Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
MILITARY
Maritime Strategy Into The Twenty-First Century
AUTHOR LCDR Alton A. Lovvorn, USN
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy
Executive Summary
Maritime Strategy into the Twenty-First Century
I. Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to review the
foundations of the current Maritime Strategy, discuss the
role of the Maritime Strategy in today's world, and the
continuing, positive role the Maritime Strategy can play in
the future.
II. Problem: With the internal chaos in the Soviet Union,
the signing of the START Accords, and the discussions
between the United States and the Soviet Union on the
reduction of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), there are
many within the United States that are calling for a
scrapping of our Maritime Strategy.
III. Data: The destruction of the Berlin Wall combined
with the reunification of Germany provides the United States
with the opportunity to reduce its military presence in
Europe. However, with the retrenchment of the Soviet Union
in eastern Europe, the potential for unrest in the newly
democratized countries has increased. The economic strength
of a resurgent Japan and the military muscle of an outward
looking China cause all nations within the Pacific Rim to
look toward a "balancer" of power in the region. The
emergence of India as a naval power in Southwest Asia adds
to the instability of the region and is perceived as a
threat by her neighbors. Since the strategy of the United
States is deterrence, and since the United States ranks
number one in the volume of exports to Europe, Asia and
Latin America, the United States must maintain the sea lines
of communication.
IV. Conclusion: The Soviet Union, though retrenching
militarily, still is the only nation to have the military
power to threaten the United States. Other countries of the
world rely on the United States to maintain a status quo in
their region. Since the United States is essentially an
island nation, a forward-deployed Navy is necessary to
maintain free the sea lines of communication and support our
allies overseas.
V. Recommendation: Refocusing of the Maritime Strategy is
necessary in order to reflect the growing regionalism of the
world and to sever the Eurocentric fixation of the United
States; however, the basic premise of the Maritime Strategy
is sound and will safely carry the United States through the
twenty-first century.
Maritime Strategy into the Twenty-First Century
Outline
Thesis: Public debate of our national goals and policies is
necessary for the maintenance of a strong, informed
republic; however, the current maritime strategy requires
not a scrapping so much as it does a review and refocusing.
I. Development of Naval Strategy
A. Birth of the nation
1. Jefferson and the gunboat Navy
2. Civil War
B. Alfred Thayer Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1991/LAA.htm Page 1 of 7
Maritime Strategy Into The Twenty-First Century 9/13/10 4:10 PM
C. Post-World War II
D. The 1983 "Maritime Strategy"
II. Focus of the current strategy
A. National strategy
B. Eurocentric/Soviet orientation
III. Political Realities
A. Maritime nature of the U.S.
B. Fiscal realities of defense
C. Soviet Union
1. START and CFE
2. Continued military capability
D. Pacific Rim
1. Japanese economic clout
2. Chinese military capability
3. U.S. as a regional "balancer"
E. Southwest Asia
1. Kuwait and Iraq
2. India
IV. Refocusing
A. Severing Eurocentric fixation
B. Necessity of broad, balanced regional strategy
MARITIME STRATEGY INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
by LCDR A. A. S. Lovvorn, USN
CG -12
Since 1988 the world has witnessed dramatic changes in
the world order. President Gorbachev has led the Soviet
Union from its diplomacy of "nyet" to a diplomacy described
by Gennady Gerasimov as the "Sinatra Doctrine" -- each
country going its own way. With each step the Soviet Union
has taken to integrate itself fully into the world order,
the United States has seen long-held assumptions crumble
into the pages of history books. General Colin L. Powell,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, referring to lost
"Army buddies," acknowledged these disappearing assumptions:
I've lost the Fulda Gap on the border in
Germany where I began my first Army assignment
. . .during the height of the Cold War. . .
The Berlin Wall is gone. . . . The Warsaw Pact
is about gone . . . The Brezhnev Doctrine is
gone.(13:12)
With each dying assumption, calls ring out from Congress,
the news media, and the public for a discarding of our
maritime and military strategies.
Public debate of our national goals and policies is
necessary for the maintenance of a strong, informed
republic; however, the current maritime strategy requires
not a scrapping so much as it does a review and refocusing.
There are enduring defense needs that must be met on a daily
basis to ensure the maintenance of our national goals. To
understand the validity of the maritime strategy, one must
have an understanding of the formation of America's maritime
thought since the founding of the country.
Since the birth of the United States, interest in the
Navy has waned more than waxed and maritime strategy has
received even less attention. Thomas Jefferson argued for a
strategy of gunboats to protect the coast, but his strategy
was proven erroneous with the War of 1812. America built a
Navy to defend and preserve her national honor; however,
there was no serious thought to defining a maritime strategy
for the nation. The Civil War saw a dramatic increase in
the size of the Navy; yet, after the successful
strangulation of the Confederacy's maritime trade, the Navy
was again forgotten. The end of the war resulted in the
slow rotting of the Navy's wooden hulls, and any thought of
a maritime strategy was discarded quickly as the nation
turned inward. Declining from the largest navy in the world
in 1865 to a navy of old, tired, and obsolescent ships in
the late 1880's, the U. S. Navy needed a champion.
Alfred Thayer Mahan in 1890 was the advocate. First to
offer a true strategy for the employment of the United
States Navy, he argued that a nation's greatness,
specifically using Great Britain as an example, was
predicated on the ability of the nation to project its power
across the seas via a strong navy. His argument reached
then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1991/LAA.htm Page 2 of 7
Maritime Strategy Into The Twenty-First Century 9/13/10 4:10 PM
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1991/LAA.htm Page 3 of 7
Maritime Strategy Into The Twenty-First Century 9/13/10 4:10 PM
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1991/LAA.htm Page 4 of 7
Maritime Strategy Into The Twenty-First Century 9/13/10 4:10 PM
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1991/LAA.htm Page 5 of 7
Maritime Strategy Into The Twenty-First Century 9/13/10 4:10 PM
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1991/LAA.htm Page 6 of 7
Maritime Strategy Into The Twenty-First Century 9/13/10 4:10 PM
Bibliography
1. Baker, Caleb. "The Japanese, Weary of Military Threat,
Cannot Ignore Potential Profits In China," Defense
News, November 26, 1990, p. 23.
2. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1990.
Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, 1990.
3. Finnegan, Philip. "Pentagon Cancels 13 Weapons,"
Defense News, February 4, 1991, p. 1.
4. Gordon, Bernard K. "The Asian-Pacific Rim: Success at
a Price," Foreign Affairs, 70 (America and the World
1990/91), 142 - 159.
5. Gregson, Wallace C., Colonel, USMC. "Keeping Up With
Navy Doctrine." Marine Corps Gazette, 74 (December
1990), 14 - 16.
6. Kamen, Al. "East Asia Alignments Altered With Ending of
the Cold War," The Washington Times, November 26,
1990, Section A., p. 1.
7. Kelso, Frank B., Admiral, USN, Chief of Naval
Operations, Address to Marine Corps Command and Staff
College. Quantico, Virginia, February 11, 1991.
8. Kiplinger, Austin. The Kiplinger Washington Letter,
October 12, 1990.
9. Leopold, George. "U.S. High-Tech Success in Gulf Fuels
Soviet Concerns," Defense News, March 11, 1991, p.
34.
10. Maull, Hanns W. "Germany and Japan," Foreign Affairs,
69 (Winter 1990/91), 91 - 106.
11. Mecham, Michael. "NATO Defense Ministers Drafting
Strategy Based on Smaller and More Mobile Forces."
Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 17,
1990, p. 70.
12. Pfaff, William. "Redefining World Power," Foreign
Affairs, 70 (America and the World 1990/91), 34 - 48.
13. Powell, Colin L., Chairman, General, USA, Joint Chiefs
of Staff. "Enduring Realities, Enduring Defense
Needs," Defense 90, (September/October), 11 - 18.
14. Remnick, David. "Soviet Hard-Liners Assail Foreign
Policy," The Washington Post, February 11, 1991
Section A., p. 11.
15. Sorensen, Theodore C. "Rethinking National Strategy,"
Foreign Affairs, 69 (Summer 1990), 1 - 18.
16. Steigman, David S. "Future cuts would reduce
capabilities shown in Gulf," Navy Times, March, 4,
1991, p. 22.
17. Tarnoff, Peter. "America's New Special Relationships,"
Foreign Affairs, 69 (Summer 1990), 67 - 80.
18. Watkins, James D., Admiral, USN, et al., The Maritime
Strategy. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute,
1986.
19. The White House. National Security Strategy of the
United States, March 1990.
20. Witt, Michael J. "U.K. Admiral Urges NATO To Examine
Sea Strategy," Defense News, February 4, 1991, p. 34.
Advertise with Us | About Us | GlobalSecurity.org In the News | Internships | Site Map | Privacy
Copyright © 2000-2010 GlobalSecurity.org All rights reserved.
Site maintained by: John Pike
Page last modified: 27-04-2005 14:02:13 Zulu
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1991/LAA.htm Page 7 of 7