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ABSTRACT
Insulation coordination in air-insulated substations has been a stages of substation development since growth generally reduces
subject of interest for many years. The cost of EHV substations re- the risk of major substation equipment [3-121. The approach used
quires careful assessment of the insulation coordination para- requires several steps. Initially, the definition of impulse stresses
meters. Early work by R. L. Witzke and T. J. Bliss [l]in 1950 pro- (including probability) based on backflashovers, shielding failures,
vided a method to investigate surge arrester location parameters. and direct strokes to the substation buswork will be discussed.
Definitive work on lightning traveling waves was reported by C. F. Next, the results of specific simulations will be illustrated and the
Wagner, I. W. Gross and B. L. Lloyd [Z] in 1954.These techniques method of analysis presented.
provided the basis for a number of papers which conducted in-depth
analysis on both general and specific systems [3-121. Finally, the results will be compared to the Georgia Power
Company experience, the criteria for future design acceptance dis-
In the 19708, attention turned to the coordination characteris- cussed, and conclusions drawn.
tics of sF6 substations [13-201. Also during this time, additional in-
sight into the lightning backflashover and shielding failure char-
acteristics was presented and then summarized by G. W. Brown [Zl,
221. Finally, additional work in impulse wave propagation was pre-
sented [23] and improved computer analysis techniques were de-
scribed [17-191. Based on the substantial field experience of the
Georgia Power Company’s 500-kV outdoor substations, it is impor-
tant tQ re-examine the insulation coordination with the improved
knowledge and tools available to provide an in-depth understand-
ing of the substation performance and to recommend arrester ap-
plication for future situations.
570
Method of Analysis with 60 Hz voltage polarity the same as the lightning surge. This is
opposite to the conventional theory. It is also significant to note
Before the voltages listed in Table I can be easily interpreted, that the peak voltage at Node 2! is well below the peak for other 60
equipment insulation levels as outlined in Table I1 should be re- Hz polarities; therefore, the most severe duty for the circuit break-
.viewed. Since transformers are not present in this initial stage of ers in the normal silbstation operating configuration occurs when
the transmission substation, all the substation equipment has a surges originate within 0.4 km (% mile) and the 60 H z polarity is
rated BIL of 1800-kV (4.41 P.u.). The actual impulse flashover the same as the lightning surge. This result emphasizes the need to
strength of the buswork and the transmission line are 2240-kV (5.49 investigate different 60 Hz polarities. The resulting peak voltages
P.u.) and 2180-kV (5.34 P.u.), respectively. Returning to Table I, in- throughout the substation are shown in Figure 4 for this .4 km (l/q
terest is directed toward situations where the voltage exceeds the mile) surge.
BIL at equipment locations. Reference to Figure 1 indicates that the
breaker voltages are listed at Nodes 5 , 8 and 14. Several significant Since the voltage at the line entrance (Node 2) exceeds the criti-
observations are made. First, the peak voltage for all but the 4.0 km cal flashover voltage by 8%, it is likely to flashover; however, the
(2% mile) waves occurs at the line entrance (Node 2) where the line breaker BIL is also exceeded itnd may flashover. Additional in-
TABLE I1
INSULATION LEVELS
(1 D.U. = 408-kV Crest)
* Assumed
** A margin of 10% (1980-kV o r 4.85 P . u . ) i s iissumed f o r CCVTs.
No margin i s allowed-for breakers o r transformers.
surge impedance is connected to the bus surge impedande. Also, cri- sight is gained by examination of the transient waveshapes a t
,tical flashover voltage of the buswork is exceeded for the 0.4 km (Ih Nodes 2, 8 and 14. Figure 5 shows strip chart recordings for these
mile) waves and the highest voltage 6.23 p.u. occurs when the 60 Hz locations. It is apparent that thiese transients do not closely ap-
voltage is of opposite polarity to the lightning surge. This agrees proximate the impulse test waveshapes. For comparison, Figure 6
with traditional theory that the steepest wavefront and the largest shows the superposition of impulse test waveshapes of 1.2 x 50psec.
change in voltage (AV) will produce the most severe transient. In It is difficult to make engineering judgments on the flashover pos-
this transmission substation.air flashovers are not considered ser- sibilities, but if it is conservatively assumed that the gap voltage
ious long-term problems since no damage will occur and reclosing (Node 2) may not flashover, no margin is provided for the breakers
will reenergize the system rapidly. Even though the peak voltages relative to the BIL test. Therefore, the breakers could be considered
may be somewhat lower, the concern is the possibility of exceeding vulnerable in this situation and the chances of a failure should be
the breaker BIL. When the results for Nodes 5, 8 and 14 are re- evaluated. However, before the probability of this situation is esti-
viewed, it is noted that the BIL for breakers is exceeded only on one mated, the application of a rod gap is considered.
wave. It is significant that this occurs for the 0.4 km (% mile) wave
c.0+La ' ' ' ' " ' ' ' ' ' ).
P
E
A
K
U 5.8
0
Ill 1 p.u.
voltage
\
tE 4.0 -0-
I
N NODE 14
P
g 3.8
0-
U
N Figure 5. Figure 6.
I
T2.0
4 is 18 Figure5. Recorded voltage waveshapes a t nodes 2 , 8 , and
.I> 14 (See Figure 1).
Figure 4. Peak voltages for transmission substation (Fig. 1)for a Figure6 BIL and CFO test waveshapes superimposed on
surge originating .4km from line C entrance. transient Waveshapes.
571
It is not possible to accurately predict the exact flashover char- As previously discussed, the magnitude of these surges will
acteristics of a rod gap when stressed by unusual waveshapes. vary depending upon the initial stroke characteristics; however, it
However, for speculative purposes, assume a gap could be designed is conservatively assumed that each surge will approach the peak
to sparkover at approximately 4.5 p.u. and located at the overhead- voltage which can be transmitted down the line without additional
bus junction. This would provide additional breaker protection, but flashovers.
would be likely to sparkover for numerous other surges. For ex-
ample, Table I shows that this gap would sparkover for all surges Substation Performance f o r Normal Operation
occurring within 2.4 km (1%miles) to 3.2 km (2 miles) of the substa-
tion. In addition, the switching surge gap sparkover would make In the previous paragraphs, it was shown it is possible that
the system more susceptible to this type flashover. These factors surges originating within 0.4 km (YImi) of the switching station
would possibly increase the line tripout rate; therefore, it is desir- could cause voltages in excess of the breaker BIL and that tripout
able to avoid the use of rod gaps unless the probability of breaker surges on a particular 0.4 km (Ih mi) section of line could occur
failure is high. every 926 years. There are three lines entering the switching sta-
tion and the results are similar for each; therefore, 309 years will be
It has been suggested [19] that a probabilistic approach can be the mean recurrence interval between surges entering the station.
used to evaluate the frequency of occurrence of the stresses des- Also, it may be assumed that the peak 60 Hz voltage has approxi-
cribed above. It is important to estimate this probability at this mately a 113 chance of being the same polarity as the surge lead-
time since the substation will remain in this “normal” operating ing to a mean recurrence interval of 926 years for the case
configuration most of the time during its five-year life. analyzed. The switching station in this initial development stage
will have a n approximate lifetime of only 5 years before expansion.
Lightning Surge Probabilities For this period, the total probability of the occurrence of surges
which exceed the breaker-tested BIL is estimated at 0.0054. It is
The lightning performance of transmission lines has been dis- also recognized that even though the breaker is not guaranteed for
cussed in many papers and is beyond the scope of this paper. The stresses above the BIL, most flashovers will be in air and not cause
lripout rate has been estimated for the Georgia Power Company catastrophic failures. Therefore, it is concluded that in the normal
500-kV lines to range from 0.38 per 100 km per year (method simi- operating configuration, the switching station performance will be
lar to that described in [21,22]) to 0.42 per 100 km per year [23]. Per-
haps more significant than the estimated tripout rate is the line excellent.
performance history of 0.27 tripout per 100 km per year average
over a four-year period (Figure 7). More typical configurations, after the intial development
phase, for transmission substations are those dontaining trans-
formers with surge arresters located close to the transformer bush-
ings. Simulations have shown that voltages in these stations
1 .E?
caused by steep-fronted waves are reduced as the number of lines
terminated increases; although, the waves causing the most severe
T* transients are again not predictable by conventional theory. The
R configuration containing one line terminated with a transformer
1 (Figure 8) is the most severe case with air flashovers a virtual cer-
P
0 tainty for the waves considered, as indicated in Table 111.
U
T0.5 Analysis similar to that done for the switching station initial
stage indicates that station performance under normal operating
conditions will be satisfactory. A mean recurrence interval of 93
years between surges originating within 4.0 km (2% mi) of the sub-
station is expected. When surges do occur in this configuration, the
line entrance performs the function of a protective rod-gap.
C - 60 HZ VOLTAGE - OPPOSITE POLARITY Figure 11. Transmission substation configuration with a breaker
out. for service.
NODE 14 NODE 18
p.u.
TR#SSnISSIM
oltage
1 psec
Figure 12. Recorded voltage waveshapes a t nodes 14 and 18 (See
Figure 11) with BIL and CFO curves superimposed.
573
seconds, a pair of breakers would be vulnerable approximately1.1 GENERATING PLANT SUBSTATION RESULTS
seconds per year for the possible second components of tripout
surges within 4.0 km (2% mi) of the substation, or for initial tripout The lightning performance of the generating plant substa-
surges within 4.0 km (2% mi) on adjacent line terminations. tions, whose electrical characteristics and expansion patterns are
somewhat different from transmission substations, was investi-
Substation Performance f o r Direct S t r o k e s gated for normal and contingency configurations. Results
analagous to those for the transmission substations were obtained
Georgia Power Company has experienced substation equip- and a similar method of analysis was applied.
ment failures apparently due to direct strokes. The response of sta-
tions to direct strokes was simulated with and without surge Substation Performance f o r Normal Operation
arresters present. In particular, the station configuration in which
failures occurred was simulated (Figure 13). The peak voltages re- Figure 2 represents a four element ring bus generating plant
corded in Table IV were highly dependent upon stroke current peak substation typical of initial installations with two sets of surge
magnitude and rate of rise. Examination of the table and related arresters well spaced with regard to the major equipment. For the
strip charts indicates that voltages in excess of the breaker BIL surges considered, no equipment BIL levels or acceptable margins
and CCVT margin are possible without exceeding the bus critical were exceeded. Another typical initial installation is that of a three
flashover, thereby increasing the risk of equipment failure. element ring bus terminating a generator step-up transformer and
Although the shielding design for the substation involved in the two transmission lines (Figure 14). With reference to Table V, the
apparent direct stroke was inadequate for some sections of the bus, BIL for the breakers and potential transformer on the bus are ex-
confirmation of a direct stroke and its location was never ceeded for all of the surges considered. Additionally, the margin
achieved. This simulation does demonstrate the need for effective
shielding against destructive direct strokes. Modernization of direct
shielding design concepts is being conducted in a separate investi-
gation and is beyond the scope of this paper.
TABLE V
Figure 13. Substation configuration during experienced lightning
failures.
Peak voltages in per unit in generating substation (Figure 14). Note
TABLE IV the 60 HZ same and opposite polarites gave similar results.
Peak voltages in per unit for direct strokes (Figure 13). DISTANCE FROM SUBSTATION-KM
575
11) AIEE Working Group of the Lightning Protective Devices 18) J. J. Minnick, R. A. Hedin, K. W. Priest, “Substation Light-
Subcommittee of the AIEE Protective Devices Committee, -
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Between Arresters and Transformers”, IEEE Transactiond IEEE Paper A77 623-2, Presented in July 1977.
on Power Apparatus and Systems, Special Supplement 1963,
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tion of EHV SFGSubstation”, IEEE Paper A77 729-7, Pre-
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M. DeSalvo, “Insulation Coordination in AF’S 500-kV Sta-
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J u n e 1967. Lightning Overvoltage Protection Requirements for a 500-kV
Gas-Insulated Substation”, IEEE Transaction Power Appa-
13) M. Murano, Y. Kawaguchi, S. Kojima, “Lightning Surge ratus and Systems, Vol. 97, No. l, pp. 68-78, January/Febru-
Phenomena on Electric Power System With SF6 Gas-Insu- ary 1978.
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Simplified”, IEEE Trans., Vol. 97, pp. 33-38, January/Febru-
14) H. W. Anderl, C. L. Wagner, T. H. Dodds, “Insulation ary 1978.
Coordination for Gas-Insulated Substations”, IEEE Trans-
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23)
sented at 1975 IEEE PES Winter Meeting, New York, New tion of Waves on a n Overhead Line”, IEEE Transaction on
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by Hybrid Simulator”, American Power Conference, Vol. 39,
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576