized to expropriate the land of Alberto Suguitan through
a Mandaluyong City Resolution No. 396, S-1994. It’s purpose is to expand the Mandaluyong
Medical Center. Because of said Resolution, Mayor Abalos sent Suguitan a letter to buy said
property but was consequently denied by the same. Thus, a legal action was commenced by said
mayor, but, Suguitan claimed that such expropriation was improper due to the fact that the power
of eminent domain by the city may only be valid through an Ordinance and not a mere resolution,
but it was countered by herein respondents as they claim that resolution is already enough in
accordance with RA 7160 (Local Government Code) and that an Ordinance was needed only for
the appropriation of funds.

Issue: Won a mere resolution is enough to expropriate

Held: No. An examination of the applicable law will show that an ordinance is necessary to
authorize the filing of a complaint with the proper court since, beginning at this point, the power of
eminent domain is already being exercised. Clearly, although the determination and award of just
compensation to the defendant is indispensable to the transfer of ownership in favor of the plaintiff,
it is but the last stage of the expropriation proceedings, which cannot be arrived at without an initial
finding by the court that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint. An order of condemnation or
dismissal at this stage would be final, resolving the question of whether or not the plaintiff has
properly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain.

National Housing Authority vs Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, Court Of Appeals

FACTS: Petitioner National Housing Authority intends to develop lands within a blighted urban
center as a socialized housing project. The Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo were the claimants/owners of
Cadastral Lot No. 1613-D located at Carreta, Mabolo, Cebu City.
The Heirs waived their right to object petitioner’s power to expropriate properties. The RTC declared
that NHA has a lawful right to expropriate the properties of respondents, and ordered the payment,
and that commissioners be appointed to ascertain just compensation.
The amount was fixed at P11,200/sqm. Petitioner appealed and while it was pending, they
filed with the trial court a Motion to Dismiss the complaint for eminent domain. It alleged that the
implementation of its socialized housing project was rendered impossible by the unconscionable
value of the land sought to be expropriated, which the intended beneficiaries cannot afford.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners may discontinue the expropriation proceedings even after final
judgment of their lawful right to acquire the lands for public purpose

RULING: No. Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the property
after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the
determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the
court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners.
The outcome of the first phase of expropriation proceedings, which is either an order of
expropriation or an order of dismissal, is final since it finally disposes of the case. On the other hand,
the second phase ends with an order fixing the amount of just compensation. Both orders, being
final, are appealable.
Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to
expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned.
Respondent landowners had already been prejudiced by the expropriation case. Petitioner
cannot be permitted to institute condemnation proceedings against respondents only to abandon it
later when it finds the amount of just compensation unacceptable.

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 Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, DPWH, and ATO
vs. Milagros Urgello

FACTS: The Civil Aeronautics Administration filed a complaint for expropriation of Lot No. 913-E-3,
owned by respondent Milagros Urgello for the projected expansion of the Lahug Airport. The CAA
agreed to purchase the Lot for P3,105 subject to the resolutory condition that in the event the
Republic of the Philippines would no longer use it as an airport, its title or ownership would revert
to respondent or her heirs upon reimbursement of the purchase price of P3,105.00. Urgello
executed a Conditional Deed of Sale to that effect.
When Mactan Airport commenced its operations, PAL stopped using Lahug Airport. Soon
enough, Filipinas Airways and Air Manila also stopped.
The Bureau of Air Transportation (previously CAA) and the Bureau of Equipment of the
then Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH), entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
whereby the BAT was to lease several parcels of land, including Lot No. 913-E-3, to MPWH for 25
years to be used as the site of the latter’s Seventh Regional Base Shop Complex.
The MPWH soon started building fences along the perimeters of Lot No. 913-E-3
Respondent requested the BAT for reconveyance and tendered Demand Draft to BAT which
received it but did not reconvey the lot.

ISSUE: WON BAT lawfully fenced Lot 913-E-3 despite its not being used as an airport

RULING: No. Contrary to petitioners DPWHs and ATOs undertakings in the Compromise
Agreement, they failed to reconvey Lot No. 913-E-3 to respondent despite her return of the
purchase price therefor. Such failure amounts to expropriation without just compensation. These
lots, without the plaintiffs consent, were unilaterally taken by the government when BAT fenced
the same. Such an act violates the constitutional mandate that Private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation.

Vda. de Ouano vs. Republic

FACTS:
1. In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAA’s predecessor agency pursued a program
to expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu City.
2. As an assurance from the government, there is a promise of reconveyance or repurchase of said
property so long as Lahug ceases its operation or transfer its operation to Mactan – Cebu Airport.
3. Some owners refused to sell, and that the Civil Aeronautics Administration filed a complaint for the
expropriation of said properties for the expansion of the Lahug Airport.
4. The trial court then declared said properties to be used upon the expansion of said projects and
order for just compensation to the land owners, at the same time directed the latter to transfer
certificate or ownership or title in the name of the plaintiff.
5. At the end of 1991, Lahug Airport completely ceased its operation while the Mactan-Cebu airport
opened to accommodate incoming and outgoing commercial flights.
6. This then prompted the land owners to demand for the reconveynace of said properties being
expropriated by the trial court under the power of eminent domain. Hence these two consolidated
cases arise.
7. In G.R. No. 168812 MCIAA is hereby ordered by court to reconvey said properties to the land
owners plus attorney’s fee and cost of suit, while in G.R. No. 168770, the RTC ruled in favor of the
petitioners Oaunos and against the MCIAA for the reconveynace of their properties but was
appealed by the latter and the earlier decision was reversed, the case went up to the CA but the
CA affirmed the reversed decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: W/N MCIAA(Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority) reconvey the lands to petitioners?

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 HELD:
YES. The notion that the government via expropriation proceedings acquires unrestricted
ownership over or a fee simple title to the covered land is no longer tenable. Expropriated lands
should be differentiated from a piece of land, ownership of which was absolutely transferred by
way of an unconditional purchase and sale contract freely entered by two parties, one without
obligation to buy and the other without the duty to sell. In that case, the fee simple concept really
comes into play. There is really no occasion to apply the “fee simple concept” if the transfer is
conditional.

The taking of a private land in expropriation proceedings is always conditioned on its

continued devotion to its public purpose. Once the purpose is terminated or peremptorily
abandoned, then the former owner, if he so desires, may seek its reversion subject of course
to the return at the very least of the just compensation received.

Department of Transportation and Communication v. Spouses Abencina

Facts: Respondent spouses Vicente and Maria Cleofe Abecina are the registered owners of five
parcels of land in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte. In February 1993, the DOTC awarded Digitel
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (Digitel) a contract for the management, operation,
maintenance, and development of a Regional Telecommunications Development Project (RTDP)
under the National Telephone Program, Phase I, Tranche 1 (NTPI-1).
Later on, the municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, donated a 1,200 square-meter
parcel of land to the DOTC for the implementation of the RDTP in the municipality. However, the
municipality erroneously included portions of the respondents' property in the donation. Pursuant to
the FLAs, Digitel constructed a telephone exchange on the property which encroached on the
properties of the respondent spouses the respondent spouses sent a final demand letter to both the
DOTC and Digitel to vacate the premises and to pay unpaid rent/damages in the amount of one
P1,200,000.00. Neither the DOTC nor Digitel complied with the demand. The RTC held that as the
lawful owners of the properties, the respondent spouses enjoyed the right to use and to possess them
- rights that were violated by the DOTC's unauthorized entry, construction, and refusal to vacate.
The RTC ordered the Department vacate the properties; and awarded the spouses with 1.2M as
actual damages. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
Issue: WON the power of eminent domain was properly exercised by DOTC.
Ruling: No. The DOTC encroached on the respondents' properties when it constructed the local
telephone exchange in Daet, Camarines Norte. The exchange was part of the RTDP pursuant to the
National Telephone Program. It is clear that when the DOTC constructed the encroaching structures
and subsequently entered the FLA with Digitel for their maintenance, it was carrying out a sovereign
function. Therefore, DOTC's acts fall within the cloak of state immunity.
However, under the Bill of Rights, whenever private property is taken for public use, it becomes the
ministerial duty of the concerned office or agency to initiate expropriation proceedings. By necessary
implication, the filing of a complaint for expropriation is a waiver of State immunity. If the DOTC had
correctly followed the regular procedure upon discovering that it had encroached on the respondents'
property, it would have initiated expropriation proceedings instead of insisting on its immunity from
suit.
The exercise of eminent domain requires a genuine necessity to take the property for public use and
the consequent payment of just compensation. The property is evidently being used for a public
purpose. However, we also note that the respondent spouses willingly entered into a lease
agreement with Digitel for the use of the subject properties. If in the future, the factual circumstances
should change and the respondents refuse to continue the lease, then the DOTC may initiate
expropriation proceedings. But as matters now stand, the respondents are clearly willing to lease the
property. Therefore, we find no genuine necessity for the DOTC to actually take the property at this
point.

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Republic vs Roque

Facts: Gonzalo Roque, Jr., et al., owned several parcels of land with a total area of about 9,811
square meters, located in Constitution Hills, Quezon City. In 1978, the Republic, via DPWH,
approached the respondents and asked them to sell a portion of the land at government-dictated
prices lower than the market value for President Marcos’ National Government Center project. The
Republic guaranteed that although the respondents would get paid a price much lower than the
market value of the land, the construction of the NGC Project would eventually enhance the value of
the surrounding portions of the land that they still own, and it them that, in the remote possibility that
it abandons the project, they will have the right to buy back the land. They signed the deed of sale.
The Republic did not immediately take possession of all of the land; thus, the respondents continued
to occupy portions of the sold properties. After several years, informal settlers began to occupy parts
of the land, and the respondents felt that the Republic was reneging on its undertaking to develop the
land into the NGC Project. Hence, Gonzalo sent letters to then DPWH Secretary Vicente Jayme
offering to buy back the properties. Gonzalo received no response. On 2003, the Housing Urban
Development Coordinating Council wrote a letter to the respondents, requesting them to vacate all
portions of the sold land that they were still occupying, because the government would use the
properties for socialized housing pursuant to RA 9207.
Gonzales filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale of the properties and asserted their right to
buy back the properties at the same price at which they sold them since the Republic failed to
develop the land according to the original purpose for which it was "expropriated." The Republic
argued that they are immune from suit as government instrumentalities, and that they agreed to
neither the respondents' right to repurchase the properties in case the government abandons the
NGC Project nor a right to additional compensation in case the respondents' remaining properties
suffer a decrease in market value.
Issue: WON the defense of immunity from suit is not proper in an eminent domain case.
Ruling: No. In the present case, the Republic entered into deeds of sale with the respondents to
construct the NGC Project on the lots sold. To facilitate the sale, the Republic created a negotiating
team to discuss the terms of the sale with the respondents. The latter agreed to the negotiated sale
on these alleged conditions: (a) that they will have the right to repurchase the properties if the NGC
Project does not push through; and (b) that the NGC Project will increase the market value of their
remaining properties.
The State's failure to abide by these conditions constitutes the State's implied waiver of its immunity.
We reiterate that the doctrine of state immunity from suit cannot serve to perpetrate an injustice on a
citizen. If we rule otherwise, we will be tolerating unfair dealing in contract negotiation. The State's
consent to be sued is presumed when the State fails to comply with the alleged terms of a deed of
donation.

Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bataan vs Garcia GR 174964, October 5, 2016

Facts: Lot Nos. 2193 and 2194 of the Bataan Cadastre, containing 1,222 square meters and 10,598
sq m, respectively, were registered in the name of the Province of Bataan. Both lots occupied by the
Bataan Community Colleges (BCC) and the Medina Lacson de Leon School of Arts and Trades
(MLLSAT), both State-run schools. On February 1998, Congress passed R.A. 8562, authored by
Cong Garia, converting the MLLSAT into a polytechnic college known as the Bataan Polytechnic
State College (BPSC), and integrating thereto the parcels of land belonging to BCC and Medina. On
the basis of the said provision, Cong. Garcia wrote to then Governor of Bataan Leonardo Roman,
and the petitioner, requesting them to cause the transfer of the title of the aforesaid lots to BPSC. No
transfer was effected.
Thus, Cong. Garcia, along with the faculty members and some concerned students of BPSC filed a
Special Civil Action for Mandamus with the RTC against the Governor and the petitioner. The
Governor and the petitioner asserted that the subject properties were owned by the Province of
Bataan and not the State, for them to be simply transferred to the BPSC by virtue of the law. The

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RTC rendered a decision ordering transfer and registration of the title to and in the name of the
BPSC. The petitioner appealed to the CA alleging that the subject lots were the patrimonial
properties of the Province of Bataan, and as such they cannot be taken by the National Government
without due process of law and without just compensation. The CA rejected said claim, declaring
that the petitioner failed to provide proof that the Province of Bataan acquired them with its own
private or corporate funds.

Issue: WON the subject parcels of land are patrimonial properties of the province of Bataan which
cannot be taken without due process of law and without just compensation.
Ruling: No. R.A. No. 8562 was not intended to expropriate the subject lots titled in the name of the
Province of Bataan, but to confirm their character as communal land of the State and to make them
available for disposition by the National Government. Thus, the sale of the subdivided lots to the
bona fide occupants by authority of Congress was not an exercise of eminent domain or
expropriation without just compensation, but simply a manifestation of its right and power to deal with
State property. "It is established doctrine that the act of classifying State property calls for the exercise
of wide discretionary legislative power which will not be interfered with by the courts."

The court reaffirmed the established general rule that "regardless of the source or classification of
land in the possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or
corporate capacity, such property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants,
whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. Accordingly, the legal situation is the same as
if the State itself holds the property and puts it to a different use" and stressed that "the property, as
has been previously shown, was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its private or
proprietary capacity. That it has in its name a registered title is not questioned, but this title should be
deemed to be held in trust for the State as the land covered thereby was part of the territory of the
City of Manila granted by the sovereign upon its creation.

Municipality of Cordova v. Pathfinder Development Corporation,

Facts:Respondent Pathfinder Development Corporation (Pathfinder) is the owner of real properties

in Alegria, Cordova, Cebu of various lots which was subject to expropriation by petitioner
Sangguniang Bay an of the Municipality of Cordova pursuant to Ordinance No. 003-2011 for the
construction of a road access from the national highway to the municipal roll-on/roll-off (RORO) port.

Subsequently, the Mayor of Cordova filed an expropriation complaint against the owners of the
properties. Later, the Mayor filed a motion to place the municipality in possession of the properties
sought to be expropriated. But Pathfinder and Topanga filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of the
Expropriation Ordinance before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, Branch 56,
claiming that no offer to buy addressed to them was shown or attached to the expropriation
complaint, thereby rendering the Ordinance constitutionally infirm for being in violation of their right
to due process and equal protection.

The RTC denied the corporations' motion for suspension of the proceedings and granting the
issuance of a Writ of Possession in favor of the municipality. But the CA reversed the RTC.

Issue: WON the taking of the properties of Topanga and Pathfinder is proper. Ruling:
Yes. Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property
to particular uses to promote public welfare. It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a
power grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the common need and advance
the general welfare. The power of eminent domain is inseparable in sovereignty being essential to
the existence of the State and inherent in government. Its exercise is proscribed by only two
Constitutional requirements: first, that there must be just compensation, and second, that no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

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The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature but may be validly delegated to local
government units. The basis for its exercise by the Municipality of Cordova, being a local
government unit, is granted under Section 19 of Republic Act 7160.

Iron and Steel Authority v. CA, 249 SCRA 538

Facts:
Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created by P.D. No. 272 in order, generally, to develop and
promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. The list of powers and functions of the ISA
included the following: xx

Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. – The authority shall have the following powers and functions: xx
(j) to initiate expropriation of land required for basic iron and steel facilities for subsequent resale and/or lease
to the companies involved if it is shown that such use of the State’s power is necessary to implement the
construction of capacity which is needed for the attainment of the objectives of the Authority; xx

The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Development
Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National Government, embarked on an
expansion program embracing, among other things, the construction of an integrated steel mill in
Iligan City.

Since certain portions of the public land subject matter Proclamation No. 2239 were occupied by a
non- operational chemical fertilizer plant and related facilities owned by Maria Cristina Fertilizer
Corporation (“MCFC”), Letter of Instruction (LOI), No. 1277, was issued directing the NSC to
“negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of
MCFC’s present occupancy rights on the subject land.”

Negotiations between NSC and private respondent MCFC did fail. Accordingly ISA commenced
eminent domain proceedings against MCFC in the RTC of Iligan City but was dismissed on the
ground that its statutory existence has expired.

ISA went on appeal to the CA, which affirmed the order of dismissal of the trial court. At the same
time, however, the Court of Appeals held that it was premature for the trial court to have ruled that
the expropriation suit was not for a public purpose, considering that the parties had not yet rested
their respective cases.

In this Petition for Review, the Solicitor General argues that since ISA initiated and prosecuted the
action for expropriation in its capacity as agent of the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic, as
principal of ISA, is entitled to be substituted and to be made a party-plaintiff after the agent ISA's
term had expired.

Issue: WON the Republic of the Philippines is allowed to substituted in expropriation proceedings.
Ruling: Yes. The Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation
proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired. ISA instituted
the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an agent or delegate or representative of the
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its authority under P.D. No. 272. The present
expropriation suit was brought on behalf of and for the benefit of the Republic as the
principal of ISA. The principal or the real party in interest is thus the Republic of the Philippines and
not the National Steel Corporation, even though the latter may be an ultimate user of the properties
involved should the condemnation suit be eventually successful.

While the power of eminent domain is, in principle, vested primarily in the legislative department of
the government, we believe and so hold that no new legislative act is necessary should the Republic
decide, upon being substituted for ISA, in fact to continue to prosecute the expropriation
proceedings.

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PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC

Facts: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directingnewspapers to

provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political
parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge,
among all candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue
and their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the
Commission for dissemination of vital election-information.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and
magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution
upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.
On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a
permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the
information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard
and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.

Issue: W/n the resolution is violative of art. 3 sec. 9 with respect to undertake expropriation case?

Held:
Yes. It held that to compel print media companies to donate “Comelec space” amounts
to “taking” of private personal property without payment of the just compensation required in
expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been established
by respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising
space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not
without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid
exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of
a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.

Telebap v. COMELEC – 289 SCRA 337

Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP)
is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. The other petitioner,
GMA Network, Inc., operates radio and television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines
under a franchise granted by Congress.

Petitioners challenge the validity of Sec. 92 of BP 881 on the ground (1) that it takes property
without due process of law and without just compensation. It contends that Section 92 singles out
radio and television stations to provide free air time. Petitioners claim that the primary source of
revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require
these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property.

Issue: WON Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of law
and without just compensation.

Ruling:

No. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government.
Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast
than there are frequencies to assign. As radio and television broadcast stations do not own
the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to
the COMELEC. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is

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a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance
by the grantee of some form of public service.

Telebap v. COMELEC – 289 SCRA 337

Facts: Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing
COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and
that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim
that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to
advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of
private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time
for one hour each day and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of
COMELEC’s requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.

Issue: Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due
process of law and without just compensation.

Ruling: The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free
air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for
the print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry
requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the
broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry
gets.

As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken
by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.

Estate of Heirs v. City of Manila, 422 SCRA 551

Facts: The records show that Jose B. L. Reyes and petitioners Heirs of Edmundo Reyes are the
pro- indiviso co-owners in equal proportion of 11 parcels of land with a total area of 13,940 square
meters situated at Sta. Cruz District, Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24359
issued by the Register of Deeds of Manila. These parcels of land are being occupied and leased
by different tenants, among whom are respondents Abiog, Maglonso and members of respondent
Sampaguita Bisig ng Magkakapitbahay, Incorporated (SBMI). Petitioners leased to respondent
Abiog Lot 2-E, Block 3007 of the consolidated subdivision plan (LRC) Psd- 328345, with an area
of 191 square meters[7] and to respondent Maglonso, Lot 2-R, Block 2996 of the same
consolidation plan, with an area of 112 square meters

Issue: Whether respondent City deprived petitioners of their property without due process of law
depends on whether the City complied with the legal requirements for expropriation.

Ruling: Before respondent City can exercise its power of eminent domain, the same must be
sanctioned and must not violate any law. Being a mere creation of the legislature, a local
government unit can only exercise powers granted to it by the legislature. Such is the nature of
the constitutional power of control of Congress over local government units, the latter being mere
creations of the former.

Due to the fatal infirmity in the City’s exercise of the power of eminent domain, its complaint for
expropriation must necessarily fail. Considering that the consolidated cases before us can be
completely resolved by the application of our Filstream ruling, it is needless to discuss the
constitutionality of Ordinance 7818. We herein apply the general precept that constitutional issues
will not be passed upon if the case can be decided on other grounds.
Wherefore, the petitions are hereby granted. in g.r. no. 132431, the decision of the court of

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appeals dated January 27, 1998 is hereby reversed and set aside. in g.r. no. 137146, the
resolutions of the court of appeals dated august 19, 1998 and December 16, 1998 are hereby
reversed and set aside

Lagcao v. Labra, GR 155746, October 13, 2004

Facts: On 1964, the Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. One of these lots was
Lot 1029, situated in Capitol Hills, Cebu City, with an area of 4,048 square meters. In 1965,
petitioners purchased Lot 1029 on installment basis. But then, in late 1965, the 210 lots, including
Lot 1029, reverted to the Province of Cebu.Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of
Lot 1029 by the City of Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the latter to sue the province for
specific performance and damages in the then Court of First Instance.

On June 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Pursuant to the ruling
of the appellate court, the Province of Cebu executed on June 1994 a deed of absolute sale over
Lot 1029 in favor of petitioners. Thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name of
petitioners and Crispina Lagcao. After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot
only to discover that it was already occupied by squatters. Thus, on June 15, 1997, petitioners
instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Branch 1, Cebu City, rendered a decision on April 1998, ordering the squatters to vacate the lot.
On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCCs decision and issued a writ of execution and order of
demolition.

Issue: Whether the Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation of
their property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the concept of
“public use” contemplated in the Constitution.

Ruling: Ordinance No. 1843 failed to comply with the foregoing substantive requirements. A clear
case of constitutional infirmity having been thus established, this Court is constrained to nullify the
subject ordinance. We recapitulate: (1) as earlier discussed, the questioned ordinance is
repugnant to the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, RA 7279 and RA 7160; (2)the precipitate
manner in which it was enacted was plain oppression masquerading as a pro-poor ordinance; (3)
the fact that petitioners small property was singled out for expropriation for the purpose of
awarding it to no more than a few squatters indicated manifest partiality against petitioners.

Indeed, experience has shown that the disregard of basic liberties and the use of short-sighted
methods in expropriation proceedings have not achieved the desired results. Wherefore, the
petition is hereby granted.

Greater Balanga Development vs. Municipality of Balanga Development

Facts:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation owned and controlled by the Camacho family, which
donated to the Municipality of Balanga the present site of the Balanga Public Market. The lot in
dispute lies behind the Balanga Public Market.
In 1987, petitioner conducted a relocation survey of the area. It discovered that certain portions
of the property had been "unlawfully usurped and invaded" by the Municipality of Balanga, which
had "allowed/tolerated/abetted" the construction of shanties and market stalls while charging
market fees and market entrance fees from the occupants and users of the area.
Petitioner applied with the Office of the Mayor of Balanga for a business permit to engage in
business in the said area. However, the Sangguniang Bayan of Balanga passed Resolution No.
12, s-88 annulling the Mayor's permit issued to petitioner and advising the Mayor to revoke the
permit "to operate a public market." Pursuant to said Resolution, Mayor Banzon issued Executive

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Order No. 1, s-88 revoking the permit insofar as it authorized the operation of a public market.
Petitioner replied that since it had not violated any law or ordinance, there was no reason for
respondents to revoke the Mayor's permit issued to it. On the contrary, petitioner asserted that
the executive order and the resolution in question were quasi-judicial acts and not mere
exercises of police power. It questioned respondents' failure to observe due process in revoking
the permit.
Issue: Whether or not the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion in the revocation of
Mayor's permit.

Ruling: Yes. Until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court, the landowner cannot be
deprived of its right over the land Of course, the Sangguniang Bayan has the duty in the exercise of
its police powers to regulate any business subject to municipal license fees and prescribe the
conditions under which a municipal license already issued may be revoked (B.P. Blg. 337, Sec. 149
[1] [r]). But the "anxiety, uncertainty, restiveness" among the stallholders and traders cannot be a
valid ground for revoking the permit of petitioner. After all, the stallholders and traders were doing
business on property not belonging to the Municipal government. Indeed, the claim that the
executive order and resolution were measures "designed to promote peace and order and protect
the general welfare of the people of Balanga" is too amorphous and convenient an excuse to justify
respondents'
Moreover, we find that the manner by which the Mayor revoked the permit transgressed
petitioner's right to due process. The alleged violation of Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga
Revenue Code was not stated in the order of revocation, and neither was petitioner informed of
this specific violation until the Rejoinder was filed in the instant case. In fact, with all the more
reason should due process have been observed in view of the questioned Resolution of the
Sangguniang Bayan.

Velarma vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
An "ejectment suit" was filed by private respondent against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court, Mauban, Quezon. Private respondent alleged: (1) that sometime in May 1981, petitioner
surreptitiously built his dwelling on a portion of her land at Barangay Lual (Poblacion), Mauban,
Quezon, registered under Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of private respondent's
husband Publio ( (2) that the matter was reported to the Barangay Captain who conducted
several conferences during which petitioner promised to vacate the land and remove his house
therefrom, notwithstanding which he still failed or refused to do so; (3) that she instituted a
criminal case against petitioner in 1986 for violation of P.D. No. 772 (the Anti-Squatting Law); (4)
that the trial court convicted petitioner of the offense and imposed a fine of P1,500.00 on him; (5)
that, despite such judgment, and notwithstanding repeated demands to vacate, petitioner
continued occupying the property, compelling her to bring the suit.
The trial court in its judgment found that private respondent had satisfactorily established her
ownership over the parcel of land in question. It also found that petitioner entered and occupied
private respondent's land "without authority of law and against the will of the owner through
strategy and stealth. The trial court ordered petitioner to vacate the subject land, remove his
house therefrom and pay private respondent exemplary damages and attorney's fees,
respectively. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Petitioner's dwelling is situated on the shoulder of the new provincial highway, part of which was
constructed on a portion of the land belonging to and titled in the name of private respondent's
husband. According to petitioner, "while it is conceded that the premises occupied by him is still
within the area covered by private respondent's title, nonetheless, . . . the subject premises . . .
already belong to the government by virtue of its exchange of the abandoned road and bridge
Issue: Whether or not the respondent has retained ownership over the lands alleged to have
already been owned by the government?

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Ruling:

Yes. As found by the trial court, the said minutes of the meeting of the Sangguniang Bayan do not
mention the execution of any deed to perfect the agreement. An engineer was appointed to
survey the old abandoned road, but this act does not in any manner convey title over the
abandoned road to the Pansacola spouses nor extinguish their ownership over the land traversed
by the new provincial highway. No evidence was introduced by petitioner to show that the survey
was actually undertaken and a specific portion of the abandoned road partitioned and conveyed
to the Pansacolas. It must be stressed that the agreement to transfer the property was made in
1974. More than twenty years later, no actual transfer had yet been made. Unless and until the
transfer is consummated, or expropriation proceedings instituted by the government, private
respondent continues to retain ownership of the land subject of this case.

Solanda vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
The original owners of the the Quijano estate and at the same time the lessors of private
respondent Manlutac, Sps. Juan and Ceferina Quijano sold thru a Deed of Absolute Sale,
the realty in favor of petitioner for Thirty Million Pesos without giving the [private respondent]
and the other tenants the chance to exercise their pre-emptive rights as accorded to them
by PD No. 1517, subject lots being declared as urbanized lands.
Later on, in a letter dated June 24, 1989, after the sale to Solanda Enterprises, Inc. was
consummated, Ceferina Quijano made an offer to the private respondent and the other tenants
for the sale of the subject estate to them. On November 25, 1989, the tenants including private
respondent thru a letter addressed to Ceferina Quijano, signified their acceptance of the
proposed sale.
Mrs. Quijano sent a letter to private respondent informing him Solanda Enterprises was already
the owner of the subject property and that the payment of monthly rental should thence be made
to Solanda Enterprises.. On July 2, 1991, Solanda Enterprises registered the land in its name.
After discovering the sale of the leased lots to Solanda Enterprises upon verification with the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila, the tenants including private respondent filed with the
RTC a complaint against Solanda and Ceferina Quijano for annulment of sale, reconveyance and
damages.
On January 21, 1993, the MTC rendered a summary judgment in favor of petitioner. However,
CA reversed it by applying PD 1517 and that the land in dispute was located within an area for
priority development (APD) and an urban land reform zone (ULRZ) and thus granting
respondents the right of first refusal.
Issue: Whether or not the CA was correct in granting the right of first refusal to private
respondent? Ruling:
No. We agree. A close reading of Proclamation No. 1967 reveals that, before a preemptive right
can be exercised, the disputed land should be situated in an area declared to be both an area for
priority development (APD) and an urban land reform zone (ULRZ).The pendency of an action for
the annulment of the sale and the reconveyance of the disputed property may not be successfully
pleaded in abatement of an action for ejectment. Private respondent's alleged right of possession
is conditioned on his right to acquire ownership over the land. His right of the possession is, at
best, only inchoate. In any event, the private respondent's expectation of being granted the
preemptive right to purchase the property neither establishes his right to posses nor justifies the
dismissal of the ejectment case against him.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
SALEM INVESTMENT CORPORATION, MARIA DEL CARMEN ROXAS DE ELIZALDE,
CONCEPCION CABARRUS VDA. DE
SANTOS, defendants-appellees,
MILAGROS AND INOCENTES DE LA RAMA, petitioners,
ALFREDO GUERRERO, respondent.

FACTS:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 340 was passed authorizing the expropriation of parcels of lands in the
names of defendants in this case, including a portion of the land belonging to Milagros and
Inocentes De la Rama. Five years thereafter, Milagros and Inocentes De la Rama entered into a
contract2 with intervenor Alfredo Guerrero whereby the De la Ramas agreed to sell to Guerrero
the entire property. The De la Ramas received the sum of P2,200,000.00 as partial payment of
the purchase price, the balance thereof to be paid upon release of the title by the Philippine
Veterans Bank. Later, Guerrero filed a complaint for specific performance to compel the De la
Ramas to proceed with the sale. While this case for specific performance was pending, the
Republic of the Philippines filed the present case for expropriation pursuant to B.P. Blg. 340.
Upon the deposit of P12,970,350.00 representing 10 percent of the approximate market value of
the subject lands, a writ of possession4 was issued on August 29, 1990 in favor of the
government. Guerrero filed a motion for intervention alleging that the De la Ramas had agreed to
sell to him the entire Lot and that a case for specific performance had been filed by him against
the De la Ramas. The trial court rendered a decision in the case for specific performance
upholding the validity of the contract to
sell in favor of Guerrero. The De la Ramas appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV-
35116) but their petition was dismissed. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the De la Ramas are entitled to receive payment of just compensation for the
expropriation of the land in question.

HELD:
No. The Court held that Guerrero is entitled to receive payment of just compensation for the
taking of the land. The power of eminent domain is an inherent power of the State. No
constitutional conferment is necessary to vest it in the State. The constitutional provision on
eminent domain, Art. III, Sec. 9, provides a limitation rather than a basis for the exercise of such
power by the government. Thus, it states that "Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation." Expropriation may be initiated by court action or by legislation.25 In
both instances, just compensation is determined by the courts. The expropriation of lands
consists of two stages:
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in
the suit.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the
court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." It is only upon the
completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. Moreover, it is
only upon payment of just compensation that title over the property passes to the government.
Therefore, until the action for expropriation has been completed an terminated, ownership over
the property being expropriated remains with the registered owner. Consequently, the latter can
exercise all rights pertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of his property, subject to
the power of the State ultimately to acquire it through expropriation. In the case at hand, the first
stage of expropriation was completed when B.P. Blg. 340 was enacted providing for the
expropriation of 1,380 square meters of the land in question. The second stage of expropriation

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through the filing of a petition for the determination of just compensation. This stage was not
completed, however, because of the intervention of Guerrero which gave rise to the question of
ownership of the subject land. Therefore, the title to the expropriated property of the De la
Ramas remained with them and did not at that point pass to the government.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS:
After respondent, the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the
government in 1947 refused to extend the lease, Petitioner commenced expropriation proceedings
in 1959. During the assessment of just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the
property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings begun.
Respondent maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to
occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements of the “taking” of property under
the power of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private
property for more than a momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.

ISSUE: W/N the taking of property has taken place in 1947when the condemnor has entered
and occupied the property as lesse.

HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced
in 1959. The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property,
(2) for more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to
public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5)
substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. In the case at
bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied the property
under a contract of lease. We hold, therefore, that the "taking" of the Castellvi property should not
be reckoned as of the year 1947 when the Republic first occupied the same pursuant to the
contract of lease, and that the just compensation to be paid for the Castellvi property should not
be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year.

JANE L. GARCIA, MAYORICO P. SANDICO, BELEN R. GARCIA and

DANILO DIOKNO, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Special Tenth Division) and NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:
The petitioners own 2 lots located in Mexico, Pampanga with a total area is 159,825 square
meters. The National Power Corporation, through virtue of a document entitled “PERMISSION
TO OCCUPY”, occupied as early as 1957 portions of the two (2) lots for the construction of 'steel
towers and high power lines. The portions of the two (2) lots occupied is designated as Block 19
in the sketch plan. The NPC has not paid anything for the portion occupied, either as rental or as
purchase price. The NPC instituted the instant action for expropriation of a 'right-of-way
easement' over a portion of the two (2) lots. The NPC intends to use the area to be expropriated
for the construction and maintenance of its Transmission Line and offered to pay an easement
fee in the nominal sum of PI.00 and 10.00 for its power to be constructed.
Petitions ensued in which the RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered NPC to pay
P15.00 per square meter as purchase price. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC and ruled
that the NPC should only pay a compensation of P0.07 per square meter and according to them,
that there was a taking or possession of Block 19 in 1957 for purposes of expropriation and that
there was an action for expropriation of the same. The CA made the value stated in the tax

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 declaration of Block 19 in 1957 its basis on the assumption that in the said year the private
respondent had taken possession of the land for the purpose of eminent domain and on the
further presumption that subsequent thereto an action for expropriation was entered in court over
this property.

ISSUE: W/N Just compensation should be determined at the time of the taking.

HELD:
No. As the private respondent's entry was gained through permission, it did not have the intention
to acquire ownership either by voluntary purchase or by the exercise of eminent domain. And the
fact remains that the private respondent never completed the negotiation as to compensation. It is
clear, therefore, that the private respondent not only did not take possession with intent to
expropriate Block 19, but that it did not institute expropriation proceedings over the same. By
virtue of the special and peculiar circumstances of the case at bar, there being no taking of the
property in question for purposes of eminent domain nor condemnation proceedings instituted
over the same to speak of, the time as of which the market value should be fixed is the time when
the trial court made its order of expropriation. It is the date of appropriation or the investing date
which as everyone knows required more than a day, sometimes weeks to carry through as would
an ordinary real estate purchase and sale. Hence, in estimating the market value, all the
capabilities of the property and all the uses to which it may be applied or for which it is adapted
are to be considered and not merely the condition it is in the time and the use to which it is then
applied by the owner. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its
improvements and capabilities may be shown and considered in estimating its value.

20. City of Government v. Judge Ericta – 122 SCRA 759

Facts: An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the regulation
ofestablishment of private cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of the total
area of the private memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are
paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private memorial park, contends that
the taking or confiscation of property restricts the use of property such that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. It also contends that
the taking is not a valid exercise of police power, since the properties taken in the exercise of police
power are destroyed and not for the benefit of the public.

Issue: Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private property

Ruling: No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The
ordinace is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to
benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaing a
public cemeteries. State's exercise of the power of expropriation requires payment of just
compensation. Passing the ordinance without benefiting the owner of the property with just
compensation or due process, would amount to unjust taking of a real property. Since the property
that is needed to be taken will be used for the public's benefit, then the power of the state to
expropriate will come forward and not the police power of the state.
The petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent court is affirmed.

21. US v. Causby – 328 US 256

Facts: Respondents claim that their property was taken, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment,
by the regular army and navy aircraft flights over their house and chicken farm. Respondents own
2.8 acres near an airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. Respondents’ property contained a
house and a chicken farm. The end of one of the runways of the airport was 2,220 feet from

Page 14 of 62
 Respondents’ property, and the glide path passed over the property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet
above the house, 63 feet above the barn, and 18 feet above the highest tree. The use by the United
States of this airport is pursuant to a lease beginning June 1, 1942, and ending June 30, 1942, with
provisions for renewal until June 30, 1967, or six months after the end of the national emergency,
whichever is earlier. The United States’ four motored bombers make loud noises when flying above
the property, and have very bright lights. Respondents’ chicken farm production had to stop,
because 150 chickens were killed by flying into walls from fright. In the Court of Claims, it was found
that the United States had taken an easement over the property on June 1, 1942, and that the value
of the property depreciation as the result of the easement was $2,000.00. The United States
petitioned for certiorari, which was granted.

Issue. Whether or not the Respondents’ property been taken within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment?

Ruling: Yes. But the case is remanded for a determination of the value of the easement and whether
the easement was permanent or temporary.
The court noted the common law doctrine of ownership of land extending to the sky above the land.
However, the court notes that an act of Congress had given the United States exclusive national
sovereignty over the air space. The court noted that common sense made the common law doctrine
inapplicable.
However, the court found that the common law doctrine did not control the present case.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The airspace is a public highway, but if the landowner is to have the full
enjoyment of his land, he must have exclusive control over the immediate reaches of the enveloping
atmosphere.

22. People v. Fajardo – 104 Phil 443

Facts: Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur convicting
defendants-appellants Juan F. Fajardo and Pedro Babilonia of a violation of Ordinance No. 7, Series
of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, for having constructed without a permit from the
municipal mayor a building that destroys the view of the public plaza. It appears that on August
1950, during the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of
Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in question providing as follows:
SECTION 1. Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before
constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor. SEC. 2. A fee of not less
than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and P1.00 for each repair permit issued.
SEC. 3. Penalty — Any violation of the provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall make the
violation liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than
12 days nor more than 24 days or both, at the discretion of the court. If said building destroys the
view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be removed at the expense of the
owner of the building or house.

Issue: Whether or not the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to
be heard.

Ruling: No. Zoning which admittedly limits property to a use which cannot reasonably be made of it
cannot be said to set aside such property to a use but constitutes the taking of such property without
just compensation. Use of property is an element of ownership therein.

Page 15 of 62
We rule that the regulation in question, Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the
Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, was beyond the authority of said municipality to enact, and is
therefore null and void. Hence, the conviction of herein appellants is reversed, and said accused are
acquitted, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

Republic vs. PLDT 26 SCRA 620 FACTS:

Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right of the Bureau of
Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the Government Telephone System and
that of PLDT, so that the Government Telephone System could make use of the lines and facilities of
the PLDT. Private respondent contends that it cannot be compelled to enter into a contract where no
agreement is had between them.

ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can
be a valid object for expropriation?

HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may require the
telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require,
subject to the payment of just compensation. The use of lines and services to allow inter- service
connection between the both telephone systems, through expropriation can be a subject to an
easement of right of way.

Main Point: the state may, in the interest of national welfare transfer utilities to public ownership
upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the state may not require a public utility
to render services in the general interest provided just compensation is paid

NPC vs. Jocson 206 SCRA 520

Facts:
The petitioner filed seven (7) eminent domain cases in the acquisition of right of way easement over
7 parcels of land in relation to the necessity of building towers and transmission line for the common
good with the offer of corresponding compensation to landowners affected with the expropriation
process. However, both parties did not come to an agreement on just compensation thereby
prompting petitioner to bring the eminent domain case. Respondent judge found existing paramount
public interest for the expropriation and thereby issued an order determining the provisional market
value of the subject areas based on tax declaration of the properties.

The petitioner, in compliance to the order of respondent judge, deposited corresponding amount of
the assessed value of said lands in the amount of P23,180,828.00 with the Philippine National Bank.
Respondents land owners filed motion for reconsideration asserting that the assessed value is way
too low and that just compensation due them is estimated as P29,970,000.00. Immediately the
following day, respondent judge increased the provisional value to that stated in the motion for
reconsideration and ordered petitioner to deposit the differential amount within 24 hours from receipt
of order while holding in abeyance the writ of possession order pending compliance to said order
which the petitioner immediately complied. Thereafter, respondent judge ordered petitioner to pay in
full amount the defendants for their expropriated property. Petitioner assailed such order to be in
violation of due process and abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge hence this
petition.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion in taking the
landowner’s property?

Held: Yes. The court ruled that PD No. 42 provides that upon filing in court complaints on eminent
domain proceeding and after due notice to the defendants, plaintiff will have the right to take

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possession of the real property upon deposit of the amount of the assessed value with PNB to be
held by the bank subject to orders and final disposition of the court. The respondent judge failed to
observe this procedure by failure to issue the writ of possession to the petitioner despite its effort to
deposit the amount in compliance to the mandate of law.

Furthermore, the respondent judge erred in increasing the provisional value of properties without
holding any hearing for both parties. The instant petition was granted by the court setting aside the
temporary restraining order and directing respondent judge to cease and desist from enforcing his
orders.

Penn Central Transportation vs. NY City 438 US 104

Facts:
Appellant owned the Grand Central Terminal, which was designated by application of New York’s
Landmarks Preservation Law to be a landmark. Thereafter, the Appellant entered into a renewable
50-year lease with UGP Properties, Ltd., a United Kingdom company, under which the UGP agreed
to construct a multistory office building on top of the terminal. The plans for the new office building
were submitted to the Commission for approval, which was denied. The plans were in conformity
with existing zoning regulation, but the Commission of Landmarks Preservation nonetheless denied
the applications for certificates of “no external effect” and for “appropriateness.” The Appellants did
not pursue any administrative remedies because none were available. The Appellants did not
decide to submit other plans to the Commission, either. Instead, the Appellants filed suit in state
court seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief barring the City from using the
Landmarks Law to impede the c onstruction of any structure that might otherwise be
lawfully constructed, and damaged for the temporary “taking” that occurred between the designation
date (August 2, 1967) and the date when the restrictions arising under the Landmarks Law would be
lifted.
The trial court granted injunctive and declaratory relief, but severed the question of damages for a
“temporary taking.” The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, and summarily rejected any claim that
the Landmarks Commission had taken any property without just compensation because the law
had not transferred control of the property to the city, but only limited the Appellants’ use. The
Appellants appealed.

Issue:Whether or not the Commission’s application of the Landmarks Preservation Law constitutes
an unconstitutional “taking” that violated the station owners’ Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights?
Ruling: No. The Landmarks Preservation Law as applied to Grand Central Terminal does not
constitute a taking because it does not impede existing uses or prevent a reasonable return on
investment. The airspace surrounding a parcel of land cannot be considered a separate parcel for
purposes of taking. Taking jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and
attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. The fact
that the law has a more severe impact on some landowners of the terminal. Additionally, Penn
Central might still be able to build some sort of building on top that would be approved; it just might
not be able to be 50-stories high.

Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.

Facts: The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) authorizes the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to use data submitted by an applicant for registration of a
covered product (hereinafter pesticide) in evaluating the application of a subsequent applicant, and
to disclose publicly some of the submitted data. Under the data-consideration provisions of § 3, as
amended in 1978, applicants now are granted a 10-year period of exclusive use for data on new
active ingredients contained in pesticides registered after September 30, 1978, while all other data
submitted after December 31, 1969, may be cited and considered in support of another application
for 15 years after the original submission if the applicant offers to compensate the original submitter.
If the parties cannot agree on the amount of compensation, either may initiate a binding arbitration

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proceeding, and if an original submitter refuses to participate in negotiations or arbitration, he forfeits
his claim for compensation. Data that do not qualify for either the 10-year period of exclusive use or
the 15-year period of compensation may be considered by EPA without limitation. Section 10, as
amended in 1978, authorizes, in general, public disclosure of all health, safety, and environmental
data even though it may result in disclosure of trade secrets. Appellee, a company headquartered in
Missouri, is an inventor, producer, and seller of pesticides, and invests substantial sums in
developing active ingredients for pesticides and in producing end-use products that combine such
ingredients with inert ingredients. Appellee brought suit in Federal District Court for injunctive and
declaratory relief, alleging, inter alia, that the data-consideration and data- disclosure provisions of
FIFRA effected a "taking" of property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment,
and that the data-consideration provisions violated the Amendment because they effected a taking
of property for a private, rather than a public, purpose. The District Court held that the challenged
provisions of FIFRA are unconstitutional, and permanently enjoined EPA from implementing or
enforcing those provisions.

Issue: Won said data is under the meaning of properties may be taken.

Held: Yes. To the extent that appellee has an interest in its health, safety, and environmental data
cognizable as a trade secret property right under Missouri law, that property right is protected by the
Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Despite their intangible nature, trade secrets have many of
the characteristics of more traditional forms of property. Moreover, this Court has found other kinds
of intangible interests to be property for purposes of the Clause.

NPC v MANUBAY AGRO-INDUSTRIALDEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

Fact: In 1996, [Petitioner] NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, a government-owned and

controlled corporation created for the purpose of undertaking the development and generation of
hydroelectric power, commenced its 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project.
Petitionern filed a complaint for expropriation before the Regional Trial Court of Naga City against
respondent in order to acquire an easement of right of way over the land which the latter owns.
Thereafter, the court authorized the immediate issuance of a writ of possession and directing Ex-
Officio Provincial Sheriff to immediately place NPC in possession of the subject land.
Subsequently, the court a quo directed the issuance of a writ of condemnation in favor of
[petitioner] through an order. Likewise, for the purpose of determining the fair and just compensation
due to [respondent], the court appointed three commissioners composed of one representative of
the petitioner, one for the respondent and the other from the court. Said Commissioners gave their
valuations.
The trial court opined that the installation thereon of the 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power
Transmission Project would impose a limitation on the use of the land for an indefinite period of time,
thereby justifying the payment of the full value of the property. Further, the RTC held that it was not
bound by the provision cited by petitioner -- Section 3-A1[6] of Republic Act 63952[7], as amended
by Presidential Decree 938. This law prescribes as just compensation for the acquired easement of
a right of way over an expropriated property an easement fee in an amount not exceeding 10
percent of the market value of such property. The trial court relied on the earlier pronouncements of
this Court that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function.
Thus, valuations made by the executive branch or the legislature are at best initial or preliminary
only.
Petitioner contends that the valuation of the expropriated property -- fixed by the trial court and
affirmed by the CA -- was too high a price for the acquisition of an easement of a mere aerial right of
way, because respondent would continue to own and use the subject land anyway. Petitioner argues
that in a strict sense, there is no taking of property, but merely an imposition of an encumbrance or a
personal easement/servitude under Article 6143[10] of the Civil Code. Such encumbrance will not
result in ousting or depriving respondent of the beneficial enjoyment of the property. And even if

Page 18 of 62
there was a taking, petitioner points out that the loss is limited only to a portion of the aerial domain
above the property of respondent. Hence, the latter should be compensated only for what it would
actually lose.

Issue: Won the respondents should only be paid of what would actually be lost
Held: No. The whole value should be paid. True, an easement of a right of way transmits no rights
except the easement itself, and respondent retains full ownership of the property. The acquisition of
such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly observed by the CA, considering the nature
and the effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite
period would deprive respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled
to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary
equivalent of the land.4 In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the just compensation to
which the owner of a condemned property is entitled is generally the market value.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, vs. MARIA MENDOZA SAN PEDRO,

Facts:Under Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, the NPC is authorized to enter private property
provided that the owners thereof shall be indemnified for any actual damage caused thereby. For the
construction of its San Manuel-San Jose 500 KV Transmission Line and Tower No. SMJ-389, NPC
negotiated with Maria Mendoza San Pedro, then represented by her son, Vicente, for an easement
of right of way over her property, Lot No. 2076. The property, which was partly agricultural and partly
residential land, was located in Barangay Partida, Norzagaray, Bulacan. On June 19, 1997, Maria
executed a Right of Way Grant. The Portion was valued for Php 600 per sq. m. , but the NPC will
only pay P230.00 per sq m for the residential portion and P89.00 per sq m for the agricultural
portion. Maria San Pedro filed her Answer on February 2, 1998, alleging that there had already been
an agreement as to the just compensation for her property. She prayed, among others, that she
should be paid the consideration stated in the Right of Way Grant, P600.00 per sq m for the
residential portion of the land as agreed upon by her and NPC, and to base the values from
Resolution No. 97-005 of the Provincial Appraisal Committee.

Issue: Won the respondent is entitled for just compensation as stated in their agreement.

Held: Yes. The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent
to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open
market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the
property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual
taking by the government. To determine the just compensation to be paid to the landowner, the
nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion

In the July 12, 1999 Majority Report, the commissioners found that the property was located in a
highly-developed area and was accessible through an all-weather road. The fact that the property
had potential for full development as shown by the existence of building projects in the vicinity, and
the long-term effect of the expropriation on the lives, comfort and financial condition of petitioners
was likewise considered. The report also took into account the ocular inspection conducted by the
commissioners on May 11, 1999. The tax declaration of the subject property, the NPC sketch plan,
the location plan, the zoning certificates, the zonal valuation of the BIR, and the opinion values were
also considered.

The lone fact that there was no available sales data on properties within the vicinity of respondent's
land for 1996 and 1997 and that the BIR zonal value was P60.00 per sq m for residential and P30.00
per sq m for agricultural did not proscribe the commissioners and the trial court from making their
own reasonable estimates of just compensation, after considering all the facts as to the condition of

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the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities.

NPC v Tiangco

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari that seeks to annul te decision of the Court of Appeals
that increased the amount of the just compensation in an expropriation case for an aerial right-of-
way filed against the respondent by the petitioner.

The Tiangcos are the owners of a parcel of land with an area of 152,187 square. NPC is a
GOCC created for the purpose of undertaking the development and generation of power. NPC’s
charter allows them to acquire private property and exercise the right of eminent domain. NPC
requires 19,423 square meters of the respondents’ property, across which its Transmission Line
Project will traverse and within which the portion sought to be expropriated stand fruit-bearing trees.
NPC made it clear that it is interested only in acquiring an easement of right-of-way over the
respondents’ property and that ownership of the area over which the right-of-way will be
established shall remain with the respondents. For this reason, NPC claims that it should pay, in
addition to the agreed or adjudged value of the improvements on the area, only an easement fee in
an amount equivalent to ten per cent (10%) of the market value of the property as declared by the
respondents or by the Municipal Assessor, whichever is lower, as provided for under Section 3-A of
Republic Act No. 6395, as amended by Presidential Decree 938. NPC filed a expropriation case on
November 20, 1990. NPC used as the determination of the fair market value of the property based
on the 1984 tax declaration. It priced the property at only P2.09/sqm plus cost of improvements.
The CA relied on 1993 assessed value that increased the price of the property. The Respondents
are asking a price of 30.00/sqm.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 1993 assessed fair market value of the property
employed by the CA is correct in determining the just compensation for property under
expropriation?

RULING: NO. In the case of eminent domain, the time of taking is the filing of the complaint, if there
was no actual taking prior thereto. The expropriation proceedings in this case having been initiated
by NPC on November 20, 1990, property values on such month and year should lay the basis for
the proper determination of just compensation. This must be taken to mean, among others, that the
value as of the time of taking should be the price to be paid the property owner.

While the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and
possession of, the expropriated property, no cogent reason appears why said power may not be
availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss of title
and possession. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which
must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land.

Land Bank of the Philippines v Juan H. Imperial

GR. No. 157753, February 12, 2007

FACTS: The petition for review assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in nullifying the
decision of the RTC of Legazpi City, acting as a Special Agrarian Court.

Respondent Juan H. Imperial owned five parcels of land with a total area of 156.1000
hectares, located in Albay. The Land Reform Program under PD 27 and EO. 228, the (DAR) placed
these lands under its Operation Land Transfer (OLT). In 1972, the lands were distributed to
deserving farmer beneficiaries. Imperial filed a complaint for determination and payment of just
compensation against the petitioner, the DAR, and the farmer beneficiaries. During the course of the
trial, the court created a commission to examine, investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the

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dispute including the lands’ valuation. On June 21, 1996, the commission submitted a report
containing the following findings: (1) the lands were not first-class riceland;
(2) the irrigation came from a creek which depended on rains; (3) the harvest was once a year;
(4) about fifteen hectares were devoted to non-fruit bearing coconut trees; (5) approximately five
hectares were upland rice while the rest of the area was uncultivated; and (6) the lands were rolling
hills.

The commission submitted another report with the following observations: (1) of the total
land area of 156.1000 hectares, only 151.7168 hectares were compensable since 4.3832 hectares
were either used by Imperial or devoted to right of way, barrio site, or feeder road; (2) the irrigated
area was only 1,000 square meters; and (3) the lands were generally devoted to upland rice. The
RTC favored the respondent and ordered the LBP to pay the respondent the fair market value of the
propety taken either in cash or bonds or in any mode of payment. On the compensability of the
areas used as feeder road, right of way, and barrio site, the petitioner claims that the Court of
Appeals erred in including them in the computation since they are not devoted to or suitable for
agriculture in contemplation of Rep. Act No. 6657 and the title to these areas remained with the
respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the areas based as feeder road, right of way, and barrio site should
be considered as compensable.

RULLING: YES! The areas used as feeder road, right of way, and barrio site, are subject to just
compensation in expropriation proceedings. It represents the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss.
To compensate is to render something which is equal in value to that taken or received.

Although such areas were not strictly used for agricultural purposes, the same were diverted
to public use. For this reason, the view that respondent should be compensated for what he actually
lost and that should include not only the areas distributed directly to the tenant beneficiaries but also
those areas used as feeder road, right of way, and barrio site, which were undoubtedly diverted to
the use of the public.

The only area that ought to be excluded is the portion or portions retained by the respondent
as owner-cultivator for his own use.

Sec. 9. Art. 3. “Taking”

FACTS: Spouses Antero and Rosario Bongbong are the registered owners parcel of land
situated at Barangay Sambulawan, Villaba, Leyte. As early as 1996, the National Power Corporation
(NPC) negotiated with the spouses Bongbong to use a portion of the property for the construction of
a 230 KV transmission line. When the spouses Bongbong agreed, NPC occupied a 25,100-sq-m
portion of the property.

NPC paid the spouses Bongbong representing the value of the improvements that were
damaged by the construction of the project. The voucher for the payment of easement fee was
prepared. However, when NPC offered a check representing 10% of the total market value of the
area affected as payment for the easement fee, Antero refused to accept the amount and demanded
that NPC pay the full value of the 25,100- sq-m portion it had occupied. The spouses Bongbong
demanded that the NPC pay P8,748,448.00 which they alleged to be the just and reasonable value
for their land and improvements. The refusal of NPC, citing that the property is classified as
agricultural, to heed their demands prompted the spouses Bongbong to file a complaint for just
compensation before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palompon, Leyte.

Page 21 of 62
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, is correct in fixing the just
compensation at P300.00/sqm from the time of the taking.

RULING: NO. The trial court determined just compensation without considering the differences
in the nature and character or condition of the property compared to the other properties in the
province which petitioner had purchased. Just compensation is the fair value of the property as
between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
government. This rule holds true when the property is taken before the filing of an expropriation suit,
and even if it is the property owner who brings the action for compensation. The nature and
character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion for determining how much just
compensation should be given to the landowner. In determining just compensation, all the facts as to
the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be
considered.

In the present case, the trial court determined just compensation without considering the
differences in the nature and character or condition of the property compared to the other properties
in the province which petitioner had purchased. It simply relied on the fact that petitioner paid
P300.00 per sq m to the other landowners whose lands had been taken as a result of the
construction of transmission lines. But a perusal of the Deeds of Sale shows that the properties
covered by the transmission lines are located in the municipalities of Kananga, Leyte or Tabango,
Leyte, while the Bongbong’s property is located in Villaba, Leyte; the Deeds of Sale describe the
properties as industrial, residential/commercial, while the tax declaration of the subject property
describes it as "agricultural."

For this reason, the Court has no alternative but to remand the case to the trial court for the
proper determination of just compensation.

32. Tan v. Republic Facts:

Tan, is the registered owner of a parcel of land. However, prior to the transfer of the property to
petitioner by SADC, PEA wrote SADC requesting permission to enter the latter’s property, then
covered by TCT No. 439101, for the purpose of constructing thereon the southern abutment of the
Zapote Bridge at the Coastal Road. SADC replied authorizing PEA to enter the property, subject to
the condition that the latter should pay a monthly rental of ₱10,000.00. SADC offered to sell the
property to PEA. On January 7, 1987, PEA informed SADC it has no plan to buy the whole lot, but
only the 1,131 square meter portion above sea level. Negotiations then ensued. However, they failed
to reach an agreement.
Later on, SADC asked PEA to pay compensation equivalent to the current zonal value plus interest of
10% per annum and a monthly rental of ₱10,000.00, also with the same interest. These sums,
according to SADC, could be considered just compensation for the government’s use of the property
since 1985 until September 2000. Thereafter,Tan acquired the property from SADC.1a\^/phi1.net
BIR informed PEA that the current zonal value of the property is ₱20,000.00 per square meter. In the
meantime, the construction of the Coastal Road was completed. Petitioner, in her desperation, wrote
PEA expressing her willingness to be compensated through a land swapping arrangement. She
proposed that PEA’s Fisherman’s Wharf be given to her in exchange for her property. The parties
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement wherein PEA agreed to execute a Deed of Exchange by
way of compensation for petitioner’s property affected by the Coastal Road.
However, PEA withdrew from the land swapping agreement. Instead, it filed a complaint for
expropriation. PEA alleged that its liability for just compensation is based on the zonal value of the
land at the time of the taking in 1985. Thus, it is liable for only the square meter portion. In her
answer, petitioner claimed that PEA should pay for the whole area.
Issue: Whether PEA should pay for the whole area as compensation.

Ruling:

Page 22 of 62
No. PEA’s entry into the property with the permission of SADC, its previous owner, was not for the
purpose of expropriating the property. SADC allowed PEA to enter the land on condition that it
should pay a monthly rental of ₱10,000.00. We stress that after its entry, PEA wrote SADC
requesting to donate or sell the land to the government. Indeed, there was no intention on the part of
PEA to expropriate the subject property. It could have simply exercised its power of eminent domain.
Thus, PEA is only liable for the square meter portion that it actually used.

33. NPC v. Ibrahim Facts:

Ibrahim owns a parcel of land located in Lanao del Norte. NAPOCOR took possession of the sub-
terrain area of the land and constructed underground tunnels on the said property. The tunnels were
apparently being used in siphoning the water of Lake Lanao and in the operation of NAPOCOR’s
Agus projects. Ibrahim and Maruhom requested Marawi City Water District for a permit to
construct or install a motorized deep well on the parcel of land but it was rejected on the grounds that
the construction would cause danger to lives and property by reason of the presence of the
underground tunnels. They demanded NAPOCOR to pay damages and to vacate the sub-terrain
portion of the land.
Issue: Whether Ibrahim has the right to ask for compensation.

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court cited Article 437 of the Civil Code which provides that: The owner
of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct
thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without
detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. Hence, the ownership of land
extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it. Therefore, Ibrahim owns the property as well
as the sub-terrain area of the land where the underground tunnels were constructed.
If the government takes property without expropriation and devotes the property to public use, after
many years, the property owner may demand payment of just compensation in the event restoration
of possession is neither convenient nor feasible. This is in accordance with the principle that persons
shall not be deprived of their property except by competent authority and for public use and always
upon payment of just compensation.

NPC v. Pure foods Facts:

Napocor sought to acquire an easement of right-of-way over certain parcels of land situated in four
towns of the province of Bulacan for the construction and maintenance of its 500 KV Transmission
Line project in Northern Luzon. It filed a special civic action for eminent domain before the trial court
against the registered owners or claimants of parcel of lands affected. The complaint alleged the
public purpose of the Northwestern Luzon Project, as well as the urgency and necessity of acquiring
easements of right- of-way over the said parcels of land.
Only PFI, SDC, Moldex and the heirs of Trinidad filed their respective answers raising the issue of
just compensation of their property to be expropriated. A report submitted to the RTC recommending
that the compensation due from NAPOCOR be based on the fair market value of P 600/sq m for
properties belonging to Moldex and P400/sq m for properties belonging to the rest of the
respondents.
NAPOCOR assailed the CA's reliance on the commissioners’ report in fixing just compensation
based on the full market value of the affected properties. It contends that only an easement of right-
of-way for the construction of the transmission line project is being claimed, thus, only an easement
fee equivalent to 10% of the fair market value of the properties should be paid to the affected property
owners and not just compensation with legal interest of 12%/annum.
Issue: Whether only an easement fee of 10% of the market value of the expropriated properties
should be paid to the affected owners.
Ruling: No. The Court ruled that the just compensation in the amount of only 10% of the market
value of the property was not enough to indemnify the incursion on the affected property.
Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or

Page 23 of 62
possession. The right- of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation of property rights over
the land traversed by transmission lines also falls within the ambit of the term "expropriation."
In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the general rule is that the just compensation to
which the owner of the condemned property is entitled is the market value. The aforementioned rule,
however, is modified where only a part of a certain property is expropriated. In addition to the market
value of the portion taken, he is also entitled to recover the consequential damage, if any, to the
remaining part of the property. At the same time, from the total compensation must be deducted the
value of the consequential benefits.”

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS SANTA LORO VDA. DE CAPIN

FACTS
Pursuant to an Interconnection Project (transmission lines) petitioner expropriated several
parcels of land among which are owned by the respondents. Upon the project’s completion,
petitioner imposed several restrictions upon the respondents on the use of their lands, to which
respondents lost substantial amount of income. After paying the respondents for their lots, only later
did respondents discover that in comparison to the measly sums they were paid by petitioner, the
other landowners within their area who resisted the expropriation of their properties in court or who
entered into compromise agreements with petitioner were paid by petitioner as just compensation for
the portions of their properties.

Petitioner claims that compensation for the full value of their properties traversed by its
transmission lines and it is obligated only to pay the easement fee equivalent to 10% of the market
value of the land as just compensation. Petitioner insists that it only acquired an easement of right of
way on the properties for the construction. The respondents still retained ownership of their
properties despite the imposition of an easement of right of way thereon. Consequently, petitioner is
liable only to pay an easement fee, 10% max of the fair market value of their properties affected

ISSUE
Whether or not the act of petitioners should pay more than the easement fee.

RULING YES
Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of
title or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights
over the land traversed by transmission lines also falls within the ambit of the term expropriation.

After the project was fully constructed on respondents’ lots, petitioner imposed restrictions
Hence, they suffered substantial loss of income. It is clear then that petitioner’s acquisition of an
easement of right of way on the lands amounted to an expropriation of the portions of the latters
properties and perpetually deprived the respondents of their proprietary rights thereon and for which
they are entitled to a reasonable and just compensation. Just compensation is defined as the full
and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.The measure is
not the takers gain, but the owners loss. In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is
definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of project,
the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land deprives private respondents of its
ordinary use. Having established that petitioners acquisition of right-of-way easement over the
portions of respondents lots was definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain, petitioner
then is liable to pay respondents just compensation and not merely an easement fee.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY (PNOC) vs. LEONILO A. MAGLASANG and OSCAR S.
MAGLASANG
G.R. No. 155407 November 11, 2008 FACTS
Petitioner filed a complaint for expropriation and eminent domaint against respondent, the registered

Page 24 of 62
owner of 2 parcels of land, to be used by the PNOC in the construction and operation of a
Geothermal Power Plant Project. Upon finality of the orders of condemnation in both expropriation
cases, the trial court made its own determination that; From the reckoning date, the Court wants to
apply a three-year period therefrom to ascertain the prevailing price From the foregoing decision,
both parties filed their respective appeals with the CA which rendered the challenged decision which
as it reduced the just compensation due to the ‘inflation factor' and ‘adjustment factor' the trial court
was unable to include.

Unable to accept the CA's decision for allegedly being contrary to law and established jurisprudence,
PNOC is now before the court with the following grounds in support of its petition that the valuation is
not well supported by the evidence on record as representing the fair market value of the
expropriated parcels of land. Here, petitioner insists that the determination of just compensation
should be reckoned prior to the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation. According to
petitioner, that it took possession of the land when PNOC leased the same from its administrator as
evidenced by a Lease Agreement.

ISSUE
Whether or not a lease is a basis for ‘taking’.

RULING NO

In the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, there is "taking" where the owner is
actually deprived or dispossessed of his property; where there is a practical destruction or a material
impairment of the value of his property; or when he is deprived of the ordinary use thereof.

There is a "taking" when the expropriator enters private property not only for a momentary period but
for a more permanent duration, for the purpose of devoting the property to a public use in such a
manner as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. Thus, in that case,
we rejected the State's contention that a lease on a year to year basis can give rise to a permanent
right to occupy, since by express legal provision a lease made for a determinate time, as was the
lease of land, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand. Neither can it be said that the
right of eminent domain may be exercised by simply leasing the premises to be expropriated.
Where, as here, the owner was compensated and not deprived of the ordinary and beneficial use of
his property by its being diverted to public use, there is no taking within the constitutional sense.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs BENJAMIN ONG CO

FACTS
Petitioner filed a complaint for the acquisition of an easement of right-of-way over three (3) lots
belonging to respondent, in connection with the construction of its transmission lines for its Lahar
Affected Transmission Line Project (Lahar Project). Petitioner obtained a writ of possession and it
took possession of the property.

Petitioner relies on Sec. 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, which provides that only an easement
fee equivalent to 10% of the market value shall be paid to affected property owners. Based on this
amendatory provision, petitioner is willing to pay an easement fee of 10% for the easement of right-
of- way it acquired for the installation of power transmission lines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there constitutes a ‘taking’ by petitioner of the property of respondent making the
former liable to pay full compensation, not pursuant to RA No. 6395.

Page 25 of 62
RULING: YES
This Court has ruled that when petitioner takes private property to construct transmission lines, it is
liable to pay the full market value upon proper determination by the courts. The taking of property
was purely an easement of a right of way, but we nevertheless ruled that the full market value should
be paid instead of an easement fee. This Court is mindful of the fact that the construction of the
transmission lines will definitely have limitations and will indefinitely deprive the owners of the land of
their normal use. The presence of transmission lines undoubtedly restricts respondents use of his
property. Petitioner is thus liable to pay respondent the full market value of the property.

As a final note, the function for determining just compensation remains judicial in character. The
executive department or legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a
violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use
without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate its own determination
shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the
just- ness of the decreed compensation. Thus, the lower court must use the standards set forth in
Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 8974 to arrive at the amount of just compensation.

National Power Corporation v Villamor 590 SCRA 11

FACTS:
Petitioner National Power Corporation, a government owned and controlled corporation
created and existing by virtue of RA 6395 as amended by PD 938, purposely to develop hydro-
electric generation power and production of power from other source. NPC was granted the power to
exercise the right of eminent domain.

NPC’s 230 KV Talisay-Compostela transmission lines and towers have to pass the parcel of
land in City of Danao and Municipality of Carmen, owned by Carlos Villamor, for its Leyte- Cebu
Interconnection Project. On Villamor’s land stand fruit bearing and non-fruit bearing trees.

Petitioner filed with RTC Danao City a complaint for eminent domain on respondent’s lands.
The RTC ordered the issuance of the corresponding writ of possession in favor of NPC. Respondent
assailed the reasonableness and adequacy of the just compensation of the property. The trial court
created a board to determine the just compensation for the lands and improvements and later
recommended the amount of Php 433 per square meter as fair market value of the lands.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the fair market value awarded by trial court may be reduced taking into
consideration that NPC is allegedly acquiring only an easement of right of way and being classified as
agricultural lands.

RULING:
No. Villamor is entitled to just compensation or the just and complete equivalent of the loss
which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. In fixing the
compensation as Php450, the court considered not only the Commissioners’ report and opinion
values of different agencies submitted to the trial court but also the several deeds of absolute sale
and compromise agreements entered into by NPC with landowners adjacent to respondent’s lands.

NPC’s claim that Section 3A of RA 6395 justifies its actions as NPC is only acquiring an
easement of right of way since the landowner retains ownership of the property and can devote the
land to farming and other agricultural purposes is false. Easement of right of way falls within the
purview of the power of eminent domain.

In installing the 230 KV Talisay-Compostela transmission lines which traverse respondent’s

Page 26 of 62
lands, a permanent limitation is imposed by petitioner against the use of lands for indefinite period.
This deprives respondent of the normal use of the land. The high tension live wires may cause
danger to life of the landowners, thus will not be able to use the land for farming or any agricultural
purposes.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION- versus – MARUHOM 609 SCRA 198

FACTS:
Lucman G. Ibrahim and his co-heirs Omar G. Maruhom, et al (respondents) are owners of a
70,000-square meter lot in Saduc, Marawi City. In 1978, NPC, without respondents’ knowledge and
consent, took possession of the subterranean area of the land and constructed therein underground
tunnels used by NPC in siphoning the water of Lake Lanao and in the operation of NPC’s projects
located in Saguiran, Lanao del Sur; Nangca and Balo-i in Lanao del Norte; and Ditucalan and
Fuentes in Iligan City. Respondents only discovered the existence of the tunnels sometime in July
199 ad further demanded that NPC to pay damages and vacate the subterranean portion of the land,
but the demand was not heeded.

Respondents instituted an action for recovery of possession of land and damages against
NPC with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur. RTC ruled in favor of respondents. NPC
insisted that the payment of just compensation for the land carries with it the correlative right to obtain
title or ownership of the land taken.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents are entitled to reasonable and just compensation.

RULING:
Yes. NPC’s acquisition of an easement of right-of-way on the lands of respondents
amounted to expropriation of the portions of the respondent’s property for which they are entitled to a
reasonable and just compensation. Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with
a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or
limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines also falls within the ambit
of the term expropriation.

The underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents use of the property for an
indefinite period and deprive them of its ordinary use. Respondents are clearly entitled to the
payment of just compensation. Notwithstanding the fact that NPC only occupies the sub-terrain
portion, it is liable to pay not merely an easement but rather the full compensation for land. This is so
because in this case, the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of its normal
beneficial use. Respondents, as the owners of the property thus expropriated, are entitled to a just
compensation which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the
assessment, than the money equivalent of said property.

THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

vs. AYALA LAND INC., ROBINSON’S LAND CORPORATION, SHANGRI-
LA PLAZA CORPORATION and SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed
by petitioner seeking the reversal and setting aside of the decision of CA which affirmed the decision
of RTC, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration of OSG. The RTC adjudged that respondents
Ayala Land Incorporated (Ayala Land), Robinsons Land Corporation (Robinsons), Shangri-la Plaza
Corporation (Shangri- la), and SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (SM Prime) could not be obliged to provide
free parking spaces in their malls to their patrons and the general public.
The Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce found that the collection of parking fees by

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shopping malls is contrary to National Building Code and figuratively speaking, the Code has
“expropriated” the land for parking. Also, Committee stated that the collection of parking fees would
be against Article II of RA 9734 (Consumer Act of the Philippines) as to the State’s policy of
protecting the interest of consumers.
The Senate Committee recommended that Office of Solicitor General should institute the
action to enjoin the collection of parking fees and enforce the sanctions for violation of National
Building Code. Respondent SM Prime assailed the recommendation of the Committee and filed a
Petition for Declaratory Relief contending that respondent has the legal right to lease parking
spaces. OSG then filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction to the RTC against
respondents, prohibiting them from collecting parking fees and contending that their practice of
charging parking fees is violative of National Building Code.
The RTC held that the Building Code with its IRR does not necessarily impose that parking
spaces shall be free of charge and providing parking spaces for free can be considered as unlawful
taking of property right without just compensation. They deemed that the respondents are not
obligated to provide parking spaces free of charge.
Issues: Whether the CA erred in affirming the ruling of RTC that respondents are not obliged to
provide free parking spaces to their customers or the public.
Ruling: No. The CA was correct in affirming the ruling of RTC, and the respondents are not obliged to
provide free parking spaces. The OSG cannot rely on Section 102 of the National Building Code to
expand the coverage of Section 803 of the same Code and Rule XIX of the IRR, so as to include the
regulation of parking fees. The OSG limits its citation to the first part of Section 102 of the National
Building Code declaring the policy of the State “to safeguard life, health, property, and public welfare,
consistent with the principles of sound environmental management and control”; but totally ignores
the second part of said provision, which reads, “and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to
provide for all buildings and structures, a framework of minimum standards and requirements to
regulate and control their location, site, design, quality of materials, construction, use, occupancy,
and maintenance.” While the first part of Section 102 of the National Building Code lays down the
State policy, it is the second part thereof that explains how said policy shall be carried out in the
Code.
In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking fees from
persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in the National Building Code or its IRR. The
State also cannot impose the same prohibition by generally invoking police power, since said
prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents’ property without payment of just compensation.

NPC v Tuazon
Facts:
On October 27, 1994, plaintiff-appellant National Power Corporation filed a complaint for
Eminent Domain against defendants-appellees Sps. R. Zabala et al before the Regional Trial Court,
Balanga City, Bataan, alleging that: defendants-appellees own parcels of land located in Balanga
City, Bataan; which is urgently needed an easement of right of way over the affected areas for its
230 KV Limay-Hermosa Transmission Line[s]. After due notice to defendants-appellees, and upon
deposit with the Philippine National Bank of the amount equal to the assessed value (₱1,636.89 ) of
the subject properties, it prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to enter and
take possession of the subject property.
On January 11, 1995, defendant-appellee Spouses Zabala moved to dismiss the complaint
averring that: they incurred a considerable expense in their property to serve the interest and well
being of the growing population of Balanga and that the just compensation would be higher if the
proposed transmission lines of plaintiff-appellant Napocor, is installed through their property. On
their part, defendants-appellees Spouses Zabala prayed for the fixing of the just compensation at
₱250.00 per square meter.
RTC rendered its Partial Decision, ruling that Napocor has the lawful authority to take for
public purpose and upon payment of just compensation a portion of spouses Zabala’s property. The
RTC likewise ruled that since the spouses Zabala were deprived of the beneficial use of their

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property, they are entitled to the actual or basic value of their property. On July 10, 2006, the CA
rendered the assailed Decision affirming the RTC’s Partial Decision.

Issue:Whether or not the taking of a portion of defendant’s property is lawful for purposes of eminent
domain

Ruling: Yes. Because it has the elements of taking for purposes of eminent domain, i.e.
expropriation must enter upon the private property, it is devoted to public use and the utilization of
the property will oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. In the
case at bar the acquiring of property through expropriation proceedings where the land or portion
thereof will be traversed by the transmission lines was a private property. Such property will be
needed for the projects or works, such land or portion thereof as necessary for public use. Also,
since the high-tension electric current passing through the transmission lines will perpetually deprive
the property owners of the normal use of their land, it is only just and proper to require Napocor to
recompense them for the full market value of their property.

Sumulong v Guerrero
Facts: On December 5, 1977 the National Housing Authority (NIIA) filed a complaint for
expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares, (in Antipolo, Rizal)
including the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing. Together with the
complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount
of P158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank, representing the "total market value" of the subject
twenty five hectares of land, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1224 which defines "the policy on
the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon payment of just compensation."
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the
possession of their property without due process of law and they further contend that "socialized
housing" as defined in Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended, for the purpose of condemnation
proceedings is not "public use" since it will benefit only "a handful of people, bereft of public
character."
Issue: Whether or not the private property to be taken in this case will be for public use (Socialized
Housing) and makes such taking valid.
Ruling: Yes. Art.3 sec 9 says that Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. This Court is satisfied that "socialized housing" fans within the confines of "public
use". It is, particularly important to draw attention to paragraph (d) of Pres. Dec. No. 1224 which
opportunities inextricably linked with low-cost housing, or slum clearance, relocation and
resettlement, or slum improvement emphasize the public purpose of the project. In the case at bar,
the use to which it is proposed to put the subject parcels of land meets the requisites of "public use".
The lands in question are being expropriated by the NHA for the expansion of Bagong Nayon
Housing Project to provide housing facilities to low-salaried government employees. Thus the taking
here in this case which is for the purpose of public use is valid.

Phil. Columbian Assn. v Hon. Panis

Facts: Philippine Columbian Association, petitioner herein, is a non-stock, non-profit domestic
corporation and is engaged in the business of providing sports and recreational facilities for its
members. Petitioner's office and facilities are located in the District of Paco, Manila, and adjacent
thereto, is a parcel of land consisting of 4,842.90 square meters owned by petitioner. Private
respondents are the actual occupants of the said parcel of land, while respondents Antonio
Gonzales, Jr. and Karlo Butiong were duly-elected councilors of the City of Manila. In 1982,
petitioner instituted ejectment proceedings against herein private respondents before the
metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. Judgment was rendered against the said occupants, ordering
them to vacate the lot and pay reasonable compensation therefor. This judgment was affirmed by
the Regional Trial Court, the Court of Appeals and subsequently by the Supreme Court in G.R. No.
85262.

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As a result of the favorable decision, petitioner filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, a
motion for execution of judgment. On June 8, 1990, private respondents filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 27, Manila, a petition for injunction and prohibition with preliminary injunction and
restraining order against the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila and petitioner, to enjoin their
ejectment from and the demolition of their houses on the premises in question. Petitioner, in turn,
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging, inter alia, that the City of Manila had no power to
expropriate private land; that the expropriation is not for public use and welfare; that the
expropriation is politically motivated.
Issue: Whether or not the city of Manila has the power to expropriate a private property and did it
meet the standard of public use principle
Ruling: Yes. The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power to
acquire private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to bona fide
tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low-salaried employees of the city. That only a few
could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does not diminish its public use
character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all who need them.
Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into a flexible
concept, influenced by changing conditions Public use now includes the broader notion of indirect
public benefit or advantage, including in particular, urban land reform and housing. Thus the act here
of city of Manila was pursuant to Art. 3 section 9 for the purpose of such expropriation was for public
use, thus it was valid.

Alejandro Manosca v. CA
FACTS: Alejandro, Asuncion and Leonica Manosca inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos
Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of about 492 square meters. When the parcel was
ascertained by the National Historical Institute (NHI) to have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo,
the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of
Presidential Decree 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was,
on 6 January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS).
Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of the measure. In his opinion
133, Series of 1987, the Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative. Accordingly, the Republic,
through the office of the Solicitor-General, instituted a complaint for expropriation before the RTC of
Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI. At the same time, the Republic filed an urgent motion for the
issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the property.
The motion was opposed by the Manoscas. The Manoscas moved to dismiss the complaint on the
main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the
act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity. The trial court issued its denial of said motion to
dismiss. The Manoscas moved for reconsideration thereafter but were denied.

ISSUE: W/N the taking of the parcel of land was for public use.
RULING: YES. Petitioners ask what is the so-called unusual interest that the expropriation of Felix
Manalo’s birthplace become so vital as to be a public use appropriate for the exercise of the power
of eminent domain when only members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt to give
some religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is
the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the
power. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of
the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and
leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar
advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few
would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence
and character of public use.

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Province of Camarines Sur v. CA 222 SCRA 173

FACTS: Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur authorized the provincial governor to

purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site in order to establish a pilot
farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial
government employees.
Pursuant to the resolution, Gov. Villafuerte filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto
San Joaquin and Efren San Joaquin. Upon motion for the issuance of writ or possession, the San
Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing.
The San Joaquins later moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price
offered for their property. The court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the province to take
possession of the properties.
The San Joaquins filed for motion for relief, but denied as well. In their petition. Asked by the CA,
Solicitor General stated that there is no need for the approval of the president for the province to
expropriate properties, however, the approval of the DAR is needed to convert the property from
agricultural to non-agricultural (housing purpose).
CA set aside the decision of the trial court suspending the possession and expropriation of the
property until the province has acquired the approval of DAR. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the expropriation is for a public purpose.
RULING: YES. The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a
public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and
advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make
available to the community invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the
cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be
enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution.

DIOSDADO LAGCAO v. JUDGE GENEROSA G. LABRA

FACTS: The Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. But then, in late 1965, the 210
lots, including Lot 1029, reverted to the Province of Cebu. Consequently, the province tried to annul
the sale of Lot 1029 by the City of Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the latter to sue the
province for specific performance and damages in the then Court of First Instance. The court a quo
ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the Province of Cebu to execute the final deed of sale in
favor of petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it was already
occupied by squatters. Thus petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC
affirmed the MTCC’s decision and issued a writ of execution and order of demolition. However, when
the demolition order was about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters to
the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the ground that the City was still looking for
a relocation site for the squatters. Acting on the mayor’s request, the MTCC issued two orders
suspending the demolition.
Unfortunately for petitioners, during the suspension period, Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City to provide socialized housing for the homeless and low-
income residents of the City, and which identified Lot 1029 (petitioners’ lot) as a socialized housing
site. Petitioners filed with the RTC an action for declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 1843 for being
unconstitutional.
ISSUE: W/N, by virtue of Ord. No. 1843, the expropriation of petitioners’ property for public use.
RULING: NO. First of all, the ordinance was unlawful or invalid. For an ordinance to be valid, it must
not only be within the corporate powers of the city or municipality to enact but must also be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law. It must be in accordance with certain well-established
basic principles of a substantive nature.
Ordinance No. 1843 failed to comply with the foregoing substantive requirements. A clear case of
constitutional infirmity having been thus established, this Court is constrained to nullify the subject

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ordinance. We recapitulate:
First, as earlier discussed, the questioned ordinance is repugnant to the pertinent provisions of the
Constitution, RA 7279 and RA 7160;
Second, the precipitate manner in which it was enacted was plain oppression masquerading as a
pro-poor ordinance;
Third, the fact that petitioners small property was singled out for expropriation for the purpose of
awarding it to no more than a few squatters indicated manifest partiality against petitioners, and
Fourth, the ordinance failed to show that there was a reasonable relation between the end sought
and the means adopted. While the objective of the City of Cebu was to provide adequate housing to
slum dwellers, the means it employed in pursuit of such objective fell short of what was legal,
sensible and called for by the circumstances.
Nota Bene: RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of property for purposes
of urban land reform and housing. RA 7160 is the law wherein Congress conferred upon
local government units the power to expropriate.

Reyes vs. NHA

Facts: Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed complaints for the expropriation of
sugarcane lands belonging to the petitioners. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was
the expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were
relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the
expropriation of these lots and the payment of just compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the lower court.

A few years later, petitioners contended that respondent NHA violated the stated public purpose
for the expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project when it failed to relocate the squatters
from the Metro Manila area, as borne out by the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court
which showed that most of the expropriated properties remain unoccupied. Petitioners likewise
question the public nature of the use by respondent NHA when it entered into a contract for the
construction of low cost housing units, which is allegedly different from the stated public purpose in
the expropriation proceedings. Hence, it is claimed that respondent NHA has forfeited its rights
and interests by virtue of the expropriation judgment and the expropriated properties should now
be returned to herein petitioners.
Issue: W/N the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in the light of the failure of respondent NHA
to use the expropriated property for the intended purpose but for a totally different purpose.
Held: No.The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA. Accordingly, petitioners cannot
insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that
the contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled doctrine
that the concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. The term "public use" has
now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and
"public convenience." Thus, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare
satisfies the requirement of public use."

In addition, the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a
public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms,
entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns.

Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, for the common good and in
cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which
will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless
citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. The expropriation of private property for the
purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance of social justice.

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Masikip vs Pasig
FACTS: Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at
Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila. The City of Pasig notified petitioner of its intention to
expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property to be used for the “sports development
and recreational activities” of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance
No. 42, Series of 1993 enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.
Petitioner replied stating that the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid,
and oppressive. Respondent reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of petitioner’s
property is “to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents” and subsequently filed
with the trial court a complaint for expropriation,

ISSUE: W/N the City of Pasig able to establish “genuine necessity”?

RULING: No.The Court holds that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a
genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property. A scrutiny of the records shows that the
Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No.
42 s. 1993 authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres
Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of
Caniogan. Petitioner’s lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore, not
clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not been shown, especially considering that
there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area,
which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.
Constitution attaches to the property of the individual requires not only that the purpose for the taking
of private property be specified. The genuine necessity for the taking, which must be of a public
character, must also be shown to exist.

Didipio vs. Earthsavers vs. Gozun

Facts: In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign companies
when it comes to either technical or financial large scale exploration or mining. In 1995, Ramos
signed into law RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. In 1994, Ramos already signed an FTAA with
Arimco Mining Co, an Australian company. The FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore
37,000 ha of land in Quirino and N. Vizcaya including Brgy Didipio. After the passage of the law,
DENR rolled out its implementing RRs. Didipio petitioned to have the law and the RR to be annulled
as it is unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful taking of property. In seeking to nullify Rep. Act
No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional, petitioners set their sight on
Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 which they claim allow the unlawful
and unjust “taking” of private property for private purpose in contradiction with Section 9, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution mandating that private property shall not be taken except for public use and
the corresponding payment of just compensation. They assert that public respondent DENR, through
the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a
private property and allow taking of land without payment of just compensation.

Traversing petitioners’ assertion, public respondents argue that Section 76 is not a taking provision
but a valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people.
This government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for the public good and that this
adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. Public
respondents concluded that “to require compensation in all such circumstances would compel the
government to regulate by purchase.”
ISSUE: W/N RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid.
Ruling: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. Public use as a requirement for the valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain is now synonymous with public interest, public benefit,
public welfare and public convenience. It includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or
advantage. Public use as traditionally understood as “actual use by the public” has already been

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abandoned.
Mining industry plays a pivotal role in the economic development of the country and is a vital tool in
the government’s thrust of accelerated recovery. The importance of the mining industry for national
development is expressed in Presidential Decree No. 463:
WHEREAS, mineral production is a major support of the national economy, and therefore the
intensified discovery, exploration, development and wise utilization of the country’s mineral
resources are urgently needed for national development.
Irrefragably, mining is an industry which is of public benefit.
That public use is negated by the fact that the state would be taking private properties for the benefit
of private mining firms or mining contractors is not at all true.

Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando Pampanga v. CA

FACTS: Petitioner sought to convert a portion of respondents’ land into Barangay Sindalan’s feeder
road. Petitioner claimed that respondents’ property was the most practical and nearest way to the
municipal road. Pending the resolution of the case at the trial court, petitioner deposited an amount
equivalent to the fair market value of the property.
Respondents alleged that that their lot is adjacent to Davsan II Subdivision privately owned by Dr.
Felix David and his wife, and that the expropriation of their property was for the benefit of the
homeowners of Davsan II Subdivision. They contended that petitioner deliberately omitted the name
of Davsan II Subdivision and, instead, stated that the expropriation was for the benefit of the
residents of Sitio Paraiso in order to conceal the fact that the access road being proposed to be built
across the respondents’ land was to serve a privately-owned subdivision and those who would
purchase the lots of said subdivision.
They also pointed out that under PD No. (PD) 957, it is the subdivision owner who is obliged to
provide a feeder road to the subdivision residents. CA ruled in favor of respondents, stating that
petitioners spent public funds for a private purpose and deprived herein defendants-appellants of
their property for an ostensible public purpose. Petitioner contested this decision, hence this
petition.

ISSUE: WON the proposed exercise of the power of eminent domain would be for a public
purpose.
HELD: No. The intended expropriation of private property for the benefit of a private individual is
clearly proscribed by the Constitution, declaring that it should be for public use or purpose.
Considering that the residents who need a feeder road are all subdivision lot owners, it is the
obligation of the Davsan II Subdivision owner to acquire a right-of-way for them. However, the
failure of the subdivision owner to provide an access road does not shift the burden to petitioner.
To deprive respondents of their property instead of compelling the subdivision owner to comply
with his obligation under the law is an abuse of the power of eminent domain and is patently
illegal. Without doubt, expropriation cannot be justified on the basis of an unlawful purpose. The
court affirmed CA’s decision.

MP: The power of eminent domain can only be exercised for public use and with just
compensation. Taking an individual’s private property is a deprivation which can only be justified
by a higher good which is public use and can only be counterbalanced by just compensation.
Without these safeguards, the taking of property would not only be unlawful, immoral, and null and
void, but would also constitute a gross and condemnable transgression of an individuals basic
right to property as well.
NOTES: Feeder Road - A secondary road which "feeds" traffic to main highways and freeways.

Fermin Manapat v. CA
FACTS: Sometime in the 1960s, the RCAM allowed a number of individuals to occupy the Grace
Park property on condition that they would vacate the premises should the former push through
with the plan to construct a school in the area. However, the plan did not materialize, so the

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occupants offered to purchase the portions they occupied. Since the occupants could not afford
RCAM’s proposed price, they organized themselves as exclusive members of the Eulogio
Rodriguez, Jr.
Tenants Association, Inc., petitioned the Government for the acquisition of the said property, its
subdivision into home lots, and the resale of the subdivided lots to them at a low price. Acting on
this petition, the Government, acting through the LTA, later succeeded by PHHC, negotiated for
the acquisition of the property from the RCAM/PRC. However, due to the high asking price of
RCAM and the budgetary constraints of the Government, the latter’s effort for expropriation was
discontinued. RCAM then decided to effect, on its own, the subdivision of the property and the
sale of the individual subdivided lots to the public. Petitioner was among those who purchased
individual subdivided lots of Grace Park directly from RCAM/PRC.
In 1977, Pres. Ferdinand Marcos issued PD 1072, appropriating P1.2m out of the President’s
Special Operations Funds to cover the additional amount needed for the appropriation of Grace
Park. The NHA, PHHC’s successor, then filed several expropriation proceedings over the already
subdivided lots for the purpose of developing Grace Park under the ZIP and subdividing it into
small lots for distribution and resale at a low cost to the residents of the area.
Manapat argued that since he is also a member of the tenant association, it would be absurd to
take the land away from him only to give it back to him as an intended beneficiary.
ISSUE: WON the NHA may validly expropriate the subject parcels of land.
HELD: Yes. NHA justified the taking of the subject property for the purpose of improving and
upgrading the area by constructing roads and installing facilities thereon under the Governments
ZIP and subdividing them into much smaller lots for distribution and sale at a low cost to qualified
beneficiaries, mostly underprivileged long-time occupants of Grace Park. Around 510 families with
approximately 5 members each will be benefited by the project. The only remaining obstacle in the
completion of this project is the lots subject of these consolidated petitions as the other lots in
Grace Park have already been expropriated.
Manapat’s contention fails to comprehend the public purpose for the taking under the socialized
housing program. The parcels of land subject of the expropriation are being taken so that they can
be subdivided into much smaller lots for distribution to deserving dwellers in the area. Upon the
completion of the project, Manapat, and those similarly situated as he, cannot assert any right to
be awarded the very same lots they currently occupy, nor be entitled to the same area of the land
they now have.

It is clear that public use, as a requisite for the exercise of eminent domain in the instant cases,
has been adequately fulfilled.
NOTES:
This is a consolidated case, I only focused on
Manapat. RCAM – Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila
LTA – Land Tenure Administration
PHHC – People’s Homesite and Housing
Corporation PRC – Philippine Realty Corporation
NHA – National Housing Authority
ZIP – Zonal Improvement Program

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G.R. 174012 Nov. 14, 2008
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority(MCIAA) v. Benjamin Tudtud, et al. FACTS:
In 1949, the National Airports Corporation (NAC) embarked on a program to expand Cebu Lahug
Airport. It sought to acquire, by negotiated sale or expropriation, several lots adjoining the then
existing airport for this purpose. The NAC acquired Lot 988 among other lots, but was thus cancelled
and issued in its stead in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Later Lot 988 was transferred
to the Air Transport Office, and later, to the MCIAA. When the Mactan-Cebu International Airport
opened for commercial flights, the Cebu Lahug Airport was closed and abandoned.
By letter of October 7, 1996 to the general manager of the MCIAA, Lydia Adlawan, acting as
attorney-in-fact of the original owners of Lot 988, demanded to repurchase the lot at the same price
paid at the time of the taking, without interest, no structures or improvements having been erected
thereon and the Cebu Lahug Airport having been closed and abandoned, hence, the purpose for
which the lot was acquired no longer existed.
Respondents alleged that the original owners or their successors-in-interest would be entitled to
repurchase the lot in the event that it was no longer used for airport purposes. MCIAA responded
that the decision granting them ownership of Lot 988 did not contain any condition that the subject
lots of the expropriation would revert to their owners in case the expansion of the Cebu Lahug
Airport would not materialize.
ISSUE: WON MCIAA should revert the subject lot to the original owners even without condition.
HELD: Yes. The MCIAA is obliged to reconvey Lot 988 to respondents with or without condition.
However, respondents must return to the MCIAA what they received as compensation for the
expropriation of Lot 988 plus legal interest to be computed from default, which in this case runs from
the time the MCIAA complies with its obligations to the respondents.
Respondents must likewise pay the MCIAA the necessary expenses it may have incurred in
sustaining Lot No. 988 and the monetary value of its services in managing it to the extent that
respondents were benefited thereby.

CITY OF MANILA, Petitioner, vs. MELBA TAN TE, Respondent. G.R. No. 169263 Sept 21, 2011
FACTS:
Manila City Mayor Joselito L. Atienza approved approved Ordinance No. 7951 an
expropriation measure authorizing him to acquire by negotiation or expropriation certain pieces of
real property along Maria Clara and Governor Forbes Streets where low-cost housing units could be
built and then awarded to bona fide residents therein. The records bear that respondent had
acquired the property in 1996, and back then it was being occupied by a number of families. In 1998,
respondent had sought the ejectment of these occupants from the premises. The favorable ruling in
that case evaded execution; hence, the court, despite opposition of the City of Manila, issued a Writ
of Demolition at respondent’s instance. It appears that in the interim between the issuance of the writ
of execution and the order of demolition, the City of Manila had instituted an expropriation case
affecting the same property. Respondent had moved for the dismissal of that first expropriation case
for lack of cause of action, lack of showing of an ordinance authorizing the expropriation, and non-
compliance with the provisions R.A. No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and
Housing Act of 1992.

Petitioner filed this second Complaint for expropriation and this time, it attached a copy of
Ordinance No. 7951 and alleged that pursuant thereto, it had previously offered to purchase the
subject property from respondent but respondent allegedly failed to retrieve it despite repeated
notices, thereby compelling petitioner to institute the present expropriation proceedings after
depositing in trust with the Land Bank of the Philippines ₱1,000,000.00 cash, representing the just
compensation required by law to be paid to respondent. Respondent did not file an answer and in
lieu of that, she submitted a Motion to Dismiss18 and raised the following grounds: that Ordinance
No. 7951 was an invalid expropriation measure because it violated the rule against taking private
property without just compensation; that petitioner did not comply with the requirements of Sections
9 and 10 of R.A. No. 7279; and that she qualified as a small property owner and, hence, exempt

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from the operation of R.A. No. 7279, the subject lot being the only piece of realty that she owned.

ISSUE: WON socialized housing falls within the confines of public use?
HELD:
Yes. The concept of socialized housing, whereby housing units are distributed and/or sold to
qualified beneficiaries on much easier terms, has already been included in the expanded definition of
"public use or purpose" in the context of the State’s exercise of the power of eminent domain. The
public use requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving
concept influenced by changing conditions. The taking to be valid must be for public use.
Specifically, urban renewal or development and the construction of low-cost housing are recognized
as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use but also because of
specific provisions in the Constitution. Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a
matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment
and in sum, the general welfare. The public character of housing measures does not change
because units in housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy prescribed
qualifications.

Congress passed R.A. No. 7279, to provide a comprehensive and continuing urban
development and housing program as well as access to land and housing by the underprivileged
and homeless citizens; uplift the conditions of the underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban
areas by making available decent housing at affordable cost; optimize the use and productivity of
land and urban resources among others. Accordingly, all city and municipal governments are
mandated to inventory all lands and improvements within their respective locality and identify lands
which may be utilized for socialized housing and as resettlement sites for acquisition and disposition
to qualified beneficiaries. Section 10 thereof authorizes local government units to exercise the power
of eminent domain to carry out the objectives of the law, but subject to the conditions stated therein
and in Section 9. In light of the foregoing, the Court is satisfied that "socialized housing" falls
within the confines of "public use.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by NAPOCOR, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF

SATURNINO Q. BORBON, AND COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents. G.R. No. 165354 January
12, 2015
FACTS:NAPOCOR entered a property in order to construct and maintain transmission lines for a
transmission project. Respondents heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon owned the subject property.
NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation seeking the acquisition of an easement of right of way
over a portion of the property alleging that it had negotiated with the respondents for the acquisition
of the easement but they had failed to reach any agreement; and that, nonetheless, it was willing to
deposit an amount representing the assessed value of the portion sought to be expropriated. It
prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession upon deposit to enable it to enter and take
possession and control of the affected portion of the property; to demolish all improvements existing
thereon; and to commence construction of the transmission line project. It likewise prayed for the
appointment of three commissioners to determine the just compensation to be paid.
The respondents staunchly maintained that NAPOCOR had not negotiated with them before
entering the property and that the entry was done without their consent; nonetheless, they tendered
no objection to NAPOCOR’s entry provided it would pay just compensation not only for the portion
sought to be expropriated but for the entire property whose potential was greatly diminished, if not
totally lost, due to the project. NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion to Discontinue
Expropriation Proceedings informing that the parties failed to reach an amicable agreement; that the
property sought to be expropriated was no longer necessary for public purpose because of the
intervening retirement of the transmission lines installed on the respondents’ property; that because
the public purpose for which such property would be used thereby ceased to exist, the proceedings
for expropriation should no longer continue, and the State was now duty-bound to return the property
to its owners.

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ISSUE: WON the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed pending
appeal

HELD: Yes, the dismissal is proper. The right of eminent domain is "the ultimate right of the
sovereign power to appropriate, not only the public but the private property of all citizens within the
territorial sovereignty, to public purpose." But the exercise of such right is not unlimited, for two
mandatory requirements should underlie the Government’s exercise of the power of eminent
domain, namely: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid
to the property owner. To be valid, the taking must be for public use. "Public use" has now been held
to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," and "public convenience."

It is essential that the element of public use of the property be maintained throughout the
proceedings for expropriation. There is no question raised concerning the right of the plaintiff here to
acquire the land under the power of eminent domain. That power was expressly granted it by its
charter. Indeed, public use is the fundamental basis for the action for expropriation; hence,
NAPOCOR’s motion to discontinue the proceedings is warranted and should be granted.

In the present case the petitioner admits that the expropriation of the land in question is no
longer necessary for public use. Had that admission been made in the trial court the case should
have been dismissed there. It now appearing positively, by resolution of the plaintiff, that the
expropriation is not necessary for public use, the action should be dismissed even without a motion
on the part of the plaintiff. The moment it appears in whatever stage of the proceedings that the
expropriation is not for a public use the complaint should be dismissed and all the parties thereto
should be relieved from further annoyance or litigation.

THE CITY OF MANILA vs. BALBINA & ARISTON ESTRADA, GR No. 7749 September 9, 1913
FACTS: George C. Sellner, a real estate agent, stated that the land in question, fronting as it did on
Calles Herran and Looban and the Paco Estero, was worth 60 per cent more than other land near
by, and placed its value at P10 per square meter. He stated that he had carried on negotiations with
regard to a parcel of land situated on the opposite side of the estero and fronting Herran; that he was
offering this land for sale at P5.50 per square meter, but that the owner succeeded in obtaining P6
per square meter, and that the sale had been consummated only about thirty days prior to the date
of the hearing. The witness stated that this land was of about the same elevation as the parcel
sought to be expropriated, but that it had no improvements, being used for the storage of coal.

Enrique Brias, another real estate man, testified that P10 was a good price for the land. He stated
that he was the owner of the land on the opposite side of the estero which had been sold for P6 per
square meter about one month prior to the hearing, but that this land was not in such a good
commercial location. The president of the Municipal Board of the city of Manila testified that a parcel
of land on the opposite side of Calle Herran but on the same side of the Paco Estero, owned by one
Clarke, had been expropriated by the city in 1908. He stated that commissioners were appointed
who duly rendered their report to the court, but as it was accepted by both parties, no further
litigation was necessary. In this case it seems that the land desired by the city was part of a parcel
fronting on Calle Herran, whose other boundaries were the Paco Estero, some private property, and
a small callejon. The portion desired by the city compromised the entire Herran frontage of the
owner.
ISSUE: WON the just compensation decided by the court is proper?
HELD: Yes. After a careful examination of the entire record in this case and the law applicable to the
questions raised therein, we are of the opinion that P10 per square meter is a just compensation for
the land taken. Without prejudice to filing a more extended opinion in which our reasons will be set
forth in full, judgment will be entered accordingly, without costs. So ordered. The city of Manila
sought to expropriate an entire parcel of land with its improvements for use in connection with a new
market at that time being erected in the district of Paco. A complaint was filed setting forth the

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necessary allegations, answer joined, and commissioners were appointed, who, after viewing the
premises and receiving evidence, and being unable to agree, submitted two reports to the court. The
court duly rendered its decision, confirming the majority report as to the improvements, but reducing
the price of the land from P20 per square meter, as fixed by the majority report, to P15 per square
meter. Motions for a new trial having been made by both parties and denied by the court, both
parties appealed from that part of the decision fixing the value of the land at P15 per square meter.
This court held that P10 per square meter was just compensation for the land, and rendered its
decision accordingly.
The court justifies such action, first, upon the ground that the great preponderance of the evidence
submitted to the commissioners showed that P10 per square meter was just compensation for the
land taken, and, second, upon the power of the court to revise the report of the commissioners when
the amount awarded is grossly inadequate or grossly excessive. The price of P10 per square meter
is 66 per cent greater than that obtained for land on the opposite side of the estero, and this
difference would seem amply sufficient to compensate for the more favored location of the
condemned land. That P10 per square meter is a just compensation is shown by a great
preponderance of the evidence. "Compensation" means an equivalent for the value of the land
(property) taken. Anything beyond that is more and anything short of that is less than compensation.
To compensate is to render something which is equal to that taken or received. The word "just" is
used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation;" to convey the idea that the equivalent to
be rendered for the property taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample. "Just compensation," means
a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained."

MANILA RAILROAD vs PAREDES

FACTS:
The plaintiff is a railroad corporation organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands and
has the power of eminent domain. In conformity with its charter it constructed and is now operating a
branch line from Manila to Gumaca, Province of Tayabas. It claims that it took possession of this
strip of land with the consent of the various owners and occupants claiming title thereto, and with the
understanding that it would pay the owners of all the lands thus taken a price to be agreed upon
thereafter, or to be fixed in condemnation proceedings; and that, not having been able to agree upon
a price with the owners of the land, it was later compelled to institute proceedings for the
condemnation of the land thus taken.
The applicant alleged that in the course of those proceedings the respondent judge issued an
order directing the Railroad Company to increase an amount of a certain deposit, therefore made by
the company to secure final payment of the value of certain lands which it sought to have
condemned for its use.

ISSUE: W/N private property for a public use without just compensation does require that
compensation shall be actually paid in advance for the occupancy of the land taken
RULING:
NO. In this jurisdiction the constitutional prohibition against the taking of property without just
compensation contains no express provision requiring prepayment and, following the weight of
authority, the court said that there is no prohibition against the legislative enactment of a form of
procedure whereby immediate possession of lands involved in expropriation proceedings may be
taken, provided always that due provision is made to secure the prompt adjudication and payment of
just compensation to the owners.

SANTOS vs LAND BANK

FACTS:
Edgar Santos, herein petitioner filed a case before the RTC for the determination of the of
just compensation for the properties taken by DAR under PD 27 in 1972. The RTC fixed the amount
of P49, 241, 876 to be the just compensation for the 36.4152 hectares and 40.7874 hectares
irrigated and unirrigated ricelands respectively. Further, the court ordered Land Bank to pay Santos

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P45, 698, 805 in the manner provided by RA No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law). Prior
to this decision, Land Bank already released P3, 543,070 to be paid to Santos in cash and bond;
thus deducting from the total amount. Land Bank complied with this decision and released the
amount of P3, 621, 023 in cash and P41, 128,024.81 in Land Bank Bond.
However, petitioner filed a motion before the RTC and insisted that he be paid in cash or
certified check instead of the bond. RTC as a consequence, order Land Bank to pay the balance in
cash or certified check instead of a bond. Land Bank moved for reconsideration. Through a new
judge, the RTC ordered Land Bank to pay Santos P5, 792,084.37 in cash and P35, 336,840.16 in
bonds. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner is correct in asserting that he be paid in cash for the just compensation
RULING:

No. It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional method for the payment of just
compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in the
past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power
of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively
limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local
purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
While the Court understand the desire of the petitioner to be paid in cash; after all his
compensation was long overdue. The Court cannot grant his petition because it is not sustained by
the law.

MUNICIPAL OF DAET vs CA
FACTS:
The judgment of the respondent Court of Appeals, subject of the instant petition to review
on certiorari, "fixing the fair market value of the property sought to be expropriated at P200.00 per
square meter or of Five Hundred Forty three thousand Four hundred (P543,400.00) pesos, and the
value of the improvement thereon at Thirty six thousand five hundred (P36,500.00) PESOS, both
amounts to bear legal interest from and after the date of the actual taking of possession by the
Municipality of Daet, Camarines Norte until the full amount is paid.
With costs against plaintiff-appellant," it must be affirmed in the light of the unusual, unique
and abnormal circumstances obtaining in this case where the complaint for condemnation was filed
on August 9, 1962 or seventeen (17) years ago but up to the present, the petitioner Municipality of
Daet has failed to make the deposit required to take possession of the property sought to be
expropriated.

ISSUE:
W/N the valuation is just, fair and reasonable RULING:
Yes. For purposes of just compensation in cases of private property acquired by the
government for public use, the basis shall be the current and fair market value as declared by
the owner or administrator or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever
is lower.
The provisional value of the property in this case having already been fixed, the deposit on
February 9, 1973 of the amount of P54,370.00 representing the assessed value of the land and the
deposit on October 21, 1977 of the amount of P25,830.00 representing the assessed value of the
improvement, both pursuant to the said decree, are not sufficient. Nevertheless, said amounts
should be deducted from the total amount due to private respondent. To explain and clarify the
judgment of the Court in affirming the decision appealed, the demolition of the building of private
respondent standing on the land by the Municipal Mayor, Engr. Jose P. Timoner on February 14,
1978 constituted the actual taking of possession of the property sought to be expropriated by the
Municipality of Daet. And from said date, February 14, 1978, interest at the legal rate shall be paid
by the municipality until the full amount is paid.

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 NAPOCOR vs. CA

Facts:National Power Corporation a GOCC vested with Eminent Domain power initiated
negotiations for right of easement to construct transmission lines to the land belonging to Matias
Cruz. For the purpose of determining the fair and just compensation due the defendants, the court
appointed three commissioners, comprised of one representative of the plaintiff, one for the
defendants and the other from the court. The commissioner for the plaintiff recommended
P1.00/sqm easement fee for Matias lot. This was countered by the commissioner of Matias with
P10.00/sqm as disturbance compensation. The court’s countered with P5.00/sqm.

The lower court granted P10.00/sqm but this was appealed and was reduced to P5.00/sqm.
Still not satisfied NPC appealed to CA. CA sustained the decision of the lower court.

NPC contend that full ownership is retained by the private respondents and they are not
totally deprived of the use of the land. They can continue planting the same agricultural crops,
except those that would result in contact with the wires. On this premise, petitioner submits that if full
market value is required, then full transfer of ownership is only the logical equivalent.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be made to pay full compensation for the land traversed by
its transmission lines.

Ruling: YES.
While it is true that plaintiff are only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually
deprives defendants of their proprietary rights.

In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent
domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay
transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period
such no plant higher than three (3) meters is allowed and the danger to life and limbs because of the
high tension current deprives private respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons, the owner
of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation.
EPZA v. DULAY
Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export
Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio
Development Corporation, in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were
expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation.
Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to
determine the just compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to San
Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under
PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared
by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such
objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the
reception of the commissioner’s report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus
enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case.

Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD
1533 is unconstitutional.
Ruling: YES. The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible
encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under
the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only
serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may
not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to
arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The

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executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a
violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use
without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from
looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.
MADDUMBA v. GSIS
Facts: Respondent GSIS conducted a public bidding of several foreclosed properties. Petitioner
Domingo B. Maddumba participated in the public bidding and submitted his sealed bid in the amount
of P98,000.00 in Philippine currency. The bid was subject to the condition that there should be a
down payment of 35% of the amount thereof, the 10% constituting the proposal bond with the
remaining 25% to be paid after the receipt of the notice of award or acceptance of the bid.
Accordingly, petitioner enclosed with his sealed bid a manager's check in the amount of P9,500.00
and cash in the amount of P300.00 to complete the P9, 800.00 proposal bond.

Upon the receipt of the notice of award, petitioner offered to pay the additional 25% in Land Bank
bonds at their face value. However, the GSIS rejected the offer. The board "resolved to reiterate
the policy that Land Bank bonds shall be accepted as payment only at a discounted rate to yield
the System 18% at maturity.

Issue: WON LBP bonds shall be accepted as payment of pre-existing obligations to government
financial institutions at their face value and not at discounted value.

Ruling: YES. Acceptance of Land Bank bonds, instead of money, undoubtedly involves a certain
degree of sacrifice for the landowner. This, of course, is in addition to the fact that, in case of
expropriation of land covered by land reform, the landowner will seldom get the compensation he
desires. Thus, discounting the Land Banks bonds, and thereby reducing their effective value,
entails and imposes an additional burden on his part. Respondent Government Service
Insurance System is ordered to accept the bonds issued by the Land Bank of the Philippines
at their par or face value.

Berkenkotter vs. CA
Facts: The property has an area of 10,640 square meters and belongs to B. H. Berkenkotter & Co.,
the herein petitioner. Vicente Viray, president of the said school, sent the owner a written offer to buy
the land in line with the 5-year expansion program of ARASOF. In reply, Berkenkotter expressed its
willingness to sell at P50.00 per square meter payable in cash. At Viray's request, the Provincial
Appraisal Committee, Office of the Provincial Assessor, Batangas City, appraised the land and fixed
its market value at P32.00 per square meter. Viray then wrote Berkenkotter another letter and
offered to buy the property at the said price. The latter stuck to its original valuation; later it said that
the property had in fact appreciated to as much as P100.00 per square meter. Further negotiations
failed to resolve the impasse between ARASOF and the petitioner. In the end, expropriation
proceedings were commenced against the petitioner by the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of
ARASOF.
In its complaint the Republic invoked the assessment made by the Provincial Appraisal Committee at
P32.00 per square meter and sought possession of the property upon payment of the 10% deposit
required by P.D. 48. Berkenkotter originally questioned the purpose of the expropriation but later
abandoned this objection and concentrated only on what it called the under-appraisal of the subject
land. Later the Regional Trial Court of Batangas issued an order of condemnation and, pursuant to
Rule 67, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, appointed a panel of commissioners to determine the just
compensation to be paid for the land.
The panel of commissioners submitted its report to the trial court and recommended that the
property be appraised at the unit price of P85.00. The Republic objected and pointed to three
contracts of sale the petitioner had concluded in 1985 whereby it sold three tracts of land similar in
topography and adjacent to the property in question for the unit price of only P19.18. The trial court

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directed the commissioners to convene anew and receive additional evidence. It did and conducted
more interviews. In its second report dated April 1, 1987, however, the panel reiterated its original
recommendation for the valuation of the property at P85.00 per square meter.
Issue: Whether or not the parcels of land should be rated at P19.18 per square meter?

Held: Yes. The Republic should not pay more simply because it is the Republic, as if it were a milking
cow with unlimited resource to abuse.

It may be asked why the petitioner should not be paid at the rate at least of P32.00, which was the
price offered by Viray and in the complaint for expropriation later filled by the Republic. The Republic
had no choice then because P.D. 1533 fixed the just compensation at the valuation given by the
owner of the government, whichever was lower.

Mercalco vs Pineda
Facts: Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a domestic corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of Philippines. Respondent Honorable Judge Gregorio G. Pineda is
impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXI, Pasig, Metro Manila. While private respondents Teofilo Arayon, Sr.,
Gil de Guzman, Lucito Santiago and Teresa Bautista are owners in fee simple of the expropriated
property situated at Malaya, Pililla, Rizal.

On October 29, 1974, a complaint for eminent domain was filed by petitioner MERALCO against
forty-two (42) defendants with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch
XXII, Pasig, Metro Manila. The complaint alleges that for the purpose of constructing a 230 KV
Transmission line from Barrio Malaya to Tower No. 220 at Pililla, Rizal, petitioner needs portions of
the land of the private respondents consisting of an aggregate area of 237,321 square meters.
Despite petitioner's offers to pay compensation and attempts to negotiate with the respondents', the
parties failed to reach an agreement.

The petitioner strongly maintains that the respondent court's act of determining and ordering the
payment of just compensation to private respondents without formal presentation of evidence by the
parties on the reasonable value of the property constitutes a flagrant violation of petitioner's
constitutional right to due process. It stressed that respondent court ignored the procedure laid down
by the law in determining just compensation because it formulated an opinion of its own as to the
value of the land in question without allowing the Board of Commissioners to hold hearings for the
reception of evidence.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent court can dispense with the assistance of a Board of
Commissioners in an expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the just compensation. Held:

Ruling: NO. In an expropriation case where the principal issue is the determination of just
compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present
evidence on the issue of just compensation. Under the Revised Rules of Court, the determination by
the Court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken" is done by the Court with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. In the case at bar, respondent judge arrived at
the amount of just compensation on its own, without the proper reception of evidence before the
Board of Commissioners. Hence, the appointment of at least three (3) competent persons as
commissioners to ascertain just compensation is a mandatory requirement.

National Corporation vs. CA

Facts: In 1978, National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), took possession of a 21,995 square
meter land which is a portion of Lot 1 of the subdivision plan situated in Marawi City, owned by
Mangondato, that was covered by Transfer Certificate Title under the mistaken belief that it forms

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part of the public land reserved for use by NAPOCOR for hydroelectric power.
NAPOCOR alleged that the subject land was until then possessed and administered by Marawi City
so that in exchange for the city's waiver and quitclaim of any right over the property, NAPOCOR had
paid the city a financial assistance instead.
Mangondato claimed that the subject land is his duly registered private property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-378-A in his name, and that he is not privy to any agreement between
NAPOCOR and Marawi City and that any payment made to said city cannot be considered as
payment to him.
More than a decade later NAPOCOR acceded to the fact that the property belongs to Mangondato.
NAPOCOR's National Power Board resolved to pay Mangondato P100.00 per square meter for only
a 12,132 square meter portion of the subject property plus 12% interest per annum from 1978.
However, in the August 7, 1990 board meeting, confirmation of said resolution was deferred to allow
NAPOCOR's regional legal counsel to determine whether P100.00 per square meter is the fair
market value.
Mangondato disagreed with the NAPOCOR board's pegging the compensation for his land at
P100.000 per square meter without interest from 1978 when NAPOCOR reassessed the fair market
value of the land. Mangondato submitted that the fair market value of his land is even more than the
P300.00 (per) square meter stated in the City Appraisal Report but that for expediency, he is willing
to settle for P300.00 per square meter plus 12% interest per annum from 1978.
The petitioner assigned the error that the lower courts erred in affirming that the just compensation
of his property was based on it’s value in 1992 when the complaint was filed and not in 1978 when
the property was taken by petition and erred in fixing it’s total value.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent court was justified in ruling that just compensation is the
equivalent of the value of the property when the complaint was filed and not during taking?

Ruling: Yes. The general rule in determining "just compensation" in eminent domain is the value of
the property as of the date of the filing of complaint, as follows :
Sec. 4. Order of Condemnation.When such a motion is overruled or when any party fails to defend
as required by this rule, the court may enter an order of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff
has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to, be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint. . .

In the instant case, however, it is difficult to conceive of how there could have been an extra-
ordinary increase in the value of the owner's land arising from the expropriation, as indeed the
records do not show any evidence that the valuation of P1,000.00 reached in 1992 was due to
increments directly caused by petitioner's use of the land. Since the petitioner is claiming an
exception to Rule 67, Section 4, 17 it has the burden of proving its claim that its occupancy and
use — not ordinary inflation and increase in land values — was the direct cause of the increase in
valuation from 1978 to 1992. Simply stated, the exception finds application where the owner would
be given undue incremental advantages arising from the use to which the government devotes the
property expropriated.

In sum, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner has failed to show why it should be
granted an exemption from the general rule in determining just compensation provided under
Section 4 of Rule 67. On the contrary, private respondent has convinced us that, indeed, such
general rule should in fact be observed in this case

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Yap and Santiago are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR,
subjecting it for transfer to qualified CARP beneficiaries. Aggrieved by the compensation valuation
of DAR and LBP, respondents filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with a preliminary

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mandatory injunction. The case was referred to CA for proper determination and disposition.

Respondents argued that DAR and LBP committed grave abuse of discretion and acted without
jurisdiction when they opened trusts accounts in lieu of the depositing in cash or bonds, before the
lands was taken and the titles are cancelled. Respondents claim that before the taking of the
property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or bonds.

DAR, maintained that the certificate of deposit was a substantial compliance with the rule on taking
and compensation. LBP confirms that the certificate of deposit expresses "reserved/deposited".

CA ruled in favor of Yap and Santiago. DAR filed a petition. DAR, maintain that the word "deposit"
referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded the opening of a trust account as
form of deposit.

ISSUE: Whether or not without prompt payment, compensation can be considered just.

RULING: NO, because the owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the
amount necessary to cope with his loss.

Obviously, this would render the right to seek a fair and just compensation illusory as it would
discourage owners of private lands from contesting the offered valuation of the DAR even if they
find it unacceptable, for fear of the hardships that could result from long delays in the resolution of
their cases.

This is contrary to the rules of fair play because the concept of just compensation embraces not
only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the
payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking.

Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just for the property owner is made
to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a
decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.

PANES vs VISAYAN STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE

FACTS: Pres. Marcos issued PD 1107 establishing the Root Crops Center in the Visayas State
College of Agriculture (hereafter VISCA) located at Baybay, Leyte. Pursuant to the purposes of the
Root Crops Center, VISCA was authorized under P.D. No. 1107 to acquire by negotiated sale or
expropriation, private agricultural properties in Barrios Pangasugan and in Guadalupe, Baybay,
Leyte.
Clothed by P.D. No. 1107 with the power to expropriate lands situated within the aforecited barrios,
respondent VISCA filed a complaint for expropriation against petitioners. The public purposes cited
therefor were the following: (1) to establish experimental fields; (2) to construct buildings,
laboratories and housing facilities for the personnel of the Root Crops Center; and (3) to integrate
and conduct country-wide researches on root crops.
Respondent VISCA deposited the amount of P74,050.00 with the PNB representing the assessed
value of the lands for taxation purposes. PD 1533 determined the just compensation in
expropriation cases to be the fair and current market value declared by the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
Petitioners filed their answer. They alleged that their lands sought to be expropriated were not
within the area specified under P.D. No. 1107; that the amount of P74,050.00 did not constitute just
compensation; and P.D. 1533 was unconstitutional.\

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ISSUE: Whether or not PD 1533 is unconstitutional for determining just compensation.

RULING: YES, the determination of just compensation under P.D. 1533, was converted from being
a judicial prerogative to an executive decision. The executive determination of just compensation in
eminent domain proceedings renders the courts inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is
reserved to them for final determination. (separation of powers)

REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Private respondent Acil Corporation owned several hectares of land in Davao del Norte, which the
government took pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private respondent's
certificates of title were cancelled and new ones were issued and distributed to farmer-
beneficiaries.
The lands were valued by the Land Bank of the PH at P19,312.24 per hectare for the riceland and
P4,267.68 per hectare for brushland, or for a total of P439,105.39. It appears, however, that in the
Statement of Agricultural Landholdings which private respondent had earlier filed with the DAR, a
lower "Fair Value Acceptable to Landowner" was stated and that based on this statement, the Land
Bank of the Philippines valued private respondent's lands uniformly at P15,311.79 per hectare and
fixed the amount of P390,557.84 as the total compensation to be paid for the lands.
Private respondent rejected the government's offer, pointing out that nearby lands planted to the
same crops were valued at the higher price of P24,717.40 per hectare. The matter was brought
before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator who sustained the initial valuation made by the
LBP.
Private respondent then filed a Petition for Just Compensation in the RTC of Tagum, Davao del
Norte, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Private respondent prayed that DAR be ordered to pay
P24,717.40 per hectare. However, the RTC dismissed its petition on the ground that private
respondent should have appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board.

Private respondent moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.

Private respondent therefore filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, contending
that a petition for just compensation falls under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC.
His contention was sustained by the Court of Appeals.

In turn the government, represented by DAR, filed this petition for review on certiorari, raising as
the issue whether in cases involving claims for just compensation, an appeal from the decision
of the provincial adjudicator to the DARAB must first be made before a landowner can resort to
the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not appeal from to the DARAB must first be made before a landowner can
resort to the RTC.

RULING: NO. Although the law speaks of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the
RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such
cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the
original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to law and therefore
would be void. What adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary
manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate
power to decide this question.

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NAPOCOR v Henson G.R. No. 129998. December 29, 1998

Facts: On March 21, 1990, the National Power Corporation initiated with the Regional Trial Court,
Pampanga, a complaint for eminent domain for the taking for public use of five (5) parcels of land,
owned or claimed by respondents, with a total aggregate area of 58,311 square meters, for the
expansion of the NPC Mexico Sub-Station. The respondents, 5 couples, were the owners.

The petitioner tried to fix the value of the land but was met of a price of 180 to 250 pesos due to the
respondents. The respondents also filed a motion to dismiss.

In the trial court, the motion to dismiss was quashed. However, the court fixed the provisional value
of the land at P100.00 per square meter, for a total area of 63,220 sqm. The petitioner deposited the
amount. The trial court allowed respondents a motion to withdraw P5,831,100.00, with a balance of
P690,900.00 as the purchase value.
3 commissioners were then authorized by the trial court to determine the provisional value of the
land for just compensation. The values were in 350, 375, and 170 per sqm from Tiglao, Atienza and
Orocio.
In May 19, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment fixing the amount of just compensation to be paid
by petitioner for the taking of the entire area of 63,220 square meters at P400.00 per square meter,
with legal interest from September 11, 1990, when petitioner was placed in possession of the land,
plus attorney’s fees of P20,000.00, and costs of the proceedings.

The CA merely deleted the attorney’s fees.

Issue: What is the just compensation for the taking of respondents’ property for the expansion of the
NPC’s Mexico Sub-station?

RULING:

P375.00 per sqm. CA decision modified. The parcels of land sought to be expropriated are
undeniably idle, undeveloped, raw agricultural land, bereft of any improvement. Except for the
Henson family, all the other respondents were admittedly farmer beneficiaries under operation land
transfer of the Department of Agrarian Reform. However, the land has been re-classified as
residential. The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion to
determine just compensation to the landowner.
CA fixed 400.00 due to the similarity with the price in the adjacent Sto. Domingo Village. The land in
question, however, was an undeveloped, idle land, principally agricultural in character, though re-
classified as residential. There was no evidence for the value. It was even higher than that of the
commissioners’ valuation.
On the other hand, Commissioner Atienza recommended a fair market value at P375.00 per square
meter. This appears to be the closest valuation to the market value of lots in the adjoining fully
developed subdivision. Considering that the subject parcels of land are undeveloped raw land, the
price of P375.00 per square meter would appear to the Court as the just compensation for the taking
of such raw land.
The court agreed with petitioner that the area of the communal irrigation canal consisting of 4,809
square meters must be excluded from the land to be expropriated. To begin with, it is excluded in the
amended complaint. Hence, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in including the same in
the area to be taken.
The trial court erroneously ordered double payment for 3,611 square meters of lot 5 (portion) in the
dispositive part of its decision, and, hence, this must be deleted.
The decision for legal interest was correct. Napocor was exempted from costs of proceedings.

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EDGARDO SANTOS, vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Petitioner Edgardo Santos is the plaintiff in Agrarian Case for the determination of just
compensation regarding properties which were taken by DAR under P.D. No. 27 A preliminary
valuation of the amount had in fact been previously released by the Land Bank in cash and bond;
thus deducting it from the total amount adjudged, the balance unpaid amounted to P45,698,805.34
which was ordered by the Regional Trial Court to be paid in accordance with RA 6657.
The Land Bank elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, which eventually dismissed the
appeal. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued by the RTC declaring that the Land Bank had
complied with the writ of execution and ordered the same to release the amount to petitioner and
the made payment to the Clerk of Court as commission fees for execution of judgment.
Petitioner claimed that the payment of Land Bank Bonds was not acceptable to him and
that the said amount should be paid in cash or certified check. The respondent Land Bank, on the
other hand, opposed the motion, contending that the judgment amount had already been satisfied.
To summarize, the very issue to be resolved in the instant case is to determine how much
should be paid in cash and how much also should be paid in bonds, to fully satisfy the judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the compensation can be

payable with bonds RULING:
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657) provides that just compensation to
landowners shall be paid in cash and bonds. Hence, a trial court decision directing the
payment of such compensation "in the manner provided by R.A. 6657" is not illegally amended
but is merely clarified by an order, issued during the execution proceedings, that such amount
shall be paid in cash and bonds.

MP EMPHASIZED

Sigre v CA

FACTS: Private respondents filed with the CA a petition for prohibition and madamus and sought
to prohibit Land Bank from accepting the leasehold rentals from Ernesto Sigre, and for LB to turn
over to private respondent the rentals previously remitted. This is in accordance to DAR
Memorandum circular no. 6 which set the guidelines of the land transfer program under PD 27.
Private respondent stated that there was no notice on the fixing of the production and the land
valuation, assailing the validity of the circular and the PD. The appellate court favored the private
respondent stating that due to the enactment of RA 6657 (CARP LAW) PD 27 is no longer
applicable.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred that the PD 27 fixing the just compensation of the land has been
repealed by CARP LAW

RULING: YES. The CARP LAW operates distinctly from PD27. RA 6657 covers all public and
private agricultural land including other lands of the public domain suitable. While PD 27 covers
rice and corn lands.

Petitioner: San Roque Realty and Development Corporation

Respondent: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (through the Armed Forces of the
Philippines) 532 SCRA 493 September 7, 2007

FACTS: The subject parcels of land are located at Lahug, Cebu City and were part of Lot No. 933.
Lot No. 933 was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11946. It was originally owned by
Ismael D. Rosales, Pantaleon Cabrera and Francisco Racaza.

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 October 19, 1938, plaintiff (then Commonwealth now Republic of the Philippines)
instituted condemnation proceeding against the owners of Lot 933 in Banilad Estate Lahug before
the Court of First for the purpose of carrying out the development program of the Philippine Army.
Judge Felix Martinez ordered plaintiff to make an initial deposit of P9,500.00 payable to the
Provincial Treasurer as pre-condition for the entry on the lands sought to be expropriated.

The Republic admits that the initial deposit was disbursed in full to the owners of the 18
lots subject of expropriation it made records of payment were destroyed by fire during World War
II, and it cannot be ascertained who received the money.

San Roque alleged that subject land have been covered by the Torrens System for
decades and any transaction including the alleged expropriation should have been registered and
annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title; that there has been no registration much less
annotation of said expropriation on TCTs issued to defendant San Roque nor any of its
predecessors-in-interest.

RTC ruled in favour of SRRDC, and the CA revesed such ruling, finding that appeal from the
CFI Decision in the expropriation case was never made by the original owners of the subject
properties, and thus, the expropriation became final and binding on the them, and SRRDC, which
merely stepped into the latter's shoes.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a compliance with the constitutional mandate that Private Property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation

RULING: No. Without full payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the
landowner to the expropriator. The Republic’s failure to pay just compensation precluded the
perfection of its title over Lot No. 932. The payment of just compensation for private property taken
for public use is an indispensable requisite for the exercise of the States sovereign power of eminent
domain.

Republic manifestly failed to present clear and convincing evidence of full payment of just
compensation and receipt thereof by the property owners. The CFI Decision makes no mention of
the initial deposit allegedly made by the Republic. Based on the CFI Decision fixing the amount of
just compensation for some of the lots, the initial deposit, if it was indeed disbursed, would still not
adequately recompense all the owners of the 18 expropriated lots. If the Republic had actually made
full payment of just compensation, in the ordinary course of things, it would have led to the
cancellation of title, or at least, the annotation of the lien in favor of the government on the certificate
of title covering Lot No. 933.

The CA Decision is reversed.

Land Bank v. Peralta

GR. No. 182704, April 23, 2014

Facts: Victorino Peralta is the registered owner of two parcels of agricultural land located at
Sinangguyan, Bukidnon. Of the total area of more than 8 hectares, 2.73 hectares were placed under
the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) program and distributed to tenant-beneficiaries pursuant to PD
No. 27. On 2000, respondent filed with the RTC, acting as special agrarian court (SAC), a petition for
judicial determination of just compensation for his landholding, alleging that the true valuation of
lands sold within the vicinity is 200,000/hectare, while the price made by the petitioner was fixed at
6,315php only/ 63 centavos per sqm. Petitioner stated that the subject land was valued way back in
1981 as evidenced by the Landowner-Tenant Production Agreement (LTPA). It maintained that
having agreed to the stipulated price in the LTPA, respondent had waived his claim for a higher

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compensation.

The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) conducted an inspection of the
subject land and recommended the amount of P17,240php, pursuant to the formula under PD
27. While the Municipal Assessor reported that the value is 200,000/hectare. The SAC rendered its
decision in favor of the plaintiffs, and the petitioners appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the
judgement of SAC finding that petitioner has not shown that it complied with the requirement of full
payment of the cost of respondent’s landholding. While it is true that petitioner had made a valuation
of the property as stated in the LTPA, using the formula provided under P.D. No. 27, the effort has not
gone beyond that point as no just compensation, as thus evaluated, had ever been made to the
respondent prompting the latter to file a summary proceeding before the DARAB, and eventually a
petition with the SAC praying for the fixing of just compensation pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657.
The CA thus ruled that since the application of the process of agrarian reform to the subject land has
remained incomplete as of the advent of R.A. 6657, actual title remains with respondent and the
completion of the agrarian reform process should now be undertaken under
R.A. 6657.

Issue: WON the CARP LAW (R.A. 6657) should apply in determining just compensation.

Ruling: Yes. If the issue of just compensation is not settled prior to the passage of R.A. No. 6657, it
should be computed in accordance with the said law, although the property was acquired under
P.D. No. 27. Considering that respondents land had been previously acquired under P.D. No. 27 but
the valuation has been the subject of his challenge before the SAC, the completion and final
resolution of just compensation should therefore be computed in accordance with Section 17 of
R.A. No. 6657.

It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by
PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR’s failure to determine the just compensation for a
considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with RA
6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation should be
the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent
being real, substantial, full and ample. Since the acquisition process under P.D. No. 27 remains
incomplete and is overtaken by R.A. No. 6657, the process should be completed under
R.A. No. 6657, with P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 having suppletory effect only.

Land Bank of the Philippines vs Eusebio G.R. No. 160143, July 2, 2014

Facts: Benecio Eusebio, Jr. was the owner of a 790.4-hectare parcel of land situated in Corba,
Masbate, registered in the name of Ricardo Tañada. Eusebio purchased this parcel of land from
Tañada in 1980. On 1988, Eusebio voluntarily offered to sell the entire 790.4-hectare parcel of land
to the government, through the DAR, pursuant to R.A. No. 6657 for ₱19,500,000.00. DAR chose to
acquire only 783.37 hectares and initially offered to purchase it at ₱2.3M, then increasing it to ₱3.1M.
Eusebio rejected both amounts. On 1993, petitioner revalued the acquirable portion at
₱3.9M, pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 6. Eusebio likewise rejected this valuation.
Meanwhile, the LBP opened a trust account in the amount of ₱3.1M in favor of Eusebio and Tañada
for the covered portion. The DAR then took physical possession of the property, had its transfer
certificate cancelled in favor of the Republic, and distributed the property at cost to the recognized
farmer-beneficiaries.

The parties referred the matter to the DARAB for summary determination of just compensation, who
fixed the property at 4M, which Eusebio did not accept. Eusebio and Tañada filed before the RTC-
SAC an action for determination and payment of just compensation against the DAR & LBP. The RTC
ruled in favor of Eusebio and fixed the price at 25M. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision

Page 50 of 62
 pointing out that DAR/LBP merely confined its determination to factors under RA 6657 and the DAR
admin orders and disregarding, in effect, the other factors relevant to the determination of what the
CA considered as the full and fair equivalent of Eusebio’s property. The CA considered as fair and
equitable the amount the RTC-SAC fixed as just compensation, given the four-year time lapse
between 1988, when Eusebio offered to sell the property and 1992, when the government actually
deprived Eusebio of his property.

Issue: WON the RTC-SAC’s determination of just compensation for the property at
₱25,000,000.00 is proper.

Ruling: No. Section 57 of R.A. 6657 explicitly vests in the RTC-SAC the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to determine just compensation for lands taken pursuant to the State’s agrarian reform
program. To guide the RTC-SAC in the exercise of its function, Section 17 of R.A. 6657 enumerates
the factors that the RTC-SAC must take into account in its determination. To ensure the agrarian
reform law’s proper implementation, Section 49 of R.A. 6657 empowers the DAR to issue such rules
and regulations necessary for the purpose. In this case, DAR AO 5-98, that incorporated, into a basic
formula, Section 17’s enumerated factors providing the details by which "just compensation" is to be
properly approximated. RT-SAC has the duty to consider the factors enumerated under Section 17
of R.A. 6657 and the DAR formula that embodies these factors in determining just compensation.

In other words, in the exercise of the essentially judicial function of determining just compensation, the
RTC-SAC is not granted unlimited discretion. It must consider and apply the R.A. No. 6657-
enumerated factors and the DAR formula (that reflects these factors) as they provide the uniform
framework or structure by which just compensation for property subject to agrarian reform should be
determined.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM vs SPOUSES DIOSDADO STA. ROMANA G.R. No.

183290, July 9, 2014

Facts: Spouses Diosdado Sta. Roman, et al. are the owners of a 27.5307-ha. agricultural land
situated in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija. Petitioner DAR compulsorily acquired a 21.2192-ha. portion
(subject land) of respondents’ property pursuant to the government’s Operation Land Transfer
Program under PD 27. On 1995, the DAR caused the generation of emancipation patents (EPs) in
favor of the farmer-beneficiaries, and, in 1996, the LBP fixed the value of the subject land at
₱361,181.87 using the formula under EO 228 and DAR Administrative Order No. 13, series of 1994.

Dissatisfied with the LBP valuation, respondents filed a Petition for Approval and Appraisal of Just
Compensation before the RTC, averring that: (a) the LBP valuation was inadequate considering the
subject land’s proximity to subdivision lots and commercial establishments; and
(b) the fair market value of the subject land should be fixed in the amount of at least
₱300,000.00/ha. as some beneficiaries were even selling their lands to subdivision developers at the
price of ₱1,000,000.00/ha.

LBP insisted on the correctness of the valuation, having been computed in accordance with the
formula under EO 228 which governs the determination of just compensation due a landowner
whose property was seized under PD 27. The RTC appointed 2 commissioners for the purpose, who
recommended the amount of ₱300,000.00/ha. as reasonable compensation for the subject land. RTC
rendered a Decision rejecting the LBP valuation and fixing the just compensation of the subject land
at ₱2,576,829.94 or ₱121,438.60/ha. It explained that while respondents’ land was acquired
pursuant to PD 27, the same is covered by Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988," which provides that in determining just
compensation, the factors under Section 17 of RA 6657 should be considered.

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Issue: WON the subject land was properly valued in accordance with the factors set forth in Section
17 of RA 6657, as amended.
Ruling: No. Settled is the rule that when the agrarian reform process is still incomplete, as in this
case where the just compensation for the subject land acquired under PD 27 has yet to be paid, just
compensation should be determined and the process concluded under RA 6657, with PD 27 and EO
228 having mere suppletory effects.
The Court has gone over the records and observed that the only factors considered by the RTC in
determining the just compensation for the subject land were (a) the acquisition price of a 5.5825- ha.
landholding situated in the same locality paid to the owner on November 17, 1997, and (b) the market
value of the subject land declared by the respondents, without a showing that the other factors under
Section 17 of RA 6657, were even taken into account or, otherwise, found to be inapplicable,
contrary to what the law requires.

G.R. No. 183901 July 9, 2014

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Petitioner, vs. SALUD GACIAS BERIÑA,CESAR
GACIAS, NORMA GACIAS TANDOC,LYDIA LEANDER GACIAS, and GREGORIO MEDEN
GACIAS, Respondents.

Facts: The Gacias heirs filed a petition for retention of the portions conveyed to them which was
favorably granted by the DAR Regional Director. On appeal DAR Secretary declared that the said
lands are within the coverage of the OLT program under PD27 and upheld the certificates of land
transfer issued in the interim in favor of the farmers-beneficiaries thereon. The DAR secretary ruled
that the conveyance made by Gacias were ineffectual considering that the tenats cultivating the
subject landholdings still recognize the previous owner, Margarita Gacias, and not respondents. the
DAR maintained that the subject portion had already been valued under PD 27 and EO 228, and,
thus, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. On the other hand, the LBP averred that respondents
had no cause of action against it for the reason that the DAR had not forwarded any claim folder
over the subject portion for processing and payment.

DAR had initially valued the 8-ha. portion of the aforesaid riceland (subject portion) at ₱77,000.00
(DAR valuation), using the formula under Executive Order No. (EO) 228 dated July 17, 1987, i.e.,
Land Value = Average Gross Product (AGP) x 2.5 x ₱35.00 x area. Respondents filed a Complaint
for Determination of Just Compensation, averring that the initial DAR valuation was
unconscionably low, considering that every ha. of riceland has an average produce of 120 sacks of
palay every harvest season. Dissatisfied the parties elevated the matter to the RTC then
subsequently to the CA, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision with the modification imposing legal
interest at the rate of 12% p.a. on the compensation award upon its finality until full payment.

Issue: Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in imposing legal interest at the rate of 12%
p.a. on the compensation award from finality of the judgment until full payment.

Ruling: Yes, Settled is the rule that when the agrarian reform process is still incomplete, as in this
case where payment for the subject portion acquired under PD 27 has yet to bemade, just
compensation should be determined and the process be concluded under Republic Act No. (RA)
6657, otherwise known as "ComprehensiveAgrarian Reform Law of 1988”, with PD 27 and EO 228
having mere suppletory effect. This means that PD 27 and EO 228 only apply when there are
gapsin RA 6657; where RA 6657 is sufficient, PD 27 and EO228 are superseded.

The determination of just compensation is a judicial function; hence, courts cannot be

unduly restricted in their determination thereof. To do so would deprive the courts of their
judicial prerogatives and reduce them to the bureaucratic function of inputting data and
arriving at the valuation.

Page 52 of 62
G.R. No. 171836 August 11, 2014
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by HON. NASSER C. PANGANDAMAN,
in his capacity as DAR-OIC Secretary, Petitioner, vs. SUSIE IRENE GALLE, Respondent.

Facts: Respondent Susie Irene Galle (Galle) owned two contiguous parcels of land known as the
Patalon Coconut Estate (the estate) in Patalon, Zamboanga City, with a total area of 410.2271
hectares and covered by two titles issued in her name – Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T- 62,736
and T-62,737. The estate is a fully developed and income-producing farm. Petitioner Land Bank of
the Philippines (LBP) valued 356.2257 hectares of the estate at ₱6,083,545.26, which valuation was
rejected by Galle. The rejected amount was supposedly deposited in the name of Galle, in the form
of cash and bonds. The Zamboanga City Registry of Deeds cancelled Galle’s titles and transferred
the entire estate to the State; TCT Nos. T-110,927 and T-110,928 were issued in the name of the
"Republic of the Philippines – Department of Agrarian Reform." On November 25,1994, TCT Nos. T-
110,927 and T-110,928 were cancelled and new titles – TCT Nos. T-111,098 and T-111,099 – were
issued in the name of "Patalon Estate Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association" (PEARA).”

The above titles covered 406.8342 hectares of the estate’s total area of 410.2271 hectares, thus
leaving 3.3929 hectares thereof unregistered. The 3.3929 hectares unaccounted for but not re- titled
or returned to Galle –were taken from her by the government without just compensation.

Issue: Whether or not there was no just compensation.

Ruling: Yes, The concept of just compensation contemplates of just and timely payment; it embraces
not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the landowner, but also the payment
ofthe land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot,
be considered "just," for the owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived
of their land while being made to wait efore actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his
loss.

G.R. No. 172507, September 14, 2016

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. SPS. MARGARITO ASOQUE AND TARCINIA
ASOQUE, Respondents.
Facts: Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of coconut land located in Barangay
Bugtong, Calbayog City. The parcel of land is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2376. The
National Power Corporation entered the respondent land to install transmission lines for its HVDC
Power Transmission Line Project. The NPC utilized 4,352 square meters for the project. Respondent
allege that the NPC would pay them the value of the portion of the land used and all improvements
that would be destroyed for NPCs project. Respondent incurred actual damages as a result of the
NPC’s cutting off some coconut trees and other fruit- and non-fruit-bearing plants during the
construction. Upon respondent's demand for just compensation, the NPC only paid for the
improvements destroyed and refused to pay for the actual value of the 4,352-square-meter area
utilized for the project.
The NPC claimed that it was only liable to pay for right of way at 10% of the market value under
Section 3-A of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended. Respondent filed before the Regional Trial
Court a Complaint for payment of just compensation and damages against the National Power
Corporation. The NPC denied respondents claims that it had illegally utilized their property, that it
entered the property with respondent’s consent, as shown by the acknowledgment receipt for
P9,897.00 as payment for damaged improvements and waiver of claims to improvements damaged.
By virtue of the acknowledgement receipt and the waiver, the National Power Corporation claimed
that there was no more need for it to institute an expropriation proceeding.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable to pay just compensation for the subject property and the
improvements.

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Ruling: Yes, Petitioner is liable to pay respondents just compensation and not merely an easement
fee on the basis that its acquisition of a right-of-way easement over the portion of respondents' land
was a taking under the power of eminent domain. Hence, due to the nature of the easement, which
will deprive the normal use of the land for an indefinite period and expose the property owners' lives
and limbs to danger, just compensation must be based on the full market value of the affected
property.

80. Art. 3. Sec. 9 - Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Alfredo Hababag, Sr. substituted by his
wife, Consolacion and Children

Facts: Alfredo was the owner of several parcels of agricultural land with an area of 82. 4927 has. in
Subat, Sorsogon. The landholdings were voluntarily offered for sale (VOS) to the government under
RA6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, but only 69.3857 has. thereof (subject
lands) were acquired in 1990.

Land Bank initially valued the subject lands at P1,237,850.00, but Alfredo rejected the valuation.
After summary administrative proceedings for the determination of the amount of just compensation,
the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) Adjudication Board (DARAB) fixed the value of the subject lands at P1,292,553.20.
Dissatisfied, Alfredo filed a Complaint for the determination of the amount of just compensation
before the RTC.

RTC appointed two commissioners designated by each party to conduct an evaluation and appraisal
of the subject,
Land Bank- Commissioner Corcuera : Just compensation value - P2,358,385.48 ;
Alfredo - Commissioner Cuba of Banco Sorsogon : Just compensation value - P5,420,600.00

RTC rendered a Decision fixing the amount of just compensation of the subject lands at
P5,653,940.00 computed as follows:
Coconut land - 63.61 has @ P50,000.00/ha. P3,180,500.00
Rice land - 4.75 has. @ P60,000.00/ha. 285,000.00
Total Land Appraised Value 3,465,500.00
Fruit-bearing coconut trees - 9,723 x P200.00 1,944,600.00
Timber trees 7 x P1,500.00 10,500.00
Total Plants and Trees Appraised Value 1,955,100.00
Reasonable income of the coconut trees for the next
20 years (based on the Income
Productivity Approach) 233,340.00
Total P5,653,940.00

Alfredo appealed to the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 66824, averring that the RTC
committed a mathematical error in computing the amount of just compensation for the subject lands,
as well as in fixing the remaining productive life of the coconut trees to only 20 years instead of 40 to
45 years.

CA rendered a Decision, in the aforesaid case, indeed finding a mathematical error in the
computation of the reasonable income from the coconut trees, which if corrected would have been
P23,335,200.00. Accordingly, adding to the same the total land appraised value of P3,465,500.00,
the CA came up with a total of P26,800,700.00. It, however, rejected Alfredo's claim for the
adjustment of the productive life of the coconut trees to anywhere between 40 to 45 years, as it gave
credence to the Inspection and Appraisal Report submitted by Commissioner Cuba which stated that
the remaining productive life of the coconut trees would only be 20 years. While expressing

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misgivings to the resultant amount which far exceeded the computations made by the parties'
commissioners, it nonetheless remanded the case for the re-computation of the accurate amount of
just compensation, applying thereto the Income Productivity Approach. In this light, it ratiocinated
that the "court a quo, with the aid of its duly-appointed commissioner, x x x is in the best position to
appreciate the technical elements involved in the formula used to determine the just compensation
for [Alfredo's] property." RTC ordered Commissioner Cuba to re-compute the accurate amount of
just compensation applying the Income Productivity Approach.

Commissioner Cuba, however, retained the total appraised values for the subject lands and the
plants/trees at P3,465,500.00 and P1,955,100.00, respectively, as similarly indicated in the
December 20, 1999 RTC Decision.

RTC rendered an Amended Decision, fixing the amount of the just compensation for the subject
lands at P40,423,400.00.

LBP and the DAR filed separate petitions for review with the CA. For its part, the LBP averred that
the RTC gravely erred in disregarding the factors under Section 17 of RA 6657 and DAR AO 6-92,
as amended by DAR AO 11-94, as ordained by the Court in the case of LBP v. Banal. On the other
hand, the DAR contended that the RTC erred in including in its computation the estimated income of
the coconut trees for their remaining economic life (computed at 20 years) and in adjudging a just
compensation award which is higher than the offered valuation of the landowner. Pending appeal,
Alfredo passed away and was substituted by his heirs, i.e., the Hababag Heirs. CA set aside the
RTC's valuation for failure to give due consideration to the factors enumerated in Section 17
of RA 6657 and the formula under DAR AO 6-92, as amended by DAR AO 11-94. Moreover,
contrary to the limitation imposed by DAR AO 6-92 -i.e., that the computed value using the
applicable formula shall not exceed the landowner's offer to sell - the CA found that the amount as
recomputed by the RTC was way beyond the landowner's offer of P1,750,000.00 as stated in the
Claims Valuation and Processing Form. Consequently, it gave more credence to the report
submitted by Commissioner Corcuera which made use of the DAR formula derived from the factors
enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657. The just compensation for the subject lands would
therefore be P34,567.4576.

The CA likewise considered the government's obligation to pay just compensation to be in the
nature of a forbearance of money and, as such, additionally imposed interests on the just
compensation award at 12% p.a., to be reckoned from the time of the taking or the filing of the
complaint, whichever is earlier.

The LBP and the Hababag Heirs filed their respective motions for partial reconsideration which
were both denied in a Resolution dated April 19, 2006; hence, the instant petitions for review on
certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not CA erred in setting aside the just compensation fixed by the RTC
which was in accordance with the provisions of Section 17 of RA 6657 and the final decision of
the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 66824 directing its re-computation.

Ruling: No. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly -stressed by this Court that the measure is not the
taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word
"compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken
shall be real, substantial, full [and] ample.

To guide the RTC in this function, Section 17 of RA 6657 enumerates the factors which must be
taken into consideration to accurately determine the amount of just compensation to be awarded

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in a particular case. They are: (a) the acquisition cost of the land; (b) the current value of like
properties;
(c) the nature and actual use of the property, and the income therefrom; (d) the owner's sworn
valuation; (e) the tax declarations; (f) the assessment made by government assessors; (g) the
social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the
government to the property; and (h) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any
government financing institution on the said land, if any.

To explain, in determining the amount of just compensation for the subject lands, the RTC
applied the Income Productivity Approach which approximated the income for the remaining
productive life of the crops therein, without considering the fortuitous events and plant diseases,
and with the expectation that they would be compensated by developments which could be made
by the property owner. The Court has repeatedly ruled that the constitutional limitation of
just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent of the market value of the
property, which is, in turn, defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the
usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property
as between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual
taking by the government. In this accord, therefore, the Court cannot sustain the formula used
by the RTC which was "based on the principle of anticipation which implies that the value of a
property is dependent on the potential net benefit that may be derived from its ownership."
Clearly, this approach, which is largely characterized by the element of futurity, is inconsistent
with the idea of valuing the expropriated property at the time of the taking.

81. Art. 3. Sec. 9 – Hon. Alvin Vergara (Mayor of Cabanatuan City) vs. Lourdes Melencio S
Garcia

Facts: The subject of this petition is a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
101793, with an area of 7,420 square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay Barrera,
Cabanatuan City, and registered under the name of the respondents.

The record showed that sometime in 1989, the subject land was taken by the Sanggunian for road-
right-of-way and road widening projects. Despite the taking of the subject land and the completion of
the road widening projects, the Sanggunian failed to tender the just compensation to the
respondents.

Upon the request of Lourdes, the Sanggunian created an appraisal committee. The Appraisal
Committee then issued resolution recommending the payment of P2,295.00 per sq m as just
compensation. Thereafter, the Sanggunian issued Resolution authorizing Mayor Vergara to
negotiate, acquire, purchase and accept properties needed by the Sanggunian for its project. Mayor
Vergara executed a Memorandum of Agreement with Lourdes as Attorney-in-fact of the
respondents, whereby the Sanggunian bound itself to pay the respondents the amount of
P17,028,900.00 in 12 years at the rate of P1,419,075.00 every year starting the first quarter of 2002
as payment of the subject land. More than four years had lapsed after the signing of the MOA but no
payment was ever made by the petitioners to the respondents despite the fact that the subject land
was already taken by the petitioners and was being used by the constituents of the City of
Cabanatuan. Despite personal and written demands, the petitioners still failed to pay the
respondents the just and fair compensation of the subject land.

In a letter, Mayor Vergara said that the Sanggunian denied the ratification of the MOA, on the ground
of fiscal restraint or deficit of the Sanggunian. In view of this resolution, Mayor Vergara claimed that
the said MOA could neither be enforced, nor bind the Sanggunian. Respondents filed a petition for
mandamus before the RTC, RTC branch 28 rendered its Order in favor of the respondents
compelling the petitioners to pay.

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 The petitioners then filed a motion for inhibition and a motion for reconsideration. Re-assignment
was made. RTC branch 30 issued an Order denying the petitioners' motions, a writ of execution was
issued.

Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with urgent Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the CA. The CA affirmed the
trial court's order but modified the same by reducing the amount to be paid by the petitioners from
P10,000,000.00 to P2,554,335.00 representing 15% of the value of the property as provided by law.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are liable for just compensation?

Ruling: Yes. The petitioners are liable to pay the full market value of the subject land.

It is uncontroverted that the subject land was taken by the petitioners without paying any
compensation to the respondents that is too long to be ignored. Without a doubt, the respondents
are entitled to the payment of just compensation. The right to recover just compensation is enshrined
in the Bill of Rights; Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that no private property shall
be taken for public use without just compensation.

There is no question raised concerning the right of the petitioners here to acquire the subject land
under the power of eminent domain. But the exercise of such right is not unlimited, for two
mandatory requirements should underlie the Government's exercise of the power of eminent domain
namely: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the
property owner. These requirements partake the nature of implied conditions that should be
complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated.

The Court cannot allow the petitioners to profit from its failure to comply with the mandate of the law.
To adequately compensate the respondents from the decades of burden on their land, the
petitioners should be made to pay the full value of P17,028,900.00 representing the just
compensation of the subject land at the time of the filing of the instant complaint when the
respondents made a judicial demand for just compensation.

82. Art. 3. Sec. 9 – Christina De Knecht vs. Hon. Pedro JL. Bautista (presiding judge over
Branch III – Pasay)

Facts: The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be ultimately linked to the Cavite Coastal
Road Project, originally called for the expropriation of properties along Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City.
Later on, however, the Ministry of Public Highways decided to make the proposed extension pass
through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. Because of the protests of residents of the latter, the
Commission on Human Settlements recommended the reversion to the original plan, but the Ministry
argued the new route which save the government P2 million. The government filed expropriation
proceedings against the owners of Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets, among whom was
petitioner.

Petitioner’s contention:

 The choice of property to be expropriated cannot be without rhyme or reason. The condemnor may
not choose any property it wants. Where the legislature has delegated a power of eminent do-main,
the question of the necessity for taking a particular fine for the intended improvement rests in the
discretion of the grantee power subject however to review by the courts in case of fraud, bad faith or
gross abuse of discretion. The choice of property must be examined for bad faith, arbitrariness or

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 capriciousness and due process determination as to whether or not the proposed location was
proper in terms of the public interests. Even the claim of respondent's Secretary Baltazar Aquino that
there would be a saving of P2 million under his new plan must be reviewed for it bears no relation to
the site of the proposed EDSA extension As envisioned by the government, the EDSA extension
would be linked to the Cavite Expressway. Logically then, the proposed extension must point to the
south and not detour to the north.

Respondent’s counter-argument:

 There was no sudden change of plan in the selection of the site of the EDSA Extension to Roxas
Blvd.
 When the Ministry of Public Highways decided to change the site of EDSA Extension to Roxas
Boulevard from Cuneta Avenue to the Del Pan - Fernando Streets, the residents of Del Pan and
Fernando Rein Streets who were to be adversely affected by the construction of EDSA Extension to
Roxas Boulevard along Del Pan - Fernando Rein Streets were duly notified of such proposed
project. Petitioner herein was one of those notified.
 It be conceded that the Cuneta Avenue line goes southward and outward (from the city center while
the Del Pan - Fernando Rein Streets line follows northward and inward direction. It must be stated
that both lines, Cuneta Avenue and Del Pan - Fernando Rein Streets lines, meet satisfactorily
planning and design criteria and therefore are both acceptable. In selecting the Del Pan - Fernando
Rein Streets line the Government did not do so because it wanted to save the motel located along
Cuneta Avenue but because it wanted to minimize the social impact factor or problem involved

Issue: Whether or not there is a genuine need to expropriate the properties owned by De Knecht and
others similarly situated on the ground that the choice of properties to be expropriated seemed
arbitrarily made by the DPWH.

Ruling: No

The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets is arbitrary and should not receive judicial
approval. The Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost factor is so minimal that it
can be disregarded in making a choice between the two lines. The factor of functionality strongly
militates against the choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets, while the factor of social and
economic impact bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta Avenue. While the issue would seem
to boil down to a choice between people, on one hand, and progress and development, on the other,
it is to be remembered that progress and development are carried out for the benefit of the people.

Manotoc v National Housing Authority (NHA)

Facts:Two petitions in this case, one challenges the constitutionality of PD No. 1669 which provides
for the expropri- ation of the property known as the "Tambunting Estate” (52,688.70 square meters)
and the second challenges the constitutionality of PD No.1670 (72,428.6 square meters) which
provides for the expropriation of the prop- erty along the Estero de Sunog-Apog. In both cases, the
petitioners maintain that the two decrees are uncon- stitutional and should be declared null and void
because the petitioners were denied to their right to just com- pensation.

In 1978, after the fire in Tambunting Estate, the President and the Metro Manila Governor made
public an- nouncement that the national government would acquire the property for the fire victims.
The President also designated the NHA to negotiate with the owners of the property for the
acquisition. This, however, the pur- chase of the property failed.

In 1980, the President issued the challenged PD Nos. 1669 and 1670. NHA then wrote the Register
of Deeds of Manila requesting new certificates of title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
However, the Register of Deeds requested the submission of the owner's copy of the certificates of

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title of the properties in question.

Petitioner Elisa R. Manotok, one of the owners of the properties to be expropriated, received from
the NHA a letter informing her that the latter had deposited P5,000,000.00 which included
P3,400,000.00 representing the first annual installment for the Tambunting Estate pursuant to P.D.
No. 1669; and another P5,000,000.00 which also included P1,600,000.00 representing the first
annual installment for the Sunog-Apog area under P.D. No. 1670.

The petitioner was also informed that she was free to withdraw her share in the properties upon
surrender by her of the titles pertaining to said properties and that if petitioner failed to avail herself
of the said offer, the NHA would be constrained to take the necessary legal steps to implement the
decrees.

Petitioners wrote a letter to the NHA alleging, inter alia, that the amounts of compensation for the
expropria- tion of the properties of the petitioners as fixed in the decrees do not constitute the "just
compensation" en- visioned in the Constitution.The petitioners argue that the government must first
have filed a complaint with the proper court under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court in order to
fulfill the requirements of due process. 'They contend that the determination of just compensation
should not have been vested solely with the City Assessor and that a maximum or fixed amount of
compensation should not have been imposed by the said decrees.

Public respondents contend that the power of eminent domain is inherent in the State and when the
legislature itself or the President through his law-making prerogatives exercises this power, the
public use and public necessity of the expropriation, and the fixing of the just compensation
become political in nature, and the courts must respect the decision of the law-making body, unless
the legislative decision is clearly and evidently arbitrary, unreasonable, and devoid of logic and
reason; and that all that is required is that just compensation be determined with due process
of law which does not necessarily entail judicial process.

Issue: W/N NHA decision is beyond the reach of judicial review.

Ruling: No. The provision of P.D. 1669 which allows NHA, at its sole option, to put portions of the
expropriated area to commercial use in order to defray the development costs of its housing projects
cannot stand constitutional scrutiny. The principle of non-appropriation of private property for private
purposes, however, remains. The legislature may not take the property of one citizen and transfer it
to another, even for a full compensation, when the public interest is not thereby promoted. The
Government still has to prove that expropriation of commercial properties in order to lease them out
also for commercial purposes would be "public use" under the Constitution.

P.D. No. 1670 suffers from a similar infirmity. There is no showing how the President arrived at the
conclusion that the Sunog-Apog area is a blighted community. The provisions of the decree on the
relocation of qualified squatter families and on the re-blocking and re-alignment of existing
structures to allow the introduction of basic facilities and services have no basis in fact The area is
well-developed with roads, drainage and sewer facilities, water connection and electric
connections, and telephone connections. There is no showing for a need to demolish the existing
valuable improvements in order to upgrade Sunog-Apog.

P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670 to be violative of the petitioners' right to due process of law and, therefore,
they must fail the test of constitutionality.

Republic v. De Knecht
Facts: De Knecht was one of the owners of several properties along the Fernando Rein-Del Pan
streets which the Government sought to expropriate to give way to the extension of EDSA and the

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construction of drainage facilities. De Knecht filed a case to restrain the Government from
proceeding with the expropriation. Her prayer was denied by the lower court but upon certiorari, the
SC reversed the lower court decision and granted the relief asked for by De Knecht ruling that the
expropriation was arbitrary. The case was remanded to the lower court. No further action was taken
despite the SC decision until two years later, in 1983, when the Government moved for the
dismissal of the case on the ground that the Legislature has since enacted BP 340 expropriating
the same properties for the same purpose. The lower court denied the motion. Appeal.

Issue: W/N an expropriation proceeding that was determined by a final judgment of the Supreme
Court may be the subject of a subsequent legislation for expropriation.

Ruling: Yes. While it is true that said final judgment of the Supreme Court on the subject becomes the
law of the case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of the Republic to take private
properties for public use upon the payment of the just compensation is so provided in the
Constitution and our laws. Such expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the Republic not
only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners but also by taking appropriate court action or by
legislation. When on 17 February 1983 the Batasang Pambansa passed BP 340 expropriating the
very properties subject of the present proceedings, and for the same purpose, it appears that it was
based on supervening events that occurred after the decision of the Supreme Court was rendered in
De Knecht in 1980 justifying the expropriation through the Fernando ReinDel Pan Streets. The
social impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this extension to be arbitrary had
disappeared. All residents in the area have been relocated and duly compensated. 80% of the
EDSA outfall and 30% of the EDSA extension had been completed. Only De Knecht remains as the
solitary obstacle to this project that will solve not only the drainage and flood control problem but also
minimize the traffic bottleneck in the area. Moreover, the decision, is no obstacle to the legislative
arm of the Government in thereafter making its own independent assessment of the circumstances
then prevailing as to the propriety of undertaking the expropriation of the properties in question and
thereafter by enacting the corresponding legislation as it did in this case. The Court agrees in the
wisdom and necessity of enacting BP 340. Thus the anterior decision of this Court must yield to
this subsequent legislative fiat.

Militante v. CA
Facts: Petitioner Pilo Militante is the registered owner of 3 contiguous parcels of land with an
aggregate area of 1,590 square meters in Balintawak, Caloocan City. 24 squatter families live in
these lots.

President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1315 expropriating forty (40) hectares of land in Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. The land expropriated was identified in the decree as a slum area that required the
upgrading of basic facilities and services and the disposal of the lots to their bona fide occupants. It
set aside P40 million as the maximum amount of just compensation to be paid the landowners.

The National Housing Authority (NHA), as the decrees designated administrator for the national gov-
ernment, undertook the implementation of P.D. 1315 in seven (7) phases called the Bagong Barrio
Project (BBP). BBP Phase 7, which includes petitioners land, was not among those acquired and paid
for in 1978-1979.

In 1986, NHA approved an emergency fund of P2 million for the acquisition of petitioners lots for the
governments Community Self-Help Program. NHA started negotiations with petitioner. Petitioner
made an initial offer of P200.00 per square meter. The NHA made a counter-offer of P175.00. Peti-
tioner increased his price to P1,000.00 and later to P3,000.00. NHA informed petitioner that NHAs
maximum offer was P500.00. This was rejected by petitioner, through his lawyer.

Petitioner requested for a revalidation of his demolition clearance and relocation of the squatters. NHA

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General Manager Jacob revalidated the demolition clearance and informed the Caloocan Mayor that
the NHA was making available enough serviced home lots in Bagong Silang Resettlement Project for
the 24 families. NHA Project Manager Carangdang, refused to implement the clearance to eject the
squatters on petitioners land and claimed that petitioners land had already been declared expropriated
by P.D. 1315.

Petitioner then filed with the respondent CA a "Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Declaration
as Inexistent and Unconstitutional Presidential Decree No. 1315" against the NHA. CA dismissed the
petition and held that petitioner failed to overcome the presumption of the decrees constitutionality.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied.

Issue: W/N the court may take cognizance of the case.

Ruling: No. The petitioner is not entitled to a writ of prohibition and writ of mandamus. The records
show that there is no direct order from the NHA General Manager addressed to respondent Ca-
rangdang to evict the squatters and demolish their shanties on the subject property. The NHA demo-
lition and revalidation clearances issued were addressed to the mayor of Caloocan City.

In the instant case, petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. He may seek
another demolition order from the NHA General Manager this time directly addressed to re-
spondent Carangdang or the pertinent NHA representative. In fact, the Government
Corporate Counsel asserts that petitioner should have brought Carangdangs inaction to the
attention of her superiors. There is therefore no extreme necessity to invoke judicial action
as the admin- istrative set-up could have easily corrected the alleged failure to act. The
General Manager, as Chief Executive Officer of the NHA, has the power of supervision over
the operations and in- ternal affairs of NHA.

Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.

G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014

Facts:

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law.

In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to
the legislative and political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of
the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic process” and "characterized by an
inordinate amount of transparency."The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social
legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the discretion to
implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the political departments, in particular,
with Congress.

Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the
assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet
to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be
challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.

Issue: W/N the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

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Ruling:
Yes. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same
is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have
already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it
is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only
becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations
thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter now.

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