1
G.R. No. 183871 February 18, 2010
LOURDES D. RUBRICO, JEAN RUBRICO APRUEBO, and MARY JOY
RUBRICO CARBONEL, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON,
P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO RAZON, MAJ. DARWIN SY a.k.a. DARWIN
REYES, JIMMY SANTANA, RUBEN ALFARO, CAPT. ANGELO
CUARESMA, a certain JONATHAN, P/SUPT. EDGAR B. ROQUERO,
ARSENIO C. GOMEZ, and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to
Section 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo2 (Amparo Rule), Lourdes D.
Rubrico, Jean Rubrico Apruebo, and Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel assail and
seek to set aside the Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 31,
2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00003, a petition commenced under the Amparo
Rule.
The petition for the writ of amparo dated October 25, 2007 was originally filed
before this Court. After issuing the desired writ and directing the respondents
to file a verified written return, the Court referred the petition to the CA for
summary hearing and appropriate action. The petition and its attachments
contained, in substance, the following allegations:
1. On April 3, 2007, armed men belonging to the 301st Air
Intelligence and Security Squadron (AISS, for short) based in
Fernando Air Base in Lipa City abducted Lourdes D. Rubrico
(Lourdes), then attending a Lenten pabasa in Bagong Bayan,
Dasmariñas, Cavite, and brought to, and detained at, the air base
without charges. Following a week of relentless interrogation -
conducted alternately by hooded individuals - and what amounts to
verbal abuse and mental harassment, Lourdes, chair of the Ugnayan
ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan, was released at Dasmariñas,
Cavite, her hometown, but only after being made to sign a statement
that she would be a military asset.
After Lourdes’ release, the harassment, coming in the form of being
tailed on at least two occasions at different places, i.e., Dasmariñas,
Cavite and Baclaran in Pasay City, by motorcycle-riding men in
bonnets, continued;
1
2. During the time Lourdes was missing, P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio Gomez
(P/Insp. Gomez), then sub-station commander of Bagong Bayan,
Dasmariñas, Cavite, kept sending text messages to Lourdes’
daughter, Mary Joy R. Carbonel (Mary Joy), bringing her to beaches
and asking her questions about Karapatan, an alliance of human
rights organizations. He, however, failed to make an investigation
even after Lourdes’ disappearance had been made known to him;
3. A week after Lourdes’ release, another daughter, Jean R. Apruebo
(Jean), was constrained to leave their house because of the
presence of men watching them;
4. Lourdes has filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal
complaint for kidnapping and arbitrary detention and administrative
complaint for gross abuse of authority and grave misconduct against
Capt. Angelo Cuaresma (Cuaresma), Ruben Alfaro (Alfaro), Jimmy
Santana (Santana) and a certain Jonathan, c/o Headquarters 301st
AISS, Fernando Air Base and Maj. Sy/Reyes with address at No. 09
Amsterdam Ext., Merville Subd., Parañaque City, but nothing has
happened; and the threats and harassment incidents have been
reported to the Dasmariñas municipal and Cavite provincial police
stations, but nothing eventful resulted from their respective
investigations.
Two of the four witnesses to Lourdes’ abduction went into hiding
after being visited by government agents in civilian clothes; and
5. Karapatan conducted an investigation on the incidents. The
investigation would indicate that men belonging to the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP), namely Capt. Cuaresma of the Philippine
Air Force (PAF), Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan and Maj. Darwin
Sy/Reyes, led the abduction of Lourdes; that unknown to the
abductors, Lourdes was able to pilfer a "mission order" which was
addressed to CA Ruben Alfaro and signed by Capt. Cuaresma of the
PAF.
The petition prayed that a writ of amparo issue, ordering the individual
respondents to desist from performing any threatening act against the
security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to
immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating
circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and
for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case
of Lourdes.
2
Before the CA, respondents President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon, then Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of
Staff, Police Director-General (P/Dir. Gen.) Avelino Razon, then Philippine
National Police (PNP) Chief, Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Roquero of the
Cavite Police Provincial Office, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Gomez, now
retired, and the OMB (answering respondents, collectively) filed, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), a joint return on the writ specifically
denying the material inculpatory averments against them. The OSG also
denied the allegations against the following impleaded persons, namely:
Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes, for lack of knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations’ truth. And by
way of general affirmative defenses, answering respondents interposed the
following defenses: (1) the President may not be sued during her
incumbency; and (2) the petition is incomplete, as it fails to indicate the
matters required by Sec. 5(d) and (e) of the Amparo Rule.4
Attached to the return were the affidavits of the following, among other public
officials, containing their respective affirmative defenses and/or statements of
what they had undertaken or committed to undertake regarding the claimed
disappearance of Lourdes and the harassments made to bear on her and her
daughters:
1. Gen. Esperon – attested that, pursuant to a directive of then
Secretary of National Defense (SND) Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr., he
ordered the Commanding General of the PAF, with information to all
concerned units, to conduct an investigation to establish the
circumstances behind the disappearance and the reappearance of
Lourdes insofar as the involvement of alleged personnel/unit is
concerned. The Provost Marshall General and the Office of the
Judge Advocate General (JAGO), AFP, also undertook a parallel
action.
Gen. Esperon manifested his resolve to provide the CA with material
results of the investigation; to continue with the probe on the alleged
abduction of Lourdes and to bring those responsible, including
military personnel, to the bar of justice when warranted by the
findings and the competent evidence that may be gathered in the
investigation process by those mandated to look into the matter;5
2. P/Dir. Gen. Razon - stated that an investigation he immediately
ordered upon receiving a copy of the petition is on-going vis-à-vis
Lourdes’ abduction, and that a background verification with the PNP
Personnel Accounting and Information System disclosed that the
names Santana, Alfaro, Cuaresma and one Jonathan do not appear
in the police personnel records, although the PNP files carry the
name of Darwin Reyes Y. Muga.
2
Per the initial investigation report of the Dasmariñas municipal police
station, P/Dir. Gen. Razon disclosed, Lourdes was abducted by six
armed men in the afternoon of April 3, 2007 and dragged aboard a
Toyota Revo with plate number XRR 428, which plate was issued for
a Mitsubishi van to AK Cottage Industry with address at 9
Amsterdam St., Merville Subd., Parañaque City. The person residing
in the apartment on that given address is one Darius/Erwin See @
Darius Reyes allegedly working, per the latter’s house helper, in
Camp Aguinaldo.
P/Dir. Gen. Razon, however, bemoaned the fact that Mrs. Rubrico
never contacted nor coordinated with the local police or other
investigating units of the PNP after her release, although she is in
the best position to establish the identity of her abductors and/or
provide positive description through composite sketching.
Nonetheless, he manifested that the PNP is ready to assist and
protect the petitioners and the key witnesses from threats,
harassments and intimidation from whatever source and, at the
same time, to assist the Court in the implementation of its
orders.61avvphi1
3. P/Supt. Roquero – stated conducting, upon receipt of Lourdes’
complaint, an investigation and submitting the corresponding report
to the PNP Calabarzon, observing that neither Lourdes nor her
relatives provided the police with relevant information;
4. P/Insp. Gomez – alleged that Lourdes, her kin and witnesses
refused to cooperate with the investigating Cavite PNP; and
5. Overall Deputy Ombudsman Orlando Casimiro - alleged that
cases for violation of Articles 267 and 124, or kidnapping and
arbitrary detention, respectively, have been filed with, and are under
preliminary investigation by the OMB against those believed to be
involved in Lourdes’ kidnapping; that upon receipt of the petition for a
writ of amparo, proper coordination was made with the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and other Law Enforcement
Offices (MOLEO) where the subject criminal and administrative
complaints were filed.
Commenting on the return, petitioners pointed out that the return was no
more than a general denial of averments in the petition. They, thus, pleaded
to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the President, Santana,
Alfaro, Capt. Cuaresma, Darwin Sy, and Jonathan. And with leave of court,
they also asked to serve notice of the petition through publication, owing to
3
their failure to secure the current address of the latter five and thus submit,
as the CA required, proof of service of the petition on them.
The hearing started on November 13, 2007.7 In that setting, petitioners’
counsel prayed for the issuance of a temporary protection order (TPO)
against the answering respondents on the basis of the allegations in the
petition. At the hearing of November 20, 2007, the CA granted petitioners’
motion that the petition and writ be served by the court’s process server on
Darwin Sy/Reyes, Santana, Alfaro, Capt. Cuaresma, and Jonathan.
The legal skirmishes that followed over the propriety of excluding President
Arroyo from the petition, petitioners’ motions for service by publication, and
the issuance of a TPO are not of decisive pertinence in this recital. The
bottom line is that, by separate resolutions, the CA dropped the President as
respondent in the case; denied the motion for a TPO for the court’s want of
authority to issue it in the tenor sought by petitioners; and effectively denied
the motion for notice by publication owing to petitioners’ failure to submit the
affidavit required under Sec. 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.8
After due proceedings, the CA rendered, on July 31, 2008, its partial
judgment, subject of this review, disposing of the petition but only insofar as
the answering respondents were concerned. The fallo of the CA decision
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, partial judgment is hereby
rendered DISMISSING the instant petition with respect to respondent Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Supt. Edgar B. Roquero,
P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio C. Gomez (ret.) and the Office of the Ombudsman.
Nevertheless, in order that petitioners’ complaint will not end up as another
unsolved case, the heads of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police are directed to ensure that the investigations
already commenced are diligently pursued to bring the perpetrators to
justice. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and P/Dir.
Gen. Avelino Razon are directed to regularly update petitioners and this
Court on the status of their investigation.
SO ORDERED.
In this recourse, petitioners formulate the issue for resolution in the following
wise:
WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their]
Petition and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party
respondent.
3
Petitioners first take issue on the President’s purported lack of immunity from
suit during her term of office. The 1987 Constitution, so they claim, has
removed such immunity heretofore enjoyed by the chief executive under the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from suit remains
preserved under our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in
the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the
1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on
the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood
in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her
tenure.9 The Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987
Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys immunity during her
incumbency, and why this must be so:
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no
need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of
the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into
court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be
freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to
fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the
legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and
anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and
important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs
the operation of the Government.10 x x x
And lest it be overlooked, the petition is simply bereft of any allegation as to
what specific presidential act or omission violated or threatened to violate
petitioners’ protected rights.
This brings us to the correctness of the assailed dismissal of the petition with
respect to Gen. Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Razon, P/Supt. Roquero, P/Insp.
Gomez, and the OMB.
None of the four individual respondents immediately referred to above has
been implicated as being connected to, let alone as being behind, the alleged
abduction and harassment of petitioner Lourdes. Their names were not even
mentioned in Lourdes’ Sinumpaang Salaysay11 of April 2007. The same goes
for the respective Sinumpaang Salaysay and/or Karagdagang Sinumpaang
Salaysay of Jean12 and Mary Joy.13
As explained by the CA, Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon were included
in the case on the theory that they, as commanders, were responsible for the
4
unlawful acts allegedly committed by their subordinates against petitioners.
To the appellate court, "the privilege of the writ of amparo must be denied as
against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon for the simple reason that
petitioners have not presented evidence showing that those who allegedly
abducted and illegally detained Lourdes and later threatened her and her
family were, in fact, members of the military or the police force." The two
generals, the CA’s holding broadly hinted, would have been accountable for
the abduction and threats if the actual malefactors were members of the AFP
or PNP.
As regards the three other answering respondents, they were impleaded
because they allegedly had not exerted the required extraordinary diligence
in investigating and satisfactorily resolving Lourdes’ disappearance or
bringing to justice the actual perpetrators of what amounted to a criminal act,
albeit there were allegations against P/Insp. Gomez of acts constituting
threats against Mary Joy.
While in a qualified sense tenable, the dismissal by the CA of the case as
against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon is incorrect if viewed against
the backdrop of the stated rationale underpinning the assailed decision vis-à-
vis the two generals, i.e., command responsibility. The Court assumes the
latter stance owing to the fact that command responsibility, as a concept
defined, developed, and applied under international law, has little, if at all,
bearing in amparo proceedings.
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the
development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas,
"command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed
forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict."14 In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form
of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine
of command responsibility,15foreshadowing the present-day precept of
holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his
subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then
formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual
criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes
committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the
perpetrators16 (as opposed to crimes he ordered).
The doctrine has recently been codified in the Rome Statute17 of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) to which the Philippines is signatory. Sec.
28 of the Statute imposes individual responsibility on military commanders for
crimes committed by forces under their control. The country is, however, not
yet formally bound by the terms and provisions embodied in this treaty-
statute, since the Senate has yet to extend concurrence in its ratification. 18
4
While there are several pending bills on command responsibility,19 there is
still no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under that doctrine. 20
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to
hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced
disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on
the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a
principle of international law or customary international law in accordance
with the incorporation clause of the Constitution.21 Still, it would be
inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command
responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal
complicity through omission, for individual respondents’ criminal liability, if
there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does
not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if
incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have been
committed. As the Court stressed in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo
(Manalo),22 the writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and
effective procedural relief against violations or threats of violation of the basic
rights to life, liberty, and security of persons; the corresponding amparo suit,
however, "is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt x x x or administrative liability requiring substantial
evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings."23 Of the same
tenor, and by way of expounding on the nature and role of amparo, is what
the Court said in Razon v. Tagitis:
It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance [threats thereof or extra-judicial killings]; it determines
responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance
[threats thereof or extra-judicial killings] for purposes of imposing the
appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [or extra-judicial killings].
xxxx
As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in
this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component
criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced
disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and
special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the
matter; the determination of what acts are criminal x x x are matters of
substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact.24 x x x
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these
proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the
first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the
disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to
5
devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to
protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however,
the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on
respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to
administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative
issuances, if there be any.
Petitioners, as the CA has declared, have not adduced substantial evidence
pointing to government involvement in the disappearance of Lourdes. To a
concrete point, petitioners have not shown that the actual perpetrators of the
abduction and the harassments that followed formally or informally formed
part of either the military or the police chain of command. A preliminary police
investigation report, however, would tend to show a link, however hazy,
between the license plate (XRR 428) of the vehicle allegedly used in the
abduction of Lourdes and the address of Darwin Reyes/Sy, who was alleged
to be working in Camp Aguinaldo.25 Then, too, there were affidavits and
testimonies on events that transpired which, if taken together, logically point
to military involvement in the alleged disappearance of Lourdes, such as, but
not limited to, her abduction in broad daylight, her being forcibly dragged to a
vehicle blindfolded and then being brought to a place where the sounds of
planes taking off and landing could be heard. Mention may also be made of
the fact that Lourdes was asked about her membership in the Communist
Party and of being released when she agreed to become an "asset."
Still and all, the identities and links to the AFP or the PNP of the alleged
abductors, namely Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes,
have yet to be established.
Based on the separate sworn statements of Maj. Paul Ciano26 and Technical
Sergeant John N. Romano,27 officer-in-charge and a staff of the 301st AISS,
respectively, none of the alleged abductors of Lourdes belonged to the 301st
AISS based in San Fernando Air Base. Neither were they members of any
unit of the Philippine Air Force, per the certification28 of Col. Raul Dimatactac,
Air Force Adjutant. And as stated in the challenged CA decision, a
verification with the Personnel Accounting and Information System of the
PNP yielded the information that, except for a certain Darwin Reyes y Muga,
the other alleged abductors, i.e., Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana and Jonathan,
were not members of the PNP. Petitioners, when given the opportunity to
identify Police Officer 1 Darwin Reyes y Muga, made no effort to confirm if he
was the same Maj. Darwin Reyes a.k.a. Darwin Sy they were implicating in
Lourdes’ abduction.
Petitioners, to be sure, have not successfully controverted answering
respondents’ documentary evidence, adduced to debunk the former’s
allegations directly linking Lourdes’ abductors and tormentors to the military
or the police establishment. We note, in fact, that Lourdes, when queried on
5
cross-examination, expressed the belief that Sy/Reyes was an NBI
agent.29 The Court is, of course, aware of what was referred to in Razon30 as
the "evidentiary difficulties" presented by the nature of, and encountered by
petitioners in, enforced disappearance cases. But it is precisely for this
reason that the Court should take care too that no wrong message is sent,
lest one conclude that any kind or degree of evidence, even the outlandish,
would suffice to secure amparo remedies and protection.
Sec. 17, as complemented by Sec. 18 of the Amparo Rule, expressly
prescribes the minimum evidentiary substantiation requirement and norm to
support a cause of action under the Rule, thus:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required.—The parties
shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.
xxxx
Sec. 18. Judgment.—x x x If the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such
reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be
denied. (Emphasis added.)
Substantial evidence is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or
violation that would warrant a finding of liability against the person
charged;31 it is more than a scintilla of evidence. It means such amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might opine
otherwise.32 Per the CA’s evaluation of their evidence, consisting of the
testimonies and affidavits of the three Rubrico women and five other
individuals, petitioners have not satisfactorily hurdled the evidentiary bar
required of and assigned to them under the Amparo Rule. In a very real
sense, the burden of evidence never even shifted to answering respondents.
The Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the appellate court’s
determination of the answering respondents’ role in the alleged enforced
disappearance of petitioner Lourdes and the threats to her family’s security.
Notwithstanding the foregoing findings, the Court notes that both Gen.
Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon, per their separate affidavits, lost no time,
upon their receipt of the order to make a return on the writ, in issuing
directives to the concerned units in their respective commands for a thorough
probe of the case and in providing the investigators the necessary support.
As of this date, however, the investigations have yet to be concluded with
some definite findings and recommendation.
6
As regards P/Supt. Romero and P/Insp. Gomez, the Court is more than
satisfied that they have no direct or indirect hand in the alleged enforced
disappearance of Lourdes and the threats against her daughters. As police
officers, though, theirs was the duty to thoroughly investigate the abduction
of Lourdes, a duty that would include looking into the cause, manner, and like
details of the disappearance; identifying witnesses and obtaining statements
from them; and following evidentiary leads, such as the Toyota Revo vehicle
with plate number XRR 428, and securing and preserving evidence related to
the abduction and the threats that may aid in the prosecution of the person/s
responsible. As we said in Manalo,33 the right to security, as a guarantee of
protection by the government, is breached by the superficial and one-sided––
hence, ineffective––investigation by the military or the police of reported
cases under their jurisdiction. As found by the CA, the local police stations
concerned, including P/Supt. Roquero and P/Insp. Gomez, did conduct a
preliminary fact-finding on petitioners’ complaint. They could not, however,
make any headway, owing to what was perceived to be the refusal of
Lourdes, her family, and her witnesses to cooperate. Petitioners’ counsel,
Atty. Rex J.M.A. Fernandez, provided a plausible explanation for his clients
and their witnesses’ attitude, "[They] do not trust the government agencies to
protect them."34 The difficulty arising from a situation where the party whose
complicity in extra-judicial killing or enforced disappearance, as the case may
be, is alleged to be the same party who investigates it is understandable,
though.
The seeming reluctance on the part of the Rubricos or their witnesses to
cooperate ought not to pose a hindrance to the police in pursuing, on its own
initiative, the investigation in question to its natural end. To repeat what the
Court said in Manalo, the right to security of persons is a guarantee of the
protection of one’s right by the government. And this protection includes
conducting effective investigations of extra-legal killings, enforced
disappearances, or threats of the same kind. The nature and importance of
an investigation are captured in the Velasquez Rodriguez case,35 in which
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights pronounced:
[The duty to investigate] must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as
a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an
objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not a step
taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the
victim or his family or upon offer of proof, without an effective search for the
truth by the government. (Emphasis added.)
This brings us to Mary Joy’s charge of having been harassed by respondent
P/Insp. Gomez. With the view we take of this incident, there is nothing
concrete to support the charge, save for Mary Joy’s bare allegations of
harassment. We cite with approval the following self-explanatory excerpt
from the appealed CA decision:
6
In fact, during her cross-examination, when asked what specific act or threat
P/Sr. Gomez (ret) committed against her or her mother and sister, Mary Joy
replied "None …"36
Similarly, there appears to be no basis for petitioners’ allegations about the
OMB failing to act on their complaint against those who allegedly abducted
and illegally detained Lourdes. Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the OMB
has taken the necessary appropriate action on said complaint. As culled from
the affidavit37 of the Deputy Overall Ombudsman and the joint affidavits38 of
the designated investigators, all dated November 7, 2007, the OMB had, on
the basis of said complaint, commenced criminal39 and
administrative40 proceedings, docketed as OMB-P-C-07-0602-E and OMB-P-
A 07-567-E, respectively, against Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and
Sy/Reyes. The requisite orders for the submission of counter-affidavits and
verified position papers had been sent out.
The privilege of the writ of amparo, to reiterate, is a remedy available to
victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of
similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or
omission is a public official or employee or a private individual.
At this juncture, it bears to state that petitioners have not provided the CA
with the correct addresses of respondents Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana,
Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes. The mailed envelopes containing the petition for a
writ of amparo individually addressed to each of them have all been returned
unopened. And petitioners’ motion interposed before the appellate court for
notice or service via publication has not been accompanied by supporting
affidavits as required by the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the appealed CA
partial judgment––disposing of the underlying petition for a writ of amparo
without (1) pronouncement as to the accountability, or lack of it, of the four
non-answering respondents or (2) outright dismissal of the same petition as
to them––hews to the prescription of Sec. 20 of the Amparo Rule on
archiving and reviving cases.41 Parenthetically, petitioners have also not
furnished this Court with sufficient data as to where the afore-named
respondents may be served a copy of their petition for review.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, the petition did not allege ultimate
facts as would link the OMB in any manner to the violation or threat of
violation of the petitioners’ rights to life, liberty, or personal security.
The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and
guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears
and threats that vitiate the quality of this life.42 It is an extraordinary writ
conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of
extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances.43 Accordingly, the remedy
7
ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the
Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of
amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs
and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.
In their petition for a writ of amparo, petitioners asked, as their main prayer,
that the Court order the impleaded respondents "to immediately desist from
doing any acts that would threaten or seem to threaten the security of the
Petitioners and to desist from approaching Petitioners, x x x their residences
and offices where they are working under pain of contempt of [this] Court."
Petitioners, however, failed to adduce the threshold substantive evidence to
establish the predicate facts to support their cause of action, i.e., the
adverted harassments and threats to their life, liberty, or security, against
responding respondents, as responsible for the disappearance and
harassments complained of. This is not to say, however, that petitioners’
allegation on the fact of the abduction incident or harassment is necessarily
contrived. The reality on the ground, however, is that the military or police
connection has not been adequately proved either by identifying the
malefactors as components of the AFP or PNP; or in case identification is not
possible, by showing that they acted with the direct or indirect acquiescence
of the government. For this reason, the Court is unable to ascribe the
authorship of and responsibility for the alleged enforced disappearance of
Lourdes and the harassment and threats on her daughters to individual
respondents. To this extent, the dismissal of the case against them is correct
and must, accordingly, be sustained.
Prescinding from the above considerations, the Court distinctly notes that the
appealed decision veritably extended the privilege of the writ of amparo to
petitioners when it granted what to us are amparo reliefs. Consider: the
appellate court decreed, and rightly so, that the police and the military take
specific measures for the protection of petitioners’ right or threatened right to
liberty or security. The protection came in the form of directives specifically to
Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon, requiring each of them (1) to ensure
that the investigations already commenced by the AFP and PNP units,
respectively, under them on the complaints of Lourdes and her daughters are
being pursued with urgency to bring to justice the perpetrators of the acts
complained of; and (2) to submit to the CA, copy furnished the petitioners, a
regular report on the progress and status of the investigations. The directives
obviously go to Gen. Esperon in his capacity as head of the AFP and, in a
sense, chief guarantor of order and security in the country. On the other
hand, P/Dir. Gen. Razon is called upon to perform a duty pertaining to the
PNP, a crime-preventing, investigatory, and arresting institution.
As the CA, however, formulated its directives, no definitive time frame was
set in its decision for the completion of the investigation and the reportorial
requirements. It also failed to consider Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen.
7
Razon’s imminent compulsory retirement from the military and police
services, respectively. Accordingly, the CA directives, as hereinafter
redefined and amplified to fully enforce the amparo remedies, are hereby
given to, and shall be directly enforceable against, whoever sits as the
commanding general of the AFP and the PNP.
At this stage, two postulates and their implications need highlighting for a
proper disposition of this case.
First, a criminal complaint for kidnapping and, alternatively, for arbitrary
detention rooted in the same acts and incidents leading to the filing of the
subject amparo petition has been instituted with the OMB, docketed as OMB-
P-C-O7-0602-E. The usual initial steps to determine the existence of a prima
facie case against the five (5) impleaded individuals suspected to be actually
involved in the detention of Lourdes have been set in motion. It must be
pointed out, though, that the filing44 of the OMB complaint came before the
effectivity of the Amparo Rule on October 24, 2007.
Second, Sec. 2245 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of an amparo
petition should a criminal action have, in the meanwhile, been commenced.
The succeeding Sec. 23,46 on the other hand, provides that when the criminal
suit is filed subsequent to a petition for amparo, the petition shall be
consolidated with the criminal action where the Amparo Rule shall
nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief under the Rule. Under the
terms of said Sec. 22, the present petition ought to have been dismissed at
the outset. But as things stand, the outright dismissal of the petition by force
of that section is no longer technically feasible in light of the interplay of the
following factual mix: (1) the Court has, pursuant to Sec. 647 of the Rule,
already issued ex parte the writ of amparo; (2) the CA, after a summary
hearing, has dismissed the petition, but not on the basis of Sec. 22; and (3)
the complaint in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E named as respondents only those
believed to be the actual abductors of Lourdes, while the instant petition
impleaded, in addition, those tasked to investigate the kidnapping and
detention incidents and their superiors at the top. Yet, the acts and/or
omissions subject of the criminal complaint and the amparo petition are so
linked as to call for the consolidation of both proceedings to obviate the
mischief inherent in a multiplicity-of-suits situation.
Given the above perspective and to fully apply the beneficial nature of the
writ of amparo as an inexpensive and effective tool to protect certain rights
violated or threatened to be violated, the Court hereby adjusts to a degree
the literal application of Secs. 22 and 23 of the Amparo Rule to fittingly
address the situation obtaining under the premises. 48 Towards this end, two
things are at once indicated: (1) the consolidation of the probe and fact-
finding aspects of the instant petition with the investigation of the criminal
complaint before the OMB; and (2) the incorporation in the same criminal
8

complaint of the allegations in this petition bearing on the threats to the right
to security. Withal, the OMB should be furnished copies of the investigation
reports to aid that body in its own investigation and eventual resolution of
OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. Then, too, the OMB shall be given easy access to all
pertinent documents and evidence, if any, adduced before the CA.
Necessarily, Lourdes, as complainant in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E, should be
allowed, if so minded, to amend her basic criminal complaint if the
consolidation of cases is to be fully effective.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS this petition for review and
makes a decision:
(c) Prepare, with the assistance of petitioners and/or
witnesses, cartographic sketches of respondents Maj.
Sy/Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo
Cuaresma, and a certain Jonathan to aid in positively
identifying and locating them.
The investigations shall be completed not later than six (6) months from
receipt of this Decision; and within thirty (30) days after completion of the
investigations, the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Director-General of the
PNP shall submit a full report of the results of the investigations to the Court,
the CA, the OMB, and petitioners.

(1) Affirming the dropping of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from This case is accordingly referred back to the CA for the purpose of
the petition for a writ of amparo; monitoring the investigations and the actions of the AFP and the PNP.

(2) Affirming the dismissal of the amparo case as against Gen. Subject to the foregoing modifications, the Court AFFIRMS the partial
Hermogenes Esperon, and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, insofar as it judgment dated July 31, 2008 of the CA.
tended, under the command responsibility principle, to attach
accountability and responsibility to them, as then AFP Chief of Staff SO ORDERED
and then PNP Chief, for the alleged enforced disappearance of
Lourdes and the ensuing harassments allegedly committed against
petitioners. The dismissal of the petition with respect to the OMB is
also affirmed for failure of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to
make out a case against that body for the enforced disappearance of
Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed; and

(3) Directing the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP, or his successor, and
the incumbent Director-General of the PNP, or his successor, to
ensure that the investigations already commenced by their
respective units on the alleged abduction of Lourdes Rubrico and the
alleged harassments and threats she and her daughters were made
to endure are pursued with extraordinary diligence as required by
Sec. 1749 of the Amparo Rule. They shall order their subordinate
officials, in particular, to do the following:

(a) Determine based on records, past and present, the

identities and locations of respondents Maj. Darwin Sy,
a.k.a. Darwin Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt.
Angelo Cuaresma, and one Jonathan; and submit
certifications of this determination to the OMB with copy
furnished to petitioners, the CA, and this Court;

(b) Pursue with extraordinary diligence the evidentiary leads

relating to Maj. Darwin Sy and the Toyota Revo vehicle with
Plate No. XRR 428; and

8
9

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, G.R. No. 151258 - versus -

Petitioner,
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
- versus - MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS
JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ Present:
SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO ADRIANO,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
Respondent. BRION,
x-------------------------x PEREZ,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154954 SERENO, and
Petitioner, REYES, JJ.

- versus - Promulgated:
February 1, 2012

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, x--------------------------------------------------x
JR., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE
MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO
GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON DECISION
VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO
MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE SERENO, J.:
VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE
FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO The public outrage over the death of Leonardo Lenny Villa the victim in this
SABBAN, PERCIVAL BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO
case on 10 February 1991 led to a very strong clamor to put an end to
SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO
BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH hazing.[1] Due in large part to the brave efforts of his mother, petitioner
LLEDO, andRONAN DE GUZMAN, Gerarda Villa, groups were organized, condemning his senseless and tragic
Respondents. death. This widespread condemnation prompted Congress to enact a special
x-------------------------x
law, which became effective in 1995, that would criminalize hazing. [2] The
FIDELITO DIZON, intent of the law was to discourage members from making hazing a
Petitioner, requirement for joining their sorority, fraternity, organization, or
association.[3] Moreover, the law was meant to counteract the exculpatory
- versus - implications of consent and initial innocent act in the conduct of initiation rites
by making the mere act of hazing punishable or mala prohibita.[4]
G.R. No. 155101
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the
Respondent.
x-------------------------x country.[5] Within a year of his death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths
emerged those of Frederick Cahiyang of the University of Visayas in Cebu;
GERARDA H. VILLA,
Raul Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan ng
Petitioner,
Araullo in Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval Training

9
10
Center; Joselito Mangga of the Philippine Merchant Marine Institute; and
Joselito Hernandez of the University of the Philippines in Baguio City. [6]
Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in
this case the general condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still
bound to observe a fundamental principle in our criminal justice system [N]o
act constitutes a crime unless it is made so by law.[7] Nullum crimen, nulla
poena sine lege. Even if an act is viewed by a large section of the populace
as immoral or injurious, it cannot be considered a crime, absent any law
prohibiting its commission. As interpreters of the law, judges are called upon
to set aside emotion, to resist being swayed by strong public sentiments, and
to rule strictly based on the elements of the offense and the facts allowed in
evidence.
Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No.
151258 (Villareal v. People), G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of
Appeals), G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People), and G.R. Nos. 178057 and
178080 (Villa v. Escalona).
FACTS
The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court
Appeals (CA)[8] and the trial court,[9] are as follows:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de
Manila University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila
Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar Bogs Asuncion,
Samuel Sam Belleza, Bienvenido Bien Marquez III, Roberto Francis Bert
Navera, Geronimo Randy Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo Lenny Villa
(neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some
members of the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law
School. They all proceeded to Rufos Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards,
they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the
neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were
informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at
any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. After
their briefing, they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City
for the commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received
threats and insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted
from the van and walked towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound,
some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were
then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan initiation rites. These rites
included the Indian Run, which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of
two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes;
the Bicol Express, which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their
backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked,
jumped, or ran over their legs; the Rounds, in which the neophytes were held
at the back of their pants by the auxiliaries (the Aquilans charged with the
duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter
were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs
by two Aquilans; and the Auxies Privilege Round, in which the auxiliaries
were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During
this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles.
They survived their first day of initiation.
of
On the morning of their second day 9 February 1991 the neophytes
were made to present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were
also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles.
Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms
or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper
and proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The
neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that they endured
on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day
officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity
members[10] Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded
that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino
(Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal,
10
11

however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including 20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to paddling and to 22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one 23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes 24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)
heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their
last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be
carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was 26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at
the carport.
In Criminal Case No. C-38340
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by 1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
Lennys shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon 2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When 3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the 5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him 6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the 7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival. 9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the

following 35 Aquilans: Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91) were jointly tried.[11] On the other hand, the trial against the
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal) due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.[12]
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson) On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama) Case No. C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug) doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino) Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.[13] A few weeks after the trial court
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban) rendered its judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero) against the remaining nine accused commenced anew.[14]
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez) On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520)[15] set aside the
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos) finding of conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused according to
16. Antonio General (General)
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores) individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim) the following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)

11
12

1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants Victorino, Sabban, and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial. [19]
General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza,
Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola
(Victorino et al.) were acquitted, as their individual guilt was
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated
not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitions were individually brought before this Court.

2. Four of the accused-appellants Vincent Tecson, Junel G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug,
The instant case refers to accused Villareals Petition for Review
Jr. (Tecson et al.) were found guilty of the crime of slight
on Certiorari under Rule 45. The Petition raises two reversible errors
physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor.
allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision dated 10 January 2002 in CA-
They were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the
G.R. No. 15520 first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent
sum of ₱30,000 as indemnity.
proof beyond reasonable doubt.[20]

3. Two of the accused-appellants Fidelito While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for
Dizon and Artemio Villareal were found guilty beyond petitioner Villareal filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011.
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011. Counsel
of the Revised Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or thus asserts that the subject matter of the Petition previously filed by
aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an petitioner does not survive the death of the accused.
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17
years of reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People

indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the

Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari,
sum of ₱50,000 and to pay the additional amount of
questioning the CAs Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated
₱1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520.[21] Petitioner sets forth two main
issues first, that he was denied due process when the CA sustained the trial
courts forfeiture of his right to present evidence; and, second, that he was
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 deprived of due process when the CA did not apply to him the same ratio
dismissed the charge against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation decidendi that served as basis of acquittal of the other accused.[22]
of his right to speedy trial.[16]Meanwhile, on different dates between the years
2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which
accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.[17]On 25 October 2006, the forfeited Dizons right to present evidence during trial. The trial court expected
CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153[18] reversed the trial courts Orders Dizon to present evidence on an earlier date since a co-accused, Antonio
General, no longer presented separate evidence during trial. According to

12
13
Dizon, his right should not have been considered as waived because he was
justified in asking for a postponement. He argues that he did not ask for a
resetting of any of the hearing dates and in fact insisted that he was ready to
present
evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier
hearing date.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have
likewise been acquitted, like the other accused, since his acts were also part
of the traditional initiation rites and were not tainted by evil motives. [23] He
claims that the additional paddling session was part of the official activity of
the fraternity. He also points out that one of the neophytes admitted that the
chairperson of the initiation rites decided that [Lenny] was fit enough to
undergo the initiation so Mr. Villareal proceeded to do the
paddling.[24]Further, petitioner echoes the argument of the Solicitor General
that the individual blows inflicted by Dizon and Villareal could not have
resulted in Lennys death.[25] The Solicitor General purportedly averred that,
on the contrary, Dr. Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by Lenny could
not be considered fatal if taken individually, but if taken collectively, the result
is the violent death of the victim.[26]
Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated
by ill will. He claims that Lennys father could not have stolen the parking
space of Dizons father, since the latter did not have a car, and their fathers
did not work in the same place or office. Revenge for the loss of the parking
space was the alleged ill motive of Dizon. According to petitioner, his
utterances regarding a stolen parking space were only part of the
psychological initiation. He then cites the testimony of Lennys co-neophyte
witness Marquez who admitted knowing it was not true and that he was just
making it up.[27]
Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was
negated by his show of concern for Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon
alludes to the testimony of one of the neophytes, who mentioned that the
former had kicked the leg of the neophyte and told him to switch places with
Lenny to prevent the latters chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon,
13
together with Victorino, helped Lenny through a sleeping bag and made him
sit on a chair. According to petitioner, his alleged ill motivation is contradicted
by his manifestation of compassion and concern for the victims well-being.
G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CAs
Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in
CA-G.R. No. 15520, insofar as it acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted
4 (Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight physical
injuries.[28] According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in holding that
there could have been no conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or
fraternity initiation had not yet been criminalized at the time Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court
should have been upheld, inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to
inflict physical injuries on Lenny. Since the injuries led to the victims death,
petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are criminally liable for the
resulting crime of homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code.[29] The said article provides: Criminal liability shall be incurred [b]y any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is
inapplicable. According to the Solicitor General, the CA acted with grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in setting
aside the trial courts finding of conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal
liability of
all the accused must be based on their individual participation in the
commission of the crime.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 Villa v. Escalona
Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari,
praying for the reversal of the CAs Decision dated 25 October 2006 and
Resolution dated 17 May 2007 in CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 and
14
90153.[30] The Petition involves the dismissal of the criminal charge filed
against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
Due to several pending incidents, the trial court ordered a separate
trial for accused Escalona, Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De
Vera, S. Fernandez, and Cabangon (Criminal Case No. C-38340) to
commence after proceedings against the 26 other accused in Criminal Case
No. C-38340(91) shall have terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial court
found the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-38340 involving the nine other co-
accused recommenced on 29 November 1993. For various reasons, the
initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005, or almost 12
years after the arraignment of the nine accused.
Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of
the 9 accused, namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues
that the accused failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable
period of time. She also points out that the prosecution cannot be faulted for
the delay, as the original records and the required evidence were not at its
disposal, but were still in the appellate court.
We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five.
ISSUES
1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizons right to present evidence
constitutes denial of due process;
2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adrianofor violation of the right of the accused to
speedy trial;
3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by
14
the trial court and adjudicated the liability of each accused according to
individual participation;
4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and
5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it
pronounced Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight
physical injuries.
DISCUSSION
Resolution on Preliminary Matters
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was
pending resolution, this Court took note of counsel for petitioners Notice of
Death of Party.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal
liability for personal penalties is totally extinguished by the death of the
convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is extinguished if
the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term personal penalties refers
to the service of personal or imprisonment penalties,[31] while the term
pecuniary penalties (las pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs,[32] including
civil liability predicated on the criminal offense complained of (i.e., civil
liability ex delicto).[33] However, civil liability based on a source of obligation
other than the delict survives the death of the accused and is recoverable
through a separate civil action.[34]
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his
criminal liability for both personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil
liability directly arising from the delict complained of. Consequently, his
Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against him deemed
closed and terminated.
G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
15
In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the
reception of evidence for accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and
22nd of September; and the 5thand 12 of October 1993.[35] The Order likewise
stated that it will not entertain any postponement and that all the accused
who have not yet presented their respective evidence should be ready at all
times down the line, with their evidence on all said dates. Failure on their part
to present evidence when required shall therefore be construed as waiver to
present evidence.[36]
However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused
manifested in open court that his client Antonio General would no longer
present separate evidence. Instead, the counsel would adopt the testimonial
evidence of the other accused who had already testified.[37] Because of this
development and pursuant to the trial courts Order that the parties should be
ready at all times down the line, the trial court expected Dizon to present
evidence on the next trial date 25 August 1993 instead of his originally
assigned dates. The original dates were supposed to start two weeks later,
or on 8 September 1993.[38] Counsel for accused Dizon was not able to
present evidence on the accelerated date. To address the situation, counsel
filed a Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging that he had to appear in a
previously scheduled case, and that he would be ready to present evidence
on the dates originally assigned to his clients.[39] The trial court denied the
Manifestation on the same date and treated the Constancia as a motion for
postponement, in violation of the three-day-notice rule under the Rules of
Court.[40] Consequently, the trial court ruled that the failure of Dizon to
present evidence amounted to a waiver of that right.[41]
Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due
process of law when the trial court forfeited his right to present evidence.
According to him, the postponement of the 25 August 1993 hearing should
have been considered justified, since his original pre-assigned trial dates
were not supposed to start until 8 September 1993, when he was scheduled
to present evidence. He posits that he was ready to present evidence on the
dates assigned to him. He also points out that he did not ask for a resetting
of any of the said hearing dates; that he in fact insisted on being allowed to
present evidence on the dates fixed by the trial court. Thus, he contends that
15
the trial court erred in accelerating the schedule of presentation of evidence,
thereby invalidating the finding of his guilt.
The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no
less than the Constitution itself.[42] Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides
that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel This constitutional right includes the right to
present evidence in ones defense,[43] as well as the right to be present and
defend oneself in person at every stage of the proceedings.[44]
In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,[45] the Sandiganbayan set the
hearing of the defenses presentation of evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June
1995. The 21 June 1995 hearing was cancelled due to lack of quorum in the
regular membership of the Sandiganbayans Second Division and upon the
agreement of the parties. The hearing was reset for the next day, 22 June
1995, but Crisostomo and his counsel failed to attend. The Sandiganbayan,
on the very same day, issued an Order directing the issuance of a warrant for
the arrest of Crisostomo and the confiscation of his surety bond. The Order
further declared that he had waived his right to present evidence because of
his nonappearance at yesterdays and todays scheduled hearings. In ruling
against the Order, we held thus:
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule
115 of the Rules of Court, Crisostomos non-appearance
during the 22 June 1995 trial was merely a waiver of his
right to be present for trial on such date only and not for
the succeeding trial dates
xxxxxxxxx
Moreover, Crisostomos absence on the 22 June
1995 hearing should not have been deemed as a waiver
of his right to present evidence. While constitutional rights
may be waived, such waiver must be clear and must be
coupled with an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Crisostomo did not voluntarily waive in person or even
through his counsel the right to present evidence. The
Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the agreement of
the prosecution, Calingayan, and Calingayan's counsel.
16
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may
be death, as in the present case, the court is called upon
to see to it that the accused is personally made aware of
the consequences of a waiver of the right to present
evidence. In fact, it is not enough that the accused is
simply warned of the consequences of another failure to
attend the succeeding hearings. The court must first
explain to the accused personally in clear terms the exact
nature and consequences of a waiver. Crisostomo was not
even forewarned. The Sandiganbayan simply went ahead to
deprive Crisostomo of his right to present evidence without
even allowing Crisostomo to explain his absence on the 22
June 1995 hearing.
Clearly, the waiver of the right to present
evidence in a criminal case involving a grave penalty is
not assumed and taken lightly. The presence of the
accused and his counsel is indispensable so that the court
could personally conduct a searching inquiry into the waiver
x x x.[46] (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to
present evidence on 25 August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present
evidence. On the contrary, it should have considered the excuse of counsel
justified, especially since counsel for another accused General had made a
last-minute adoption of testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding
trial dates; and since Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks later.
At any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five hearing dates for the reception of
evidence. If it really wanted to impose its Order strictly, the most it could have
done was to forfeit one out of the five days set for Dizons testimonial
evidence. Stripping the accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates constitutes
a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.
Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid
waiver of the right to present evidence and be heard does not per se work to
vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal case or to enforce an automatic
remand of the case to the trial court.[47] In People v. Bodoso, we ruled that
where facts have adequately been represented in a criminal case, and no
procedural unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or
the defense as a result of the invalid waiver, the rule is that a guilty verdict
16
may nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is supported beyond reasonable
doubt by the evidence on record.[48]
We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on
record to resolve the case at bar. Neither can we see any procedural
unfairness or irregularity that would substantially prejudice either the
prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver. In fact, the
arguments set forth by accused Dizon in his Petition corroborate the material
facts relevant to decide the matter. Instead, what he is really contesting in his
Petition is the application of the law to the facts by the trial court and the CA.
Petitioner Dizon admits direct participation in the hazing of Lenny Villa by
alleging in his Petition that all actions of the petitioner were part of the
traditional rites, and that the alleged extension of the initiation rites was not
outside the official activity of the fraternity. [49] He even argues that Dizon did
not request for the extension and he participated only after the activity was
sanctioned.[50]
For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over
from one judge or justice to another at the trial court, at the CA, and even at
the Supreme Court. Remanding the case for the reception of the evidence of
petitioner Dizon would only inflict further injustice on the parties. This case
has been going on for almost two decades. Its resolution is long overdue.
Since the key facts necessary to decide the case have already been
determined, we shall proceed to decide it.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)
Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano should not have been dismissed, since they failed to assert their
right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She points out that
the accused failed to raise a protest during the dormancy of the criminal case
against them, and that they asserted their right only after the trial court had
dismissed the case against their co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner also
emphasizes that the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss filed
by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos, and Adriano, because it found that the
prosecution could not be faulted for the delay in the movement of this case
17
when the original records and the evidence it may require were not at its
disposal as these were in the Court of Appeals.[51]
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in
Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. [52] This right
requires that there be a trial free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive
delays.[53] The right is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended with
unjustified postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable
motive.[54] In determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts
should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of
postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. [55] The conduct of
both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed.[56] Also to be
considered are factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-
assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon the defendant.[57]
We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of
the case pursuant to the right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to
acquittal.[58] As a consequence, an appeal or a reconsideration of the
dismissal would amount to a violation of the principle of double
jeopardy.[59] As we have previously discussed, however, where the dismissal
of the case is capricious, certiorari lies.[60] The rule on double jeopardy is not
triggered when a petition challenges the validity of the order of dismissal
instead of the correctness thereof.[61] Rather, grave abuse of discretion
amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double
jeopardy from attaching.[62]
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the
case against accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of
the violation of their right to speedy trial. The court held thus:
17
An examination of the procedural history of this case
would reveal that the following factors contributed to the slow
progress of the proceedings in the case below:
xxxxxxxxx
5) The fact that the records of the case were
elevated to the Court of Appeals and the
prosecutions failure to comply with the order of
the court a quo requiring them to secure certified
true copies of the same.
xxxxxxxxx
While we are prepared to concede that some of the
foregoing factors that contributed to the delay of the trial of
the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their
right to speedy trial has been utterly violated in this case x x
x.
xxxxxxxxx
[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due
to the fact that the records of the case were elevated to the
Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions failure to comply
with the order of the court a quo requiring it to secure
certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from the
records is the fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the
court a quo already issued an Order requiring the
prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to secure
the complete records of the case from the Court of Appeals.
The prosecution did not comply with the said Order as in
fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a quo in
an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no
compliance on the part of the prosecution. It is not stated
when such order was complied with. It appears, however,
that even until August 5, 2002, the said records were still
not at the disposal of the trial court because the lack of it
was made the basis of the said court in granting the motion
to dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
It is likewise noticeable that from December 27,
1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period of almost seven
years, there was no action at all on the part of the court
18
a quo. Except for the pleadings filed by both the
prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which was on
January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner Sarucas motion to
set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the court did not
act upon, the case remained dormant for a considerable
length of time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is
precisely the kind of delay that the constitution frowns upon x
x x.[63] (Emphasis supplied)
This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information
was filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano,
Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera.[64] On 29 November 1993, they were
all arraigned.[65] Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not commence
until 28 March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.[66]
As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained
interval or inactivity of the Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the
arraignment of the accused amounts to an unreasonable delay in the
disposition of cases a clear violation of the right of the accused to a speedy
disposition of cases.[67] Thus, we held:
The delay in this case measures up to the
unreasonableness of the delay in the disposition of cases
in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found
the delay of six years by the Ombudsman in resolving
the criminal complaints to be violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition
of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman,
where the Court held that the delay of almost six years
disregarded the Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on
complaints before him; and in Cervantes vs.
Sandiganbayan, where the Court held that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in not
quashing the information which was filed six years after
the initiatory complaint was filed and thereby depriving
petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the
case. So it must be in the instant case, where the
reinvestigation by the Ombudsman has dragged on for a
decade already.[68] (Emphasis supplied)
18
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-
G.R. SP No. 89060 that accused Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial was
violated. Since there is nothing in the records that would show that the
subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon,
and De Vera, the effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice
system. It dictates that when a person is charged with an offense, and the
case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner
without the consent of the accused the accused cannot again be charged
with the same or an identical offense.[69] This principle is founded upon the
law of reason, justice and conscience.[70] It is embodied in the civil law
maxim non bis in idem found in the common law of England and undoubtedly
in every system of jurisprudence.[71] It found expression in the Spanish Law,
in the Constitution of the United States, and in our own Constitution as one of
the fundamental rights of the citizen,[72] viz:
Article III Bill of Rights
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act.
Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this
particular constitutional right, provides as follows:[73]
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.
When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and
after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction
or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall
19

be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or

for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case,
for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily tantamount to a deprivation of due process;[78] (2) where there is a finding of
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information. mistrial;[79] or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion. [80]

The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power under Rule 65
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
the judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
imposed either through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
instrumentality of the government.[81] Here, the party asking for the review
or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of
must show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment
the same Rules.[74] The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse of discretion
following: (a) there is a valid complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a
amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
competent court; (c) the defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d) the
duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power
defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him or her was
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; [82] or a
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the defendants express
blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the
consent.[75]
court of its very power to dispense justice.[83] In such an event, the accused
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, [a] cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy. [84]
verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of
such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which
for the same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed seeks the reversal of (1) the acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction
purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as
of Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, both on the
an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases
basis of a misappreciation of facts and evidence. According to the Petition,
with accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding
the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the decision of the Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law because
the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following private complainant and petitioner were denied due process of law when the
conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a public respondent completely ignored the a) Position Paper x x x b) the
greater penalty.[76] We further stressed that an acquitted defendant is entitled
Motion for Partial Reconsideration x x x and c) the petitioners Comment x x
to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his
x.[85] Allegedly, the CA ignored evidence when it adopted the theory of
acquittal.[77]
individual responsibility; set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court;
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge and failed to apply Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. [86] The Solicitor
the lower courts acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty General also assails the finding that the physical blows were inflicted only by
on the latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1) where the

19
20
Dizon and Villareal, as well as the appreciation of Lenny Villas consent to
hazing.[87]
In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess,
and reweigh the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties.[88] In People v. Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of discretion
cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the
facts and the evidence.[89] Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an
appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not
by an application for a writ of certiorari.[90] Therefore, pursuant to the rule on
double jeopardy, we are constrained to deny the Petition contra Victorino et
al. the 19 acquitted fraternity members.
We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson,
Ama, Almeda, and Bantug the four fraternity members convicted of slight
physical injuries.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double
jeopardy similarly applies when the state seeks the imposition of a higher
penalty against the accused.[91]We have also recognized, however,
that certiorari may be used to correct an abusive judgment upon a clear
demonstration that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so
grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. [92] The present
case is one of those instances of grave abuse of discretion.
In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama,
Almeda, and Bantug, the CA reasoned thus:
Based on the medical findings, it would appear
that with the exclusion of the fatal wounds inflicted by
the accused Dizon and Villareal, the injuries sustained
by the victim as a result of the physical punishment
heaped on him were serious in nature. However, by
20
reason of the death of the victim, there can be no precise
means to determine the duration of the incapacity or the
medical attendance required. To do so, at this stage would
be merely speculative. In a prosecution for this crime where
the category of the offense and the severity of the penalty
depend on the period of illness or incapacity for labor, the
length of this period must likewise be proved beyond
reasonable doubt in much the same manner as the same act
charged [People v. Codilla, CA-G.R. No. 4079-R, June 26,
1950]. And when proof of the said period is absent, the
crime committed should be deemed only as slight
physical injuries [People v. De los Santos, CA, 59 O.G.
4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398]. As such, this
Court is constrained to rule that the injuries inflicted by the
appellants, Tecson, Ama, Almeda and Bantug, Jr., are only
slight and not serious, in nature.[93] (Emphasis supplied and
citations included)
The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa[94] in
finding that the four accused should be held guilty only of slight physical
injuries. According to the CA, because of the death of the victim, there can
be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or medical
attendance required.[95] The reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A
review of that case would reveal that the accused therein was guilty merely
of slight physical injuries, because the victims injuries neither caused
incapacity for labor nor required medical attendance. [96] Furthermore, he did
not die.[97] His injuries were not even serious.[98] Since Penesa involved a
case in which the victim allegedly suffered physical injuries and not death,
the ruling cited by the CA was patently inapplicable.
On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama,
Almeda, and Bantug were liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly
contradicts its own findings of fact. According to the court, the four accused
were found to have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken
during such initiation rites on the person of Villa.[99] It then adopted the NBI
medico-legal officers findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villas
21
death was the multiple traumatic injuries he suffered from the initiation
rites.[100]Considering that the CA found that the physical punishment
heaped on [Lenny Villa was] serious in nature,[101] it was patently
erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to slight physical injuries,
which is a light felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator
shall be liable for the consequences of an act, even if its result is different
from that intended. Thus, once a person is found to have committed an initial
felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results in
the death of the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal
framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not
subject to discretion.
The CAs application of the legal framework governing physical
injuries punished under Articles 262 to 266 for intentional felonies and Article
365 for culpable felonies is therefore tantamount to a whimsical, capricious,
and abusive exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. According
to the Revised Penal Code, the mandatory and legally imposable penalty in
case the victim dies should be based on the framework governing the
destruction of the life of a person, punished under Articles 246 to 261 for
intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies, and not under the
aforementioned provisions. We emphasize that these two types of felonies
are distinct from and legally inconsistent with each other, in that the accused
cannot be held criminally liable for physical injuries when actual death
occurs.[102]
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their
acts, in and of themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the
CAs own findings. From proof that the death of the victim was the cumulative
effect of the multiple injuries he suffered,[103] the only logical conclusion is
21
that criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have been proven
to have directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The
accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest.
Accordingly, we find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda,
and Bantug criminally liable for slight physical injuries. As an allowable
exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we therefore give due course to the
Petition in G.R. No. 154954.
Resolution on Ultimate Findings
According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable
as a crime, the intentional infliction of physical injuries on Villa was
nonetheless a felonious act under Articles 263 to 266 of the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, in ruling against the accused, the court a quo found that
pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity
members were guilty of homicide, as it was the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the physical injuries they had intentionally inflicted.[104]
The CA modified the trial courts finding of criminal liability. It ruled
that there could have been no conspiracy since the neophytes, including
Lenny Villa, had knowingly consented to the conduct of hazing during their
initiation rites. The accused fraternity members, therefore, were liable only for
the consequences of their individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the accused
Victorino et al. were acquitted; 4 of them Tecson et al. were found guilty of
slight physical injuries; and the remaining 2 Dizon and Villareal were found
guilty of homicide.
The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein
the perpetrator clearly commits a felony in order to take revenge upon, to
gain advantage over, to harm maliciously, or to get even with, the victim.
Rather, the case involves an ex ante situation in which a man driven by his
own desire to join a society of men pledged to go through physically and
psychologically strenuous admission rituals, just so he could enter the
22
fraternity. Thus, in order to understand how our criminal laws apply to such
situation absent the Anti-Hazing Law, we deem it necessary to make a brief
exposition on the underlying concepts shaping intentional felonies, as well as
on the nature of physical and psychological initiations widely known as
hazing.
Intentional Felony and Conspiracy
Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of
thought.[105] The classical theory posits that a human person is essentially a
moral creature with an absolute free will to choose between good and
evil.[106] It asserts that one should only be adjudged or held accountable for
wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired. [107]The basic postulate
of the classical penal system is that humans are rational and calculating
beings who guide their actions with reference to the principles of pleasure
and pain.[108] They refrain from criminal acts if threatened with punishment
sufficient to cancel the hope of possible gain or advantage in committing the
crime.[109] Here, criminal liability is thus based on the free will and moral
blame of the actor.[110] The identity of mens rea defined as a guilty mind, a
guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent is the predominant
consideration.[111] Thus, it is not enough to do what the law prohibits.[112] In
order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be
committed by means of dolo or malice.[113]
The term dolo or malice is a complex idea involving the elements
of freedom, intelligence, and intent.[114] The first element, freedom, refers to
an act done with deliberation and with power to choose between two
things.[115] The second element, intelligence, concerns the ability
determine the morality of human acts, as well as the capacity to distinguish
between a licit and an illicit act.[116] The last element, intent, involves an aim
or a determination to do a certain act.[117]
The element of intent on which this Court shall focus is described as
the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. [118] It
refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person
proceeds.[119] It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act,
while intent concerns the result of the act.[120] While motive is the moving
power that impels one to action for a definite result, intent is the purpose of
using a particular means to produce the result.[121] On the other hand, the
term felonious means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from
an evil heart or purpose.[122] With these elements taken together, the
requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which
is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act.
Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus
malus that the act or omission be done willfully, maliciously, with deliberate
evil intent, and with malice aforethought.[123] The maxim is actus non facit
reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of is innocent.[124] As is required of the other
elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt.[125]
In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for
conspiracy to attach. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that
conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it
is to be interpreted to refer only to felonies committed by means of doloor
malice. The phrase coming to an agreement connotes the existence of a
prefaced intent to cause injury to another, an element present only in
intentional felonies. In culpable felonies or criminal negligence, the injury
inflicted on another is unintentional, the wrong done being simply the result of
to
an act performed without malice or criminal design.[126] Here, a person
performs an initial lawful deed; however, due to negligence, imprudence, lack
of foresight, or lack of skill, the deed results in a wrongful act.[127] Verily, a
deliberate intent to do an unlawful act, which is a requisite in conspiracy, is
inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by means of culpa.[128]
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus
a vital ingredient in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of
22
23
homicide.[129] Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence
of malice or dolo[130] immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction
of injuries.[131] Intent to kill or animus interficendi cannot and should not be
inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such
intent.[132] Furthermore, the victims death must not have been the product of
accident, natural cause, or suicide.[133] If death resulted from an act executed
without malice or criminal intent but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or
negligence the act must be qualified as reckless or simple negligence or
imprudence resulting in homicide.[134]
Hazing and other forms of initiation rites
The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society. [135] It
is said that, throughout history, hazing in some form or another has been
associated with organizations ranging from military groups to indigenous
tribes.[136] Some say that elements of hazing can be traced back to the
Middle Ages, during which new students who enrolled in European
universities worked as servants for upperclassmen.[137] It is believed that the
concept of hazing is rooted in ancient Greece,[138] where young men recruited
into the military were tested with pain or challenged to demonstrate the limits
of their loyalty and to prepare the recruits for battle.[139] Modern fraternities
and sororities espouse some connection to these values of ancient Greek
civilization.[140] According to a scholar, this concept lends historical legitimacy
to a tradition or ritual whereby prospective members are asked to prove their
worthiness and loyalty to the organization in which they seek to attain
membership through hazing.[141]
23
Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a
student wishing to join an organization to receive an invitation in order to be a
neophyte for a particular chapter.[142] The neophyte period is usually one to
two semesters long.[143] During the program, neophytes are required to
interview and to get to know the active members of the chapter; to learn
chapter history; to understand the principles of the organization; to maintain a
specified grade point average; to participate in the organizations activities;
and to show dignity and respect for their fellow neophytes, the organization,
and its active and alumni members.[144] Some chapters require the initiation
activities for a recruit to involve hazing acts during the entire neophyte
stage.[145]
Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual
that serves as prerequisite for admission to an organization.[146] In hazing, the
recruit, pledge, neophyte, initiate, applicant or any other term by which the
organization may refer to such a person is generally placed in embarrassing
or humiliating situations, like being forced to do menial, silly, foolish, or other
similar tasks or activities.[147] It encompasses different forms of conduct that
humiliate, degrade, abuse, or physically endanger those who desire
membership in the organization.[148] These acts usually involve physical or
psychological suffering or injury.[149]
The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact,
more than a century ago, our national hero Andres Bonifacio organized a
secret society named Kataastaasan Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga
Anak ng Bayan (The Highest and Most Venerable Association of the Sons
and Daughters of the Nation).[150] The Katipunan, or KKK, started as a small
confraternity believed to be inspired by European Freemasonry, as well as by
confraternities or sodalities approved by the Catholic
Church.[151] The Katipunans ideology was brought home to each member
through the societys initiation ritual.[152] It is said that initiates were brought
to a dark room, lit by a single point of illumination, and were asked a series
24

of pounded the spiked medals through the shirts and into the chests of the
questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve.[153] They victims.[164]

were made to go through vigorous trials such as pagsuot sa isang lungga or

In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State
[pagtalon] sa balon.[154] It would seem that they were also made to withstand
University chapter of Kappa Alpha Psi invited male students to enter into a
the blow of pangherong bakal sa pisngi and to endure a matalas na pledgeship program.[165] The fraternity members subjected the pledges to
punyal.[155] As a final step in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was made to repeated physical abuse including repeated, open-hand strikes at the nape,
sign membership papers with the his own blood. [156] the chest, and the back; caning of the bare soles of the feet and buttocks;
blows to the back with the use of a heavy book and a cookie sheet while the
It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the
pledges were on their hands and knees; various kicks and punches to the
Americans to the Philippines in the late 19th century. As can be seen in the
body; and body slamming, an activity in which active members of the
following instances, the manner of hazing in the United States was jarringly
fraternity lifted pledges up in the air and dropped them to the ground. [166] The
similar to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity on Lenny Villa.
fraternity members then put the pledges through a seven-station circle of
physical abuse.[167]
Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the
fourth classmen to do exhausting physical exercises that sometimes resulted
In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went
in permanent physical damage; to eat or drink unpalatable foods; and in
through hazing by fraternity members of the Kappa Alpha Order at the
various ways to humiliate themselves.[157] In 1901, General Douglas
Auburn University in Alabama.[168]The hazing included the following: (1)
MacArthur got involved in a congressional investigation of hazing at the
having to dig a ditch and jump into it after it had been filled with water, urine,
academy during his second year at West Point.[158]
feces, dinner leftovers, and vomit; (2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3)
being pushed and kicked, often onto walls or into pits and trash cans; (4)
In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the
eating foods like peppers, hot sauce, butter, and yerks (a mixture of hot
candidate-victim was injured during the shriners hazing event, which was
sauce, mayonnaise, butter, beans, and other items); (5) doing chores for the
part of the initiation ceremonies for Hejaz membership. [159] The ritual involved
fraternity and its members, such as cleaning the fraternity house and yard,
what was known as the mattress-rotating barrel trick.[160] It required each
being designated as driver, and running errands; (6) appearing regularly at 2
candidate to slide down an eight to nine-foot-high metal board onto
a.m. meetings, during which the pledges would be hazed for a couple of
connected mattresses leading to a barrel, over which the candidate was
hours; and (7) running the gauntlet, during which the pledges were pushed,
required to climb.[161] Members of Hejaz would stand on each side of the
kicked, and hit as they ran down a hallway and descended down a flight of
mattresses and barrel and fun-paddle candidates en route to the barrel.[162]
stairs.[169]
In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp
In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim
Lejeune, North Carolina, were seen performing a ceremony in which they
Sylvester Lloyd was accepted to pledge at the Cornell University chapter of
pinned paratrooper jump wings directly onto the neophyte paratroopers
the Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity.[170] He participated in initiation activities,
chests.[163] The victims were shown writhing and crying out in pain as others

24
25
which included various forms of physical beatings and torture, psychological
coercion and embarrassment.[171]
In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the
initiate-victim suffered injuries from hazing activities during the fraternitys
initiation rites.[172] Kenner and the other initiates went through psychological
and physical hazing, including being paddled on the buttocks for more than
200 times.[173]
In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones a university student in Florida
sought initiation into the campus chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity
during the 2005-06 academic year.[174] The pledges efforts to join the
fraternity culminated in a series of initiation rituals conducted in four nights.
Jones, together with other candidates, was blindfolded, verbally harassed,
and caned on his face and buttocks.[175] In these rituals described as
preliminaries, which lasted for two evenings, he received approximately 60
canings on his buttocks.[176] During the last two days of the hazing, the rituals
intensified.[177] The pledges sustained roughly 210 cane strikes during the
four-night initiation.[178] Jones and several other candidates passed out.[179]
The purported raison dtre behind hazing practices is the proverbial
birth by fire, through which the pledge who has successfully withstood the
hazing proves his or her worth.[180] Some organizations even believe that
hazing is the path to enlightenment. It is said that this process enables the
organization to establish unity among the pledges and, hence, reinforces and
ensures the future of the organization.[181] Alleged benefits of joining include
leadership opportunities; improved academic performance; higher self-
esteem; professional networking opportunities; and the esprit
dcorp associated with close, almost filial, friendship and common cause. [182]
25
Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.
The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to
hazing in the military.[183] The hazing of recruits and plebes in the armed
services was so prevalent that Congress prohibited all forms of
military hazing, harmful or not.[184] It was not until 1901 that Illinois passed the
first state anti-hazing law, criminalizing conduct whereby any one sustains an
injury to his [or her] person therefrom.[185]
However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to
the efforts of the Committee to Halt Useless College Killings and other similar
organizations, that states increasingly began to enact legislation prohibiting
and/or criminalizing hazing.[186] As of 2008, all but six states had enacted
criminal or civil statutes proscribing hazing.[187]Most anti-hazing laws in the
U.S. treat hazing as a misdemeanor and carry relatively light consequences
for even the most severe situations.[188] Only a few states with anti-hazing
laws consider hazing as a felony in case death or great bodily harm
occurs.[189]
Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except
hazing that results in death or great bodily harm, which is a Class 4
felony.[190] In a Class 4 felony, a sentence of imprisonment shall be for a term
of not less than one year and not more than three years. [191] Indiana criminal
law provides that a person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally
performs hazing that results in serious bodily injury to a person commits
criminal recklessness, a Class D felony.[192]
The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a
deadly weapon.[193] As an element of a Class C felony criminal recklessness
resulting in serious bodily injury, death falls under the category of serious
bodily injury.[194] A person who commits a Class C felony is imprisoned for a
fixed term of between two (2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence
being four (4) years.[195] Pursuant to Missouri law, hazing is a Class A
misdemeanor, unless the act creates a substantial risk to the life of the
student or prospective member, in which case it becomes a Class C
26
felony.[196] A Class C felony provides for an imprisonment term not to exceed
seven years.[197]
In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail
felony.[198] An individual adjudged guilty of a state jail felony is punished by
confinement in a state jail for any term of not more than two years or not less
than 180 days.[199] Under Utah law, if hazing results in serious bodily injury,
the hazer is guilty of a third-degree felony.[200] A person who has been
convicted of a third-degree felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for a
term not to exceed five years.[201] West Virginia law provides that if the act of
hazing would otherwise be deemed a felony, the hazer may be found guilty
thereof and subject to penalties provided therefor. [202] In Wisconsin, a person
is guilty of a Class G felony if hazing results in the death of another.[203]
Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to
exceed 10 years, or both.[204]
In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited
remedies, as there was no hazing statute.[205] This situation was exemplified
in Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity, wherein Barry Ballous family
resorted to a civil action for wrongful death, since there was no anti-hazing
statute in South Carolina until 1994.[206]
The existence of animus
interficendi or intent to kill not
proven beyond reasonable doubt
The presence of an ex ante situation in this case, fraternity initiation
rites does not automatically amount to the absence of malicious intent
or dolus malus. If it is proven beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators
were equipped with a guilty mind whether or not there is a contextual
background or factual premise they are still criminally liable for intentional
felony.
The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement
that with the exception of Villareal and Dizon accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda,
and Bantug did not have the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa or
the other neophytes. We shall no longer disturb this finding.
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the
trial court and found that the two accused had the animus interficendi or
intent to kill Lenny Villa, not merely to inflict physical injuries on him. It
justified its finding of homicide against Dizon by holding that he had
apparently been motivated by ill will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept
repeating that his fathers parking space had been stolen by the victims
father.[207] As to Villareal, the court said that the accused suspected the
family of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had a hand in
A the death of Villareals brother.[208] The CA then ruled as follows:
The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and
Marquez. It was very clear that they acted with evil and
criminal intent. The evidence on this matter is unrebutted
and so for the death of
Villa, appellants Dizon and Villareal must and should
face the consequence of their acts, that is, to be held
liable for the crime of homicide.[209] (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.
The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of Bienvenido
Marquez to determine the existence of animus interficendi. For a full
appreciation of the context in which the supposed utterances were made, the
Court deems it necessary to reproduce the relevant portions of witness
Marquezs testimony:
Witness We were brought up into [Michael Musngis] room
and we were briefed as to what to
expect during the next three days and
we were told the members of the
fraternity and their batch and we were
also told about the fraternity song, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
26
27
Witness We were escorted out of [Michael Musngis] house
and we were made to ride a van and we
were brought to another place in
Kalookan City which I later found to be
the place of Mariano Almeda, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to bow our head
down and to link our arms and then the
driver of the van and other members of
the Aquilans who were inside left us
inside the van, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness We heard voices shouted outside the van to the
effect, Villa akin ka, Asuncion Patay
ka and the people outside pound the
van, rock the van, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone of voice and
how strong a voice these remarks
uttered upon your arrival?
Witness Some were almost shouting, you could feel the
sense of excitement in their voices, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van was being
rocked through and through, what were
the voices or utterances that you heard?
Witness Villa akin ka, Asuncion patay ka, Recinto patay
ka sa amin, etc., sir.
Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, how long did
they continue during the rocking of the
van which lasted for 5 minutes?
xxxxxxxxx
Witness Even after they rocked the van, we still kept on
hearing voices, sir.
27
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of physical
beating] were being inflicted, was there
any utterances by anybody?
Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some were
discouraging, and some were
encouraging others who were
pounding and beating us, it was just
like a fiesta atmosphere, actually
some of them enjoyed looking us being
pounded, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those voices that you
heard?
Witness One particular utterance always said was, they
asked us whether matigas pa yan,
kayang-kaya pa niyan.
Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular uttered those
particular words that you quote?
Witness I cannot particularly point to because there were
utterances simultaneously, I could not
really pin point who uttered those words,
sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you heard during
the conduct of this Bicol Express?
Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this Honorable Court
what were the utterances that you
remember?
Witness For example, one person particularly Boyet
Dizon stepped on my thigh, he would
say that and I quote ito, yung pamilya
nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko, so
that would in turn sort of justifying him in
inflicting more serious pain on me. So
28
instead of just walking, he would jump
on my thighs and then after on was
Lenny Villa. He was saying to the
effect that this guy, his father stole
the parking space of my father, sir.
So, thats why he inflicted more pain on
Villa and that went on, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which particular
accused?
Witness Boyet Dizon, sir.
Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that particular time was
accusing you of having your family have
his brother killed, what was your
response?
Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not true and that
he was just making it up sir. So he
said that I knew nothing of that incident.
However, he just in fact after the Bicol
Express, he kept on uttering those
words/statements so that it would in turn
justify him and to give me harder blows,
sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular
mentioning that Lenny Villas father
stole the parking space allotted for
his father, do you recall who were
within hearing distance when that
utterance was made?
Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that utterance,
sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness There were different times made this accusation so
there were different people who heard
from time to time, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
28
Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court when was the
next accusation against Lenny Villas
father was made?
Witness When we were line up against the wall, Boyet
Dizon came near to us and when
Lenny Villas turn, I heard him uttered
those statements, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this accusation to
Lenny Villas father?
Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa.
Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?
Witness There were slaps and he knelt on Lenny Villas
thighs and sometime he stand up and
he kicked his thighs and sometimes
jumped at it, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day but not right
now. You mentioned also
that accusations made by Dizon you
or your family had his brother killed,
can you inform this Honorable Court
what exactly were the accusations
that were charged against you while
inflicting blows upon you in
particular?
Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told me in
particular if I knew that his family who
had his brother killed, and he said that
his brother was an NPA, sir so I knew
that it was just a story that he made
up and I said that I knew nothing
about it and he continued inflicting
blows on me, sir. And another incident
was when a talk was being given, Dizon
was on another part of the pelota court
and I was sort of looking and we saw
that he was drinking beer, and he said
29
and I quote: Marquez, Marquez, ano
ang tinitingin-tingin mo diyan, ikaw
yung pamilya mo ang nagpapatay sa
aking kapatid, yari ka sa akin, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What else?
Witness Thats all, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February 8, 1991, did
ever a doctor or a physician came
around as promised to you earlier?
Witness No, sir.[210] (Emphasis supplied)
On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus:
Judge Purisima When you testified on direct examination Mr.
Marquez, have you stated that there
was a briefing that was conducted
immediately before your initiation as
regards to what to expect during the
initiation, did I hear you right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima Who did the briefing?
Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson Victorino.
Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court what
they told you to expect during the
initiation?
Witness They told us at the time we would be brought to a
particular place, we would be mocked
at, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you expected to be mocked at,
ridiculed, humiliated etc., and the
likes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand that there
would be physical contact?
29
Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we could
immediately go back to school. All the
bruises would be limited to our arms and
legs, sir. So, if we wear the regular
school uniforms like long sleeves, it
would be covered actually so we have
no thinking that our face would be
slapped, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that beforehand that
you would have bruises on your body
but that will be covered?
Witness Yes, sir.
JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical contact or
implements that you expect that would
create bruises to your body?
Witness At that point I am already sure that there would be
hitting by a paddling or paddle, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that much
of the initiation procedures is
psychological in nature?
Witness Combination, sir.[211] (Emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not
consist only of physical initiation,
meaning body contact, is that correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-called
psychological initiation, correct?
30
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you believe
of things calculated to terrify you,
scare you, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating masters made
belief situation intended to, I repeat,
terrify you, frighten you, scare you
into perhaps quitting the initiation, is
this correct?
Witness Sometimes sir, yes.
Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon was
initiating you, he said or he was
supposed to have said according to you
that your family were responsible for the
killing of his brother who was an NPA,
do you remember saying that?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with that
statement said to you by Dizon that you
did not believe him because that is
not true, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only psychologizing
you perhaps, the purpose as I have
mentioned before, terrifying you,
scaring you or frightening you into
quitting the initiation, this is correct?
Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main reason, I
think, why he was saying those
things was because he wanted to
inflict injury.
Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is your only
perception, correct?
30
Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he was telling
this to Villareal, he was hitting me.
Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that you [were]
subjected to the same forms of initiation
by all the initiating masters? You said
that earlier, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the others who
jumped on you or kicked you said
something similar as was told to you by
Mr. Dizon?
Witness No, sir.
Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the Bicol Express
for instance, the masters would run on
your thighs, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure that was
followed by the initiating masters not
only on you but also on the other
neophytes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say that
whatever forms of initiation was
administered by one master, was
also administered by one master on a
neophyte, was also administered by
another master on the other
neophyte, this is correct?
Witness Yes, sir.[212] (Emphasis supplied)
According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed
by the CA to Dizon and Villareal were baseless,[213] since the statements of
the accused were just part of the psychological initiation calculated to instill
fear on the part of the neophytes; that [t]here is no element of truth in it as
31
testified by Bienvenido Marquez; and that the harsh words uttered by
Petitioner and Villareal are part of tradition concurred and accepted by all the
fraternity members during their initiation rites.[214]
We agree with the Solicitor General.
The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring
mistake of substantial proportion on the part of the CA it mistook the
utterances of Dizon for those of Villareal. Such inaccuracy cannot be
tolerated, especially because it was the CAs primary basis for finding that
Villarreal had the intent to kill Lenny Villa, thereby making Villareal guilty of
the intentional felony of homicide. To repeat, according to Bienvenido
Marquezs testimony, as reproduced above, it was Dizon who uttered both
accusations against Villa and Marquez; Villareal had no participation
whatsoever in the specific threats referred to by the CA. It was Boyet
Dizon [who] stepped on [Marquezs] thigh; and who told witness
Marquez, [I]to, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko. It was also
Dizon who jumped on Villas thighs while saying, [T]his guy, his father stole
the parking space of my father. With the testimony clarified, we find that the
CA had no basis for concluding the existence of intent to kill based solely
thereon.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we
refer to the entire factual milieu and contextual premise of the incident to fully
appreciate and understand the testimony of witness Marquez. At the outset,
the neophytes were briefed that they would be subjected to psychological
pressure in order to scare them. They knew that they would be mocked,
ridiculed, and intimidated. They heard fraternity members shout, Patay
ka, Recinto, Yari ka, Recinto, Villa, akin ka, Asuncion, gulpi ka, Putang ina
mo, Asuncion, Putang ina nyo, patay kayo sa amin, or some other words to
that effect.[215] While beating the neophytes, Dizon accused Marquez of the
death of the formers purported NPA brother, and then blamed Lenny Villas
father for stealing the parking space of Dizons father. According to the
Solicitor General, these statements, including those of the accused Dizon,
were all part of the psychological initiation employed by the Aquila
Fraternity.[216]
31
Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizons way of inflicting
psychological pressure was through hurling make-believe accusations at the
initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories, so that he could justify giving the
neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity initiation and role
playing. Even one of the neophytes admitted that the accusations were
untrue and made-up.
The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct
of hazing. In fact, during the Senate deliberations on the then proposed Anti-
Hazing Law, former Senator Lina spoke as follows:
Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we conveyed
during the period of interpellations on why we included the
phrase or psychological pain and suffering.
xxxxxxxxx
So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the
neophyte or the recruit but the recruit or neophyte is made
to undergo certain acts which I already described
yesterday, like playing the Russian roulette extensively to
test the readiness and the willingness of the neophyte
or recruit to continue his desire to be a member of the
fraternity, sorority or similar organizationor playing and
putting a noose on the neck of the neophyte or recruit,
making the recruit or neophyte stand on the ledge of the
fourth floor of the building facing outside, asking him to jump
outside after making him turn around several times but the
reality is that he will be made to jump towards the inside
portion of the building these are the mental or
psychological tests that are resorted to by these
organizations, sororities or fraternities. The doctors who
appeared during the public hearing testified that such acts
can result in some mental aberration, that they can even
lead to psychosis, neurosis or insanity. This is what we want
to prevent.[217] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizons behavior must
not be automatically viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill
Lenny Villa. Rather, it must be taken within the context of the fraternitys
32
psychological initiation. This Court points out that it was not even established
whether the fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity with each
other as would lend credence to the veracity of Dizons threats. The testimony
of Lennys co-neophyte, Marquez, only confirmed this view. According to
Marquez, he knew it was not true and that [Dizon] was just making it
up.[218] Even the trial court did not give weight to the utterances of Dizon as
constituting intent to kill: [T]he cumulative acts of all the accused were not
directed toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict physical harm as part of the
fraternity initiation rites x x x.[219] The Solicitor General shares the same view.
Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty
of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the
existence of intent to kill. Animus interficendi cannot and should not be
inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such
intent.[220] Instead, we adopt and reinstate the finding of the trial court in
part, insofar as it ruled that none of the fraternity members had the
specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.[221]
The existence of animus
iniuriandi or malicious intent to
injure not proven beyond
reasonable doubt
The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to
inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa. Echoing the Decision of the trial court,
the Solicitor General then posits that since all of the accused fraternity
members conspired to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa and death
ensued, all of them should be liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles
262 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code,[222] the employment of physical
injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the
existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the
mental state of the wrongdoer iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is
no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony.
32
Thus, in case of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must
be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the
physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive
the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt
of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical
injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an
intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man
guilty unless his intentions are.[223]
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances [224] that the mere
infliction of physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person
automatically liable for an intentional felony. In Bagajo v. People,[225] the
accused teacher, using a bamboo stick, whipped one of her students behind
her legs and thighs as a form of discipline. The student suffered lesions and
bruises from the corporal punishment. In reversing the trial courts finding of
criminal liability for slight physical injuries, this Court stated thus:
Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility [w]e are persuaded
that she did not do what she had done with criminal intent the means she
actually used was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred
or any malevolent intent. Considering the applicable laws, we then ruled that
as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of
whipping her pupil. In People v. Carmen,[226] the accused members of the
religious group known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima under the
guise of a ritual or treatment plunged the head of the victim into a barrel of
water, banged his head against a bench, pounded his chest with fists, and
stabbed him on the side with a kitchen knife, in order to cure him of nervous
breakdown by expelling through those means the bad spirits possessing him.
The collective acts of the group caused the death of the victim. Since
malicious intent was not proven, we reversed the trial courts finding of liability
for murder under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and instead ruled that
the accused should be held criminally liable for reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide under Article 365 thereof.
Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accuseds initial acts of
inflicting physical pain on the neophytes were attended by animus
iniuriandi amounting to a felonious act punishable under the Revised Penal
33
Code, thereby making it subject to Article 4(1) thereof. In People v. Regato,
we ruled that malicious intent must be judged by the action, conduct, and
external acts of the accused.[227] What persons do is the best index of their
intention.[228] We have also ruled that the method employed, the kind of
weapon used, and the parts of the body on which the injury was inflicted may
be determinative of the intent of the perpetrator.[229] The Court shall thus
examine the whole contextual background surrounding the death of Lenny
Villa.
Lenny died during Aquilas fraternity initiation rites. The night before
the commencement of the rites, they were briefed on what to expect. They
were told that there would be physical beatings, that the whole event would
last for three days, and that they could quit anytime. On their first night, they
were subjected to traditional initiation rites, including the Indian Run, Bicol
Express, Rounds, and the Auxies Privilege Round. The beatings were
predominantly directed at the neophytes arms and legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to
present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to
memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles. Late in the afternoon,
they were once again subjected to traditional initiation rituals. When the
rituals were officially reopened on the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the
neophytes were subjected to another traditional ritual paddling by the
fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the
neophytes. The auxiliaries protected the neophytes by functioning as human
barriers and shielding them from those who were designated to inflict
physical and psychological pain on the initiates.[230] It was their regular duty
to stop foul or excessive physical blows; to help the neophytes to pump their
legs in order that their blood would circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after
every physical activity or round; to serve food and water; to tell jokes; to
coach the initiates; and to give them whatever they needed.
These rituals were performed with Lennys consent.[231] A few days
before the rites, he asked both his parents for permission to join the Aquila
33
Fraternity.[232] His father knew that Lenny would go through an initiation
process and would be gone for three days.[233] The CA found as follows:
It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and
voluntarily consented to undergo physical initiation and
hazing. As can be gleaned from the narration of facts, they
voluntarily agreed to join the initiation rites to become
members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to the initiation,
they were given briefings on what to expect. It is of
common knowledge that before admission in a fraternity, the
neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they
were made aware that traditional methods such as
mocking, psychological tests and physical punishment
would take place. They knew that the initiation would
involve beatings and other forms of hazing. They were
also told of their right and opportunity to quit at any time
they wanted to. In fact, prosecution witness Navera testified
that accused Tecson told him that after a week, you can
already play basketball. Prosecution witness Marquez for
his part, admitted that he knew that the initiates would
be hit in the arms and legs, that a wooden paddle would
be used to hit them and that he expected bruises on his
arms and legs. Indeed, there can be no fraternity
initiation without consenting neophytes.[234] (Emphasis
supplied)
Even after going through Aquilas grueling traditional rituals during
the first day, Lenny continued his participation and finished the second day of
initiation.
Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof
showing clear malicious intent, we are constrained to rule that the
specific animus iniuriandi was not present in this case. Even if the specific
acts of punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes of inflicting physical
pain were done voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the
elements of freedom and intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the
fundamental ingredient of criminal intent was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt. On the contrary, all that was proven was that the acts were done
pursuant to tradition. Although the additional rounds on the second night
34
were held upon the insistence of Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were
officially reopened with the consent of the head of the initiation rites; and the
accused fraternity members still participated in the rituals, including the
paddling, which were performed pursuant to tradition. Other than the paddle,
no other weapon was used to inflict injuries on Lenny. The targeted body
parts were predominantly the legs and the arms. The designation of roles,
including the role of auxiliaries, which were assigned for the specific purpose
of lending assistance to and taking care of the neophytes during the initiation
rites, further belied the presence of malicious intent. All those who wished to
join the fraternity went through the same process of traditional initiation; there
is no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or given a different
treatment. We stress that Congress itself recognized that hazing is uniquely
different from common crimes.[235] The totality of the circumstances must
therefore be taken into consideration.
The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical
injuries was rooted may also be determined by Lennys continued
participation in the initiation and consent to the method used even after the
first day. The following discussion of the framers of the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law
is enlightening:
SENATOR GUINGONA. Most of these acts, if not
all, are already punished under the Revised Penal Code.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If hazing is done at present
and it results in death, the charge would be murder or
homicide.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death,
it may be frustrated homicide or serious physical injuries.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
34
SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who
commits sexual abuse does so it can be penalized under
rape or acts of lasciviousness.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for
making a new offense under this definition of the crime of
hazing?
SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of
persons either composing a sorority, fraternity or any
association from making this requirement of initiation that
has already resulted in these specific acts or results, Mr.
President.
That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong
signal across the land that no group or association can
require the act of physical initiation before a person can
become a member without being held criminally liable.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the
rationale for that imposition? Because the distinguished
Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a mere
organization, he is not seeking the punishment of an
initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the
punishment of certain acts that resulted in death, et cetera
as a result of hazing which are already covered crimes.
The penalty is increased in one, because we would
like to discourage hazing, abusive hazing, but it may be a
legitimate defense for invoking two or more charges or
offenses, because these very same acts are already
punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a
very telling difference: When a person or group of persons
resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining entry into
an organization, the intent to commit a wrong is not
visible or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these
35
specific crimes, Mr. President, let us say there is death or
there is homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then the
intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if the
crime of hazing is the basis, what is important is the
result from the act of hazing.
To me, that is the basic difference and that is what
will prevent or deter the sororities or fraternities; that they
should really shun this activity called hazing. Because,
initially, these fraternities or sororities do not even
consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that
acts of lasciviousness are even committed initially, Mr.
President.
So, what we want to discourage is the so-
called initial innocent act. That is why there is need to
institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang
fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-recruit. Wala talaga
silang intensiyong makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at
buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito na namatay
nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin talaga
iyong neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka
lamang natin isasakdal ng murder kung namatay na, ay after
the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa mga
kabataan na: Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay
kasalanan at kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa
inyo.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr.
President, of the distinguished Sponsor. But I am again
disturbed by his statement that the prosecution does not
have to prove the intent that resulted in the death, that
resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted in
the acts of lasciviousness or deranged mind. We do not
have to prove the willful intent of the accused in proving or
establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a
novel situation where we create the special crime
without having to go into the intent, which is one of the
basic elements of any crime.
If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the
intent were merely to initiate, then there is no offense.
And even the distinguished Sponsor admits that the
organization, the intent to initiate, the intent to have a
35
new society or a new club is, per se, not punishable at
all. What are punishable are the acts that lead to the
result. But if these results are not going to be proven by
intent, but just because there was hazing, I am afraid
that it will disturb the basic concepts of the Revised
Penal Code, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing,
precisely, is being criminalized because in the context
of what is happening in the sororities and fraternities,
when they conduct hazing, no one will admit that their
intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already
criminalizing the fact of inflicting physical pain. Mr. President,
it is a criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred,
discouraged.
If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to
prove that the masters intended to kill or the masters
intended to maim. What is important is the result of the act of
hazing. Otherwise, the masters or those who inflict the
physical pain can easily escape responsibility and say,
We did not have the intention to kill. This is part of our
initiation rites. This is normal. We do not have any
intention to kill or maim.
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as
well have been charged therefore with the ordinary
crime of homicide, mutilation, et cetera, where the
prosecution will have a difficulty proving the elements if
they are separate offenses.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming
there was a group that initiated and a person died. The
charge is murder. My question is: Under this bill if it becomes
a law, would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy or not
anymore?
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is
present during hazing x x x
SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present.
First, would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy?
Second, would the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or
not?
36
SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second
question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there is no need to
prove intent to kill.
SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.
SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not
be murder. It should be hazing, Mr. President. [236] (Emphasis
supplied)
During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on
the issue of whether to include sodomy as a punishable act under the Anti-
Hazing Law, Senator Lina further clarified thus:
SENATOR BIAZON. Mr. President, this
Representation has no objection to the inclusion of sodomy
as one of the conditions resulting from hazing as necessary
to be punished. However, the act of sodomy can be
committed by two persons with or without consent.
To make it clearer, what is being punished here is
the commission of sodomy forced into another individual by
another individual. I move, Mr. President, that sodomy be
modified by the phrase without consent for purposes of this
section.
SENATOR LINA. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if
we qualify sodomy with the concept that it is only going to
aggravate the crime of hazing if it is done without consent
will change a lot of concepts here. Because the results
from hazing aggravate the offense with or without
consent. In fact, when a person joins a fraternity,
sorority, or any association for that matter, it can be
with or without the consent of the intended victim. The
fact that a person joins a sorority or fraternity with his
consent does not negate the crime of hazing.
This is a proposed law intended to protect the
citizens from the malpractices that attend initiation which
may have been announced with or without physical infliction
of pain or injury, Mr. President. Regardless of whether
there is announcement that there will be physical hazing
36
or whether there is none, and therefore, the neophyte is
duped into joining a fraternity is of no moment. What is
important is that there is an infliction of physical pain.
The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even
has to be protected from himself if he joins a fraternity, so
that at a certain point in time, the State, the individual, or
the parents of the victim can run after the perpetrators
of the crime, regardless of whether or not there was
consent on the part of the victim.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, I understand the
position taken by the distinguished Gentleman from Cavite
and Metro Manila. It is correct that society sometimes adopts
new mores, traditions, and practices.
In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the
private proclivities of some individuals when they do their
acts in private as we do not take a peek into the private
rooms of couples. They can do their thing if they want to
make love in ways that are not considered acceptable by the
mainstream of society. That is not something that the State
should prohibit.
But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing,
Mr. President. Such that the act may even be entered into
with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of pain
may be done with the consent of the neophyte. If the law
is passed, that does not make the act of hazing not
punishable because the neophyte accepted the infliction
of pain upon himself.
If the victim suffers from serious physical
injuries, but the initiator said, Well, he allowed it upon
himself. He consented to it. So, if we allow that
reasoning that sodomy was done with the consent of
the victim, then we would not have passed any law at all.
There will be no significance if we pass this bill,
because it will always be a defense that the victim
allowed the infliction of pain or suffering. He accepted it
as part of the initiation rites.
37
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that
we would want to prohibit. That the defense of consent
will not apply because the very act of inflicting physical
pain or psychological suffering is, by itself, a punishable
act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical
injuries merely aggravates the act with higher penalties.
But the defense of consent is not going to nullify the
criminal nature of the act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can
only aggravate the offense if it is committed without
consent of the victim, then the whole foundation of this
proposed law will collapse.
SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the
committee amendment? (Silence.) The Chair hears none;
the same is approved.[237]
(Emphasis supplied)
Realizing the implication of removing the states burden to prove
intent, Senator Lina, the principal author of the Senate Bill, said:
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority
Leader brought out the idea of intent or whether there it
is mala in se or mala prohibita. There can be a radical
amendment if that is the point that he wants to go to.
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can
just make this a special law on hazing. We will not
include this anymore under the Revised Penal Code.
That is a possibility. I will not foreclose that suggestion,
Mr. President.[238](Emphasis supplied)
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law
and the core principle of mala in se adhered to under the Revised Penal
Code, Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it
created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala
prohibita. This dilemma faced by Congress is further proof of how the nature
37
of hazing unique as against typical crimes cast a cloud of doubt on whether
society considered the act as an inherently wrong conduct or mala in se at
the time. It is safe to presume that Lennys parents would not have
consented[239] to his participation in Aquila Fraternitys initiation rites if the
practice of hazing were considered by them as mala in se.
Furthermore, in Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through
Associate Justice (now retired Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that in our
nations very recent history, the people have spoken, through Congress, to
deem conduct constitutive of hazing, [an] act[] previously considered
harmless by custom, as criminal.[240] Although it may be regarded as a
simple obiter dictum, the statement nonetheless shows recognition that
hazing or the conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or psychological
suffering has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing
Law, there was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly
considered an intentional felony. And when there is doubt on the
interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused. In
dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is
constrained to rule against the trial courts finding of malicious intent to inflict
physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or animus
iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual
background of his death, the unique nature of hazing, and absent a law
prohibiting hazing.
The accused fraternity members
guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean,
however, that the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of
criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are
38
committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is
fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done
without malice, from which an immediate personal harm, injury or material
damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence
on the part of the person committing it.[241] In this case, the danger is visible
and consciously appreciated by the actor.[242] In contrast, simple imprudence
or negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from which an injury
or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or
skill.[243] Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not
openly visible. [244]
The test[245] for determining whether or not a person is negligent in
doing an act is as follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person
to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a
reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law
imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous
results of the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.[246]
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged
with recklessness, the degree of precaution and diligence required varies
with the degree of the danger involved.[247] If, on account of a certain line of
conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the
individual who chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to
be very careful, in order to prevent or avoid damage or injury. [248] In contrast,
if the danger is minor, not much care is required. [249] It is thus possible that
there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required
of an individual, from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant
effort.[250] The duty of the person to employ more or less degree of care will
depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.[251]
There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.
38
According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac
failure secondary to multiple traumatic injuries.[252] The officer explained that
cardiac failure refers to the failure of the heart to work as a pump and as part
of the circulatory system due to the lack of blood.[253] In the present case, the
victims heart could no longer work as a pumping organ, because it was
deprived of its requisite blood and oxygen.[254] The deprivation was due to the
channeling of the blood supply from the entire circulatory system including
the heart, arteries, veins, venules, and capillaries to the thigh, leg, and arm
areas of Lenny, thus causing the formation of multiple hematomas or blood
clots.[255] The multiple hematomas were wide, thick, and deep,[256] indicating
that these could have resulted mainly from injuries sustained by the victim
from fist blows, knee blows, paddles, or the like. [257] Repeated blows to those
areas caused the blood to gradually ooze out of the capillaries until the
circulating blood became so markedly diminished as to produce
death. [258] The officer also found that the brain, liver, kidney, pancreas,
intestines, and all other organs seen in the abdominals, as well as the
thoracic organ in the lungs, were pale due to the lack of blood, which was
redirected to the thighs and forearms.[259] It was concluded that there was
nothing in the heart that would indicate that the victim suffered from a
previous cardiac arrest or disease.[260]
The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villas arms and
thighs, resulting from repeated blows to those areas, caused the loss of
blood from his vital organs and led to his eventual death. These hematomas
must be taken in the light of the hazing activities performed on him by the
Aquila Fraternity. According to the testimonies of the co-neophytes of Lenny,
they were punched, kicked, elbowed, kneed, stamped on; and hit with
different objects on their arms, legs, and thighs.[261] They were also paddled
at the back of their thighs or legs;[262] and slapped on their faces.[263] They
were made to play rough basketball.[264] Witness Marquez testified on Lenny,
saying: [T]inamaan daw sya sa spine.[265] The NBI medico-legal officer
explained that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the
multiple injuries suffered by the latter.[266] The relevant portion of the
testimony is as follows:
39
Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was your testimony
on various cross examinations of
defense counsels that the injuries that
you have enumerated on the body of the
deceased Lenny Villa previously marked
as Exhibit G-1 to G-14 individually by
themselves would not cause the death
of the victim. The question I am going to
propound to you is what is the
cumulative effect of all of these injuries
marked from Exhibit G-1 to G-14?
Witness All together nothing in concert to cause to the
demise of the victim. So, it is not fair for
us to isolate such injuries here because
we are talking of the whole body. At the
same manner that as a car would not
run minus one (1) wheel. No, the more
humane in human approach is to
interpret all those injuries in whole and
not in part.[267]
There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity
members were drinking during the initiation rites.[268]
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were
tantamount to recklessness, which made the resulting death of Lenny a
culpable felony. It must be remembered that organizations owe to their
initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process. [269] With the
foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal officer found that the
victims death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal
responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in and
contributed to the infliction of physical injuries.
It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have
been prevented, or at least mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity
accused Dizon and Villareal restrained themselves from insisting on
reopening the initiation rites. Although this point did not matter in the end,
39
as records would show that the other fraternity members participated in the
reopened initiation rites having in mind the concept of seniority in fraternities
the implication of the presence of alumni should be seen as a point of review
in future legislation. We further note that some of the fraternity members
were intoxicated during Lennys initiation rites. In this light, the Court submits
to Congress, for legislative consideration, the amendment of the Anti-Hazing
Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or
alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that
would increase the applicable penalties.
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly or unwittingly impose
the misery of hazing and employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood.
There must be a better way to establish kinship. A neophyte admitted that he
joined the fraternity to have more friends and to avail himself of the benefits it
offered, such as tips during bar examinations.[270] Another initiate did not give
up, because he feared being looked down upon as a quitter, and because he
felt he did not have a choice.[271] Thus, for Lenny Villa and the other
neophytes, joining the Aquila Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By giving
consent under the circumstances, they left their fates in the hands of the
fraternity members. Unfortunately, the hands to which lives were entrusted
were barbaric as they were reckless.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide shall cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda,
Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then, these five
accused fraternity members would have all been convicted of the crime of
hazing punishable by reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment).[272] Since there
was no law prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny died, we are
constrained to rule according to existing laws at the time of his death. The
CA found that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt,
Victorino et al.s individual participation in the infliction of physical injuries
upon Lenny Villa.[273] As to accused Villareal, his criminal liability was totally
40

extinguished by the fact of his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice
to the applicability of the Anti-Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore,
the modification of criminal liability from slight physical injuries to reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only with respect to accused
Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
The accused liable to pay
damages
The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the
amounts of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto and ₱1,000,000 as moral
damages, to be jointly and severally paid by accused Dizon and Villareal. It
also awarded the amount of ₱30,000 as indemnity to be jointly and severally
paid by accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of
death of the victim.[274] In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,[275] we
sustain the CAs award of indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.
The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory
damages, including expenses incurred in connection with the death of the
victim, so long as the claim is supported by tangible documents. [276] Though
we are prepared to award actual damages, the Court is prevented from
granting them, since the records are bereft of any evidence to show that
actual expenses were incurred or proven during trial. Furthermore, in the
appeal, the Solicitor General does not interpose any claim for actual
damages.[277]
The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief
suffered on account of the victims death.[278] This penalty is pursuant to
Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code, which provides that the spouse, legitimate
and illegitimate descendants and the ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased.[279] Thus, we hereby we affirm the CAs award of moral damages
in the amount of ₱1,000,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding
petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET
ASIDE IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 finding
Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and
Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries is
also MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio
Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent
Tecson are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and
severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the
amount of ₱50,000, and moral damages in the amount of ₱1,000,000, plus
legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the
finality of this Decision until satisfaction.[280]Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et
al., is hereby AFFIRMED. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 &
178080, dismissing the criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca,
and Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the
Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed,
and the criminal case against Artemio Villareal
deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives for possible consideration of

40
41

the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and
the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as
aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.

SO ORDERED.

41
42
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ACELO
VERRA, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
A day in court is the touchstone of the right to due process in criminal
justice. It is an aspect of the duty of the government to follow a fair process of
decision-making when it acts to deprive a person of his liberty. [1] But just as
an accused is accorded this constitutional protection, so is the State entitled
to due process in criminal prosecutions.[2] It must similarly be given the
chance to present its evidence in support of a charge.
In the case at bar, petitioner, People of the Philippines, claims that it
was denied its day in court and its due process right was breached. Filing
this Petition under Rule 45, it seeks to set aside, on pure questions of law,
the April 6, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals.
On November 14, 1988, respondent Acelo Verra was charged with the
crime of murder for killing a certain Elias Cortezo. A warrant of arrest was
issued by the Regional Trial Court against him on November 21, 1988. He
remained at-large until May 24, 1996 when he voluntarily submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the court accompanied by his counsel. Immediately,
arraignment proceeded during which he entered a plea of Not Guilty.
On the same day, the prosecution called to the witness stand the wife of
the victim, private complainant Damiana Cortezo. She testified that: (1) she
has executed an affidavit of desistance;[3] (2) she is no longer interested in
prosecuting the case; and (3) other witnesses of the shooting incident have
turned hostile and have similarly lost concern in pursuing the same.
Thereafter, the prosecution, joined by the counsel for the accused, moved for
the dismissal of the case. In light of these developments, the trial judge
issued an Order dated May 24, 1996 granting the motion, thus.:
WHEREFORE, after considering the testimony of the private complainant
and the motion of the prosecution joined by counsel for the accused, this
Court is hopeless (sic) in proceeding with this case. Therefore let this case
be considered DISMISSED and the Warrant of Arrest for the accused is
hereby cancelled.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Subsequently, two other witnesses of the shooting incident appeared
after learning of the dismissal of the case and manifested their willingness to
testify. Further, two sisters of the victim assailed the allegation of lack of
interest. Consequently, the prosecution filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order
42
of Dismissal on July 22, 1996 asserting that Damiana and the accused
misled the trial court and deprived the plaintiff, People of the Philippines, its
day in court. For which reason, it argued, the Order dismissing the case
should be voided.
On August 21, 1996, the trial court set aside the Order of Dismissal
dated May 24, 1996. Respondent moved for its reconsideration but his
motion was denied on September 26, 1996. He then instituted before the
Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari challenging the August 21 Order.
The appellate court rendered a Decision on April 6, 1998 granting the
petition. It ruled that the dismissal of the case against petitioner has attained
finality, and that its revival requires the filing of a new case or
information, viz:
Thus in the case at bar, when the trial court issued its order of dismissal, as
far as the court is concerned, the case was ended. To revive the case
against the same accused or to prosecute him anew for the same act
imputed to him, the government has to file a new case or information for the
reason that the dismissed case had already been terminated, definitely and
finally.
xxxxxxxxx
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the orders dated August
21, 1996 and September 26, 1996 are hereby SET ASIDE, and the Order
dated May 24, 1996 reinstated.[5]
Hence, the present course of action. In this Petition for Review,
petitioner impugns the Decision of the appellate court in that:
The Court of Appeals decided a question of substance in a way that is not in
accord with law and jurisprudence when it ruled that: (i) the state was not
denied its day in court and was not misled by private complainant in the
dismissal of the case; and (ii) the order of the trial court dismissing the case
has attained finality.[6]
The petition is devoid of merit.
I
Petitioner cannot complain that it was denied its day in court. It was, in
the first place, represented by a public prosecutor who was personally
present in every stage of the proceeding -- from the arraignment to the
promulgation of the dismissal order -- to protect its interests. It was given the
chance to submit its evidence as it in fact called to the stand its own witness,
Damiana (who incidentally was the only witness presented here), during the
43
day of the hearing. Then, the prosecutor was able to conduct her direct
examination. More importantly, petitioner was the one who jointly moved with
accuseds counsel for the dismissal of this case due to lack of evidence. The
Order of Dismissal was given in open court by the presiding judge without
any remonstrance from the prosecution.
II
We are similarly not persuaded by petitioners contention that by reason
of the deceit employed by Damiana, the prosecution and the trial court were
misled.
Well settled is the rule that for fraud to cause the annulment of a
judgment, it must be established by clear and convincing evidence. The
petitioner must sufficiently prove the specific acts constituting the deceit on
the part of Damiana. It must demonstrate that (1) her statements are untrue,
made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless and conscious
ignorance thereof, especially if parties are not on equal terms, made with
intent that petitioner act thereon or in a manner apparently fitted to induce it
to act thereon, and (2) petitioner must act in reliance on the statements in the
manner contemplated, or manifestly probable to its injury.[7]
Damianas declarations on the witness stand regarding the hostility of
the other witnesses and lack of interest in prosecuting the case may be false,
but there is no proof that they were made with knowledge of its falsity or with
reckless and conscious ignorance thereof. It is one thing to allege deceit and
fraud but another to prove by evidence the specific acts constituting the
same.
To be sure, fraud as a ground for nullity of a judgment must be extrinsic
to the litigation. Were this not the rule, there would be no end to the litigation,
perjury being of such common occurrence in trials.[8] Fraud is extrinsic or
collateral where it prevents a party from having a trial, or real contest, or from
presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters
pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was
procured so that there is never a fair submission of the controversy. In other
words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the
litigation which is committed outside of trial of the case, whereby the
defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case,
by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent.[9]
Enlightening are the following examples given by Justice Miller, viz:
x x x. Where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully
his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by
keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the
defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the
acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority
43
assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where the
attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his clients interest to the other
side -- these, and similar cases which show that there has never been a real
contest in the trial or hearing of the case, are reasons for which a new suit
may be sustained to set aside and annul a former judgment or decree, or
open the case for a new and fair hearing. See, Wells, Res Judicata, sec 499;
Pearce v. Olney, 20 Conn., 544; Wierich v. De Zoya, 7 Ill., (2 Gilm.) 385;
Kent v. Richards, 3 Md. Ch., 396; Smith v. Lowry, 1 Johns. Ch., 320; De
Louis v. Meek, 2 Green (Iowa), 55.
In all these cases and many others which have been examined, relief has
been granted on the ground that, by some fraud practiced directly upon the
party seeking relief against the judgment or decree, that party has been
prevented from presenting all of his case to the court.[10]
Further, it must be emphasized that the fraud or deceit cannot be of the
losing partys own doing, nor must it contribute to it. The extrinsic fraud must
be employed against it by the adverse party, who because of some trick,
artifice, or device naturally prevails in the suit. The end result not only defeats
legitimate rights of the losing party in the lawsuit. On a larger scale, it
circumvents the adversarial system of our litigation process and makes a
mockery of our judicial contests. That instead of having two antagonists who
genuinely compete to fully ventilate their cause and demolish that of his
opponents, what transpires is a scripted theatrical drama played before the
august hall of an officer of the court.
Examining the facts of the case at bar, we find that no fraud or deceit
was properly proved against the respondent. Indeed, petitioner admits that if
there was fraud or deceit here, it was practiced by its own witness, Damiana,
in making her false testimony. As such, it has no reason to protest. Even
assuming, arguendo, that she misled the petitioner and the court, her action
should not be taken against the accused. Petitioner has not proffered any
proof that Damiana and the respondent were in collusion. Allegation of
collusion must be established by competent and credible proof.
To be sure, petitioner has only itself to blame for jointly moving for the
dismissal of this case too soon, without first verifying the truth of Damianas
statement. It could have easily confirmed whether indeed the other witnesses
to the shooting incident have turned hostile by contacting them. It cannot put
forth the excuse that it did not know their whereabouts or could not get in
touch with them, since their addresses were indicated on the Sworn
Statements they executed in connection with the killing on September 1,
1987 during the period of police investigation. The Sworn Statements
actually formed part of the basis for the filing of the Information against the
respondent. Contacts could have similarly been established with the victims
relatives.
44

III Fiscal Cesar M. Merin.[16] Second, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of
Tacloban City clearly had jurisdiction to hear and try the murder charge
As there is no vice which taints the Order of Dismissal of the trial court against the respondent. Third, he was arraigned in open court on May 24,
issued in open court on May 24, 1996, subsequently reduced to writing and 1996 with the assistance of a counsel de officio.[17] Fourth, during the
entered in the Book of Judgment on May 30, 1996, we hold that it has now arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty.[18] Finally, there was a valid
attained finality. Petitioners reliance on the cases of Villa v. termination of this case on the basis of the trial judge's Order to Dismiss the
Lazaro[11] and Paulin v. Gimenez[12] is misplaced. We held in Villa that a case. While it is true that the respondent joined the prosecution in praying for
judgment rendered without due process is null and void, could never become its dismissal, double jeopardy will still attach since the basis for the ruling
final, and could be attacked in any appropriate proceeding. We ruled was the insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution. In view of private
in Paulin, on the other hand, that a violation of the states right to due complainant's desistance and her testimony that other witnesses have turned
process ousts courts of their jurisdiction and warrants a remand of the case hostile and are also no longer interested in prosecuting this case, petitioner
to the trial court for further proceeding and reception of evidence. In those clearly lacks the evidence to support the charge.
two cases, however, it is clear that the aggrieved parties were denied their
day in court. In Villa, petitioner was not informed of the complaint against IN VIEW WHEREOF, there being no showing that the Court of Appeals
her; the administrative inquiry involving her was conducted in the most committed any reversible error, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
informal manner by means only of communication requiring submission of
certain documents; and the documents she submitted were never given SO ORDERED.
consideration on the pretense of lack of compliance. Similarly, in Paulin, the
prosecution was stripped of its right to complete the presentation of its
evidence when the case therein was prematurely terminated and dismissed.
Obviously, the facts in Villa and Paulin are different. That petitioner, to
reiterate, was never denied its day in court nor was it deceived by its own
witness is a point already well-belabored.
IV
Finally, we agree with the respondent's claim that to revive the case
against him would be violative of his constitutional right against double
jeopardy.
Under Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution, "No person shall be
twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act."[13] In a long line of
decisions, we have enumerated the following requisites for double jeopardy
to attach: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after
arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the
defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.[14] There
are however two occasions when double jeopardy will attach even if the
motion to dismiss the case is made by the accused himself. The first is when
the ground is insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution, and the second is
when the proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the
right to a speedy trial.[15]
In the case at bar, we find all the above-cited requisites present. First,
there was a valid information, sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction, filed on November 14, 1988 duly signed by 4 thAssistant Provincial

44
45
G.R. No. 176389 December 14, 2010
ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176864
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A.
GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER
ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
Brief Background
On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen
years old, and Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their home in
Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation, the police arrested a
group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial
court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the
identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public
whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of what everybody
referred to as the Vizconde massacre.
Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI
announced that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M.
Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She
pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano,
Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez,
Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She
also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the
fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public
prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al.1
The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 274, presided over by
Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused since Artemio
Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large.2 The prosecution presented Alfaro
45
as its main witness with the others corroborating her testimony. These
included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the
security guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the
Webb’s household, police officer Biong’s former girlfriend, and Lauro G.
Vizconde, Estrellita’s husband.
For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the crime
and saying they were elsewhere when it took place. Webb’s alibi appeared
the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the
United States of America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses as well
as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense
presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the
incredible nature of her testimony.
But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the events
surrounding it, the trial court found a credible witness in her. It noted her
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged
by grueling cross-examinations. The trial court remained unfazed by
significant discrepancies between Alfaro’s April 28 and May 22, 1995
affidavits, accepting her explanation that she at first wanted to protect her
former boyfriend, accused Estrada, and a relative, accused Gatchalian; that
no lawyer assisted her; that she did not trust the investigators who helped
her prepare her first affidavit; and that she felt unsure if she would get the
support and security she needed once she disclosed all about the Vizconde
killings.
In contrast, the trial court thought little of the denials and alibis that Webb,
Lejano, Rodriguez, and Gatchalian set up for their defense. They paled,
according to the court, compared to Alfaro’s testimony that other witnesses
and the physical evidence corroborated. Thus, on January 4, 2000, after four
years of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the
accused guilty as charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian,
Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion perpetua and on
Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four months, and one
day to twelve years. The trial court also awarded damages to Lauro
Vizconde.3
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, modifying
the penalty imposed on Biong to six years minimum and twelve years
maximum and increasing the award of damages to Lauro Vizconde.4 The
appellate court did not agree that the accused were tried by publicity or that
the trial judge was biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that
rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with
those who had a part in raping and killing Carmela and in executing her
mother and sister.
46
On motion for reconsideration by the accused, the Court of Appeals' Special
Division of five members voted three against two to deny the motion, 5 hence,
the present appeal.
On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court
issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis
the semen specimen taken from Carmela’s cadaver, which specimen was
then believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI. The Court granted the
request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence6 to give the
accused and the prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might
want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case.
Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer
has custody of the specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial
court. The trial record shows, however, that the specimen was not among the
object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case.
This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on
the ground that the government’s failure to preserve such vital evidence has
resulted in the denial of his right to due process.
Issues Presented
Accused Webb’s motion to acquit presents a threshold issue: whether or not
the Court should acquit him outright, given the government’s failure to
produce the semen specimen that the NBI found on Carmela’s cadaver, thus
depriving him of evidence that would prove his innocence.
In the main, all the accused raise the central issue of whether or not Webb,
acting in conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez,
Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed Carmela and put to death her mother
and sister. But, ultimately, the controlling issues are:
1. Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as eyewitness, describing the
crime and identifying Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada,
Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who committed it, is
entitled to belief; and
2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his
alibi and rebut Alfaro’s testimony that he led the others in committing
the crime.
The issue respecting accused Biong is whether or not he acted to cover up
the crime after its commission.
46
The Right to Acquittal
Due to Loss of DNA Evidence
Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland,7 that he is entitled to outright acquittal
on the ground of violation of his right to due process given the State’s failure
to produce on order of the Court either by negligence or willful suppression
the semen specimen taken from Carmela.
The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and,
consistent with this, semen specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro
identified Webb in her testimony as Carmela’s rapist and killer but serious
questions had been raised about her credibility. At the very least, there exists
a possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the other hand, the semen specimen
taken from Carmela cannot possibly lie. It cannot be coached or allured by a
promise of reward or financial support. No two persons have the same DNA
fingerprint, with the exception of identical twins.8 If, on examination, the DNA
of the subject specimen does not belong to Webb, then he did not rape
Carmela. It is that simple. Thus, the Court would have been able to
determine that Alfaro committed perjury in saying that he did.
Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce
the semen specimen at this late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v.
Maryland9 that he cites has long be overtaken by the decision in Arizona v.
Youngblood,10 where the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process does
not require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be
useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of
the prosecution or the police. Here, the State presented a medical expert
who testified on the existence of the specimen and Webb in fact sought to
have the same subjected to DNA test.
For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA
evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for
conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its
admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen
secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not
come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of
preserving the specimen in the meantime.
Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webb’s application for DNA
testing, he allowed the proceeding to move on when he had on at least two
occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to
challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the other
accused.11 They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but
merely as an error committed by the trial court in rendering its decision in the
case. None of the accused filed a motion with the appeals court to have the
47
DNA test done pending adjudication of their appeal. This, even when the
Supreme Court had in the meantime passed the rules allowing such test.
Considering the accused’s lack of interest in having such test done, the State
cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be required to
produce the semen specimen at some future time.
Now, to the merit of the case.
Alfaro’s Story
Based on the prosecution’s version, culled from the decisions of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals, on June 29, 1991 at around 8:30 in the
evening, Jessica Alfaro drove her Mitsubishi Lancer, with boyfriend Peter
Estrada as passenger, to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center parking lot
to buy shabu from Artemio "Dong" Ventura. There, Ventura introduced her to
his friends: Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Miguel
"Ging" Rodriguez, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, and Joey
Filart. Alfaro recalled frequently seeing them at a shabu house in Parañaque
in January 1991, except Ventura whom she had known earlier in December
1990.
As Alfaro smoked her shabu, Webb approached and requested her to relay a
message for him to a girl, whom she later identified as Carmela Vizconde.
Alfaro agreed. After using up their shabu, the group drove to Carmela’s
house at 80 Vinzons Street, Pitong Daan Subdivision, BF Homes, Parañaque
City. Riding in her car, Alfaro and Estrada trailed Filart and Rodriguez who
rode a Mazda pick-up and Webb, Lejano, Ventura, Fernandez, and
Gatchalian who were on a Nissan Patrol car.
On reaching their destination, Alfaro parked her car on Vinzons Street,
alighted, and approached Carmela’s house. Alfaro pressed the buzzer and a
woman came out. Alfaro queried her about Carmela. Alfaro had met Carmela
twice before in January 1991. When Carmela came out, Alfaro gave her
Webb’s message that he was just around. Carmela replied, however, that
she could not go out yet since she had just arrived home. She told Alfaro to
return after twenty minutes. Alfaro relayed this to Webb who then told the
group to drive back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.
The group had another shabu session at the parking lot. After sometime,
they drove back but only Alfaro proceeded to Vinzons Street where Carmela
lived. The Nissan Patrol and the Mazda pick-up, with their passengers,
parked somewhere along Aguirre Avenue. Carmela was at their garden. She
approached Alfaro on seeing her and told the latter that she (Carmela) had to
leave the house for a while. Carmela requested Alfaro to return before
midnight and she would leave the pedestrian gate, the iron grills that led to
47
the kitchen, and the kitchen door unlocked. Carmela also told Alfaro to blink
her car’s headlights twice when she approached the pedestrian gate so
Carmela would know that she had arrived.
Alfaro returned to her car but waited for Carmela to drive out of the house in
her own car. Alfaro trailed Carmela up to Aguirre Avenue where she dropped
off a man whom Alfaro believed was Carmela’s boyfriend. Alfaro looked for
her group, found them, and relayed Carmela’s instructions to Webb. They
then all went back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center. At the parking
lot, Alfaro told the group about her talk with Carmela. When she told Webb of
Carmela’s male companion, Webb’s mood changed for the rest of the
evening ("bad trip").
Webb gave out free cocaine. They all used it and some shabu, too. After
about 40 to 45 minutes, Webb decided that it was time for them to leave. He
said, "Pipilahan natin siya [Carmela] at ako ang mauuna." Lejano said, "Ako
ang susunod" and the others responded "Okay, okay." They all left the
parking lot in a convoy of three vehicles and drove into Pitong Daan
Subdivision for the third time. They arrived at Carmela’s house shortly before
midnight.
Alfaro parked her car between Vizconde’s house and the next. While waiting
for the others to alight from their cars, Fernandez approached Alfaro with a
suggestion that they blow up the transformer near the Vizconde’s residence
to cause a brownout ("Pasabugin kaya natin ang transformer na ito"). But
Alfaro shrugged off the idea, telling Fernandez, "Malakas lang ang tama mo."
When Webb, Lejano, and Ventura were already before the house, Webb told
the others again that they would line up for Carmela but he would be the first.
The others replied, "O sige, dito lang kami, magbabantay lang kami."
Alfaro was the first to pass through the pedestrian gate that had been left
open. Webb, Lejano, and Ventura followed her. On entering the garage,
Ventura using a chair mounted the hood of the Vizcondes’ Nissan Sentra and
loosened the electric bulb over it ("para daw walang ilaw"). The small group
went through the open iron grill gate and passed the dirty kitchen. Carmela
opened the aluminum screen door of the kitchen for them. She and Webb
looked each other in the eyes for a moment and, together, headed for the
dining area.
As she lost sight of Carmela and Webb, Alfaro decided to go out. Lejano
asked her where she was going and she replied that she was going out to
smoke. As she eased her way out through the kitchen door, she saw Ventura
pulling out a kitchen drawer. Alfaro smoked a cigarette at the garden. After
about twenty minutes, she was surprised to hear a woman’s voice ask, "Sino
yan?" Alfaro immediately walked out of the garden to her car. She found her
48
other companions milling around it. Estrada who sat in the car asked her,
"Okay ba?"
After sitting in the car for about ten minutes, Alfaro returned to the Vizconde
house, using the same route. The interior of the house was dark but some
light filtered in from outside. In the kitchen, Alfaro saw Ventura searching a
lady’s bag that lay on the dining table. When she asked him what he was
looking for, he said: "Ikaw na nga dito, maghanap ka ng susi." She asked him
what key he wanted and he replied: "Basta maghanap ka ng susi ng main
door pati na rin ng susi ng kotse." When she found a bunch of keys in the
bag, she tried them on the main door but none fitted the lock. She also did
not find the car key.
Unable to open the main door, Alfaro returned to the kitchen. While she was
at a spot leading to the dining area, she heard a static noise (like a television
that remained on after the station had signed off). Out of curiosity, she
approached the master’s bedroom from where the noise came, opened the
door a little, and peeked inside. The unusual sound grew even louder. As she
walked in, she saw Webb on top of Carmela while she lay with her back on
the floor. Two bloodied bodies lay on the bed. Lejano was at the foot of the
bed about to wear his jacket. Carmela was gagged, moaning, and in tears
while Webb raped her, his bare buttocks exposed.
Webb gave Alfaro a meaningful look and she immediately left the room. She
met Ventura at the dining area. He told her, "Prepare an escape. Aalis na
tayo." Shocked with what she saw, Alfaro rushed out of the house to the
others who were either sitting in her car or milling on the sidewalk. She
entered her car and turned on the engine but she did not know where to go.
Webb, Lejano, and Ventura came out of the house just then. Webb suddenly
picked up a stone and threw it at the main door, breaking its glass frame.
As the three men approached the pedestrian gate, Webb told Ventura that he
forgot his jacket in the house. But Ventura told him that they could not get in
anymore as the iron grills had already locked. They all rode in their cars and
drove away until they reached Aguirre Avenue. As they got near an old hotel
at the Tropical Palace area, Alfaro noticed the Nissan Patrol slow down.
Someone threw something out of the car into the cogonal area.
The convoy of cars went to a large house with high walls, concrete fence,
steel gate, and a long driveway at BF Executive Village. They entered the
compound and gathered at the lawn where the "blaming session" took place.
It was here that Alfaro and those who remained outside the Vizconde house
learned of what happened. The first to be killed was Carmela’s mother, then
Jennifer, and finally, Carmella. Ventura blamed Webb, telling him, "Bakit
naman pati yung bata?" Webb replied that the girl woke up and on seeing
48
him molesting Carmela, she jumped on him, bit his shoulders, and pulled his
hair. Webb got mad, grabbed the girl, pushed her to the wall, and repeatedly
stabbed her. Lejano excused himself at this point to use the telephone in the
house. Meanwhile, Webb called up someone on his cellular phone.
At around 2:00 in the morning, accused Gerardo Biong arrived. Webb
ordered him to go and clean up the Vizconde house and said to him, "Pera
lang ang katapat nyan." Biong answered, "Okay lang." Webb spoke to his
companions and told them, "We don’t know each other. We haven’t seen
each other…baka maulit yan." Alfaro and Estrada left and they drove to her
father’s house.12
1. The quality of the witness
Was Alfaro an ordinary subdivision girl who showed up at the NBI after four
years, bothered by her conscience or egged on by relatives or friends to
come forward and do what was right? No. She was, at the time she revealed
her story, working for the NBI as an "asset," a stool pigeon, one who earned
her living by fraternizing with criminals so she could squeal on them to her
NBI handlers. She had to live a life of lies to get rewards that would pay for
her subsistence and vices.
According to Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, former head of the NBI Anti-
Kidnapping, Hijacking, and Armed Robbery Task Force (AKHAR) Section,
Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since November or December
1994 as an "asset." She supplied her handlers with information against drug
pushers and other criminal elements. Some of this information led to the
capture of notorious drug pushers like Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando
Bacquir. Alfaro’s tip led to the arrest of the leader of the "Martilyo gang" that
killed a police officer. Because of her talent, the task force gave her "very
special treatment" and she became its "darling," allowed the privilege of
spending nights in one of the rooms at the NBI offices.
When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her
about it and she was piqued. One day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing that
she knew someone who had the real story behind the Vizconde massacre.
Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring that someone to the
NBI to tell his story. When this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to
press her, she told him that she might as well assume the role of her
informant. Sacaguing testified thus:
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. Atty. Sacaguing, how did Jessica Alfaro become a witness in the
Vizconde murder case? Will you tell the Honorable Court?
49

xxxx COURT:

A. She told me. Your Honor, that she knew somebody who related to How was that?
her the circumstances, I mean, the details of the massacre of the
Vizconde family. That’s what she told me, Your Honor. WITNESS SACAGUING:

ATTY. ONGKIKO: A. "Easy lang, Sir. Sir, relax lang, Sir, papapelan ko, papapelan ko
na lang ‘yan."
Q. And what did you say?
xxxx
xxxx
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
A. I was quite interested and I tried to persuade her to introduce to
me that man and she promised that in due time, she will bring to me Q. All right, and what was your reaction when Ms. Alfaro stated that
the man, and together with her, we will try to convince him to act as a "papapelan ko na lang yan?"
state witness and help us in the solution of the case.
WITNESS SACAGUING:
xxxx
A. I said, "hindi puwede yan, kasi hindi ka naman eye witness."
Q. Atty. Sacaguing, were you able to interview this alleged witness?
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
WITNESS SACAGUING:
Q. And what was the reply of Ms. Alfaro?
A. No, sir.
WITNESS SACAGUING:
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
A. Hindi siya nakakibo, until she went away.
Q. Why not?
(TSN, May 28, 1996, pp. 49-50, 58, 77-79)
WITNESS SACAGUING:
Quite significantly, Alfaro never refuted Sacaguing’s above testimony.
A. Because Jessica Alfaro was never able to comply with her
promise to bring the man to me. She told me later that she could not
2. The suspicious details
and the man does not like to testify.
But was it possible for Alfaro to lie with such abundant details some of which
ATTY. ONGKIKO: even tallied with the physical evidence at the scene of the crime? No doubt,
yes.
Q. All right, and what happened after that?
Firstly, the Vizconde massacre had been reported in the media with dizzying
WITNESS SACAGUING: details. Everybody was talking about what the police found at the crime
scene and there were lots of speculations about them.
A. She told me, "easy lang kayo, Sir," if I may quote, "easy lang Sir,
huwag kayong…"

49
50
Secondly, the police had arrested some "akyat-bahay" group in Parañaque
and charged them with the crime. The police prepared the confessions of the
men they apprehended and filled these up with details that the evidence of
the crime scene provided. Alfaro’s NBI handlers who were doing their own
investigation knew of these details as well. Since Alfaro hanged out at the
NBI offices and practically lived there, it was not too difficult for her to hear of
these evidentiary details and gain access to the documents.
Not surprisingly, the confessions of some members of the Barroso "akyat
bahay" gang, condemned by the Makati RTC as fabricated by the police to
pin the crime on them, shows how crime investigators could make a
confession ring true by matching some of its details with the physical
evidence at the crime scene. Consider the following:
a. The Barroso gang members said that they got into Carmela’s house by
breaking the glass panel of the front door using a stone wrapped in cloth to
deaden the noise. Alfaro could not use this line since the core of her story
was that Webb was Carmela’s boyfriend. Webb had no reason to smash her
front door to get to see her.
Consequently, to explain the smashed door, Alfaro had to settle for claiming
that, on the way out of the house, Webb picked up some stone and, out of
the blue, hurled it at the glass-paneled front door of the Vizconde residence.
His action really made no sense. From Alfaro’s narration, Webb appeared
rational in his decisions. It was past midnight, the house was dark, and they
wanted to get away quickly to avoid detection. Hurling a stone at that glass
door and causing a tremendous noise was bizarre, like inviting the neighbors
to come.
b. The crime scene showed that the house had been ransacked. The
rejected confessions of the Barroso "akyat-bahay" gang members said that
they tried to rob the house. To explain this physical evidence, Alfaro claimed
that at one point Ventura was pulling a kitchen drawer, and at another point,
going through a handbag on the dining table. He said he was looking for the
front-door key and the car key.
Again, this portion of Alfaro’s story appears tortured to accommodate the
physical evidence of the ransacked house. She never mentioned Ventura
having taken some valuables with him when they left Carmela’s house. And
why would Ventura rummage a bag on the table for the front-door key,
spilling the contents, when they had already gotten into the house. It is a
story made to fit in with the crime scene although robbery was supposedly
not the reason Webb and his companions entered that house.
50
c. It is the same thing with the garage light. The police investigators found
that the bulb had been loosened to turn off the light. The confessions of the
Barroso gang claimed that one of them climbed the parked car’s hood to
reach up and darken that light. This made sense since they were going to rob
the place and they needed time to work in the dark trying to open the front
door. Some passersby might look in and see what they were doing.
Alfaro had to adjust her testimony to take into account that darkened garage
light. So she claimed that Ventura climbed the car’s hood, using a chair, to
turn the light off. But, unlike the Barroso "akyat-bahay" gang, Webb and his
friends did not have anything to do in a darkened garage. They supposedly
knew in advance that Carmela left the doors to the kitchen open for them. It
did not make sense for Ventura to risk standing on the car’s hood and be
seen in such an awkward position instead of going straight into the house.
And, thirdly, Alfaro was the NBI’s star witness, their badge of excellent
investigative work.lavvphil After claiming that they had solved the crime of
the decade, the NBI people had a stake in making her sound credible and,
obviously, they gave her all the preparations she needed for the job of
becoming a fairly good substitute witness. She was their "darling" of an
asset. And this is not pure speculation. As pointed out above, Sacaguing of
the NBI, a lawyer and a ranking official, confirmed this to be a cold fact. Why
the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to see this is mystifying.
At any rate, did Alfaro at least have a fine memory for faces that had a strong
effect on her, given the circumstances? Not likely. She named Miguel "Ging"
Rodriguez as one of the culprits in the Vizconde killings. But when the NBI
found a certain Michael Rodriguez, a drug dependent from the Bicutan
Rehabilitation Center, initially suspected to be Alfaro’s Miguel Rodriguez and
showed him to Alfaro at the NBI office, she ran berserk, slapping and kicking
Michael, exclaiming: "How can I forget your face. We just saw each other in a
disco one month ago and you told me then that you will kill me." As it turned
out, he was not Miguel Rodriguez, the accused in this case.13
Two possibilities exist: Michael was really the one Alfaro wanted to implicate
to settle some score with him but it was too late to change the name she
already gave or she had myopic vision, tagging the wrong people for what
they did not do.
3. The quality of the testimony
There is another thing about a lying witness: her story lacks sense or suffers
from inherent inconsistencies. An understanding of the nature of things and
the common behavior of people will help expose a lie. And it has an
abundant presence in this case.
51
One. In her desire to implicate Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez,
and Filart, who were supposed to be Webb’s co-principals in the crime,
Alfaro made it a point to testify that Webb proposed twice to his friends the
gang-rape of Carmela who had hurt him. And twice, they (including, if one
believes Alfaro, her own boyfriend Estrada) agreed in a chorus to his
proposal. But when they got to Carmela’s house, only Webb, Lejano,
Ventura, and Alfaro entered the house.
Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez supposedly stayed around
Alfaro’s car, which was parked on the street between Carmela’s house and
the next. Some of these men sat on top of the car’s lid while others milled on
the sidewalk, visible under the street light to anyone who cared to watch
them, particularly to the people who were having a drinking party in a nearby
house. Obviously, the behavior of Webb’s companions out on the street did
not figure in a planned gang-rape of Carmela.
Two. Ventura, Alfaro’s dope supplier, introduced her for the first time in her
life to Webb and his friends in a parking lot by a mall. So why would she
agree to act as Webb’s messenger, using her gas, to bring his message to
Carmela at her home. More inexplicably, what motivated Alfaro to stick it out
the whole night with Webb and his friends?
They were practically strangers to her and her boyfriend Estrada. When it
came to a point that Webb decided with his friends to gang-rape Carmela,
clearly, there was nothing in it for Alfaro. Yet, she stuck it out with them, as a
police asset would, hanging in there until she had a crime to report, only she
was not yet an "asset" then. If, on the other hand, Alfaro had been too
soaked in drugs to think clearly and just followed along where the group took
her, how could she remember so much details that only a drug-free mind
can?
Three. When Alfaro went to see Carmela at her house for the second time,
Carmella told her that she still had to go out and that Webb and his friends
should come back around midnight. Alfaro returned to her car and waited for
Carmela to drive out in her own car. And she trailed her up to Aguirre Avenue
where she supposedly dropped off a man whom she thought was Carmela’s
boyfriend. Alfaro’s trailing Carmela to spy on her unfaithfulness to Webb did
not make sense since she was on limited errand. But, as a critical witness,
Alfaro had to provide a reason for Webb to freak out and decide to come with
his friends and harm Carmela.
Four. According to Alfaro, when they returned to Carmela’s house the third
time around midnight, she led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura through the
pedestrian gate that Carmela had left open. Now, this is weird. Webb was the
gang leader who decided what they were going to do. He decided and his
51
friends agreed with him to go to Carmela’s house and gang-rape her. Why
would Alfaro, a woman, a stranger to Webb before that night, and obviously
with no role to play in the gang-rape of Carmela, lead him and the others into
her house? It made no sense. It would only make sense if Alfaro wanted to
feign being a witness to something she did not see.
Five. Alfaro went out of the house to smoke at the garden. After about twenty
minutes, a woman exclaimed, "Sino yan?" On hearing this, Alfaro
immediately walked out of the garden and went to her car. Apparently, she
did this because she knew they came on a sly. Someone other than Carmela
became conscious of the presence of Webb and others in the house. Alfaro
walked away because, obviously, she did not want to get involved in a
potential confrontation. This was supposedly her frame of mind: fear of
getting involved in what was not her business.
But if that were the case, how could she testify based on personal knowledge
of what went on in the house? Alfaro had to change that frame of mind to one
of boldness and reckless curiosity. So that is what she next claimed. She
went back into the house to watch as Webb raped Carmela on the floor of
the master’s bedroom. He had apparently stabbed to death Carmela’s mom
and her young sister whose bloodied bodies were sprawled on the bed. Now,
Alfaro testified that she got scared (another shift to fear) for she hurriedly got
out of the house after Webb supposedly gave her a meaningful look.
Alfaro quickly went to her car, not minding Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada,
Rodriguez, and Filart who sat on the car or milled on the sidewalk. She did
not speak to them, even to Estrada, her boyfriend. She entered her car and
turned on the engine but she testified that she did not know where to go. This
woman who a few minutes back led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the
house, knowing that they were decided to rape and harm Carmela, was
suddenly too shocked to know where to go! This emotional pendulum swing
indicates a witness who was confused with her own lies.
4. The supposed corroborations
Intending to provide corroboration to Alfaro’s testimony, the prosecution
presented six additional witnesses:
Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who autopsied
the bodies of the victims, testified on the stab wounds they sustained14 and
the presence of semen in Carmela’s genitalia,15 indicating that she had been
raped.
Normal E. White, Jr., was the security guard on duty at Pitong Daan
Subdivision from 7 p.m. of June 29 to 7 a.m. of June 30, 1991. He got a
52
report on the morning of June 30 that something untoward happened at the
Vizconde residence. He went there and saw the dead bodies in the master’s
bedroom, the bag on the dining table, as well as the loud noise emanating
from a television set.16
White claimed that he noticed Gatchalian and his companions, none of whom
he could identify, go in and out of Pitong Daan Subdivision. He also saw
them along Vinzons Street. Later, they entered Pitong Daan Subdivision in a
three-car convoy. White could not, however, describe the kind of vehicles
they used or recall the time when he saw the group in those two instances.
And he did not notice anything suspicious about their coming and going.
But White’s testimony cannot be relied on. His initial claim turned out to be
inaccurate. He actually saw Gatchalian and his group enter the Pitong Daan
Subdivision only once. They were not going in and out. Furthermore, Alfaro
testified that when the convoy of cars went back the second time in the
direction of Carmela’s house, she alone entered the subdivision and passed
the guardhouse without stopping. Yet, White who supposedly manned that
guardhouse did not notice her.
Surprisingly, White failed to note Biong, a police officer, entering or exiting
the subdivision on the early morning of June 30 when he supposedly
"cleaned up" Vizconde residence on Webb’s orders. What is more, White did
not notice Carmela arrive with her mom before Alfaro’s first visit that night.
Carmela supposedly left with a male companion in her car at around 10:30
p.m. but White did not notice it. He also did not notice Carmela reenter the
subdivision. White actually discredited Alfaro’s testimony about the
movements of the persons involved.
Further, while Alfaro testified that it was the Mazda pick-up driven by Filart
that led the three-vehicle convoy,17 White claimed it was the Nissan Patrol
with Gatchalian on it that led the convoy since he would not have let the
convoy in without ascertaining that Gatchalian, a resident, was in it. Security
guard White did not, therefore, provide corroboration to Alfaro’s
testimony.1avvphi1
Justo Cabanacan, the security supervisor at Pitong Daan Subdivision
testified that he saw Webb around the last week of May or the first week of
June 1991 to prove his presence in the Philippines when he claimed to be in
the United States. He was manning the guard house at the entrance of the
subdivision of Pitong Daan when he flagged down a car driven by Webb.
Webb said that he would see Lilet Sy. Cabanacan asked him for an ID but he
pointed to his United BF Homes sticker and said that he resided there.
Cabanacan replied, however, that Pitong Daan had a local sticker.
52
Cabanacan testified that, at this point, Webb introduced himself as the son of
Congressman Webb. Still, the supervisor insisted on seeing his ID. Webb
grudgingly gave it and after seeing the picture and the name on it,
Cabanacan returned the same and allowed Webb to pass without being
logged in as their Standard Operating Procedure required.18
But Cabanacan's testimony could not be relied on. Although it was not
common for a security guard to challenge a Congressman’s son with such
vehemence, Cabanacan did not log the incident on the guardhouse book.
Nor did he, contrary to prescribed procedure, record the visitor’s entry into
the subdivision. It did not make sense that Cabanacan was strict in the
matter of seeing Webb’s ID but not in recording the visit.
Mila Gaviola used to work as laundry woman for the Webbs at their house at
BF Homes Executive Village. She testified that she saw Webb at his parents’
house on the morning of June 30, 1991 when she got the dirty clothes from
the room that he and two brothers occupied at about 4.a.m. She saw him
again pacing the floor at 9 a.m. At about 1 p.m., Webb left the house in t-shirt
and shorts, passing through a secret door near the maid’s quarters on the
way out. Finally, she saw Webb at 4 p.m. of the same day.19
On cross-examination, however, Gaviola could not say what distinguished
June 30, 1991 from the other days she was on service at the Webb
household as to enable her to distinctly remember, four years later, what one
of the Webb boys did and at what time. She could not remember any of the
details that happened in the household on the other days. She proved to
have a selective photographic memory and this only damaged her testimony.
Gaviola tried to corroborate Alfaro’'s testimony by claiming that on June 30,
1991 she noticed bloodstains on Webb's t-shirt.20 She did not call the
attention of anybody in the household about it when it would have been a
point of concern that Webb may have been hurt, hence the blood.
Besides, Victoria Ventoso, the Webbs' housemaid from March 1989 to May
1992, and Sgt. Miguel Muñoz, the Webbs' security aide in 1991, testified that
Gaviola worked for the Webbs only from January 1991 to April 1991.
Ventoso further testified that it was not Gaviola's duty to collect the clothes
from the 2nd floor bedrooms, this being the work of the housemaid charged
with cleaning the rooms.
What is more, it was most unlikely for a laundrywoman who had been there
for only four months to collect, as she claimed, the laundry from the rooms of
her employers and their grown up children at four in the morning while they
were asleep.
53
And it did not make sense, if Alfaro’s testimony were to be believed that
Webb, who was so careful and clever that he called Biong to go to the
Vizconde residence at 2 a.m. to clean up the evidence against him and his
group, would bring his bloodied shirt home and put it in the hamper for
laundrywoman Gaviola to collect and wash at 4 a.m. as was her supposed
habit.
Lolita De Birrer was accused Biong’s girlfriend around the time the
Vizconde massacre took place. Birrer testified that she was with Biong
playing mahjong from the evening of June 29, 1991 to the early morning of
June 30, when Biong got a call at around 2 a.m. This prompted him,
according to De Birrer, to leave and go to BF. Someone sitting at the
backseat of a taxi picked him up. When Biong returned at 7 a.m. he washed
off what looked like dried blood from his fingernails. And he threw away a
foul-smelling handkerchief. She also saw Biong take out a knife with
aluminum cover from his drawer and hid it in his steel cabinet.21
The security guard at Pitong Daan did not notice any police investigator
flashing a badge to get into the village although Biong supposedly came in at
the unholy hour of two in the morning. His departure before 7 a.m. also
remained unnoticed by the subdivision guards. Besides, if he had cleaned up
the crime scene shortly after midnight, what was the point of his returning
there on the following morning to dispose of some of the evidence in the
presence of other police investigators and on-lookers? In fact, why would he
steal valuable items from the Vizconde residence on his return there hours
later if he had the opportunity to do it earlier?
At most, Birrer’s testimony only established Biong’s theft of certain items
from the Vizconde residence and gross neglect for failing to maintain the
sanctity of the crime scene by moving around and altering the effects of the
crime. Birrer’s testimony failed to connect Biong's acts to Webb and the other
accused.
Lauro Vizconde testified about how deeply he was affected by the loss of
her wife and two daughters. Carmella spoke to him of a rejected suitor she
called "Bagyo," because he was a Parañaque politician’s son. Unfortunately,
Lauro did not appear curious enough to insist on finding out who the rejected
fellow was. Besides, his testimony contradicts that of Alfaro who testified that
Carmela and Webb had an on-going relation. Indeed, if Alfaro were to be
believed, Carmela wanted Webb to come to her house around midnight. She
even left the kitchen door open so he could enter the house.
5. The missing corroboration
53
There is something truly remarkable about this case: the prosecution’s core
theory that Carmela and Webb had been sweethearts, that she had been
unfaithful to him, and that it was for this reason that Webb brought his friends
to her house to gang-rape her is totally uncorroborated!
For instance, normally, if Webb, a Congressman’s son, courted the young
Carmela, that would be news among her circle of friends if not around town.
But, here, none of her friends or even those who knew either of them came
forward to affirm this. And if Webb hanged around with her, trying to win her
favors, he would surely be seen with her. And this would all the more be so if
they had become sweethearts, a relation that Alfaro tried to project with her
testimony.
But, except for Alfaro, the NBI asset, no one among Carmela’s friends or her
friends’ friends would testify ever hearing of such relationship or ever seeing
them together in some popular hangouts in Parañaque or Makati. Alfaro’s
claim of a five-hour drama is like an alien page, rudely and unconnectedly
inserted into Webb and Carmela’s life stories or like a piece of jigsaw puzzle
trimmed to fit into the shape on the board but does not belong because it
clashes with the surrounding pieces. It has neither antecedent nor
concomitant support in the verifiable facts of their personal histories. It is
quite unreal.
What is more, Alfaro testified that she saw Carmela drive out of her house
with a male passenger, Mr. X, whom Alfaro thought the way it looked was
also Carmela’s lover. This was the all-important reason Webb supposedly
had for wanting to harm her. Again, none of Carmela’s relatives, friends, or
people who knew her ever testified about the existence of Mr.X in her life.
Nobody has come forward to testify having ever seen him with Carmela. And
despite the gruesome news about her death and how Mr. X had played a role
in it, he never presented himself like anyone who had lost a special friend
normally would. Obviously, Mr. X did not exist, a mere ghost of the
imagination of Alfaro, the woman who made a living informing on criminals.
Webb’s U.S. Alibi
Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi.
a. The travel preparations
Webb claims that in 1991 his parents, Senator Freddie Webb and his wife,
Elizabeth, sent their son to the United States (U.S.) to learn the value of
independence, hard work, and money.22 Gloria Webb, his aunt, accompanied
him. Rajah Tours booked their flight to San Francisco via United Airlines.
54
Josefina Nolasco of Rajah Tours confirmed that Webb and his aunt used
their plane tickets.
Webb told his friends, including his neighbor, Jennifer Claire Cabrera, and
his basketball buddy, Joselito Orendain Escobar, of his travel plans. He even
invited them to his despedida party on March 8, 1991 at Faces Disco along
Makati Ave.23 On March 8,1991, the eve of his departure, he took girlfriend
Milagros Castillo to a dinner at Bunchums at the Makati Cinema Square. His
basketball buddy Rafael Jose with Tina Calma, a blind date arranged by
Webb, joined them. They afterwards went to Faces Disco for Webb's
despedida party. Among those present were his friends Paulo Santos and
Jay Ortega.24
b. The two immigration checks
The following day, March 9, 1991, Webb left for San Francisco, California,
with his Aunt Gloria on board United Airlines Flight 808.25 Before boarding his
plane, Webb passed through the Philippine Immigration booth at the airport
to have his passport cleared and stamped. Immigration Officer, Ferdinand
Sampol checked Webb’s visa, stamped, and initialed his passport, and let
him pass through.26 He was listed on the United Airlines Flight’s Passenger
Manifest.27
On arrival at San Francisco, Webb went through the U.S. Immigration where
his entry into that country was recorded. Thus, the U.S. Immigration
Naturalization Service, checking with its Non-immigrant Information System,
confirmed Webb's entry into the U.S. on March 9, 1991. Webb presented at
the trial the INS Certification issued by the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service,28 the computer-generated print-out of the US-INS
indicating Webb's entry on March 9, 1991,29 and the US-INS Certification
dated August 31, 1995, authenticated by the Philippine Department of
Foreign Affairs, correcting an earlier August 10, 1995 Certification. 30
c. Details of U.S. sojourn
In San Francisco, Webb and his aunt Gloria were met by the latter’s
daughter, Maria Teresa Keame, who brought them to Gloria’s house in Daly
City, California. During his stay with his aunt, Webb met Christopher Paul
Legaspi Esguerra, Gloria’s grandson. In April 1991, Webb, Christopher, and
a certain Daphne Domingo watched the concert of Deelite Band in San
Francisco.31 In the same month, Dorothy Wheelock and her family invited
Webb to Lake Tahoe to return the Webbs’ hospitality when she was in the
Philippines.32
54
In May 1991, on invitation of another aunt, Susan Brottman, Webb moved to
Anaheim Hills, California.33 During his stay there, he occupied himself with
playing basketball once or twice a week with Steven Keeler34 and working at
his cousin-in-law’s pest control company.35 Webb presented the company’s
logbook showing the tasks he performed,36 his paycheck,37 his ID, and other
employment papers. On June 14, 1991 he applied for a driver's license 38 and
wrote three letters to his friend Jennifer Cabrera.39
On June 28, 1991, Webb’s parents visited him at Anaheim and stayed with
the Brottmans. On the same day, his father introduced Honesto Aragon to his
son when he came to visit.40 On the following day, June 29, Webb, in the
company of his father and Aragon went to Riverside, California, to look for a
car. They bought an MR2 Toyota car.41 Later that day, a visitor at the
Brottman’s, Louis Whittacker, saw Webb looking at the plates of his new
car.42 To prove the purchase, Webb presented the Public Records of
California Department of Motor Vehicle43 and a car plate "LEW WEBB."44 In
using the car in the U.S., Webb even received traffic citations.45
On June 30, 1991 Webb, again accompanied by his father and
Aragon,46 bought a bicycle at Orange Cycle Center.47 The Center issued
Webb a receipt dated June 30, 1991.48 On July 4, 1991, Independence Day,
the Webbs, the Brottmans, and the Vaca family had a lakeside picnic.49
Webb stayed with the Brottmans until mid July and rented a place for less
than a month. On August 4, 1991 he left for Longwood, Florida, to stay with
the spouses Jack and Sonja Rodriguez.50 There, he met Armando Rodriguez
with whom he spent time, playing basketball on weekends, watching movies,
and playing billiards.51 In November 1991, Webb met performing artist Gary
Valenciano, a friend of Jack Rodriguez, who was invited for a dinner at the
Rodriguez’s house.52 He left the Rodriguez’s home in August 1992, returned
to Anaheim and stayed with his aunt Imelda Pagaspas. He stayed there until
he left for the Philippines on October 26, 1992.
d. The second immigration checks
As with his trip going to the U.S., Webb also went through both the U.S. and
Philippine immigrations on his return trip. Thus, his departure from the U.S.
was confirmed by the same certifications that confirmed his
entry.53 Furthermore, a Diplomatic Note of the U.S. Department of State with
enclosed letter from Acting Director Debora A. Farmer of the Records
Operations, Office of Records of the US-INS stated that the Certification
dated August 31, 1995 is a true and accurate statement. And when he
boarded his plane, the Passenger Manifest of Philippine Airlines Flight No.
103,54 certified by Agnes Tabuena55 confirmed his return trip.
55
When he arrived in Manila, Webb again went through the Philippine
Immigration. In fact, the arrival stamp and initial on his passport indicated his
return to Manila on October 27, 1992. This was authenticated by Carmelita
Alipio, the immigration officer who processed Webb’s reentry.56 Upon his
return, in October 1992, Paolo Santos, Joselito Erondain Escobar, and
Rafael Jose once again saw Webb playing basketball at the BF's Phase III
basketball court.
e. Alibi versus positive identification
The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in rejecting as weak Webb’s
alibi. Their reason is uniform: Webb’s alibi cannot stand against Alfaro’s
positive identification of him as the rapist and killer of Carmela and,
apparently, the killer as well of her mother and younger sister. Because of
this, to the lower courts, Webb’s denial and alibi were fabricated.
But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the
accused is truly innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and alibi.
So how can such accused penetrate a mind that has been made cynical by
the rule drilled into his head that a defense of alibi is a hangman’s noose in
the face of a witness positively swearing, "I saw him do it."? Most judges
believe that such assertion automatically dooms an alibi which is so easy to
fabricate. This quick stereotype thinking, however, is distressing. For how
else can the truth that the accused is really innocent have any chance of
prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet?
There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard
against slipping into hasty conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly
finish the job of deciding a case. A positive declaration from a witness that he
saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel out the
accused’s claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as positive an
identification as a truthful witness can. The lying witness can also say as
forthrightly and unequivocally, "He did it!" without blinking an eye.
Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two
criteria:
First, the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible
witness. She is credible who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually based on
past experiences with her. Her word has, to one who knows her, its weight in
gold.
And second, the witness’ story of what she personally saw must be
believable, not inherently contrived. A witness who testifies about something
she never saw runs into inconsistencies and makes bewildering claims.
55
Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet
the above criteria.
She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her
conscience. She had been hanging around that agency for sometime as a
stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and squealing on them.
Police assets are often criminals themselves. She was the prosecution’s
worst possible choice for a witness. Indeed, her superior testified that she
volunteered to play the role of a witness in the Vizconde killings when she
could not produce a man she promised to the NBI.
And, although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the
details that the investigators knew of the case. She took advantage of her
familiarity with these details to include in her testimony the clearly
incompatible act of Webb hurling a stone at the front door glass frames even
when they were trying to slip away quietly—just so she can accommodate
this crime scene feature. She also had Ventura rummaging a bag on the
dining table for a front door key that nobody needed just to explain the
physical evidence of that bag and its scattered contents. And she had
Ventura climbing the car’s hood, risking being seen in such an awkward
position, when they did not need to darken the garage to force open the front
door—just so to explain the darkened light and foot prints on the car hood.
Further, her testimony was inherently incredible. Her story that Gatchalian,
Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart agreed to take their turns raping
Carmela is incongruent with their indifference, exemplified by remaining
outside the house, milling under a street light, visible to neighbors and
passersby, and showing no interest in the developments inside the house,
like if it was their turn to rape Carmela. Alfaro’s story that she agreed to serve
as Webb’s messenger to Carmela, using up her gas, and staying with him till
the bizarre end when they were practically strangers, also taxes incredulity.
To provide basis for Webb’s outrage, Alfaro said that she followed Carmela
to the main road to watch her let off a lover on Aguirre Avenue. And,
inexplicably, although Alfaro had only played the role of messenger, she
claimed leading Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house to gang-rape
Carmella, as if Alfaro was establishing a reason for later on testifying on
personal knowledge. Her swing from an emotion of fear when a woman woke
up to their presence in the house and of absolute courage when she
nonetheless returned to become the lone witness to a grim scene is also
quite inexplicable.
Ultimately, Alfaro’s quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not inherently
unbelievable, testimony cannot be the positive identification that
jurisprudence acknowledges as sufficient to jettison a denial and an alibi.
56
f. A documented alibi
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory
evidence57 that (a) he was present at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the scene of the crime.58
The courts below held that, despite his evidence, Webb was actually in
Parañaque when the Vizconde killings took place; he was not in the U.S.
from March 9, 1991 to October 27, 1992; and if he did leave on March 9,
1991, he actually returned before June 29, 1991, committed the crime,
erased the fact of his return to the Philippines from the records of the U.S.
and Philippine Immigrations, smuggled himself out of the Philippines and into
the U.S., and returned the normal way on October 27, 1992. But this ruling
practically makes the death of Webb and his passage into the next life the
only acceptable alibi in the Philippines. Courts must abandon this unjust and
inhuman paradigm.
If one is cynical about the Philippine system, he could probably claim that
Webb, with his father’s connections, can arrange for the local immigration to
put a March 9, 1991 departure stamp on his passport and an October 27,
1992 arrival stamp on the same. But this is pure speculation since there had
been no indication that such arrangement was made. Besides, how could
Webb fix a foreign airlines’ passenger manifest, officially filed in the
Philippines and at the airport in the U.S. that had his name on them? How
could Webb fix with the U.S. Immigration’s record system those two dates in
its record of his travels as well as the dates when he supposedly departed in
secret from the U.S. to commit the crime in the Philippines and then return
there? No one has come up with a logical and plausible answer to these
questions.
The Court of Appeals rejected the evidence of Webb’s passport since he did
not leave the original to be attached to the record. But, while the best
evidence of a document is the original, this means that the same is exhibited
in court for the adverse party to examine and for the judge to see. As Court
of Appeals Justice Tagle said in his dissent,59the practice when a party does
not want to leave an important document with the trial court is to have a
photocopy of it marked as exhibit and stipulated among the parties as a
faithful reproduction of the original. Stipulations in the course of trial are
binding on the parties and on the court.
The U.S. Immigration certification and the computer print-out of Webb’s
arrival in and departure from that country were authenticated by no less than
the Office of the U.S. Attorney General and the State Department. Still the
Court of Appeals refused to accept these documents for the reason that
56
Webb failed to present in court the immigration official who prepared the
same. But this was unnecessary. Webb’s passport is a document issued by
the Philippine government, which under international practice, is the official
record of travels of the citizen to whom it is issued. The entries in that
passport are presumed true.60
The U.S. Immigration certification and computer print-out, the official
certifications of which have been authenticated by the Philippine Department
of Foreign Affairs, merely validated the arrival and departure stamps of the
U.S. Immigration office on Webb’s passport. They have the same evidentiary
value. The officers who issued these certifications need not be presented in
court to testify on them. Their trustworthiness arises from the sense of official
duty and the penalty attached to a breached duty, in the routine and
disinterested origin of such statement and in the publicity of the record. 61
The Court of Appeals of course makes capital of the fact that an earlier
certification from the U.S. Immigration office said that it had no record of
Webb entering the U.S. But that erroneous first certification was amply
explained by the U.S. Government and Court of Appeals Justice Tagle stated
it in his dissenting opinion, thus:
While it is true that an earlier Certification was issued by the U.S. INS on
August 16, 1995 finding "no evidence of lawful admission of Webb," this was
already clarified and deemed erroneous by no less than the US INS Officials.
As explained by witness Leo Herrera-Lim, Consul and Second Secretary of
the Philippine Embassy in Washington D.C., said Certification did not pass
through proper diplomatic channels and was obtained in violation of the rules
on protocol and standard procedure governing such request.
The initial request was merely initiated by BID Commissioner Verceles who
directly communicated with the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, USA,
bypassing the Secretary of Foreign Affairs which is the proper protocol
procedure. Mr. Steven Bucher, the acting Chief of the Records Services
Board of US-INS Washington D.C. in his letter addressed to Philip Antweiler,
Philippine Desk Officer, State Department, declared the earlier Certification
as incorrect and erroneous as it was "not exhaustive and did not reflect all
available information." Also, Richard L. Huff, Co-Director of the Office of
Information and privacy, US Department of Justice, in response to the appeal
raised by Consul General Teresita V. Marzan, explained that "the INS
normally does not maintain records on individuals who are entering the
country as visitors rather than as immigrants: and that a notation concerning
the entry of a visitor may be made at the Nonimmigrant Information system.
Since appellant Webb entered the U.S. on a mere tourist visa, obviously, the
initial search could not have produced the desired result inasmuch as the
data base that was looked into contained entries of the names of
IMMIGRANTS and not that of NON-IMMIGRANT visitors of the U.S..62
57

The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio
accuracy of travel documents like the passport as well as the domestic and Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the
foreign records of departures and arrivals from airports. They claim that it crimes of which they were charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their
would not have been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the Philippines guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately RELEASED
after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the from detention unless they are confined for another lawful cause.
U.S., and openly return to the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel
between the U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower courts took only about Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections,
twelve to fourteen hours. Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is DIRECTED to report the action he has taken to this Court
If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it might as well within five days from receipt of this Decision.
tear the rules of evidence out of the law books and regard suspicions,
surmises, or speculations as reasons for impeaching evidence. It is not that SO ORDERED.
official records, which carry the presumption of truth of what they state, are
immune to attack. They are not. That presumption can be overcome by
evidence. Here, however, the prosecution did not bother to present evidence
to impeach the entries in Webb’s passport and the certifications of the
Philippine and U.S.’ immigration services regarding his travel to the U.S. and
back. The prosecution’s rebuttal evidence is the fear of the unknown that it
planted in the lower court’s minds.

7. Effect of Webb’s alibi to others

Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only

with respect to him, but also with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez,
Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the proposition
that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony will
not hold together. Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story. Without
it, the evidence against the others must necessarily fall.

CONCLUSION

In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court
entertains doubts about the innocence of the accused since an open mind is
willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable,
lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an
innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to one’s inner being,
like a piece of meat lodged immovable between teeth.

Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on
the testimony of an NBI asset who proposed to her handlers that she take
the role of the witness to the Vizconde massacre that she could not produce?

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated
December 15, 2005 and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS accused-appellants

57