FREEDOM OF CENSORSHIP workings of government that led to the Vietnam war, the newspapers nobly

did precisely that which the Founders hoped and trusted they would do.
(NEAR v MINNESOTA)
(GONZALES v COMELEC)
- A statute provided for the suppression of any periodical found, after
hearing, on the basis of its past issues, to be obscene, malicious, In our country, regrettably, there does not appear to be the same
scandalous or defamatory. THE LAW WAS ANNULED vigilance in the protection of the right against censorship.

(NEWYORK TIMES v US) The law in this case prohibited, except during the prescribed election period.
“solicitation or undertaking of any campaign or propaganda, whether directly
Facts: The respondent sought to enjoin the publication by two newspapers of
or indirectly, by an individual, the making of speeches, announcements or
certain official classified papers relating to American policy on the Vietnam
commentaries or holding of interviews for or against the election of any party
war. Such publication, it was argued, would be detrimental to the security of
or candidate for public office, or the publication or distribution of campaign
the US.
or materials.:
Held: The US Supreme Court, in sustaining the periodicals, declared:
This provision was sustained although only four justices supported it, as the
“Any system of prior restraints of expression, comes to this bearing a other seven who opposed were one vote short of the 2/3’s majority then
heavy presumption against its validity. The government thus carries a heavy needed to annul it.
burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such restrain. The
The justification given was that the inordinate pre-occupation of the people
District Court for the Southern District of New York in the New York Times
with politics tended toward the neglect of the other serious needs of the
case and the District Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia circuit in
nation and the pollution of its suffrages/
the Washington Post case held that the Government had not met that
burden, We Agree” (INC v CA)

Amplifying on this per curiam decision, Justice Black observed:
“In the 1st amendment, the founding fathers gave the free press the
protection it must have to fulfill its essential rule in our democracy. The press
was to serve the governed, not the governors. The Government’s power to
censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free
to censure the Government. The press was protected so that it could bare the
secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained
press can effectively expose deception in government. And paramount
among the responsibilities of free press is the duty to prevent any part of the
government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands
to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell. In my view, farm from
deserving condemnation for their courageous reporting, the New York Times,
the Washington Post, and other newspapers should be commended for
serving the purpose that the Founding Fathers saw so clearly. In revealing the
Two basic issues were raised, to wit, whether the Movies and
Television Review and Classification Board had the power to review the
petitioner’s programs and clear them for showing on television and, assuming
it had, whether it gravely abused its discretion in prohibiting their exhibition
as x-rated materials.
The subject programs were barred from public viewing by the Board
for attacking certain doctrines and practices of the Catholic and Protestant
religions, but were sustained by the RTC, which also prohibited the Board
from requiring the petitioner to submit its programs to it for previous
clearance. The CA reversed the RTC, prompting the INC to go the SC for relief.
The majority of the Court held for the Board on the 1st issue but found
that it should not have banned the telecast of the programs because they did
not attack but merely criticized the other religions in the exercise by the INC
of its freedom of expression and religion.
 The criticisms did not create a clear and present danger requiring the
prior restraint of the State, according to Justice Puno, who was joined by
Justices Regalado, Davide, Romero, Francisco and Torres, with Chief Justice
Narvasa concurring in the result. Justice Padilla, Melo and Kapunan, while
agreeing that the Board had indeed committed grave abuse of discretion,
filed strong dissents impugning its censorship powers as violative of the Bill
of Rights.
(NATIONAL PRESS CLUB v COMELEC)
The issue was the validity of Sec. 11 RA 6646, prohibiting:
“b) … any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other
mass media, or any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give
free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other pollical purposes
except to the Commission as provided under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality who is a candidate for any effective public office shall take a leave
of absence from his work as such during the campaign period.”
In sustaining this provision, the SC, through Justice Feliciano, declared
inter alia:
“Sec 11(b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and access
to mass media of the candidates themselves. The limitation, however bears
a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional objective set out in
ART 9(c)(4) and ART 2(26) of the constitution. For it is precisely in the
unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time that the
resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial
difference. Here lies the core problem of equalization of the situations of the
candidates with deep pockets and the candidates with shallow or empty
pockets that ART 9(c)(4) of the constitution and Sec 11(b) seek to address.
That the statutory mechanism which Sec 11(b) brings into operation is
designed and may be expected to bring about or promote equal opportunity
and equal time and space, for political candidates to inform all and sundry
about themselves, cannot be gainsaid”
“Finally, the nature and characteristics of modern-mass media
especially electronic media, cannot be totally disregarded. Realistically, the
only limitation upon free speech of candidates imposed is on the right of
candidates to bombard the helpless electorate with paid advertisements
commonly repeated in the mass media ad nauseam. Frequently, such
repetitive political commercials when fed into the electronic media
themselves constitute invasions of the privacy of the general electorate. It
might be supposed that it is easy enough for a person at home simply to flick
off his radio or television set. But it is rarely simple. For the candidates with
deep pockets may purchase radio or television time in many. If not all, the
major stations or cannels. Or they may directly or indirectly own or control
the stations of channels themselves. The contemporary reality in the
Philippines is that. In a very real sense, listeners and viewers constitute a
“captive audience”
“The paid political advertisements interjected into the electronic
media and repeated with mind-deadening frequency, are commonly
intended and crafted, not so much to inform and educate as to condition and
manipulate, not so much to provoke rational and objective appraisal of
candidates qualifications or programs as to appeal to the non-intellective
faculties listening and viewing the public to be free from such intrusions and
their subliminal effects is at least as important as the right of candidates to
advertise themselves through modern electronic media and the right of
media enterprises to maximize their revenues from the marketing of
“packaged” candidates”
Dissenting with Justices Gutierrez and Paras, Justice Cruz observed:
I realize only too well that the ideas that may be conveyed by the
prohibited media advertisements will mostly be exaggerations or distortions
or plain poppycock and may intrude upon or patience. We may indeed be
opening a Pandora’s box. But these are unavoidable in the free society. As
part of the larger picture, these impositions are only minor irritations that,
placed in proper perspective, should not justify the withdrawal of the great
and inalienable liberty that is the bedrock of this Republic. It is best to
remember in this regard that freedom of expression exists not only for the
thought that agrees with us, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, but also for the
thought that we abhor.
I submit that all the channels of communication should be kept open
to insure the widest dissemination of information bearing on the forthcoming
elections. An uninformed electorate is not likely to be circumspect in the
choice of the officials who will represent them in the councils of government.
That they may exercise their suffrages wisely, it Is important that they be
apprised of the election issues. Including the credentials, if any, of the various
aspirants for public office. This is especially necessary now in view of the
dismaying number of mediocrities who, by an incredible aberration of ego,
are relying on their money, or their tinsel popularity, or their private armies,
to give them the plume of victory.
(ADIONG v COMELEC)
The SC held through Justice Gutierrez. The posting of decals and
stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicab and other moving vehicles needs
the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizens
becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda, not the financial
resources of the candidate. Whether the candidate is rich and therefore, can
afford to dole-out more decals and stickers or poor and without the means
to spread out the same number of decals and stickers is not as important as
the right of the owner to freely express his choice and exercise his right of
free speech. The owner can even prepare his own decals or stickers for
posting on his personal property. To strike down this right and enjoin it is
impermissible encroachment of his liberties.
The prohibition of posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places
whether public or private except in authorized areas designated by the
Comelec becomes censorship which cannot be justified but the constitution.
FREEDOM OF PUNISHMENT; BALANCE OF INTEREST TEST; CRISTICISM OF
OFFICIAL CONDUCT
(AYER PRODUCTION PTY LTD v JUDGE CAPULONG)
Juan Ponce Enrile sought to enjoin the production of a movie entitled
“Dour Days of Revolution” claiming that his inclusion in this film on the
“people power” revolution of February 1986 would violate his right to
privacy. Recalling that Enrile was one of the leaders of the historic event.
The SC rejected his claim and said:
“The right of privacy of a public figure is narrower than that of an
ordinary citizen. Enrile has not retired into seclusion of simple private
citizenship. He continues to be a public figure
The line of equilibrium between the constitutional freedom of speech
and of expression and the right of privacy may be marked out in terms of a
requirement that the proposed motion picture must be no reckless disregard
of truth in depicting the participation of Enrile in the EDSA Revolution. It must
not enter into matters of essentially private concern. To the extent that the
motion picture limits itself in portraying the participation of Enrile in the EDSA
Revolution to those events directly related to the public facts of the EDSA
Revolution, the intrusion onto Enrile’s privacy is not unreasonable and
actionable.”
Worthy if special note is the rule regarding the criticism of the administration
of justice. While courts have taken a lenient view toward attacks against
public officials in general, it would seem they are not similarly disposed when
it comes to public comment upon their own conduct.
(FREEDMAN v MARYLAND)
The administration of censorship system for moving pictures
presents peculiar dangers to constitutionally protected speech.
The statute in this case was ANNULLED only because of procedural defects in
the method of censorship, but the US SC stressed that in any event “that the
burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression must res on the
censor”
It is axiomatic that obscenity is not constitutionally protected
because it offends public decency and morals. The problem is how to define
the word, a task in which the US SC has encountered not a little difficulty.