THE LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

A.C. No. 6732 October 22, 2013

ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU OF

INVESTIGATION, WESTERN VISA YAS, REGIONAL OFFICE NBI-WEVRO), FOR
SAN PEDRO, ILOILO CITY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR N. PE, JR., ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, SAN
JOSE, ANTIQUE, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that of a court of law is guilty
of the gravest misconduct and deserves the supreme penalty of disbarment.

The Case

Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment against Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Atty. Salvador N Pe, Jr. respondent) of San Jose, Antique for his having allegedly
falsified an in existent decision of Branch 64 of the Regional Trial Court stationed in
Bugasong, Antique (RTC) instituted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
Western Visayas Regional Office, represented by Regional Director Atty. Oscar L.
Embido.

Antecedent

On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the RTC, received a written
communication from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a Solicitor in the United Kingdom (UK).
The letter requested a copy of the decision dated February 12, 1997 rendered by Judge
Rafael O. Penuela in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the
Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was one Shirley
Quioyo.1

On September 9, 2004, the RTC received another letter from Mr. Hunt, reiterating the
request for a copy of the decision in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the
Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna.2

Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the records of Special
Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive
Death of Rey Laserna. It was then discovered that the RTC had no record of Special
Proceedings No. 084 wherein Shirley Quioyo was the petitioner. Instead, the court files
revealed that Judge Penuela had decided Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the
Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rolando Austria, whose petitioner
was one Serena Catin Austria.

Informed that the requested decision and case records did not exist, 3 Mr. Hunt sent a
letter dated October 12, 2004 attaching a machine copy of the purported decision in
Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive
Death of Rey Laserna that had been presented by Shirley Quioyo in court proceedings
in the UK.4

After comparing the two documents and ascertaining that the document attached to the
October 12, 2004 letter was a falsified court document, Judge Penuela wrote Mr. Hunt
to apprise him of the situation.5

The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the Clerk of Court to communicate on
the situation in writing to the NBI, triggering the investigation of the falsification.6

In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley Quioyo, executed an affidavit on

March 4, 2005,7 wherein he stated that it was the respondent who had facilitated the
issuance of the falsified decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter
of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna for a fee of ₱60,000.00. The
allegations against the respondent were substantially corroborated by Mary Rose
Quioyo, a sister of Shirley Quioyo, in an affidavit dated March 20, 2005. 8

The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side,9 but he invoked his constitutional
right to remain silent. The NBI also issued subpoenas to Shirley Quioyo and Dy Quioyo
but only the latter appeared and gave his sworn statement.

After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman for
Visayas the records of the investigation, with a recommendation that the respondent be
prosecuted for falsification of public document under Article 171, 1 and 2, of the Revised
Penal Code, and for violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act).10 The NBI likewise recommended to the Office of the Court
Administrator that disbarment proceedings be commenced against the
respondent.11 Then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a Member of the
Court) officially endorsed the recommendation to the Office of the Bar Confidant. 12

Upon being required by the Court, the respondent submitted his counter-
affidavit,13 whereby he denied any participation in the falsification. He insisted that Dy
Quioyo had sought his opinion on Shirley’s petition for the annulment of her marriage;
that he had given advice on the pertinent laws involved and the different grounds for the
annulment of marriage; that in June 2004, Dy Quioyo had gone back to him to present a
copy of what appeared to be a court decision;14 that Dy Quioyo had then admitted to
him that he had caused the falsification of the decision; that he had advised Dy Quioyo
that the falsified decision would not hold up in an investigation; that Dy Quioyo, an
overseas Filipino worker (OFW), had previously resorted to people on Recto Avenue in
Manila to solve his documentation problems as an OFW; and that he had also learned
from Atty. Angeles Orquia, Jr. that one Mrs. Florencia Jalipa, a resident of Igbalangao,
Bugasong, Antique, had executed a sworn statement before Police Investigator
Herminio Dayrit with the assistance of Atty. Orquia, Jr. to the effect that her late
husband, Manuel Jalipa, had been responsible for making the falsified document at the
instance of Dy Quioyo.15

Thereafter, the Court issued its resolution16 treating the respondent’s counter-affidavit
as his comment, and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In a report and recommendation dated June 14, 2006, 17 Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the
IBP Investigating Commissioner, found the respondent guilty of serious misconduct and
violations of the Attorney’s Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility , and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one year. She concluded that
the respondent had forged the purported decision of Judge Penuela by making it appear
that Special Proceedings No. 084 concerned a petition for declaration of presumptive
death of Rey Laserna, with Shirley Quioyo as the petitioner, when in truth and in fact the
proceedings related to the petition for declaration of presumptive death of Rolando
Austria, with Serena Catin Austria as the petitioner;18 and that the respondent had
received ₱60,000.00 from Dy Quioyo for the falsified decision. She rationalized her
conclusions thusly:

Respondent’s denials are not worthy of merit. Respondent contends that it was one
Manuel Jalipa (deceased) who facilitated the issuance and as proof thereof, he
presented the sworn statement of the widow of Florencia Jalipa (sic). Such a contention
is hard to believe. In the first place, if the decision was obtained in Recto, Manila, why
was it an almost verbatim reproduction of the authentic decision on file in Judge
Penuela’s branch except for the names and dates? Respondent failed to explain this.
Secondly, respondent did not attend the NBI investigation and merely invoked his right
to remain silent. If his side of the story were true, he should have made this known in
the investigation. His story therefore appears to have been a mere afterthought. Finally,
there is no plausible reason why Dy Quioyo and his sister, Mary Rose Quioyo would
falsely implicate him in this incident.19

In its Resolution No. XVII-2007-063 dated February 1, 200,20 the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved, with modification, the report and recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner by suspending the respondent from the practice of law
for six years.

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
70921 denying the respondent’s motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No.
XVII-2007-063. The IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the case to the Court in
accordance with Section 12(b), Rule 139-B22 of the Rules of Court.
On January 11, 2011, the Court resolved: (1) to treat the respondent’s
comment/opposition as his appeal by petition for review; (2) to consider the
complainant’s reply as his comment on the petition for review; (3) to require the
respondent to file a reply to the complainant’s comment within 10 days from notice; and
(4) to direct the IBP to transmit the original records of the case within 15 days from
notice.

Ruling

We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Indeed, the respondent was guilty
of grave misconduct for falsifying a court decision in consideration of a sum of money.

The respondent’s main defense consisted in blanket denial of the imputation. He

insisted that he had had no hand in the falsification, and claimed that the falsification
had been the handiwork of Dy Quioyo. He implied that Dy Quioyo had resorted to the
shady characters in Recto Avenue in Manila to resolve the problems he had
encountered as an OFW, hinting that Dy Quioyo had a history of employing
unscrupulous means to achieve his ends.

However, the respondent’s denial and his implication against Dy Quioyo in the illicit
generation of the falsified decision are not persuasive. Dy Quioyo’s categorical
declaration on the respondent’s personal responsibility for the falsified decision, which
by nature was positive evidence, was not overcome by the respondent’s blanket denial,
which by nature was negative evidence.23

Also, the imputation of wrongdoing against Dy Quioyo lacked credible specifics and did
not command credence.1âwphi1 It is worthy to note, too, that the respondent filed his
counter-affidavit only after the Court, through the en banc resolution of May 10, 2005,
had required him to comment.24 The belatedness of his response exposed his blanket
denial as nothing more than an after thought.

The respondent relied on the sworn statement supposedly executed by Mrs. Jalipa that
declared that her deceased husband had been instrumental in the falsification of the
forged decision. But such reliance was outrightly worthless, for the sworn statement of
the wife was rendered unreliable due to its patently hearsay character. In addition, the
unworthiness of the sworn statement as proof of authorship of the falsification by the
husband is immediately exposed and betrayed by the falsified decision being an almost
verbatim reproduction of the authentic decision penned by Judge Penuela in the real
Special Proceedings Case No. 084.

In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct
for having authored the falsification of the decision in a non-existent court proceeding.
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should
uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."
Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility not
to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent

transactions can justify a lawyer’s disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law.25 Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the court decision by the respondent
was an act that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act
made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the
falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person.
He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.

It then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar that they should do
nothing that may in any way or degree lessen the confidence of the public in their
professional fidelity and integrity.26 The Court will not hesitate to wield its heavy hand of
discipline on those among them who wittingly and willingly fail to meet the enduring
demands of their Attorney’s Oath for them to:

x x x support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; xxx do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; x x x not wittingly or willingly promote or sue on groundless, false or unlawful suit,
nor give aid nor consent to the same; x x x delay no man for money or malice, and x x x
conduct themselves as lawyers according to the best of their knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients x x x.

No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession is
always a privilege that the Court extends only to the deserving, and that the Court may
withdraw or deny the privilege to him who fails to observe and respect the Lawyer’s
Oath and the canons of ethical conduct in his professional and private capacities. He
may be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law not only for acts and omissions
of malpractice and for dishonesty in his professional dealings, but also for gross
misconduct not directly connected with his professional duties that reveal his unfitness
for the office and his unworthiness of the principles that the privilege to practice law
confers upon him.27 Verily, no lawyer is immune from the disciplinary authority of the
Court whose duty and obligation are to investigate and punish lawyer misconduct
committed either in a professional or private capacity.28The test is whether the conduct
shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer unworthy to continue as an
officer of the Court.29WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ASST.
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
DISBARS him effective upon receipt of this decision.

The Court DIRECTS the Bar Confidant to remove the name of ASST. PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. from the Roll of Attorneys.
This decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated proceedings to be
initiated against ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant the Office of
the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the country and to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

A.C. No. 8000 August 5, 2014

CHAMELYN A. AGOT, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LUIS P. RIVERA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court's resolution is a Complaint-Affidavit1 dated August 30, 2008 filed by
complainant Chamelyn A. Agot (complainant) against respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera
(respondent), charging him of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
and the lawyer's oath for misrepresentation, deceit, and failure to account for and return
her money despite several demands.

The Facts

In her Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleged that she was invited as maid of honor in
her best friend’s wedding on December 9, 2007 at the United States of America. To
facilitate the issuance of her United States (US) visa, complainant sought the services
of respondent who represented himself as an immigration lawyer. Thus, on November
17, 2007, they entered into a Contract of Legal Services (Contract),2 whereby
respondent undertook to facilitate and secure the release of a US immigrant visa in
complainant’s favor prior to the scheduled wedding. In consideration therefor,
complainant paid respondent the amount of ₱350,000.00 as downpayment and
undertook to pay the balance of ₱350,000.00 after the issuance of the US visa. 3 The
parties likewise stipulated that should complainant’s visa application be denied for any
reason other than her absence on the day of the interview and/or for records of criminal
conviction and/or any court-issued hold departure order, respondent is obligated to
return the said downpayment.4 However, respondent failed to perform his undertaking
within the agreed period. Worse, complainant was not even scheduled for interview in
the US Embassy. As the demand for refund of the downpayment was not heeded,
complainant filed a criminal complaint for estafa and the instant administrative complaint
against respondent.5

In his Comment6 dated December 5, 2008, respondent claimed that his failure to
comply with his obligation under the Contract was due to the false pretenses of a certain
Rico Pineda (Pineda), who he had believed to be a consul for the US Embassy and to
whom he delivered the amount given by the complainant. Respondent elaborated that
he had a business relationship with Pineda on the matter of facilitating the issuance of
US visas to his friends and family, including himself. He happened to disclose this to a
certain Joseph Peralta, who in turn referred his friend, the complainant, whose previous
US visa application had been denied, resulting in the execution of the Contract.
Respondent claimed that Pineda reneged on his commitments and could no longer be
located but, nonetheless, assumed the responsibility to return the said amount to
complainant.7 To buttress his claims, respondent attached pictures supposedly of his
friends and family with Pineda as well as electronic mail messages (e-mails) purportedly
coming from the latter.8

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation9 dated April 17, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable,
and accordingly, recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension for a period
of four (4) months, with a warning that a repetition of the same would invite a stiffer
penalty.10

The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of engaging in deceitful

conduct for: (a) misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer; (b) failing to deliver
the services he contracted; and (c) being remiss in returning complainant’s
downpayment of ₱350,000.00. The Investigating Commissioner did not lend credence
to respondent’s defense anent his purported transactions with Pineda considering that
the latter’s identity was not proven and in light of respondent’s self-serving evidence,
i.e., photographs and e-mails, which were bereft of any probative value.11

In a Resolution dated December 14, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously
adopted and approved the aforesaid report and recommendation with the modification
increasing the period of suspension to six (6) months and ordering respondent to return
the amount of ₱350,000.0012 to complainant within thirty (30) days from receipt of
notice, with legal interest from the date of demand.13

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable for violating the CPR.

The Court’s Ruling

After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBP’s findings,
subject to the modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed upon
respondent.

As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.14 In this regard, Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS

OF THE LANDAND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

In the instant case, respondent misrepresented himself as an immigration lawyer, which

resulted to complainant seeking his assistance to facilitate the issuance of her US visa
and paying him the amount of ₱350,000.00 as downpayment for his legal services. In
truth, however, respondent has no specialization in immigration law but merely had a
contact allegedly with Pineda, a purported US consul, who supposedly processes US
visa applications for him. However, respondent failed to prove Pineda’s identity
considering that the photographs and e-mails he submitted were all self-serving and
thus, as correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, bereft of any probative
value and consequently cannot be given any credence. Undoubtedly, respondent’s
deception is not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal
profession; it reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law.15

Corollary to such deception, respondent likewise failed to perform his obligations under
the Contract, which is to facilitate and secure the issuance of a US visa in favor of
complainant. This constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, to
wit:

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglecta legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client,
he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s
cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He
owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed upon him.16 Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by
his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively
liable,17 as in this case.

Furthermore, respondent violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when
he failed to refund the amount of ₱350,000.00 that complainant paid him, viz.:
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES
OF HIS CLIENTTHAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from the client.

xxxx

Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. x x x.

Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes
on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith.18 The highly fiduciary nature of this
relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property
collected or received for or from his client.19 Thus, a lawyer’s failure to return upon
demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in this case, gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as
of professional ethics.20

Anent the proper penalty for respondent’s acts, jurisprudence provides that in similar
cases where lawyers neglected their client’s affairs and, at the same time, failed to
return the latter’s money and/or property despite demand, the Court imposed upon them
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin,21 the
Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his failure to perform his
undertaking under his retainership agreement with his client and to return the money
given to him by the latter. Also, in Jinon v. Jiz, 22the Court suspended the lawyer for a
period of two (2) years for his failure to return the amount his client gave him for his
legal services which he never performed. In this case, not only did respondent fail to
facilitate the issuance of complainant’s US visa and return her money, he likewise
committed deceitful acts in misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer, resulting
in undue prejudice to his client. Under these circumstances, a graver penalty should be
imposed upon him. In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it appropriate to increase
the period of suspension from the practice of law of respondent from six (6) months, as
recommended by the IBP, to two (2) years.

Finally, the Court sustains the IBP's recommendation ordering respondent to return the
amount of ₱350,000.00 he received from complainant as downpayment. It is well to
note that "while the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only
revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer's administrative and not his
civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities
which are purely civil in nature - for instance, when the claim involves moneys received
by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct [from] and not
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement."23 Hence, since respondent received
the aforesaid amount as part of his legal fees, the Court finds the return thereof to be in
order.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera (respondent) is found guilty of violating
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon the finality of this
Decision, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.1âwphi1

Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Chamelyn A. Agot the

legal fees he received from the latter in the amount of ₱350,000.00 within ninety (90)
days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will
warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's record in this Court as attorney.
Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

A.C. No. 8313 July 14, 2015

PILAR IBANA-ANDRADE and CLARE SINFOROSA ANDRADE-

CASILIHAN, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

This is an administrative case filed against Atty. Eva Paita-Moya by Pilar Ibana-Andrade
and Clare Sinforosa Andrade-Casilihan. On 7 December 2009, this Court, through the
First Division, issued a Resolution1 referring the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or decision within ninety
(90) days from the receipt of records.

After the proceedings, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted to the
Supreme Court on 18 November 2013 its Notice of Resolution,2 alongside the Records
of the case. The IBP Board of Governors also passed a Resolution 3 on 13 February
2013 adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation4 of the Investigating
Commissioner for this case.
The Report and Recommendation summarizes the facts of this case as follows:

Here is complainants’ version. On October 3, 2007, complainant Pilar Andrade,

stockholder and Treasurer of Mabini College Inc. filed Civil Case No. 7617 for
Injunction, Mandamus and Damages before the Regional Trial Court of Daet,
Camarines Norte when she was illegally suspended by Luz Ibana-Garcia, Marcel
Lukban and respondent Atty. Eva Paita-Moya. In the said case then pending before the
Honorable Executive Judge Arniel Dating, respondent Atty. Eva Paita-Moya appeared
as counsel for all respondents.

Complainant Clare Sinforosa I. Andrade-Casilihan likewise filed an illegal dismissal

case against Mabini College Inc. and now pending before the Honorable Court of
Appeals. In the said labor case, respondent stood as counsel for Mabini College, Inc.
and co-respondent Luz I. Garcia and Marcel Lukban.

In another illegal dismissal case filed by Alven Bernardo I. Andrade on September 28,
2005 currently pending before the Court of Appeals, respondent acted as counsel for
Mabini College, Inc. Luz I. Garcia and Marcel Lukban.

After the aforementioned cases were filed, complainants had found out that on June 27,
2008, the Honorable Supreme Court promulgated a resolution in the case entitled
Wilson Cham versus Atty. Eva Paita-Moya docketed as A.C. No. 7484 suspending
respondent from the practice of law for one month.

Complainants were surprised. They later got a copy of the Office of the Bar Confidant’s
certification confirming that until date (apparently May 6, 2009, the dare [sic] OR No.
0304748 was issued) respondent’s suspension order has not yet been lifted.

On June 2, 2009, complainants were able to obtain a copy of the Supreme Court
Circular No. 51-2009 informing all courts that respondent was suspended from the
practice of law for one month and said suspension was received by respondent on June
15, 2008.

However, despite of the subject June 27, 2009 Resolution on July 15, 2008 and despite
knowledge of her suspension from the practice of law, the said resolution having been
further posted in the website of the Supreme Court and is available in CD Asia’s Lex
Libris, respondent continued to practice law in wilful disobedience of the Supreme
Court’s suspension order in A.C. No. 7494.

In fact from June 27, 2008 until May 2009, respondent filed the following papers and
pleadings as counsel in Civil Case No. 7617, to wit:

Comment to Motion for Voluntary Inhibition dated July 15, 2008.

Motion to Admit Answer which was undated but submitted on November 12, 2008.
An undated Comments/Opposition to the Petitioner’s Formal Offer of Evidence in
Support of the Application for Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction which was
received by petitioners’ counsel on November 26, 2008.Motion to Admit Amended
Motion for Reconsideration dated February 9, 2009 which was received by petitioners’
counsel on February 12, 2009.

Motion for Reconsideration dated January 23, 2009.

Motion to File Position Paper dated April 13, 2009; and

Pre-Trial Brief for Respondents dated May 13, 2009.

Also in connection with complainant Casahilan’s Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, respondent never withdrew her appearance. The same is true in the case of
Alven Bernardo Andrade. Respondent never withdrew her appearance therein.

Likewise and notwithstanding such suspension, respondent continued to practice law

and respondent clients in other cases before the four (4) branches of the Regional Trial
Court in Daet, Camarines Norte. Supporting this truthful assertion are the following:

CERTIFICATION dated May 29, 2009 issued by Atty. Michael Angelo S. Rieo, Branch
Clerk of Court, Branch 38, Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte.

CERTIFICATION dated November 24, 2009 issued by Atty. Elaine Gay R. Belen,
Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 39, Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte.

CERTIFICATION dated November 19, 2009 issued by Mr. Eddie E. Balonzo, Acting
Clerk of Court, Branch 40, Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte; and

CERTIFICATION dated November 5, 2009 issued by Mr. Chito B. Pacao, OIC/Legal

Researcher II, Branch 41, Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte.

And per the November 5, 2009 letter of Atty. Michael Mortimer G. Pajarillo, Chapter
President, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Camarines Norte Chapter, Daet,
Camarines Norte, respondent "xxx Atty. Eva Paita-Moya has not complied with the
order of the Supreme Court relative to her suspension from the practice of law from
June 27, 2008 up to the present.5

Respondent’s version, as stated in the Report,6 is that she started serving the
suspension order on 20 May 2009. This was also her position in her Manifestation and
Motion to Suspend Proceedings7 dated 30 September 2010. She likewise alleged
therein that she had filed with the Supreme Court in December 2009 an Urgent Motion
to Lift Order of Suspension with the Supreme Court, which was unresolved as of the
date of her Manifestation.8Additionally, she argued that the resolution of the initial
administrative case docketed as A.M. No. 7464 was material to her position in this
particular case.9
The issue in this case falls solely on the question of whether Respondent engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law, that is, the practice of law despite the clear language
of this Court’s suspension order.

The Report and Recommendation recommended that Respondent be found liable. We

adopt the same, with modification.

The suspension order was received by Respondent on July 15, 2008. 10 Despite this,
she continued to practice law in various cases, as shown by the pleadings she filed and
the certifications noted by the Report.11 In fact, she continued receiving various fees for
her services throughout the duration of her suspension.12

It is important to note that her defense consists of an admission that she was indeed
suspended, and allegedly served her suspension.13 She claimed that she never
received the resolution that had allegedly suspended her.14 By logical inference
therefore, her sole defense is ignorance of the resolution that suspended her.

However, the records of this very Court belie her statements. Office of the Court
Administrator Circular No. 51-2009 stated the following:

For your information and guidance, quoted hereunder is the dispositive portion of the
Resolution of the Third Division dated 27 June 2008, in Administrative Case No. 7494
entitled, "Wilson Cham vs. Atty. Eva Paita-Moya", to wit:

WHEREFORE, Atty. Eva Paita-Moya is found guilty of gross misconduct and hereby
SUSPENDED for one month from the practice of law, effective upon her receipt of this
Decision. She is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with
more severely.

On 15 July 2008, Atty. Moya received the said resolution as per Registry Return Receipt
No. 2320. (Emphases supplied)15

Moreover, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued a Certification dated 8 May 2009 that
the suspension of Atty. Paita-Moya in A.C. No. 7494 had not yet been lifted.16

We had laid down guidelines in Maniago v. De Dios,

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby RESOLVED that the following guidelines

be observed in the matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice
of law:

1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of
law, the Court shall render a decision imposing the penalty;

2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory
upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for
 reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision final
and executory;

3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn
Statement with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein
that he or she has desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared in any
court during the period of his or her suspension;

4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the
IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending
cases handled by him or her, and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;

5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondents compliance

with the order of suspension;

6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under
oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or
disbarment, as may be warranted.17

This case is not without precedent.18 Previously, we had already stated the standard for
discipline upon erring lawyers who continue practicing despite being suspended by the
Court, viz: Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any
lawful order of a superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor.

— A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

In Molina v. Atty. Magat, this court suspended further Atty. Ceferino R. Magat from the
practice of law for six months for practicing his profession despite this court's previous
order of suspension.1âwphi1 We impose the same penalty on Atty. Baliga for holding
his position as Regional Director despite lack of authority to practice law.19

The Commissioner recommended the suspension of respondent from the active

practice of law for six ( 6) months with stem warning that any similar infraction in the
future would be dealt with more severely.20 In light of this and the jurisprudence already
cited, we adopt the recommendation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA is found GUILTY of
violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for an additional period of six (6) months from her one (1) month
suspension, totaling seven (7) months from service of this resolution, with a WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of
the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to respondent's
record as member of the Bar.

Atty. Paita-Moya is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of her receipt of this
Decision, to determine the reckoning point when her suspension shall take effect.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

A.C. No. 7594, February 09, 2016

ADELPHA E. MALABED, Complainant, v. ATTY. MELJOHN B. DE LA

PEÑA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by Adelpha E. Malabed

(complainant) against Atty. Meljohn B. De la Peña (respondent) for
dishonesty and grave misconduct.

The Facts

In her Complaint1 dated 7 August 2007, complainant charged respondent

with dishonesty for "deliberately and repeatedly making falsehood" that
"misled the Court." First, complainant claimed that the Certificate to File
Action in the complaint filed by respondent refers to a different complaint,
that is the complaint filed by complainant's brother against Fortunato
Jadulco. In effect, there was no Certificate to File Action, which is required
for the filing of a civil action, in the complaint filed by respondent on behalf
of his client Fortunato Jadulco.

Second, complainant alleged that respondent did not furnish her counsel
with a copy of the free patent covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 1730, but respondent forwarded a copy to the Court of Appeals.
Complainant claimed that she could not properly defend herself without a
copy of the title. She further claimed that the title presented by respondent
was fabricated. To support such claim, complainant presented Certifications
from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the
Registry of Deeds in Naval, Biliran, allegedly confirming that there is no file
in their offices of OCT No. 1730.

Complainant also alleged that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest

when he represented the occupants of the lot owned by complainant's
family, who previously donated a parcel of land to the Roman Catholic
Church, which deed of donation respondent notarized.

Complainant further accused respondent of conniving with Regional Trial

Court (RTC), Naval, Biliran, Branch 16 Judge Enrique C. Asis, who was his
former client in an administrative case, to rule in his clients' favor.
Complainant narrated the outcomes in the "cases of Estrellers which were
filed in the [Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)] and reversed by the RTC,
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to favor respondent x x x and his
client[s] x x x."

Complainant charged respondent with grave misconduct when he defied the

accessory penalty of his dismissal as a judge. Respondent worked as
Associate Dean and Professor of the Naval Institute of Technology (NIT) -
University of Eastern Philippines College of Law, which is a government
institution, and received salaries therefor, in violation of the accessory
penalty of dismissal which is his perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in any government office.

In his Comment2 dated 16 December 2007, respondent basically denied the

charges against him. Respondent alleged that "the [Certificate to File Action]
he used when he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for quieting of title before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran was the certification of Lupon
Chairman, the late Rodulfo Catigbe, issued on May 9, 2001."3

Respondent also claimed that the free patent title was attached to the folio
of the records in Civil Case No. B-1118 and he furnished a copy of the same
to complainant's counsel. Assuming opposing counsel was not furnished,
respondent wondered why he raised this matter only upon filing of the
instant complaint.

Respondent argued that notarization of the deed of donation had no relation

to the case filed against the occupants of the lot. Respondent likewise
stressed that the matter regarding Judge Asis's rulings favorable to his
clients should be addressed to Judge Asis himself.

As regards the charge of grave misconduct for defying the accessory penalty
of dismissal from the service, respondent admitted that he accepted the
positions of Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT - University of Eastern
Philippines College of Law, which is a government institution. However,
respondent countered that he was no longer connected with the NIT College
of Law; and thus, this issue had become moot. Respondent further claimed
that his designation as Assistant Dean was only temporary, and he had not
received any salary except honorarium. Respondent stated that he even
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) and the MCLE Office a copy
of his designation as Associate Dean, and since there were no objections, he
proceeded to perform the functions appurtenant thereto. He likewise
submitted an affidavit from Edgardo Garcia, complainant in the
administrative case against him, who interposed no objection to his petition
for judicial clemency filed before this Court.

Complainant filed a Reply-Affidavit4 on 22 January 2008. Respondent filed a

Rejoinder to Reply5 on 20 February 2008. Complainant filed a Surrejoinder
to the Rejoinder to Reply6 on 20 February 2008. All these submissions
basically reiterated the respective arguments of the parties and denied each
other's allegations.

The Ruling of the IBP

In his Report and Recommendation,7 Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)

Commissioner Norberto B. Ruiz noted the foul language used by respondent
in his pleadings submitted before the IBP. Respondent described
complainant's counsel as "silahis" and accused complainant of "cohabiting
with a married man x x x before the wife of that married man died."
According to the IBP Commissioner, such offensive language "[is a] clear
manifestation[] of respondent's gross misconduct that seriously affect his
standing and character as an officer of the court."

With respect to the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct, the IBP
Commissioner found that respondent is guilty of the same "as evidenced by
the numerous documents attached by complainant in all the pleadings she
has submitted." Respondent committed acts of dishonesty and grave
misconduct (1) for using a Certificate to File Action which was used in a
complaint filed by complainant's brother Conrado Estreller against Fortunato
Jadulco, who is respondent's client; (2) for not furnishing complainant's
counsel with a copy of the free patent covered by OCT No. 1730 which was
attached to the Comment respondent filed with the Court of Appeals; and
(3) for accepting the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT -
University of Eastern Philippines College of Law and receiving salaries
therefor, in violation of the accessory penalty of prohibition on
reemployment in any government office as a result of his dismissal as a
judge.

The IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from

the practice of law for one year.8

On 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution

adopting the IBP Commissioner's recommendation. The Resolution reads:
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2011-137
Adm. Case No. 7594
Adelpha E. Malabed vs. Atty. Meljohn De La Peña

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED

and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A" and finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and finding
Respondent guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct, Atty. Meljohn B. De
La Peña is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.9
The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty and
grave misconduct.

The Ruling of the Court

Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

Using foul language in pleadings

In his Comment, respondent called complainant's counsel "silahis by nature

and complexion"10 and accused complainant of "cohabiting with a married
man x x x before the wife of that married man died."11 In his Rejoinder,
respondent maintained that such language is not foul, but a "dissertation of
truth designed to debunk complainant's and her counsel's credibility in filing
the administrative case."12
We are not convinced. Aside from such language being inappropriate, it is
irrelevant to the resolution of this case. While respondent is entitled and
very much expected to defend himself with vigor, he must refrain from using
improper language in his pleadings. In Saberon v. Larong,13 we stated:
x x x [W]hile a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage,
such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language.
Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain
from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor
or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the
cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dignified.
For using improper language in his pleadings, respondent violated Rule 8.01
of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states:
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Non-submission of certificate to file action

The submission of the certificate to file action, which evidences the non-
conciliation between the parties in the barangay, is a pre-condition for the
filing of a complaint in court.14 Complainant claims that there is no such
certificate in the complaint filed by respondent on behalf of Fortunato
Jadulco, et al. Instead, what respondent submitted was the certificate to file
action in the complaint filed by complainant's brother, Conrado Estreller,
against Fortunato Jadulco.15

Respondent counters that what he used "when he filed Civil Case No. [B-]
1118 for Quieting of Title, etc. x x x was the certification x x x issued on May
9, 2001, x x x."

Based on the records, the complaint for quieting of title in Civil Case No. B-
1118 was filed with the RTC on 18 October 2000. The Certificate of
Endorsement, which respondent claimed was the certificate to file action he
used in Civil Case No. B-1118, was issued on 9 May 2001, or after the filing
of the complaint on 18 October 2000. It is apparent that the Certificate of
Endorsement did not exist yet when the complaint in Civil Case No. B-1118
was filed. In other words, there is no truth to respondent's allegation that
the subject matter of Civil Case No. B-1118 was brought before the Lupon
Tagapamayapa and that a certificate to file action was issued prior to the
filing of the complaint. Clearly, respondent misrepresented that he filed a
certificate to file action when there was none, which act violated Canon 10,
Rule 10.01, and Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of
any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the

contents of a paper, x x x.
Failure to furnish opposing counsel with copy of title

With regard to respondent's alleged act of not furnishing complainant's

counsel with a copy of the free patent title, we find that it does not
constitute dishonesty.

Admittedly, the Court of Appeals was furnished a copy of OCT No. 1730,
which means that a copy of the title exists. There is no showing that
respondent deliberately did not furnish complainant's counsel with a copy of
the title. The remedy of complainant should have been to file with the Court
of Appeals a motion to furnish complainant or counsel with a copy of the title
so she and her counsel could examine the same.

Moreover, whether OCT No. 1730 is fabricated, as complainant alleges, is a

question of fact demanding an examination of the parties' respective
evidence. Obviously, this matter falls outside the scope of this administrative
case, absent any clear and convincing proof that respondent himself
orchestrated such fabrication. The DENR and Registry of Deeds certifications
do not prove that respondent manufactured OCT No. 1730. Such documents
merely confirm that OCT No. 1730 does not exist in their official records.

Conflict of interest

Complainant accuses respondent of conflict of interest when the latter

allegedly notarized a deed of donation of a parcel of land executed by
complainant's family in favor of the Roman Catholic Church. Eventually,
respondent allegedly sought to litigate as counsel for the opposing parties
who are occupants in the lot owned by complainant's family.

Suffice to state that notarization is different from representation. A notary

public simply performs the notarial acts authorized by the Rules on Notarial
Practice, namely, acknowledgments, oaths and affirmations, jurats,
signature witnessings, and copy certifications. Legal representation, on the
other hand, refers to the act of assisting a party as counsel in a court action.

As regards complainant's serious accusations against respondent of

conniving with Judge Asis and conspiring with the latter to render judgments
favorable to respondent's clients, such are bare allegations, without any
proof. Complainant simply narrated the outcomes of the proceedings in Civil
Case Nos. 1017, 860 and 973, which were filed by the Estrellers in the MCTC
and reversed by the RTC. Complainant conveniently failed to present any
concrete evidence proving her grave accusation of conspiracy between
respondent and Judge Asis. Moreover, charges of bias and partiality on the
part of the presiding judge should be filed against the judge, and not against
the counsel allegedly favored by the judge.

Violation of prohibition on reemployment in government office

In our 9 February 1994 Resolution,16 we dismissed respondent as Acting

Judge of Municipal Trial Court of Naval, Leyte and Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Caibiran-Culaba, Leyte for partiality, with
prejudice to reappointment to any public office, including government-owned
or controlled corporations.

There is no dispute that respondent knows full well the consequences of his
dismissal as a judge, one of which is the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in any government office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Despite being disqualified,
respondent accepted the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of NIT-
College of Law, a government institution, and received compensation
therefor.

Respondent alleges that his designation was only temporary, and "no fixed
salary was attached to his designation except for honorarium." Respondent
also claims that he furnished a copy of his designation to the OBC and MCLE
office as a "gesture of x x x respect, courtesy and approval from the
Supreme Court." He further avers that complainant in the administrative
case against him (as a judge) posed no objection to his petition for
clemency.

Respondent's contentions are untenable. The prohibition on reemployment

does not distinguish between permanent and temporary appointments.
Hence, that his designation was only temporary does not absolve him from
liability. Further, furnishing a copy of his designation to the OBC and MCLE
office does not in any way extinguish his permanent disqualification from
reemployment in a government office. Neither does the fact that
complainant in his previous administrative case did not object to his petition
for clemency.

In view of his disqualification from reemployment in any government office,

respondent should have declined from accepting the designation and
desisted from performing the functions of such positions.17Clearly,
respondent knowingly defied the prohibition on reemployment in a public
office imposed upon him by the Court.

In Santeco v. Avance,18 where respondent lawyer "willfully disobeyed this

Court when she continued her law practice despite the five-year suspension
order," the Court held that failure to comply with Court directives constitutes
gross misconduct, insubordination or disrespect which merits a lawyer's
suspension or even disbarment.

Gross Misconduct

In sum, respondent committed gross misconduct for (1) misrepresenting

that he submitted a certificate to file action issued by the Lupon
Tagapamayapa when in fact there was none prior to the institution of the
civil action of his client, Fortunato Jadulco, in Civil Case No. B-1118; (2)
using improper language in his pleadings; and (3) defying willfully the
Court's prohibition on reemployment in any government office as accessory
penalty of his dismissal as a judge. Gross misconduct is defined as "improper
or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies
a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment."19

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct is a
ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so
to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In view of respondent's repeated gross misconduct, we increase the IBP's
recommended penalty to suspension from the practice of law for two (2)
years.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Meljohn B. De la Peña GUILTY of

gross misconduct and accordingly SUSPEND him from the practice of law for
two (2) years with a WARNING that the commission of the same or similar
act or acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
the Office of the Bar Confidant, and all courts in the Philippines for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10628 July 1, 2015

MAXIMINO NOBLE III, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ORLANDO O. AILES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This instant administrative case arose from a verified Complaint1 for disbarment dated
April 16, 2012 filed by complainant Maximino Noble III (Maximino) against respondent
Atty. Orlando O. Ailes (Orlando) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

The Facts

Maximino alleged that on August 18, 2010, Orlando, a lawyer, filed a Complaint 2 for
damages against his own brother, Marcelo 0. Ailes, Jr. (Marcelo), whom Maximino
represented, together with other defendants, therein. In the said complaint, Orlando
stated the following data: "IBP-774058-12/07 /09-QC x x x MCLE Compliance No. II-
00086893 /Issued on March 10, 2008."4 Maximino claimed that at the time of the filing of
the said complaint. Orlando’s IBP O.R. number should have already reflected payment
of his IBP annual dues for the year 2010, not 2009, and that he should have finished his
third Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance, not just the second.

Sometime in December 2011, Maximino learned from Marcelo that the latter had filed a
separate case for grave threats and estafa5 against Orlando .. When Maximino was
furnished a copy · of the complaint, he discovered that, through text messages, Orlando
had been maligning him and dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as counsel,
claiming that he was incompetent and that he charged exorbitant fees, saying, among
others: " x x x Better dismiss [your] hi-track lawyer who will impoverish [you] with his
unconscionable [professional] fee. Max Noble, as shown in court records, never
appeared even once, that's why you lost in the pre-trial stage. x x x get rid of [Noble] as
[your] lawyer. He is out to squeeze a lot of money from [you]. x x x daig mo nga
mismong abogado mong polpol."6 Records show that Orlando even prepared a Notice
to Terminate Services of CounseI7 in the complaint for damages, which stated that
Maximina "x x x has never done anything to protect the interests of the defendants in a
manner not befitting his representation as a seasoned law practitioner and, aside from
charging enormous amount of professional fees and questionable expenses, said
counsel's contracted services reached as far only in preparing and filing uncalled for
motions to dismiss x x x" as well as a Compromise Agreement,8 both of which he sent
to Marcelo for his signature. Affronted, Maximino filed the instant complaint charging
Orlando with violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), Bar Matter (BM) Nos. 8509and 192210, and prayed
for the disbarment of respondent as well as the award of damages.

In his defense,11 Orlando denied the charges against him and claimed that his late
submission of the third MCLE compliance is not a ground for disbarment and that the
Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel and Compromise Agreement were all made
upon the request of Marcelo when the latter was declared in default in the
aforementioned civil case. Moreover, he insisted that the allegedly offensive language in
his text messages sent to Marcelo was used in a "brother-to-brother communication"
and were uttered in good faith.12

Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave threats and estafa filed by Marcelo against
Orlando was downgraded to unjust vexation13 and, on June 19, 2012, after voluntarily
entering a plea of guilty, Orlando was convicted of the crime of unjust vexation,
consisting in his act of vexing or annoying Marcelo by "texting insulting, threatening and
persuading words to drop his lawyer over a case x x x. "14

IBP Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation15 dated April 30, 2013, the IBP Commissioner
recommended the dismissal of the case against Orlando, finding that a transgression of
the MCLE compliance requirement is not a ground for disbarment as in fact, failure to
disclose the required information would merely cause the dismissal of the case and the
expunction of the pleadings from the records. Neither did the IBP Commissioner find
any violation of the CPR so gross or grave as to warrant any administrative liability on
the part of Orlando, considering that the communication between Orlando and Marcelo,
who are brothers, was done privately and not directly addressed to Maximino nor
intended to be published and known by third persons.

In a Resolution16 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the IBP Commissioner's Report and Recommendation and dismissed the
case against Orlando, warning him to be more circumspect in his dealings. Maximino
moved for reconsideration17 which was however denied in a Resolution18 dated May 3,
2014 with modification deleting the warning.

Aggrieved, Maximino filed the present petition for review on certiorari. 19

 The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the IBP correctly dismissed the
complaint against Orlando.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal
proficiency and morality.20 It is a special privilege burdened with conditions before the
legal profession, the courts, their clients and the society such that a lawyer has the duty
to comport himself in a manner as to uphold integrity and promote the public's faith in
the profession.21 Consequently, a lawyer must at all times, whether in public or private
life, act in a manner beyond reproach especially when dealing with fellow lawyers. 22

In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR provides:

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or
favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or
neglectful counsel.

Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified
and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession.1âwphi1 The use of
intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of the judicial
forum.23 In Buatis Jr. v. People,24 the Court treated a lawyer's use of the words "lousy,"
"inutile," "carabao English," "stupidity," and "satan" in a letter addressed to another
colleague as defamatory and injurious which effectively maligned his integrity. Similarly,
the hurling of insulting language to describe the opposing counsel is considered conduct
unbecoming of the legal profession.25 In this case, the IBP found the text messages that
Orlando sent to his brother Marcelo as casual communications considering that they
were conveyed privately. To the Court's mind, however, the tenor of the messages
cannot be treated lightly. The text messages were clearly intended to malign and annoy
Maximino, as evident from the use of the word ''polpol" (stupid). Likewise, Orlando's
insistence that Marcelo immediately terminate the services of Maximino indicates
Orlando's offensive conduct against his colleague, in violation of the above-quoted
rules. Moreover, Orlando's voluntary plea of guilty to the crime of unjust vexation in the
criminal case filed against him by Marcelo was, for all intents and purposes, an
admission that he spoke ill, insulted, and disrespected Maximino - a departure from the
judicial decorum which exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.

On this score, it must be emphasized that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions such that a lawyer's words and actions directly affect the public's opinion
of the legal profession. Lawyers are expected to observe such conduct of nobility and
uprightness which should remain with them, whether in their public or private lives, and
may be disciplined in the event their conduct falls short of the standards imposed upon
them.26 Thus, in this case, it is inconsequential that the statements were merely relayed
to Orlando's brother in private. As a member of the bar, Orlando should have been more
circumspect in his words, being fully aware that they pertain to another lawyer to whom
fairness as well as candor is owed. It was highly improper for Orlando to interfere and
insult Maximino to his client.

Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings, as in this case,

constitutes unprofessional conduct which subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.27 While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language.28 The Court has
consistently reminded the members of the bar to abstain from all offensive personality
and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party. Considering
the circumstances, it is glaringly clear how Orlando transgressed the CPR when he
maligned Maximino to his client.29

With regard to Orlando's alleged violation of BM No. 1922, the Court agrees with the
IBP that his failure to disclose the required information for MCLE compliance in the
complaint for damages he had filed against his brother Marcelo is not a ground for
disbarment. At most, his violation shall only be cause for the dismissal of the complaint
as well as the expunction thereof from the records.30

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes GUILTY of violating
Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is hereby ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in dealing with his
professional colleagues and STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
A.C. No. 7241 October 17, 2011
[Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1506]

ATTY. FLORITA S. LINCO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

The instant case stemmed from an Administrative Complaint1 dated June 6, 2005 filed
by Atty. Florita S. Linco (complainant) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
against Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal for disciplinary action for his failure to perform his duty
as a notary public, which resulted in the violation of their rights over their property.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Complainant claimed that she is the widow of the late Atty. Alberto Linco (Atty. Linco),
the registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements, consisting of 126 square
meters, located at No. 8, Macopa St., Phase I-A, B, C & D, Valley View Executive
Village, Cainta, Rizal and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 259001.

Complainant alleged that Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal (respondent), a notary public for
Mandaluyong City, notarized a deed of donation2 allegedly executed by her husband in
favor of Alexander David T. Linco, a minor. The notarial acknowledgment thereof also
stated that Atty. Linco and Lina P. Toledo (Toledo), mother of the donee, allegedly
personally appeared before respondent on July 30, 2003, despite the fact that
complainant’s husband died on July 29, 2003.3

Consequently, by virtue of the purported deed of donation, the Register of Deeds of

Antipolo City cancelled TCT No. 259001 on March 28, 20054 and issued a new TCT No.
292515 in the name of Alexander David T. Linco.

Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant complaint. She claimed that respondent's
reprehensible act in connivance with Toledo was not only violative of her and her
children's rights but also in violation of the law. Respondent's lack of honesty and
candor is unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar.

In his Answer,6 respondent admitted having notarized and acknowledged a deed of

donation executed by the donor, Atty. Linco, in favor of his son, Alexander David T.
Linco, as represented by Lina P. Toledo.

Respondent narrated that on July 8, 2003, he was invited by Atty. Linco, through an
emissary in the person of Claire Juele-Algodon (Algodon), to see him at his residence
located at Guenventille II D-31-B, Libertad Street, Mandaluyong City. Respondent was
then informed that Atty. Linco was sick and wanted to discuss something with him.

Respondent pointed out that Atty. Linco appeared to be physically weak and sickly, but
was articulate and in full control of his faculties. Atty. Linco showed him a deed of
donation and the TCT of the property subject of the donation. Respondent claimed that
Atty. Linco asked him a favor of notarizing the deed of donation in his presence along
with the witnesses.

However, respondent explained that since he had no idea that he would be notarizing a
document, he did not bring his notarial book and seal with him. Thus, he instead told
Algodon and Toledo to bring to his office the signed deed of donation anytime at their
convenience so that he could formally notarize and acknowledge the same.

On July 30, 2003, respondent claimed that Toledo and Algodon went to his law office
and informed him that Atty. Linco had passed away on July 29, 2003. Respondent was
then asked to notarize the deed of donation. Respondent admitted to have consented
as he found it to be his commitment to a fellow lawyer. Thus, he notarized the subject
deed of donation, which was actually signed in his presence on July 8, 2003.

During the mandatory conference/hearing on September 7, 2005, it was established

that indeed the deed of donation was presented to respondent on July 8,
2003.7 Respondent, likewise, admitted that while he was not the one who prepared the
deed of donation, he, however, performed the notarization of the deed of donation only
on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died.81avvphi1

On November 23, 2005, in its Report and Recommendation,9 the IBP-Commission on

Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of violating the Notarial Law and the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

The IBP-CBD observed that respondent wanted it to appear that because the donor
appeared before him and signed the deed of donation on July 8, 2003, it was just
ministerial duty on his part to notarize the deed of donation on July 30, 2003, a day after
Atty. Linco died. The IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent should know that the parties
who signed the deed of donation on July 8, 2003, binds only the signatories to the deed
and it was not yet a public instrument. Moreover, since the deed of donation was
notarized only on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died, the acknowledgement
portion of the said deed of donation where respondent acknowledged that Atty. Linco
"personally came and appeared before me" is false. This act of respondent is also
violative of the Attorney's Oath "to obey the laws" and "do no falsehood."

The IBP-CBD, thus, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year, and that his notarial commission be revoked and he be
disqualified from re-appointment as notary public for a period of two (2) years.
On April 27, 2006, in Resolution No. XVII-2006-215,10 the IBP-Board of Governors
resolved to adopt and approve the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Respondent moved for reconsideration, but was denied.11

On July 29, 2009, considering respondent's petition for review dated May 19, 2009 of
IBP Resolution No. XVII-2006-215 dated April 27, 2006 and IBP Resolution No. XVIII-
2008-678 dated December 11, 2008, denying complainant's motion for reconsideration
and affirming the assailed resolution, the Court resolved to require complainant to file
her comment.12

In her Compliance,13 complainant maintained that respondent has not stated anything
new in his motion for reconsideration that would warrant the reversal of the
recommendation of the IBP. She maintained that respondent violated the Notarial Law
and is unfit to continue being commissioned as notary public; thus, should be
sanctioned for his infractions.

On August 16, 2011, in view of the denial of respondent's motion for reconsideration,
the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court, recommended that the instant
complaint is now ripe for judicial adjudication.

RULING

The findings and recommendations of the IBP are well taken.

There is no question as to respondent's guilt. The records sufficiently established that

Atty. Linco was already dead when respondent notarized the deed of donation on July
30, 2003. Respondent likewise admitted that he knew that Atty. Linco died a day before
he notarized the deed of donation. We take note that respondent notarized the
document after the lapse of more than 20 days from July 8, 2003, when he was
allegedly asked to notarize the deed of donation. The sufficient lapse of time from the
time he last saw Atty. Linco should have put him on guard and deterred him from
proceeding with the notarization of the deed of donation.

However, respondent chose to ignore the basics of notarial procedure in order to

accommodate the alleged need of a colleague. The fact that respondent previously
appeared before him in person does not justify his act of notarizing the deed of
donation, considering the affiant's absence on the very day the document was
notarized. In the notarial acknowledgment of the deed of donation, respondent attested
that Atty. Linco personally came and appeared before him on July 30, 2003. Yet
obviously, Atty. Linco could not have appeared before him on July 30, 2003, because
the latter died on July 29, 2003. Clearly, respondent made a false statement and
violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer.

We will reiterate that faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the
oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct.14 Respondent should not notarize a
document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of
what are stated therein.15

Time and again, we have repeatedly reminded notaries public of the importance
attached to the act of notarization. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified
or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into
a public document; thus, making that document admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to
rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private
instrument.16

For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in
the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of
this form of conveyance would be undermined.17Hence, again, a notary public should
not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and
truth of what are stated therein.

This responsibility is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer. A graver
responsibility is placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to
do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. He is mandated to the sacred duties
appertaining to his office, such duties, being dictated by public policy and impressed
with public interest.18 Respondent's failure to perform his duty as a notary public
resulted not only in damaging complainant's rights over the property subject of the
donation but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public. He should, therefore,
be held liable for his acts, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.

In Lanuzo v. Atty. Bongon,19 respondent having failed to discharge his duties as a

notary public, the revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years and suspension from the
practice of law for one year were imposed. We deem it proper to impose the same
penalty.

WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional Responsibility,
the notarial commission of respondent ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL, is REVOKED. He
is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two years. He is
also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year, effective
immediately. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of receipt of this Decision
in order to determine when his suspension shall take effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision
likewise be attached to the personal records of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice