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Oath of Office as Member of the Bar as shown by a

 Group 1 Letter of Request dated July 23, 1979, ...


1. EN BANC 3. At around Eleven o' clock in the morning of July 26,
1979, while waiting for my turn to take my Oath as a
A. M. No. 139 March 28, 1983 member of the Bar, I was made to sign my Lawyer's
Oath by one of the Clerk in the Office of the Bar
RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee. Confidant and while waiting there, Atty. Romeo Mendoza
ATTY. PROCOPIO S. BELTRAN, JR., President of the told me that Chief Justice, the Honorable Enrique M.
Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., complainant, Fernando wants to talk to me about the Reply of Mr.
vs. Jorge Uy (Deceased) to my Answer to his Complaint. The
ELMO S. ABAD, respondent. Honorable Chief Justice told me that I have to answer
the Reply and for which reason the taking of my
Lawyer's Oath was further suspended. *
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
4. On July 31, 1979, I filed my Reply to Mr. Jorge
Charged by Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., president of Uy's Answer with a Prayer that the Honorable Supreme
the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., of Court determines my fitness to be a member of the Bar;
practicing law without having been previously admitted
to the Philippine Bar, Mr. Elmo S. Abad could not deny 5. While waiting for the appropriate action which the
and had to admit the practice. In exculpation he gives Honorable Supreme Court may take upon my Prayer to
the following lame explanation: determine my fitness to be a member of the Bar, I
received a letter from the Integrated Bar of the
1. On July 23, 1979, respondent conformably with Philippines, Quezon City Chapter dated May 10, 1980
the Resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court En informing the respondent of an Annual General Meeting
Banc dated July 10, 1979, ... prior to his taking the together with my Statement of Account for the year
Oath of Office as a member of the bar, paid his Bar 1980-1981, ... .
Admission Fee in the amount of P175.00 as shown by
Official Receipt No. 8128792, ... paid his Certification 6. Believing that with my signing of the Lawyer's
Fee in the amount of P5.00 as shown by Official Receipt Oath on July 26, 1979 and my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's
No. 8128793, ... and also paid his Membership Dues for (Deceased) Answer, the Honorable Supreme Court did
the year 1979-80 to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines not ordered for the striking of my name in the Roll of
as shown by Official Receipt No. 83740,... . Attorneys with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
therefore a Member in Good Standing, I paid my
2. On July 26, 1979, Atty. Romeo Mendoza, the then membership due and other assessments to the
Clerk of Court of the Honorable Supreme Court, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter,
included the respondent as among those taking the as shown by Official Receipt No. 110326 and Official
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Receipt No. 0948, ... . Likewise respondent paid his to the Philippine Bar and the right to practise law
Professional Tax Receipt as shown by Official Receipt thereafter. He should know that two essential requisites
No. 058033 and Official Receipt No. 4601685, ... . for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely:
his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and
7. On February 28, 1981, the Integrated Bar of the his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs.
Philippines, Quezon City Chapter also included the 17 and 19, Rules of Court.)
name of the respondent as a Qualified Voter for the
election of officers and directors for the year 1981-1982, The proven charge against respondent Abad constitutes
... . contempt of court (Rule 71, Sec. 3(e), Rules of Court.)

8. Respondent's belief and good faith was further WHEREFORE, Mr. Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five
enhanced by the fact that on January 8, 1981, Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to this Court within
Complainant Jorge Uy in SBC607 died and herein ten (10) days from notice failing which he shall serve
respondent submitted a verified Notice and Motion with twenty-five (25) days imprisonment.
the Honorable Supreme Court on April 27, 1981;
notifying the Court of this fact with a prayer that herein SO ORDERED.
respondent be allowed to take his Oath as Member of
the Bar; Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion Jr.,
Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin
9. Thereafter, respondent was again assessed by the Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Integrated Bar for his 1981-1982 membership due and
other assessment for which the undersigned paid as Aquino, J., is on leave.
shown by Official Receipt No. 132734 and Official
Receipt No. 3363, ... . Footnotes

10. Respondent likewise paid his Professional Tax * The case was SBC No. 607-Jorge Q. Uy vs. Elmo
Receipt for 1981 as shown by Official Receipt No. S. Abad which was dismissed on November 25, 1982
3195776, ... . because of the death of the complainant. However, there
is still pending BM No. 136-Esperanza T. Sistoso, et al.
11. Respondent likewise has a Certificate of vs. Elmo S. Abad for qualified theft. The respondent was
Membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as required to file an answer on October 26, 1982.
well as a Certificate of Membership in Good Standing
with the Quezon City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, ....

Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances


which he has narrated do not constitute his admission
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2. EN BANC lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys
as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that
[B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005] one of the obligations of a member is the payment of
annual dues as determined by the IBP Board of
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as
REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the
DUES. Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the
IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray
DECISION the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the
policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: from payment of dues is but an implementation of the
Courts directives for all members of the IBP to help in
This is a request for exemption from payment of the defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment
petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr. of annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is
allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of
In his letter,[1] dated 22 September 2004, petitioner membership. It asserted that what petitioner could have
sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his
amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the
for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being IBP could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to
admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part pay dues could have been stopped. It also alleged that
of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of
1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive
December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. status for its members, which if approved by the Board
He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP
the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil members from payment of the annual dues.
Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice
of ones profession while in government service, and In his reply[4] dated 22 February 2005, petitioner
neither can he be assessed for the years when he was contends that what he is questioning is the IBP Board of
working in the USA. Governors Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of
annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP whether or not they are engaged in active or inactive
for comment.[2] practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-
Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal
comment[3] stating inter alia: that membership in the protection clause and the due process clause. He also
IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual
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membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation
him considering that he has been in an inactive status for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.[5]
and is without income derived from his law practice. He
adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official
membership dues would constitute deprivation of unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires
property right without due process of law. Lastly, he membership and financial support of every attorney as
claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the
inactive status is neither injurious to active law retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the
practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to Supreme Court.[6]
the community where the inactive lawyers-members
reside. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate
with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse
entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster
he was working abroad from 1986-2003? the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of
We rule in the negative. improving the profession in this fashion be shared by
the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program
An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which the lawyers.[7]
every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
association organized by individual lawyers themselves, Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that
membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and
Bar is essentially a process by which every member of duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to
the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in the practice of law and in the integration of the
carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged Philippine Bar[8] - which power required members of a
to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a
or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
an official national body of which all lawyers are regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is
required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a
all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying
including the requirement of payment of a reasonable out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.
annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of
the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in
or professional responsibility, breach of which the Integration of the Philippine Bar,[9] thus:
constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar
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For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that
members does not mean that the Court is attempting to the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of
levy a tax. discussing the situation of members under inactive
status and the nonpayment of their dues during such
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to
for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to
the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it the IBP.
follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose
a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the
possible to put on an integrated Bar program without penalty of removal would amount to a deprivation of
means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied property without due process and hence infringes on
powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose one of his constitutional rights.
such exaction.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty.
The only limitation upon the States power to regulate Marcial Edillon,[10] in this wise:
the privilege of law is that the regulation does not
impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest . . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in
promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a
slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to
required payment of the annual dues. consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police
power of the State, and under the necessary powers
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This respondents right to practice law before the courts of
means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues this country should be and is a matter subject to
subsists for as long as ones membership in the IBP regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the
remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a
of practice, the member is engaged in. penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty
may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows unreasonable or arbitrary.
exemption from payment of membership dues. At most,
as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is
the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such
stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court
in the IBP could have been terminated and his to exact compliance with the lawyers public
obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued. responsibilities.

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As a final note, it must be borne in mind that Medado graduated from the University of the
membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in
conditions,[11] one of which is the payment of 19791 and passed the same year’s bar examinations
membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them with a general weighted average of 82.7.2
entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof
warrants such drastic move. On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the
Philippine International Convention Center (PICC)
WHEREFORE, petitioners request for exemption from together with the successful bar examinees.3 He was
payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May
P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date,
membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non- allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to
extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office
decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit when he went home to his province for a vacation.6
his suspension from the practice of law.
Several years later, while rummaging through his old
SO ORDERED. college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the
Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, had not signed in the roll, and that what he had
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria- signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, an attendance record.7
Tinga, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already
working. He stated that he was mainly doing
3. EN BANC corporate and taxation work, and that he was not
B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013 actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he
operated “under the mistaken belief [that] since he
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ha[d] already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll
ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner. of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his
status as a lawyer”;8 and “the matter of signing in
RESOLUTION the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and
compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten.”9
SERENO, C.J.:
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he
Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado was required to provide his roll number in order for
(Medado). his MCLE compliances to be credited.10 Not having

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signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to it was not a third party who called this Court’s
provide his roll number. attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was
Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse,
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When
Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him this long
allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11 to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly
replied: Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong
clarificatory conference on the matter on 21 mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna
September 201212 and submitted a Report and happen. At the same time, it’s a combination of
Recommendation to this Court on 4 February apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen.
2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to come
petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, here … sign the roll and take the oath as
gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It necessary.16
explained that, based on his answers during the For another, petitioner has not been subject to any
clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no action for disqualification from the practice of law,17
valid justification for his negligence in signing in the which is more than what we can say of other
Roll of Attorneys.15 individuals who were successfully admitted as
members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this
After a judicious review of the records, we grant fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to
Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject to the strict requirements of the ethics of the
the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty profession, and that he has prima facie shown that
equivalent to suspension from the practice of law. he possesses the character required to be a member
of the Philippine Bar.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to
sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent
imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of and able legal practitioner, having held various
disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron,
most serious ethical transgressions of members of Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil
the Bar. Company, and the Energy Development
Corporation.19
In this case, the records do not show that this action
is warranted. All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a
full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar. While the
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good practice of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this
moral character when he finally filed the instant Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege
Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that
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from individuals who have shown mental fitness and continue practicing law without taking the necessary
moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession. steps to complete all the requirements for admission
to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate practice of law.
petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of
inaction. Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice
of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney or officer
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law of the court, and acting as such without authority,
since 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years, may constitute indirect contempt of court,27 which
without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28
justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal
“neither willful nor intentional but based on a contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of
mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment.”22 charges and the conduct of hearings.30 In this case,
while it appears quite clearly that petitioner
We disagree. committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly
engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to from making any finding of liability for indirect
excuse a person from the legal consequences of his contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has
acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a been filed against him.
mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful
justification, because everyone is presumed to know Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law
the law and its consequences.25 Ignorantia facti likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of
excusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly,
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
may have at first operated under an honest mistake While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely
of fact when he thought that what he had signed at prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized
the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by
the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision,
realized that what he had signed was merely an because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty
attendance record, he could no longer claim an to prevent the unauthorized practice of
honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that law. This duty likewise applies to law students and
point, Medado should have known that he was not a Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar,
full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of they are bound to comport themselves in accordance
his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was with the ethical standards of the legal profession.
the act of signing therein that would have made him
so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to
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Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Del
violations of Canon 9 have warranted the penalty of Castillo, Abad, Perez, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and
suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is Leonen, JJ., concur.
not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him Brion, and Villarama, Jr., JJ., On leave.
from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to Peralta, Bersamin, and Mendoza, JJ., On official
impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by leave.
allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1)
year after receipt of this Resolution. For his
transgression of the prohibition against the 4. FIRST DIVISION
unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to
fine him in the amount of P32,000. During the one ROGELIO A. TAN, NORMA TAN G.R. No. 169517
year period, petitioner is warned that he is not
allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is and MALIYAWAO PAGAYOKAN,
sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes
practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Petitioners,
Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.
- versus -
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll
of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael BENEDICTO M. BALAJADIA,
A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this Respondent.
Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a Promulgated:March 14, 2006
FINE of P32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law.
During the one year period, petitioner is NOT x ----------------------------------- x
ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY
WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice DECISION
of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys
will be dealt with severely by this Court.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office
of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Before us is an original petition[1] for contempt filed
Philippines, and the Office of the Court by petitioners Rogelio Tan, Norma Tan and
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the Maliyawao Pagayokan against respondent Benedicto
country.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Balajadia.

SO ORDERED.

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Petitioners allege that on May 8, 2005, respondent affidavit regarding the 10:00 oclock parking incident,
filed a criminal case against them with the Office of which is the subject of the instant petition,
the City of Prosecutor of Baguio City for usurpation erroneously referred to him as a practicing lawyer
of authority, grave coercion and violation of city tax because Atty. Aquinos secretary copied verbatim
ordinance due to the alleged illegal collection of paragraph 5 of Atty. Aquinos complaint-affidavit.
parking fees by petitioners from respondent. In Hence, it was inadvertently alleged that respondent
paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit, respondent is a practicing lawyer based in Baguio City with office
asserted that he is a practicing lawyer based in address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session
Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Road, Baguio City, which statement referred to the
Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City.[2] person of Atty. Aquino and his law office address.
However, certifications issued by the Office of the Bar
Confidant[3] and the Integrated Bar of the Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquinos secretary, executed an
Philippines[4] showed that respondent has never affidavit[8] admitting the mistake in the preparation
been admitted to the Philippine Bar. Hence, of the complaint-affidavit. Respondent alleged that
petitioners claim that respondent is liable for indirect he did not read the complaint-affidavit because he
contempt for misrepresenting himself as a lawyer. assumed that the two complaint-affidavits contained
the same allegations with respect to his occupation
In his Comment,[5] respondent avers that the and office address. Respondent claims that he had
allegation in paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit no intention of misrepresenting himself as a
that he is a practicing lawyer was an honest mistake. practicing lawyer.
He claims that the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino
prepared the subject complaint-affidavit which was In their Reply,[9] petitioners reiterate that
patterned after Atty. Aquinos complaint-affidavit.[6] respondent should be made liable for indirect
It appears that Atty. Aquino had previously filed a contempt for having made untruthful statements in
complaint-affidavit against petitioners involving the the complaint-affidavit and that he cannot shift the
same subject matter. blame to Atty. Aquinos secretary.

Respondent claims that two complaint-affidavits The sole issue for resolution is whether respondent
were drafted by the same secretary; one for the May is liable for indirect contempt.
5, 2005 parking incident at 10:00 oclock in the
morning and another for the parking incident on the Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:
same date but which occurred at 1:00 oclock in the
afternoon. Respondent insists that the complaint- Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after
affidavit regarding the 1:00 oclock parking incident charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has
correctly alleged that he is a businessman with office been filed, and an opportunity given to the
address at Room B-204, 2/F Lopez Building, Session respondent to comment thereon within such period
Road, Baguio City.[7] However, the complaint- as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by
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himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the paragraph 5 of respondents complaint-affidavit was,
following acts may be punished for indirect indeed, the result of inadvertence.
contempt:
Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the
xxxx allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was the
result of inadvertence and cannot, by itself, establish
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a intent as to make him liable for indirect contempt. In
court, and acting as such without authority; the cases where we found a party liable for the
unauthorized practice of law, the party was guilty of
x x x x. some overt act like signing court pleadings on behalf
of his client;[12] appearing before court hearings as
In several cases,[10] we have ruled that the an attorney;[13] manifesting before the court that he
unauthorized practice of law by assuming to be an will practice law despite being previously denied
attorney and acting as such without authority admission to the bar;[14] or deliberately attempting
constitutes indirect contempt which is punishable by to practice law and holding out himself as an
fine or imprisonment or both. The liability for the attorney through circulars with full knowledge that
unauthorized practice of law under Section 3(e), Rule he is not licensed to do so.[15]
71 of the Rules of Court is in the nature of criminal
contempt and the acts are punished because they In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to
are an affront to the dignity and authority of the show that respondent acted as an attorney or that he
court, and obstruct the orderly administration of intended to practice law. Consequently, he cannot be
justice. In determining liability for criminal made liable for indirect contempt considering his
contempt, well-settled is the rule that intent is a lack of intent to illegally practice law.
necessary element, and no one can be punished
unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended However, while the evidence on record failed to prove
to commit it.[11] respondents deliberate intent to misrepresent
himself as an attorney and act as such without
In the case at bar, a review of the records supports authority, he is hereby warned to be more careful
respondents claim that he never intended to project and circumspect in his future actions.
himself as a lawyer to the public. It was a clear
inadvertence on the part of the secretary of Atty WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Aquino. The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to Respondent is WARNED to be more careful and
the circumstances that gave rise to the mistake in circumspect in his future actions.
the drafting of the complaint-affidavit conforms to
the documentary evidence on record. Taken together, SO ORDERED.
these circumstances show that the allegation in

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5. EN BANC administrative case against his nephew for
falsification of school records or credentials.
February 20, 1981
In the meantime, Juan T. Publico took the 1960 Bar
IN RE: PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT IN THE Examination, passed it, took the lawyer's oath, and
ROLL OF ATTORNEYS, JUAN T. PUBLICO, signed the Roll of Attorneys.
petitioner.
The administrative case was referred to the Court's
Legal Officer-Investigator, Ricardo Paras, Jr., for
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: investigation and report. On September 10, 1961,
Dulcisimo Tapel moved to drop the complaint on the
Three Petitions for the reinstatement of Juan T. ground that his witnesses had turned hostile. The
Publico in the Roll of Attorneys, have been filed: (1) Motion was denied, however, as the complainant's
by Juan T. Publico himself dated May 28, 1979; 2) by witnesses had already testified. Upon the termination
the President and twelve members of the faculty of of the hearing, the Legal Officer-Investigator
the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Sta. submitted a Report with the following findings and
Mesa, Manila, where Juan T. Publico is also a faculty recommendation:
member, filed on June 1, 1979; and 3) by the San
Page 723 Miguel (Catanduanes) Civic Association in To recapitulate, respondent Juan Tapel Publico (son
Metro Manila through its President, Vice-President of Francisco Publico) studied at Buhi Elementary
and Directors on April 23, 1979. School, Bato, Catanduanes, until Grade VI, but
finished only Grade V in said school, because on
The records disclose that Juan Tapel Publico filed a February 1, 1950, or before the end of the school
petition to take the Bar Examination in 1960 after year 1949-1950, he left said school and came to
failing in the 1959 Bar Examination. His uncle, Manila. Once in Manila, he enrolled in Third Year
Dulcisimo B. Tapel opposed the petition alleging that high school at the University of Manila. Required by
his nephew is not a person of good moral character the school authorities to submit his school records
for having misrepresented, sometime in 1950, when for Grade VI elementary and First and Second Year
he was sixteen (16) years of age, that he was eligible high school, he sent for the records of his cousin
for Third Year High School, University of Manila, by Juan Marino Publico (son of Gabriel Publico).
utilizing the school records of his cousin and name-
sake, Juan M. Publico when, in actual fact, For all the foregoing, we find and so hold that
petitioner had not completed Grade VI of his respondent falsified his school records, by making it
elementary schooling, much less, First and Second appear that he had finished or completed Grade VI
Year High School. When required to file a formal elementary and First and Second Year high school,
Complaint, Dulcisimo Tapel instituted an when in truth and in fact he had not, thereby
violating the provisions of Sections 5 and 6, Rule 127
12
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Group 1 to Group 4
of the Rules of Court, which require completion by a
bar examinee or candidate of the prescribed courses On April 17, 1974, Juan T. Publico filed his second
in elementary, high, pre-law and law school, prior to Petition for Reinstatement stating that the Complaint
his admission to the practice of law. for disbarment against him had been withdrawn by
the complainant, but that the Legal Officer-
Wherefore, the undersigned Investigators hereby Investigator proceeded with the hearing ex parte;
recommend that respondent's name be stricken from that he was unable to cross-examine the witnesses
the Rollo of Attorneys. against him as he was unaware of the ex-parte
proceedings until he was informed by the Legal
In this Court's Resolution of February 23, 1962, the Officer-Investigator about the same; that he had
name of Juan T. Publico was stricken off the Roll of suffered so much already and to let him suffer
Attorneys. perpetual disqualification would not be in
consonance with the program of the New Society. He
Approximately eleven years later, or on June 28, prayed that his name be reinstated in the Roll of
1973, Juan T. Publico filed a Petition for Attorneys, or that the case be reopened so that he
Reinstatement alleging that he had never received, could cross-examine the witnesses against him and
for had he been informed, nor did he have any clear himself of the charges. This Court denied his
knowledge of the Resolution of the Court ordering Petition in its Resolution of April 23, 1974.
the Bar Division to strike his name from the Roll of
Attorneys until March 1969, when after taking his On November 17, 1975, Juan T. Publico wrote to the
oath of office as Municipal Judge of Gigmoto, Chief Justice imploring his assistance that he may
Catanduanes, he was advised to inquire into the be given another opportunity to enjoy the privileges
outcome of the disbarment case against him; that he of a lawyer, and requesting that a hearing be held
was shocked and humiliated upon learning of the where he could personally plead for his
said Resolution; that he resigned from all his reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys. Again, this
positions in public and private offices, and Court denied the aforesaid letter-petition.
transferred to Manila. He then prayed that the Court
allow his reinstatement taking into consideration his Petitioner filed a fourth petition for reinstatement on
exemplary conduct from the time he became a July 8, 1976 stating that he had remained a person
lawyer, his services to the community the numerous of good moral character and had an exemplary social
awards, resolutions and/'or commendations he standing in the community where he resides, as
received, which were incorporated in the Petition, shown by his election to various positions in different
and particularly, for the sake of his children. The associations: as peace officer of Barangay 593, Zone
Court denied the Petition. Petitioner moved for 58 of the City of Manila (Annex A of the petition),
reconsideration claiming that he had been President of the Stallholders and Vendors
sufficiently punished already, but again this was Association of Pamilihang Sentral ng Sta. Mesa, Inc.
denied by the Court for lack of merit. (Annex B), re-elected President of the Altura
13
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Group 1 to Group 4
Elementary School General Parents-Teachers of the Polytechnic university of the Philippines, a
Association (Annex C), and re-elected President of the State University.
San Miguel (Catanduanes) Civic Association in Metro
Manila (Annex D). He also alleged that his moral Additionally, petitioner submitted evidence
character and integrity had remained irreproachable, purporting to show his honesty and integrity and
that he had been more than sufficiently punished other manifestations of his good moral character,
and had been undergoing economic difficulties particularly, the Resolution dated March 30, 1979 of
because of his disbarment. In its Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Catanduanes
August 3, 1976, this Court denied the Petition with Chapter (Annex A); the Resolution dated April 16,
finality. 1979 of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Miguel,
Catanduanes (Annex B); the letter of the Municipal
For consideration now is petitioner's fifth plea for Mayor of San Miguel, Alejandro T. Tatel addressed to
reinstatement filed on June 1, 1979 in addition to a the late Chief Justice Castro dated April 17, 1979
letter-petition addressed to Chief Justice Enrique M. (Annex B-1), all attesting to his good character and
Fernando dated November 3, 1979. In his Petition, standing in the community and his capability as a
Juan T. Publico avers that his enrollment in Third lawyer. Further submitted are certifications issued
Year High School in Manila was through the by the different government offices Court of First
initiative of his uncle, Dulcisimo B. Tapel who Instance of Catanduanes (Annex C); Catanduanes
accompanied him to school and enrolled him in a Integrated National Police Command (Annex F
grade level above his qualifications in spite of his should be D); Office of the Provincial Fiscal at Virac,
demonstrations; that the misrepresentation Catanduanes (Annex F), and First Municipal Circuit
committed about his academic records was not his Court, Bato-San Miguel, Bato, Catanduanes (Annex
own fault alone, but was precipitated by his uncle, E), certifying that petitioner has not been accused
who as member of the faculty of the Catanduanes nor convicted of any crime.
Institute had access to the records of the school; that
being merely sixteen years of age, he could not be The petition filed by the President and Faculty of the
expected to act with discernment as he was still Polytechnic University of the Philippines reiterated
under the influence of his uncle, who later on caused the same circumstances as those stated by Juan T.
his disbarment; that he had conducted himself in a Publico in his own Petition and further professed
manner befitting a member of the bar; that he had that Atty. Publico is a competent and proficient
striven to serve the people and the government as teacher; that his moral integrity and honesty are
shown by the positions he held as Municipal beyond reproach; that to require him to comply with
Attorney of San Miguel, Catanduanes, Deputy what he missed in the steps of the educational ladder
Register of Deed of Catanduanes, Election Registrar would be meaningless and without any value as it is
of the Commission on Elections, and Editorial not intended to benefit him nor the system of
Assistant in the Editorial Staff of the defunct House education; and that non-formal education has
of Representatives, and presently as faculty member already been recognized and given its equivalence in
14
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 1 to Group 4
the scheme of formal education. The petition also Almost nineteen (19) years, by February 23, 1981,
mentioned the names of some great men who had shall have elapsed since petitioner was barred from
been school dropouts, but who did not let this fact exercising his profession. Cognizant that the power
deter them from attaining success in their respective to discipline, especially if amounting to disbarment,
fields. should be exercised on the preservative and not on
the indicative principle, 2 we find that the evidence
The petition filed by the San Miguel (Catanduanes) submitted by petitioner, particularly, the
Civic Association in Metro Manila is substantially of testimonials presented on his behalf, as listed
the same tenor and added that petitioner was re- heretofore, his good conduct and honorable dealings
elected President of that Association for four years subsequent to his disbarment, his active involvement
from 1972 to 1975 inclusive. in civic, educational, and religious organizations,
render him fit to be restored to membership in the
No opposition has been filed to any of the petitions. Bar, and that petitioner has been sufficiently
punished and disciplined. 3
The criterion for reinstatement has been stated as
follows: WHEREFORE, petitioner Juan T. Publico is hereby
ordered reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.
Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated
rests to a great extent in the sound discretion of the SO ORDERED.
court, The court action will depend, generally
speaking, on whether or not it decides that the Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez,
public interest in the orderly and impartial Guerrero, Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.
administration of justice will be conserved by the
applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an Aquino J., took no part.
attorney and counselor at law. The applicant must,
like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the
court that he is a person of good moral character — Separate Opinions
a fit and proper person to practice law. The court will
take into consideration the applicant's character and
standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and BARREDO, J., concurring:
character of the charge for which he was disbarred,
his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the I concur because there have been cases in the past
time that has elapsed between the disbarment and where persons who had not attended any law school
the application for reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec. were admitted to practice the law profession.
301, p. 443). 1

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Group 1 to Group 4
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring: administered. Membership in the bar, as aptly
pointed out by Justice Cardozo, is a privilege
There is no question to my mind that, as so ably put burdened with conditions. One of them, and by far
in the opinion of Justice Melencio-Herrera, the most important, is fidelity to the concept that a
reinstatement is warranted. This is not to overlook lawyer is an officer of the court. That he should never
the offense which caused his disbarment. It certainly forget. He is expected to aid not to hinder or obstruct
was not in conformity with the high standard the cause of truth so that justice may be dispened
membership in the legal profession entails. with according to law. In that sense, the mere lapse
Nonetheless, it could be said that he had expiated of time, to my mind, while justifying the view that
long enough for this particular lapse from rectitude, there has been retribution, is not decisive. It is my
one, moreover, committed at a time when he was belief, that, of itself alone, it does not suffice to call
barely sixteen years of age. His youthful years while indubitably for reinstatement. Far more important is
certainly not constituting a justification may be a showing that his conduct after disbarment is such
considered as impressed with a mitigating character. that there can be a reasonable expectation of his
Moreover, from the recitals appearing in resolutions being able to comply with a lawyer's oath. As with my
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Catanduanes brethren, I am convinced that respondent in this
Chapter, and the Sangguniang Bayan of San Miguel case has given sufficient proof that he would not be
Catanduanes, as well as certifications of different lacking in that respect. Hence my vote to readmit
government offices, it would appear that his conduct him to membership in the bar.
subsequent to his disbarment can stand a rigorous
appraisal. At least, no other misdeed has been
attributed to him. There is pertinence therefore to
this excerpt from Barba v. Pedro: "There is no affront
to reason then in ruling that the punishment, while
deserved, has lasted long enough. He has sufficiently
rehabilitated himself." 1

The same approach to my mind is reflected in the


opinion of the Court. Why this brief concurrence
then? While there is no clear necessity for it, it may
not be amiss to say a few words on the implications
of the preservative and not vindictive principle as the
test, the satisfaction of which warrants an affirmative
response to a plea for reinstatement. As in the case
contempt proceedings where such a doctrine has
held sway, and justifiably so, what is sought to be
guarded zealously is that justice be properly
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Group 1 to Group 4
 Group 2 Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964.[1] It
was after the child was born, complainant alleged,
that respondent first promised he would marry her
6. Mitchell Simon, Nick Smith … (no citation) after he passes the bar examinations. Their
relationship continued and respondent allegedly
7. EN BANC made more than twenty or thirty promises of
marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on the
[SBC Case No. 519. July 31, 1997] latters birthdays. Her trust in him and their
relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that
PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant, vs. SIMEON respondent married another woman. Hence, this
BARRANCO, JR., respondent. petition.

RESOLUTION Upon complainants motion, the Court authorized the


taking of testimonies of witnesses by deposition in
ROMERO, J.: 1972. On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case citing
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia complainants failure to comment on the motion of
Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved from the duty to
Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal take aforesaid testimonies by deposition.
profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar Complainant filed her comment stating that she had
examinations on the fourth attempt, after justifiable reasons in failing to file the earlier
unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968. comment required and that she remains interested
Before he could take his oath, however, complainant in the resolution of the present case. On June 18,
filed the instant petition averring that respondent 1974, the Court denied respondents motion to
and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of dismiss.
wedlock was born to them and that respondent did
not fulfill his repeated promises to marry her. On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a
motion to dismiss on the ground of abandonment
The facts were manifested in hearings held before filed by respondent on September 17, 1979.[2]
Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in June and July 1971. Respondents third motion to dismiss was noted in
Respondent and complainant were townmates in the Courts Resolution dated September 15, 1982.[3]
Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in In 1988, respondent repeated his request, citing his
their teens, they were steadies. Respondent even election as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
acted as escort to complainant when she reigned as Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active
Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. Complainant first participation in civic organizations and good
acceded to sexual congress with respondent standing in the community as well as the length of
sometime in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son,

17
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 1 to Group 4
time this case has been pending as reasons to allow constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has
him to take his oath as a lawyer.[4] held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act
complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so
dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant to corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to
time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the a high degree.[6] It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless
lawyers oath upon payment of the required fees.[5] act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion
of respectable members of the community.[7]
Respondents hopes were again dashed on November
17, 1988 when the Court, in response to We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang[8] quite
complainants opposition, resolved to cancel his relevant because mere intimacy between a man and
scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so
recommendation. corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the
imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even
The IBPs report dated May 17, 1997 recommended if as a result of such relationship a child was born
the dismissal of the case and that respondent be out of wedlock.[9]
allowed to take the lawyers oath.
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts
We agree. whose sexual relations were evidently consensual.
We do not find complainants assertions that she had
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyers been forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She
oath in 1971 because of the charges of gross continued to see and be respondents girlfriend even
immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until
respondent bore an illegitimate child with his 1971. All those years of amicable and intimate
sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that relations refute her allegations that she was forced to
he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he have sexual congress with him. Complainant was
passes the bar examinations. then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued
their relationship and was not an innocent young girl
We find that these facts do not constitute gross who could be easily led astray. Unfortunately,
immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent chose to marry and settle permanently
respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in with another woman. We cannot castigate a man for
premarital sexual relations with complainant and seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is
promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral a sacred and perpetual bond which should be
character on his part but the same does not
18
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 1 to Group 4
entered into because of love, not for any other 9. EN BANC
reason.
A.M. No. P-220 December 20, 1978
We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an
act of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and JULIO ZETA, complainant,
unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make vs.
respondent suffer severely and it seems, perpetually, FELICISIMO MALINAO, respondent.
sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be
admitted into. Even assuming that his past
indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that BARREDO, J.:
respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer
constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During Administrative complaint against Felicisimo Malinao
this time there appears to be no other indiscretion court interpreter of the Court of First Instance of
attributed to him.[10] Respondent, who is now sixty- Catbalogan, Samar charging as follows:
two years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit
belatedly, to take the lawyers oath. l — ILLEGALLY APPEARING IN COURT. — MR.
Malinao has been appearing in the municipal court
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby of this town for parties like attorney when he is not
DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is an attorney. Reliable information also says he has
ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon been appearing in the municipal courts of Daram,
payment of the proper fees. Zumarraga, Talalora and even Sta. Rita. He is not
authorized to do so we believe. He makes it his
SO ORDERED. means of livelihood as he collects fees from his
clients. He competes with attorneys but does not pay
Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, anything. We believe that his doing so should be
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, and stopped for a good government. These facts can be
Panganiban, JJ., concur. checked with records of those municipal courts.

Narvasa, C.J., Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., 2 — GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE. — Being
on leave employed in the Court of First Instance he would
instigate persons, especially in his barrio to grab
8. In Re: James Joseph Hann; 123.. 2005? land rob or coerce. In fact he has cases in the
municipal court in this town involving himself and
his men. He incite them telling them not to be afraid
as he is a court employee and has influence over the
judges. Those persons being ignorant would believe
him and so would commit crimes. This act of Mr.
19
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 1 to Group 4
Malinao is contrary to good order and peace as he is Superintendent, Department of Justice, Manila, the
using his supposed influences to urge persons to undersigned's reply to the preceding endorsements,
commit crimes. to wit: That the alleged letter-complaint of one Julio
Zeta is not inclosed in the first indorsement, which
3 — CRIME OF FALSIFICATION. — Information has absence has also been noticed and noted on the right
it that he is unfaithfully filing his time record in the hand corner of the said first indorsement by the
CFI. Even he has been out practicing in the Clerk of Court, of this Court; that despite this
municipal courts sometimes he would fill his time absence, and without waiving, however, his right to
record as present. He receives salary for those absent any pertinent provision of law, but for respect and
days. This can be checked with time record he has courtesy to a Superior, he hereby states that he has
submitted and if he has any application for leave. He not violated any rule or law, much less Sec. 12, Rule
may try to cure it by submitting application for leave XVIII of the Civil Service Rules; that his participation
but this should not be allowed as he has already for defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could
committed crime. not engage the services of counsel by reason of
poverty and the absence of one in the locality, said
4 — VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER AND CIVIL assistance has also checked the miscarriage of
SERVICE LAW.-WE have reliable information it is justice by the Presiding Municipal Judge, now
prohibited for a civil service employee to engage in resigned; that he is attaching herewith a carbon-
private practice any profession or business without original of a pleading submitted by Atty. Simeon
permission from the Department Head. Mr. Malinao Quiachon the attorney of record for the defendants in
we are sure has not secured that permission because Civil Case No. 24, entitled 'Jose Kiskisan versus Fidel
he should not be allowed to practice as he is not an Pacate, et al. for Forcible Entry, in the Municipal
attorney. If that were so, he violated that Executive Court of Talalora, Samar, which is a 'Motion To
Order and Civil Service Law and we are urgently and Withdraw Exhibits', as Annex 'A', as part of this
earnestly requesting the Commissioner of Civil reply. (Page 5, Rec.)
Service to investigate him on this. If warranted he
should be given the corresponding penalty as the Department of Justice that had jurisdiction over
dismissal because we believe he deserve it. (Page 2, the matter then, referred the said complaint and
Record.) answer to District Judge Segundo Zosa, Court of
First Instance, Catbalogan, Western Samar, for
After respondent filed the following 3rd indorsement investigation, report and recommendation, and after
relative to the above complaint: due hearing, Judge Zosa submitted his report
pertinent parts of which read thus:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Secretary
of Justice, Manila, thru the Honorable District Inspite of diligent efforts exerted by the Court to
Judge, Court of First Instance, Branch I, Catbalogan, subpoena the complainant, Julio Zeta, who is said to
Samar, and thru the Honorable Judicial be a resident of Zumarraga, Samar the same had
20
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 1 to Group 4
failed because the said Julio Zeta appears to be a
fictitious person 1. Was on leave from office on August 5, 1960 and
September 17, 1960;
Inspite of the failure of the complainant to appear in
the investigation in connection with his complaint 2. Was present in office on December l5, 1962;
against Felicisimo Malinao, the Court nevertheless
proceeded to investigate the case against him by 3. Was present in office on January 26, 1963, and
calling Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar, present also on February 18, 1963 but undertime by
Judge Juanito Reyes of Zumarraga, Samar and 1 hour;
Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar.
4. Was on leave from office on March 1, 1963;
Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar, declared
that according to his docket books the respondent 5. Was on leave from office on March 27, 1969; and
appeared as counsel for Vicente Baculanlan in
criminal case No. 1247 in the Municipal Court of Sta. 6. Was present in office on June 17, 1970 but
Rita, Samar, for grave threats and in criminal case undertime by 5 hours.
No. 1249 for the same accused and Romulo
Villagracia for illegal possession of firearm on August Comparing the dates when the respondent appeared
5, 1960 and on September 17, 1970. before the aforementioned Municipal Courts with his
daily time records, he made it appear that on
Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar, declared December 15, 1962 and February 18, 1963 he was
that the respondent appeared as counsel in civil case present in his office although according to the
No. 39 in the Municipal Court of Daram, Samar, testimony of Judge Miguel Avestruz he was before
entitled Felix Versoza versus Victor Payao, et al., for his Court on December 15, 1962 as well as on
forcible entry on December 15, 1962, January 26, February 18, 1963. Again according to Judge
1963, February 18, 1963 and on March 1, 1963. Juanito Reyes the respondent appeared in his Court
on June 17, 1970. The respondent again made it
Judge Juanito Reyes declared that on March 27, appear in his daily time record that he was present
1969, the respondent appeared as counsel for the with an undertime of five hours. The respondent did
defendant in civil case No. 318 of the Municipal not offer any plausible explanation for this
Court of Zumarraga entitled Restituto Centino versus irregularity.
Jesus Tizon for forcible entry and again on June 17,
1970 in the same case. xxx xxx xxx

From the certification of the Clerk of this Court, it With respect to the crime of falsification of his daily
appears that the respondent had the following time record as shown by the evidence, he had made
entries in his daily time record: it appear that he was present in his office on
21
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 1 to Group 4
December 15, 1962, February 18, 1963 and June 17, The defense of respondent that "his participation (sic)
1970 when as a matter of fact he was in the for defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could
Municipal Court of Daram attending to a case not engage the services of counsel by reason of
entitled Felix Versoza versus Victor Payao, et al., for poverty and the absence of one in the locality"
forcible entry as well as in the Municipal Court of cannot, even if true, carry the day for him,
Zumarraga attending to Civil Case No. 318 entitled considering that in appearing as counsel in court, he
Restituto Centino versus Jesus Tizon for forcible did so without permission from his superiors and,
entry. The Inquest Judge respectfully recommends worse, he falsified his time record of service to
that he be given stern warning and severe reprimand conceal his absence from his office on the dates in
for this irregularity. question. Indeed, the number of times that
respondent acted as counsel under the above
With respect to the fourth charge, for violation of circumstances would indicate that he was doing it as
Section 12, Rule XVIII, Republic Act 2260, as a regular practice obviously for considerations other
amended, again the evidence shows that respondent than pure love of justice.
had been appearing as counsel in the municipal
courts of Sta. Rita, Daram and Zumarraga in In the premises, it is quite obvious that the offense
violation of the rules of the Civil Service Law. (Pp. 28- committed by respondent is grave, hence it warrants
31, Record.) a more drastic sanction than that of reprimand
recommended by Judge Zosa. We find no alternative
We have carefully reviewed the record, and We find than to separate him from the service, with the
the conclusions of fact of the Investigator to be amply admonition that he desist from appearing in any
supported by the evidence, particularly the court or investigative body wherein Only members of
documents consisting of public records and the the bar are allowed to practice.
declarations of the judges before whom respondent
had appeared. It is clear to Us that respondent, apart WHEREFORE, respondent Felicisimo Malinao is
from appearing as counsel in various municipal hereby ordered dismissed from his position as
courts without prior permission of his superiors in interpreter in the Court of First Instance, CFI,
violation of civil service rules and regulations, Zumarraga, Western Samar with prejudice to
falsified his time record of service by making it reemployment in the judicial branch of the
appear therein that he was present in his office on government.
occasions when in fact he was in the municipal
courts appearing as counsel, without being a Castro, C.J., Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar,
member of the bar, which, furthermore, constitutes Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez
illegal practice of law. We, therefore, adopt the above and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
findings of fact of the Investigator.

22
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Group 1 to Group 4
10. THIRD DIVISION resolution of July 30, 1990 prohibiting private
respondent to appear as counsel in Criminal Case
[G.R. Nos. 89591-96. January 24, 2000] No. 4262,[1] the latter accepted cases and continued
practicing law.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON.
BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge of On April 7, 1997, Senior State Prosecutor Henrick F.
Branch 12, Regional Trial Court of Antique, and Guingoyon filed with the Supreme Court a motion
AVELINO T. JAVELLANA, respondents. ULANDU seeking clarification on the following questions: "(1)
Does the resolution of this Honorable Court dated
RESOLUTION July 30, 1990, prohibiting Atty. Javellana from
appearing as counsel refer only to Criminal Case No.
PARDO, J.: 4262? (2) Is Atty. now (Judge) Deogracias del Rosario
still the custodian of Atty. Javellana? and (3) Since it
On September 8, 1999, we denied the Peoples motion appears that Atty. (now Judge) del Rosario never
seeking reconsideration of our August 13, 1990 really held and detained Atty. Javellana as prisoner
decision in these cases. In said resolution, we held in his residence, is not Atty. Javellana considered an
that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda escapee or a fugitive of justice for which warrant for
committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing his arrest should forthwith be issued?"[2] Mis spped
the order of August 8, 1989 giving custody over
private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk In a resolution dated June 18, 1997, we "noted" the
of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San above motion.
Jose, Antique, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during
the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At After we denied the motion for reconsideration on
that time, sufficient reason was shown why private September 8, 1999, the trial court resumed hearing
respondent Javellana should not be detained at the Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. Earlier, on August
Antique Provincial Jail. The trial courts order 2, 1999, Rolando Mijares filed with the Regional Trial
specifically provided for private respondents Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, a motion
detention at the residence of Atty. del Rosario. seeking the revocation of the trial courts custody
However, private respondent was not to be allowed order and the imprisonment of private respondent
liberty to roam around but was to be held as Javellana in the provincial jail.
detention prisoner in said residence.
On November 15, 1999, private respondent Javellana
This order of the trial court was not strictly complied filed with the Supreme Court an urgent motion
with because private respondent was not detained in seeking to clarify whether the June 18, 1997
the residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his resolution finally terminated or resolved the motion
normal activities as if he were a free man, including for clarification filed by the State Prosecutor on April
engaging in the practice of law. Despite our 7, 1997.
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Group 1 to Group 4
the commission of the offense.[3] He must be
Private respondent Javellana has been arrested detained in jail during the pendency of the case
based on the filing of criminal cases against him. By against him, unless he is authorized by the court to
such arrest, he is deemed to be under the custody of be released on bail or on recognizance.[4] Let it be
the law. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias del stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive
Rosario the custody of private respondent Javellana detention or serving final sentence can not practice
with the obligation "to hold and detain" him in Atty. their profession nor engage in any business or
del Rosarios residence in his official capacity as the occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive,
clerk of court of the regional trial court. Hence, when while in detention. This is a necessary consequence
Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased to of arrest and detention. Consequently, all the
be the personal custodian of accused Javellana and accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 must be
the succeeding clerk of court must be deemed the confined in the Provincial Jail of Antique.
custodian under the same undertaking.
Considering that the pendency of Criminal Cases
In our mind, the perceived threats to private Nos. 3350-3355 has dragged on for more than ten
respondent Javelanas life no longer exist. Thus, the (10) years, the presiding judge of the Regional Trial
trial courts order dated August 8, 1989 giving Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, is ordered to
custody over him to the clerk of court must be continue with the trial of said criminal cases with all
recalled, and he shall be detained at the Provincial deliberate dispatch and to avoid further delay.
Jail of Antique at San Jose, Antique.
WHEREFORE, the August 8, 1989 order of the trial
Regarding his continued practice of law, as a court is hereby SET ASIDE. All accused in Criminal
detention prisoner private respondent Javellana is Cases Nos. 3350-3355, including Avelino T.
not allowed to practice his profession as a necessary Javellana and Arturo F. Pacificador are ordered
consequence of his status as a detention prisoner. detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose,
The trial courts order was clear that private Antique, effective immediately, and shall not be
respondent "is not to be allowed liberty to roam allowed to go out of the jail for any reason or guise,
around but is to be held as a detention prisoner." except upon prior written permission of the trial
The prohibition to practice law referred not only to court for a lawful purpose.
Criminal Case No. 4262, but to all other cases as
well, except in cases where private respondent would Let copies of this resolution be given to the Provincial
appear in court to defend himself. Spped Director, PNP Antique Provincial Police Office, San
Jose, Antique and to the Provincial Jail Warden,
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose, Antique.
offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the
custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of SO ORDERED.
liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for
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Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and 11. SECOND DIVISION
Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.2/17/00 9:54 AM
[A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000]
Footnotes:
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY.
[1] During the pendency of G. R. No. 89591-96, on FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.
July 16, 1990, private respondent Avelino T.
Javellana filed a motion seeking permission from this DECISION
Court to be allowed to appear as counsel for accused
Norberto Patino in Criminal Case No. 4262, then MENDOZA, J.:
pending before Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San
Jose, Antique. This Court denied his motion and This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-
ruled that being a detention prisoner, he cannot be payment of bar membership dues filed against
allowed to appear as counsel for the aforesaid respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
accused. Rollo, p. 510.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8,
[2] Rollo, p. 1445. 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a
member of the bar, alleged that:
[3] Rule 113, Sections 2, 3, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your
attention and appropriate sanction the matter of
[4] Rule 114, Section 1, 1985 Rules on Criminal Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years
Procedure. now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R.
Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his
pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal
259060" but he has been using this for at least three
years already, as shown by the following attached
sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996
and 1997: (originals available)

Annex A .......-

"Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated


December 1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253,
RTC, Br. 224, QC

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Annex B .......- only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of
Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also
"Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated copy furnishing some of these courts).
November 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br.
259 (not 257), Paraaque, MM Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:
Annex C .......-
1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per
"An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc
to File Required Comment and Opposition" dated Decision on October 28, 1981 ( in SCRA )
January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No.
42286, CA 6th Div. 2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated
June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66,
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated
138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly February 14, 1995 denying the motion for
admitted member of the bar "who is in good and reconsideration of the conviction which is
regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).
also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that
"default in the payment of annual dues for six Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings
months shall warrant suspension of membership in dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and
the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant,
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be
name of the delinquent member from the Roll of respondents signature above his name, address and
Attorneys." the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060."[1] Also
attached was a copy of the order,[2] dated February
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of
and appropriate action on the bar standing of Atty. the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying
Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant respondents motion for reconsideration of his
and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation
which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member. Jksm of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification[3]
Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not indicate any dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of the
PTR for payment of professional tax. Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R.
Macalinao-Javier, that respondents "last payment of
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not
and 28, suspension of an attorney may be done not
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paid or remitted any amount to cover his Complainant need not even file this complaint if
membership fees up to the present." indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge was
never set aside and reversed, and also had the
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed
comment on the complaint within ten days from by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would
receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to surrender his right or privilege to practice law.
the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. In his comment-memorandum,[4] 4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that
dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:[5] respondent had been delinquent in his dues.

3. That with respect to the complainants absurd Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear
claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the per his Income Tax Return, up to the present, that
same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his
automatically no longer a member in good standing. Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a
farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.
only an admitted member of the bar who is in good
standing is entitled to practice law. Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent
being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt
The complainants basis in claiming that the under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in
undersigned was no longer in good standing, were as 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an
above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe in
decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 view of his detachment from a total practice of law,
conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC, but only in a limited practice, the subsequent
concealment of encumbrances. Chief payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is
covered by such exemption. In fact, he never
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be
dismissal decision was set aside and reversed and voted upon.
respondent was even promoted from City Judge of
Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being
Br. 150. covered by the exemption and if only to show that he
never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing
in Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed to the Court at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with
of Appeals and is still pending. interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He
is ready to tender such fulfillment or payment, not
for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and
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frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of
the complainant, but as an honest act of accepting taxes, income taxes as an example."
reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues ....
despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith, The above cited provision of law is not applicable in
to the contrary. Esmsc the present case. In fact, respondent admitted that
he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it
passed a resolution[6] adopting and approving the clear per his Income tax Return up to the present
report and recommendation of the Investigating time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par.
Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and 4 of Respondents Memorandum).
recommended his suspension from the practice of
law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his
Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a Esmmis
resolution,[7] dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant
to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case On the second issue, complainant claims that
is here for final action on the decision of the IBP respondent has misled the court about his standing
ordering respondents suspension for three months. in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his
pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are his actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not
as follows: discuss this issue.

On the first issue, Complainant has shown First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he
"respondents non-indication of the proper IBP O.R. has engaged in law practice without having paid his
and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in
and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his the pleadings submitted by complainant to this
use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years." Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the
pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years
The records also show a "Certification dated March 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that
24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida R. such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt
Makahinud Javier that respondents last payment of number for the years in which those pleadings were
his IBP dues was in 1991." filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in
a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith
While these allegations are neither denied nor that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as
categorically admitted by respondent, he has invoked income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior
and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he citizen since 1992.
is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No.
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Rule 139-A provides: Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the
Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES
Board of Governors shall determine with the UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso
from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare
Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS
compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof. AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he
the payment of annual dues for six months shall mislead or allow the court to be misled by any
warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated artifice.
Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall
be a ground for the removal of the name of the Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court
indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can view of respondents advanced age, his express
engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more
and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." temperate application of the law,[8] we believe the
While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior penalty of one year suspension from the practice of
citizens "exemption from the payment of individual law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is
income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable later, is appropriate.
income does not exceed the poverty level as
determined by the National Economic and WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas
Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1)
exemption does not include payment of membership YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever
or association dues. is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to
Atty. Llamas personal record in the Office of the Bar
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of
pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts
and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the in the land.
Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the SO ORDERED.

Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. ULAND

29
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Group 1 to Group 4
 Group 3
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA)
12. See case #4 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act
G.R. No. 169517 of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine
ROGELIO A. TAN, NORMA TAN and MALIYAWAO citizenship.[1] On that day, he took his oath of
PAGAYOKAN v. BENEDICTO M. BALAJADIA allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter,
13. EN BANC he returned to the Philippines and now intends to
B.M. No. 1678 resume his law practice. There is a question,
however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he
LAW, gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004.
Thus, this petition.
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY,
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the
Petitioner, Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys
Promulgated: and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
December 17, 2007
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for
x---------------------------------x admission to the bar. Every applicant for admission
as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the
RESOLUTION Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good
moral character, and a resident of the Philippines;
CORONA, J.: and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner that no charges against him, involving moral
Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any
practice of law. court in the Philippines.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar
March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition
Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has
for his ailments. He subsequently applied for again met all the qualifications and has none of the
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
aid program. His application was approved and he recommends that he be allowed to resume the
became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his
30
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 1 to Group 4
retaking the lawyers oath to remind him of his duties Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member
and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine of the Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory
bar. requirements and who is in good and regular
standing is entitled to practice law.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the
Bar Confidant with certain modifications. Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications.
The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines,
conditions.[2] It is so delicately affected with public at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
interest that it is both a power and a duty of the character and a resident of the Philippines.[5] He
State (through this Court) to control and regulate it must also produce before this Court satisfactory
in order to protect and promote the public welfare.[3] evidence of good moral character and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, been filed or are pending in any court in the
maintenance of the highest degree of morality, Philippines.[6]
faithful observance of the rules of the legal
profession, compliance with the mandatory Moreover, admission to the bar involves various
continuing legal education requirement and payment phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of
of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the educational, moral and other qualifications;[7]
Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for passing the bar examinations;[8] taking the lawyers
membership in good standing in the bar and for oath[9] and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving
enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of
a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him the license to practice.[10]
unworthy of the trust and confidence which the
courts and clients repose in him for the continued The second requisite for the practice of law ―
exercise of his professional privilege.[4] membership in good standing ― is a continuing
requirement. This means continued membership
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership
dues in the IBP;[11] payment of the annual
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person professional tax;[12] compliance with the mandatory
heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or continuing legal education requirement;[13] faithful
thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the observance of the rules and ethics of the legal
provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and profession and being continually subject to judicial
regular standing, is entitled to practice law. disciplinary control.[14]

31
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Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his practice, he must first secure from this Court the
Filipino citizenship still practice law in the authority to do so, conditioned on:
Philippines? No.
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual
The Constitution provides that the practice of all membership dues in the IBP;
professions in the Philippines shall be limited to
Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.[15] (b) the payment of professional tax;
Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates (c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, mandatory continuing legal education; this is
the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other specially significant to refresh the
words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws
terminates the privilege to practice law in the and update him of legal developments and
Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied
to foreigners.[16] (d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not
only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also
reason of naturalization as a citizen of another renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the
country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA Republic of the Philippines.
9225. This is because all Philippine citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed Compliance with these conditions will restore his
not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.
conditions of [RA 9225].[17] Therefore, a Filipino
lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M.
if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance
Although he is also deemed never to have terminated with the conditions stated above and submission of
his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after
right to resume law practice accrues. which he may retake his oath as a member of the
Philippine bar.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the
legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires
his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions (he) SO ORDERED.
shall apply with the proper authority for a license or
permit to engage in such practice.[18] Stated
otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law
32
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14. Petition to re acquire the privilege to practice law in 16. EN BANC
the Philippines
Moneses BM# 2112, 2012 G.R. Nos. L-10236-48 January 31, 1958
PDF File
THE PFOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellant,
15. Article 12, Section 14, Consti
vs.
Section 14. The sustained development of a reservoir of
national talents consisting of Filipino scientists, EUSTACIO DE LUNA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
entrepreneurs, professionals, managers, high-level
technical manpower and skilled workers and craftsmen Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor
in all fields shall be promoted by the State. The State Felicisimo R. Rosete for appellant.
shall encourage appropriate technology and regulate its Luis F. Gabinete for appellee Eustacio de Luna.
transfer for the national benefit. The practice of all Pedro B. Ayuda for appellee Estella R. Gordo.
Alejandro P. Capitulo for appellees Angelo T. Lopez and Alawadin I.
professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino Bandon.
citizens, save in cases prescribed by law. Fransisco de la Fuente for appellee Oreste Arellano y Rodriguez.
Bienvenido Peralta for appellee Abraham C. Calaguas.
Section 2, Rule 138, RoC Santos L. Parina, Generosa H. Hubilla, Maria Velez y Estrellas,
Jaime P. Marco, Roque J. Briones, Balbino P. Fajardo and Emilio P.
Jardinico, Jr. in their own behalf.
Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission
to the bar. — Every applicant for admission as a member
of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least CONCEPCION, J.:
twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and
resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the
This is an appeal, taken by the prosecution, from an
Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
order, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, granting
character, and that no charges against him, involving
a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant in each one of
moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any
the above entitled cases, for lack of jurisdiction and,
court in the Philippines.
also, upon the ground that the facts alleged in the
amended informations, filed in said cases, do not
constitute the crime of contempt of court with which
said defendants (Eustacio de Luna, Jaime P. Marco,
Santos L. Parina, Estela R. Gordo, Angelo T. Lopez,
Generosa H. Hubilla Oreste Arellano y Rodriguez,
Abraham C. Calaguas, Roque J. Briones, Alawadin T.
Bandon, Balbino P. Fajardo, Maria Velez y Estrellas and
Emilio P. Jardinico, Jr., are charged. It is alleged in said
amended informations that, on or about the 22nd day of
33
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December, 1954, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the and from the Corpus Juris Secundum, the rule to the
person accused in each one Of these cases. effect that .

. . . well knowing that he has not passed the bar It is a well-established rule that the power to judge the
examination and was not in any way authorized to take contempt rest exclusively with the court contemned and
his oath as a lawyer and after haing been duly informed that no court is authorized to punish a contempt
and notified that certain portions of Republic Act No. against another. Accordingly, disobedience of the order
972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, are of a state court is not punishable as for contempt by a
unconstitutional and therefore void and without force court of another state or by a federal court.
and effect, and that all the petitions of the candidates
including the accused who failed in the examinations of the lower court concluded that the contemptuous act
1946 to 1952, inclusive, for admission to the bar were allegedly committed by appellees herein "was committed
refused and denied by the Resolution of the Honorable, not against" said court "but against the Supreme Court
the Supreme Court, promulgated on March 18, 1954, of the Philippines" and that, accordingly, the Court of
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and First Instance of Manila "has no jurisdiction to try and
contemptously disobey and resist in an insolent and punish" the appellees herein.
defiant manner the said Resolution of the Supreme
Court directed to him and each and everyone of the This conclusion is untenable. The above-quoted
petitioners, and perform acts constituting improper provisions of the Rules of court is permissive in nature.
conduct and manifestations that tend directly or It is merely declaratory of the inherent power of courts
indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the to punish those guilty of contempt against the same. It
administration of justice in all courts of the Philippines does not declare that jurisdiction of the court concerned
and impair the respect to and attack the authority and to so punish the guilty party is exclusive. Indeed, in
dignity of the Honorable, the Supreme Court and all promulgating said Rules of Court, this Court could not
other inferior courts by then and there, without being have validly denied to other Courts, to which the
lawfully authorized to do so, taking an oath as a lawyer jurisdiction may have been vested by statute, the right
before a notary public and making manifestations to to exercise said authority, for the rule-making power of
that effect before the Honorable, the Supreme Court. the Supreme Court, under Article VIII, section 13, of the
Constitution, is limited to the promulgation of "rules
After quoting from Rule 64, section 4, of the Rules of concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all
Court, the pertinent part of which reads: courts, and the admission to the practice of law," and
does not extend to the determination of the jurisdiction
Where the contempt . . . has been committed against a of the courts of justice in the Philippines. In fact, section
superior court or judge, or against an officer appointed 2 of said Article VIII of the Constitution explicitly
by it, the charge may be filed with such superior court . ordains that "Congress shall have the power to define,
. . (Emphasis our.). prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various
courts," thereby implying, necessarily, that such power
34
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Group 1 to Group 4
is withheld from the Supreme Court. Needless to say, Supreme Court, in view of the inherent power of the
the aforesaid view, quoted from Corpus Juris latter to punish those guilty of contempt against the
Secundum, is good law only "unless otherwise provided same.
by stattute" (17 C.J.S., 81), and such statute, providing
"otherwise", exists in the Philippines. It may not be amiss to add that, in the event of such
concurrent jurisdiction over cases of contempt of court,
Moreover, the amended informantions specifically allege it would be a good practice to acknowledge the
that the defendants herein did "perform acts preferencial right of the court against which the act of
constituting improper conduct and manifestations that contempt was committed to try and punish the guilty
the tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or party. However, insofar as appellees herein are
degrade the administration of justice in all courts of the concerned, on February 3, 1955, this Court passed and
Philippines and impair the respect to and attack the promulgated a resolution of the following tenor:
authority and dignity of the Honorable, the Supreme
Court and all other inferior courts." To put it differently The Court received from Pedro B. Ayuda a
the acts charged werecommitted, according to said communication of the following tenor:
amended informations, in contempt of the Supreme
Court, as well as of "all other courts of the Philippines,"
including the Court of First Instance of Manila. Thus,
the very authorities cited in the order appealed from do REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
not justify the same.
SUPREME COURT
Again , section 236 of Act No. 190 and section 6 of Rule
64 of the Rules of Court provide that a person guilty of MANILA
any of the acts of contempt defined, respectively, in
section 232 of said Act and section 3 of said Rule 64,
"may be fined not exceeding one thousand pesos, or
imprisoned not more than six months." Pursuant to
IN-RE ATTORNEYS WHO TOOK THE OATH BEFORE A
section 44 of the Revised Judiciary Act of 1948
NOTARY PUBLIC UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF
(Republic Act No. 296), courts of first instance have
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972.
original jurisdiction over criminal cases "in which the
penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than
six months, or a fine of more than two thousand pesos."
Inasmuch as a fine not exceeding P1,000 may be
imposed in the cases of contempt under consideration, Oreste Arellano y Rodriguez.
it follows that the same are within the original
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Pedro B. Ayuda.
although such jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the
35
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Group 1 to Group 4
Alawadin I. Bandon. MANIFESTATION

Roque J. Briones. COMES NOW the undersigned for and in representation


of the above-named attorneys and to this Honorable
Abraham C. Calaguas. Court, hereby respectfully makes manifestation that
they have taken the oath of office as Attorneys-at-Law
Balbino P. Fajardo. on December 22, 1954 before Mr. Anatolio A. Alcova, a
Notary Public in and for the City of Manila, with office at
Claro C. Gofredo. R-201 Regina Building, Escolta, Manila, in pursuance of
the provisions of Republic Act No. 972;
Estela R. Gordo.
There are attached to this manifestation seventeen (17)
Generoso H. Hubilla. copies of the oath of office as Annexes 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E',
'F', 'G', 'H', 'I', 'K', 'L', 'M', 'N', 'O', 'P', and 'Q'.
Emilio P. Jardinico, Jr.
Messrs, Alejandro P. Capitulo, Claro C. Godofredo, and
Angelo T. Lopez. Florencio P. Sugarol of the group took the bar
examination in August, 1954. They also had taken their
oath before this Honorable Tribunal, January 20, 1955.
Eustacio de Luna.
This manifestation is made for all legal effects as they
Jaime P. Marco.
will practice law in all the Courts of the Philippines.
Santos L. Parina.
Manila, Philippines, January 28, 1955.
Florencio P. Sugarol, and
(Sgd.) PEDRO B. AYUDA
Maria Velez y Estrellas.
In his own behalf and on behalf of the others in his
capacity as president of the 1946-1952 BAR
Attorneys. EXAMINEES ASSOCIATION, 2034 Azcarraga, Manila.

It appearing that the persons mentioned, except


Capitulo, Gefredo, and Sugarol, have not passed the
xxx xxx xxx. examinations, it was resolved:

36
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Group 1 to Group 4
A. To refer the matter to the Fiscal, City of Manila for The next question for determination is whetehr the acts
investigation and appropriate action in connection with charged in the amended informations constitute
Section 3 (e), Rule 64; contempt of court. After quoting the allegation of said
amended informations to the effect that the defendant in
B. As Pedro Ayuda has assumed to be an attorney each one of the instant cases.
without authority, he is given 10 days from notice
thereof, within which to explain why he should not be . . . did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
dealt with for contempt of the Court; contemptuously disobey and resist in an insolent snd
defiant manner the said Resolution of the Supreme
C. The notary public Anatolio A. Alcoba, member of the Court directed to him, and each and everyone of the
Bar, who has illegally administered the oath to the said petitioners and perform acts constituting improper
persons in disregard of this Court's resolution denying conduct and manifestations that tend directly and
them admission to the Bar (except Capitulo, Gofredo indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the
and Sugarol), is hereby given ten days to show cause administration of justice. . .
why he should not be disbarred or suspended from the
pratice of law; the lower court had the following to say:

D. The clerk of Court is directed to furnish copy of this From this allegation, there is no hint whatsoever that
resolution to the Court of Appeals and to all courts of any command, order or notification from the judicial
first instance, the Court of Industrial Relations, the court or any non-judicial person, committee or body
Public Service Commission, and the Department of clothed by law with power to punish for contempt has
Justice; been disobeyed or violated by the herein accused.
Moreover, there is nothing shown in the resolution of
E. As to Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol, proper action the Honorable Supreme Court of March 18, 1954
will be taken later in their respective cases. (pp. 36-37, dircting the accused not to take their oath as lawyers.
rec., G.R. No. L-10245.) The mere fact of taking an oath by any person as a
lawyer does not make him automatically a lawyer
It is clear, from the foregoing resolution, that this Court without having completed the requirements prescribed
did not intend to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction by the Supreme Court for the admission to the practice
over the acts of alleged contempt committed by by law. It is necessary before his admission to the Bar
appellees herein and that we preferred that the that he passes the required bar examinations and is
corresponding action be taken by the City Fiscal of admitted by the Supreme Court to practice as attorney.
Manila in the Court of First Instance of Manila. In fine, Our statutes punishas criminal contempt one 'assuming
the latter had no jurisdiction over the cases at the bar. to be an attorney or an officer of a court and acting as
such without authority.' (par. F. Rule 64, Rules of
Court.) The mere taking of oath of lawyers by herein
accused, in the humble opinion of this Court, is not
37
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 1 to Group 4
tantamount to practice law. However, if this had taken 1946 to 1952, inclusive for admission to the bar were
one step further, as for example, after taking their refused and denied by the resolution of the Honorable
oaths, they have held out themselves as lawyers to the Supreme Court, on March 18, 1954, . . .
public, received cases for litigants, appeared before any
court of justice personally or by filing pleadings In other words, appellees knew that they did not pass
therewith, would be considered that they are really the bar examination. Although they, likewise, sought
engaged in the practice of law. These accused have not admission to the Bar under the provisions of Republic
committed any of these acts as enunciated by our Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953,
Supreme Tribunal in the case of Bosque and Ney, 8 they were subsequently notified of the resolution of this
Phil., 146, nor have they disobeyed or defied any Court denying said petition. Inasmuch as the oath as
command, order or notification of this Court or of the lawyer is a prerequisite to the practice of law and may
Honorable Supreme Court. What they have done only be taken only, before the Supreme Court, by those
was the taking of their oath as lawyers before a notary authorized by the latter to engage in such practice, the
public who was not authorized by law to take their oath resolution denying the aforementioned petition of
as lawyers, as the latter can only swear as such before appellees herein, implied, necessarily, a denial of the
the Supreme Court or any member thereof. right to said oath, as well as a prohibition of or
injunction against the taking thereof. When, this
Pursuant to the above stated reasons, this Court is of notwithstanding, appellees took the oath before a notary
the opinion and so holds that no criminal contempt has public, and formally advised this Court, not only of such
been committed by the herein accused before this Court fact, but also, that "they will practice in all the courtr of
and neither before the highest Tribunal of this land. the Philippines," they, accordingly, disobeyed the order
implied, in said resolution, thus violating section 232 of
The aforementioned quotation from the amended Act No. 190, which declares in part:
informations is, however, incomplete. It did not include
the allegation to the effect that the defendant in each
one of the cases ar bar took his "oath as a lawyer before A person guilty of any of the following acts may be
a notary public" and filed the manifestation transcribed punished as for contempt:
in the resolutionabove quoted,
1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
well knowing that he has not passed the bar process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or
examination and was not in any way authorized to take injunction granted by a court or judge.
his oath as a lawyer and after having been duly
informed and notified that certain portions of Republic and section 3, subdivision (b), Rule 64, of the Rules of
Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, are Court, which is identical.
unconstitutional and therefore void and without force
and effect, and that all the petition of the candidates
including the accused who failed in the examinations of
38
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Group 1 to Group 4
This case is, in principle, analogous to that of U.S. vs. . . . Acts which bring the court into disrepute or
Ney and Bosque (8 Phil., 146), which involved two disrespect or which offend its dignity, affront its
lawyers, an American, C.W. Ney, and a Spaniard, Juan majesty, or challenge its authority constitute contempt
Garcia Bosque, who sent out a circular, signed "Ney and of court. . . . (12 Am. Jur. 395.).
Bosque", stating that they had established an office for
the general practice of law in all courts of the Islands The lower court is, seemingly, under the impression that
and that Bosque would devote himself especially to appellees could not be guilty of contempt of court unless
consultation and office work relating to Spanish Law. they actually engaged in the practice of law or "held out
Accused of contempt of court, both were convicted as to the public" as lawyers "by means of circulars." Such
charged, although upon different grounds. As regards view is inaccurate, for assuming to be an attorney . . .
the Spaniard, it was held that a former order of this and acting as such without authority," is, only one of
Court denying his admission to the practice of in the the means by which contempt of court may be
Philippines, on account of alienage, "was directly committed, under said Rule 64, section 3, of the Rules
binding upon him;" that the aforementioned circular of Court. At any rate, by taking "'the oath of office as
"amounted to an assertation of his right and purpose" to attorney-at-law" and notifying the Supreme Court that
engage in such practice of law; and that "consequently they had done so and would "practice law in all courts of
the conduct of the defendant Bosque amounts to the Philippines", the appellees had for all intents and
disobedience of an order made in a proceeding to which purposes, "held out to the public" as such attorneys-at-
he was a party." As regards Ney, he was found guilty of law (U.S. vs. Ney and Mosque, supra).
"misbehaviour" committed by "an officer of the court."
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed,
Likewise, by their aforementioned acts, as set forth in and let the records of these cases be remanded to the
the amended informations, appellees herein expressed court of origin for further proceedings not inconsistent
clearly their intent to, and did, in fact, challenged and with this decision. It is so ordered.
defy the authority of this Court to pass upon and settle,
in a final and conclusive manner, the issue whether or Bengzon, Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A.,
not they should be admitted to the bar, as well as, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and
embarrass, hinder and obstruct the administration of Felix, JJ., concur.
justice and impair the respect due to the courts of
justice in general, and the Supreme Court, in particular.
Thus, they performed acts constituting an "improper
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice," in
violation of section 3, subdivision (b) of said Rule 64.

39
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Group 1 to Group 4
17. Section 20, Rule 138, RoC (h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to
himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed;
Section 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an
attorney: (i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all
fair and honorable means, regardless of his personal
(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every
Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey defense that the law permits, to the end that no person
the laws of the Philippines. may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of
law.
(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice and judicial officers;

(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or


proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such
defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable
under the law.

(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the


causes confided to him, such means only as are
consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to
mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or
false statement of fact or law;

(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every


peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and
to accept no compensation in connection with his
client's business except from him or with his knowledge
and approval;

(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to


advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of
a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the
cause with which he is charged;

(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the


continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any
man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;
40
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 1 to Group 4
 Group 4 21. Section 21, Rule 138, RoC

Section 21. Authority of attorney to appear.


18. See case # 3 — an attorney is presumed to be properly
authorized to represent any cause in which he
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF appears, and no written power of attorney is
ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO required to authorize him to appear in court for
his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion
19. See case # 1 of either party and on reasonable grounds
therefor being shown, require any attorney who
RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee. assumes the right to appear in a case to produce
ATTY. PROCOPIO S. BELTRAN, JR., President of the or prove the authority under which he appears,
Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue,
complainant, the name of the person who employed him, and
vs. may thereupon make such order as justice
ELMO S. ABAD, respondent. requires. An attorneys wilfully appear in court for
a person without being employed, unless by leave
20. Section 16, Rule 138, RoC of the court, may be punished for contempt as an
officer of the court who has misbehaved in his
Section 16. Failing candidates to take review official transactions.
course. — Candidates who have failed the bar
examinations for three times shall be disqualified
from taking another examination unless they
show the satisfaction of the court that they have
enrolled in and passed regular fourth year review
classes as well as attended a pre-bar review
course in a recognized law school.

The professors of the individual review subjects


attended by the candidates under this rule shall
certify under oath that the candidates have
regularly attended classes and passed the
subjects under the same conditions as ordinary
students and the ratings obtained by them in the
particular subject.

41
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Group 1 to Group 4
22. THIRD DIVISION Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's
branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the
[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997] grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made
Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in
respondent. bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts
which made said contract an Onerous Contract
DECISION prejudicial to my rights and interests."

NARVASA, C.J.: He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail


and quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
representative (or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the
Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea
housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of
executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically
District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used state on record that I am terminating the contract **. I
to be friends. hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before
said onerous and manipulated contract against my
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales
executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of agent, hence the need to annul the controversial
one of the housing units belonging to the above contract."
mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and
in connection therewith, a housing loan was also Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
Finance Corporation (NHMFC). City. The envelope containing it, and which actually
went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, right hand corner above the description of the
1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been
Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his typed.
contract with the company. He wrote:
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also
" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit &
notifying you of my intent to terminate the Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage
Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati
company, as represented by your Sales City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract
42
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Group 1 to Group 4
with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his
housing loan in connection therewith, which was The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to
payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on
a month. Among other things, he said: Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and began
negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of **
" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I (Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the refund of ** (his)
hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the payments."c
'manipulated contract' entered into between me and the
E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of
sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a
maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which
and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above
without my authority and against my will. Thus, the mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free
contract itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of Postage PD 26."[1] In that complaint, she accused
the attending circumstances, that my consent was Alauya of:
vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty,
and abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting 1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no
of the minds between me and the swindling sales agent solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident
who concealed the real facts from me." bad faith;"

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in 2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor
some detail what he took to be the anomalous and established reputation;"
actuations of Sophia Alawi.
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the postage **;" and
NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and
May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons 4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only
already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his
salary on account thereof.a He also wrote on January She deplored Alauya's references to her as
18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc."
Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his
Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his
salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies,
the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and
into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings
agent."b with Alauya had been regular and completely
43
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 1 to Group 4
transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of
dismissed from the service, or be appropriately June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who had
disciplined (sic) ** " suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless
nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,"
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60
complaint. Conformably with established usage that had been deducted from his salary.[7] He declared that
notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating
Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of
this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege,
Assistant Division Clerk of Court.[2] saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a
subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3] in certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26,"
which he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to were typewritten on the envelope by some other person,
require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C.
according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before
Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but respondent himself, and attached to the comment as
only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or Annex J);[8] and as far as he knew, his subordinate
the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the mailed the letters with the use of the money he had
Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed
Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that with the official mail of the court, this had occurred
the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.[9]
him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of court and
ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the
also "a scion of a Royal Family **."[4] assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of
in much less aggressive, even obsequious tones,[5] "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for
Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial,"
complaint in order that he might comment thereon.[6] connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor.
He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
good faith and within the confines of the law; and that
Sophia Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what
falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a he did "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and
housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of injured."[10] He claims he was manipulated into
P4,333.10 from his salary. reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend.[11]
He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's
assurance that she would show the completed
44
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 1 to Group 4
document to him later for correction, but she had since manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in
avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and
he still does not know where the property -- subject of established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had
his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa written inter alia that:
& Co. -- is situated;[12] He says Alawi somehow got his
GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to 1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in
return it the next day, she did not do so until after question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
several months. He also claims that in connection with dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his
signature on such pertinent documents as those 2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and
regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and
of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which interests;"
he ever saw.[13]
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud,
without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, and
malicious and baseless allegations," and complainant
Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, her 4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated
complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being the contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully
apparent and demonstrable. secured and pursued the housing loan without ** (his)
authority and against ** (his) will," and "concealed the
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) real facts **."
letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated
April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these
earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of statements, he was merely acting in defense of his
which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man
Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered
refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA." "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and
untold financial suffering," considering that in six
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from
Administrator for evaluation, report and his salary.[15]
recommendation.[14]
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates
aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics
charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through and utmost responsibility in the public service.[16]
45
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Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials person and the rights of others at all times, and that his
and employees ** at all times respect the rights of every act and word should be characterized by
others, and ** refrain from doing acts contrary to law, prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical
good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be
public safety and public interest."[17] More than once mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held
has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
behavior of every official and employee of an agency
involved in the administration of justice, from the As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this
presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be Court has already had occasion to declare that persons
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members
Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before
among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to Shari'a courts.[21] While one who has been admitted to
earn and keep the respect of the public for the the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the
judiciary."[18] Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in
the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney."
good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having
for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
believed -- however sincerely -- to be deceitful, successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate. admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they
convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia only who are authorized to practice law in this
Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with jurisdiction.
propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue
harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good Alauya says he does not wish to use the title,
morals, good customs, public policy, public order, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in his
supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators.
faith."[19] Righteous indignation, or vindication of right The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His
cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not
downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar warrant his use of the title of attorney.
and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard
of conduct more stringent than for most other Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of
government workers. As a man of the law, he may not the franking privilege, the record contains no evidence
use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, adequately establishing the accusation.
menacing, or otherwise improper.[20] As a judicial
employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the
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WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby 24. EN BANC
REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate,
insulting or virulent language, i.e., language [B.M. Nos. 979 and 986. December 10, 2002]
unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title
of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other RE: 1999 BAR EXAMINATIONS,
impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt
with more severely. MARK ANTHONY A. PURISIMA, petitioner.

SO ORDERED. RESOLUTION

Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., BELLOSILLO, J.:


concur.
Petitioner was conditionally admitted to take the 1999
Bar Examinations. Like many others he was directed to
submit the required certification of completion of the
pre-bar review course within sixty (60) days from the
23. Section 13, Rule 138, Roc last day of the examinations.

Section 13. Disciplinary measures. — No candidate Petitioner passed the 1999 Examinations. But in a
shall endeavor to influence any member of the Resolution dated 13 April 2000 the Court disqualified
committee, and during examination the candidates shall him from becoming a member of the Philippine Bar and
not communicate with each other nor shall they give or declared his examinations null and void on two (2)
receive any assistance. The candidate who violates this grounds: (a) Petitioner failed to submit the required
provisions, or any other provision of this rule, shall be certificate of completion of the pre-bar review course
barred from the examination, and the same to count as under oath for his conditional admission to the 1999
a failure against him, and further disciplinary action, Bar Examinations; and (b) He committed a serious act of
including permanent disqualification, may be taken in dishonesty which rendered him unfit to become a
the discretion of the court. member of the Philippine Bar when he made it appear in
his Petition to Take the 1999 Bar Examinations that he
took his pre-bar review course at the Philippine Law
School (PLS) when, as certified by Acting Registrar
Rasalie G. Kapauan, PLS had not offered such course
since 1967.

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the 13 April


2000 Resolution but his motion was denied.

47
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On 29 October 2001, retired Regional Trial Court Judge provided for the school where petitioner attended his
Amante P. Purisima, father of petitioner, filed a Petition pre-bar review course.
to Reopen Bar Matter 986. However, the Court in its
Resolution of 27 November 2001 noted without action Petitioner further averred that on 26 July 1999, a week
the said petition and further resolved that no further after the filing of the Petition to take the bar, he (thru
pleadings will be entertained. Ms. Felipe) submitted the Certification of Completion of
the Pre-Bar Review as Annex D of his Petition to prove
On 2 July 2002 petitioner filed a Motion for Due Process that he actually enrolled and attended the pre-bar
stating, among others, his reasons why in his Petition to review course in UST.
Take the 1999 Bar Examinations it was stated that he
was enrolled in and regularly attending the pre-bar To corroborate his enrollment in UST, petitioner
review course at the PLS and not at the University of submitted (a) the Official Receipt of his payment of
Santo Tomas (UST) where he in fact took the said course tuition fee for the course; (b) his identification card for
as evidenced by the Certification dated 22 July 1999 of the course; (c) car pass to the UST campus; (d)
Dean Amado L. Damayuga of the UST Faculty of Civil individual affidavits of classmates in the pre-bar review
Law. course in UST that petitioner was their classmate and
that he attended the review course; (e) separate
Petitioner claimed that the statement in paragraph 8 of affidavits of five (5) UST students/acquaintances of
his Petition that he x x x enrolled in and passed the petitioner that they saw him regularly attending the
regular fourth year (law) review classes at the Phil. Law review lectures; (f) affidavit of Professor Abelardo T.
School x x x x was a self-evident clerical error and a Domondon attesting to the attendance of petitioner in
mere result of an oversight which is not tantamount to a his review classes and lectures in Taxation and Bar
deliberate and willful declaration of a falsehood. Review Methods at the UST Faculty of Civil Law; (g)
affidavit of Ms. Gloria L. Fernandez, maintenance staff
Petitioner explained that upon obtaining a ready-made at the UST Law Department that she knew petitioner
form of the Petition and affixing his signature on the very well as he was among those who would arrive early
space provided therefor, he requested his and request her to open the reading area and turn on
schoolmate/friend Ms. Lilian A. Felipe to fill up the the airconditioning before classes started; and, (h)
form, have it notarized and then to file it for him with affidavit of Ms. Melicia Jane Parena, office clerk at the
the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC). Being consumed UST Faculty Civil Law, that Dean Dimayuga issued the
with his preparations for the upcoming bar Certification dated 22 July 1999 to the effect that
examinations, petitioner admitted that he did not have petitioner was officially enrolled in and had completed
the opportunity to check the veracity of the information the pre-bar review course in UST which started on 14
supplied by Ms. Felipe. Had he done this he could have April 1999 and ended 24 September 1999.
readily seen that Ms. Felipe had erroneously typed
Philippine Law School, instead of UST, on the space Petitioner also explained that he did not submit the
required certification of completion of the pre-bar review
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course within sixty (60) days from the last day of the Gingoyon was given the benefit of the doubt and allowed
examinations because he thought that it was already to take the Lawyers Oath.
unnecessary in view of the Certification of Completion
(Annex D of his Petition) issued by Dean Dimayuga In said case, Mr. Gingoyon stated in his Petition to take
which not only attested to his enrollment in UST but the 1998 Bar that the charge of Grave Threats (Criminal
also his completion of the pre-bar review course. Case No. 9693) against him was still pending before the
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Mandaue City, Branch
In a letter dated 17 September 2002, addressed to Chief 3, when in fact, in the decision of MTC dated April 8,
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., thru Senior Associate 1998, he was already convicted. But the Court believed
Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, who took over as Chairman his explanation that he had no actual knowledge of his
of the 1995 Committee on Bar Examinations, retired conviction.
Judge Purisima expressed his concern for his son and
stated that his son took the pre-bar review course in In allowing Mr. Gingoyon to take the Lawyers Oath, the
UST and that he entry in his sons Petition that he took Court stated, thus:
it in PLS is a self-evident clerical error. He then poised
the question that if there was really a falsehood and It had been two (2) years past since he first filed the
forgery in paragraph 8 and Annex D of the Petition, petition to take the lawyers oath. Hopefully, this period
which would have been a fatal defect, why then was his of time of being deprived the privilege had been long
son issued permit to take the 1999 Bar examinations? enough for him to do some introspection.

Pursuant to the Court Resolution of 1 October 2002, the In his letter, petitioners father also pleaded that the
OBC conducted a summary hearing on 30 October 2002 three (3) years denial of his sons request for oath-taking
during which the Bar Confidant asked clarificatory should be enough penalty, if there may be any wrong
questions from petitioner who appeared together with that his son may have unwittingly committed.
his father, retired Judge Purisima, and Ms. Lilian Felipe.
It is submitted that the same kindness and compassion
On 7 November 2002 the OBC submitted its Report and extended to Mr. Gingoyon in Bar Matter 890 be given to
Recommendation the pertinent portions of which are petitioner. Three years deprivation of the privilege to
quoted hereunder: practice law may be considered an ample penalty, not to
mention that petitioner has not been convicted of any
Considering petitioners explanation fortified by crime.
unquestionably genuine documents in support thereof,
we respectfully submit that petitioner should be given As regards petitioners failure to submit within sixty days
the benefit of the doubt. the required certification of completion of the pre-bar
review course, his explanation that there was no need
The Resolution of the Court dated April 2, 2002, in Bar for him to submit another certification because the July
Matter 890, may be cited. In the said case, Victor Rey T. 22, 1999 Certification of Dean Dimayuga certified not
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only his enrollment but also his completion of the
course, is impressed with truth. The OBS respectfully submits that pertitioners
explanation should also be given credit just like his
Let it be also noted that, in the Resolution dated April three co-examinees.
13, 2000, in this Bar Matter 986, the Court declared
DISQUALIFIED from the 1999 Bar examinations not Let it be finally cited that in Bar Matter No. 832, in the
only Purisima but also Josenio Marquez Reoma, Ma. Matter of Admission to the Bar of Blas Antonio M.
Salvacion Sucgang Revilla and Victor Estell Tesorero for Tuliao, the Court also favorably considered the report of
their failure to submit within sixty days from the last the Committee on Legal Education which recommended
day of the examinations the certification of completion of the admission to the Bar of Mr. Tuliao on grounds of
the pre-bar review course. However, the Court, in its fairness, equal treatment and protection, considering
Resolution dated June 20, 2000, acting on the separate that his co-accused in a criminal case have been allowed
motions for reconsideration of the Court Resolution to take the lawyers oath. This Court stated, in its
dated April 13, 2000 filed by Reoma and Revilla, both Resolution dated November 27, 2001, that there was no
were allowed to take the Lawyers Oath. reason to accord a different treatment to Mr. Tuliao, and
that the dispensation of justice should be even-handed
In the case of Reoma, his explanation that his failure to and consistent.
submit the required certification was due to his honest
belief and assumption that the UP College of Law, where The recommendation is well taken.
he took his review course, had filed the required
certification together with other required documents, The foremost question to be resolved is whether
was accepted. petitioner did enrol in and complete his pre-bar review
course in UST as he herein avows.
In the case of Revilla, her claim that her failure to
submit the required certification within the 60-day The testimony of petitioner and Ms. Felipe during the 30
period was due to her erroneous impression that only October 2002 hearing that the subject Certification of
the certification of enrollment and attendance was Dean Dimayuga was duly submitted to the OBC a week
arequired, was likewise accepted. after the filing of the Petition to take the bar appears to
be credible. It is supported by documentary evidence
The Court also allowed Mr. Tesorero to take his oath, as showing that petitioner actually enrolled and completed
he stated that his f ailure to submit within the 60-day the required course in UST.
period was due to his honest and mistaken belief that
he had substantially complied with the requirements for Granting that the Certification of Dean Dimayuga was
admission to the Bar Examinations because he thought defective as it certified completion of the pre-bar review
that the required certificate of compleltition of the pre- course which was still on-going, this defect should not
bar review course is the same as the certificate of be attributed to petitioner considering that he had no
enrollment and attendance in the said course. participation in the preparation thereof. Whatever it is,
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the fact remains that there is such a certification issued bar review course is an additional requirement under
by the UST which appears to be genuine. This finding is Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for those who failed the
backed by the affidavit of Ms. Parena, office clerk at the bar examinations for three (3) or more times.
UST Faculty of Civil Law, that she was the one who
released the Certification to petitioner on 26 July 1999. For the Court to insist on strict compliance may be
literally asking for the moon but it can be done. We just
Indeed, it must be stressed that there is nothing on have to bear in mind that this requirement is not an
record which impugns the authenticity of the subject empty or idle ceremony; it is intended to ensure the
Certification as well as that of the other documentary quality and preparedness of those applying for
evidence proferred by petitioner to establish that he was admission to the bar.
duly enrolled and took the pre-bar review course in UST,
not in PLS. As to the argument that the Certification of WHEREFORE, premises considered, as recommended
Dean Dimayuga did not include the taking and by the Office of the Bar Confidant in its Report and
completion of the pre-bar review course, the realities of Recommendation dated 7 November 2002, the prayer in
our bar reviews render it difficult to record the Bar Matters Nos. 979 and 986 is granted and examinee
attendance religiously of the reviewees every single day MARK ANTHONY A. PURISIMA who passed the 1999
for several months. Bar Examinations is now allowed to take the Lawyers
Oath and be admitted to the Philippine Bar. He is
Considering petitioners explanation, fortified by further allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys upon
undisputedly genuine documents, at the very least, payment of the required fees.
petitioner should be given the benefit of the doubt and
be allowed to take his oath. SO ORDERED.

The Court is well aware of instances in the past when Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Quisumbing,
,as a measure of compassion and kindness, it has acted Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
favorably on similar petitions. In his letter petitioners Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and
father pleaded that the denial of permission for Mark to Azcuna, JJ., concur.
take his oath for about three (3) years now should be
enough penalty. It is time to move on. Panganiban, J., in the result.

At this juncture it may be well to note the Courts


growing concern over the apparent laxity of law schools
in the conduct of their pre-bar review classes.
Specifically, it has been observed that the attendance of
reviewees is not closely monitored, such that some
reviewees are able to comply with the requisite with
minimal attendance. Enrollment and completion of pre-
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25. EN BANC
Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and
G.R. No. 176278 taxpayer, filed this original action for the writ of
certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-
ALAN F. PAGUIA, Arroyos nomination of respondent former Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent
Petitioner, Representative to the United Nations (UN) for violation of
Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the
Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, that respondent Davides age at that time of his
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from
and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., holding his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on
in his capacity as Permanent Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory
Representative of the Philippines to the retirement age of all officers and employees of the
United Nations, Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65.[3] Petitioner
theorizes that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for
Respondents. all DFA employees, career or non-career; thus,
Promulgated: June 25, 2010 respondent Davides entry into the DFA ranks
discriminates against the rest of the DFA officials and
x-----------------------------------x employees.

RESOLUTION
In their separate Comments, respondent Davide, the
CARPIO, J.: Office of the President, and the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs (respondents) raise threshold issues against the
At issue is the power of Congress to limit the Presidents petition. First, they question petitioners standing to
prerogative to nominate ambassadors by legislating age bring this suit because of his indefinite suspension from
qualifications despite the constitutional rule limiting the practice of law.[4] Second, the Office of the President
Congress role in the appointment of ambassadors to the and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (public respondents)
Commission on Appointments confirmation of argue that neither petitioners citizenship nor his
nominees.[1] However, for lack of a case or controversy taxpayer status vests him with standing to question
grounded on petitioners lack of capacity to sue and respondent Davides appointment because petitioner
mootness,[2] we dismiss the petition without reaching remains without personal and substantial interest in the
the merits, deferring for another day the resolution of outcome of a suit which does not involve the taxing
the question raised, novel and fundamental it may be. power of the state or the illegal disbursement of public
funds. Third, public respondents question the propriety
of this petition, contending that this suit is in truth a
52
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petition for quo warranto which can only be filed by a The same conclusion holds true for petitioners
contender for the office in question. invocation of his taxpayer status. Taxpayers
contributions to the states coffers entitle them to
On the eligibility of respondent Davide, respondents question appropriations for expenditures which are
counter that Section 23s mandated retirement age claimed to be unconstitutional or illegal.[7] However, the
applies only to career diplomats, excluding from its salaries and benefits respondent Davide received
ambit non-career appointees such as respondent commensurate to his diplomatic rank are fixed by law
Davide. and other executive issuances, the funding for which
was included in the appropriations for the DFAs total
The petition presents no case or controversy for expenditures contained in the annual budgets Congress
petitioners lack of capacity to sue and mootness. passed since respondent Davides nomination. Having
assumed office under color of authority (appointment),
First. Petitioners citizenship and taxpayer status do not respondent Davide is at least a de facto officer entitled to
clothe him with standing to bring this suit. We have draw salary,[8] negating petitioners claim of illegal
granted access to citizens suits on the narrowest of expenditure of scarce public funds.[9]
ground: when they raise issues of transcendental
importance calling for urgent resolution.[5] Three factors Second. An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to
are relevant in our determination to allow third party petitioner also obtains. Petitioners suspension from the
suits so we can reach and resolve the merits of the practice of law bars him from performing any activity, in
crucial issues raised the character of funds or assets or out of court, which requires the application of law,
involved in the controversy, a clear disregard of legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.[10]
constitutional or statutory prohibition, and the lack of Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully crafted
any other party with a more direct and specific interest arguments on equal protection grounds and employing
to bring the suit.[6] None of petitioners allegations highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse
comes close to any of these parameters. Indeed, implicit Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed
in a petition seeking a judicial interpretation of a conduct.
statutory provision on the retirement of government
personnel occasioned by its seemingly ambiguous
crafting is the admission that a clear disregard of Third. A supervening event has rendered this case
constitutional or statutory prohibition is absent. academic and the relief prayed for moot. Respondent
Further, the DFA is not devoid of personnel with more Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010.
direct and specific interest to bring the suit. Career
ambassadors forced to leave the service at the mandated
retirement age unquestionably hold interest far more WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
substantial and personal than petitioners generalized
interest as a citizen in ensuring enforcement of the law.
SO ORDERED.
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