VELEZ v. DE VERA.

496 SCRA 345. 2006

FACTS:
In AC No. 6697, Complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez sought the suspension or disbarment of
Respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera (1) for misrepresentation through his concealment of the
suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar of California; and (2) for violation of the
“rotation rule” enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491.

The first ground concerned an administrative case filed against Atty. de Vera before the State
Bar of California. The action arose from an insurance case he had handled involving Julius Wills
III, who had figured in an automobile accident in 1986. To settle the case amicably, Atty. de
Vera received -- on his client’s behalf -- a $12,000 check, which he then deposited in his
personal account. Because of his irregular deposit of his client's funds, respondent was
suspended from the practice of law for three years, upon the recommendation of the hearing
referee. The case was not decided on the merits, because Atty. de Vera resigned from the
California Bar. Later, his resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of California.

On the second ground, complainant averred that respondent’s transfer of membership from the
Pasay, Parañaque, Las Piñas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) IBP Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP
Chapter was a circumvention of the rotation rule. Allegedly, Atty. de Vera made the transfer for
the sole purpose of becoming IBP national president. Complainant stressed that respondent
neither resided in Agusan del Sur nor held office there.

A companion case, Bar Matter No. 1227, referred to the letter-request of respondent, asking the
Supreme Court to schedule his oath-taking as IBP national president. On the other hand, AM No.
05-5-15-SC referred to the letter-report of IBP National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz,
furnishing the Court with the May 13, 2005, IBP Resolution removing Atty. de Vera from the
latter’s positions as IBP board member and executive vice-president, for committing acts
inimical to the board and the IBP in general.

The controversy in these two consolidated cases started when the IBP board approved the
withdrawal of a Petition docketed at the Supreme Court as “Integrated Bar of the Philippines et
al v. Senate of the Philippines et al. - SC-R165108. Subsequently, during the plenary session
held at the 10th National IBP Convention, respondent allegedly made some untruthful
statements, innuendos, and blatant lies in connection with the IBP board's Resolution to
withdraw the Petition On May 12, 2005, IBP Governor Romulo A. Rivera wrote to IBP National
President Cadiz, praying for the removal of the IBP board membership of Atty. De Vera, who
had allegedly committed acts inimical to the board and the IBP in general. The following day On
May 12, 2005, IBP Governor Romulo A. Rivera wrote to IBP National President Cadiz, praying
for the removal of the IBP board membership of Atty. De Vera, who had allegedly committed
acts inimical to the board and the IBP in general.

On June 13, 2005, the IBP board took note of the vacancy in the EVP position, brought about by
the removal of Atty. de Vera. In his stead, IBP Governor Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was
formally elected and declared as EVP.
On June 20, 2005, Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished that position. Thus, on June 25, 2005,
during its last regular meeting, the IBP board elected a new EVP in the person of IBP Governor
Jose Vicente B. Salazar.

On June 28, 2005, IBP National President Cadiz requested the Supreme Court's approval of Atty.
Salazar's election and assumption of office as national president, in the event that Atty. de Vera
would be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law; or should his removal from his
positions as member of the 2003-2005 board of governors and as EVP of the IBP be approved by
the Court.

Protesting the election of both Atty. Santiago and Atty. Salazar, Atty. De Vera vehemently
insists that there is no proof that he misappropriated his client's funds as the elder Willis gave
him authority to use the same and that the latter even testified under oath that he "expected de
Vera might use the money for a few days." He also questions his removal from the IBP Board on
the ground that he was denied "very basic rights of due process recognized by the Honorable
Court even in administrative cases" like the right to answer formally or in writing and within
reasonable time, the right to present witnesses in his behalf, the right to a fair hearing. He protest
the fact that he was not able to cross-examine the complainant, IBP Governor Rivera, and the
latter voted as well for his expulsion which made him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same
time.

The IBP Board counters that since its members were present during the plenary session, and
personally witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera's actuations, an evidentiary or formal hearing was
no longer necessary.

ISSUES:
1. WHETHER THE JUDGMENT IN AC NO. 6052 CONSTITUTED A BAR TO THE
FILING OF AC 6697

2. WHETHER, IN THE COURSE OF HIS PRACTICE OF LAW, RESPONDENT ATTY.

DE VERA COMMITTED MALPRACTICE AMOUNTING TO MORAL TURPITUDE
IN THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA AND IN THE PHILIPPINES

HELD:

1. The Court unanimously held in a per curiam Decision that AC No. 6052 did not constitute a
bar to the filing of AC No. 6697. The two administrative cases involved different subject matters
and causes of action. In AC No. 6052, the subject matter was the qualification of Atty. de Vera to
run for the position of IBP governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present Administrative
Complaint, the subject matter was his privilege to practice law. The two aforementioned cases
did not seek the same relief. In the first case, the complainants sought to prevent respondent from
assuming his post as IBP governor for Eastern Mindanao; the cause of action referred to his
alleged violation of IBP bylaws. In the second case, what was principally sought was his
suspension or disbarment; the primary cause of action was his alleged violation of the Lawyer's
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
2. In resolving the second issue, the Court cited Maquera, according to which a judgment of
suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction may transmute into a similar
judgment of suspension in the Philippines, only if the basis of the foreign court’s action included
any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in our jurisdiction.

The Court opined that by insisting that he was authorized by his client’s father and attorney-in-
fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera was impliedly admitting his use of the Willis funds for his
own personal use. Undoubtedly, his unauthorized use of his client’s funds was highly unethical.
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic about this matter. The conduct
of Atty. de Vera -- holding on to the money of his client without the latter’s acquiescence -- was
indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It was clear that by depositing the $12,000 check in
his own bank account and using it for his own benefit, respondent was guilty of malpractice,
gross misconduct, and unethical behavior. He violated his oath to conduct himself with all good
fidelity to his client. Nevertheless, the Court decreed that, where any lesser penalty could
accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed. Considering the amount involved
in this case, the Court considered the penalty of suspension for two years appropriate.

On the other hand, The Court found that the transfer by Atty. de Vera of his membership to the
Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter was within his rights. He could not be deemed to be guilty of
unethical conduct or behavior. Neither the Code of Professional Responsibility nor the Lawyer’s
Oath punished lawyers for aspiring to be the IBP national president or prohibited them from
doing perfectly legal acts in accomplishing that goal.

BAUTISTA VS. GONZALES

FACTS:

A complaint for disbarment was filed by Angel Bautista against Ramon Gonzales for
malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer’s oath. The complaint indicated the
following acts:
1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients to pay all expenses, including court fees,
for a contingent fee of fifty percent of the value of the property in litigation.
2. Acting as counsel for conflicting parties
3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of one of his clients while the case was still
pending;
4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with him for the
development into a residential subdivision of a land involved in a previous case
5. Submitting falsified documents to the court
6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant who was his client;
7. Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints without legal basis before the court
8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office by making false
assertion of facts in his pleadings;
9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared so that while he does not intentionally tell a lie, he does not
tell the truth either."
Gonzales denied the accusations against him. Based on the investigations conducted, the
Solicitor General recommended that Gonzales be suspended for 6 months.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT GONZALES IS LIABLE.

HELD: YES.
1. Lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation as
provided by Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer to take an
oath to “obey the laws of the Republic of the Philippines as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein. For any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred by the Supreme Court. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer
as the vanguard of our legal system. The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is
a repulsive and reprehensible act which the Court will not countenance.

2. Gonzales violated this rule by purchasing the property of his client, as the same is
prohibited under Art. 1491 of the Civil Code. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by
purchase the property and rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with such
property and rights, as well as with the client. Lawyers should never seek to mislead the court
by false statement of fact or law

3. Gonzales presented documents making it appear that two people signed the original
documents he submitted to the court. He in fact admitted that these people merely agreed to
by phone to sign, but had not actually signed the alleged true copy of the document. Such
conduct constitutes willful disregard of his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a
manner consistent with the truth.

A.M. No. 09-6-1-SC, January 21, 2015

RE: VIOLATION OF RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE

FACTS - Re: Complaint against Atty. Siapno

Atty. Siapno was alleged to be maintaining a notarial office along Alvear St. East, Lingayen
Pangasinan and was performing notarial acts and practices in Lingayen, Natividad and
Dagupan City without the requisite notarial commission. Atty. Siapno applied and was
commissioned to perform notarial functions by Executive Judge Anthony Sison of the RTC, San
Carlos City, Pangasinan from March 22, 2007 to December 31, 2008. His notarial commission
was never renewed upon expiration.

Complainants presented evidence supporting their allegations such as the pictures of Atty.
Siapno’s law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan; and documents to prove that Atty. Siapno
performed acts of notarization in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City, to wit: (1) Addendum
to Loan and Mortgage Agreement showing that the Promissory Note was notarized before Atty.
Siapno in Lingayen, Pangasinan in 2007; (2) Deed of Absolute Sale, dated January 24, 2008,
notarized in Natividad, Pangasinan; (3) Joint Affidavit of Two Disinterested Persons Re: Given
Name and Date of Birth, dated January 6, 2009, notarized in Dagupan City; and (4)
Acknowledgement of Debt, dated January 24, 2008, notarized in Dagupan City.

The Executive Judge found that Atty. Siapno was issued a notarial commission within the
jurisdiction of Lingayen, Pangasinan, from January 20, 2003 to December 31, 2004 and February
8, 2005 to December 3, 2006. His commission, however, was cancelled on June 8, 2006 and he
was not issued another commission thereafter. The Executive Judge found Atty. Siapno to
have violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Commission when he performed notarial
functions without commission and recommended that he be fined in the amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). The Supreme Court however, was not satisfied with the
recommended penalty.

FACTS - Re: Atty. Pedro Santos

The second letter-complaint was filed by Audy B. Espelita (Espelita) against Atty. Pedro L.
Santos (Atty. Santos). It alleged that in 2008, Espelita lost his driver’s license and he executed an
affidavit of loss which was notarized by Atty. Santos. The said affidavit, however, was denied
for authentication when presented before the Notarial Section in Manila because Atty. Santos
was not commissioned to perform notarial commission within the City of Manila.

FACTS - Re: Atty “Evelyn”.

The third letter-complaint came from a concerned citizen reporting that a certain Atty. Evelyn
who was holding office at Room 402 Leyba Bldg., 381 Dasmariñas Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila,
had been notarizing and signing documents for and on behalf of several lawyers.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE LAYWERS VIOLATED THE RULES ON

NOTARIAL PRACTICE.

HELD: Yes.

Decision of the Supreme Court Re: Atty. Siapno.

Atty. Siapno is guilty of violating Section 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice;
Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in
any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2)
years commencing the first day of January of the year in which the commissioning is made,
unless earlier revoked or the notary public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of
Court.

Under the rule, only persons who are commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court which granted the commission. Clearly, Atty.
Siapno could not perform notarial functions in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City of the
Province of Pangasinan since he was not commissioned in the said places to perform such act.

The Supreme Court stated the importance of notarization done by lawyers. The Court said;
Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless and
routine act. It is invested with substantive public interest that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public.12 It must be emphasized that the act of notarization by a
notary public converts a private document into a public document making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe
with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.

Atty. Siapno also violated Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of professional Responsibility which
proscribes all lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and
directs them to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, at all times.

Court’s Decision Re:Atty Santos and Atty. Evelyn.

The Judge handling the case of Atty. Santos and Atty. Evelyn was no longer the Executive Judge
of RTC-Manila at the time the orders of the Court were handed down to him. To date, no formal
investigation has been conducted on the alleged violation of Atty. Santos and the reported illegal
activities of a certain Atty. Evelyn. Therefore, the Court stated that the incumbent Executive
Judge of the RTC-Manila, whether permanent or in acting capacity, is ordered to conduct a
formal investigation on the matter and to submit his Report and Recommendation within sixty
(60) days from receipt of copy of this decision.

The Court ended with the following decision;

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for two (2) years and BARRED PERMANENTLY from being commissioned as Notary
Public, effective upon his receipt of a copy of this decision.

With respect to the complaints against Atty. Pedro L. Santos and a certain Atty. Evelyn, the
Clerk of Court is ordered to RE-DOCKET them as separate administrative cases. The Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, is ordered to conduct a formal investigation on the
matter and to submit his Report and Recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of a
copy of this decision.

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG)

vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:
On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and
ordered its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held from March 26 to 28,
1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Subsequently, former Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance for the
assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK's liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of
Republic Act No. 265.

One of the first acts of President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former
President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on
July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution,
accounting and damages” against respondents Lucio Tan, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Imelda R. Marcos and others referred to as dummies of the Marcoses. In connection
therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the
above-named persons by means of taking advantage of their close relationship and influence
with former President Marcos.

Shortly thereafter, respondents Tan, et al. filed with this Court petitions for certiorari, prohibition
and injunction seeking to, among others, nullify the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG.
After the filing of the comments thereon, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan
(Fifth Division) for proper disposition. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were
represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then
resumed his private practice of law.

On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for
respondent Tan, et al. The PCGG opined that Atty. The motions alleged that respondent
Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al.
when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Bank's officials on the
procedure to bring about GENBANK's liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank
in connection with its petition which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify
invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility proscribing former government
lawyers from accepting “engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in said service.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents
Tan, et al. violated the interdiction embodied in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD: The petition is denied.

The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of “matter” referred to in
the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the “intervention” made by the former government
lawyer on the “matter.” The American Bar

Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined “matter” as any discrete, isolatable act as well as
identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and not
merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations
or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.

Beyond doubt, the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in
the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation
and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.” We hold that this advice
given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter”
contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No.
342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the “drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or
agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law” are acts which do
not fall within the scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify.

It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to
respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No.
107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does an
act which can be considered as innocuous such as “x x x drafting, enforcing or interpreting
governmentor agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.”

The petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading; hence, it has to be signed by
respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to the
actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Similarly, the Court
in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be
caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes
the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the
client has confidence The client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the
benefit of the work done by the latter

The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on
the official independence of lawyers in the government service. The case at bar involves the
position of Solicitor General, the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be
overly stressed that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree of
independence. It is this independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of
the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend officials who
violate the trust of their office.
Any undue diminution of the independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect
on the rule of law.

Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest
prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive
period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza.
Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was
the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 was not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and
(2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length
cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable.

AREOLA vs. ATTY. MENDOZA

A.C. No. 10135 January 15, 2014

FACTS:

This refers to the administrative complaint filed by Edgardo D. Areola (Areola) a.k.a.
Muhammad Khadafy against Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), from the Public
Attorney s Office (PAO) for violation of her attorney s oath of office, deceit, malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, and for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In the letter-complaint addressed to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), Areola stated that he was filing the complaint in behalf of his co-detainees.
He alleged that, during Prisoners Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited the Jail and called all detainees
with pending cases before the RTC, where she was assigned, to attend her speech/lecture. Areola
claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the following during her speech:
"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay maging praktikal sana
kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang ang pera
ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay
kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong mga detenidong mga babae na no bail ang kaso sa
drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon."3
Areola furthermore stated that when he helped his co-inmates in drafting their pleadings and
filing motions before the RTC, Atty. Mendoza undermined his capability. Atty. Mendoza
asseverated that the filing of the administrative complaint against her is a harassment tactic by
Areola.

The Investigating Commissioner stated that the Complainant is knowledgeable in the field of
law. While he may be of service to his fellow detainees, he must, however, be subservient to the
skills and knowledge of a full fledged lawyer. He however found no convincing evidence to
prove that Atty. Mendoza received money from Areola’s co-detainees as alleged.
Nonetheless, Atty. Mendoza admitted in her Answer that she advised her clients and their
relatives to approach the judge and the fiscal "to beg and cry" so that their motions would be
granted and their cases against them would be dismissed. To the Investigating Commissioner,
this is highly unethical and improper as the act of Atty. Mendoza degrades the image of and
lessens the confidence of the public in the judiciary. The Investigating Commissioner
recommended that Atty. Mendoza be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
months.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ATTY. MENDOZA IS LIABLE FOR GIVING IMPROPER

ADVICE TO HER CLIENTS IN VIOLATION OF RULE 1.02 AND RULE 15.07 OF THE
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.

HELD: Yes.

The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza made irresponsible
advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that "a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Rule 15.07 states
that "a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of
fairness."

Atty. Mendoza’s improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in our legal system.
Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors
according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendoza’s careless remark is uncalled for.
It must be remembered that a lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice. To that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must
always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and
honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client’s cause,
is condemnable and unethical.

In spite of the foregoing, the Court deems the penalty of suspension for two (2) months as
excessive and not commensurate to Atty. Mendoza’s infraction. Disbarment and suspension of a
lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great
caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. The Court notes
that when Atty. Mendoza made the remark "Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain
na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon", she was not compelled by bad faith or malice. While her
remark was inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment is not disparaging and reproachful so as
to cause dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary.