G.R. No. L-32055 February 26, 1988
REYNALDO BERMUDEZ, SR., and, ADONITA YABUT BERMUDEZ vs. HON. JUDGE A.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, DOMINGO PONTINO y TACORDA and CORDOVA NG SUN KWAN,
YAP, J.:
This is a direct appeal on pure questions of law from the Order of March 10, 1970 of the Honorable
Judge (now Supreme Court Justice) Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera of the defunct Court of First Instance
of Manila, Branch XVII, dismissing plaintiffs-appellants' complaint in Civil Case No. 77188 entitled
"Reynaldo Bermudez, Sr. and Adonita Yabut Bermudez, plaintiffs, versus Domingo Pontino y Tacorda
and Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, defendants," and from the Order of May 7, 1970 denying plaintiffs-
appellants' Motion for Reconsideration.
The background facts of the case are as follows:
A cargo truck, driven by Domingo Pontino and owned by Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, bumped a jeep on
which Rogelio, a six-year old son of plaintiffs-appellants, was riding. The boy sustained injuries which
caused his death. As a result, Criminal Case No.92944 for Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence
was filed against Domingo Pontino by the Manila City Fiscal's Office. Plaintiffs-appellants filed on July
27,1969 in the said criminal case "A Reservation to File Separate Civil Action."
On July 28,1969, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil case for damages with the Court of First Instance
of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 77188, entitled "Reynaldo Bermudez, Sr. et al., Plaintiffs vs.
Domingo Pontino y Tacorda and Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, Defendants." Finding that the plaintiffs
instituted the action "on the assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in the accident of May 10,
1969 constituted a quasi-delict," the trial court stated that plaintiffs had already elected to treat the
accident as a "crime" by reserving in the criminal case their right to file a separate civil action. That
being so, the trial court decided to order the dismissal of the complaint against defendant Cordova Ng
Sun Kwan and to suspend the hearing of the case against Domingo Pontino until after the criminal case
for Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence is finally terminated. From said order, plaintiffs filed the
present appeal, stating as their main reasons the following:
I. The main issue brought before this Honorable Court is whether the present action is based on
quasi-delict under the Civil Code and therefore could proceed independently of the criminal case
for homicide thru reckless imprudence.
II. The second question of law is whether the lower court could properly suspend the hearing of the
civil action against Domingo Pontino and dismiss the civil case against his employer Cordova Ng
Sun Kwan by reason of the fact that a criminal case for homicide thru reckless imprudence is
pending in the lower court against Domingo Pontino
III. The last question of law is whether the suspension of the civil action against Domingo Pontino
and the dismissal of the civil case against his employer Cordova Ng Sun Kwan by reason of the
pending criminal case against Domingo Pontino for homicide thru reckless imprudence in the lower
court could be validly done considering that the civil case against said defendants-appellees also
sought to recover actual damages to the jeep of plaintiffs-appellants."
We find the appeal meritorious.
The heart of the issue involved in the present case is whether the civil action filed by the plaintiffs-
appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict. The trial court treated the case as an action based on
a crime in view of the reservation made by the offended party in the criminal case (Criminal Case No.
92944), also pending before the court, to file a separate civil action. Said the trial court:
It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the assumption that defendant Pontino's
negligence in the accident of May 10, l969 constituted a quasi-delict. The Court cannot accept the
validity of that assumption. In Criminal Case No. 92944 of this Court, plaintiffs had already
appeared as complainants. While that case was pending, the offended parties reserved the right to
institute a separate civil action. If, in a criminal case, the right to file a separate civil action for
damages is reserved, such civil action is to be based on crime and not on tort. That was the ruling
in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964."
We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court is inapplicable to the instant case. In
Joaquin vs. Aniceto, the Court held:
The issue in this case is: May an employee's primary civil liability for crime and his employer's
subsidiary liability therefor be proved in a separate civil action even while the criminal case against
the employee is still pending?
To begin with, obligations arise from law, contract, quasi-contract, crime and quasi-delict.
According to appellant, her action is one to enforce the civil liability arising from crime. With respect
to obligations arising from crimes, Article 1161 of the New Civil Code provides:
Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws, subject to
the provisions of article 21 77, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary, Title,
on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this book, regulating damages.
xxx xxx xxx
It is now settled that for an employer to be subsidiarily liable, the following requisites must be
present: (1) that an employee has committed a crime in the discharge of his duties; (2) that said
employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability; (3) that the employer is engaged in
some kind of industry. (1 Padilla, Criminal Law, Revised Penal Code 794 [1964])
Without the conviction of the employee, the employer cannot be subsidiarily liable.
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce the
civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-
delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the employer
solidarity liable for the negligent act of his employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of
the diligence of a good father of the family.
In the case at bar, the action filed b appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-delict. 1 The
fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did not
preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.
The appellants invoke the provisions of Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which
provide:

Section 1. — Institution of criminal and civil action. — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to
institute it separately.

Section 2. — Independent civil action.-In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal
case,provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.

Article 2177 of the Civil Code, cited in Section 2, of Rule 111, provides that —

Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

The appellant precisely made a reservation to file an independent civil action in accordance with the
provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111, Rules of Court. In fact, even without such a reservation, we have
allowed the injured party in the criminal 1 case which resulted in the acquittal of the accused to recover
damages based on quasi-delict. In People vs. Ligon, G.R. No. 74041, we held:

However, it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability.
While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable
doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages (Article 29, Civil
Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes
a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist (Padilla vs. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).

WHEREFORE, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the appealed orders of the trial court,
dated March 10, 1970 and May 7, 1970, and remand the case for further proceedings. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 128927. September 14, 1999]
REMEDIOS NOTA SAPIERA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RAMON
SUA, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
REMEDIOS NOTA SAPIERA appeals to us through this petition for review the Decision of the
Court of Appeals[1] which acquitted her of the crime of estafa but held her liable nonetheless for the
value of the checks she indorsed in favor of private respondent Ramon Sua.
On several occasions petitioner Remedios Nota Sapiera, a sari-sari store owner, purchased from
Monrico Mart certain grocery items, mostly cigarettes, and paid for them with checks issued by one
Arturo de Guzman: (a) PCIB Check No. 157059 dated 26 February 1987 for P140,000.00; (b) PCIB
Check No. 157073 dated 26 February 1987 for P28,000.00; (c) PCIB Check No. 157057 dated 27
February 1987 for P42,150.00; and, d) Metrobank Check No. DAG - 045104758 PA dated 2 March
1987 for P125,000.00. These checks were signed at the back by petitioner. When presented for
payment the checks were dishonored because the drawers account was already closed. Private
respondent Ramon Sua informed Arturo de Guzman and petitioner about the dishonor but both failed to
pay the value of the checks. Hence, four (4) charges of estafa were filed against petitioner with the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. D-8728, D-8729, D-8730 and D-
8731. Arturo de Guzman was charged with two (2) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed as Crim.
Cases Nos. D-8733 and D-8734. These cases against petitioner and de Guzman were consolidated
and tried jointly.
On 27 December 1989 the court a quo[2] acquitted petitioner of all the charges of estafa but did not
rule on whether she could be held civilly liable for the checks she indorsed to private respondent. The
trial court found Arturo de Guzman guilty of Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on two (2) counts and sentenced
him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day in each of the cases, and to pay private
respondent P167,150.00 as civil indemnity.
Private respondent filed a notice of appeal with the trial court with regard to the civil aspect but the
court refused to give due course to the appeal on the ground that the acquittal of petitioner was
absolute. Private respondent then filed a petition for mandamus with the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-GR SP No. 24626, praying that the court a quo be ordered to give due course to the appeal on the
civil aspect of the decision. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and ruled that private respondent
could appeal with respect to the civil aspect the judgment of acquittal by the trial court.
On 22 January 1996, the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 36376 rendered the assailed
Decision insofar as it sustained the appeal of private respondent on the civil aspect and ordering
petitioner to pay private respondent P335,000.00 representing the aggregate face value of the four (4)
checks indorsed by petitioner plus legal interest from the notice of dishonor.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision. On 19 March 1997 the Court of
Appeals issued a Resolution noting the admission of both parties that private respondent had already
collected the amount of P125,000.00 from Arturo de Guzman with regard to his civil liability in Crim.
Cases Nos. 8733 and 8734. The appellate court noted that private respondent was the same offended
party in the criminal cases against petitioner and against de Guzman. Criminal Cases Nos. 8733 and
8734 against De Guzman, and Crim. Cases Nos. 8730 and 8729 against petitioner, involved the same
checks, to wit: PCIB Checks Nos. 157057 for P42,150.00 and Metrobank Check No. DAG-045104758
PA for P125,000.00.
Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled that private respondent could not recover twice on the same
checks. Since he had collected P125,000.00 as civil indemnity in Crim. Cases Nos. 8733 and 8734, this
amount should be deducted from the sum total of the civil indemnity due him arising from the estafa
cases against petitioner. The appellate court then corrected its previous award, which was erroneously
placed at P335,000.00, to P335,150.00 as the sum total of the amounts of the four (4) checks
involved. Deducting the amount of P125,000.00 already collected by private respondent, petitioner was
adjudged to pay P210,150.00 as civil liability to private respondent. Hence, this petition alleging that
respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioner civilly liable to private respondent because her
acquittal by the trial court from charges of estafa in Crim. Cases Nos. D-8728, D-8729, D-8730 and D-
8731 was absolute, the trial court having declared in its decision that the fact from which the civil liability
might have arisen did not exist.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The issue is whether respondent Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in requiring petitioner to pay civil indemnity to private respondent after the trial court had
acquitted her of the criminal charges. Section 2, par. (b), of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, specifically provides: "Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the
civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil might arise did not exist.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it
includes a declaration that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil
liability is not extinguished by acquittal where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b) where
the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and,
(c) where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is
acquitted.[3] Thus, under Art. 29 of the Civil Code -
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted.Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the
court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be
found to be malicious.
In a criminal case where the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so
declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision
whether or not acquittal is due to that ground.
An examination of the decision in the criminal cases reveals these findings of the trial court -
Evidence for the prosecution tends to show that on various occasions, Remedios Nota Sapiera
purchased from Monrico Mart grocery items (mostly cigarettes) which purchases were paid with checks
issued by Arturo de Guzman; that those purchases and payments with checks were as follows:
(a) Sales Invoice No. 20104 dated February 26, 1987 in the amount of P28,000.00; that said items
purchased were paid with PCIBank Check No. 157073 dated February 26, 1987;
(b) Sales Invoice No. 20108 dated February 26, 1987 in the amount of P140,000.00; that said items
purchased were paid with PCIBank No. 157059 dated February 26, 1987;
(c) Sales Invoice No. 20120 dated February 27, 1987 in the amount of P42,150.00; that said items were
paid with PCIBank Check No. 157057 dated February 27, 1987;
(d) Sales Invoice No. 20148 and 20149 both dated March 2, 1987 in the amount of P120,103.75; said
items were paid with Metrobank Check No. 045104758 dated March 2, 1987 in the amount
of P125,000.00.
That all these checks were deposited with the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, Dagupan
Branch, for collection from the drawee bank;
That when presented for payment by the collecting bank to the drawee bank, said checks were
dishonored due to account closed, as evidenced by check return slips; x x x x.
From the evidence, the Court finds that accused Remedios Nota Sapiera is the owner of a sari-sari
store inside the public market; that she sells can(ned) goods, candies and assorted grocery items; that
she knows accused Arturo De Guzman, a customer since February 1987; that de Guzman purchases
from her grocery items including cigarettes; that she knows Ramon Sua; that she has business dealings
with him for 5 years; that her purchase orders were in clean sheets of paper; that she never pays in
check; that Ramon Sua asked her to sign subject checks as identification of the signature of Arturo de
Guzman; that she pays in cash; sometimes delayed by several days; that she signed the four (4)
checks on the reverse side; that she did not know the subject invoices; that de Guzman made the
purchases and he issued the checks; that the goods were delivered to de Guzman; that she was not
informed of dishonored checks; and that counsel for Ramon Sua informed de Guzman and told him to
pay x x x x
In the case of accused Remedios Nota Sapiera, the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy.
Based on the above findings of the trial court, the exoneration of petitioner of the charges of estafa
was based on the failure of the prosecution to present sufficient evidence showing conspiracy between
her and the other accused Arturo de Guzman in defrauding private respondent. However, by her own
testimony, petitioner admitted having signed the four (4) checks in question on the reverse side. The
evidence of the prosecution shows that petitioner purchased goods from the grocery store of private
respondent as shown by the sales invoices issued by private respondent; that these purchases were
paid with the four (4) subject checks issued by de Guzman; that petitioner signed the same checks on
the reverse side; and when presented for payment, the checks were dishonored by the drawee bank
due to the closure of the drawers account; and, petitioner was informed of the dishonor.
We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that despite the conflicting versions of the parties, it
is undisputed that the four (4) checks issued by de Guzman were signed by petitioner at the back
without any indication as to how she should be bound thereby and, therefore, she is deemed to be an
indorser thereof. The Negotiable Instruments Law clearly provides -
Sec. 17. Construction where instrument is ambiguous. - Where the language of the instrument is
ambiguous, or there are admissions therein, the following rules of construction apply: x x x x (f) Where a
signature is so placed upon the instrument that it is not clear in what capacity the person making the
same intended to sign, he is deemed an indorser. x x x x
Sec. 63. When person deemed indorser. - A person placing his signature upon an instrument otherwise
than as maker, drawer or acceptor, is deemed to be an indorser unless he clearly indicates by
appropriate words his intention to be bound in some other capacity.
Sec. 66. Liability of general indorser. - Every indorser who indorses without qualification, warrants to all
subsequent holders in due course: (a) The matters and things mentioned in subdivisions (a), (b) and (c)
of the next preceding section; and (b) That the instrument is, at the time of the indorsement, valid and
subsisting;
And, in addition, he engages that, on due presentment, it shall be accepted or paid or both, as the case
may be, according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonored and the necessary proceedings on dishonor
be duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder or to any subsequent indorser who may be
compelled to pay it.
The dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner did not erase her civil liability since the
dismissal was due to insufficiency of evidence and not from a declaration from the court that the fact
from which the civil action might arise did not exist. [4] An accused acquitted of estafa may nevertheless
be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant. The accused should be
adjudged liable for the unpaid value of the checks signed by her in favor of the complainant. [5]
The rationale behind the award of civil indemnity despite a judgment of acquittal when evidence is
sufficient to sustain the award was explained by the Code Commission in connection with Art. 29 of the
Civil Code, to wit:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is
one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of
miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to
the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived
from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable
consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and
civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate
and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other private rights. One is for
punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the
aggrieved party x x x x It is just and proper that for the purposes of imprisonment of or fine upon the
accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying
the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the
invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right
of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal
law?[6]
Finally, with regard to the computation of the civil liability of petitioner, the finding of the Court of
Appeals that petitioner is civilly liable for the aggregate value of the unpaid four (4) checks subject of the
criminal cases in the sum of P335,150.00, less the amount of P125,000.00 already collected by private
respondent pending appeal, resulting in the amount of P210,150.00 still due private respondent, is a
factual matter which is binding and conclusive upon this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22 January
1996 as amended by its Resolution dated 19 March 1997 ordering petitioner Remedios Nota Sapiera to
pay private respondent Ramon Sua the remaining amount of P210,150.00 as civil liability, is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 107725. January 22, 1998]
ESPERO SALAO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and JOWIE
APOLONIO, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Malolos, Bulacan, which ordered petitioner Espero
Salao to pay private respondent Jowie Apolonio P20,000.00 in actual damages, P10,000.00 in moral
damages, and P15,000.00 in attorneys fees, as well as the appellate courts resolution of October 23,
1992 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
This case originated from a complaint for damages filed by the private respondent for head injuries
allegedly inflicted on him by petitioner on August 24, 1986. Private respondent, then a senior student at
the Philippine Air Transport and Training Services, Inc., testified that on August 24, 1986, at around
6:30 p.m., he saw a friends jeep parked outside the compound of the petitioner. Upon entering the
compound he saw his friend having drinks with petitioner. He therefore decided to join them but
petitioner saw him and drove him away for being a drug addict. As he was leaving petitioner hit him on
the head with a gun and threatened him with further harm. Only the timely intervention of private
respondents brother, Gary Apolonio, and petitioners mother, Lourdes Salao, saved him from further
injuries in the hands of petitioner.[2]
Private respondent submitted in evidence a certification and receipts,[3] in support of his claim for
damages. The expenses were incurred for an operation at Martinez Memorial Hospital which
necessitated private respondents confinement there from September 4 to 9, 1986.[4]
The private respondents claim was corroborated by his brother, Gary Apolonio, who testified that
while he was buying cigarettes from a store in front of petitioners residence, he saw the latter hit his
brother on the head with a gun, even as he accused him of teaching petitioners son, Dennis, how to
abuse drugs. Gary said he had to take his brother to the hospital because of injuries on the head
caused by petitioner.[5]
Dr. Antonio Sarrosa testified that he operated on Jowie Apolonio for a fractured skull at the
Martinez Memorial Hospital.[6]
On the other hand, petitioner claimed it was private respondent who tried to assault him and he
only acted in self defense by hitting private respondent with his gun. According to petitioner, on August
24, 1986, between 5 and 6:30 p.m., he was surprised to see private respondent inside their yard having
drinks with his nephew and the latters friends. Because he told the group to stop drinking, private
respondent resented his order and left. Later, petitioners wife arrived and told him that private
respondent was very angry and making threats against petitioner. As petitioner went to buy cigarettes at
the store of his sister-in-law located also within the compound, private respondent shouted at him and
hit him. Petitioner claimed that, in self defense, he pulled his gun and hit the private respondent with
it. He asked the group to throw private respondent out of the compound. [7]
Petitioner also claimed he was going to file charges against private respondent but was persuaded
not to do so by private respondents mother because they were neighbors. [8] He said he counseled his
sons not to keep private respondent in their company as he suspected him to be engaged in illegal acts
and trying to make his sons do the same.[9]
The trial court found the private respondents version of the incident to be more convincing than
that of the petitioner which it found to be uncorroborated and self-serving.[10]Accordingly, it rendered
judgment against the petitioner. The trial court also denied petitioners subsequent motion for
reconsideration and new trial.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision in toto and later denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioner then brought this appeal questioning the award of
damages and attorneys fees to private respondent. In his Reply to Private Respondents Comment, he
raised as additional ground the fact that in the criminal case for serious physical injuries and grave
threats based on the same incident, the Municipal Trial Court of Obando, Bulacan found him not guilty
and accordingly dismissed the case against him.
The appeal is without merit.
First. It is settled that issues not raised in the court a quo cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal in this Court without violating the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. [11] In the case
at bar, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, assigning two errors allegedly committed by the trial
court, to wit:
1. The Trial Court erred in taking cognizance of and hearing the case without plaintiff first
availing the conciliation process provided by PD 1508; and
2. The Trial Court erred in denying defendant-appellants motion for reconsideration and
alternatively motion for new trial.
The propriety of such award of damages and the effect of petitioners acquittal in the criminal cases
were not questioned by petitioner. Consequently, he is barred from raising these questions for the first
time in this appeal.
Second. Petitioner has not shown that the award of damages is not supported by evidence. For
example, the award of P20,000.00 for actual damages is based on hospital bills and receipts for
medicine which private respondent properly identified in court and formally offered in evidence. [12]
That private respondent is competent to testify regarding the authenticity and due execution of
these documents is beyond doubt. Rule 132, 20 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
20. Proof of private document. - Before any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuiness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
Needless to say, this factual finding of the trial court, especially because it was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals and petitioner in this case has presented no rebutting evidence, is well nigh conclusive
in this appeal.[13]
The award of P10,000.00 for moral damages is likewise appropriate. This being a case of physical
injuries resulting from a crime or quasi-delict, moral damages may be awarded in the discretion of the
court, as provided by Art. 2219(1) or (2) of the Civil Code. The evidence gives no ground for doubt that
such discretion was properly and judiciously exercised by the trial court. The award is in fact consistent
with the rule that moral damages are not intended to enrich the injured party, but to alleviate the moral
suffering he has undergone by reason of the defendants culpable action.[14]
With regard to the award of P15,000.00 for attorneys fees, petitioner invokes rulings [15] that in view
of the policy against placing a premium on the right to litigate, awards for attorneys fees must be based
on findings of fact and law, expressed in the judgment of the trial court, which bring the case within the
exceptions enumerated in Art. 2208 of the Civil Code. In this case, the award of attorneys fees is based
on the trial court finding that because of this case private respondent was compelled to secure the
services of counsel for P20,000.00.[16] (The actual award is for P15,000.00) Art. 2208(2) provides:

Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial
costs, cannot be recovered, except: . . . .

(2) When the defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to
incur expenses to protect his interest; . . .

Contrary to petitioners contention, there was compliance by the trial court with the rule regarding
attorneys fees.
Third. Nor is there merit in petitioners claim that his acquittal in the criminal action for serious
physical injuries constitutes a definitive finding that he has no civil liability to the private
respondent. Petitioner invokes Rule 111, 2(b) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:

Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. [17]

The civil liability referred to in this Rule is the civil liability arising from crime (ex delicto). It is not
the civil liability for quasi delict which is allowed to be brought separately and independently of the
criminal action by Art. 33 of the Civil Code.[18] The civil liability based on such cause of action is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened
or has not been committed by the accused.[19] Indeed, because the offended party does not intervene in
the criminal prosecution, it is entirely possible that all the witnesses presented in the civil action may not
have been presented by the public prosecutor in the criminal action with the result that the accused in
the criminal case may be acquitted. This is what happened in the recent case of Heirs of Guaring v.
Court of Appeals[20] where, because the only survivor in a motor car accident whose testimony proved
to be pivotal in the civil case was not called to testify in the criminal prosecution of the driver of the other
vehicle, the latter was acquitted on reasonable doubt.
We therefore hold that petitioners acquittal in the criminal case for serious physical injuries and
grave threats is not conclusive of his liability for damages to private respondent. This case is separate,
distinct and independent of the criminal action and requires only a preponderance to prove it.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918
AMADO PICART, plaintiff-appellant, vs.FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-appellee.
STREET, J.:
In this action the plaintiff, Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the defendant, Frank Smith, jr., the sum of
P31,000, as damages alleged to have been caused by an automobile driven by the defendant. From a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of La Union absolving the defendant from liability
the plaintiff has appealed.
The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this action took place on December 12, 1912, on the
Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. It appears that upon the occasion in question the plaintiff
was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant
approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles
per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give
warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more
successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the
rule of the road.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being
perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up
against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he
did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. The bridge is
shown to have a length of about 75 meters and a width of 4.80 meters. As the automobile approached,
the defendant guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so
doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. The pony had not as yet
exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. Seeing that the pony was
apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing
down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten
quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant
quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it
as then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it
became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it
as struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell
and its rider was thrown off with some violence. From the evidence adduced in the case we believe that
when the accident occurred the free space where the pony stood between the automobile and the
railing of the bridge was probably less than one and one half meters. As a result of its injuries the horse
died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical
attention for several days.
The question presented for decision is whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the
manner above described was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the
damage done; and we are of the opinion that he is so liable. As the defendant started across the bridge,
he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he
moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and
he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the
moving vehicle. In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet
some distance away; and from this moment it was not longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape
being run down by going to a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed
entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that
there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the
horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he was
almost upon the horse. He was, we think, deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet
exhibited fright. But in view of the known nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if the
animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles, he might get exited and jump under the
conditions which here confronted him. When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger
he was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard
supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The
existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the
actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent
in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of
course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the
particular case. Abstract speculations cannot here be of much value but this much can be profitably
said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to
them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected
to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent
man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it
was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can
be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence
in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the
tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his
foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is clearly
established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have
recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have
foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these
circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent
negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the
defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is
immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by
an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair
chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
The decision in the case of Rkes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359) should perhaps be
mentioned in this connection. This Court there held that while contributory negligence on the part of the
person injured did not constitute a bar to recovery, it could be received in evidence to reduce the
damages which would otherwise have been assessed wholly against the other party. The defendant
company had there employed the plaintiff, as a laborer, to assist in transporting iron rails from a barge
in Manila harbor to the company's yards located not far away. The rails were conveyed upon cars which
were hauled along a narrow track. At certain spot near the water's edge the track gave way by reason of
the combined effect of the weight of the car and the insecurity of the road bed. The car was in
consequence upset; the rails slid off; and the plaintiff's leg was caught and broken. It appeared in
evidence that the accident was due to the effects of the typhoon which had dislodged one of the
supports of the track. The court found that the defendant company was negligent in having failed to
repair the bed of the track and also that the plaintiff was, at the moment of the accident, guilty of
contributory negligence in walking at the side of the car instead of being in front or behind. It was held
that while the defendant was liable to the plaintiff by reason of its negligence in having failed to keep the
track in proper repair nevertheless the amount of the damages should be reduced on account of the
contributory negligence in the plaintiff. As will be seen the defendant's negligence in that case consisted
in an omission only. The liability of the company arose from its responsibility for the dangerous condition
of its track. In a case like the one now before us, where the defendant was actually present and
operating the automobile which caused the damage, we do not feel constrained to attempt to weigh the
negligence of the respective parties in order to apportion the damage according to the degree of their
relative fault. It is enough to say that the negligence of the defendant was in this case the immediate
and determining cause of the accident and that the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff was a more
remote factor in the case.

A point of minor importance in the case is indicated in the special defense pleaded in the defendant's
answer, to the effect that the subject matter of the action had been previously adjudicated in the court of
a justice of the peace. In this connection it appears that soon after the accident in question occurred,
the plaintiff caused criminal proceedings to be instituted before a justice of the peace charging the
defendant with the infliction of serious injuries (lesiones graves). At the preliminary investigation the
defendant was discharged by the magistrate and the proceedings were dismissed. Conceding that the
acquittal of the defendant at the trial upon the merits in a criminal prosecution for the offense mentioned
would be res adjudicata upon the question of his civil liability arising from negligence -- a point upon
which it is unnecessary to express an opinion -- the action of the justice of the peace in dismissing the
criminal proceeding upon the preliminary hearing can have no effect. (See U. S. vs. Banzuela and
Banzuela, 31 Phil. Rep., 564.)

From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment
is her rendered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum of two hundred pesos (P200), with
costs of other instances. The sum here awarded is estimated to include the value of the horse, medical
expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel, and lawful interest on
the whole to the date of this recovery. The other damages claimed by the plaintiff are remote or
otherwise of such character as not to be recoverable. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL, vs.
THE IAC and LEONARDO DIONISIO
FELICIANO, J:
In the early morning of 15 November 1975 — at about 1:30 a.m. — private respondent Leonardo
Dionisio was on his way home — he lived in 1214-B Zamora Street, Bangkal, Makati — from a
cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager of a marketing corporation. During the
cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his
Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at
Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car
headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he
saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned by and
registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand
side of General Lacuna Street (i.e., on the right hand side of a person facing in the same direction
toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding), facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked
askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking
the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set
anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home
by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his employer Phoenix, in
view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning, Dionisio claimed that he tried to
avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump
truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent
facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga basically
claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel
had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the
other hand, countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in
driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and
without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due rare in the selection
and supervision of the dump truck driver.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and Carbonel and ordered
the latter:
(1) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 15,000.00 for hospital bills and the
replacement of the lost dentures of plaintiff;
(2) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 1,50,000.-00 as loss of expected income
for plaintiff brought about the accident in controversy and which is the result of the negligence
of the defendants;
(3) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 10,000. as moral damages for the
unexpected and sudden withdrawal of plaintiff from his lifetime career as a marketing man;
mental anguish, wounded feeling, serious anxiety, social humiliation, besmirched reputation,
feeling of economic insecurity, and the untold sorrows and frustration in life experienced by
plaintiff and his family since the accident in controversy up to the present time;
(4) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 10,000.00 as damages for the wanton
disregard of defendants to settle amicably this case with the plaintiff before the filing of this
case in court for a smaller amount.
(5) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 4,500.00 due as and for attorney's
fees; and
(6) The cost of suit. (Emphasis supplied)
Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. That court in CA-G.R. No. 65476
affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the award of damages to the following extent:
1. The award of P15,000.00 as compensatory damages was reduced to P6,460.71, the latter
being the only amount that the appellate court found the plaintiff to have proved as actually
sustained by him;
2. The award of P150,000.00 as loss of expected income was reduced
to P100,000.00, basically because Dionisio had voluntarily resigned his job such that, in the
opinion of the appellate court, his loss of income "was not solely attributable to the accident in
question;" and
3. The award of P100,000.00 as moral damages was held by the appellate court as excessive
and unconscionable and hence reduced to P50,000.00.
The award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs
remained untouched.
This decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is now before us on a petition for review.
Both the trial court and the appellate court had made fairly explicit findings of fact relating to the manner
in which the dump truck was parked along General Lacuna Street on the basis of which both courts
drew the inference that there was negligence on the part of Carbonel, the dump truck driver, and that
this negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and Dionisio's injuries. We note, however, that
both courts failed to pass upon the defense raised by Carbonel and Phoenix that the true legal and
proximate cause of the accident was not the way in which the dump truck had been parked but rather
the reckless way in which Dionisio had driven his car that night when he smashed into the dump truck.
The Intermediate Appellate Court in its questioned decision casually conceded that Dionisio was "in
some way, negligent" but apparently failed to see the relevance of Dionisio's negligence and made no
further mention of it. We have examined the record both before the trial court and the Intermediate
Appellate Court and we find that both parties had placed into the record sufficient evidence on the basis
of which the trial court and the appellate court could have and should have made findings of fact relating
to the alleged reckless manner in which Dionisio drove his car that night. The petitioners Phoenix and
Carbonel contend that if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked, that
negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's
recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he
sustained. The need to administer substantial justice as between the parties in this case, without having
to remand it back to the trial court after eleven years, compels us to address directly the contention put
forward by the petitioners and to examine for ourselves the record pertaining to Dionisio's alleged
negligence which must bear upon the liability, or extent of liability, of Phoenix and Carbonel.
There are four factual issues that need to be looked into: (a) whether or not private respondent Dionisio
had a curfew pass valid and effective for that eventful night; (b) whether Dionisio was driving fast or
speeding just before the collision with the dump truck; (c) whether Dionisio had purposely turned off his
car's headlights before contact with the dump truck or whether those headlights accidentally
malfunctioned moments before the collision; and (d) whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the
accident.
As to the first issue relating to the curfew pass, it is clear that no curfew pass was found on the person
of Dionisio immediately after the accident nor was any found in his car. Phoenix's evidence here
consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who had taken Dionisio, unconscious, to the Makati
Medical Center for emergency treatment immediately after the accident. At the Makati Medical Center, a
nurse took off Dionisio's clothes and examined them along with the contents of pockets together with
Patrolman Cuyno. 1 Private respondent Dionisio was not able to produce any curfew pass during the
trial. Instead, he offered the explanation that his family may have misplaced his curfew pass. He also
offered a certification (dated two years after the accident) issued by one Major Benjamin N. Libarnes of
the Zone Integrated Police Intelligence Unit of Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, which was said
to have authority to issue curfew passes for Pampanga and Metro Manila. This certification was to the
effect that private respondent Dionisio had a valid curfew pass. This certification did not, however,
specify any pass serial number or date or period of effectivity of the supposed curfew pass. We find that
private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night of
the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during
that night. The relevance of possession or non-possession of a curfew pass that night lies in the light it
tends to shed on the other related issues: whether Dionisio was speeding home and whether he had
indeed purposely put out his headlights before the accident, in order to avoid detection and possibly
arrest by the police in the nearby police station for travelling after the onset of curfew without a valid
curfew pass.
On the second issue — whether or not Dionisio was speeding home that night — both the trial court and
the appellate court were completely silent.
The defendants in the trial court introduced the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who was at the scene of
the accident almost immediately after it occurred, the police station where he was based being barely
200 meters away. Patrolman Cuyno testified that people who had gathered at the scene of the accident
told him that Dionisio's car was "moving fast" and did not have its headlights on. 2 Dionisio, on the other
hand, claimed that he was travelling at a moderate speed at 30 kilometers per hour and had just
crossed the intersection of General Santos and General Lacuna Streets and had started to accelerate
when his headlights failed just before the collision took place. 3
Private respondent Dionisio asserts that Patrolman Cuyno's testimony was hearsay and did not fag
within any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule since the facts he testified to were not
acquired by him through official information and had not been given by the informants pursuant to any
duty to do so. Private respondent's objection fails to take account of the fact that the testimony of
Patrolman Cuyno is admissible not under the official records exception to the hearsay rule 4 but rather
as part of the res gestae. 5 Testimonial evidence under this exception to the hearsay rule consists of
excited utterances made on the occasion of an occurrence or event sufficiently startling in nature so as
to render inoperative the normal reflective thought processes of the observer and hence made as a
spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event, and not the result of reflective thought. 6
We think that an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly smashing into a stationary object in
the dead of night is a sufficiently startling event as to evoke spontaneous, rather than reflective,
reactions from observers who happened to be around at that time. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno
was therefore admissible as part of the res gestae and should have been considered by the trial court.
Clearly, substantial weight should have been ascribed to such testimony, even though it did not, as it
could not, have purported to describe quantitatively the precise velocity at winch Dionisio was travelling
just before impact with the Phoenix dump truck.
A third related issue is whether Dionisio purposely turned off his headlights, or whether his headlights
accidentally malfunctioned, just moments before the accident. The Intermediate Appellate Court
expressly found that the headlights of Dionisio's car went off as he crossed the intersection but was
non-committal as to why they did so. It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his
headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police
precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection. We
believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that offered by private respondent
Dionisio — i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some
mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in switching his lights
on again at "bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck.
A fourth and final issue relates to whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident. The
evidence here consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno to the effect that private respondent
Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time he was taken from his smashed car and brought to the Makati
Medical Center in an unconscious condition. 7This testimony has to be taken in conjunction with the
admission of Dionisio that he had taken "a shot or two" of liquor before dinner with his boss that night.
We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the
influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless
imprudence. 8 There simply is not enough evidence to show how much liquor he had in fact taken and
the effects of that upon his physical faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness. We are also
aware that "one shot or two" of hard liquor may affect different people differently.
The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private respondent
Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than
he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General
Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and
sticking out onto the road lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the
legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful — or negligent
manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That
there was a reasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and the
accident and respondent's injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner,
the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the
truck driver's negligence.
The petitioners, however, urge that the truck driver's negligence was merely a "passive and static
condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was an "efficient intervening cause and that
consequently Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the accident
rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel. We note that the petitioners' arguments are drawn from a
reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the United States but we are unable to
persuade ourselves that these arguments have any validity for our jurisdiction. We note, firstly, that
even in the United States, the distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would
have us adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited." Professors and Keeton make this quite
clear:
Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of
the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated. If the defendant has
created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said
not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary
antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result it is quite impossible
to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably
the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before. The defendant
who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition," but the act may be culpable
because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the gasoline, the condition has done quite
as much to bring about the fire as the spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant
has created, the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse of a considerable
time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability; one who digs
a trench in the highway may still be liable to another who fans into it a month
afterward. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the
distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to
the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a
position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not
the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the nature of the risk
and the character of the intervening cause. 9
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition"
was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and the private
respondent's car would in an probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew
without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an
unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created
this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in
point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient
intervening or independent cause. What the Petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no more
than a foreseeable consequent manner which the truck driver had parked the dump truck. In other
words, the petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly
situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was
not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact
between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of
liability. It is helpful to quote once more from Professor and Keeton:
Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human
experience is reasonably to be anticipated or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate
under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligence among other reasons,
because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that
reason. Thus one who sets a fire may be required to foresee that an ordinary, usual and
customary wind arising later wig spread it beyond the defendant's own property, and therefore
to take precautions to prevent that event. The person who leaves the combustible or explosive
material exposed in a public place may foresee the risk of fire from some independent source.
... In all of these cases there is an intervening cause combining with the defendant's conduct to
produce the result and in each case the defendant's negligence consists in failure to protect
the plaintiff against that very risk.
Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a
substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has
indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope original risk, and
hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening
causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility.
Thus it has been held that a defendant will be required to anticipate the usual weather of the
vicinity, including all ordinary forces of nature such as usual wind or rain, or snow or frost or
fog or even lightning; that one who leaves an obstruction on the road or a railroad track should
foresee that a vehicle or a train will run into it; ...
The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable negligence
of others. ... [The standard of reasonable conduct may require the defendant to protect the
plaintiff against 'that occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary incidents of human life,
and therefore to be anticipated.' Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the
plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic
becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is negligently
driven; and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved
of responsibility when another negligently drives into it. --- 10
We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and
proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently
respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts
(Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The theory here of
petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver was negligent, private respondent Dionisio had the
"last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries, and that Dionisio having failed to
take that "last clear chance" must bear his own injuries alone. The last clear chance doctrine of the
common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith 11 but it is a matter for debate
whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. The historical
function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law
doctrine or rule that of contributory negligence. 12 The common law rule of contributory negligence
prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence was
relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. 13 The common law
notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent
provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do
so. 14 Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has
to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to
recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. 15
Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from its common law
matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not
believe so. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence
— the plaintiff's or the defendant's — was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That task is not
simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the
use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The relative location in the continuum of time of
the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that
may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or
omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the
rest of the community. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be
absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act
with that increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the
truck driver's own wrongful act or omission. To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out
the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the forseeable consequences of his own
negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in
society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must
tend to weaken the very bonds of society.

Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of his
employer Phoenix 16in supervising its employees properly and adequately. The respondent appellate
court in effect found, correctly in our opinion, that Phoenix was not able to overcome this presumption of
negligence. The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its truck driver to bring the dump truck to his
home whenever there was work to be done early the following morning, when coupled with the failure to
show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when
away from company premises, is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix.

Turning to the award of damages and taking into account the comparative negligence of private
respondent Dionisio on one hand and petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix upon the other hand, 17 we
believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-
80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by
private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and
Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and
attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to
reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of
damages made by the respondent appellate court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is modified by reducing the aggregate
amount of compensatory damages, loss of expected income and moral damages private respondent
Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 124354. April 11, 2002]
ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOS, in their own behalf and as natural guardians of the
minors, ROMMEL RAMOS, ROY RODERICK RAMOS, and RON RAYMOND RAMOS, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DE LOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR. ORLINO HOSAKA and DR.
PERFECTA GUTIERREZ, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Private respondents De Los Santos Medical Center, Dr. Orlino Hosaka and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez
move for a reconsideration of the Decision, dated December 29, 1999, of this Court holding them civilly
liable for petitioner Erlinda Ramos comatose condition after she delivered herself to them for their
professional care and management.
For better understanding of the issues raised in private respondents respective motions, we will
briefly restate the facts of the case as follows:
Sometime in 1985, petitioner Erlinda Ramos, after seeking professional medical help, was advised
to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder (cholecystectomy). She was
referred to Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, who agreed to perform the operation on her. The operation was
scheduled for June 17, 1985 at 9:00 in the morning at private respondent De Los Santos Medical
Center (DLSMC). Since neither petitioner Erlinda nor her husband, petitioner Rogelio, knew of any
anesthesiologist, Dr. Hosaka recommended to them the services of Dr. Gutierrez.
Petitioner Erlinda was admitted to the DLSMC the day before the scheduled operation. By 7:30 in
the morning of the following day, petitioner Erlinda was already being prepared for operation. Upon the
request of petitioner Erlinda, her sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz, who was then Dean of the College of
Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center, was allowed to accompany her inside the operating room.
At around 9:30 in the morning, Dr. Hosaka had not yet arrived so Dr. Gutierrez tried to get in touch
with him by phone. Thereafter, Dr. Gutierrez informed Cruz that the operation might be delayed due to
the late arrival of Dr. Hosaka. In the meantime, the patient, petitioner Erlinda said to Cruz, Mindy, inip
na inip na ako, ikuha mo ako ng ibang Doctor.
By 10:00 in the morning, when Dr. Hosaka was still not around, petitioner Rogelio already wanted
to pull out his wife from the operating room. He met Dr. Garcia, who remarked that he was also tired of
waiting for Dr. Hosaka. Dr. Hosaka finally arrived at the hospital at around 12:10 in the afternoon, or
more than three (3) hours after the scheduled operation.
Cruz, who was then still inside the operating room, heard about Dr. Hosakas arrival. While she
held the hand of Erlinda, Cruz saw Dr. Gutierrez trying to intubate the patient. Cruz heard Dr. Gutierrez
utter: ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan. Cruz noticed a
bluish discoloration of Erlindas nailbeds on her left hand. She (Cruz) then heard Dr. Hosaka instruct
someone to call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist. When he arrived, Dr. Calderon attempted to
intubate the patient. The nailbeds of the patient remained bluish, thus, she was placed in a
trendelenburg position a position where the head of the patient is placed in a position lower than her
feet. At this point, Cruz went out of the operating room to express her concern to petitioner Rogelio that
Erlindas operation was not going well.
Cruz quickly rushed back to the operating room and saw that the patient was still in trendelenburg
position. At almost 3:00 in the afternoon, she saw Erlinda being wheeled to the Intensive Care Unit
(ICU). The doctors explained to petitioner Rogelio that his wife had bronchospasm. Erlinda stayed in the
ICU for a month. She was released from the hospital only four months later or on November 15,
1985. Since the ill-fated operation, Erlinda remained in comatose condition until she died on August 3,
1999.[1]
Petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a civil case for damages against
private respondents. After due trial, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of petitioners.
Essentially, the trial court found that private respondents were negligent in the performance of their
duties to Erlinda. On appeal by private respondents, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts
decision and directed petitioners to pay their unpaid medical bills to private respondents.
Petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari. The private respondents were
then required to submit their respective comments thereon. On December 29, 1999, this Court
promulgated the decision which private respondents now seek to be reconsidered. The dispositive
portion of said Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the appellate court appealed from are hereby modified so
as to award in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private respondents the following: 1)
P1,352,000.00 as actual damages computed as of the date of promulgation of this decision plus a
monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously
survives; 2) P2,000,000.00 as moral damages, 3) P1,500,000.00 as temperate damages; 4)
P100,000.00 each exemplary damages and attorneys fees; and 5) the costs of the suit. [2]
In his Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent Dr. Hosaka submits the following as grounds
therefor:
I. THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT HELD
RESPONDENT DR. HOSAKA LIABLE ON THE BASIS OF THE CAPTAIN-OF-THE-SHIP DOCTRINE.
II. THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN HOLDING RESPONDENT DR. HOSAKA
LIABLE DESPITE THE FACT THAT NO NEGLIGENCE CAN BE ATTRIBUTABLE TO HIM.
III. ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT RESPONDENT DR. HOSAKA IS LIABLE, THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES THAT WERE CLEARLY
EXCESSIVE AND WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS.[3]
Private respondent Dr. Gutierrez, for her part, avers that:
A. THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT MAY HAVE INADVERTENTLY OVERLOOKED THE
FACT THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 29 MAY 1995 HAD ALREADY
BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AS OF 25 JUNE 1995, THEREBY DEPRIVING THIS
HONORABLE COURT OF JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT PETITION;
B. THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT MAY HAVE INADVERTENTLY OVERLOOKED
SEVERAL MATERIAL FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED,
WOULD INDUBITABLY LEAD TO NO OTHER CONCLUSION BUT THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT DOCTORS WERE NOT GUILTY OF ANY NEGLIGENCE IN RESPECT OF THE
INSTANT CASE;
B.1 RESPONDENT DOCTOR PERFECTA GUTIERREZ HAS SUFFICIENTLY
DISCHARGED THE BURDEN OF EVIDENCE BY SUBSTANTIAL PROOF OF HER
COMPLIANCE WITH THE STANDARDS OF DUE CARE EXPECTED IN HER
RESPECTIVE FIELD OF MEDICAL SPECIALIZATION.
B.2 RESPONDENT DOCTOR PERFECTA GUTIERREZ HAS SUFFICIENTLY
DISCHARGED THE BURDEN OF EVIDENCE BY SUBSTANTIAL PROOF OF HER
HAVING SUCCESSFULLY INTUBATED PATIENT ERLINDA RAMOS
 C. THE SUPREME COURT MAY HAVE INADVERTENTLY PLACED TOO MUCH RELIANCE ON
THE TESTIMONY OF PETITIONERS WITNESS HERMINDA CRUZ, DESPITE THE EXISTENCE
OF SEVERAL FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH RENDERS DOUBT ON HER CREDIBILITY
D. THE SUPREME COURT MAY HAVE INADVERTENTLY DISREGARDED THE EXPERT
TESTIMONY OF DR. JAMORA AND DRA. CALDERON
E. THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT MAY HAVE INADVERTENTLY AWARDED DAMAGES
TO PETITIONERS DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART
OF RESPONDENT DOCTOR.[4]
Private respondent De Los Santos Medical Center likewise moves for reconsideration on the
following grounds:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE INSTANT PETITION
AS THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD ALREADY BECOME FINAL
AND EXECUTORY
II. THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT AN EMPLOYER-
EMPLOYEE [RELATIONSHIP] EXISTS BETWEEN RESPONDENT DE LOS SANTOS MEDICAL
CENTER AND DRS. ORLINO HOSAKA AND PERFECTA GUTIERREZ
III. THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT DE LOS
SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER IS SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH RESPONDENT DOCTORS
IV. THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN INCREASING THE AWARD OF
DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS.[5]
In the Resolution of February 21, 2000, this Court denied the motions for reconsideration of private
respondents Drs. Hosaka and Gutierrez. They then filed their respective second motions for
reconsideration. The Philippine College of Surgeons filed its Petition-in-Intervention contending in the
main that this Court erred in holding private respondent Dr. Hosaka liable under the captain of the ship
doctrine. According to the intervenor, said doctrine had long been abandoned in the United States in
recognition of the developments in modern medical and hospital practice. [6] The Court noted these
pleadings in the Resolution of July 17, 2000.[7]
On March 19, 2001, the Court heard the oral arguments of the parties, including the
intervenor. Also present during the hearing were the amicii curiae: Dr. Felipe A. Estrella, Jr., Consultant
of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes, former Director of the Philippine General Hospital and former
Secretary of Health; Dr. Iluminada T. Camagay, President of the Philippine Society of Anesthesiologists,
Inc. and Professor and Vice-Chair for Research, Department of Anesthesiology, College of Medicine-
Philippine General Hospital, University of the Philippines; and Dr. Lydia M. Egay, Professor and Vice-
Chair for Academics, Department of Anesthesiology, College of Medicine-Philippine General Hospital,
University of the Philippines.
The Court enumerated the issues to be resolved in this case as follows:
1. WHETHER OR NOT DR. ORLINO HOSAKA (SURGEON) IS LIABLE FOR
NEGLIGENCE;
2. WHETHER OR NOT DR. PERFECTA GUTIERREZ (ANESTHESIOLOGIST) IS LIABLE
FOR NEGLIGENCE; AND
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HOSPITAL (DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER) IS LIABLE
FOR ANY ACT OF NEGLIGENCE COMMITTED BY THEIR VISITING CONSULTANT
SURGEON AND ANESTHESIOLOGIST.[8]
We shall first resolve the issue pertaining to private respondent Dr. Gutierrez. She maintains that
the Court erred in finding her negligent and in holding that it was the faulty intubation which was the
proximate cause of Erlindas comatose condition. The following objective facts allegedly negate a finding
of negligence on her part: 1) That the outcome of the procedure was a comatose patient and not a dead
one; 2) That the patient had a cardiac arrest; and 3) That the patient was revived from that cardiac
arrest.[9] In effect, Dr. Gutierrez insists that, contrary to the finding of this Court, the intubation she
performed on Erlinda was successful.
Unfortunately, Dr. Gutierrez claim of lack of negligence on her part is belied by the records of the
case. It has been sufficiently established that she failed to exercise the standards of care in the
administration of anesthesia on a patient. Dr. Egay enlightened the Court on what these standards are:
x x x What are the standards of care that an anesthesiologist should do before we administer
anesthesia? The initial step is the preparation of the patient for surgery and this is a pre-operative
evaluation because the anesthesiologist is responsible for determining the medical status of the patient,
developing the anesthesia plan and acquainting the patient or the responsible adult particularly if we are
referring with the patient or to adult patient who may not have, who may have some mental handicaps
of the proposed plans. We do pre-operative evaluation because this provides for an opportunity for us to
establish identification and personal acquaintance with the patient. It also makes us have an opportunity
to alleviate anxiety, explain techniques and risks to the patient, given the patient the choice and
establishing consent to proceed with the plan. And lastly, once this has been agreed upon by all parties
concerned the ordering of pre-operative medications. And following this line at the end of the evaluation
we usually come up on writing, documentation is very important as far as when we train an
anesthesiologist we always emphasize this because we need records for our protection, well,
records. And it entails having brief summary of patient history and physical findings pertinent to
anesthesia, plan, organize as a problem list, the plan anesthesia technique, the plan post operative,
pain management if appropriate, special issues for this particular patient. There are needs for special
care after surgery and if it so it must be written down there and a request must be made known to
proper authorities that such and such care is necessary. And the request for medical evaluation if there
is an indication. When we ask for a cardio-pulmonary clearance it is not in fact to tell them if this patient
is going to be fit for anesthesia, the decision to give anesthesia rests on the anesthesiologist. What we
ask them is actually to give us the functional capacity of certain systems which maybe affected by the
anesthetic agent or the technique that we are going to use. But the burden of responsibility in terms of
selection of agent and how to administer it rest on the anesthesiologist. [10]
The conduct of a preanesthetic/preoperative evaluation prior to an operation, whether elective or
emergency, cannot be dispensed with.[11] Such evaluation is necessary for the formulation of a plan of
anesthesia care suited to the needs of the patient concerned.
Pre-evaluation for anesthesia involves taking the patients medical history, reviewing his current
drug therapy, conducting physical examination, interpreting laboratory data, and determining the
appropriate prescription of preoperative medications as necessary to the conduct of anesthesia. [12]
Physical examination of the patient entails not only evaluating the patients central nervous system,
cardiovascular system and lungs but also the upper airway. Examination of the upper airway would in
turn include an analysis of the patients cervical spine mobility, temporomandibular mobility, prominent
central incisors, deceased or artificial teeth, ability to visualize uvula and the thyromental distance. [13]
 Nonetheless, Dr. Gutierrez omitted to perform a thorough preoperative evaluation on Erlinda. As
she herself admitted, she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation itself, one hour before
the scheduled operation. She auscultated[14] the patients heart and lungs and checked the latters blood
pressure to determine if Erlinda was indeed fit for operation.[15] However, she did not proceed to
examine the patients airway. Had she been able to check petitioner Erlindas airway prior to the
operation, Dr. Gutierrez would most probably not have experienced difficulty in intubating the former,
and thus the resultant injury could have been avoided. As we have stated in our Decision:
In the case at bar, respondent Dra. Gutierrez admitted that she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day
of the operation itself, on 17 June 1985. Before this date, no prior consultations with, or pre-operative
evaluation of Erlinda was done by her. Until the day of the operation, respondent Dra. Gutierrez was
unaware of the physiological make-up and needs of Erlinda. She was likewise not properly informed of
the possible difficulties she would face during the administration of anesthesia to Erlinda. Respondent
Dra. Gutierrez act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative
procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility. The
measures cautioning prudence and vigilance in dealing with human lives lie at the core of the
physicians centuries-old Hippocratic Oath. Her failure to follow this medical procedure is, therefore, a
clear indicia of her negligence.[16]
Further, there is no cogent reason for the Court to reverse its finding that it was the faulty
intubation on Erlinda that caused her comatose condition. There is no question that Erlinda became
comatose after Dr. Gutierrez performed a medical procedure on her. Even the counsel of Dr. Gutierrez
admitted to this fact during the oral arguments:
CHIEF JUSTICE: Mr. Counsel, you started your argument saying that this involves a comatose
patient?
ATTY. GANA: Yes, Your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE: How do you mean by that, a comatose, a comatose after any other acts were
done by Dr. Gutierrez or comatose before any act was done by her?
ATTY. GANA: No, we meant comatose as a final outcome of the procedure.
CHIEF JUSTICE: Meaning to say, the patient became comatose after some intervention,
professional acts have been done by Dr. Gutierrez?
ATTY. GANA: Yes, Your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE: In other words, the comatose status was a consequence of some acts performed
by D. Gutierrez?
ATTY. GANA: It was a consequence of the well, (interrupted)
CHIEF JUSTICE: An acts performed by her, is that not correct?
ATTY. GANA: Yes, Your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE: Thank you.[17]
What is left to be determined therefore is whether Erlindas hapless condition was due to any fault
or negligence on the part of Dr. Gutierrez while she (Erlinda) was under the latters care. Dr. Gutierrez
maintains that the bronchospasm and cardiac arrest resulting in the patients comatose condition was
brought about by the anaphylactic reaction of the patient to Thiopental Sodium (pentothal). [18] In the
Decision, we explained why we found Dr. Gutierrez theory unacceptable. In the first place, Dr. Eduardo
Jamora, the witness who was presented to support her (Dr. Gutierrez) theory, was a pulmonologist.
Thus, he could not be considered an authority on anesthesia practice and procedure and their
complications.[19]
Secondly, there was no evidence on record to support the theory that Erlinda developed an
allergic reaction to pentothal. Dr. Camagay enlightened the Court as to the manifestations of an allergic
reaction in this wise:
DR. CAMAGAY: All right, let us qualify an allergic reaction. In medical terminology an allergic
reaction is something which is not usual response and it is further qualified by the release of a
hormone called histamine and histamine has an effect on all the organs of the body generally
release because the substance that entered the body reacts with the particular cell, the mass
cell, and the mass cell secretes this histamine. In a way it is some form of response to take
away that which is not mine, which is not part of the body. So, histamine has multiple effects
on the body. So, one of the effects as you will see you will have redness, if you have an allergy
you will have tearing of the eyes, you will have swelling, very crucial swelling sometimes of the
larynges which is your voice box main airway, that swelling may be enough to obstruct the
entry of air to the trachea and you could also have contraction, constriction of the smaller
airways beyond the trachea, you see you have the trachea this way, we brought some visual
aids but unfortunately we do not have a projector. And then you have the smaller airways, the
bronchi and then eventually into the mass of the lungs you have the bronchus. The difference
is that these tubes have also in their walls muscles and this particular kind of muscles is
smooth muscle so, when histamine is released they close up like this and that phenomenon is
known as bronco spasm. However, the effects of histamine also on blood vessels are different.
They dilate blood vessel open up and the patient or whoever has this histamine release has
hypertension or low blood pressure to a point that the patient may have decrease blood supply
to the brain and may collapse so, you may have people who have this.[20]
These symptoms of an allergic reaction were not shown to have been extant in Erlindas case. As
we held in our Decision, no evidence of stridor, skin reactions, or wheezing some of the more common
accompanying signs of an allergic reaction appears on record. No laboratory data were ever presented
to the court.[21]
Dr. Gutierrez, however, insists that she successfully intubated Erlinda as evidenced by the fact
that she was revived after suffering from cardiac arrest. Dr. Gutierrez faults the Court for giving
credence to the testimony of Cruz on the matter of the administration of anesthesia when she (Cruz),
being a nurse, was allegedly not qualified to testify thereon. Rather, Dr. Gutierrez invites the Courts
attention to her synopsis on what transpired during Erlindas intubation:
12:15 p.m. Patient was inducted with sodium pentothal 2.5% (250 mg) given by slow IV. 02
was started by mask. After pentothal injection this was followed by IV injection
of Norcuron 4mg. After 2 minutes 02 was given by positive pressure for about
one minute. Intubation with endotracheal tube 7.5 m in diameter was done with
slight difficulty (short neck & slightly prominent upper teeth) chest was
examined for breath sounds & checked if equal on both sides. The tube was
then anchored to the mouth by plaster & cuff inflated. Ethrane 2% with 02 4
liters was given. Blood pressure was checked 120/80 & heart rate regular and
normal 90/min.
12:25 p.m. After 10 minutes patient was cyanotic. Ethrane was discontinued & 02 given
alone. Cyanosis disappeared. Blood pressure and heart beats stable.
12:30 p.m. Cyanosis again reappeared this time with sibilant and sonorous rales all over the
chest. D_5%_H20 & 1 ampule of aminophyline by fast drip was started. Still the
 cyanosis was persistent. Patient was connected to a cardiac monitor. Another
ampule of of [sic] aminophyline was given and solu cortef was given.
12:40 p.m. There was cardiac arrest. Extra cardiac massage and intercardiac injection of
adrenalin was given & heart beat reappeared in less than one minute. Sodium
bicarbonate & another dose of solu cortef was given by IV. Cyanosis slowly
disappeared & 02 continuously given & assisted positive pressure. Laboratory
exams done (see results in chart).
Patient was transferred to ICU for further management.[22]
From the foregoing, it can be allegedly seen that there was no withdrawal (extubation) of the
tube. And the fact that the cyanosis allegedly disappeared after pure oxygen was supplied through the
tube proved that it was properly placed.
The Court has reservations on giving evidentiary weight to the entries purportedly contained in Dr.
Gutierrez synopsis. It is significant to note that the said record prepared by Dr. Gutierrez was made only
after Erlinda was taken out of the operating room. The standard practice in anesthesia is that every
single act that the anesthesiologist performs must be recorded. In Dr. Gutierrez case, she could not
account for at least ten (10) minutes of what happened during the administration of anesthesia on
Erlinda. The following exchange between Dr. Estrella, one of the amicii curiae, and Dr. Gutierrez is
instructive:
DR. ESTRELLA You mentioned that there were two (2) attempts in the intubation period?
DR. GUTIERREZ Yes.
Q There were two attempts. In the first attempt was the tube inserted or was the laryngoscope only
inserted, which was inserted?
A All the laryngoscope.
Q All the laryngoscope. But if I remember right somewhere in the re-direct, a certain lawyer, you
were asked that you did a first attempt and the question was did you withdraw the tube? And
you said you never withdrew the tube, is that right?
A Yes.
Q Yes. And so if you never withdrew the tube then there was no, there was no insertion of the tube
during that first attempt. Now, the other thing that we have to settle here is when cyanosis
occurred, is it recorded in the anesthesia record when the cyanosis, in your recording when did
the cyanosis occur?
A (sic)
Q Is it a standard practice of anesthesia that whatever you do during that period or from the time of
induction to the time that you probably get the patient out of the operating room that every
single action that you do is so recorded in your anesthesia record?
A I was not able to record everything I did not have time anymore because I did that after the, when
the patient was about to leave the operating room. When there was second cyanosis already
that was the (interrupted)
Q When was the first cyanosis?
A The first cyanosis when I was (interrupted)
Q What time, more or less?
A I think it was 12:15 or 12:16.
Q Well, if the record will show you started induction at 12:15?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And the first medication you gave was what?
A The first medication, no, first the patient was oxygenated for around one to two minutes.
Q Yes, so, that is about 12:13?
A Yes, and then, I asked the resident physician to start giving the pentothal very slowly and that was
around one minute.
Q So, that is about 12:13 no, 12:15, 12:17?
A Yes, and then, after one minute another oxygenation was given and after (interrupted)
Q 12:18?
A Yes, and then after giving the oxygen we start the menorcure which is a relaxant. After that
relaxant (interrupted)
Q After that relaxant, how long do you wait before you do any manipulation?
A Usually you wait for two minutes or three minutes.
Q So, if our estimate of the time is accurate we are now more or less 12:19, is that right?
A Maybe.
Q 12:19. And at that time, what would have been done to this patient?
A After that time you examine the, if there is relaxation of the jaw which you push it downwards and
when I saw that the patient was relax because that monorcure is a relaxant, you cannot
intubate the patient or insert the laryngoscope if it is not keeping him relax. So, my first attempt
when I put the laryngoscope on I saw the trachea was deeply interiorly. So, what I did ask
mahirap ata ito ah. So, I removed the laryngoscope and oxygenated again the patient.
Q So, more or less you attempted to do an intubation after the first attempt as you claimed that it
was only the laryngoscope that was inserted.
A Yes.
Q And in the second attempt you inserted the laryngoscope and now possible intubation?
A Yes.
Q And at that point, you made a remark, what remark did you make?
A I said mahirap ata ito when the first attempt I did not see the trachea right away. That was when I
(interrupted)
Q That was the first attempt?
A Yes.
Q What about the second attempt?
A On the second attempt I was able to intubate right away within two to three seconds.
Q At what point, for purposes of discussion without accepting it, at what point did you make the
comment na mahirap ata to intubate, mali ata ang pinasukan
A I did not say mali ata ang pinasukan I never said that.
Q Well, just for the information of the group here the remarks I am making is based on the
documents that were forwarded to me by the Supreme Court. That is why for purposes of
discussion I am trying to clarify this for the sake of enlightenment. So, at what point did you
ever make that comment?
A Which one, sir?
Q The mahirap intubate ito assuming that you (interrupted)
A Iyon lang, that is what I only said mahirap intubate (interrupted)
Q At what point?
A When the first attempt when I inserted the laryngoscope for the first time.
Q So, when you claim that at the first attempt you inserted the laryngoscope, right?
A Yes.
Q But in one of the recordings somewhere at the, somewhere in the transcript of records that when
the lawyer of the other party try to inquire from you during the first attempt that was the time
when mayroon ba kayong hinugot sa tube, I do not remember the page now, but it seems to
me it is there. So, that it was on the second attempt that (interrupted)
A I was able to intubate.
Q And this is more or less about what time 12:21?
A Maybe, I cannot remember the time, Sir.
Q Okay, assuming that this was done at 12:21 and looking at the anesthesia records from 12:20 to
12:30 there was no recording of the vital signs. And can we presume that at this stage there
was already some problems in handling the patient?
A Not yet.
Q But why are there no recordings in the anesthesia record?
A I did not have time.
Q Ah, you did not have time, why did you not have time?
A Because it was so fast, I really (at this juncture the witness is laughing)
Q No, I am just asking. Remember I am not here not to pin point on anybody I am here just to more
or less clarify certainty more ore less on the record.
A Yes, Sir.
Q And so it seems that there were no recording during that span of ten (10) minutes. From 12:20 to
12:30, and going over your narration, it seems to me that the cyanosis appeared ten (10)
minutes after induction, is that right?
A Yes.
Q And that is after induction 12:15 that is 12:25 that was the first cyanosis?
A Yes.
Q And that the 12:25 is after the 12:20?
A We cannot (interrupted)
Q Huwag ho kayong makuwan, we are just trying to enlighten, I am just going over the record ano,
kung mali ito kuwan eh di ano. So, ganoon po ano, that it seems to me that there is no
recording from 12:20 to 12:30, so, I am just wondering why there were no recordings during
the period and then of course the second cyanosis, after the first cyanosis. I think that was the
time Dr. Hosaka came in?
A No, the first cyanosis (interrupted).[23]
We cannot thus give full credence to Dr. Gutierrez synopsis in light of her admission that it does
not fully reflect the events that transpired during the administration of anesthesia on Erlinda. As pointed
out by Dr. Estrella, there was a ten-minute gap in Dr. Gutierrez synopsis, i.e., the vital signs of Erlinda
were not recorded during that time. The absence of these data is particularly significant because, as
found by the trial court, it was the absence of oxygen supply for four (4) to five (5) minutes that caused
Erlindas comatose condition.
On the other hand, the Court has no reason to disbelieve the testimony of Cruz. As we stated in
the Decision, she is competent to testify on matters which she is capable of observing such as, the
statements and acts of the physician and surgeon, external appearances and manifest conditions which
are observable by any one.[24] Cruz, Erlindas sister-in-law, was with her inside the operating
room.Moreover, being a nurse and Dean of the Capitol Medical Center School of Nursing at that, she is
not entirely ignorant of anesthetic procedure. Cruz narrated that she heard Dr. Gutierrez remark, Ang
hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan. She observed that the
nailbeds of Erlinda became bluish and thereafter Erlinda was placed in trendelenburg position. [25] Cruz
further averred that she noticed that the abdomen of Erlinda became distended. [26]
The cyanosis (bluish discoloration of the skin or mucous membranes caused by lack of oxygen or
abnormal hemoglobin in the blood) and enlargement of the stomach of Erlinda indicate that the
endotracheal tube was improperly inserted into the esophagus instead of the trachea. Consequently,
oxygen was delivered not to the lungs but to the gastrointestinal tract. This conclusion is supported by
the fact that Erlinda was placed in trendelenburg position. This indicates that there was a decrease of
blood supply to the patients brain. The brain was thus temporarily deprived of oxygen supply causing
Erlinda to go into coma.
The injury incurred by petitioner Erlinda does not normally happen absent any negligence in the
administration of anesthesia and in the use of an endotracheal tube. As was noted in our Decision, the
instruments used in the administration of anesthesia, including the endotracheal tube, were all under
the exclusive control of private respondents Dr. Gutierrez and Dr. Hosaka.[27] In Voss vs.
Bridwell,[28]which involved a patient who suffered brain damage due to the wrongful administration of
anesthesia, and even before the scheduled mastoid operation could be performed, the Kansas
Supreme Court applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, reasoning that the injury to the patient therein
was one which does not ordinarily take place in the absence of negligence in the administration of an
anesthetic, and in the use and employment of an endotracheal tube. The court went on to say that
[o]rdinarily a person being put under anesthesia is not rendered decerebrate as a consequence of
administering such anesthesia in the absence of negligence. Upon these facts and under these
circumstances, a layman would be able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that
the consequences of professional treatment were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due
care had been exercised.[29] Considering the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the
testimony of Cruz was properly given credence in the case at bar.
For his part, Dr. Hosaka mainly contends that the Court erred in finding him negligent as a
surgeon by applying the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine.[30] Dr. Hosaka argues that the trend in United
States jurisprudence has been to reject said doctrine in light of the developments in medical practice.
He points out that anesthesiology and surgery are two distinct and specialized fields in medicine and as
a surgeon, he is not deemed to have control over the acts of Dr. Gutierrez. As anesthesiologist, Dr.
Gutierrez is a specialist in her field and has acquired skills and knowledge in the course of her training
which Dr. Hosaka, as a surgeon, does not possess.[31] He states further that current American
jurisprudence on the matter recognizes that the trend towards specialization in medicine has created
situations where surgeons do not always have the right to control all personnel within the operating
room,[32] especially a fellow specialist.[33]
Dr. Hosaka cites the case of Thomas v. Raleigh General Hospital,[34] which involved a suit filed by
a patient who lost his voice due to the wrongful insertion of the endotracheal tube preparatory to the
administration of anesthesia in connection with the laparotomy to be conducted on him. The patient
sued both the anesthesiologist and the surgeon for the injury suffered by him. The Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia held that the surgeon could not be held liable for the loss of the patients voice,
considering that the surgeon did not have a hand in the intubation of the patient. The court rejected the
application of the Captain-of-the-Ship Doctrine, citing the fact that the field of medicine has become
specialized such that surgeons can no longer be deemed as having control over the other personnel in
the operating room. It held that [a]n assignment of liability based on actual control more realistically
reflects the actual relationship which exists in a modern operating room. [35] Hence, only the
anesthesiologist who inserted the endotracheal tube into the patients throat was held liable for the injury
suffered by the latter.
This contention fails to persuade.
That there is a trend in American jurisprudence to do away with the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine
does not mean that this Court will ipso facto follow said trend. Due regard for the peculiar factual
circumstances obtaining in this case justify the application of the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine. From the
facts on record it can be logically inferred that Dr. Hosaka exercised a certain degree of, at the very
least, supervision over the procedure then being performed on Erlinda.
First, it was Dr. Hosaka who recommended to petitioners the services of Dr. Gutierrez. In effect,
he represented to petitioners that Dr. Gutierrez possessed the necessary competence and skills. Drs.
Hosaka and Gutierrez had worked together since 1977. Whenever Dr. Hosaka performed a surgery, he
would always engage the services of Dr. Gutierrez to administer the anesthesia on his patient. [36]
Second, Dr. Hosaka himself admitted that he was the attending physician of Erlinda. Thus, when
Erlinda showed signs of cyanosis, it was Dr. Hosaka who gave instructions to call for another
anesthesiologist and cardiologist to help resuscitate Erlinda. [37]
Third, it is conceded that in performing their responsibilities to the patient, Drs. Hosaka and
Gutierrez worked as a team. Their work cannot be placed in separate watertight compartments because
their duties intersect with each other.[38]
While the professional services of Dr. Hosaka and Dr. Gutierrez were secured primarily for their
performance of acts within their respective fields of expertise for the treatment of petitioner Erlinda, and
that one does not exercise control over the other, they were certainly not completely independent of
each other so as to absolve one from the negligent acts of the other physician.
That they were working as a medical team is evident from the fact that Dr. Hosaka was keeping an
eye on the intubation of the patient by Dr. Gutierrez, and while doing so, he observed that the patients
nails had become dusky and had to call Dr. Gutierrezs attention thereto. The Court also notes that the
counsel for Dr. Hosaka admitted that in practice, the anesthesiologist would also have to observe the
surgeons acts during the surgical process and calls the attention of the surgeon whenever
necessary[39] in the course of the treatment. The duties of Dr. Hosaka and those of Dr. Gutierrez in the
treatment of petitioner Erlinda are therefore not as clear-cut as respondents claim them to be. On the
contrary, it is quite apparent that they have a common responsibility to treat the patient, which
responsibility necessitates that they call each others attention to the condition of the patient while the
other physician is performing the necessary medical procedures.
It is equally important to point out that Dr. Hosaka was remiss in his duty of attending to petitioner
Erlinda promptly, for he arrived more than three (3) hours late for the scheduled
operation. The cholecystectomy was set for June 17, 1985 at 9:00 a.m., but he arrived at DLSMC only
at around 12:10 p.m. In reckless disregard for his patients well being, Dr. Hosaka scheduled two
procedures on the same day, just thirty minutes apart from each other, at different hospitals. Thus,
when the first procedure (protoscopy) at the Sta. Teresita Hospital did not proceed on time, Erlinda was
kept in a state of uncertainty at the DLSMC.
The unreasonable delay in petitioner Erlindas scheduled operation subjected her to continued
starvation and consequently, to the risk of acidosis, [40] or the condition of decreased alkalinity of the
blood and tissues, marked by sickly sweet breath, headache, nausea and vomiting, and visual
disturbances.[41] The long period that Dr. Hosaka made Erlinda wait for him certainly aggravated the
anxiety that she must have been feeling at the time. It could be safely said that her anxiety adversely
affected the administration of anesthesia on her. As explained by Dr. Camagay, the patients anxiety
usually causes the outpouring of adrenaline which in turn results in high blood pressure or disturbances
in the heart rhythm:
DR. CAMAGAY: x x x Pre-operative medication has three main functions: One is to alleviate
anxiety. Second is to dry up the secretions and Third is to relieve pain. Now, it is very
important to alleviate anxiety because anxiety is associated with the outpouring of certain
substances formed in the body called adrenalin. When a patient is anxious there is an
outpouring of adrenalin which would have adverse effect on the patient. One of it is high blood
pressure, the other is that he opens himself to disturbances in the heart rhythm, which would
have adverse implications. So, we would like to alleviate patients anxiety mainly because he
will not be in control of his body there could be adverse results to surgery and he will be
opened up; a knife is going to open up his body. x x x[42]
Dr. Hosaka cannot now claim that he was entirely blameless of what happened to Erlinda. His
conduct clearly constituted a breach of his professional duties to Erlinda:
CHIEF JUSTICE: Two other points. The first, Doctor, you were talking about anxiety, would you
consider a patient's stay on the operating table for three hours sufficient enough to aggravate
or magnify his or her anxiety?
DR. CAMAGAY: Yes.
CHIEF JUSTICE: In other words, I understand that in this particular case that was the case, three
hours waiting and the patient was already on the operating table (interrupted)
 DR. CAMAGAY: Yes.
CHiEF JUSTICE: Would you therefore conclude that the surgeon contributed to the aggravation of
the anxiety of the patient?
DR. CAMAGAY: That this operation did not take place as scheduled is already a source of anxiety
and most operating tables are very narrow and that patients are usually at risk of falling on the
floor so there are restraints that are placed on them and they are never, never left alone in the
operating room by themselves specially if they are already pre-medicated because they may
not be aware of some of their movement that they make which would contribute to their injury.
CHIEF JUSTICE: In other words due diligence would require a surgeon to come on time?
DR. CAMAGAY: I think it is not even due diligence it is courtesy.
CHIEF JUSTICE: Courtesy.
DR. CAMAGAY: And care.
CHIEF JUSTICE: Duty as a matter of fact?
DR. CAMAGAY: Yes, Your Honor.[43]
Dr. Hosaka's irresponsible conduct of arriving very late for the scheduled operation of petitioner
Erlinda is violative, not only of his duty as a physician to serve the interest of his patients with the
greatest solicitude, giving them always his best talent and skill, [44] but also of Article 19 of the Civil Code
which requires a person, in the performance of his duties, to act with justice and give everyone his due.
Anent private respondent DLSMCs liability for the resulting injury to petitioner Erlinda, we held that
respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respondent doctors therefor under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code[45] since there exists an employer-employee relationship between private respondent DLSMC
and Drs. Gutierrez and Hosaka:
In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting
consultant staff. While consultants are not, technically employees, x x x the control exercised, the hiring
and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee
relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in
fact exists, the control test is determining. x x x[46]
DLSMC however contends that applying the four-fold test in determining whether such a
relationship exists between it and the respondent doctors, the inescapable conclusion is that DLSMC
cannot be considered an employer of the respondent doctors.
It has been consistently held that in determining whether an employer-employee relationship
exists between the parties, the following elements must be present: (1) selection and engagement of
services; (2) payment of wages; (3) the power to hire and fire; and (4) the power to control not only the
end to be achieved, but the means to be used in reaching such an end. [47]
DLSMC maintains that first, a hospital does not hire or engage the services of a consultant, but
rather, accredits the latter and grants him or her the privilege of maintaining a clinic and/or admitting
patients in the hospital upon a showing by the consultant that he or she possesses the necessary
qualifications, such as accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate), evidence of fellowship and
references.[48] Second, it is not the hospital but the patient who pays the consultants fee for services
rendered by the latter.[49] Third, a hospital does not dismiss a consultant; instead, the latter may lose his
or her accreditation or privileges granted by the hospital. [50] Lastly, DLSMC argues that when a doctor
refers a patient for admission in a hospital, it is the doctor who prescribes the treatment to be given to
said patient. The hospitals obligation is limited to providing the patient with the preferred room
accommodation, the nutritional diet and medications prescribed by the doctor, the equipment and
facilities necessary for the treatment of the patient, as well as the services of the hospital staff who
perform the ministerial tasks of ensuring that the doctors orders are carried out strictly.[51]
After a careful consideration of the arguments raised by DLSMC, the Court finds that respondent
hospitals position on this issue is meritorious. There is no employer-employee relationship between
DLSMC and Drs. Gutierrez and Hosaka which would hold DLSMC solidarily liable for the injury suffered
by petitioner Erlinda under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
As explained by respondent hospital, that the admission of a physician to membership in DLSMCs
medical staff as active or visiting consultant is first decided upon by the Credentials Committee thereof,
which is composed of the heads of the various specialty departments such as the Department of
Obstetrics and Gynecology, Pediatrics, Surgery with the department head of the particular specialty
applied for as chairman. The Credentials Committee then recommends to DLSMC's Medical Director or
Hospital Administrator the acceptance or rejection of the applicant physician, and said director or
administrator validates the committee's recommendation. [52] Similarly, in cases where a disciplinary
action is lodged against a consultant, the same is initiated by the department to whom the consultant
concerned belongs and filed with the Ethics Committee consisting of the department specialty
heads. The medical director/hospital administrator merely acts as ex-officio member of said committee.
Neither is there any showing that it is DLSMC which pays any of its consultants for medical
services rendered by the latter to their respective patients. Moreover, the contract between the
consultant in respondent hospital and his patient is separate and distinct from the contract between
respondent hospital and said patient. The first has for its object the rendition of medical services by the
consultant to the patient, while the second concerns the provision by the hospital of facilities and
services by its staff such as nurses and laboratory personnel necessary for the proper treatment of the
patient.
Further, no evidence was adduced to show that the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda was due to
a failure on the part of respondent DLSMC to provide for hospital facilities and staff necessary for her
treatment.
For these reasons, we reverse the finding of liability on the part of DLSMC for the injury suffered
by petitioner Erlinda.
Finally, the Court also deems it necessary to modify the award of damages to petitioners in view of
the supervening event of petitioner Erlindas death. In the assailed Decision, the Court awarded actual
damages of One Million Three Hundred Fifty Two Thousand Pesos (P1,352,000.00) to cover the
expenses for petitioner Erlindas treatment and care from the date of promulgation of the Decision up to
the time the patient expires or survives.[53] In addition thereto, the Court awarded temperate damages of
One Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,500,000.00) in view of the chronic and continuing
nature of petitioner Erlindas injury and the certainty of further pecuniary loss by petitioners as a result of
said injury, the amount of which, however, could not be made with certainty at the time of the
promulgation of the decision. The Court justified such award in this manner:
Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the time of litigation, the injury
suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence has been completed and that the cost can be
liquidated. However, these provisions neglect to take into account those situations, as in this case,
where the resulting injury might be continuing and possible future complications directly arising from the
injury, while certain to occur, are difficult to predict.
In these cases, the amount of damages which should be awarded, if they are to adequately and SO ORDERED.
correctly respond to the injury caused, should be one which compensates for pecuniary loss incurred
and proved, up to the time of trial; and one which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but
which could not, from the nature of the case, be made with certainty. In other words, temperate
damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where
the injury is chronic and continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases, no incompatibility
arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided for. The reason is that these damages
cover two distinct phases.

As it would not be equitableand certainly not in the best interests of the administration of justicefor the
victim in such cases to constantly come before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking adjustments to
the compensatory damages previously awardedtemperate damages are appropriate. The amount given
as temperate damages, though to a certain extent speculative, should take into account the cost of
proper care.

In the instant case, petitioners were able to provide only home-based nursing care for a comatose
patient who has remained in that condition for over a decade. Having premised our award for
compensatory damages on the amount provided by petitioners at the onset of litigation, it would be now
much more in step with the interests of justice if the value awarded for temperate damages would allow
petitioners to provide optimal care for their loved one in a facility which generally specializes in such
care. They should not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at home without
the aid of professionals, for anything less would be grossly inadequate. Under the circumstances, an
award of P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would therefore be reasonable.[54]

However, subsequent to the promulgation of the Decision, the Court was informed by petitioner
Rogelio that petitioner Erlinda died on August 3, 1999. [55] In view of this supervening event, the award of
temperate damages in addition to the actual or compensatory damages would no longer be justified
since the actual damages awarded in the Decision are sufficient to cover the medical expenses incurred
by petitioners for the patient. Hence, only the amounts representing actual, moral and exemplary
damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit should be awarded to petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby modified as follows:
(1) Private respondent De Los Santos Medical Center is hereby absolved from liability arising from
the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda Ramos on June 17, 1985;
(2) Private respondents Dr. Orlino Hosaka and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez are hereby declared to be
solidarily liable for the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda on June 17, 1985 and are ordered to pay
petitioners

(a) P1,352,000.00 as actual damages;

(b) P2,000,000.00 as moral damages;

(c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;

(d) P100,000.00 as attorneys fees; and

(e) the costs of the suit.

G.R. No. 94713 November 23, 1995
MANSION BISCUIT CORPORATION, represented by its president, ANG CHO HONG, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, TY TECK SUAN substituted by his heirs, ROSENDA TY, ELIZABETH TY
KOH, EDWARD TY, EDMUND TY, EDGAR TY, EVELYN T. LIM, EDWIN TY and EDISON TY, and
SIY GUI, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The instant petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 8,
1990 dismissing petitioner's appeal of the civil aspect of Criminal Cases Nos. 5598-V-83 entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Ty Teck Suan" and 5599-V-83 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Ty
Teck Suan and Siy Gui", both for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as the
Bouncing Checks Law.
The established facts are as follows:
Sometime in 1981, Ty Teck Suan, as president of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation, ordered numerous
cartons of nutri-wafer biscuits from Mansion Biscuit Corporation. Before the delivery of the goods on
November 12, 1981, Ty Teck Suan issued to Ang Cho Hong, president of Mansion, four (4) postdated
checks totaling P404,980.00 as payment for the nutri-wafer biscuits.1 Four (4) other postdated checks in
the amount of P100,000.00 each,2 were issued by Ty Teck Suan with Siy Gui as co-signor in December
of the same year.
Accordingly, Mansion Biscuit Corporation delivered the goods from November 12, 1981 to January 7,
1982, inclusive.3
When the first four checks dated December 24, 1981, January 2, 1982, January 9, 1982 and January
16, 1982 were deposited, they were all dishonored due to insufficiency of funds.4 Ang Cho Hong
informed Ty Teck Suan of the dishonor and requested him to replace the checks with cash or good
checks. Ty Teck Suan failed to heed said request.5
Subsequently, Ty Teck Suan delivered a total of 1,150 sacks of Australian flour to Mansion Biscuit on
February 11, 1982, February 22, 1982 and March 8, 1982. Said deliveries plus cash advanced by Ty
Teck Suan in December 1981 amounted to P162,500.00.6 The same amount was applied by Mansion
Biscuit as payment for the first postdated check issued by Ty Teck Suan in the amount of P104,980.00.
(This resulted in the exclusion of the first check from the information which was later filed against Ty
Teck Suan.7)
On March 1, 1982, Ang Cho Hong sent Ty Teck Suan a formal demand letter 8 requesting that the latter
make good the value of the dishonored checks within five (5) days from receipt thereof. 9 Thereafter, the
second batch of checks issued by Ty Teck Suan and Siy Gui dated March 20, 1982, April 10, 1982,
May 1, 1982 and May 22, 1982 all became due and payable but on deposit, they were all dishonored
again.10 On August 3, 1982, Mansion Biscuit, through its counsel, sent a final demand letter 11 informing
Ty Teck Suan that it would be constrained to file an action against him should he continuously refuse to
pay.
Ty Teck Suan having failed to meet his obligation, an information for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 (Bouncing Checks Law) was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172 in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila on February 16, 1983. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 5598-V-83, the same
reads:
That on or about and during the month of January, 1982, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Ty Teck
Suan, knowing fully well that he has no sufficient funds with the Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation, Quezon Avenue Branch, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
prepare, issue and make out, for value check No. 034847 dated January 2, 1982, in the amount of
P100,000.00, check No. 034848 dated January 9, 1982, in the amount of P100,000.00, and check
No. 034849 dated January 16, 1982, in the amount of P100,000.00 drawn against the said bank in
payment of cartons of Nutri-Wafer biscuits purchased from the Mansion Biscuit Corporation,
represented by Ang Cho Hong, President thereof, by the Edward Ty Brothers Corporation thru said
accused Ty Tech Suan, but the said checks upon presentation with the said bank for deposit and
verification of sufficiency of funds was (sic) dishonored and refused payment on the ground of
"insufficient funds", and despite repeated demands to make good said checks or redeem the same
within five (5) banking days from demands, said accused failed and refused to do so, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Mansion Biscuit Corporation, in the total amount of P300,000.00.
Contrary to law.12 (Emphasis ours)
An identical information for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed as Criminal Case No. 5599-V-83, was
likewise filed against Ty Teck Suan and Siy Gui, the treasurer of the Edward Ty Brothers Corporation,
for their having issued checks Nos. 10698023, 10698024, 10698025 and 10698026 drawn against the
Equitable Banking Corporation and respectively dated March 20, 1982, April 10, 1982, May 1, 1982 and
May 22, 1982 for the amount of P100,000.00 each or in the total sum of P400,000.00. The checks were
allegedly issued in payment for cartons of nutri-wafer biscuits purchased from Mansion Biscuit but were
refused payment for insufficiency of funds upon presentment at the said bank. 13
Ty Teck Suan and Siy Gui pleaded not guilty to the charges. In the course of the trial, complainant Ang
Cho Hong filed a verified motion for the issuance of a writ of attachment. Even as the accused filed a
bond in the amount of P700,000.00, the court issued an order of attachment on some of his real
properties on November 26, 1984.14
After the prosecution rested its case, Ty Teck Suan filed a motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to
evidence, which Siy Gui likewise adopted as his own. The motion to dismiss was based on the following
grounds: (a) the subject checks were issued merely to guarantee or secure fulfillment of the agreement
with the complainant; (b) the four Equitable Banking Corporation checks were issued by the accused
only as replacement for the four Rizal Banking Corporation checks issued by Ty Teck Suan alone, and
(c) the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense.15
On October 12, 1987, after the prosecution filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss, the trial court,
presided by then Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong,16 issued an order granting the motion to dismiss,
stating that:
On issuance of checks prior to August 8, 1984 when the Ministry of Justice ruled otherwise, the
defense of issuance of checks to guarantee the payment of an obligation was still a valid defense.
The transaction between the accused Ty Teck Suan and the complaining witness occurred in the
months of March, April and May 1982 in Criminal Case No. 5599-V-83; and during the month of
January 1982 in Criminal Case No. 5598-V-83. The jurisprudence in connection with the issuance
 of checks which were dishonored after issuance but which checks were issued to guarantee
payment (sic) an obligation are still applicable to both accused. Supreme Court rulings where
issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of BP 22 are enunciated in Virginia
Montano vs. Josefino Galvez, June 19, 1981; Alice Quizon vs. Lydia Calingo, October 23,
1981; Alfredo Guido vs. Miguel A. Mateo, et al., November 17, 1981; Zenaida Lazarao vs. Maria
Aquino, August 7, 1981. The stare decisis in these cases is where the check is issued as part of an
arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not the
drawer is not criminally liable for either Estafa or Violation of BP Blg. 22.
xxx xxx xxx
Therefore, the Court concludes that the issuance of the above-mentioned checks by the accused
subject of these two criminal cases, and their subsequent dishonor cannot be considered in
Violation of BP 22 because one important element of the offense is missing; that the check is made
or drawn and issued to apply on account or for value and because these were issued to guarantee
the fulfillment of an agreement to deliver biscuits by complainant when accused Ty Teck Suan
would place orders.17
In the same order of dismissal, Judge Capulong found that accused Siy Gui's liability had not been
established by the prosecution as it appeared that he had no personal transactions with the complainant
although he was a co-signatory in the second batch of four checks.18 The dispositive' portion of the
above-mentioned order reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds merit in the Motion to Dismiss based on Demurrer to Evidence. Both
accused are hereby declared not guilty of the offense charged in the Information in both cases. The
bail bonds posted for their provisional liberty are ordered CANCELLED.
Consequently, the Order of Attachment issued in this case is hereby set aside.
SO ORDERED.19
The prosecution then filed a motion for reconsideration and for clarification as to the civil aspect of the
criminal actions which were deemed impliedly instituted therein. 20 The defense opposed the motion.
On October 30, 1987, the lower court denied the motion on the ground that:
. . . no civil liability can be enunciated and enforced in this (sic) criminal cases due to the
acquittal of both accused. Above-cited liability of both accused if any, can be ventilated and
enforced only in a separate action on the agreement guaranteed by the checks. . . . 21
Thus, on November 11, 1987, the petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari and injunction
with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 13264, questioning only the propriety of
the trial court's order setting aside the order of attachment. 22
On February 22, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision23 annulling and setting aside the
questioned portion of the order dated October 17, 1987 which set aside the writ of attachment.
Meanwhile, petitioner Mansion Biscuit Corporation filed another appeal to the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 16580, this time assailing the trial court's ruling absolving defendants from
civil liability in the criminal cases. Petitioner contended that the acquittal of the accused in the criminal
cases did not necessarily extinguish their civil liability, citing Padilla v. Court of Appeals,24 People
v. Jalandoni,25 Maximo v. Gerochi, Jr.26 and People v. Relova.27
On January 10, 1989, while the appeal was pending with the Court of Appeals, Ty Teck Suan died. A
motion to dismiss the appeal concerning him pursuant to Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was
filed by his counsel. This was opposed by petitioner.28 In the resolution of January 8, 1990, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit and granted the substitution of appellee Ty Teck
Suan by his children named Rosenda Ty, Elizabeth Ty Koh, Edward Ty, Edmund Ty, Edgar Ty, Evelyn
T. Lim, Edwin Ty and Edison Ty.29
On May 8, 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 30 dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. It
held that the civil liability sought to be enforced by the complainant was not the personal obligation of Ty
Teck Suan but a contractual liability of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation of which Ty Teck Suan was the
president. The civil liability of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation to Mansion Biscuit was not litigated and
resolved in the criminal cases because Edward Ty Brothers Corporation was not a party thereto.
Accordingly, the appellate court held that a separate civil action should be instituted by petitioner
against Edward Ty Brothers Corporation.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner came to this Court by way of the instant
petition for review alleging that respondent Court of Appeals erred in: (a) limiting its appeal to civil
liability arising from contract; (b) refusing to acknowledge the quasi-delict or tort committed by Ty Teck
Suan; (c) insisting that the contractual liability could not be enforced against Ty Teck Suan; (d) not
ruling that Ty Teck Suan, by his actuations, had personally assumed liability, and (e) disregarding the
conclusive findings of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 13264.31
Petitioner contends that "when Ty Teck Suan committed the illegal act of insuring and delivering
worthless checks as advance payment, thus successfully inducing Ang Cho Hong, president of
Mansion, to deliver several hundred cartons of nutri-van biscuits, two (2) civil liabilities arose, namely:
(1) the civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and (2) the civil
liability arising from tort or quasi-delict."32 Petitioner further alleges that when Ty Teck Suan and Siy Gui
were acquitted in the criminal cases, "only the civil liability arising from crime was extinguished"
pursuant to Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, but their civil liability based on quasi-delictremained.
Private respondents, on the other hand, asseverate that Ty Teck Suan and Siy Gui could not be held
liable for a contractual liability of the corporation which they represented. They maintain the view that
petitioner must file a separate civil action against Edward Ty Brothers Corporation inasmuch as the
latter is the real party in interest and was not a party to the criminal cases filed against them which are
subject of the present petition for review.
We are thus confronted with the issue of whether or not the petitioner can enforce the civil liability for
non-payment of the nutri-wafer biscuits in question against private respondents notwithstanding the fact
that the latter contracted the agreement in behalf of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation.
We rule in the negative.
The civil liability for non-payment of the nutri-wafer biscuits delivered by petitioner to the Edward Ty
Brothers Corporation cannot be enforced against the private respondents because the said civil liability
was not the personal liability of Ty Teck Suan to Mansion Biscuit Corporation, rather, it was the
contractual liability of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation, of which Ty Teck Suan was president, to
Mansion Biscuit Corporation. This is borne out by the records of the case. The information in Criminal
Cases Nos. 5598-V-83 and 5599-V-83 filed against Ty Teck Suan and Siy Gui reveal that the checks
were issued "in payment of the cartons of nutri-wafer biscuits purchased from the Mansion Biscuit
Corporation, represented by Ana Cho Hong, president thereof, by Edward Ty Brothers Corporation thru
said accused Ty Teck Suan."33 Moreover, petitioner itself admitted that the contract was executed by
and between Edward Ty Brothers Corporation, represented by its president, Ty Teck Suan, and
Mansion Biscuit Corporation,34 likewise represented by its president, Ang Cho Hong. This was correctly
observed by respondent Court of Appeals in its assailed decision and we quote:
The civil liability which the complainant seeks to enforce is the unpaid value of the nutri-van biscuits
which were allegedly ordered by Ty Teck Suan from complainant and delivered by the latter
between 12 November 1981 and the first week of January 1982. It is apparent from the record,
however, that this civil liability is not the personal liability of Ty Teck Suan to private complainant
Ang Cho Hong. It is the contractual liability of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation of which Ty Teck
Suan was president, to Mansion Biscuit Corporation, of which Ang Cho Hong was president. This is
clear from the Statement of Facts in plaintiffs-appellant brief, the relevant and pertinent portions of
which read:
Sometime in 1981, Teck Suan, as president of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation ordered numerous
cartons of nutri-van biscuits from Mansion Biscuit Corporation. As payment for these goods, Ty
Teck Suan issued four (4) postdated checks amounting P404,980.00. These checks were delivered
to Mr.Ang Cho Hong, President of Mansion biscuit corporation sometime during the first week of
November, 1981 (p. 17, tsn of March 14, 1984). (at p. 10 of Brief, Emphasis ours.)
xxx xxx xxx
These goods were received by Ty Teck Suan, through Edward Ty Brothers Corporation as its
Consignees, and this was evidenced by the different receipts that have been issued by Edward
Ty Brothers Corporation and its Consignees . . ., as well as by the "authority to deliver"
documents issued by Edward Ty Brothers Corporation . . . and signed by one Elizabeth Ty
Kho, the daughter of Ty Teck Suan (p. 24, tsn of June 13, 1984). (at pp. 11-12, ibid) Likewise,
the informations uniformly state that the checks were "in payment of cartons of Nutri-Wafers
biscuit purchased from the Mansion Biscuit Corporation, represented by Ang Cho Hong,
President thereof, by the Edward Ty Brothers Corporation thru said accused Ty Teck Suan . . .
It is quite obvious from the foregoing that Ty Teck Suan did not purchase the biscuits for himself
but for Edward Ty Brothers Corporation in his capacity as its president. Neither did Ang Cho Hong
sell and deliver the biscuits in his personal capacity but for and in behalf of Mansion Biscuits
Corporation of which he was president. The issue of the civil liability of Edward Ty Brothers
Corporation to Mansion Biscuits Corporation arising from the contract of purchase and sale
between them could not have been and was not litigated and resolved in the criminal case
inasmuch as they were not parties therein. A separate civil action must be instituted by Mansion
Biscuits Corporation against Edward Ty Brothers Corporation to enforce the contract between
them.35
With respect to the issue of tortious liability, the respondent court had this to say:
Another telling circumstance against plaintiff-appellant's posture is his statement of the sole issue
to be resolved in this appeal, to wit:
Statement of Issues
Whether or not plaintiff-appellant has established his right to the payment of the goods he
delivered to defendants-appellees.
It is quite clear from the foregoing that plaintiff-appellant is enforcing a contractual, not a tortious,
liability.
Assuming that plaintiff-appellant has basis for his quasi-delict claim, the same must be addressed
still against Edward Ty Brothers Corporation for the established facts show that the post-dated
checks were issued by accused-appellee not in payment of his personal obligations but of the
corporation's. Moreover the fraud allegedly committed by accused-appellee was merely incidental
to the contractual obligation, not an independent act which could serve as a source of obligation.
The cases cited by plaintiff-appellant, to illustrate that the existence of a contract does not preclude
an action on quasi-delict where the act that breaks the contract constitutes a quasi-delict, have no
application because the acts complained of therein were performed to break an existing contract,
whereas the alleged fraud herein was committed at the time of the creation of the contractual
relationship and as an incident thereof.36
Necessarily, any claim for tortious liability must be ventilated in a separate action against the proper
party.
As a sidelight, we would like to reiterate our ruling in People v.
Bayotas,37 where we summarized the rules with respect to recovery of civil liability arising from crime
and other sources, to wit:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of
the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts.
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule III of
the 1984 Rules on Criminal Procedures as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
 4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 38

In the case at bench, the acquittal of Ty Teck Suan and Siy Gui extinguished both their criminal and civil
liability as it is clear from the order acquitting them that the issuance of the checks in question did not
constitute a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Consequently, no civil liability arising from the alleged delict may
be awarded.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.