PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER VS HON RUBEN TORRES

FACTS:

PHILPHOS assails the decision of Sec of Labor affirming the order of the Arbiter which directed
the immediate conduct of a certification election among supervisory, professional, or technical
and confidential employees of petitioner corporation.

July 7 1989 PhilPhos Movement for Progress filed with DOLE a petition for certification election
among the supervisory employees of petitioner alleging that as a supervisory union duly
registered with the Department of Labor and Employment it was seeking to represent the
supervisory employees of PHILPHOS.

The petition was not opposed by PHILPHOS. 11 August 1989, PHILPHOS submitted a position
paper with the Mediator-Arbiter stating that its management welcomed the creation of a
supervisory employees' union provided the necessary requisites of law were properly observed,
but exempting from the union its superintendents who were managerial and not supervisory
employees as they managed a division, subdivision or section, and were vested with powers
or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies. PHILPHOS also asserted that
its professional or technical employees were not within the definition of supervisory employees
under the Labor Code.

Petitioner PhilPhos prayed for exclusion of superintendents and professional technical

employees from PMPI supervisory union.

Mediator arbiter Rodolfo Milado ordered holding certification election among supervisory
employees of petitioner excluding the superintendents and professional and technical
employees. Also directed the parties to attend pre-election conference for the determination
of mechanic of the election process and qualifications and eligibility.

PMPI filed an amended petition to represent not only supervisory but also professional,
technical and confidential employees.

14 December 1989, parties agreed to submit their respective position papers.

28 March 1990 granted petition directing the holding of certification election among
supervisory etc. to compromise the proposed bargaining unit.

PHILPHOS appealed the order of March 28, PHILPHOS moved for reconsideration but was
denied. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER PETITIONER WAS DENIED OF DUE PROCESS IN TH PROCEEDINGS BEFORE

RESPONDENT MEDIATOR-ARBITER
RULING: whether professional/technical and confidential employees may validly join
respondent PMPI composed of supervisors

PHILPHOS claims that it was denied due process when respondent Mediator-Arbiter granted the
amended petition of respondent PMPI without according PHILPHOS a new opportunity to be
heard.

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to

administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Where, as in the instant case,
petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to
consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the position papers filed by the
parties, there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process, as petitioner
was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it
so desired, insisted on a hearing to confront and examine the witnesses of the other party.
But it did not; instead, it opted to submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter.
Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the
Secretary of Labor.

SECOND ISSUE: we are with petitioner that being a supervisory union, respondent PMPI cannot
represent the professional/technical and confidential employees of petitioner whose positions
we find to be more of the rank and file than supervisory.

Supervisory – are those effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such
authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent
judgment. Managerial employees are those having authority to hire and fire.

The peculiar role of supervisors is such that while they are not managers, when they
recommend action implementing management policy or ask for the discipline or dismissal of
subordinates, they identify with the interests of the employer and may act contrary to the
interests of the rank and file.

Petitioner described positions and functions of professional/technical employees: They are

immediately under the direction and supervision of supervisors or superintendents. They have
no men under them but are regularly called upon by their supervisors or superintendents on
some technical matters.

Certification of Personnel Officer Duhaylungsod: professional/technical are non-supervisory

and belong in a rank and file. They are not allowed to join a union composed of supervisors.
Supervisory employees cannot join a labor organization of employees under their supervision
but may validly form a separate organization of their own.

This is provided in Art. 245 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6715, to wit: Managerial
employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees
shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank and file employees but
may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.

Respondent PMPI is supposed to be a union of 125 supervisors. If with professional/technical,

they will be 271, wherein they are more than the supervisors.

Supervisors have the right to form their own union or labor organization. What the law
prohibits is a union whose membership comprises of supervisors merging with the rank and
file employees because this is where conflict of interests may arise in the areas of discipline,
collective bargaining and strikes. The professional/technical employees of petitioner therefore
may join the existing rank and file union, or form a union separate and distinct from the
existing union organized by the rank and file employees of the same company.

The professional/technical employees of petitioner Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation

(PHILPHOS) are declared disqualified from affiliating with respondent Philphos Movement for
Progress, Inc. (PMPI). The Department of Labor is directed to order immediately the conduct of
certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, particularly excluding
them from its professional and technical employees.
BAYANI ALONTE VS JUDGE MAXIMO SAVELLANO

FACTS:

SYNOPSIS: Bayani M. Alonte, then incumbent Mayor of Biñan, Laguna and

Buenaventura
Concepcion were charged with rape based on the complaint of Juvielyn
Punongbayan. mDuring the pendency of the petition for change of venue,
Juvielyn, assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an a􀀽davit of
desistance. The petition for change of venue was granted and the case was
raffled to respondent judge who issued warrants of arrest for petitioners.

Following arraignment, Juvielyn said that she has no interest in further

prosecuting the action. State said that it has no further evidence to prove guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. She moved to the dismissal of the case.

Due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the court
or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear
and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired
by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an
opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful
hearing. Mandatory and indispensable.

There can be no short-cut to the

legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his full
day in
court. Due process, rightly occupying the 􀀽rst and foremost place of honor in our
Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be denied even to
the most undeserving.

FACTS:

September 12, 1996, in Sto Tomas Binan Laguna the above named accused
incumbent mayor of Binan Laguna, after giving water to the complainant child
and made her dizzy and weak, willfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with Juvielyn Punongbayan, Buenaventrua Concepcion participated by bringing
the complainant child to the resthouse.

The case was raffled and was assigned to the RTC Binan Laguna. On 13
December 1996, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through her counsel Attorney
Remedios C. Balbin, and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor ("ACSP") Leonardo
Guiyab, Jr., filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a Petition for a
Change of Venue (docketed Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC) to have the
case transferred and tried by any of the Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila.

Meanwhile, Juvie filed an affidavit of desistance: that the case is moving so

slowly (a) change of venue (b) propriety of the appeal to the Court of
Appeals(c)hold departure order filed with the Binan Court; that she has already
missed 2 semesters of college; simply wants to stop and live elsewhere, to start
life anew, and live normally once again; withdrawing here complaint for rape.

Petitioner counsel moved to dismiss the change of venue. ACSP Guiyab filed his
comment that he was not aware of the desistance of private complainant and
opined that the desistance, in any case, would not produce any legal effect since
it was the public prosecutor who had direction and control of the prosecution of
the criminal action. He prayed for the denial of the motion to dismiss.

SC granted the petitioner for change of venue.

Sept 17 1997, now re-docketed to the Clerk of Court of Manila, Branch 53 RTC
Manila, with respondent Judge Maximo Savellano

October 7 – submitted to the Manila court a compliance

October 9 - Judge Savellano found probable cause for the issuance of warrants
for the arrest of petitioners Alonte and Concepcion "without prejudice to, and
independent of, this Court's separate determination as the trier of facts, of the
voluntariness and validity of the [private complainant's] desistance in the light of
the opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo
Guiyab."

On 02 November 1997, Alonte voluntarily surrendered himself to Director

Santiago Toledo of the National Bureau of Investigation.

Nov 7 – petitioners were arraigned and both pleaded not guilty. Judge Savellano,
both parties agreed to proceed with the trial of the case on the merits. According
to Alonte, however, Judge Savellano allowed the prosecution to present
evidence relative only to the question of the voluntariness and validity of the
affidavit of desistance.

It would appear that immediately following the arraignment, the prosecution

presented private complainant Juvie-lyn Punongbayan followed by her parents.
During this hearing, Punongbayan affirmed the validity and voluntariness of her
affidavit of desistance. She stated that she had no intention of giving positive
testimony in support of the charges against Alonte and had no interest in further
prosecuting the action. Punongbayan confirmed: (i) That she was compelled to
desist because of the harassment she was experiencing from the media, (ii) that
no pressures nor influence were exerted upon her to sign the a􀀽davit of
desistance, and (iii) that neither she nor her parents received a single centavo
from anybody to secure the affidavit of desistance.

Parents also affirmed their signatures on the affidavit of desistance, and their
consent.

10 November 1997 – petitioner filed a motion to bail, Asst Prosecutor

Camponares stated that the State interposed no objection to the granting
of bail, justice and equity.

Respondent judge did not act on the application for bail.

Nov 17 – Alonte filed anew an urgent plea to resolve the motion for bail.
None of the motions were acted upon by Judge Savellano.

Dec 17 – received a notice from RTC Manila of the schedule of

promulgation on Dec 18 1997. Counsel of Concepcion denied having
received the notice.

Dec 18 - Atty. Sigrid Fortun and Atty. Jose Flaminiano manifested that Alonte
could not attend the promulgation of the decision because he was suffering from
mild hypertension and was confined at the NBI clinic and that, upon the other
hand, petitioner Concepcion and his counsel would appear not to have been
notified of the proceedings. The promulgation, nevertheless, of the decision
proceeded in absentia: guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Dec 18 – petitioner filed motion for reconsideration, also filed instant “Ex
Abundante Ad Cautelam” certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, bail.

Alonte contention:
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo in violation of
the mandatory provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, speci􀀽cally, in the
conduct and order of trial (Rule 119) prior to the promulgation of a judgment
(Rule 120; Annex A).

Concenpcion contention:

The decision had been rendered in gross violation of the right of the accused to a
fair trial by an impartial and neutral judge. The decision had been rendered in gross
violation of the right of the accused to a fair trial by an impartial and neutral judge
Judge Savellano:

The two (2) accused did not present any countervailing evidence during the trial.
They did not take the witness stand to refute or deny under oath the truth of the
contents of the private complainant's aforementioned affidavit which she expressly
affirmed and confirmed in Court, but, instead, thru their respective lawyers, they
rested and submitted the case for decision merely on the basis of the private
complainant's so called 'desistance' which, to them, was sufficient enough for their
purposes. They left everything to the so-called 'desistance' of the private
complainant."

According to petitioners, however, there was no such trial for what was
conducted on 07 November 1997, aside from the arraignment of the accused,
was merely a proceeding in conformity with the resolution of this Court in
Administrative Case No. 97-1-12-RTC to determine the validity and voluntariness
of the afidavit of desistance executed by Punongbayan.

Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides
the
fundamentals.

"(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law.

"(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustifiable."

While Judge Savellano has claims that petitioners-accused were each represented during the
hearing on 07 November 1997 with their respective counsel of choice; that none of their
counsel interposed an intention to cross-examine rape victim Juvielyn Punongbayan, even
after she attested, in answer to respondent judge's clarificatory questions, the voluntariness
and truth of her two affidavits - one detailing the rape and the other detailing the attempts to
buy her desistance; the opportunity was missed/not used, hence waived. The rule of case law
is that the right to confront and cross-examine a witness 'is a personal one and may be
waived.”

Right to cross-examine may be waived: It should be pointed out, however, that

the existence of the waiver must be positively demonstrated. The standard of
waiver requires that it "not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing,
intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and
likely consequences." Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so
construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver. The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a few of
the deviations from what otherwise should have been the regular course of trial:
Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to prove their
defenses nor have dates therefor been scheduled for the purpose; (2) the
parties have not been given the opportunity to present rebutting evidence
nor have dates been set by respondent Judge for the purpose; and (3)
petitioners have not admitted the act charged in the Information so as to
justify any modification in the order of trial.

Finally, it may be opportune to say, once again, that prosecutors are expected
not merely to discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism and skill but also to act each time with utmost devotion and
dedication to duty. The Court is hopeful that the zeal which has been exhibited
many times in the past, although regrettably a disappointment on few occasions,
will not be wanting in the proceedings yet to follow.

WHEREFORE, conformably with all the foregoing, the Court hereby RULES that

(a) The submission of the "A􀀽davit of Desistance," executed by Juvie-

Lyn Y. Punongbayan on 25 June 1997, having been 􀀽led AFTER the institution
of Criminal Case No. 97-159935, DOES NOT WARRANT THE DISMISSAL of
said criminal case;
(b) For FAILURE OF DUE PROCESS, the assailed judgment, dated 12
December 1997, convicting petitioners is declared NULL AND VOID and thereby
SET ASIDE; accordingly, the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings; and
(c) Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding Judge of Branch 53 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, is ENJOINED from further hearing Criminal Case
No. 97-159935; instead, the case shall immediately be scheduled for raffle
among the other branches of that court for proper disposition.
CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO ANIAG VS COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner assails in this petition (for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition)
the following resolutions of the Commission on Elections, Resolution 2327 for
being unconstitutional; resolution no. 92-0829 and Resolution 92-0999 for wan of
legal and factual bases.

The factual backdrop: In preparation for the synchronized national and local
elections scheduled on 11 May 1992, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
issued on 11 December 1991 Resolution No. 2323 otherwise referred to as the
"Gun Ban," promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and
transporting of firearms or other deadly weapons, on security personnel or
bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police
organizations, and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the
election period; Dec 26, established spot checkpoints.

On 10 January 1992, pursuant to the "Gun Ban," Mr. Serapio P. Taccad,

Sergeant-at-Arms, House of Representatives, wrote petitioner who was then
Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan requesting the return of the two (2)
firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives. Upon being advised of
the request on 13 January 1992 by his staff, petitioner immediately instructed
his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pickup the firearms from petitioner's house
at Valle Verde and return them to Congress. Meanwhile, 5pm, PNP set up a
checkpoint outside Batasan Complex, 30 minutes late, flagged down the car
and found the firearms neatly packed in their gun cases placed in the car.

Arellano explained that he was ordered by petitioner to get the firearms form the
house and return to Sergeant at arms Tacad of the HOR.

Police referred the case to office of City prosecutor. The referral did not include
petitioner as among those charged with an election offense. City Prosecutor then
ordered the release.

On 28 January 1992, the City Prosecutor invited petitioner to shed light on the
circumstances mentioned in Arellano's sworn explanation. Petitioner not only
appeared at the preliminary investigation to confirm Arellano's statement but also
wrote the City Prosecutor urging him to exonerate Arellano. He explained that
Arellano did not violate the firearms ban as he in fact was complying with it when
apprehended by returning the firearms to Congress; and, that he was petitioner's
driver, not a security officer nor a bodyguard.
Petitioner questions constitutionality of Resolution 2327: that the Omnibus
Election Code provides for the disqualification of any person/candidate from
running for or holding a public office, i.e., any person who has either been
declared by competent authority as insane or incompetent or has been
sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen
months or for a crime involving moral turpitude; that gunrunning, using or
transporting firearms or similar weapons and other acts mentioned in the
resolution are not within the letter or spirit of the provisions of the Code; that the
resolution did away with the requirement of final conviction before the
commission of certain offenses; that instead, it created a presumption of guilt as
a candidate may be disqualified from office in situations (a) where the criminal
charge is still pending, (b) where there is no pending criminal case, and (c) where
the accused has already been acquitted, all contrary to the requisite quantum of
proof for one to be disqualified from running or holding public office.

(but the issue on his disqualification from running election was rendered moot
when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the elections; futile to discuss his
qualification to run public office)

whether he can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to return to

the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives the two firearms
issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrantless
search of his car.

Petitioner contention: without warrant and without informing the driver of his
fundamental rights the policemen searched his car. The firearms were not tucked
in the waist nor within the immediate reach of Arellano but were neatly packed in
their gun cases and wrapped in a bag kept in the trunk of the car; violates Sec 2
and 3 (2) Art III.

Petitioner further maintains that he was neither impleaded as party

respondent in the preliminary investigation before the Office of the City
Prosecutor nor included in the charge sheet. Consequently, making him a
respondent in the criminal information would violate his constitutional right
to due process.

As to bodyguard issue: Arellano was not a security personnel but a civilian

employee assigned to him as driver by the HOR. Specifically, petitioner further
argues, Arellano was instructed to return to Congress, as he did, the firearms in
compliance with the directive of its Sergeant-at-Arms pursuant to the "Gun Ban,"
thus, no law was in fact violated.
It points out that it was upon petitioner's instruction that Arellano brought
the firearms in question outside petitioner's residence, submitting that his
right to be heard was not violated as he was invited by the City Prosecutor
to explain the circumstances regarding Arellano's possession of the
firearms. Petitioner also filed a sworn written explanation about the
incident.

As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly

issued by an appropriate authority. However, this is not absolute. Aside
from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been
upheld in cases of moving vehicles and the seizure of evidence in plain
view, as well as the search conducted at police or military checkpoints
which we declared are not illegal per se, and stressed that the warrantless
search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is
neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the
inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search.

Petitioner contends that the guns were not tucked in Arellano's waist nor placed
within his reach, and that they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed
inside a bag at the back of the car. Significantly, COMELEC did not rebut this
claim. The records do not show that the manner by which the package was
bundled led the PNP to suspect that it contained firearms. There was not mention
either of any report regarding any nervous, suspicious or unnatural reaction from
Arellano when the car was stopped and searched. Given these circumstances
and relying on its visual observation, the PNP could not thoroughly search the
car lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction.

In the case at bench, we find that the checkpoint was set up twenty (20) meters
from the entrance to the Batasan Complex to enforce Resolution No. 2327.
There was no evidence to show that the policemen were impelled to do so
because of a confidential report leading them to reasonably believe that certain
motorists matching the description furnished by their informant were engaged in
gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing special strike forces. Nor, as
adverted to earlier, was there any indication from the package or behavior of
Arellano that could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen.

The action then of the policemen unreasonably intruded into petitioner's privacy
and the security of his property, in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the Constitution.

Moreover, the manner by which COMELEC proceeded against petitioner

runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution. The facts show
that petitioner was not among those charged by the PNP with violation of
the Omnibus Election Code. Nor was he subjected by the City Prosecutor
to a preliminary investigation for such offense. The nondisclosure by the
City Prosecutor to the petitioner that he was a respondent in the
preliminary investigation is violative of due process which requires that the
procedure established by law should be obeyed.

COMELEC argues that petitioner was given the chance to be heard because he
was invited to enlighten the City Prosecutor regarding the circumstances leading
to the arrest of his driver, and that petitioner in fact submitted a sworn letter of
explanation regarding the incident. This does not satisfy the requirement of
due process the essence of which is the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense.
Due process guarantees the observance of both substantive and
procedural rights, whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution
itself or only a statute or a rule of court.

While the right to preliminary investigation is statutory rather than constitutional in its
fundamental, since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a component part
of due process in criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary investigation
conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally
at risk of incarceration or some other penalty is not a mere formal or technical right;
it is a substantive right.

Apparently, petitioner was merely invited during the preliminary

investigation of Arellano to corroborate the latter's explanation. Petitioner
then was made to believe that he was not a party respondent in the case,
so that his written explanation on the incident was only intended to
exculpate Arellano, not petitioner himself. Hence, it cannot be seriously
contended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet the
accusation against him as he was not apprised that he was himself a
respondent when he appeared before the City Prosecutor. Petitioner did
not waive his right to a preliminary investigation.
SPOUSES ROMUALDEZ VS COMELEC AND DENNIS GARAY

FACTS:

Private respondent Dennis Garay filed a complaint with the COMELEC thru
Office of the Election Officer charging petitioner violation of the Omnibus Election
Code, similarly referred to as BP Blg 881, and Section 12 od RA 8189.

Private respondent deposed, inter alia, that: petitioners are of legal ages; Private
respondent deposed, inter alia, that: petitioners are of legal ages; petitioners made false
and untruthful representations in violation of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8189, by
indicating therein that they are residents of 935 San Jose Street, Burauen, Leyte,
when in truth and in fact, they were and still are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop,
Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City, and registered voters of
Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, Precinct No. 4419-A,
as evidenced by Voter Registration Record Nos. 26195824 and 26195823; and that
petitioners, knowing fully well said truth, intentionally and willfully, did not fill the
blank spaces in said applications corresponding to the length of time which they
have resided in Burauen, Leyte; failure to apply to transfer of registration records
due to change of residence to another city or municipality.

Petitioner contention: they did not make any false and untruthful statements in their
application. They avowed that they intended to reside in Burauen, Leyte, since the year
1989. On even date, the Barangay District III Council of Burauen passed a Resolution of
Welcome, expressing therein its gratitude and appreciation to petitioner Carlos S.
Romualdez for choosing the Barangay as his official residence.

En Banc Resolution 11 June 2004: As aptly observed by the Investigating Officer, the filing
of request for the cancellation and transfer of Voting Registration Record does not automatically
cancel the registration records. The fact remains that at the time of application for registration as
new voter of the herein Respondents on May 9 and 11, 2001 in the Office of Election Officer of
Burauen, Leyte their registration in Barangay 4419-A, Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame
Quezon City was still valid and subsisting.

ISSUE: COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT PREMISED ITS

RESOLUTION ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND FAILED TO CONSIDER
CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS THAT WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.

RULING:

Essentially, petitioners are of the view that they were not accorded due process of law.
Specifically, their right to refute or submit documentary evidence against the new charges
which COMELEC ordered to be fied against them. Moreover, petitioners insist that Section
45 (j) of the Voter's Registration Act is vague as it does not refer to a definite provision of
the law, the violation of which would constitute an election offense; hence, it runs contrary to
Section 14 (1) and Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. COURT IS NOT
PERSUADED.
First. The Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is couched in
a language which embraces the allegations necessary to support the charge for violation of
Section 10 (g) and (j), in relation to Section 45 (j) of Republic Act No. 8189.
(see ipad for the provisions violated by Spouses Romualdez)

Respondent-spouses, registered as new voters of the Municipality of Burauen, Leyte, [in spite
of] the fact that they were and still are, registered voters of Quezon City as early as June 22,
1997;

7.1 That, Double Registration is an election offense. A person qualified as a voter is only
allowed to register once. If a person registers anew as a voter in spite of a subsisting
registration, the new application for registration will be disapproved. The registrant is also liable
not only for an election offense of double registration, but also for another election offense of
knowingly making any false or untruthful statement relative to any data or information required
in the application for registration. In fact, when a person applies for registration as a voter, he or
she fills up a Voter Registration Record form in his or her own handwriting, which contains a
Certification which reads:

"I do solemnly swear that the above statements regarding my person are true and correct; that I
possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a voter; that the thumbprints,
specimen signatures and photographs appearing herein are mine; and that I am not registered
as a voter in any other precinct."

Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that the
election offenses charged against them by private respondent are entirely different
from those for which they stand to be accused of before the RTC, as charged by the
COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no incongruity between the charges
as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and the Informations filed before the RTC.

Petitioners' reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their claim of lack of due
process because, as we have said, the charges contained in private respondent's
Complaint-Affidavit and the charges as directed by the COMELEC to be filed are
based on the same set of facts. In fact, the nature of the criminal charges in private
respondent's Complaint-Affidavit and that of the charges contained in the Informations filed
with the RTC, pursuant to the COMELEC Resolution En Banc are the same, such that,
petitioners cannot claim that they were not able to refute or submit documentary evidence
against the charges that the COMELEC filed with the RTC. Petitioners were afforded due
process because they were granted the opportunity to refute the allegations in
private respondent's Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April 2001, in opposition to the
Complaint-Affidavit, petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss
with the Law Department of the COMELEC. They similarly filed a Memorandum before
the said body. Finding that due process was not dispensed with under the
circumstances in the case at bar, we agree with the stance of the Office of the
Solicitor General that petitioners were reasonably apprised of the nature and
description of the charges against them. It likewise bears stressing that preliminary
investigations were conducted whereby petitioners were informed of the complaint
and of the evidence submitted against them. They were given the opportunity to
adduce controverting evidence for their defense. In all these stages, petitioners
actively participated.
In Orquinaza vs People: the conduct of another preliminary investigation for the offense of
acts of lasciviousness would be a futile exercise because the complainant would only be
presenting the same facts and evidence which have already been studied by the
prosecutor. The court frowns upon such superfluity which only serves to delay the
prosecution and disposition of the criminal complaint.

Second. Petitioners would have this court declare Section 45 (j) of Republic Act No. 8189
vague, on the ground that it contravenes the fair notice requirement of the 1987
Constitution, in particular, Section 14 (1) and Section 14 (2), Article III of thereof. Petitioners
submit that Section 45 (j) of Republic Act No. 8189 makes no reference to a definite
provision of the law, the violation of which would constitute an election offense.

We are not convinced.

The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.
Court has imposed certain limitations by which a criminal statute, as in the challenged law
at bar, may be scrutinized. This Court has declared that facial invalidation or an "on-its-face"
invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that 'one to
whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the
ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in
which its application might be unconstitutional.' As has been pointed out, 'vagueness challenges
in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation,
while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied'
to a particular defendant.'"

Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal

of parties whose cases may not have even reached the courts. Such invalidation would
constitute a departure from the usual requirement of "actual case and controversy" and
permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness.

Overbreadth doctrine (see Coffee Notes)

The law articulates the policy of the State to systematize the present method of registration
in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters. A reading of
Section 45 (j) conjointly with the provisions upon which petitioners are charged, i.e.,
Sections 10 (g) and (j) would reveal that the matters that are required to be set forth under
the aforesaid sections are crucial to the achievement of a clean, complete, permanent and
updated list of voters. The factual information required by the law is sought not for mere
embellishment.
There is a definitive governmental purpose when the law requires that such facts should be
set forth in the application. The periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of
registration delve into the matter of residency, a requisite which a voter must satisfy to be
deemed a qualified voter and registered in the permanent list of voters in a precinct of the
city or municipality wherein he resides. Of even rationality exists in the case of the
requirement in Section 10 (j), mandating that the applicant should state that he/she is not a
registered voter of any precinct. Multiple voting by so-called flying voters are glaring
anomalies which this country strives to defeat.

These provisions have not been declared unconstitutional. Moreover, every statute has in
its favor the presumption of validity. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or
argumentative. We hold that petitioners failed to overcome the heavy presumption in favor
of the law. Its constitutionality must be upheld in the absence of substantial grounds for
overthrowing the same.

A salient point. Courts will refrain from touching upon the issue of constitutionality unless it
is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota. In the case at bar, the lis mota is the alleged
grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC in finding probable cause for the 􀀽ling of
criminal charges against petitioner THE COUR IS UNIMPRESSED.

(PROCEED TO COFFE NOTES :-------(((((((((

PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS VS JOSE LUIS ALCUAZ, NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

DOCTRINES:
 While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of
the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it
may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice
and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that
such power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in an arbitrary
and confiscatory manner.

FACTS:

By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, PHILCOMSAT was granted "a franchise to
establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places as
the grantee may select, station or stations and associated equipment and
facilities for international satellite communications." Under this franchise, it was
likewise granted the authority to "construct and operate such ground facilities as
needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite
system and ground terminal or terminals."

1967, PHILCOMSAT established its provisional earth station in Pinugay Rizal.it

provided direct satellite communication links with the Pacific Ocean thru the
Pacific Ocean INTELSAT satellite. Pinugay II – Indian Ocean INTELSAT
satellite.Pinugay III established to temporarily assume the functions of Pinugay I
and II while being refurbished. Pinugay IV was established to take over links in
Pinugay I due to obsolescence.

The petitioner is also the sole signatory for the Philippines in the Agreement and
the Operating Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications
Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) of 115 member nations, as well as in the
Convention and the Operating Agreement of the International Maritime Satellite
Organization (INMARSAT) of 53 member nations, which two global commercial
telecommunications satellite corporations were collectively established by
various states in line with the principles set forth in Resolution 1721 (XVI) of the
General Assembly of the United Nations.

Petitioner has been leasing its satellite circuits to PLDT, Phil Global Comms,
Eastern Telecom, Globe Mackay, Capitol Wireless.

Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the
jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC.
However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987,
petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent
NTC, including all its facilities and services and the fixing of rates. Implementing
said Executive Order No. 196, respondents required petitioner to apply for the
requisite certificate of public convenience and necessity covering its facilities and
the services it renders, as well as the corresponding authority to charge rates
therefor.

Sept 9, 1987, filed with the respondent NTC application for authority to continue
operating and maintaining the same facilities it has since 1967, and to constinue
providing intl satellite communications. Pending hearing, it also applied for
provisional authority to continue operate and maintain above mentioned facilities.
It was approved on Sept 16, 1987, it was vlaid for six months and was again
extended for 6 months.

NTC order extension for another six months but it directed the petitioner to
charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of 15% on the present
authorized rates on the ground that: through the initial evaluation by the Rates
Regulation Division of the Common Carrier Authorization Dept

PHILCOMSAT assail the above order on the ff reasons: (1) enabling act EO
546 empowering to fix rates for public service communication does not provide
necessary standards, undue delegation of legislative powers (but really is that of
quasi judicial power of respondent NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires
an express conferment by the legislative body). (2) the same was exercised in an
unconstitutional manner, hence it is ultra vires, in that (a) the questioned order
violates procedural due process for having been issued without prior notice
and hearing; and (b) the rate reduction it imposes is unjust, unreasonable and
confiscatory, thus constitutive of a violation of substantive due process.

Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be

sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is
provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed
the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the
administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes
a rate, its act must both be non-confiscatory and must have been
established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the
absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional.
In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the
legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority
is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the
absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be
implied.
We need not go into an in-depth analysis of the pertinent provisions of the
law in order to conclude that respondent NTC, in the exercise of its
ratefixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety, public
interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more
than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power.

Issue on violation of without notice to petitioner and without the benefit of

hearing: We are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's
ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its rates would adversely affect its
operations and the quality of its service to the public considering the
maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the financial
outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to
cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC
based its questioned order.

While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the
application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not
exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well
as the requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in
NTC, it may not exercise the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner.

Public Service Act: Section 16© Proceedings of the Commission, upon

notice and hearing. — The
Commission shall have power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with
the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions
mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, . . . which shall be imposed,
observed and followed thereafter by any public service;

It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority

to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the
order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is
made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the
commission's own motion as in the present case. That such a hearing is
required is evident in respondents' order of September 16, 1987 in NTC
Case No. 8794 which granted PHILCOMSAT a provisional authority "to
continue operating its existing facilities, to render the services it presently
offers, and to charge the rates as reduced by them" under the condition
that "(s)ubject to hearing and the final consideration of the merit of this
application, the Commission may modify, revise or amend the rates . . .."
Upon a showing, therefore, that the order requiring a reduced rate is
confiscatory, and will unduly deprive petitioner of a reasonable return upon its
property, a declaration of its nullity becomes inductible, which brings us to the
issue on substantive due process.

There is no question that petitioner is a mere grantee of a legislative franchise

which is subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress when the
common good so requires. Apparently, therefore, such grant cannot be
unilaterally revoked absent a showing that the termination of the operation of said
utility is required by the common good. The rule is that the power of the State to
regulate the conduct and business of public utilities is limited by the consideration
that it is not the owner of the property of the utility, or clothed with the general
power of management incident to ownership, since the private right of ownership
to such property remains and is not to be destroyed by the regulatory power.

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of

private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of
property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional
guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.

This basic requirement of reasonableness comprehends such rates which

must not be so low as to be confiscatory, or too high as to be oppressive.

Consequently, we hold that the challenged order, particularly on the issue

of rates provided therein, being violative of the due process clause is void
and should be nullified. Respondents should now proceed, as they should
heretofore have done, with the hearing and determination of petitioner's
pending application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity
and in which proceeding the subject of rates involved in the present
controversy, as well as other matters involved in said application, may be
duly adjudicated with reasonable dispatch and with due observance or our
pronouncements herein.
ANGTIBAY VS COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND NATIONAL
LABOR UNION INC.

DOCTRINES:
There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings
of this character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes
the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to
present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he
asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. The decision
must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of
Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

FACTS:
Solicitor- general in behalf of respondent court of Industrial Relations consider
the following legal conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:
(Spanish)

Respondent National Labor Union prays for the vacation rendered by the
majority: Toribio Teodoro said that there was shortage of leather soles in ANG
TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the
National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the
Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. (2)That
the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a
scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the National Labor
Union, Inc., from work.

The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to the motion
for new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.

We have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had before the Court
of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial evidence to
indicate that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union
affiliation or activity.

The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are

specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is
more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the
nation.

FUNCTION OF COURT OF IR: When directed by the President of the

Philippines, it shall investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the industry
concerned or to the industries established in a designated locality, with a view to
determining the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or
locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon"
or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or lessees to landowners. There
is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a
departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.

And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been
especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into
effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of
Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it,
entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
Process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are
cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing which includes the
right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Justice
Hughes, in Morgan v. U. S., 304 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed
1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the
rudimentary requirements of fair play."
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case
and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he
asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. ("the
right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the
board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person
or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without
notice or consideration.")
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide
right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that
of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely
nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached."
(4) Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”
 (5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing,
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is
enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of
securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the
controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of
investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report
and decision are only advisory
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act
on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at
a decision The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.

In the light of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here

that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National
Workers' Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the
thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a rational way, a conclusion
of law.

We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the
petition. By and large, after considerable discussion, we have come to the
conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant
is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in
his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue
involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations
and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue
involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the
result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is
hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the
Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case,
receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove.
ADMU VS IGNACIO CAPULONG

DOCTRINES:

 Petitioner university herein, thus: "(1) the students must be informed in

writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) that
they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the
assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence
against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case."
 In view of the death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner Cynthia del Castillo, as
Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students
on February 11, 1991 to submit within twentyfour hours their written
statement on the incident, the records show that instead of filing a reply,
respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the
charges. While some of the students mentioned in the February 11, 1991
notice duly submitted written statements, the others failed to do so. Thus,
the latter were granted an extension of up to February 18, 1991 to file their
statements. Petitioners' notices/letters dated February 11, February 14
and 20 clearly show that respondent students were given ample
opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf and to answer the
charges leveled against them. The requisite assistance of counsel
was met when, from the very start of the investigations before the
Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Committee, the law firm of
Gonzales Batiller and Bilog and Associates put in its appearance and
filed pleadings in behalf of respondent students.

FACTS:

1975, court was confronted to compel the Faculty Admission Committee of the
Loyola School of Theology, a religious seminary which has a working
arrangement with the Ateneo de Manila University regarding accreditation of
common students, to allow petitioner who had taken some courses therein for
credit during summer, to continue her studies. 1 Squarely meeting the issue, we
dismissed the petition on the ground that students in the position of petitioner
possess, not a right, but a privilege, to be admitted to the institution.

In support of its decision, the Court invoked academic freedom of institutions of

higher learning, as recognized by the Constitution, the concept encompassing
the right of a school to choose its students.
Eighteen (18) years later, the right of a University to refuse admittance to its
students, this time in Ateneo de Manila University proper, is again challenged.

The individual concerned was not regular student, the respondent in the case at
bar, having been previously enrolled in the University, week re-admission.
petitioner was also refused re-admittance because of her behavior in the
classroom.

On the other hand, students who are now being refused admission into petitioner
University have been found guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law
School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. The
case attracted much publicity due to the death of one of the neophytes and
serious physical injuries inflicted on another.

(another opportunity for the Court to add another dimension to the concept of
academic freedom of institutions of higher learning, this time a case fraught with
social and emotional overtones)

Aquila Legis, a fraternity organized in the Ateneo Law School, held its initiation
rites on February 8, 9 and 10, 1991, for students interested in joining its ranks.
As a result of such initiation rites, Leonardo "Lennie" H. Villa, a first year student
of petitioner university, died of serious physical injuries at the Chinese General
Hospital on February 10, 1991. He was not the lone victim, though, for another
freshman by the name of Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the
Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical
injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion.

Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written

statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although
respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file
a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. Through
their respective counsels, they requested copies of the charges and pertinent
documents or affidavits.

On February 20, 1991, petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board composed

of petitioners Judge Ruperto Kapunan, Justice Venicio Escolin, Atty. Marcos
Herras, Fiscal Miguel Albar and Atty. Ferdinand Casis, to hear the charges
against respondent students. In a letter dated February 20, 1991, respondent
Cdpr

students were informed that they had violated Rule No. 3 of the Rules on
Discipline contained in the Law School Catalogue. Said letter also states: "The
complaint/charge against you arose from participation in acts of hazing
committed during the Aquila Legis initiations held on February 8-10, 1991. The
evidence against you consist of testimonies of students, showing your
participation in acts prohibited by the School regulations." Finally, it ordered
respondent students to file their written answers to the above charge on or
before February 22, 1991, otherwise they would be deemed to have waive
their defense.

In a motion dated February 21, 1991, respondent students, through counsel,

requested that the investigation against them be held in abeyance, pending
action on their request for copies of the evidence against them.

In a resolution dated March 9, 1991, the Board found respondent students guilty
of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which
prohibits participation in hazing activities. The Board found that respondent
students acted as master auxiliaries or "auxies" during the initiation rites of Aquila
Legis, and exercised the "auxies privilege," which allows them to participate in
the physical hazing. Although respondent students claim that they were
there to assist and attend to the needs of the neophytes, actually they were
assigned a definite supportive role to play in the organized activity. Their
guilt was heightened by the fact that they made no effort to prevent the
infliction of further physical punishment on the neophytes under their care.
The Board considered respondent students part and parcel of the integral
process of hazing. In conclusion, the Board pronounced respondents
guilty of hazing, either by active participation or through acquiescence.

On March 18, 1991, respondent students filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction alleging that they were
currently enrolled as students for the second semester of schoolyear 1990-91.
Unless a temporary restraining order is issued, they would be prevented from
taking their examinations. The petition principally centered on the alleged
lack of due process in their dismissal.

Petitioners moved to strike out the Supplemental Petition arguing that the
creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which
alleged lack of due process in the conduct of investigations by the Disciplinary
Board against respondent students; that a supplemental petition cannot be
admitted without the same being set for hearing and that the supplemental
petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order will, in effect, extend the
previous restraining order beyond its mandatory 20-day lifetime.

May 17 1991 – Judge ordered petitioners to reinstate the respondents and to

conduct special examinations which the students were not allowed to take. On
the same date, May 17, 1991, the Special Board investigating petitioners Abas
and Mendoza concluded its investigation. On May 20, 1991, it imposed the
penalty of dismissal on respondent students Adel Abas and Zosimo Mendoza
and directed the dropping of their names from its roll of students.

ISSUE: whether a school is within its rights in expelling students from its
academic community pursuant to its disciplinary rules and moral
standards; and (2) whether or not the penalty imposed by the school
administration is proper under the circumstances.

RULING:

It is the threshold argument of respondent students that the decision of petitioner

Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S. J., then President of the Ateneo de Manila University, to
expel them was arrived at without affording them their right to procedural due
process. We are constrained to disagree as we find no indication that such right
has been violated. On the contrary, respondent students' rights in a school
disciplinary proceeding, as enunciated in the cases of Guzman v. National
University, Alcuaz v PSBA, Q.C. Branch and Non v. Dames II have been
meticulously respected by petitioners in the various investigative proceedings
held before they were expelled.

Guzman case is more appropriate to the instant case (see doctrine above)

Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not
accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements which
became the basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they were denied
procedural due process. Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the
same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for
disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to
cross examination. An administrative proceeding conducted to investigate
students' participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes
of a judicial proceeding. A closer examination of the March 2, 1991 hearing
which characterized the rules on the investigation as being summary in
nature and that respondent students have no right to examine affiants-
neophytes, reveals that this is but a reiteration of our previous ruling in
Alcuaz.

Similarly, the Disciplinary Board's resolution dated March 10, 1991 was preceded
by a hearing on March 2, 1991 wherein respondent students were summoned to
answer clarificatory questions.

It cannot be over-emphasized that the charge filed before the Joint

Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee and the Disciplinary
Board is not a criminal case requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt but is
merely administrative in character. As such, it is not subject to the rigorous
requirements of criminal due process, particularly with respect to the specification
of the charge involved. As we have had occasion to declare in previous
cases of a similar nature, due process in disciplinary cases involving
students does not entail proceedings and hearings identical to those
prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Accordingly,
disciplinary charges against a student need not be drawn with the
precision of a criminal information or complaint. Having given prior notice
to the students involved that "hazing" which is not defined in the School
Catalogue shall be defined in accordance with Senate Bill No. 3815, the
proposed bill on the subject of Sen. Jose Lina, petitioners have said what
needs to be said. We deem this sufficient for purposes of the investigation
under scrutiny.

Hazing, as a ground for disciplining a student, to the extent of dismissal or

expulsion, finds its raison d' etre in the increasing frequency of injury, even
death, inflicted upon the neophytes by their insensate "masters." Assuredly, it
passes the test of reasonableness and absence of malice on the part of the
school authorities. Far from fostering comradeship and esprit d' corps, it has
merely fed upon the cruel and baser instincts of those who aspire to eventual
leadership in our country.

Spanish to the American government, namely, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the
Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 made no mention of the rights now subsumed
under the catch-all term of "academic freedom." This is most especially true with
respect to the institutional aspect of the term. It had to await the drafting of the
Philippine Constitutions to be recognized as deserving of legal protection. The
breakthrough for the concept itself was found in Section 5 of the 1935
Constitution which stated: "Universities established by the State shall enjoy
academic freedom." The only State university at that time, being the University of
the Philippines, the Charter was perceived by some as exhibiting rank favoritism
for the said institution at the expense of
the rest.

In an attempt to broaden the coverage of the provision, the 1973 Constitution

provided in its Section 8 (2): "All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy
academic freedom." In his interpretation of the provision, former U.P. President
Vicente G. Sinco, who was also a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, declared that it "definitely grants the right of academic freedom to
the University as an institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a
university professor."
Has the right been carried over to the present Constitution? In an attempt to give
an explicit definition with an expanded coverage, the Commissioners of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986 came up with this formulation: "Academic
freedom shall be enjoyed by students, by teachers, and by researchers." After
protracted debate and ringing speeches, the final version which was none too
different from the way it was couched in the previous two (2) Constitutions, as
found in Article XIV, Section 5 (2) states: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in
all institutions of higher learning." In anticipation of the question as to whether
and what aspects of academic freedom are included herein, ConCom
Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna explained: "Since academic freedom is a
dynamic concept, we want to expand the frontiers of freedom, especially in
education therefore, we shall leave it to the courts to develop further the
parameters of academic
freedom."

Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, 41 we have consistently upheld

the salutary proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning
is discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the
student rather than a right. "For private schools have the right to establish
reasonable rules and regulations for the admission, discipline and
promotion of students. This right . . . extends as well to parents .. . as
parents are under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation, individually
and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools."

It must be borne in mind that universities are established, not merely to

develop the intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty
values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you will,
of the total man.

In essence, education must ultimately be religious — not in the sense that the
founders or charter members of the institution are sectarian or profess a religious
ideology. Rather, a religious education, as the renowned philosopher Alfred
North Whitehead said, is "an education which inculcates duty and reverence." It
appears that the particular brand of religious education offered by the Ateneo de
Manila University has been lost on the respondent students.
Certainly, they do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution as the Ateneo
de Manila University as their own a minute longer, for they may foreseeably cast
a malevolent influence on the students currently enrolled, as well as those who
come after them.

Having carefully reviewed the records and the procedure followed by

petitioner university, we see no reason to reverse its decision founded on
the following undisputed facts: that on February 8, 9 and 10, 1991, the
Aquila Legis Fraternity conducted hazing activities; that respondent
students were present at the hazing as auxiliaries, and that as a result of
the hazing, Leonardo Villa died from serious physical injuries, while
Bienvenido Marquez was hospitalized. In light of the vicious acts of
respondent students upon those whom ironically they would claim as
"brothers" after the initiation rites, how can we countenance the imposition
of such nominal penalties as reprimand or even suspension? We,
therefore, affirm petitioners' imposition of the penalty of dismissal upon
respondent students. This finds authority and justification in Section 146 of
the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK VS ANTI-TERRORISM
COUNCIL

FACTS:

Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007, petitioner Southern

Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a non-government organization, and
Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, 􀀽led a
petition for certiorari and prohibition on July 16, 2007. Petitioners Kilusang Mayo
Uno (KMU), National Federation of Labor Unions- Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-
KMU), and Center for Trade Union and Human Rights (CTUHR), represented by
their respective officers who are also bringing the action in their capacity as
citizens. (and otherssssssssss)

Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Council

composed of, at the time of the 􀀽ling of the petitions, Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice
Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense
Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local
Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves
as members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and
Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon. The Karapatan,
BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise impleaded President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and the support agencies for the Anti-Terrorism Council like
the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, National Bureau of Investigation,
Bureau of Immigration, Office of Civil Defense, Intelligence Service of the AFP,
Anti-Money Laundering Center, Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and
the PNP intelligence and investigative elements.

The petitions fail.

In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four

exacting requisites, viz.: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the
issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.