A.C. No.

11256, March 07, 2017

FLORDELIZA A. MADRIA, Complainant, v. ATTY. CARLOS P. RIVERA, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

A lawyer who causes the simulation of court documents not only violates the court and its processes, but
also betrays the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client and must be disbarred to maintain the
integrity of the Law Profession.

Antecedents

In November 2002, complainant Flordeliza A. Madria consulted the respondent in his law office in
Tuguegarao City, Cagayan to inquire about the process of annulling her marriage with her husband, Juan C.
Madria. After giving the details of her marriage and other facts relevant to the annulment, the respondent
told her that she had a strong case, and guaranteed that he could obtain for her the decree of annulment.
He told her, too, that his legal services would cost P25,000.00, and that she should return on November 19,
2002 inasmuch as he would still prepare the complaint for the annulment. At the time of the consultation,
she was accompanied by her daughter, Vanessa Madria, and her nephew, Jayson Argonza.1

The complainant returned to the respondent's office on November 19, 2002. On that occasion, he showed
her the petition for annulment, and asked her to sign it. She paid to him an initial amount of P4,000.00.2He
acknowledged the payment through a handwritten receipt.3

The complainant again went to the respondent's office on December 16, 2002 to deliver another partial
payment, and to follow up on the case. The respondent advised her to just wait for the resolution of her
complaint, and assured her that she did not need to appear in court. He explained that all the court notices
and processes would be sent to his office, and that he would regularly apprise her of the developments.4 On
December 28, 2002, she returned to his office to complete her payment, and he also issued his receipt for
the payment.5

The complainant's daughter Vanessa thereafter made several followups on behalf of her mother. In the
latter part of April 2003, the respondent informed the complainant that her petition had been granted.6Thus,
Vanessa went to the respondent's office and received a copy of the trial court's decision dated April 16, 2003
signed by Judge Lyliha Abella Aquino of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, in Tuguegarao City.7

According to the complainant, the respondent advised her to allow five months to lapse after the release of
the decision before she could safely claim the status of "single." After the lapse of such time, she declared in
her Voter's Registration Record (VRR) that she was single.8

The complainant, again through Vanessa, received from the respondent a copy of the certificate of finality
dated September 26, 2003 signed by one Jacinto C. Danao of the RTC (Branch 4).9

Believing that the documents were authentic, the complainant used the purported decision and certificate of
finality in applying for the renewal of her passport.10 However, she became the object of an investigation by
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) because her former partner, Andrew Dowson Grainge, had filed a
complaint charging that she had fabricated the decision for the annulment of her marriage. Only then did
she learn that the decision and the certificate of finality given by the respondent did not exist in the court
records, as borne out by the letter signed by Atty. Aura Clarissa B. Tabag-Querubin, Clerk of Court of the
RTC Branch IV, to wit: ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary

MS. RACHEL M. ROXAS

Officer-in-Charge
Regional Consular Office
Tuguegarao City

Madam:

This is in reply to your letter dated June 23, 2011 inquiring on whether Civil Case No. 6149 for the
Annulment of Marriage between Flordeliza Argonza Madria and Juan C. Madria was filed and decided by this
Court.

As per records of this Court, the above-entitled case was filed on April 25, 2003 but was dismissed as per
Order of this Court dated April 6, 2004.

The signature of the [sic] Judge Lyliha Abella Aquino as appearing in the alleged decision attached to your
letter is a blatant forgery.

For your information and guidance.

Very truly yours,

(sgd)
AURA CLARISSA B. TABAG-QUERUBIN
Clerk of Court V11 chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

As a result, the complainant faced criminal charges for violation of the Philippine Passport Act in the RTC in
Tuguegarao City.12 She claims that she had relied in good faith on the representations of the respondent;
and that he had taken advantage of his position in convincing her to part with her money and to rely on the
falsified court documents.13

In his answer,14 the respondent denies the allegations of the complainant. He averred that he had informed
her that he would still be carefully reviewing the grounds to support her petition; that she had insisted that
he should prepare the draft of her petition that she could show to her foreigner fiance; that she had also
prevailed upon him to simulate the court decision to the effect that her marriage had been annulled, and to
fabricate the certificate of finality; that she had assured him that such simulated documents would be kept
strictly confidential; that he had informed her that the petition had been filed in April 2003, but she had paid
no attention to such information; that she had not appeared in any of the scheduled hearings despite notice;
and that he had not heard from her since then, and that she had not even returned to his office.

Findings and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)

After conducting her investigation, IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala submitted her Report and
Recommendation15 wherein she concluded that the respondent had violated his Lawyer's Oath; and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years.

The IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the findings of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala, modified the
recommendation of suspension from the practice of law for two years to disbarment through its Resolution
No. XXI-2015-242, to wit: ChanRoblesVi rtuala wlibra ry

RESOLUTION NO. XXI-2015-242

CDB Case No. 14-4315
Flordeliza A. Madria vs. Atty. Carlos P. Rivera

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED AND APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A", considering violation of his lawyers' oath as a lawyer and a member of
the Bar by preparing a simulated Court decision granting the petition for annulment of marriage of
complainant and a certificate of finality of the annulment petition. Hence, Atty. Carlos P. Rivera is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.16 chanro blesvi rt uallawli bra ry

Ruling of the Court

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

The respondent acknowledged authorship of the petition for annulment of marriage, and of the simulation of
the decision and certificate of finality. His explanation of having done so only upon the complainant's
persistent prodding did not exculpate him from responsibility. For one, the explanation is unacceptable, if
not altogether empty. Simulating or participating in the simulation of a court decision and a certificate of
finality of the same decision is an outright criminal falsification or forgery. One need not be a lawyer to know
so, but it was worse in the respondent's case because he was a lawyer. Thus, his acts were legally
intolerable. Specifically, his deliberate falsification of the court decision and the certificate of finality of the
decision reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part, and made a mockery of the administration of
justice in this country. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.
The respondent directly contravened the letter and spirit of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1, and Rule 15.07,
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit: ChanRoble sVi rt ualawlib ra ry

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

xxxx
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of
fairness.
The respondent would shift the blame to his client. That a lay person like the complainant could have
swayed a lawyer like the respondent into committing the simulations was patently improbable. Yet, even if
he had committed the simulations upon the client's prodding, he would be no less responsible. Being a
lawyer, he was aware of and was bound by the ethical canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly those quoted earlier, which would have been enough to deter him from committing the
falsification, as well as to make him unhesitatingly frustrate her prodding in deference to his sworn
obligation as a lawyer to always act with honesty and to obey the laws of the land. Surely, too, he could not
have soon forgotten his express undertaking under his Lawyer's Oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to its
commission."17 Indeed, the ethics of the Legal Profession rightly enjoined every lawyer like him to act with
the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law.18 As we have
observed in one case:19
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member
of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that would promote public
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the Bar are expected to always live up to the
standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility as the relationship between an attorney and
his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith.
Also, Canon 1520 and Rule 18.0421 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility required the
respondent be true to the complainant as his client. By choosing to ignore his fiduciary responsibility for the
sake of getting her money, he committed a further violation of his Lawyer's Oath by which he swore not to
"delay any man's cause for money or malice," and to "conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best of
[his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients." He compounded
this violation by taking advantage of his legal knowledge to promote his own selfish motives, thereby
disregarding his responsibility under Canon 17.22

Under Section 27,23 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be disbarred on any of the following
grounds, namely: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct;
(5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a
case without authority so to do.

Falsifying or simulating the court papers amounted to deceit, malpractice or misconduct in office, any of
which was already a ground sufficient for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.24The
moral standards of the Legal Profession expected the respondent to act with the highest degree of
professionalism, decency, and nobility in the course of their practice of law.25 That he turned his back on
such standards exhibited his baseness, lack of moral character, dishonesty, lack of probity and general
unworthiness to continue as an officer of the Court.26

We note that the respondent was previously sanctioned for unprofessional conduct. In Cruz-Villanueva v.
Rivera,27 he was suspended from the practice of law because he had notarized documents without a notarial
commission. This circumstance shows his predisposition to beguile other persons into believing in the
documents that he had falsified or simulated. It is time to put a stop to such proclivity. He should be quickly
removed through disbarment.

It is true that the power to disbar is always exercised with great caution and only for the most imperative
reasons or in cases of clear misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and member of the bar.28 But we do not hesitate when the misconduct is gross, like in
the respondent's case. We wield the power now because the respondent, by his gross misconduct as herein
described, absolutely forfeited the privilege to remain in the Law Profession. As we reminded in Embido v.
Pe,29 in which we disbarred the respondent lawyer for falsifying a court decision: Cha nRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession is always a privilege
that the Court extends only to the deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny the privilege to him
who fails to observe and respect the Lawyer's Oath and the canons of ethical conduct in his professional and
private capacities. He may be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law not only for acts and
omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty in his professional dealings, but also for gross misconduct not
directly connected with his professional duties that reveal his unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of
the principles that the privilege to practice law confers upon him. Verily, no lawyer is immune from the
disciplinary authority of the Court whose duty and obligation are to investigate and punish lawyer
misconduct committed either in a professional or private capacity. The test is whether the conduct shows
the lawyer to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, and whether the
conduct renders the lawyer unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court.30 chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS Atty. CARLOS P. RIVERA guilty of GRAVE
MISCONDUCT and VIOLATION OF THE LAWYER'S OATH; and, ACCORDINGLY,
ORDERS his DISBARMENT. Let his name be STRICKEN from the ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to: (a) the OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance; (b) the INTEGRATED
BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES; (c) the OFFICE OF THE BAR CONFIDANT for appending to the respondent's
personal record as a member of the Bar; and (d) the OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE for possible criminal prosecution of the respondent.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry

A.C. NO. 11385, March 14, 2017

ORTIGAS PLAZA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY JANICE

MONTERO, Complainant, v. ATTY. EUGENIO S. TUMULAK, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM::

Under the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is sworn to respect the law
and legal processes, and any violation thereof merits condign disciplinary action against the lawyer.

The present complaint asks for the disbarment of Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak for his participation in the
forcible intrusion into the complainant's property.

Antecedents

Complainant Ortigas Plaza Development Corporation owned the parcel of land located in Ortigas Avenue
Extension, Pasig City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. PT-126797 of the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal (property).

The complainant alleges that at around 11:00 a.m. of November 29, 2012, Atty. Tumulak, accompanied by
uniformed guards of the Nationwide Security Agency, Inc., unlawfully entered and took control of the
entrance and exit of the property. It appears that prior to the incident, Atty. Tumulak had furnished several
documents to the complainant, including the deed of assignment executed by one Henry F. Rodriguez as the
administrator of the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes R. Rodriguez designating Atty. Tumulak as an
assignee.1 The documents furnished by Atty. Tumulak were all related to the intestate proceedings of the
Estate of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez docketed as S.P. No. IR-1110 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 34, in Iriga City (RTC), which involved the claim of the heirs of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez
to several parcels of land situated all over the country, including the Provinces of Rizal, Quezon, and
Bulacan, and Quezon City, Caloocan City, Pasay City, Antipolo City, Muntinlupa City, Parañaque City,
Marikina City, Baguio City, Angeles City, San Fernando City and Tagaytay City.2

The complainant charges Atty. Tumulak with deceit, dishonesty and fraud for claiming to have coordinated
with the proper government agencies prior to the illegal and forcible intrusion.3 The complainant manifests
that as a lawyer, Atty. Tumulak ought to know that the claim of his principal in the property was barred
by res judicata due to the valid issuance of a Torrens title under its name. Accordingly, his conduct
constituted conduct unbecoming of a lawyer deserving of sanction.4

In his answer to the complaint,5 Atty. Tumulak denies having been present when the security guards of
Nationwide Security Agency entered the complainant's property. He insists that the allegations against him
were pure hearsay because Ms. Montero, the representative of the complainant, had no personal knowledge
of the incident; that the documents he had furnished to the complainant included records of the intestate
proceedings in the RTC involving the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez and Antonio Rodriguez;
that he had no hand in procuring the documents; that he did not himself enter the property; and that the
entry into the property was effected by the sheriff pursuant to a writ of execution.

Report and Recommendation of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)

After due hearing, IBP Commissioner of Bar Discipline Ricardo M. Espina submitted his Report and
Recommendation,6 wherein he found Atty. Tumulak to have violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Commissioner Espina recommended the suspension of Atty. Tumulak
from the practice of law for two years.

On October 28, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXII-2015-57 adopting the findings
and recommendation of Commissioner Espina7viz.:

RESOLUTION NO. XXII-2015-57

CIBD Case No. 13-3707
Ortigas Plaza Dev't Corp. vs.
Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak

RESOLVED to ADOPT the findings of facts and recommended penalty of 2 years su5pension of Atty. Eugenio
S. Tumulak by the Investigating Commissioner.

Issue

Did Atty. Tumulak violate Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
facilitated the implementation of the writ of execution and the entry into the complainant's property?

Ruling of the Court

Atty. Tumulak deserves to be severely sanctioned for violating the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Pertinent portions of Commissioner Espina's Report and Recommendation, which adequately illustrated Atty.
Tumulak' s transgressions, are worth quoting verbatim, viz.:

We enumerate respondent lawyer's violation of the following rules/principles when he led the forcible
intrusion into OPDC office in Pasig City:

a)
Atty. Tumulak knew, or ought to know, that property claims based on Spanish title can no longer
be cited as legitimate basis for ownership as of 16 February 1976 by virtue of Presidential Decree
No. 892;

b)
Respondent lawyer, as a long-time practitioner (admitted to the Bar in 1971), is presumed to know that
the Supreme Court has promulgated a case specifically addressing the fake titles arising from
spurious "Deed of Assignment" of the supposed Estate of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. This is the
2005 case of Evangelista, et al. vs. Santiago[G.R. No. 157447; April 29, 2005] where the
same modus as the one adopted by respondent lawyer, was used by an "assignee" in claiming
properties located in Paranque, Las Pinas, Muntinlupa, Cavitc, Batangas, Pasay, Taguig, Makati,
Pasig, Mandaluyong, Quezon City, Caloocan, Bulacan, and Rizal, allegedly as part of the Estate of
Don Hermogenes Rodriguez;

c)
x x x;

d)
While respondent lawyer claims that the "deed of assignment" in his favor has a consideration, unfortunately
we did not see any agreed consideration in the document. If there is no monetary consideration, it will be
treated as a donation with the corresponding payable taxes. Respondent lawyer's documents don't show
that taxes have been paid for the document to be legally binding;

e)
Torrens title cannot be attacked collaterally but can only be questioned in a principal action x x x. If
respondent lawyer thinks that OPDC's title on the Pasig property is questionable, he could have tiled an
action to annul OPDC's title and not bring in the cavalry, so to speak, in the form of uniformed security
guards, to take over the property; and

f)
We find respondent's actions highly questionable and contrary to legal protocol; (i) the court documents
were issued by the RTC-Iriga City, Br. 94; (ii) it "affects" a property located in Pasig City; (iii) respondent
lawyer became the "assignee" of a Pasig City property; (iv) no taxes were paid for the "assignment"; (v)
assistance of the Sheriff of Pasig was not enlisted by respondent, instead, he enlists the help of the Sheriff
of Manila; (vi) all that the Sheriff of Manila did was to deliver the RTC-Iriga, Br. 34 court documents to
complainant but with a twist; the Sheriff and respondent lawyer were escorted by a phalanx of security
guards; (vii) the uniformed guards, obviously upon instruction, took over and/or controlled the gates of
OPDC offices with attendant force and intimidation. Respondent lawyer's claimed innocence cannot prevail
over these illegalities of which he, or his agents, had a hand.

With the above highly questionable acts totally irreconcilable with a seasoned practitioner like respondent
lawyer, we find Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak liable for violation of Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility,
specifically Rule 1.01 and 1.02 thereof. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

Commissioner Espina correctly observed that the Court in the 2005 ruling in Evangelista v. Santiago8 had
already enjoined the successors and heirs of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez from presenting the
Spanish title as proof of their ownership in land registration proceedings, as follow:

In their Complaint, petitioners claimed title to the Subject Property by virtue of their actual and continuous
possession of the same since time immemorial, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest.
Yet, the Deeds of Assignment executed by lsmael Favila in their favor, attached to and an integral part of
their Complaint, revealed that petitioners predecessors-in-interest based their right to the Subject Property
on the Spanish title awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez.

There existed a contradiction when petitioners based their claim of title to the Subject Property on their
possession thereof since time immemorial, and at the same time, on the Spanish title granted to Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez. Possession since time immemorial carried the presumption that the land had never
been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish
conquest. If the Subject Property was already private property before the Spanish conquest, then it would
have been beyond the power of the Queen of Spain to award or grant to anyone.
The title to and possession of the Subject Property by petitioners predecessors-in-interest could be traced
only as far back as the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Petitioners, having acquired portions of
the Subject Property by assignment, could acquire no better title to the said portions than their
predecessors-in-interest, and hence, their title can only be based on the same Spanish title.

Respondent maintained that P.D. No. 892 prevents petitioners from invoking the Spanish title as basis of
their ownership of the Subject Property. P.D. No. 892 strengthens the Torrens system by discontinuing the
system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law, and by categorically declaring all lands recorded
under the latter system, not yet covered by Torrens title, unregistered lands. It further provides that within
six months from its effectivity, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their
land under what is now P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree. Thereafter,
Spanish titles can no longer be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the
Torrens system. Indubitably, P.D. No. 892 divests the Spanish titles of any legal force and effect in
establishing ownership over real property.

P.D. No. 892 became effective on 16 February 1976. The successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez had only
until 14 August 1976 to apply for a Torrens title in their name covering the Subject Property. In the absence
of an allegation in petitioners' Complaint that petitioners predecessors-in-interest complied with P.D. No.
892, then it could be assumed that they failed to do so. Since they failed to comply with P.D. No. 892, then
the successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez were already enjoined from presenting the Spanish title as
proof of their ownership of the Subject Property in registration proceedings.

Registration proceedings under the Torrens system do not create or vest title, but only confirm and record
title already created and vested. By virtue of P.D. No. 892, the courts, in registration proceedings under the
Torrens system, are precluded from accepting, confirming and recording a Spanish title. Reason therefore
dictates that courts, likewise, are prevented from accepting and indirectly confirming such Spanish title in
some other form of action brought before them (i.e., removal of cloud on or quieting of title), only short of
ordering its recording or registration. To rule otherwise would open the doors to the circumvention of P.D.
No. 892, and give rise to the existence of land titles, recognized and affirmed by the courts, but would never
be recorded under the Torrens system of registration. This would definitely undermine the Torrens system
and cause confusion and instability in property ownership that P.D. No. 892 intended to eliminate.9

Moreover, in Santiago v. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority,10 the Court denied the petition of the successors
of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by applying the principle of stare decisis, ruling therein that the
applicable laws, the issues, and the testimonial and documentary evidence were identical to those in the
situation in Evangelista v. Santiago, thusly:

The present petition is substantially infirm as this Court had already expressed in the case of Nemencio C.
Evangelista, et al. v. Carmelino M. Santiago, that the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez, the Titulo
de Propriedad de Torrenos of 1891, has been divested of any evidentiary value to establish ownership over
real property.

Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R. Santiago anchor their right to recover
possession of the subject real property on claim of ownership by Victoria M. Rodriguez being the sole heir of
the named grantee, Hermogenes Rodriguez, in the Spanish title Titulo de Propriedad de Torrenos.

xxx

Prescinding from the foregoing, the instant petition must be denied by virtue of the principle of stare
decisis. Not only are the legal rights and relations of herein parties substantially the same as those passed
upon in the aforementioned 2005 Evangelista Case, but the facts, the applicable laws, the issues, and the
testimonial and documentary evidence are identical such that a ruling in one case, under the principle
of stare decisis, is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.11

Finally, the 2011 ruling in Pascual v. Robles 12 affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) setting
aside the amended decision rendered in S.P. No. IR-1110 by the RTC. This ruling should have alerted Atty.
Tumulak from taking the actions giving rise to the complaint against him inasmuch as he has admitted to
have derived his rights from the deed of assignment executed in his favor by Henry Rodriguez as the
administrator of the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez pursuant to said amended decision.
Moreover, Atty. Tumulak is presumed as a lawyer to know the developments in S.P. No. IR-1110 not only by
virtue of his becoming an assignee of the estate but also because of his being a lawyer with the constant
responsibility of keeping abreast of legal developments.13

Atty. Tumulak cannot shield himself from personal responsibility behind the deed of assignment. The deed
was doubtful on its face, as borne out by the text, to wit:

DEED OF ASSIGNMENT

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS

This Deed of Assignment is made and executed by and between

The INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE HERMOGENES R. RODRIGUEZ AND ANTONIO R.

RODRIGUEZ, represented by HENRY F. RODRIGUEZ, of legal age, widower, Filipino, x xx Judicial Heir and
Court-Appointed Administrator by virtue of AMENDED DECISIONdated August 13, 19999 of Fifth Judicial
Region, RTC Branch 34, lriga City in SPECS. PROCS. No. IR-1110 which settled the issue of Heirship,
Administratorship and Settled [sic] of the Estate of Hem1ogenes and Antonio Rodriguez y Reyes Estate,
hereinafter referred to as the ASSIGNOR;

-and-

EUGENIO S. TUMULAK, of legal age, widower x x x hereinafter referred to as the ASSIGNEE:

WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, the ASSIGNOR is the Court-Appointed Administrator and one of the Judicial heirs of the
Intestate Estate of the late HERMOGENES and ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ y REYES Estate by virtue of
AMENDED DECISION dated Augsut 13, 1999 of Fifth Judicial Region, RTC Branch 34, Iriga City in SPECS.
PROCS. No. IR-1110 which settled the issue of Heirship, Administratorship and Settlement of the Estate of
Hermogenes and Antonio Rodriguez y Reyes Estate, thereafter, petitions for certiorari tiled with
the SUPREME COURT assailing the aforesaid Amended Decision were DENIED and declared FINAL &
EXECUTORY in G.R. Nos. 140271, 140915, 168648, 142477 and 182645, affirming the same Amended
Decision;

Whereas, the ASSIGNEE has secured the property and actual occupant/s over the same property
they arc presently occupying and initiating steps for recovery of the same parcel and has shown
exemplary loyalty and faithfulness to the ASSIGNOR and also consistently protected the rights
and interest of the Estate against intruder, impostor, usurpers and false claimant with spurious
title/s over the same property;

NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing, the ASSIGNOR has agreed to execute
this DEED OF ASSIGNMENT and the ASSIGNEE, has accepted and both parties have mutually
agreed to the following terms and conditions herein stipulated;

A parcel of land situated in Ortigas Avenue corner Raymundo Avenue, Barangay Rosario, Pasig City, Metro
Manila, Island of Luzon, with containing an area of THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND EIGTH [sic] HUNDRED AND
NINE[TY] ONE SQUARE METERS (35,891) more or less technical description described below, to

xxx

1. That the ASSIGNEE shall shoulder all the expenses in the performance of the task as indicated x x x
above such as payment for the real taxes, titling, researching, liaising with government agencies, paying
lawyers involved in the litigation, and other incidental expenses relevant in the consummation of the said
transaction;

2. That the ASSIGNEE shall secure and facilities (sic] all documents from Land Registration Authority, DENR-
LMB, DENR-LMS, Register of Deeds and such other government agencies concerned for the completion of
titling process subject to the existing laws, rules and regulation in accordance to Land Registration Act;
3. That the ASSIGNEE shall perform the task of relocation and verification[,] land survey,
possessing, fencing, guarding, surveying and or reviving plans, paying taxes, titling, selling,
leasing, developing, segregating and mortgaging;

4. That the ASSIGNEE shall be the AD-LITEM representative of the ASSIGNOR, before of [sic] any Court[,]
Administrative and Quasi-Judicial body and to bring suit, defend, in connection with the actions brought for
or against the ASSIGNOR of whatever nature and kind; and

5. That the ASSIGNEE shall report regularly to the ASSIGNOR per the above tasks and accomplishment.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their respective signatures on the date 22 March
2010 and place QUEZON CITY above written.14 (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

Atty. Tumulak cannot deny his personal participation in the unlawful and forcible intrusion into the property
just because the complainant did not establish his physical presence thereat at the time. In fact, such
physical participation was not even necessary in order to properly implicate him in personal responsibility for
the intrusion after he admitted having furnished to the complainant the deed of assignment and other
documents as the source of his authority. Specifically, his duties under the deed of assignment
included "shoulder[ing] all the expenses in the performance of [securing the property x x x and initiating
steps for recovery of the same parcel] x x x such as x x x or payment for the real taxes, titling, researching,
liaising with government agencies, paying lawyers involved in the litigation, and other incidental expenses
relevant in the consummation of the said transaction;" and "possessing, fencing, [and] guarding" the
property.

It is notable in this connection that Atty. Tumulak had been discharging his role as the assignee since the
time of the execution of the deed of assignment on March 22, 2010. Considering that he had been in charge
of doing all the actions necessary to enforce the interest of his principal since March 22, 2010, and that the
forcible intrusion complained about occurred on November 29, 2012, or more than two years from the
execution of the deed of assignment, he is reasonably and ineluctably presumed to have coordinated all the
actions leading to the intrusion.

Finally, even assuming that the amended decision was valid and enforceable, Atty. Tumulak could not
legitimately resort to forcible intrusion to advance the interest of the assignor. The more appropriate action
for him would be to cause the annulment of the complainant's title instead of forcibly entering the property
with the aid of armed security personnel.

All told, Atty. Tumulak was guilty of misconduct for circumventing existing laws and disregarding settled
rulings in order to commit injustice against the complainant. His conduct betrayed his Lawyer's Oath "to
support [the] Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein." He breached Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 -A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

To the best of his ability, every lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law, and to avoid any act or
omission that is contrary thereto. The lawyer's personal deference to the law not only speaks of his or her
commendable character but also inspires in the public a becoming respect and obedience to the law.15

The sworn obligation of every lawyer under the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility to
respect the law and the legal processes is a continuing condition for retaining membership in the Legal
Profession. The lawyer must act and comport himself or herself in such a manner that would promote public
confidence in the integrity of the Legal Profession.16 Members of the Bar are reminded, therefore, that their
first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than to seek exceptions as loopholes.17 A lawyer
who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act that warrants
disciplinary action against him or her.18

The suspension from the practice of law or disbarment of a lawyer is justified if he or she proves unworthy
of the trust and confidence imposed by the Lawyer's Oath, or is otherwise found to be wanting in that
honesty and integrity that must characterize the members of the Bar in the performance of their
professional duties.19 Although the Court imposed a six-month suspension from the practice of law on erring
lawyers found violating Canon l, Rules 1.01 and 1.02,20 we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to suspend
Atty. Tumulak from the practice of law for a period of two years. Such penalty was appropriate and condign
in relation to the misconduct he committed as well as to the prejudice he caused the complainant.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. EUGENIO S. TUMULAK guilty of
violating the Lawyer's Oath and Canon 1, and Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period of TWO(2) YEARS EFFECTIVE
IMMEDIATELY, with the STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more
severely.

This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to the respondent's
personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts in the Philippines
for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 11346, March 08, 2017

DR. BASILIO MALVAR, Complainant, v. ATTY. CORA JANE P. BALEROS, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment1 filed on June 30, 2014 by Dr. Basilio Malvar (complainant)
against Atty. Cora Jane P. Baleros (respondent) for acts amounting to grave misconduct consisting of
falsification of public document, violation of Administrative Matter No. 02-8-13-SC or the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice (Notarial Rules) and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Antecedent Facts

The complainant is the owner of a parcel of land located,in Barangay Pagudpud, San Fernando City, La
Union.2 On January 7, 2011, the complainant executed a Deed of Absolute Sale3 in favor of Leah Mallari
(Mallari) over the said lot for the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). This transaction
was acknowledged by the children of the complainant through a document denominated as Confirmation of
Sale.4

The process of conveying the title of the lot in the name of Mallari spawned the legal tussle between the
parties. According to the complainant, an agreement was made between him and Mallari wherein he
undertook to facilitate the steps in order to have the title of the lot transferred under Mallari's
name.5However, without his knowledge and consent, Mallari who was not able to withstand the delay in the
delivery of the title of the land sold to her allegedly filed an Application for Certification of Alienable and
Disposable Land6 as a preliminary step for the segregation and titling of the same before the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), San Fernando City, La Union using the complainant's name and signing the said application.7 A civil
case for collection of sum of money was instituted by Mallari before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Aringay, La Union seeking reimbursement tor the expenses she incurred by reason of the transfer and titling
of the property she purchased.8 A compromise agreement9 was forged between the parties which failed
because two out of the four checks issued by the complainant were unfunded.10 This prompted Mallari to file
a criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law,
against the complainant before the MTC of Aringay, La Union.11

Ultimately, a criminal case for falsification of public document against Mallari was filed before the Office of
the Prosecutor and now pending before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of San Fernando City, La
Union, Branch 1.12 The complainant alleged that it was through the conspiracy of Mallari and the respondent
that the crime charged was consummated.13

Notwithstanding the Office of the Prosecutor's determination that the evidence presented was insufficient to
establish conspiracy between Mallari and the respondent, thereby dropping the latter's name from the
indictment, the complainant remained unfazed and thus, initiated the present petition for disbarment
seeking the imposition of disciplinary sanction against the respondent.14 The complainant claimed that the
respondent, by notarizing the assailed Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land, made it
appear that he executed the same when the truth of the matter was he never went to the office of the
respondent for he was in Manila at the time of the alleged notarization and was busy performing his duties
as a doctor.15

On August 19, 2014, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
issued a Notice of Mandatory Conference16 requiring both parties to appear before it on November 18, 2014.
However, the scheduled mandatory conference was reset to December 2, 201417 here the complainant
personally appeared while the respondent was represented by her attorney-in-fact and counsel.18

The complainant buttressed in his position paper that the respondent consummated the crime of falsification
of public document as delineated under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and thus, the presumption of
regularity in the notarization of the contested document has been overthrown and cannot work in her
favor.19 He recapped that he never appeared before the respondent to have the subject document
notarized.20 The complainant stressed that the respondent made a mockery of the Notarial Rules by
notarizing the Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land in his absence.

In her Position Paper,21 the respondent refuted the allegations against her by narrating that Benny Telles,
the complainant and his sons came to her office to have the subject document notarized and that she is
certain as to the identity of the complainant.22 Moreover, she argued that the charges filed against her were
all part of the complainant's scheme to avoid his obligations to Mallari as the buyer of his lot.23

Ruling of the IBP

On June 15, 2015, Commissioner Maria Angela Esquivel (Commissioner Esquivel) found that the respondent
was negligent in the performance of her duties as a notary public and violated the Notarial Rules, thereby
recommending disciplinary imposition against her. The pertinent portion of the Report and
Recommendation24 reads: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that the Respondent's commission as a
notary public be revoked; that she be disqualified for being a notary public for two (2) years with a stem
warning that a repetition of similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.25
In a Resolution26 dated June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved Commissioner
Esquivel's report and recommendation with modification, to wit: chanRoble svirtual Lawlib rary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A", for failure of Respondent to observe due diligence in the performance
of her duties and obligations as a Notary Public specifically Rule VI, Section 2 of the Notarial Law. Thus, [the
respondent's] notarial commission, if presently commissioned, is immediately REVOKED. Furthermore,
[she] is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a Notary Public for two (2) years and
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.27 (Emphasis and italics in the original)
The Issues

Whether administrative liability should attach to the respondent by reason of the following acts alleged to
have been committed by her:

1. Falsification of the Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land;

2. Notarization of the aforesaid document in the absence of the complainant; and

 3. Double Entries in the Notarial Registry.

Ruling of the Court

After a close scrutiny of the facts of the case, the Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from the
resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

With regard to the imputation of falsification of public document, the Court shall not inquire into the merits
of the said criminal case pending adjudication before the MTCC and make a ruling on the matter.
Commissioner Esquivel correctly declined to resolve the falsification case pending resolution before the
regular court to which jurisdiction properly pertains. Though disbarment proceedings are sui generis as they
belong to a class of their own and are distinct from that of civil or criminal actions, it is judicious for an
administrative body like IBP-CBD not to pre-empt the course of action of the regular courts in order to avert
contradictory findings.28

The Court concurs with the conclusion of Commissioner Esquivel that the respondent violated several
provisions of the Notarial Rules. The complainant insists that the Application for Certification of Alienable and
Disposable Land was notarized sans his presence. An affidavit requiring a jurat which the respondent
admittedly signed and notarized on August 18, 2010 forms part of the subject document. The jurat is that
end part of the affidavit in which the notary certifies that the instrument is sworn to before her, thus,
making the notarial certification essential.29 The unsubstantiated claim of the respondent that the
complainant appeared before her and signed the contested document in her presence cannot prevail over
the evidence supplied by the complainant pointing that it was highly improbable if not impossible for him to
appear before the respondent on the date so alleged that the subject document was notarized. The
complainant furnished in his Sworn Judicial Affidavit submitted before the court patients' record cards
showing that he attended to a number of them on August 18, 2010 in De Los Santos Medical Center, E.
Rodriguez, Sr. Avenue, Quezon City.30

A jurat as sketched in jurisprudence lays emphasis on the paramount requirements of the physical presence
of the affiant as well as his act of signing the document before the notary public.31 The respondent indeed
transgressed Section 2(b) of Rule IV of the Notarial Rules by affixing her official signature and seal on the
notarial certificate of the affidavit contained in the Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable
Land in the absence of the complainant and for failing to ascertain the identity of the affiant. The thrust of
the said provision reads:cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

SEC. 2. Prohibitions.

xxx

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document -

(1)
is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2)
is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
The physical presence of the affiant ensures the proper execution of the duty of the notary public under the
law to determine whether the former's signature was voluntarily affixed.32 Aside from forbidding notarization
without the personal presence of the affiant, the Notarial Rules demands the submission of competent
evidence of identity such as an identification card with photograph and signature which requirement can be
dispensed with provided that the notary public personally knows the affiant. Competent evidence of identity
under Section 12 of Rule II of the Notarial Rules is defined as follows: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

Sec. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. - The phrase "competent evidence of identity" refers to the
identification of an individual based on:

a)
at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and
signature of the individual; or
b)
the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction who is
personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses
neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows the
individual and shows to the notary public documentary identification.
Granting that the complainant was present before the notary public at the time of the notarization of the
contested document on August 18, 2010, the respondent remained unjustified in not requiring him to show
a competent proof of his identification. She could have escaped administrative liability on this score if she
was able to demonstrate that she personally knows the complainant. On the basis of the very definition of
a jurat under Section 6 of Rule II of the Notarial Rules, case law echoes that the non-presentation of the
affiant's competent proof of identification is permitted if the notary public personally knows the former.33 A
'jurat' refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary
public and presents an instrument or document; (b) is personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity; (c) signs the instrument or
document in the presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to
such instrument or document.34

Further, the respondent displayed lack of diligence by the non observance of the obligations imposed upon
her under Section 2 of Rule VI of the Notarial Rules, to wit:
chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register.

(a) For every notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial register at the time of
notarization the following:

(1)
the entry number and page number;
(2)
the date and time of day of the notarial act;
(3)
the type of notarial act;
(4)
the title or description of the instrument, document or proceeding;
(5)
the name and address of each principal;
(6)
the competent evidence of identity as defined by the Rules if the signatory is not personally known to the
notary;
(7)
the name and address of each credible witness swearing to or affirming the person's identity;
(8)
the fee charged for the notarial act;
(9)
the address where the notarization was performed if not in the notary's regular place of business; and
(10)
any other circumstance the notary public may deem of significance or relevance.

xxx

(e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state
on the instrument or document the page/s of his register on which the same is recorded. No
blank line shall be left between entries.

x x x (Emphasis ours)
The same notarial details were assigned by the respondent to two distinct documents. In an order of the
MTCC where the criminal case for falsification of document was pending, Clerk of Court Atty. Raquel Estigoy-
Andres (Atty. Estigoy-Andres) was directed to transmit the original document of the Application for
Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land which was notarized by the respondent.35 A similar order was
issued by the MTCC requiring the DENR for the production of the impugned document.36 The DENR issued a
certification that despite diligent efforts they could not locate the said document but which they were certain
was received by their office.37 Meanwhile, upon Atty. Estigoy-Andres' certification,38 it was discovered that
as per the respondent's notarial register submitted to the Office of the Clerk of Court, Document No. 288,
Page No. 59, Book No. LXXIII, Series of 2010 does not pertain to the Application for Certification of
Alienable and Disposable Land but to a notarized document denominated as Joint Affidavit of Adjoining
Owners39 executed by Ricardo Sibayan and Cecilia Flores. Undoubtedly, the document entitled Application
for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land nowhere appears in the respondent's notarial register. The
respondent further exposed herself to administrative culpability when she regretfully offered plain oversight
as an excuse for the non-inclusion of the challenged document in her notarial register and by stating that it
is her office staff who usually fills it up.

To reiterate, the respondent admitted having signed and notarized the Application for Certification of
Alienable and Disposable Land but based from the foregoing, she indubitably failed to record the assailed
document in her notarial book. It is axiomatic that notarization is not an empty, meaningless or routinary
act. It is through the act of notarization that a private document is converted into a public one, making it
admissible in evidence without need of preliminary proof of authenticity and due execution.40 "If the
document or instrument does not appear in the notarial records and there is no copy of it therein, doubt is
engendered that the document or instrument was not really notarized, so that it is not a public document
and cannot bolster any claim made based on this document."41 The respondent's delegation of her notarial
function of recording entries in her notarial register to her staff is a clear contravention of the explicit
provision of the Notarial Rules dictating that such duty be fulfilled by her and not somebody else. This
likewise violates Canon 9, Rule 9.01 of the CPR which provides that: chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be
performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
In addition to the above charges, Commissioner Esquivel noted that the respondent failed to retain an
original copy in her records and to submit the duplicate copy of the document to the Clerk of Court.
However, in a previous case, the Court ruled that the requirement stated under Section 2(h) of Rule VI of
the Notarial Rules applies only to an instrument acknowledged before the notary public and not to the
present document which contains a jurat.42 "A jurat is a distinct creature from an acknowledgment."43 It is
that part of an affidavit in which the notary certifies that before him or her, the document was subscribed
and sworn to by the executor; while an acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going
before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed.44 Hence, no liability can be
ascribed to the respondent relative to such ground.

The Court finds unacceptable the respondent's defiance of the Notarial Rules. Under the circumstances, the
respondent should be made liable not only as a notary public who failed to discharge her duties as such but
also as a lawyer who exhibited utter disregard to the integrity and dignity owing to the legal profession. The
acts committed by the respondent go beyond being mere lapses in the fulfilment of her duties under the
Notarial Rules, they comprehend a parallel breach of the CPR particularly Canon 9, Rule 9.01, Canon 1, Rule
1.01 which provides that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct"
and the Lawyer's Oath which amplifies the undertaking to do no falsehood and adhere to laws and the legal
system being one of their primordial tasks as officers of the court. Given the evidentiary value accorded to
notarized documents, the failure of the notary public to record the document in her notarial register
corresponds to falsely making it appear that the document was notarized when, in fact, it was not.45 It
cannot be overemphasized that notaries public are urged to observe with utmost care and utmost fidelity
the basic requirements in the performance of their duties; otherwise, the confidence of the public in the
integrity of notarized deeds will be undermined.46

In a number of cases, the Court has subjected lawyers who were remiss in their duties as notaries public to
disciplinary sanction. Failure to enter the notarial acts in one's notarial register, notarizing a document
without the personal presence of the affiants and the failure to properly identify the person who signed the
questioned document constitute dereliction of a notary public's duties which warrants the revocation of a
lawyer's commission as a notary public.47 Upholding the role of notaries public in deterring illegal or immoral
arrangements, the Court in the case of Dizon v. Atty. Cabucana, Jr.48 prohibited the respondent for a period
of two (2) years from being commissioned as a notary public for notanzmg a compromise agreement
without the presence of all the parties. In the case of Atty. Benigno T. Bartolome v. Atty. Christopher A.
Basilio,49 which factual milieu is similar to the present case, the Court meted out against therein respondent
the penalty of revocation of notarial commission and disqualification for two (2) years from being appointed
as a notary public and suspension for six (6) months from the practice of law due to various infringement of
the Notarial Rules such as failure to record a notarized document in his notarial register and notarizing a
document without the physical presence of the affiant.

Following jurisprudential precedents and as a reminder to notaries public that their solemn duties which are
imbued with public interest are not to be taken lightly, the Court deems it proper to revoke the notarial
register of the respondent if still existing and to disqualify her from appointment as a notary public for two
(2) years. She is also suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. Contrary to the complainant's
proposition to have the respondent disbarred, the Court is of the belief that her acts do not merit such a
grave penalty and the sanctions so imposed suffice. The Court held in an array of cases that "removal from
the Bar should not really be decreed when any punishment less severe - reprimand, temporary suspension
or fine would accomplish the end desired."50

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Cora Jane P. Baleros is GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath. Her notarial commission, if still
existing, is hereby REVOKED, and she is hereby DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a
period of two (2) years. She is likewise SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective
immediately. Further, she is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5333, March 13, 2017

ROSA YAP PARAS, Complainant, v. JUSTO DE JESUS PARAS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from the disbarment complaint1 (1995 complaint) filed by Rosa Yap Paras
(complainant) against her husband Justo de Jesus Paras (respondent) for which he was suspended from the
practice of law for a year. The issues before the Court now are (a) whether respondent should be held
administratively liable for allegedly violating his suspension order and (b) whether his suspension should be
lifted.

The Facts

In a Decision2 dated October 18, 2000, the Court suspended respondent from the practice of law for six (6)
months for falsifying his wife's signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments, and for one
(1) year for immorality and abandonment of his family, with the penalties to be served
simultaneously.3 Respondent moved for reconsideration4 but the Court denied it with finality in a
Resolution5 dated January 22, 2001.

On March 2, 2001, complainant filed a Motion6 to declare in contempt and disbar respondent and his
associate, Atty. Richard R. Enojo (Atty. Enojo), alleging that respondent continued to practice law, and that
Atty. Enojo signed a pleading prepared by respondent, in violation of the suspension order.7Moreover,
complainant claimed that respondent appeared before a court in Dumaguete City on February 21, 2001,
thereby violating the suspension order.8 On March 26, 2001, complainant filed a second motion for contempt
and disbarment,9 claiming that, on March 13, 2001, Atty. Enojo again appeared for Paras and Associates, in
willful disobedience of the suspension order issued against respondent.10 Complainant filed two (2) more
motions for contempt dated June 8, 200111 and August 21, 200112 raising the same arguments. Respondent
and Atty. Enojo filed their respective comments,13 and complainant filed her replies14 to both comments.
Later on, respondent filed a Motion to Lift Suspension15 dated May 27, 2002, informing the Court that he
completed the suspension period on May 22, 2002. Thereafter, respondent admitted that he started
accepting new clients and cases after the filing of the Motion to Lift Suspension.16 Also, complainant
manifested that respondent appeared before a court in an election case on July 25, 2002 despite the
pendency of his motion to lift suspension. In view of the foregoing, the Court referred the matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for report and recommendation.17

On March 26, 2003, complainant filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Clarificatory Order18 on the status of
respondent' suspension, essentially inquiring whether respondent can resume his practice prior to the
Court's order to lift his suspension.19 Meanwhile, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received the same
inquiry through a Letter20 dated March 21, 2003 signed by Acting Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) Judge
Romeo Anasario of the Second MCTC of Negros Oriental. Accordingly, the Court referred the foregoing
queries to the OBC for report and recommendation.21

In a Report and Recommendation22 dated June 22, 2004, the OBC recommended that the Court issue an
order declaring that respondent cannot engage in the practice of law until his suspension is ordered lifted by
the Court.23 Citing case law, the OBC opined that the lifting of a lawyer's suspension is not automatic upon
the end of the period stated in the Court's decision and an order from the Court lifting the suspension is
necessary to enable him to resume the practice of his profession. In this regard, the OBC noted that: (a)
respondent's suspension became effective on May 23, 2001 upon his receipt of the Court resolution
denying his motion for reconsideration with finality; and (b) considering that the suspensions were to be
served simultaneously, the period of suspension should have ended on May 22, 2002.24 To date,
however, the Court has not issued any order lifting the suspension.

Soon thereafter, in a Resolution25 dated August 2, 2004, the Court directed the IBP to submit its report and
recommendation on the pending incidents referred to it. Since no report was received until 2013, the Court
was constrained to issue a Resolution26 dated January 20, 2014, requiring the IBP to submit a status report
regarding the said incidents. In response, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline sent a letter27 to the Court,
conveying that the Board of Governors had passed a Resolution dated April 15, 2013 affirming respondent's
suspension from the practice of law.28 However, in view of the pendency of respondent's motion for
reconsideration before it, the IBP undertook to transmit the case records to the Court as soon as said motion
is resolved.29 Thereafter, in a letter30 dated September 22, 2015, the IBP advised the Court that it denied
respondent's motion for reconsideration. The Court received the records and relevant documents only on
February 15, 2016.31

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In the Report and Recommendation32 dated January 16, 2012, instead of resolving only the pending
incidents referred to the IBP, the IBP Investigating Commissioner examined anew the 1995 complaint filed
against respondent which had been resolved with finality by the Court in its Decision dated October 18,
2000 and Resolution dated January 22, 2001. The Investigating Commissioner recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years for falsifying his wife's signature in the
bank loan documents and for immorality.33

In a Resolution34 dated April 15, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation dated January 16, 2012, with modification decreasing the recommended penalty to
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.35 Aggrieved, respondent Filed a motion for
reconsideration,36 alleging that his administrative liability based on the charges in the 1995 complaint had
been settled more than a decade ago in the Court's Decision dated October 18, 2000. He added that to
suspend him anew for another year based on the same grounds would constitute administrative double
jeopardy. He stressed that the post-decision referral of this case to the IBP was limited only to pending
incidents relating to the motion to declare him in contempt and his motion to lift the suspension. Such
motion was, however, denied in a Resolution dated June 7, 2015.37

The Issues Before the Court

The core issues in this case are: (a) whether respondent should be administratively held liable for practicing
law while he was suspended; and (b) whether the Court should lift his suspension.

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, the Court notes that the instant matters referred to the IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation pertain to respondent's alleged violation of the suspension order and his request for the
Court to lift the suspension order. However, the IBP Investigating Commissioner evidently did not dwell on
such matters. Instead, the IBP Investigating Commissioner proceeded to determine respondent's liability
based on the 1995 complaint filed by herein complainant – which was already resolved with finality by no
less than the Court itself. To make things worse: (a) the IBP Board of Governors failed to see the IBP
Investigating Commissioner's mishap, and therefore, erroneously upheld the latter's report and
recommendation; and (b) it took the IBP more than a decade to resolve the instant matters before it. Thus,
this leaves the Court with no factual findings to serve as its basis in resolving the issues raised before it.
Generally, the IBP's formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not be dispensed with,
except for valid and compelling reasons,38 as it is essential to accord both parties an opportunity to be heard
on the issues raised.39 Absent a valid fact-finding investigation, the Court usually remands the
administrative case to the IBP for further proceedings.40 However, in light of the foregoing circumstances, as
well as respondent's own admission that he resumed practicing law even without a Court order lifting his
suspension, the Court finds a compelling reason to resolve the matters raised before it even without the
IBP's factual findings and recommendation thereon.

According to jurisprudence, the "practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, as well as legal principles, practice or procedure[,] and calls for legal knowledge,
training[,] and experience."41 During the suspension period and before the suspension is lifted, a lawyer
must desist from practicing law.42 It must be stressed, however, that a lawyer's suspension is not
automatically lifted upon the lapse of the suspension period.43 The lawyer must submit the required
documents and wait for an order from the Court lifting the suspension before he or she resumes the practice
of law.44

In this case, the OBC correctly pointed out that respondent's suspension period became effective on May 23,
2001 and lasted for one (1) year, or until May 22, 2002. Therafter, respondent filed a motion for the lifting
of his suspension. However, soon after this filing and without waiting for a Court order approving the same,
respondent admitted to accepting new clients and cases, and even working on an amicable settlement for
his client with the Department of Agrarian Reform.45 Indubitably, respondent engaged in the practice of law
without waiting for the Court order lifting the suspension order against him, and thus, he must be held
administratively liable therefor.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court
and willfully appearing as an attorney without authority to do so – acts which respondent is guilty of in this
case – are grounds for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law,46 to wit:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent, prevailing case law47 shows that the Court
consistently imposed an additional suspension of six (6) months on lawyers who continue practicing law
despite their suspension. Thus, an additional suspension of six (6) months on respondent due to his
unauthorized practice of law is proper. The Court is mindful, however, that suspension can no longer be
imposed on respondent considering that just recently, respondent had already been disbarred from the
practice of law and his name had been stricken off the Roll of Attorneys in Paras v. Paras.48 In Sanchez v.
Torres,49 the Court ruled that the penalty of suspension or disbarment can no longer be imposed on a lawyer
who had been previously disbarred.50 Nevertheless, it resolved the issue on the lawyer's administrative
liability for recording purposes in the lawyer's personal file in the OBC. Hence, the Court held that
respondent therein should be suspended from the practice of law, although the said penalty can no longer
be imposed in view of his previous disbarment. In the same manner, the Court imposes upon respondent
herein the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, although the said
penalty can no longer be effectuated in view of his previous disbarment, but nonetheless should be
adjudged for recording purposes. That being said, the issue anent the propriety of lifting his suspension is
already moot and academic.

As for Atty. Enojo, complainant insists that by signing a pleading dated February 21, 200151 and indicating
therein the firm name Paras and Associates, Atty. Enojo conspired with respondent to violate the suspension
order.

Complainant's contention is untenable.

As a lawyer, Atty. Enojo has the duty and privilege of representing clients before the courts. Thus, he can
sign pleadings on their behalf. The Court cannot give credence to complainant's unsubstantiated claim that
respondent prepared the pleading and only requested Atty. Enojo to sign it. Furthermore, the pleading
averted to by complainant was dated February 21, 2001, when respondent's suspension was not yet
effective. Thus, the contempt charge against Atty. Enojo must be denied for lack of merit.

As a final note, the Court reminds the IBP to meticulously, diligently, and efficiently act on the matters
referred to it for investigation, report, and recommendation, and to submit its report with reasonable
dispatch so as to ensure proper administration of justice. Any inordinate delay cannot be countenanced.

WHEREFORE, respondent Justo de Jesus Paras is hereby found GUILTY of violating Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
However, considering that respondent has already been previously disbarred, this penalty can no longer be
imposed.

The motion to declare Atty. Richard R. Enojo in contempt is DENIED for lack of merit.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's
personal record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in
the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 11043, March 08, 2017

LIANG FUJI, Complainant, v. ATTY. GEMMA ARMI M. DELA CRUZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

Failure to exercise utmost prudence in reviewing the immigration records of an alien, which resulted in the
alien's wrongful detention, opens the special prosecutor in the Bureau of Immigration to administrative
liability.

Before this Court is an administrative complaint1 dated November 23, 2015 filed by Liang Fuji (Fuji) and his
family, against Bureau of Immigration Special Prosecutor Gemma Armi M. Dela Cruz (Special Prosecutor
Dela Cruz) for gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law in relation to her issuance of a Charge Sheet
against Fuji for overstaying.

Through a letter2 dated December 8, 2015, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Atty. Ma. Cristina B.
Layusa directed the complainants to file a verified complaint "with supporting documents duly authenticated
and/or affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts alleged"3 in the complaint.

Complainants replied4 by furnishing this Court with copies of the Verified Petition to Reopen S.D. O. No.
BOC-2015-357 (B.L.O. No. SBM-15-420) and for Relief of Judgment with Urgent Prayer for Immediate
Consideration, and Administrative Complaint (Verified Petition and Administrative Complaint),5 which Fuji
filed with the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration, and prayed that the same be treated as
their verified complaint. Complainants further informed this Court that they had difficulty obtaining certified
true copies of the November 21, 2013 Order of the Board of Commissioners, which granted Fuji's Section
9(g) visa, Summary Deportation Order dated June 17, 2015, and Warrant of Deportation from the Bureau of
Immigration personnel who just gave them the "run[-]around."6 They alleged that the Bureau of
Immigration personnel were not particularly helpful, and did not treat Fuji's case with urgency.7
The facts of this case show that in a Summary Deportation Order8 dated June 17, 2015, Fuji, a Chinese
national, was ordered deported for overstaying. From the Order, it appears that Special Prosecutor Dela
Cruz was the special prosecutor who brought the formal charge against Fuji and another person upon her
finding that Fuji's work visa had expired on May 8, 2013, with extension expired on December 6,
2013.9 Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz found that Fuji had overstayed for one (1) year and six (6) months in
violation of Commonwealth Act No. 613, Section 37(a)(7).10 Her investigation was triggered by a complaint-
affidavit dated April 30, 2015 of a certain Virgilio Manalo alleging that Fuji and another person had
defrauded him.11

On June 29, 2015, Fuji filed his Motion for Reconsideration.12

On July 28, 2015, the Bureau of Immigration Intelligence Division served Fuji's Warrant of Deportation, and
thereafter arrested him at Brgy. Maloma, San Felipe, Zambales with the assistance from local police.13 Fuji
was brought to and detained at the Bureau of Immigration Detention Facility, National Capital Region Police
Office, Taguig City.14

On October 9, 2015, the Board of Commissioners denied Fuji's Motion for Reconsideration.15

On November 23, 2015, Fuji filed his Verified Petition and Administrative Complaint.16 Subsequently, on
March 10, 2016, Fuji filed an Omnibus Motion to Reopen and Lift S.D.O. BOC-2015-357, and Release on Bail
through counsel.17

On March 22, 2016, the Board of Commissioners issued a Resolution dismissing the deportation charge
against Fuji on the ground that "[t]he records show that Liang has a working visa valid until 30 April 2016
under Jiang Tuo Mining Philippines, Inc. as Marketing Liason."18 Fuji was directed to be released from Bureau
of Immigration-Warden's Facility on March 23, 2016.19

In his administrative complaint, Fuji alleged that his rights to due process were violated since he was not
afforded any hearing or summary deportation proceedings before the deportation order was issued against
him.20 Fuji further alleged that Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz failed miserably in discharging her duties
because a simple initial review of the Bureau of Immigration records would have revealed that he was not
overstaying because his Section 9(g) work visa was valid until April 30, 2016.21

In her August 25, 2016 Comment,22 respondent Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz denied that she committed
any grave misconduct.23 She claimed that Fuji was accorded due process during the summary deportation
proceedings.24 He was directed, through an Order dated May 14, 2015 of the Legal Division, to submit his
Counter-Affidavit/Memorandum, which he failed to do.25 Fuji was also able to file his motion for
reconsideration and verified petition to reopen the case.26

Respondent further claimed that the Memorandum dated June 4, 2015 of the Bureau of Immigration -
Management Information System (BI-MIS) constituted a substantial evidence of Fuji's overstay in the
country, hence, her formal charge had legal basis.27

Respondent added that as a civil servant, she enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of
her duties.28 She had no intention to violate any law and did not commit any flagrant disregard of the rules,
or unlawfully used her station to procure some benefit for herself or for other persons.29 Respondent pointed
out that the Ombudsman had in fact dismissed the complainant's charges against her.30 She added that Fuji
stated in his March 29, 2016 Affidavit of Desistance that he had mistakenly signed some documents
including the administrative complaint.31

We find respondent administratively liable for her negligence in her failure to ascertain the facts
before levying the formal charge against Fuji for overstaying.

Generally, this Court defers from taking cognizance of disbarment complaints against lawyers in government
service arising from their administrative duties, and refers the complaint first either to the proper
administrative body that has disciplinary authority over the erring public official or employee or the
Ombudsman.32

For instance, in Spouses Buffe v. Gonzales,33 this Court dismissed the disbarment complaint against former
Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez, former Undersecretary of Justice Fidel J. Exconde, Jr., and former
Congressman Eleandro Jesus F. Madrona, holding that the respondents were public officials being charged
for actions involving their official functions during their tenure, which should be resolved by the Office of the
Ombudsman.34 In that case, one (1) of the respondents sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
forum-shopping because he allegedly received an order from the Office of the Ombudsman directing him to
file a counter-affidavit based on the same administrative complaint filed before the Office of the Bar
Confidant.35

Again, in the fairly recent case of Alicias, Jr. v. Macatangay,36 the Court dismissed the complaint against
respondents - government lawyers in the Civil Service Commission. The Court held that the acts or
omissions alleged in the complaint were "connected with their . . . official functions in the [Civil Service
Commission] and within the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of their superior or the Office of the
Ombudsman."37 It would seem that the complainant directly instituted a disbarment complaint with this
Court instead of filing an administrative complaint before the proper administrative body.

This case is an exception. Unlike the circumstances in Spouses Buffe and Alicias, Jr., the records here show
that the Office of the Ombudsman had previously dismissed Fuji's administrative complaint due to the
pendency of his Verified Petition and Administrative Complaint before the Bureau of Immigration, and
considered the case closed.38

The Bureau of Immigration subsequently granted Fuji's petition to reopen his case and ordered his release.
However, it was silent as to the culpability of respondent on the charges levelled by Fuji.

Thus, with the termination of the administrative proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman and the
apparent inaction of the Bureau of Immigration on complainant's administrative complaint, this Court
considers it proper to take cognizance of this case, and to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
discipline respondent under its "plenary disciplinary authority"39 over members of the legal profession.40

Contrary to respondent's stance, Fuji's purported Affidavit of Desistance is not sufficient cause to dismiss
this administrative complaint. This Court has previously held that proceedings of this nature cannot be
"interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the
charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same."41 The primary object of disciplinary
proceedings is to determine the fitness of a member to remain in the Bar. It is conducted solely for the
public welfare,42 and the desistance of the complainant is irrelevant. What will be decisive are the facts
borne out by the evidence presented by the parties. In Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos:43
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for
the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct
as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as
all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.44
II

Respondent Dela Cruz claimed that she issued the formal charge against Fuji for overstaying on the basis of
the Memorandum dated June 4, 2015 of the BI-MIS.45 A copy of the Memorandum with attachments was
attached to respondent's Comment.46

However, nowhere in the Memorandum was it stated that Fuji "overstayed" or that "Liang's working visa
expired on 8 May 2013 and his TVV expired on 6 December 2013"47 as respondent claims. Relevant portions
of the Memorandum read: chanRoblesvirtual La wlibra ry

For : ATTY. GEMMA ARMI M. DELA CRUZ

From : ACTING CHIEF, MIS DIVISION

 REQUEST FOR IMMIGRATION STATUS; VISA EXTENSION
Re : PAYMENT, LATEST TRAVEL AND DEROGATORY OF THE
FOLLOWING:

1. MR./MS. LIANG FUJI

2. MR./MS. CHEN XIANG HE

3. MR./MS. JACKY CHANG HE

Date : 04 June 2015

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------

Further to your request for verification of Immigration Status; Visa Extension Payment and TRAVEL
RECORD/S, please find the result/s as follows:

....

Result/s : 1. LIANG FUJI

- Derogatory Record Not Found

- Latest Travel Record Found (Please see the attached files for
your ready reference. NOTE: DOB: 18 October 1991)

- Immigration Status Found

- Latest Payment Record Found in BI-Main (Please see the

attached files for your ready reference. NOTE: DOB: 18
October 1991)48

....
The Memorandum merely transmitted copies of immigration records showing details of filing of applications,
such as official receipts, - and travel record of Fuji. It was respondent Dela Cruz who made the
determination that Fuji overstayed on the basis of the'documents transmitted to her by the BI-MIS.

Among the documents transmitted by the BI-MIS were computer print-outs showing details of official
receipts dated June 14, 2013, August 7, 2013, and November 19, 2013 for temporary visitor visa extension
and official receipt dated July 15, 2013 for an application for change of immigration status. Also, the travel
records of Fuji show the following details: c hanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

Date &
: 4 June 2015 3:05 PM
Time

Verifier : DIMARUCOT J

Database : TRAVEL - ARRIVAL

 FLIG IMMIG
TRAVEL TRAVE POR OFFIC3E REMAR
HT STAT ACTION
DATE L TIME T R KS
NO US

10-
11:34P CZ37 NAI ALLOWE
FEBRUARY 9G MIJARES
M 7 A1 D
-2014

06-
11:51P CZ37 NAI PARANG ALLOWE
JANUARY- 9A
M 7 A1 UE D
2012

22-
11:25P CZ37 NAI ALLOWE
SEPTEMBE 9A NUNEZ
M 7 A1 D49
R-2011
Fuji's travel records as of June 4, 2015, show his arrival in the Philippines on February 10, 2014 under a
work visa immigration status.50 Simple prudence dictates that respondent Atty. Dela Cruz should have
verified whether or not the July 15, 2013 application for change of status had been approved by the Bureau
of Immigration Commissioners, especially since she had complete and easy access to the immigration
records.

Respondent failed in the performance of her basic duties. Special prosecutors in the Bureau of Immigration
should exercise such degree of vigilance and attention in reviewing the immigration records, whenever the
legal status and documentation of an alien are at issue. For while a deportation proceeding does not partake
of the nature of a criminal action, it is however, a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding
affecting the freedom and liberty of a person.51

Respondent was expected to be reasonably thorough in her review of the documents transmitted to her by
the BI-MIS, especially as it may ultimately result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective deportee.
She should not have simply relied on the handwritten note by a personnel from the BI-MIS at the bottom
portion of the receipt dated November 19, 2013 for 9A visa extension stating "Valid until: 06-Dec-2013."
Had she inquired further, she would have discovered that Fuji's application dated July 15, 2013 for
conversion from temporary visitor visa (9A) to work visa (9G) was approved by the Board of Commissioners
on November 21, 2013 — or one (1) year and seven (7) months earlier - with validity until April 30, 2016.
Thus, even if Fuji's temporary visitor (9A) visa had expired on December 6, 2013 his stay in the country was
still valid under the 9G work visa.

Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of her duties as a government official.52 However, if said misconduct as a
government official also constitutes a violation of her oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional
Responsibility,53 then she may be subject to disciplinary sanction by this Court.

Atty. Dela Cruz failed to observe Rule 18.03 of the Code of the Professional Responsibility, which mandates
that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable." As a special prosecutor in the Bureau of Immigration, she is the representative, not
of any private party, but of the State. Her task was to investigate and verify facts to determine whether a
ground for deportation exists, and if further administrative action — in the form of a formal charge — should
be taken against an alien.

Had respondent carefully reviewed the records of Fuji, she would have found out about the approval of Fuji's
application, which would negate her finding of overstaying. Because of her negligence, Fuji was deprived of
his liberty for almost eight (8) months, until his release on March 23, 2016.

Simple neglect of duty is defined as a failure to give attention to a task due to carelessness or
indifference.54 In this case, respondent's negligence shows her indifference to the fundamental right of every
person, including aliens, to due process and to the consequences of her actions.
Lawyers in government service should be more conscientious with their professional obligations consistent
with the time-honored principle of public office being a public trust.55 The ethical standards under the Code
of Professional Responsibility are rendered even more exacting as to government lawyers because they have
the added duty to abide by the policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics, competence, and
professionalism in public service.56 In this case, respondent's negligence evinces a failure to cope with the
strict demands and high standards of public service and the legal profession.

The appropriate sanction is discretionary upon this Court.57 Under the Civil Service Rules,58 the penalty for
simple neglect of duty is suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months. In previous
cases,59this Court imposed the penalty of suspension of three (3) months to six (6) months for erring
lawyers, who were negligent in handling cases for their clients. We find appropriate the penalty of
suspension of three (3) months considering the consequence of respondent's negligence. This suspension
includes her desistance from performing her functions as a special prosecutor in the Bureau of Immigration.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gemma Armi M. Dela Cruz is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) months.

The respondent, upon receipt of this Resolution, shall immediately serve her suspension. She shall formally
manifest to this Court that her suspension has started, and copy furnish all courts and quasi-judicial bodies
where she has entered her appearance, within five (5) days upon receipt of this Resolution. Respondent
shall also serve copies of her manifestation on all adverse parties in all the cases she entered her formal
appearance.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be attached to Atty. Gemma
Armi M. Dela Cruz's personal record. Copies of this Resolution should also be served on the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines for its proper disposition, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.