Case 26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/mar2007/gr_162053_2007.

html

G.R. No. 162053 March 7, 2007 517 SCRA 677

ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEE'S ASSOCIATION-AFW (SLMCEA-AFW) AND MARIBEL S.
SANTOS, Petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) AND ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER,
INC.,Respondents.

 FACTS:

Petitioner Maribel S. Santos was hired as X-Ray Technician in the Radiology department of
private respondent St. Luke’s Medical Center, Inc. On April 22, 1992, Congress passed and enacted
Republic Act No. 7431 known as the “Radiologic Technology Act of 1992.” Said law requires that no
person shall practice or offer to practice as a radiology and/or x-ray technologist in the Philippines
without having obtained the proper certificate of registration from the Board of Radiologic Technology.
St. Luke’s issued a final notice to all practitioners of Radiologic Technology to comply with the
requirement of Republic Act No. 7431 by December 31, 1995; otherwise, the unlicensed employee will
be transferred to an area which does not require a license to practice if a slot is available. Petitioner was
issued three memorandum on different dates requiring her to comply with Republic Act. No. 7431 by
taking and passing the forthcoming examination scheduled in June 1997; otherwise, private respondent
SLMC may be compelled to retire her from employment should there be no other position available
where she may be absorbed. Due to the failure of Santos to comply with such requirement, St. Luke’s
issued a notice to petitioner informing the latter that the management of private respondent SLMC has
approved her retirement in lieu of separation pay. The Personnel Manager of St. Luke also issued a
“Notice of Separation from the Company” to petitioner Santos in view of the latter’s refusal to accept St.
Luke’s offer for early retirement. The notice also states that while said private respondent exerted its
efforts to transfer petitioner Maribel S. Santos to other position/s, her qualifications do not fit with any
of the present vacant positions in the hospital. Petitioner Santos filed a complaint against private
respondent SLMC for illegal dismissal. Private respondent St. Luke’s Medical Center, Inc. argues that
petitioner was legally and validly terminated in accordance with Republic Act Nos. 4226 and 7431; that
its decision to terminate petitioner Santos was made in good faith and was not the result of unfair
discrimination; and that petitioner Santos’ non-transfer to another position in the SLMC was a valid
exercise of management prerogative. On September 5, 2000, the Labor Arbiter came out with a Decision
ordering private respondent SLMC to pay petitioner Maribel S. Santos the amount of One Hundred
Fifteen Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱115,500.00) representing her separation pay. All other claims of
petitioner were dismissed for lack of merit. Dissatisfied, petitioner Maribel S. Santos perfected an appeal
with the public respondent NLRC. On August 23, 2002, public respondent NLRC promulgated its Decision
affirming the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. It likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioners in its Resolution promulgated on December 27, 2002. Petitioner thereafter filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA which, as previously mentioned, affirmed the decision of the NLRC.
  ISSUE/S:

Whether or not petitioner Santos was illegally dismissed.

 APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE LABOR CODE/ SPECIAL LAWS:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7431 - AN ACT REGULATING THE PRACTICE OF RADIOLOGIC TECHNOLOGY IN
THE PHILIPPINES, CREATING THE BOARD OF RADIOLOGIC TECHNOLOGY DEFINING ITS POWERS
AND FUNCTIONS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. - It is the policy of the State to upgrade the practice of radiologic
technology in the Philippines for the purpose of protecting the public from the hazards posed by
radiation as well as to ensure safe and proper diagnosis, treatment and research through the
application of machines and/or equipment using radiation.

Sec. 15. Requirement for the Practice of Radiologic Technology and X-ray Technology. - Unless
exempt from the examinations under Sections 16 and 17 hereof, no person shall practice or offer to
practice as a radiologic and/or x-ray technologist in the Philippines without having obtained the
proper certificate of registration from the Board.

 RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

The SC held that petitioner was validly dismissed.

It is significant to note that petitioners expressly concede that the sole cause for petitioner
Santos’ separation from work is her failure to pass the board licensure exam for X-ray technicians, a
precondition for obtaining the certificate of registration from the Board. It is argued, though, that
petitioner Santos’ failure to comply with the certification requirement did not constitute just cause for
termination as it violated her constitutional right to security of tenure.

While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise
may be reasonably regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals,
peace, education, order, safety, and the general welfare of the people. Consequently, persons who
desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required
to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. The most concrete
example of this would be in the field of medicine, the practice of which in all its branches has been
closely regulated by the State. It has long been recognized that the regulation of this field is a reasonable
method of protecting the health and safety of the public to protect the public from the potentially
deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice medicine. The same
rationale applies in the regulation of the practice of radiologic and x-ray technology.

The enactment of R.A. (Nos.) 7431 and 4226 are recognized as an exercise of the State’s
inherent police power. It should be noted that the police power embraces the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, educations, good order, safety or general welfare of the
people. The state is justified in prescribing the specific requirements for x-ray technicians and/or any
other professions connected with the health and safety of its citizens. Respondent-appellee being
engaged in the hospital and health care business is a proper subject of the cited law; thus, having in
mind the legal requirements of these laws, the latter cannot close its eyes and let complainant-
appellant’s private interest override public interest.

No malice or ill-will can be imputed upon private respondent as the separation of petitioner
Santos was undertaken by it conformably to an existing statute. It is undeniable that her continued
employment without the required Board certification exposed the hospital to possible sanctions and
even to a revocation of its license to operate. Certainly, private respondent could not be expected to
retain petitioner Santos despite the inimical threat posed by the latter to its business. This
notwithstanding, the records bear out the fact that petitioner Santos was given ample opportunity to
qualify for the position and was sufficiently warned that her failure to do so would result in her
separation from work in the event there were no other vacant positions to which she could be
transferred. Despite these warnings, petitioner Santos was still unable to comply and pass the required
exam. To reiterate, the requirement for Board certification was set by statute. Justice, fairness and due
process demand that an employer should not be penalized for situations where it had no participation
or control.

While our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the
protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers.
The law also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement
in the interest of fair play. Labor laws, to be sure, do not authorize interference with the employer's
judgment in the conduct of the latter’s business. Private respondent is free to determine, using its own
discretion and business judgment, all elements of employment, "from hiring to firing" except in cases of
unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided by law. None of these exceptions is present in
the instant case.

Petition is denied.
Case 22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_146762_2007.html

G.R. No. 146762 January 30, 2007 513 SCRA 325

CULVER B. SUICO, TERESA D. CENIZA and RONALD R. DACUT, Petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY
(PLDT)/ AUGUSTO G. COTELO, Respondents.
x-------------------x
G.R. No. 153584 January 30, 2007
BENIGNO MARIANO, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY
(PLDT), Respondents.
x-------------------x
G.R. No. 163793 January 30, 2007
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY (PLDT), Petitioner,
vs.
ERNESTO BORJE, Respondent.

 FACTS:

Petitioners Culver B. Suico, Teresa D. Ceniza, Ronald R. Dacut were regular employees of
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) Cebu Jones Exchange and members of
Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon ng Pilipinas (MKP). On September 1997, MKP launched a strike against
PLDT. Complainants participated in the strike by picketing the PLDT. PLDT sent twin-notice to Suico et.al,
to explain the acts of violation that happened during the strike when a PLDT managerial employee,
sustained injuries when strikers blocked her way to the premises of PLDT. But the complainants failed to
provide the required written explanation. Complainants merely restated their request for formal
hearing. Yet, PLDT sent them termination notices dated November 19, 1997. Complainants filed a
Complaint for illegal dismissal and damages with the Labor Arbiter (LA). In a Decision dated July 15,
1998, the LA declared the dismissal of complainants illegal and ordered their reinstatement.
Complainants filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the NLRC denied in its Resolution dated March
27, 2000.1 Thereafter, complainants filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) but the
latter dismissed it in a Decision dated September 22, 2000

 ISSUE/S:

Whether PLDT violated the requirements of due process under the Labor Code when it dismissed said
employees without heeding their request for the conduct of a formal hearing as provided for under
PLDT Systems Practice No. 94-016 and prior to submission of their respective answers to the charges
against them.
  APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE LABOR CODE/ SPECIAL LAWS:

The minimum standards of due process in all cases of termination of employment are prescribed under
Article 277(b) of the Labor Code, to wit:

Art. 277. Miscellaneous Provisions.

xxxx

(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected
against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of
notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is
sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the cause for termination and shall
afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative, if he so desires, in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated
pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment. (Emphasis supplied).

It is implemented by Rule XXIII of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code,53 which
provides:

Section 2. Standards of due process; requirements of notice.-

I. For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Code:

(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and
giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side;

(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if the
employee so desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the
evidence presented against him; and

(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all
the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination xxx.

 RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

According to this honorable Court, the procedure adopted by PLDT in dismissing Suico, et al. fell
short of the requirements of due process. The requirements of due process by which to test the
validity of the procedure adopted by PLDT in dismissing Suico, et al. are those embodied in Art. 277
(b) of the Labor Code, Rule XXII of the Implementing Rules of Book V and Systems Practice No. 94-
016.

PLDT complied with the two-notice requirement of due process. The first notices sent to Suico, et al.
set out in detail the nature and circumstances of the violations imputed to them, required them to
explain their side and expressly warned them of the possibility of their dismissal should their
explanation be found wanting. The last notices informed Suico, et al. of the decision to terminate
their employment and cited the evidence upon which the decision was based. These two notices
would have sufficed had it not been for the existence of Systems Practice No. 94-016. Under
Systems Practice No. 94-016, PLDT granted its employee the alternative of either filing a written
answer to the charges or requesting for opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the
assistance of his counsel or union representative, if he so desires.

Suico, et al. exercised their option under Systems Practice No. 94-016 by requesting that a formal
hearing be conducted and that they be given copies of sworn statements and other pertinent
documents to enable them to prepare for the hearing. This option is part of their right to due
process. PLDT is bound to comply with the Systems Practice.

Company policies or practices are binding on the parties. Some can ripen into an obligation on the
part of the employer, such as those which confer benefits on employees or regulate the procedures
and requirements for their termination

Art. 277 (b) in relation to Art. 264 (a) and (e) recognizes the right to due process of all workers,
without distinction as to the cause of their termination. Where no distinction is given, none is
construed. Hence, the foregoing standards of due process apply to the termination of employment
of Suico, et al. even if the cause therefor was their supposed involvement in strike-related violence
prohibited under Art. 264 (a) and (e).

Moreover, the procedure for termination prescribed under Art. 277(b) and Rule XXII of the
Implementing Rules of Book V is supplemented by existing company policy. Art. 277(b) provides that
the procedure for termination prescribed therein is without prejudice to the adoption by the
employer of company policy on the matter, provided this conforms with the guidelines set by the
DOLE such as Rule XXII of the Implementing Rules of Book V. This is consistent with the established
principle that employers are allowed, under the broad concept of management prerogative, to
adopt company policies that regulate all aspects of personnel administration including the dismissal
and recall of workers.
CASE 17 - CABALEN

 RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

According to the Supreme Court, the respondents were illegally dismissed because petitioners
failed to follow the principles of due process and its failure to sufficiently state and prove the alleged
wrongdoings of the respondents. The employer has the burden of proving a valid dismissal of an
employee,1for which two requisites must concur: (a) the dismissal must be for any of the causes
expressed in the Labor Code; and (b) the employee must be accorded due process, basic of which is the
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself which petitioner company did not followed.
Also, this honorable court pointed out The Section 2 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code provision means that the written notice to the employees who stand to
lose their employment must specify the particular acts or omissions constituting the grounds for their
dismissal. The rule ensures that the employees are able to answer the charges and to defend
themselves from imputed wrongdoings before their dismissals are ordered. Precisely because of
petitioners’ failure to sufficiently state the acts or omissions constituting the alleged transgressions that
respondent Obien asked to be clarified of the charges against her. Because of the vagueness of the
charges, it followed that respondents could only issue a general denial. The Corrective Action Report
(CARE) furnished each of the respondents in accordance with the company’s Code of Conduct was not
any better. It did not contain the date/s when the alleged infractions were committed, the person/s
who reported the same for investigation, or the signatures of the employees’ immediate supervisors.

Petitioners did not even take notice of their own procedures on disciplinary actions. The only
facts present in the records are that respondents were issued above-said CARE Forms asking them to
explain their alleged infractions within 48 hours; and they subsequently received notices of dismissal
after they submitted their written explanations. however, there is nothing to show that before their
dismissal, respondents were informed of their immediate supervisors’ decision to terminate their
services, or that they were thereafter invited to an administrative investigation before the HRD manager
or officer who is tasked to conduct the investigation in the presence of the employees’ immediate
supervisor/s and the witnesses, if necessary, as provided under Section IV of the company’s Code of
Conduct. No record of any administrative investigation proceeding has also been presented, which
under the company’s rules. Therefore, only petitioners’ allegation that the statements of the witnesses
were taken as part of the administrative investigation is before this Court. Yet, their allegations remain
as allegations as they did not present any evidence to support it. On the dismissal of Quiambao allegedly
on the ground of business losses, it was obligatory upon petitioners to prove it by substantial evidence,
yet also failed to do so. In fact, Quiambao presented documents to disprove the validity of his
retrenchment on that ground. For petitioners’ failure to discharge its burden then, this Court is
constrained to hold that respondent Quiambao’s dismissal was not valid. The disadvantaged employees
should be protected against any arbitrary deprivation of their jobs.
Case 12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/mar2007/gr_169570_2007.html

G.R. No. 169570 March 2, 2007 517 SCRA 309

RICARDO PORTUGUEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
GSIS FAMILY BANK (Comsavings Bank) and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

 FACTS:

 ISSUE/S:

 APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE LABOR CODE/ SPECIAL LAWS:

 RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

Case 3

G.R. No. 127598 January 27, 1999 326 SCRA 172

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR LEONARDO QUISUMBING AND MERALCO EMPLOYEES AND
WORKERS ASSOCIATION (MEWA), respondents.

 FACTS:

 ISSUE/S:

 APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE LABOR CODE/ SPECIAL LAWS:

 RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

Case 4

[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.] 70 PHL 726

MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.
https://www.scribd.com/doc/52362578/Calalang-vs-Williams-Digested-Case

 FACTS:

 ISSUE/S:

 APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE LABOR CODE/ SPECIAL LAWS:

 RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

Case 5

G.R. Nos. L-30632-33 April 11, 1972 44 SCRA 350

CALTEX FILIPINO MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., W.E. MENEFEE and B.F.
EDWARDS, respondents.

 FACTS:

 ISSUE/S:

 APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE LABOR CODE/ SPECIAL LAWS:

 RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT: