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by
Benjamin T. Sirolly
Approved by:
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Adviser: Professor James (Political Science)
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Reader: Professor Magee (Economics)
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Honors Council Representative: Professor Groff (Philosophy)
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Table of Contents
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................V
ENDNOTES............................................................................................... 102
Table of Figures
Abstract
oriented at consensus. For the theory to have applicability in a modern context, it must
somehow accommodate John Rawls has called the “fact of pluralism.” 1 If consensus is
not a feasible goal, the question arises whether the aims of voting and deliberation are
reconcilable. I argue that because deliberative democracy requires only that citizens have
force to deliberation. Furthermore, I argue that voting and deliberation are mutually
supportive and necessary in the pursuit of the deliberative ideal. This is due to the fact
that together voting and deliberation allow for the actualization and harmonization of the
two components of the deliberative citizen, the public and private. Voting and
Chapter 1: Introduction
contemporary answer to this age old question is, 'a democratic one.' One might charge
that a government is legitimate when its mantra is “of the people, by the people, for the
people.” 1 But unfortunately, the answer to the question of what makes a good
government is far from simple. When thinking about the ideal form of government the
non-ideal real world must be considered. The institutions of government as well as the
The philosophical groundings of the government must be deeply connected with real
world institutions and practices. All the while, the government must remain loyal to its
citizens and to the mantra “of the people, by the people, for the people.”
The most promising contemporary solution for what a good government would
look like is called deliberative democracy. Deliberative democracy, a term only first
used in the 1980s 2 , is in its simplest form exactly what it sounds like, a political system
where deliberation is the foundation and the most central piece of the democracy.
this democracy would look like, but a few key features tie each of the theorists together.
First and foremost, deliberation is the most important and essential type of participation
for a citizen of the democracy. At its most basic, the deliberation is a discussion by equal
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common decision, and in doing so, deliberation creates in them a sense of agency and self
governance and forces those individuals to justify their beliefs to others. This process of
individuals entering the political realm both legitimizes the government through popular
support and at the same time creates a sense of shared value and life between citizens.
decisions will be made. Jon Elster's early account of an ideal deliberative democracy
claimed that, “there would not be any need for an aggregating mechanism, since a
rational discussion would tend to produce unanimous preferences.” 3 His reference to “an
votes to determine a majority choice. Elster's claim is almost certainly too strong for any
large scale, modern, plural democracy. When millions of individuals from heterogeneous
backgrounds are asked to a make a collective decision, there is likely to be nothing that
the group can decide on of practical importance to a political system. Even if consensus
could be found at some time in the infinite future, political questions are generally time
dependent and a unanimity requirement could prevent any timely reactions. So then if
unanimity cannot be expected because of the constraints of time and scale in a large,
modern, plural democracy, then there must be some other way of making the important
theorists for this task is decision through a majority wins vote. Their perspective is that,
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if unanimity cannot be reached and a decision must be made, then a vote is needed as a
two questions arise. First, can the aggregation of votes accurately describe and depict the
Whether voting can accurately aggregate votes to determine the majority will has
long been the topic of study for a field of political science called Social Choice Theory.
These theorists have proven that there is no sure-fire way to add up votes that will always
be fair and logical. Some problems inherent to the aggregation of votes are that any
system of voting is open to manipulation by its voters, that the addition of votes can lead
to illogical and thus meaningless outcomes (for example, candidate A beats candidate B
who beats candidate C, but candidate C can also beat candidate A, or A>B>C>A), and
that the winner of a vote can sometimes be determined solely on the choice of the method
of adding up votes.
Even if voting can mathematically represent, and thus be in part reconciled with
deliberation, the further question arises whether voting is fundamentally in conflict with
aspires to hold people accountable for their statements and beliefs through continuous
public discussion whereas voting is a private act which requires no debate and within
which the voters are accountable only to themselves. Even the way that we think of the
as a strategic process where the more powerful political factions jockey and fight for
those few independent or 'swing' voters in order to garner the desired level of support,
generally 51 percent. The two processes of deliberation and voting seem to push the
political spectrum in two entirely different directions, one towards cooperation, and the
other toward strategy. It is no wonder then that deliberative democracy theorists shy
My question is this: Can deliberation and voting exist together without harming one
another, and if they can, is aggregation able to represent the outcomes of a deliberation
properly?
What I will show in this thesis is that deliberation and voting are reconcilable in
their processes and aims, normatively and socio-psychologically. Not only are these two
processes able to exist together, I show that their co-existence is symbiotic. Where
deliberation has faults, voting is able to compensate and where aggregation has been
This result is important for both fields of Social Choice Theory and Deliberative
Democracy. For the Social Choice Theorists, my results give reason to the mathematical
findings. I show that the problems of aggregation do not occur when the act of voting
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represents an actual social choice. For the Deliberative Democrats, my work refocuses
deliberative democracy and challenges them to think of voting of an essential part (rather
than a method of last resort) of the deliberative process. I believe that, if further
developed, this shift will be fruitful for the field of deliberative democracy by clarifying
many of the current institutional problems as well as offering new and powerful avenues
present, the work is an exposition of the interplay of deliberation and voting, one that I
laid much of the groundwork for the theory of deliberative democracy in his 1995 work
Between Facts and Norms. Beginning with deliberative democracy's historical and
philosophical place in political theory, I will then move on to focus on the processes of
deliberation and the institutional aspects of a deliberative democracy that most directly
pertain to the voting. I will then present a few divergent viewpoints on the substance and
The third chapter will focus on the problems associated with aggregating votes.
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This chapter will be built largely around two thinkers, Kenneth Arrow and William H.
Riker. Arrow determines that any logically arranged system of voting can output an
illogical result and Riker then shows that any fair system of voting, being vulnerable to
agenda setter. The third chapter will build these two results up so that the reader
unfamiliar to social choice theory can fully understand the power and extent of their
findings.
The fourth chapter analyzes social choice theory in both its real world significance
as well as its interaction with deliberation and deliberative democracy. The discussion on
the real world significance of voting largely comes from Gerry Mackie's work
Democracy Defended. His work is a long warranted study of the prevalence of the
problems of social choice in real democracies. I then take the results of his work and,
with the guidance of a few deliberative democrats, show how deliberation can account for
many of Mackie's results and then argue that greater movement towards a deliberative
democracy would further reduce the problems presented by social choice theorists.
deliberation and voting, I argue that these findings show a need for both deliberation and
voting in concert. This analysis hinges on the idea that in our decision making processes,
we need both public and private experiences and interactions to fully experience the
deliberative effects. I will argue that voting is a much needed moment of private
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sincerity within the larger context of the public deliberation. I continue this argument
through to the normative end of deliberation and voting, arguing that a private vote is
necessary for an effective public deliberation. Through this analysis, I will show that
deliberative democrats' expressed desires for deliberation are actually better met when
2.1 Introduction
contrast to classic theories of direct and representative democracy that emphasize the
contends that the nature of the discussions of proposal and institutionalization of law
ground that law's legitimacy. In other words, when a deliberation can ideally find
I will begin this chapter with an exposition of the basic structure of deliberative
Habermas. His work has in large part defined and shaped the current deliberative
democracy theory. Even those thinkers who have presented independent conceptions of
democracy will begin with his ideas on communicative action, move to communicative
action’s place in a discourse theory of law and democracy in terms of legitimacy, and
Then the focus will shift to a few competing conceptions of what a deliberative
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democracy might look like. These thinkers both add substance and some depth to
Prior to Habermas, there were generally two paradigms of explanation for social
action, one for economists, the other sociologists. Economic theorists generally used
strategic behavior or instrumental rationality to describe social action, which accounts for
action in a fairly Hobbesian sense 4 in that each individual’s actions can be entirely
instrumental rationality essentially removes all meaning from laws and social norms
because individuals would only follow those norms and laws when it was to their
individuals to act with no instrumental goal or end purpose in mind. 6 In this paradigm,
sociologists explain actions in accordance with social norms through irrational tendencies
of social compliance.
individuals can rationally follow social norms, where he finds a middle ground between
instrumental rationality and irrational normative action. Habermas believes that there is
one, unified rationality to all social action that is justifiable across all modern cultures.
Below I will describe Habermas's conception of how this social rationality is developed
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and at the center of our social norms.
What makes social rationality possible is the use of ordinary language. Language,
in order for us to share them at all. 7 Because language allows for a shared understanding
of propositions pertaining to social norms, we are able to justify those norms to each
other. The rationality, or validity, of a social norm is then justifiable through discussion
from the simple, such as a family coming together to build a shelf, to the complex, where
a nation creates a national defense system. In both of these cases, there is a problem of
action coordination, and because the actors need the cooperation of all involved in order
for the project to be successful, they must attempt to reach some consensus over how that
attempts to reach a consensus through communication they unavoidably act under certain
presuppositions, or follow a few guidelines though often unspoken, that are necessary to
1
The contention that the guidelines are natural and necessary is not universally accepted by deliberative
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The presuppositions to a discursive process aimed at action coordination, as given
by Habermas are that, “the participants must assume, among other things, that they (a)
pursue their illocutionary goals without reservations, that they (b) tie their agreement to
the intersubjective recognition of criticizable validity claims, and that they (c) are ready
to take on the obligations resulting from consensus and relevant for further interaction.” 10
Taken together, these three presuppositions set the stage for individuals to enter into a
participants not hold back in their arguments aimed at convincing the other parties. In
other words, the arguments should not be constrained due to reservations about the
possible consequences of those arguments. One must not feel pressure or fear or any
other force against their entering their own ideas and desires into the conversation. This
ensures that no arguments are precluded and similarly that nothing is left unsaid. If
something were to be left unsaid by a participant, that participant would most likely be
The second condition (b) is that individuals “tie their agreement to intersubjective
presenting claims to truth that can only be justified socially. 11 Validity claims “[pertain]
to action norms and all the general normative propositions that express the meaning of
democratic theorists. However, many of the same theorists who disagree with the idea that the
guidelines are not unavoidable do agree with the content of the rules. The debate between these
thinkers and Habermas asks whether these rules of debate must be codified and enforced to ensure
proper outcomes. I leave this question open.
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12
such norms.” These are claims that are discussed and agreed to (or not) within a real
discourse between real individuals. Validity claims' success and failure depends solely
upon the “rationally motivated agreement” of the participants of the debate. In other
words, validity claims are accepted or not by the force of the better argument, and thus
intersubjectivity which allows for the recognition and challenging of validity claims.
[assuming] that addressees are accountable, that is autonomous and sincere, with both
themselves and others.” 13 Through these three idealizations the participants form the
language use. This linguistic foundation allows participants to directly and cooperatively
discuss any social norm in a meaningful way that allows for mutually understood
The final rule of discourse, (c) that an individual must be “ready to take on the
obligations resulting from consensus,” 14 guarantees that the agreements made in the
communication are carried through. Whereas a verbal agreement might rest only on a
carried out in the lives of the agreeing participants. The norms created through
communicative action are binding and internally codified, rather than externally enforced.
In this way, the results of communicative action are like a moral code, where the
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motivation for compliance is an internal duty.
motivations and construction of societal norms in that it allows for the following of social
norms not only because they are there, or that strategic rationality dictates that we do so,
which anyone affected can take part. Habermas's insight is that our social lives do have a
sense of rationality to them, in that our normative actions are rational because of the
Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as
participants in rational discourses. 15
imperative replacing Kant's internal process of moral justification 16 with a public process
individuals to exist in a Kingdom of Ends where the need for each individual's consent
ensures that everyone's autonomy is fully respected. Furthermore, the ability for a
normative rule to be generalized is found in both Kant and Habermas, except that
problems of action coordination is meant to generate valid norms to which every member
action. These presuppositions will, and in fact must, occur in the ideal discourse
situation. However, because the political world is far from ideal, deliberation must be
somehow modified in order to take into account the unavoidable social and political facts
subset of discursively generated norms, but they are not one in the same. This is because
theoretic interpretation insists on the fact that democratic will-formation draws its
legitimating force not from a previous convergence of settled ethical convictions but both
from the communicative presuppositions that allow the better arguments to come into
play in various forms of deliberation and from the procedures that secure fair bargaining
processes.” 18 At the same time those modified procedures must maintain a deep
normative legitimacy.
Our next step, then, is to determine where the discourse principle fits within the
application of the discourse principle to the political and legal system, institutionalizing
discourse within a system of government created to enable the creation, and enforcement
of law.
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To better define the process of legitimacy behind deliberative democracy,
“that only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent of all citizens
in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted.” 20
The democratic principle both draws on and departs from the discourse principle. On one
discursive processes in order to be legitimate. On the other, the historical and societal
The nature of law is due to its specific role in society throughout history, and thus
the constraints on the discourse principle are not particularly normative, but historical. 21
The story of law, as told by Habermas, begins in the traditional society, where individuals
interacted on a regular basis. Due to this regular interaction, the subjects recognized each
followed fairly similar, not very specialized roles, and each of these individuals would be
working under a similar moral system. However, as the society became increasingly
compartmentalized and specialized, the legal form “became necessary to offset deficits
arising with the collapse of traditional ethical life.” 22 This collapse, due to the
“regulate interpersonal relationships and conflicts between actors who recognize one
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another in an abstract community first produced by the legal norms themselves.” 23
In a modern society, where the traditional ethical construction has lost its
foothold, the society is composed of actors who interact sparsely or not at all. Problems
of action coordination arise between these actors that cannot be feasibly solved by
traditional discursive methods. Here law must fill in the gap between individuals,
creating both a language for interaction as well as a set of rules for that interaction. In
order for markets, businesses, specialization, and modern commerce in general to come
into being, law is necessary to artificially create communal standards to allow these
The nature of law must differ further from morality in that law pertains only to
external relationships, rather than internal kinds of motivation. 25 Because of the lack of
everyday communicative interaction between the parties involved, which would have
norms to be generated, law is not an internally motivated moral choice but rather a choice
between individuals who do not often interact, law asks only that the participants can
of the law, which guides the outcomes of the democratic principle, distinguishes moral
norms from the norms created from the democratic principle insofar as the moral
principle generates an internally constituted rule set whereas the democratic principle
institutionalized.” 26
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Thus law, Habermas argues, must play a dual role, in that it must adhere to the
burdens imparted by its social role and at the same time maintain its connection to
normative claims; 27 law must both address local actors in particular situations as well as
tie its precepts to universalizable validity claims; law is inherently enforced coercively,
yet the individuals under coercive enforcement must see themselves as the authors of that
law. Law is split between these competing claims of the facts of social reality and the
normative ties that give legitimacy to the law. The generation of law must maintain a
connection to, but take a step away from, the ideal considerations of the discourse
situation. Where this step leads is into the democratic principle, a less ideal, more
framework for a rational political will-formation, and it should ensure that will-formation
can express itself as the common will of freely associated legal persons.” 28
Unfortunately, because legally binding arguments are not ideal, due to their inclusion of
however social and political facts of argumentation prevent this idealization from being
realized. Thus the hope of deliberative democracy is to approximate the ideal outcomes
of communicative action through institutions of government and law that can guide the
power and social structures to ensure that they do not overwhelm the ideals of the
discourse principle. Also, the discourse principle is meant to deal with disputes over
ideal and normative matters and so it is not entirely adept at addressing the temporally
limited, pragmatic, and complicated questions that arise in the political sphere.
the rational solution of pragmatic, moral, and ethical questions – the very problems that
accumulate with the failure of the functional, moral, and ethical integration of society
connection to moral standards while returning decisions that meet the practical
consensus, there must be rules of bargaining that somehow neutralize power differences
between the parties. Furthermore, the deliberative process must include methods of fair
bargaining that are not seen in the discourse principle. Habermas cautions that these
conditions of bargaining, rather than consensus seeking, will likely induce strategic
actions by the parties involved. 32 Strategic action is incompatible with the outcomes of
communicative action, but deliberative democracy and the legal claims to validity are
more flexible than those of communicative action alone. In legislation generated through
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democratic political processes:
at the same time incorporate social realities. Fairness is maintained, even in the face of
strategic action, insofar as the ability to bargain and have influence is given equally to all
of the participants. Then, fairness is achieved in negotiated agreements when “all the
affected interests can come into play and have equal chances of prevailing.” 33
It may seem that the discourse principle is now almost relegated to a footnote, in
that legislative processes must move farther and farther away from consensus in order to
incorporate social reality. However, the basic ideas of fair bargaining must be founded
within moral discourses rooted in the discourse principle. Furthermore, the particular
nature of the issues at hand in legislative decision making – temporally limited and non-
supplemented but not replaced. This allows the deliberative democracy to incorporate
the non-ideal nature of the discourse. When viewed as a whole, deliberative politics is a
messy process, but even so it always maintains its connection to the original legitimating
forces of law. The processes of deliberative democracy incorporate the power structures
and social and political facts but only after their harmful affects have been largely
negated.
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and what is the context or purpose of that discourse? Habermas argues for a two track
insights provide direction for, and give legitimacy to, the institutional procedures of
government. This two track model is legitimate under two conditions, that the
institutional procedures must be open to input from the informal public sphere and that
the institutional structure is appropriately formatted to allow for the relevant types of
discourse to ensure a rational outcome. The second of these precepts has been fleshed
out in the above discussion on the democratic process and its inclusion of fair processes
of bargaining and strategic action in concert with the deeper tie to normative processes.
The first condition requires a discourse of interaction between the citizen and their
government. Before this interaction can be analyzed, the idea of citizenship must first be
clarified. In the two track model, the normative standing of the citizen is an
amalgamation of the two most commonly accepted political constructions of the citizen
Liberalism views the citizen as a private person with private rights that protect
The liberal view of politics in general views politics as the interaction of a number of
minority is possible because through greed or treating individuals as a means rather than
an end. Perhaps the treatment of individuals as private citizens then brings liberals to
their common fear of a “tyranny of the majority”, where minority groups are subjugated
to the will of a majority within the society, and thus human rights must be codified to
A deliberative democracy pushes past the view of citizens as entirely private. The
cooperation. When individuals form their will and opinions in a public, deliberative,
setting, they no longer can be said to hold entirely private interests. Instead, their
whole.” 36 Society, and thus the lives of those within it, is centered about politics.
Rights are not negative, but are positive liberties which guarantee the “possibility of
participation in a common praxis, through the exercise of which citizens can first make
Because of the legal system’s grounding through the discourse principle, legal
persons -or those subject to, and authors of, the law- must be defined as bearers of rights.
These rights can come in two general genres, popular sovereignty and human rights is the
right to self-rule. Civic republicans argue that the right to popular sovereignty is at the
heart of political organization, and that any system of rights is only an extension of the
specific ideals of each community. The second general genre of rights that legal persons
may claim is that of human rights. Popular sovereignty and human rights have often been
thought to be at odds with one another, due to the fact that rights limit the bounds of
popular sovereignty and their foundations are at odds-one founded in liberalism, the other
republicanism. However, Habermas argues that these two types of rights are not in
conflict, but instead work in concert to allow citizens the freedom and ability to exercise
That the two types of rights work in concert is due to the deliberative founding of
those rights within the idea of political autonomy. The exercise of political autonomy, in
concert with the democratic principle requires that the communicative processes of will
and action formation that compose the discourse principle are controlling legislation.
Therefore, individuals must be able both to participate fully in the process of discourse as
well as freely form their own opinions and conclusions. To deny either of these would be
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to undercut the process of communicative action, and thus the legitimacy of the
legislation. Neither popular sovereignty nor human rights can be placed above the other.
Or, human rights are necessary to ensure that popular sovereignty is accessible through
communicative action. In this construction, both human rights and popular sovereignty
The two-track model of discursive politics denies both that democracy can be
legitimate without some public orientation and that society is constituted and centered
about politics. First, if the theory of communicative action and the discourse principle is
at the center of legitimacy, citizens must be somehow publicly oriented toward mutual
cooperation and understanding. Second, political questions are not questions about
shared moral and ethical life, and so society cannot be wholly centered around politics.
“[These] two views would exhaust the alternatives only if we hat to conceive of the state
and society in terms of the whole and its parts. To the discourse theory of democracy
Political power flows not from one origin, but from two tracks, the
institutionalized legislative government and the civil society, or public sphere. The
institutions of government are charged with focusing the numerous conversations and
because “communicative power” and influence generated in the public sphere are
public sphere serve to direct, through political elections and activism, and legitimate the
government, mediated by the precepts of a constitution. The constitution ensures that the
government must take account the discourses of the public sphere while at the same time
the public sphere is unable to legislate independent of the government. This method
wide discussion, but at the same time brings the multiplicity of deliberative results into
society and the connection of the outcome of those discourses to democracy and law.
look like, and in order to add some depth and breadth to the picture I will now review
some of the most important components of a deliberative democracy through the work of
scope of this paper. What I offer here is a sample of the literature on what constitutes a
fair and legitimate deliberation. Because the concern of this paper is whether voting and
fair and legitimate deliberation. Because deliberation, rather than voting, is the central
key to legitimacy of democracy, voting must mesh with deliberative standards, instead of
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the reverse. Therefore, it is imperative to have a clear picture of the fair and legitimate
Democracy,” suggest that the precepts and principles of deliberative democracy are
centered around one idea: reciprocity. 42 They explain that, “the basic premise of
reciprocity is that citizens owe one another justifications for the institutions, laws and
public policies that bind them.” 43 Insofar as this is true, reciprocity is the driving force
Out of the principle of reciprocity flows the idea of the economy of mutual
respect. The economy of mutual respect calls on individuals to look for points of
convergence of argument. 45 Mutual respect requires that, “when political opponents seek
to economize on their disagreements, they continue to search for fair terms of social
disagreements.” 46 Taken together, reciprocity and mutual respect are the driving force
Deliberators acting with mutual respect and a sense of reciprocity could almost
and listen to others (reciprocity), and do so in order to find consensus (mutual respect),
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we have in many ways recreated the original conditions that are necessary for ideal
with another, we have already come to the realization that we require the unforced
consent of the other. In realizing this, we must respect their ideas and justify our own if
we hope to come to consensus at all. Thus, Guntman and Tompson provide a new
Braybrook's narrative delivers us an image of the discourse principle unfolding in the real
world, and brings several considerations about the discourse principle to light. The first
consideration is that of the scale of the debate. Braybrook's narrative insists that each
participant remain informed of each and every argument that ends up affecting the final
outcome. In order to, and in the process of, engaging in this criticism, the participants
will come to grasp the meaning of each other's arguments, and thus will form an
Even in a small group of individuals, such a process is time consuming, as anyone who
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has served on a committee might already know. Finally, at the conclusion of the debate,
the individuals each understand the entire scope and depth of the debate because of their
from which they are able to make and defend arguments, which is what Habermas terms
the intersubjective perspective. Therefore, even a less ideal picture of deliberation leads
to some of the very positive outcomes of a mutually shared perspective and an all
Another issue which jumps out from Braybrook's narrative is that the “resolution”
of the discussion is in the form of a majority wins vote. Habermas views a vote as a
measure which is only taken when the question at the center of the deliberation is time
Braybrook, the discussion is not considered resolved at this point. Rather, for Habermas
the discussion always remains open. This dissonance between Braybrook and Habermas
begins to show, I believe, the underlying tension between ideal deliberation and its
required practical outcomes. Habermas presents a carefully crafted theory which ensures
that we do not taint our outcomes by closing debate with a vote. Yet, when enacted by
actual participants, this fine distinction is easily lost, as Braybrook’s use of language,
demonstrates.
James Borhman suggests that Habermas’s standard of legitimacy as laid out in the
democratic principle is too strict to be realized in any real society. The standard of
unanimity, that all must agree, in a pluralist society is far too high, argues Borhman 48 .
This reformulation places emphasizes the process proceeding a decision, and places
legitimacy not in the final agreement of every citizen’s agreement to every particular
decision, but rather the ongoing participation of citizens in the discourse that formulates
those decisions.
democracy, but I am skeptical that Habermas would disagree with him. In his discussion
of voting, Habermas argues that the process of the debate will likely continue
indefinitely. The practical reality of society dictates that consensus is a goal at some time
far in the future. Voting is a pause in the process of a discourse that is necessitated by
time or institutional pressures to decide, but that vote does not stop the process. In fact,
Habermas argues that members of a minority giving their consent to the outcome of a
vote hinges on the “proviso that they themselves retain the opportunity of winning over
the majority with better arguments and thus of revising the previous decision.” 50 In this
light, Bohman’s suggestion elucidates the deep tie of the process, rather than the
the world and the democracies of old face new and deep challenges. If citizens were to
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deliberate over legislation with the express purpose of reaching a consensus, or even a
compromise, I believe that many of the ideological splits and powerful roadblocks that
plague the current system would be swiftly removed. However, the problems of
pluralism of beliefs prevents consensus, the scale of modern societies prevents society-
wide deliberations, and the general facts of politics prevent the realization of any kind of
Presently, the processes of deliberative democracy cannot expect full success, and insofar
as they fail, we must rely on the time-tested process trusted by democracy for hundreds of
3.1 Introduction
I argued in the previous two chapters that a deliberative democracy will always
have occasions when voting is the only democratic means of generating political
decisions. This chapter is concerned with an analysis of the act of voting and the methods
begin with an outline of aggregative voting that explores the extent to which the
procedures leading up to a vote affect the outcome. Then the narrative shifts towards the
aggregation of a single vote and the problems of cycling that arise. The chapter ends
For democratic voting to be justifiable, we must at the very least know that the
outcome of the vote represents an actual majority choice, that the vote was not
manipulated, and that the voters were free to choose their actual preference. In the scope
of this paper, an individual's preferences are thought of as being expressed in their vote,
In a democracy, one might think that a vote should easily to meet these
conditions, but voting can be a complicated process, clouding the results. For example,
in American local and district wide elections the aggregation of votes is in the form of a
simple plurality system. These elections generally determine positions from school board
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member to members of congress. In a Presidential election, there are three steps to the
aggregation of preferences in the form of votes. The election begins with fiery political
primaries that often decide candidates for each major party. Next, those winners are
presented to the entire public in a state wide vote; nationally, the vote is completed in
three rounds: first a primary, then a popular election which chooses official presidential
methods of aggregative voting. Any bill must first be introduced and approved by a
committee, and within this small group the proposal goes through several rounds of
whether the bill is considered by the full legislature. In the greater legislative body the
Finally, depending on whether the bill is in the Senate or the House, the bill might require
several more procedural votes which will bring about a final vote, yea or nay, on the
content. Thus, to think of the vote on a bill as a simple yea or nay vote by the members
mistaken. In fact, most methods of aggregation are more than one-shot events, due to
However, even if we limit our interest to the tally of votes in a one-shot context,
where a number of alternatives are presented to some number of individuals, there are
multiple voting systems from which one might choose. To name a few, there is the
Sirolly 32
Borda count, the Condorcet method, plurality wins, runoff voting, instant runoff voting,
the Hare method, approval voting, the Schulze method, and the two thirds majority
criterion, and others. Luckily, all of these voting systems work on a very similar set of
principles anchored to the ideal of majority rule. Insofar as they are similar in this way,
collectively chosen by the community as the social choice profile. As with individual
preference profiles, we expect that the social choice profile should be logically transitive.
Transitivity in any profile implies a logical order. In other words, transitivity means that
violation of this type of logical order. The most classic case of intransitivity in a social
In the paradox of voting, we are presented with three individuals, 1, 2, and 3 who
are attempting to decide on some social question with three alternatives, A, B and C.
method, which looks at the options in pairs to determine which one beats the rest most
so B is the social choice over C. The paradox arises when C is compared to A, and in this
Sirolly 33
case, two individuals also prefer C to A. Aggregated through the Condorcet method, the
social choice profile intransitive. To summarize, from a set of individuals with logical or
transitive preferences this method of aggregation does not return a result that is also
transitive.
The modern critique of methods of aggregation truly found its voice in the 1950s
with the economist Kenneth Arrow. Arrow, who later won the Nobel Prize in
preferences. What makes Arrow’s work noteworthy is that he takes this single case of
Simply put, he argues that there is no method of adding up votes that can return a
social welfare function”3 and attempts to find a method of aggregation that can meet all
five criteria in all cases. In describing Arrow’s proof, I will attempt to avoid unnecessary
I find a mathematical analogy helpful in thinking about the span of options that
Arrow’s formula must represent. Simple mathematical relationships can either be greater
than, less than, or equal to, or some combination of the three. Symbolically, we represent
the quality of greater than as “>” because the number on the left is greater than the one on
the right, less than as “<”, and two numbers of equal value as “=”. We also can represent
the combinations greater than or equal to as “≥” and less than or equal to as “≤”.
analogy, Arrow is interested in the relative position in a preference order of two different
options, and so he constructs a relational notation. When one option is outright preferred
So, for instance if x is preferred to y (x>y), he writes it xPy. For the case where there is
represented by xRy, which is known as a weak preference order. Also, in the case that x
relations, P, I, and R constitute the whole set of relational possibilities for linear
To specify the actor whose preferences we are referring to, Arrow places a
subscript next to the preference relation. Thus the symbol for an individual i who prefers
x to y is xPiy, and for individual one in the paradox of voting, we write AP1B and BP1C.
As long as individual 1’s preferences are transitive, AP1C can be inferred from the other
Sirolly 35
two (if A>B and B>C, then A>C). To represent the social choice outcome no subscript is
used. 2 One final piece of notation is the use of a prime (′) on the relational symbol. The
prime signifies an independent preference order over the same set of alternatives by the
same individual. So, for example, we can write xPiy and xP′iy, signifying that the primed
and unprimed preference relations are part of different overall sets of preference orders.
For instance, the full preference orders could be xPiy, yPiz, and xP′iy, zP′iy. At this point I
will begin with Arrow’s proof, now armed with the necessary notational knowledge.
welfare function. The social welfare function is subject to several basic and logical
For example, if a society is trying to collectively decide some policy, the social
welfare function must be able to incorporate, or be defined for, every allowed individual
ordering of preferences. It might be that some orderings are not allowed, for instance
Germany no longer tolerates Nazi sympathizers. For those orderings that are allowed all
2
Arrow offers several uses of the notation for clarity (the parenthetical explanations are mine in the form of
(mathematical analogue. “Or,” the ordinary language explanation)):
a) For all x, xRx. (x=x. Or, x is indifferent, and so must also be related by R, to itself.)
b) If xPy, then xRy. (If x>y, then x≥y. Or, if x is preferred to y, x must also be preferred or indifferent
to y.)
c) If xPy and yPz , then xPz. (If x>y and y>z, then x>z. Or, if x is preferred to y and y to z, then x
must be preferred to z.)
d) If xIy and yIz, then xIz. (If x=y and y=z, then x=z. Or, if x is indifferent to y and y is indifferent to
z, then x is indifferent to z.)
e) For all x and y, either xRy or yPx. (Either x≥y or y>x. Or, x can be either preferred or indifferent to
y, but if it is neither of those, y must be preferred to x.)
f) If xPy and yRz, then xPz. (If x>y and y≥z, then x>z. Or, if x is preferred to y and y is preferred or
indifferent to z, then x must be preferred to z.)
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possible preference orders must be accounted for. Derived from this type of
Remembering that R1, R2 are the preference orderings for individual one and individual
two in the hypothetical society, the formal definition of the first condition simply requires
The second condition ensures that the social welfare function does not, for some
alternative, respond negatively when an individual changes their preference for that
societally preferred to y and an individual then decides to change their vote from y to x,
the total aggregated result should not then change to y being preferred to x. This would
mean that someone increasing their preference for an alternative decreases the social
preference for that alternative. Because this result is undesirable, Arrow presents the
In a more formal way, Arrow has stated that an alternative should not be lowered in the
The third condition defining the social welfare function is commonly referred to
Sirolly 37
as the independence of irrelevant alternatives. Independence from irrelevant alternatives
means that if there is if the social welfare function is comparing to alternatives, x and y,
the results of that comparison should not depend on a third alternative z. If we imagine a
vote with three candidates x, y, z, where the aggregated social preference tells us that x is
hypothetical vote, the candidate z dies of a heart attack close to the time of the vote.
In order to avoid an effect by an alternative on the social preference order of two other
alternatives, the formal restriction on the social welfare function is stated in condition
three as:
Condition 3: Let R1,R2, and R′1, R′2 be two sets of individual orderings. If,
for both individuals i and for all x and y in a given set of alternatives S, xRiy
if and only if xR′iy then the social choice made from S is the same whether
the individual orderings are R1,R2, or R′1, R′2.( Independence of irrelevant
alternatives.) 7
The condition defines two different preference orders for individuals one and two over
the same set of alternatives, and in both orders x is at least as good as y. From this,
The last two conditions essentially ensure the democratic nature of the
A social welfare function is imposed if it does not respond at all to change in preference
orders of the individuals in that society. 3 An imposed social welfare function could, for
instance, order xPy even if the entire society unanimously preferred y to x, or yPx.
Imposition violates any sense of democratic “rule by the people,” because the “people's”
dictatorship). 9
Simply put, if the social welfare function’s preference order always and only depends on
one individual’s preferences, then the social welfare function is determined dictatorially
In total, the conditions that have been placed on the social welfare function are as
follows: it must be defined for all allowed preference orders, it must be monotonic, it
must not take into account irrelevant alternatives, it must not be imposed, and it must not
be dictatorial. We can say with some confidence that these general conditions are
operating principles that should be incorporated into any logical and ethical system of
3
The formal definition of imposition: A social welfare function will be said to be imposed if for some pair of
distinct alternatives x and y, xRy for any set of individual orderings R1, R2, where R is the social ordering
corresponding to R1, R2.
4
Formal Definition of dictatorship: A social welfare function is said to be “dictatorial” if there exists an individual i
such that for all x and y, xPiy implies xPy regardless of the orderings of all individuals other than i, where P is the
social preference relation corresponding to those orderings
Sirolly 39
Arrow's breakthrough was in proving that a system of aggregation satisfying the
conditions does not exist because “satisfying those conditions leads to a contradiction.” 10
The contradiction arises when you examine a hypothetical decision by two individuals
over three alternatives. For two of the three alternatives, x and y, there are two general
possibilities of preference ordering, which are: (1) both individuals prefer the same
alternative, such that xP1y and xP2y, or (2) they prefer different alternatives, for example
For the first alternative(1), the social welfare function must return the result xPy,
because if it were to return any other ordering, the function would violate condition four,
In the case of the second possibility (2) where our individuals do not agree (xP1y
and yP2x), the social welfare function can return one of three results: xPy, yPx, or xIy.
For the case of xPy, returned for the preference profiles of xP1y and yP2x, it can be
shown that individual one is a dictator 12 , violating the dictatorship condition. If yPx
resulted, individual two would similarly be a dictator. Therefore, the only fair social
So, with the conditions of fairness for the social welfare function, we have two
consequences, that if the two individual society is split, the society is indifferent (a tie), or
5
Here I have departed from Arrow’s numbering system of the consequences for clarity.
Sirolly 40
if the society is unanimous, the society prefers that option.
In this hypothetical society of two we can imagine that individual one has a
preference ordering of xP1y and yP1z, (x>y>z) while individual two’s ordering is zP2x,
xP2y (z>x>y). From the first consequence, we know that the social welfare function must
return xPy (x>y). Also, with preference orders yP1z (y>z) and zP2y (z>y) consequence
two requires that yIz (y=z). Thus, because the social welfare function must be transitive,
or logically ordered, xPy and yIz (x>y=z) requires xPz (x>z). However, if we look back
to the original preference orders, we see that xP1z (x>y) and zP2x (z>x) which, by
consequence two, must result xIz (x=z). Arrow concludes that “it cannot be that x is both
preferred and indifferent to z [(x>z ≠ x=z)]. Hence, the assumption that there is a social
welfare function compatible with conditions 1-5 has led to a contradiction.” 14 In any
aggregation of votes, there will always be some probability that the aggregation of those
To generalize and summarize his result, Arrow offers the Possibility Theorem:
If there are at least three alternatives among which the members of society
are free to order in any way, then every societal welfare function satisfying
conditions 2 and 3 and yielding a social order satisfying Axioms 1 and 2
must be either imposed or dictatorial. The Possibility Theorem shows that,
if no prior assumptions are made about the nature of individual orderings,
there is no method of voting which will remove the paradox of voting,
neither plurality voting nor any scheme of representation, no matter how
complicated. 15
In his possibility theorem Arrow has shown that, even if there happens to be a society
where everyone can clearly express their own preferences and everyone is working
together in good faith to determine the majority’s preference, a fair and rational method
Sirolly 41
of aggregation that always works does not exist. No matter how innovative or careful the
counters are, as long as the method of aggregation meets the criterion of the five
Some thirty or so years after Arrow presented his powerful proof of the
impossibility of a social welfare function that meets certain simple conditions, William
Riker, a professor at the University of Rochester, expanded upon this theory to show the
arbitrary and meaningless nature of any voting system. In the significant work,
the Theory of Social Choice,” Riker hopes, “to assess whether it is sensible to pursue
By democratic ends, Riker is referring to those values that build the philosophical
participation, liberty, and equality. These elements of democracy were chosen by Riker
not for their philosophic importance but rather because statistically they are the elements
that most democracies hold in common. 17 His characterization is adequate, though not
ability to freely choose and act within both political deliberation and society as a whole.
Sirolly 42
Finally, political equality is necessary so that deliberative results are not skewed towards
the influential and the powerful, but rather towards the true consensus of the polity.
When Riker asks whether democratic means can meet the democratic ends, he is
concerned with problems that arise potentially and actually in constructing and carrying
out a system of voting. The first question along this line of thought asks whether there is
a proper choice of method for the aggregation of votes, and whether the choice of the
system affects the outcome. The casual observer can likely provide their own example of
how the construction of the system of voting can affect the final outcome. For example,
in committees, the order of voting on different amendments and bills can return different
outcomes. The order of amendments, or procedural votes, can steer the outcomes at the
The primary system also has the possibility of excluding a candidate that would
be the actual majority choice of the voters. For example, in a two party system, the
preferred to all the others nationally. “Such a candidate, call him the Golden Median,
though very popular with independents as well as many people in all parties, might loose
by a narrow margin in his own party to another candidate.” 18 If the primary system were
designed, say, to not restrict voting to just party members but to any registered voter, the
outcomes would almost certainly be different. When the outcome of a vote is dependent
only on the choice of method of aggregation, a burden must be placed upon finding the
right and fair method of voting that can be justified over all of the rest.
Riker contends that we cannot choose between voting systems on any ethical or
Sirolly 43
value based criteria because at least on a basic, perhaps superficial level, all of the
methods of aggregation are fair. “If, for any choice that is supposedly fair because it
comes out of a fair procedure, there is another choice from another procedure that is fair
in a different and conflicting way, then it is difficult to justify the fairness of any
choice.” 19 However, Riker argues that the efficiency of systems of voting can be
analyzed by testing the system against a reasonable set of criteria. These criteria are very
much analogous to those presented by Arrow, both in form and content. Yet, where
Arrow defines reasonable criteria based on logical transitivity, Riker looks to fairness.
second condition, a voting system should not reduce some alternative’s position in the
societal preference order if an individual increases their preference for that alternative.
The second condition of fairness requires that the vote-counting not give more
power or influence in determining the final result to one, or a group of, individuals. The
voting system should not differentiate between individuals, and thus Riker specifies this
The final condition of fairness requires that none of the alternatives are given an
unfair advantage structurally over any of the others. For example, a two thirds majority
rule applied to amendments to the Constitution naturally gives advantage to the status
Riker shows that the only system of voting that can meet these three conditions is
majority voting between two alternatives. 22 Majority voting between two alternatives
easily satisfies the three conditions as follows: a vote for one candidate helps that
Sirolly 44
candidate and leaves the other without a vote (monotonicity), individuals have one vote
that is tallied equally (undifferentiatedness), and a two-choice vote has no systemic bias
under majority rule. Unfortunately, binary choices are extremely rare, and perhaps non-
possibility. A budget, for example, could range across some large number of values in
we consider possible candidates, on the other hand, the set of possible alternatives in an
American presidential election is theoretically every natural-born citizen over the age of
thirty five. Structurally, this set is restricted through entrance costs such as campaign
money and political primaries. Thus, Riker's critique is not that we do not observe binary
choices in politics, but instead that the creation of those choices is somewhat arbitrary
where the primaries usually start out with several candidates. This field is narrowed
down to a few during the first few weeks, and then to one by the party’s convention.
Thus, Riker explains, “since there are always more than two alternatives, the most
For either party, their best interest lies in garnering all of the voters at or near their
particular political orientation. If a single party presented two candidates, those two
candidates would likely split the base of loyal voters. Unless this party has the support of
an overwhelming majority of the population, they are certain to lose an election where
Sirolly 45
they present two candidates. Consider, for example, the case where party A has
other forty. If both parties offer one candidate in an election, party A will undoubtedly
win. If, by some matter of indecision, party A presents not one, but two candidates that
split the vote (for example, the candidates taking 35% to 25%) it is likely that party B,
preferred by an absolute minority of people, will likely garner the highest number of
votes. With three candidates and no clear majority winner, the question then becomes
how to best decide the winner. Riker argues that because “the way the reduction occurs
determines which two will be decided,” any choice of a particular voting system is
“unfair.” 25 A primary system or any other system of eliminating alternatives from many
to two violates the neutrality condition. Therefore, even though the two party majority
wins vote is by far the most ideal in terms of returning a fair and reasonable result two
choices almost never occur and o relying upon a system of two alternatives is neither
With three or more alternatives, “no one method satisfies all the conditions of
fairness that have been proposed as reasonable and just.” 26 Each one of the many
systems of aggregating votes meets some of the conditions, but not others. Here Riker’s
argument very much follows in the footsteps of Arrow, only this time it is explicitly
framed in terms of voting and fairness. Where Riker departs from Arrow is his focus on
system create conditions that allow a skilled and powerful politician to underhandedly
Sirolly 46
force his or her choice into being the winner. Because intransitivity is a component of all
voting systems (aside from the binary choice, majority wins, which has been previously
paradox of voting, recall that three individuals with three preferences returned an
outcome where A was preferred to B, which was preferred to C, which was preferred to
A, or APB, BPC, CPA. If individual three (CP3A, AP3B) holds agenda power in a
committee setting and they know the preference orderings before a vote, they could easily
arrange the order of voting to first pit B against A, returning A as the winner, and then A
against C. With this order of voting, C will win. All alternatives have been put to a vote
at least once making C appear to be the majority winner when it is in fact not. On the
other hand, if either individual one or two had agenda power and knowledge of the
preferences they could rearrange the order of voting so that their first choice wins. In the
case of a cyclic outcome, it is up to the individual with agenda control, rather than
similar enough to that majority-supported alternative has the power to pull votes away
and from the original majority choice, thus placing both the new alternative as well as the
midterm election, Republican Senator Rick Santorum and his backers were discovered to
Sirolly 47
27
be supporting a Green Party candidate’s campaign. The Green Party is on the far left of
the political spectrum, whereas Rick Santorum was considered by many to be on the
extreme right. The actions by he and his supporters can then be understood as a strategic
effort to divert votes from his Democratic opponent to the Green Party candidate.
Surreptitiously supporting a third party candidate in order to pull votes away from an
opponent is a tempting strategy and Riker argues that this form of manipulation of a
democratic voting system can never be structurally eliminated. 28 The power of Riker's
claim is that both the motivation to, and the possibility of, manipulating the voting system
strategic voting. 29 Strategic voting occurs when an individual gains a strategic edge by
voting against their true preferences in order ensure that their real preference wins.
Strategic voting of this sort occurs when an individual understands the preference
structures of others and through their knowledge of the method of aggregation combined
with that knowledge they can arrange their vote in such a way that their actual first
preference wins. To better explain this phenomenon, a few real world examples of
Strategic voting can occur when supporters of third party candidates vote for their
second choice so that their least preferred candidate does not win. In the 2000 and 2004
presidential election, there was much discussion in the general media about a vote for a
popular third party candidate Ralph Nader. Because an individual voting for Nader
would almost certainly choose Al Gore over George Bush, many argued that a vote for
Sirolly 48
Nader was effectively a vote for Bush. Many actual supporters of Nader likely voted for
majority system strategic voting is almost encouraged by the winner take all structure
which pushes individuals toward the majority candidate closest to their ideological pole.
In so doing, Riker argues that the two party system is enforced because, “strategic voting
Riker argues that another example of strategic voting can be found in the history
of the U.S. House of Representatives. 31 In 1956 a bill was presented to authorize grants
to assist school districts with construction costs due to the post World War II baby boom.
The bill had wide support until an amendment was offered by Adam Clayton Powell,
which would authorize the funds only to those states with schools “open to all children
without regard to race in conformity with requirements of the United States Supreme
Court decisions.” 32 The decision to which the bill was referring was the 1954 decision
Brown vs. Board of Education, which held racially segregated schools unconstitutional.
The procedure of the House of Representatives first pits a against b, or the amended bill
against the non amended bill, and then the winner of that contest against c. In the first
vote of a against b, the congress voted 227 to 197 for a. Then, in the contest of the
amended bill against the status quo, or no funding, the vote was 229 to 199 against a, for
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c. Thus, the bill as presented with the Powell Amendment failed to pass a full house
vote. This outcome becomes suspicious because a similar bill without the Powell
Amendment was presented one year later and eighteen, mostly Southern, Democrats who
had previously voted against the amended bill voted for the un-amended bill. 33 If the
preferences of these democrats were known – being for school funds but against tying
ideologically opposed to greater school funding voted for the Powell Amendment in
order to make the bill lose in the long run. Riker presents evidence from both speeches at
the time as well as probable preference orders garnered from other votes that suggest that
many of the anti-segregationist Republicans did in fact vote for the Powell Amendment
Political power plays from large scale coalitions, as seen in the Powell
Amendment example, can often cloud the legislative process in such a way that makes
one question the fairness and legitimacy of the outcomes. In a democracy, that the real
the very least disturbing, and could in fact constitute a real threat to the democratic
process.
Though the next type of strategic voting may occur in various forums, the
legislative process is generally home to the strategy of vote trading. Vote trading is a
process in which one legislator agrees to vote for another legislator’s pet project, in return
for a similar, but reversed, vote on a separate issue. The proposals are generally of little
importance to the one legislator, but great importance to the other. What Riker shows is
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that vote trading can actually be harmful to a majority of people while only helping a
minority and at the same time purposefully undercut the system of voting. In some cases,
vote trading causes cycles where before there were none. Perhaps more troublesome is
there are some cases where vote-trading makes everyone worse off. In the event of vote
trading, the knowledge that one pair of individuals are trading votes create an incentive
for everyone to trade votes in order to avert a situation where a few benefit highly and the
rest are harmed. 35 Vote trading can cause the outcome to shift from one preferred by
most to one preferred by none by eliminating the possibility that the proper alternative is
chosen. In this and other ways, reactive vote trading can leave everyone worse off then
they began.
trading as having positive, rather than negative connotations in a system of voting. They
argue that vote trading allows for consideration of degree of preference of voters. Such a
same sway as the “most concerned individuals”(Buchanan 133). On the other hand:
satisfaction with the result. Without vote trading, those largely indifferent to the proposal
would win, and their satisfaction would be minimal. However, if vote trading is allowed,
Sirolly 51
those in the minority have a large increase in satisfaction due to the satisfaction of their
initial desire as indicated in the intensity of their preference. Also, the minority now is
obligated to side with, on a separate issue of little importance, those in the majority on an
issue important to them. Vote trading can twice maximize the outcome.
For Riker, vote trading undermines the vote while Buchanan/Tullock argue that it
can improve the outcome. One point of divergence in the two understandings of Riker
Riker's view of vote trading being mutually harmful is due to a model where individuals,
equilibrium, moving the outcome to a less desirable outcome. 36 Buchanan and Tullock
realize that vote trading can break down if there is no accountability for a vote, as in an
anonymous vote. 37 However, in the case where there is accountability, the maximizing
effects remain.
A deliberative perspective on the action of vote trading sheds light on its deeper
meaning. Buchanan and Tullock's argument that accountability is necessary points to the
communicative action. The very act of vote trading implies that there was some
discussion between the parties involved that communicates preferences and that there
was a consensus between the parties about a course of action that would be mutually
Sirolly 52
beneficial. Communicative action allows for a course of action which does not undercut,
The capacities of aggregative voting alone are limited, as Arrow and Riker have
shown. However, deliberation can overcome the limited ability of aggregative voting to
incorporate more complicated variables such as preference intensity. Take, for example,
proposed options are an Italian restaurant (i) and a fresh seafood restaurant (s). A survey
is sent out and it finds that five individuals have the preference order sPii and three iPis.
From this information the social choice is simply decided as sPi. However, if the
colleagues were in a room together, they would find out that one of the individuals with
ordering iPis will not eat seafood. In a purely aggregative method of decision making,
the group has now decided to leave their colleague hungry for the night for lack of
acceptable choices. Yet, if the group were to deliberate, they would almost certainly
decide to change their vote against their previous preference, perhaps eliciting the
concession from the minority to return the favor at some point in the future. Though the
undercut the voting system for an easily attainable and mutually acceptable decision.
Deliberative democracy also has the capacity to prevent the negative effects, and
in some cases the very act of, strategic voting and agenda manipulation. There are three
avenues of approach that a deliberative democracy can take to solving these problems.
These are, removing the incentives for strategic manipulation (a), generating a
cooperative sentiment (b), 39 and providing an external observer to point out and thwart
Sirolly 53
manipulation(c).
Deliberation can change the incentives for strategic manipulation (a) by creating
an agenda manipulator can damage your ability to affect future debate. This is due to the
fact that “listeners are aware of the possibility of deception, and so calculate whether or
increases skepticism on your actions and may create a situation where “nobody will
Dryzek and List claim that even in a one shot deliberation, the fact that
preferences must be defended publicly is a natural restraint to preferences. They offer the
everyone’s preferences, while at the same time remaining silent on their own preferences
until very late in the discourse. Dryzek and List offer this hypothetical story:
The hypothetical manipulator has apparently found a cycle in the profiles which they can
manipulator would likely be able to stay quite and induce their preferred outcome.
However, in a deliberative setting, for i to reveal their preference set so late in the
day creates a:
…risk that the others will not believe i is sincere. The best case that i can
Sirolly 54
make for revealing the preference ordering xPizPiy late in the day is that
he/she has been persuaded of this ordering by the preceding deliberation.
Yet, such a lie is risky, because the content of the deliberation has actually
advanced the standing of y, not z – otherwise there would be no reason for
i to act strategically against y here.
Because i must justify their preferences to others, they must either be prolific liars. To do
this they will almost always be discovered in their manipulation attempt. Furthermore,
deliberative democracy is not a one shot affair. If the manipulator succeeds in this case,
they will be on record for the preference order xPizPiy. If, for some reason, the issue is
revisited, the speaker will be hard pressed to justify their actual preference order in light
of their past statements. The situation will become even worse for the manipulator if the
choice between z any y, the manipulator is on the record as supporting z, but their actual
preference is y. In this case, the deliberator is between a rock and a hard place, having to
either support z or invent a story to cover up the previous manipulation and give good
truthful both in the short and long run, by pre-empting, discovering and punishing
attempts at manipulation.
that in the non-ideal political deliberation strategic action is not always avoided. Dryzek
and List offer a few practical reasons why individuals in a deliberative setting will be
situation of social interaction where people talk and listen to each other, enabling each
person to recognize their interrelation with a social group.” 44 Dryzek and List explain
that group discussion alone creates a sense of shared bond that prevents individuals from
acting to harm the others in the group. This conclusion comes from a number of
that “the period of discussion within the group prior to each individual choice between
though the participants would be expected to defect because of the one-shot nature of
Dryzeck and List argue that this cooperation is due to two mutually enforcing
tendencies of group discussion. The first is that “discussion provides participants with
opportunities for multi-lateral promise making about the choices they will make.” 46
Though these promises are unenforceable, and the account given by instrumental
rationality suggests the breaking of promises, the “empirical evidence suggests that social
powerful.” 47 At the very least these findings are hopeful for a cooperative account of
deliberative democracy and it even seems that these individuals in one-shot games may
there is a different sort of context attached to discussion. Dryzek and List argue that:
I think that Habermas would call this contextualized decision making frame the
intersubjective perspective. Through deliberation about the issues, our frame of mind and
cooperative one.
Acting under a cooperative perspective offers two ways out of Riker’s claims of
manipulation and strategy, which are: an overall prevention of strategy and manipulation,
to use strategy to undermine others. The second claim harkens back to Buchanan and
Tullock’s analysis of vote trading. In the case of vote trading, individuals acting
cooperatively could increase the optimality of outcomes. Similarly, general strategic and
seemingly manipulative action can be a way to overcome the natural limitations built into
the actions of voters in the 2000 election. The voters who voted for their second choice,
Gore, instead of their first, Nader, were under Riker’s definition voting strategically.
However, in this case I would argue that the voters were not manipulating the system, but
instead they realized that the structure of the system necessitated a strategic vote for their
voice to count. If, for example, the presidential election were decided by a Condorcet
pairwise comparison, individuals with first preference for Nader would have no reason to
vote strategically, their profile would count as a vote for Gore in the Gore-Bush
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comparison. However, in a one person one vote system, a vote for Nader was effectively
a vote for Bush. As such, individuals taking this information –information likely gained
in a deliberative process– into account had to vote strategically in order for their entire
voting system per-se, but instead is an action that overcomes the limitations of certain
methods of aggregation. 49
that deliberative democracy naturally creates external observers which are able to
“referee” the procedures of voting (c). Many of Riker’s problems of manipulation and
strategy are troublesome not because they cannot be recognized by the voters, but rather
that the voters have little they can do about it. There may be cases where those within the
system are entirely at the will of a powerful manipulator or strategic actor. In these cases,
an external actor with the power to step in can do so and stop the manipulation from
occurring. Also, there might be cases in which the deliberation breaks down into
mutually harmful strategic action. In these cases, an external observer or mediator could
understanding of the two-track model. The two-track theory of law and politics as
presented by Habermas, there are two sets of coinciding deliberations that are
continuously occurring in a society, one in the institutionalized legislative body and the
other in the public sphere. In the public sphere, the aggregative mechanisms are utilized
to elect representatives and determine referenda on both the legislative and constitutional
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level. In the government, aggregative mechanisms are used to decide legislative and
mechanisms are independent of each other. Because these two spheres of society are
separately constituted, but connected through a flow of power and influence, there is the
action. In modern democracies, the press has often supplemented the public sphere’s
ability to play the role of external watchdog. Today this role is being further supported
by legions of bloggers who watch the government for any false move. The press and
bloggers combined have the ability to create a public sentiment against the manipulators.
Through pointing out manipulations to citizens, these sources can create a discussion
about the legitimacy of the actions of the government. The results of this discussion are
what Habermas calls discursively generated communicative power. This power can force
the institutions and the actors within it to “play fair” because of the deep connection of
The discursive approach takes the bite out of Riker’s argument. Through
allowing for discussion and cooperation, the processes of deliberative democracy are
much less vulnerable to manipulation. When the public sphere is understood as a check
presents a balanced approach that dilutes power and encourages cooperation. In this new
setting, democracy is a highly principled and hopeful activity, unlike the corrupt process
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described by Riker. However, I have not yet addressed Arrow’s problems of cycling and
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter presented the two general areas of issues that arise in the
aggregation of votes, cycling and manipulation. I presented the suggestion that the
problems of manipulation can be solved through deliberation, both by the voters as well
as in the context of the two track model. Chapter 4 focuses on the problems of
intransitivity in the social choice profile, as per Arrow’s proof. I first address the issue at
the empirical level and show that intransitivity hardly, if ever, occurs. This discussion is
followed by an explanation of some of the reasons why we might not see problems of
cycling. I finish the chapter with a discussion of the way out of Arrow’s result through
Kenneth Arrow proved that any system of voting has the logical possibility of
failure, but American Political scientist Gerry Mackie claims that such a failure hardly
Mackie cites a number of real world preference and voting data where there is little to no
cycling. Furthermore, he argues that there is not one acceptable example of cycling or
No doubt many people over the last thirty years have thought that it would
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be intellectually and professionally satisfying to demonstrate a real
instance of cycling, yet the positive claims of cycling we have from the
entire political universe can be counted on one’s fingers and toes (and …
even these claims collapse under further scrutiny).2
votes, then the question arises: which mechanisms are at work that avoid the
deliberative effects work to shape the preference orders and constrain the aggregative
mechanisms in such a way that avoids cycles. 3 For an informative discussion on how
institutional constraints can help reduce the problem of cycling, see the paper,
“Democracy and Social Choice” by Jules Coleman and John Ferejohn 4 . I have chosen
not to analyze the institutional constraints, but rather I will investigate the ways in which
deliberation alone can neutralize intransitivity in the social choice profile. By avoiding
that the strength of deliberation as a foundation for democracy is internally strong, even
intransitivity in a way that the classic theories of liberalism and populism, as defined by
Riker, cannot. Liberalism finds itself subject to Arrow’s theorem because it can hardly
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deny Arrow’s conditions (except, perhaps, for the independence of irrelevant alternatives
which is the most often challenged of the conditions 5 ). Populism, on the other hand, ties
the legitimacy of decisions to a majority will. If Arrow’s conditions hold, then in some
democracy then presents a new avenue of solution, in that “the discovery that aggregative
mechanisms are systematically unstable helps illuminate a more plausible case for
deliberation.” 6 Deliberation can be utilized as a way out of the social choice problems
4.3.1 Unanimity
almost by definition trivial; if there is no disagreement on an issue than the social choice
However, it has been repeatedly argued that unanimity is far too strong a requirement for
a modern plural democracy. That being said, there need not be complete unanimity for a
modern, plural society? On one hand, Mackie argues that people live in the same world
and thus have similar interests in that world.7 He explains that, “for example, most
prefer prosperity to torture of kittens to suicidal nuclear war.”8 Though Mackie may be
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correct in assuming that most people would prefer prosperity to suicidal nuclear war,
ideology.
If the individuals in society are equally likely to hold any preference order, then
“the probability of the existence of a Condorcet winner decreases with increases in the
number of options as well as with increases in the number of options.”9 However, with
slight deviations from an impartial culture (all preference orders equally likely) the
probability of a cycle typically converges to zero.10 For example, with 999 voters and
impartial culture, but only likely 4 percent of the time with a 5 percent unanimity in the
society (95 percent impartial), and is completely unexpected (zero probability) with 10
percent of the voters unanimous in their choices11. Put simply, the more alike
individuals are in a society, the more likely there will be no problems of aggregation.
actual unanimity. In other words, we might hope for consensus, but deliberation makes
no requirement of it, so we have no normative reason to expect it. In fact, two theorists,
Jack Knight and James Johnson, argue that there is a tension between the expressed goal
of consensus and the normative ideal of deliberative democracy. They suggest that the
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normative requirement “that parties to deliberation have free and equal access to relevant
democracy cannot rest when it finds consensus, but it must always bring up new
questions and challenges to that consensus. However, Knight and Johnson worry that
“the appearance of new and hitherto unheard constituencies in deliberative arenas will
unsettle, if not altogether subvert, any extant shared understanding.” 13 The tension is
that, though deliberative democracy pursues consensus, it at the same time must be
constantly attempting to break that consensus and create turmoil in order to incorporate
every perspective and ideology. Knight and Johnson conclude that this tension within a
and Johnson point out a very real tension in deliberative democracy, but I believe that this
constituted legislation. Recall that the democratic principle requires that, “only those
statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent of all citizens.” 14 The search
for scientific truth provides a constructive analogue in this respect to the processes of
deliberative democracy. The pursuit of science is to find a true consensus, a truth that
will withstand any test and explain any experiment. At a few points in history some of
the greatest scientists have been led to think that a consensus had been found, or that all
of the big questions been answered and all of the hard problems had been solved. In fact,
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one of the great physicists, James Clerk Maxwell, attacked the view in his time that “in a
few years, all great physical constants will have been approximately estimated, and that
the only occupation which will be left to men of science will be to carry these
measurements to another place of decimals.” 15 Science did not rest on its laurels, and a
mere 26 years later Maxwell was more than vindicated. In the “five papers that shook the
world,” 16 Einstein published theories including the photo-electric effect (the foundation
These papers laid the groundwork for what is now known as modern physics. The point
is not that Maxwell was shortsighted (which he was), but that science continues to test
every theory to try to find the breaking point. Science continually finds new and
Through this process of constant testing and challenging, science is able to pursue deeper
The pursuits of science show that the “disconcerting” tension between a pursuit of
disconcerting at all. The constant challenge to consensus ensures that our consensus is in
fact legitimate if it can meet and answer the challenge. If the pre-existing consensus
disintegrates under challenge, then it means only that the consensus was not full and thus
not legitimate in the first place. Like science, deliberative politics cannot rest, but instead
new voice and every new generation. This process of pursuing deliberative validity and
legislative legitimacy, like the pursuit of scientific truth, may be challenging and arduous,
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but it is undoubtedly worthwhile.
pursue consensus without necessarily reaching it. However, the lack of consensus leaves
direction at this impasse; Riker notes in “Liberalism Against Populism” that “if, by
reason of discussion, debate, civic education, and political socialization, voters have a
what it means for the problems of cycling in section 4.3.2. Then I will argue that
4.3.2 Single-Peakedness
relation to all of the others, there would never be failures of voting of the type that Arrow
orders in a given society can be arranged into a coherent order. In many contemporary
political systems, this order would span the political space from the liberal left to the
preferences to be graphed two dimensionally, where the dependent variable is the degree
of preference and the independent variable is the span of the alternatives. When graphed
in this manner, each individual’s preference line will exhibit only a single peak. What is
peaked preferences.
In Figure one, individuals one through six can be arranged on a left to right scale,
though this arrangement does not necessarily correspond to any political sense of left and
right.
Still, if we are to imagine these individuals within the American political system, and the
right, then individual 1 is a liberal through and through, individual 2 might be a right
wing conservative, whereas individual 4 is a moderate with little tolerance for extreme
views but is indifferent to those in the middle. Though not universal, these sorts of
Left Right
.
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expect it at all. For example, if a community has decided to build a new amenity, the
choice between the various alternatives might be far from single-peaked. If the
alternatives are a basketball court (A), a workout area (B), and a swimming pool (C), they
are likely to be preferred by the individuals for very different reasons and in different
ways. Where one individual’s preferences might be based upon raising property values,
another’s might be due to their favored activity. So it might be that one person prefers
the basketball court to the workout area and the workout area to the swimming pool
(AP1B, BP1C), a second person prefers the swimming pool to the basketball court to the
workout area (CP2A, AP2B), and a third prefers the workout area to the swimming pool to
the basketball court (BP3C, CP3A). If the community is restricted to three members (or
perhaps a three member panel charged with making the decision) then the paradox of
voting returns. Recalling the paradox of voting at the beginning of last chapter, we had
three individuals who were choosing between three alternatives. Figure two below is a
Figure 2: The three individuals, 1, 2, and 3, are represented by a triangle, square, and
circle respectively
The preference orders in the paradox of voting are not single-peaked, and thus it
modified to pertain only to those preference orders that are not single-peaked. Also, this
single-peakedness must not even be universal. If even 75 percent of the individuals have
personal preference orderings that are single-peaked, the intransitivity in Arrow's theorem
is prevented. 21
Given that minimal societal agreement over alternatives can ensure that Arrow’s
single-peakedness is not always likely. However, some political issues and candidate
elections do, on face, invite single-peakedness, but a democracy cannot enforce single-
peaked preferences, even when such enforcement may seem logical. For example, in the
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2000 American presidential election, if we consider the three candidates that garnered the
most attention –Al Gore, George W. Bush, and Ralph Nader- you might expect everyone
to hold single-peaked preferences. If the three candidates are arranged on a left to right
scale, in the order of Nader, Gore, Bush, it is expected that if you preferred Nader, the
most liberal candidate, the second choice would be Gore because his values are closer in
most respects to Nader’s than are Bush’s. Similarly, a Bush supporter would likely prefer
Nader least of the three. However, there are no restrictions on an individual’s reasoning
behind their preference structure. Therefore, someone might choose to vote solely on
how entertaining the candidates are. Gore was often chided over his stiff personality, and
so someone ordering their preferences on the basis of entertainment might prefer Bush to
Nader to Gore. If we were to add this preference order to the other single peaked orders,
the society would no longer be single-peaked. Though most political junkies would
cringe to think that an individual might base their vote on something as apolitical as
entertainment, our democratic system allows reasons such as these to preserve and
deliberative democracy can utilize deliberation in ways that will create higher degrees of
single peakedness. However, I will begin the discussion with the work of two theorists
Jack Knight and James Johnson who suggest that deliberation should focus on coming to
consensus on the dimensional issue at hand, rather than the sustentative preferences
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within those dimensions.22 Though finding the issues that are agreed upon, the number
of “dimensions over which [deliberators] disagree” which in turn reduces the likelihood
dimension.”24
uncover the depth of their disagreement about certain issues. However, with a common
view of the issue dimension “majority rule need not generate cyclical social orderings.” 25
In the example of the presidential election in 2000, as long as everyone agrees that what
aggregative transitivity is ensured. It does not matter whether there is a deep divide
between those who support Nader and those who support Bush, just that they hold a
Thus, Knight and Johnson ask deliberators to only attempt to find consensus in
the underlying issues that are at stake rather attempt to come to consensus on the subject
of the preferences. I find two problems with this point. First, though I agree that a
the current state of American politics, where participation in previous elections has been
alarmingly low. If citizens do not choose to find time for the simple act of voting, I
question whether citizens would find time to sit down in order to find their dimensions of
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agreement and disagreement. The second point flows from the first, in that a deliberators
In order to pursue consensus, the deliberators must first find some common
ground from which to build. This determination of common ground is, in social choice
a proposal is presented for a universal health care system. A majority of the deliberators
are for the system, yet some are reluctant. The majority, wanting consensus on the issue,
begins to ask questions of the minority, in order to find out what exactly the minority
disagrees with. It is determined through questioning that the minority agrees with the
majority that healthcare in general desirable, that healthcare should be provided for
everyone, that public health care could provide the same level of treatment and even that
healthcare run by the private sphere is no different than that run in the public sphere.
believe that public healthcare is too expensive for the government’s budget. At this
point, the deliberation seems to have made great progress towards consensus. But at the
same time the deliberators have found those dimensions on which they do and do not
through deliberation on the issues, rather than just the issue dimensions. To rehash my
first point, I believe that citizens will never be especially motivated to spend time
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deliberating in order to solve theoretical problems of aggregative stability by finding
politics in the hope of convincing others. These types of conversations are exactly the
types of deliberations that will have the effect of reducing the number of contested issue
dimensions, but they do so with an entirely different purpose. Therefore, Knight and
democracy theorists, John Dryzek and Christian List, see deliberation as being able to
induce single peakedness through several other mechanisms.26 First of all, deliberation
interests appeal to the group as a whole, and therefore are much more persuasive and
powerful in a larger group setting. Some examples of generalizable interests include “the
economist's idea of the public good,” 28 the satisfaction of the basic needs of life, or even
the utilitarian's idea of maximizing community utility. Each of these examples can be
used as a scale against which a number of alternatives could be measured. The power of
arguments relying upon generalizable interests is that they are justifiable in a public
debate to others, and thus are the only arguments that can survive in a deliberative
deliberation can be found in the experience of one of the representatives on the Resource
This individual, once included in the political deliberation, was convinced to follow the
societal dimension of understanding, rather than his own personal dimensions of interest.
His change of heart was likely in part due to his newfound understanding of the scope of
the situation due to deliberation – that the development would go forth, and his influence
was limited to the terms of that development – as well as a bit of the compromise that
Habermas argues will result in a political deliberation. In either account, the end result
was that deliberation transformed this individual's preferences from non to single-peaked.
set of experiments conducted by James Fishkin called deliberative polls. The poll is
political decision. Participants are then interviewed and invited to spend a weekend
discussing the issue at a common site. 31 Between the interview and discussion, the
participants are sent a “carefully balanced briefing” which lays out the various arguments
surrounding the policy question. 32 The weekend consists of randomized small groups
led by professionally trained moderators and intercessions where participants are allowed
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to question panels of experts, policy makers, and politicians. At the end of the
In a number of the deliberative polls it was found that deliberation brings personal
preference orders closer to single-peakedness, but only for issues of low to medium
salience. 34 Salience is the extent to which the issues were generally discussed and
known publicly. Their findings show that for issues that have not had much public
debate, those issues have a generally low initial single-peakedness, but once deliberated
On the other hand, issues with high salience saw virtually no change in their degree of
hand. 36
On the whole, these findings are encouraging for the prospects of deliberation
with respect to social choice theory. Deliberation, in these cases, has lived up to its
promise of not only increasing the knowledge of the deliberators, but also inducing a
Looking back at both the arguments of Dryzek and List, as well as the results from
deliberative polling, there is a philosophical and social effect that occurs in deliberation
that many of the deliberative theorists gesture toward. That effect is a transformation of
preferences, one that takes those personally held tastes and transforms them into publicly
think of a group of friends and their relationship to a number of alternatives in the form
of movies. If you were to ask each of the individuals in the group what their favorite
movie was, the list might be extensive and widely varied. However, this list would
almost certainly change if you asked the group to collectively choose a movie out of that
list to watch for the night. Each individual would then (in a considerate group of friends)
have to consider the best movie for the group, rather than their own tastes alone. The
movie chosen would likely be one that is acceptable to all, but not necessarily one that is
a favorite of any of the particular friends. Here, the tastes of the individuals play a role in
the deliberation about the choice of movies, however those tastes are not dominating in
the final decision. Instead, the publicly justifiable preferences are the ones that survive,
such as “everyone will enjoy this or that particular movie in some way,” or “this is the
only movie that no one is viscerally against.” In any case, their arguments, and thus the
preference structures for this particular decision differ from their individual tastes.
What Dryzek and List contend, and the Deliberative polls show, is that
deliberation changes individuals' preference orders, and on the whole makes them more
single-peaked. To reconsider the evidence from the deliberative polls, I argue that the
One of the most interesting findings reported in the study was the deliberative poll
on the Australian Head of State. The issue was classified as being of high salience, and
1-3. The dominant dimension is determined by analyzing the content of the preference
orders and finding the ordering which, when all preference orders are compared, exhibits
the most preference orders that are single peaked. So, for example, in the Nader-Gore-
Bush example, the dominant dimension was Nader-Gore-Bush, but the two other unique
dimensions are Gore-Nader-Bush (the individual who voted on entertainment value alone
would be single peaked here) and Nader-Bush-Gore. The final poll indicated a fairly
similar level of single-peakedness, again around 80 percent, but the dominant dimension
had switched to 1-2-3. Simply put, single-peakedness remained, but the ordering of the
dimension changed completely. List, Luskin, Fishkin,, and McLean, the publishers of the
deliberative poll in concert with the other deliberative polls start to show a definite trend,
that salience is directly correlated with single peakedness. Salience was defined by the
authors of the paper as the amount of public attention or thought that would have been
applied to the particular issue prior to the deliberative poll. That public attention and
thought likely corresponds to processes resembling the informal deliberation in the public
or public discussions of the issues of high salience. Furthermore, those individuals would
be likely to talk about those issues to others in common conversation. For issues of lower
salience, the individuals might know about the alternatives, but are much less likely to
arguably be connected to the ability to speak about the issue meaningfully. In other
be meaningful and in turn productive towards some end purpose. This is not to say that
without purpose are not communicative and thus not under the presuppositions of ideal
deliberation. On the other hand, conversations with purpose -one example being a
deliberative conversation whose purpose is to find common ground and thus consensus-
require some point of reference, some argumentative starting point in the form of a
single-peaked issue dimension for the participants to make arguments in the first place.
The empirical evidence suggests that, the more conversations held about resolving
become. Or, the more conversations take place, the more individuals adopt the single-
the group of friends conversing about movies. If they are attempting to determine what
movie to watch, they must have at least one common dimension that they can gesture
towards in their discussion. If the opposite were the case, if the friends were only to offer
their tastes for the night and nothing more, the conversation might sound something like
the following. “I want to watch ‘Pirates of the Caribbean’ to see Johnny Depp,” says
one, “It’s ‘Terminator’ all the way for me,” another chimes, “Well I like the ‘Princess
Bride,’” etc. This conversation will end, and nothing of substance will have been said.
Each will know what movie the other likes, but they are no closer to reaching an
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agreement. The conversation only becomes meaningful in the context of a purpose; 37
6
coordination. Certainly, if the purpose of conversation is to learn more about the others,
statements about personal tastes are enough. However, in order to have a conversation
about action coordination, the statements themselves must be in the context of this
purpose. The conversation only becomes meaningful with such statements as “everyone
would enjoy this movie,” statements that recognize and are catered to the context.
At this point, individuals might disagree on whether this or that particular movie
would satisfy the most people (especially in the case of limited knowledge about the
movies in question), but their conversation would at this point be most productive. Even
if a consensus could not be obtained, a quick majority vote would give an easy answer,
due to the single-peakedness and uni-dimensionality of the profiles, to which movie was
in order to speak to others productively about issues, then the odd results from the
Australian deliberative poll are more understandable. The issue was of high salience, and
thus many individuals were having informal deliberations about it before the deliberative
poll. In order for those conversations to be meaningful, they had to have some context,
6
It is possible that this sort of discussion is all that is needed for a close group of friends. If they
know each other well enough, the statement of preferences might be enough that they could each privately
decide on the best movie to watch as a group. However, I believe this private decision is not the result of
some special faculty for aggregating preferences, but instead is the result of many prior deliberations by the
group of friends which has in turn given each member enough information and personal sense of shared
destiny to forgo the actual deliberation and simulate the result of such a deliberation alone.
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which was evidenced by the high degree of single-peakedness. However, when more
information and experts were introduced, the context of the conversation must have
was that in order to be able to converse about the topic, the individuals needed some
low salience, the single-peakedness went up more drastically than any other time because
Dryzek and List claim that this single-peakedness comes from the necessity of
argument – that if you are trying to convince someone, you must use generalizable terms.
The process of presenting your privately held tastes into a public, purposeful, discussion
has a transformative effect that takes privately held tastes and converts those tastes into
publicly held, justifiable political beliefs. Democracy is not about what particular
alternative is liked by most individuals, but rather about which alternative survives
deliberation, and is thus a public or social choice. The context of choice being public
ensures that our preferences are similarly grounded in public argument and public issue
dimensions. So then, democracy makes sense with social choices that are made together
cycles prevent us from knowing the true will of the people, he is correct. Democracy
only makes sense when we do not have cycles, and we do not have aggregative cycles
when we deliberate.
Social choice theory and its claims of irrationality of democracy actually point us
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to the times that democracy is meaningful. Democracy is meaningful when we come
together as a common, free, and equal people trying to solve common problems with
one.
meaningful way all of the time. In asking what sort of mechanism can help us avoid
these problems, it is likely that deliberation is not only an answer, it may be the most
democracy, social choice theory shows us that democracy itself is meaningless without
is really a different way of saying that we have a similar view of the political dimension,
which means that we have single peaked preferences. Habermas is especially adept then
commonly solving problems of action coordination through deliberation, for this is the
Though the problems of aggregation do not disappear, they are now predictable. 38
Mackie reflects that “the Condorcet paradox is not so surprising: why would an
aggregation function work to reduce widely distributed disagreements? Voting does not
reduce disagreements, it can only register them.” 39 In other words, there is no substitute
peaked, we might want to reconsider what is meant by a “social choice”. When voting
aggregates a number of individual tastes, each on the whole uncorrelated with the next,
the outcome can be illogical. However, there was no an internal logic running through
this set of preferences in the first place. Yet, when there is logic to the preferences
viewed as a whole, or when through the act of coming together and discussing a choice
the profiles are single peaked, there is an identifiable collective understanding, or reason.
Therefore, when social choices return logical results we can call this a social choice, one
grounded in a collective discussion and public reason. Hence, Arrow and Riker's have
not proven the irrationality and meaninglessness of democracy, but instead they have
5.1 Introduction
The focus of the previous two chapters presented the problems of, and
deliberative solutions to, aggregating votes. The argument was made that the aggregation
the investigation analyzes the effect that the decision rule plays on deliberation's
The chapter will begin with a short discussion of the legitimation questions that
arise when political foundations of government are based upon majority, rather than
unanimous, rules. The following discussion will focus on two aspects of the interplay
between majority voting and deliberation aimed at unanimity, the psychological and the
normative. These discussions will show that the normative foundations of deliberative
democracy are better met when majority voting is an integral part of deliberation.
actual unanimity at the conclusion. Habermas believes that deliberation should be aimed
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at consensus, but that the consensus may not happen for some impractically long period
of deliberation. Therefore, it is only the nature of the debate, rather than its outcomes,
that make it legitimate. Specifically, there are two key pieces to the legitimacy of the
of the debate. On the other hand, a legitimate debate must be “violence free”, or free
from coercion, manipulation, and the imposition of ones’ will upon another. A legitimate
debate must be free from that which has the capacity to damage an individual’s trust and
personal agency required to fairly and freely make political decisions. Thus there are two
Arguments must be generalized and rationalized and they must be given in the context of
a fair and free debate. Deliberative democracy does not rule out majority rule, it only
decision making.
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The question that I wish to raise is whether deliberation alone is best suited to
decision rule better approximates an ideal deliberation in circumstances with high social
pressures to conform. In order to analyze the effect of different voting rules, I now turn
democracy. The investigations have shown that when individuals are placed together and
forced to find consensus on issues, there can be great social forces at play. Social forces,
or social pressure is often felt as the pressure to conform or pressure to act in a certain
way in a deliberation. Social forces work against the deliberative ideal in two specific
ways, creating group polarization and silencing of numerical minorities. Thus, social
communicative action, the only force on participants should be “the force of the better
argument.” These social forces seem to be in part created by tensions that arise due to the
produces stronger social forces within a group”2 than a group deciding under a majority
rule.
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5.3.1 Social Forces at Work: Polarization and Silencing of the Numerical Minority
“group polarization means that members of a deliberating group predictably move toward
personal injury cases show a dramatic polarization effect in which juries’ inclination to
the effect of polarization is to move individuals in groups to more extreme issue positions
across many types of discussions ranging from the value laden to the strictly
informational.
When a group moves towards an extreme point after deliberation, the more
homogeneous the ideological makeup of the group, the more polarization occurs.
farther toward the extreme, away from the general ideological center of society, and
who talk or even live, much of the time, in isolated enclaves,” 6 or enclave deliberation, is
important of which is that it moves the deliberating group away from, rather than toward
a societal consensus.
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7
Tali Mendelberg offers two psychological explanations for the effect of
polarization. Either group polarization may be driven by social comparison (“the attempt
group's norm, or “deliberators in the majority [offering] more novel and valid arguments
for their side.” 9 The force of the better argument should surely play an important role in
deliberative democracy, and so it is of little concern. However, the possibility that social
group discussions. For example, “in simulated jury deliberations in which a small
numerical minority disagrees with the majority, the minority often capitulates to the
majority even when it continues to disagree.” 10 Furthermore, “groups that must reach a
decision may tend to steamroll over inflexible minorities” 11 The minority that remains
silent and agrees publicly, but disagrees privately, undercuts the purpose and legitimacy
of deliberative democracy which rests upon each individual having full agency in the
rule forces individuals with deep disagreements to come to some agreement in a limited
amount of time. When agreement is not easily reached, the participant s might pressure
the dissenters to conform. Those in the majority might begin to feel angry or agitated at
those in the numerical minority for standing in the way of a collective decision. The
message in order to show solidarity and commitment to their message. 12 The majority
would then perceive the minority as inflexible, leading to a “steamrolling” of their views.
Though this is one of many possible paths towards a subjugation of the minority, it shows
how social pressure against dissent can grow and build quickly when the deliberators find
Both effects of group polarization and the silencing of numerical minorities show
that social forces in deliberation can have negative effects in terms of approximating the
communicative ideal. Social forces are most likely to be found in situation where the
conflict is deep, and the likelihood of success of the deliberation is lowest. 13 It is useful
these social forces are generated and how intense they might become. For example, at
the scale of a national population, or even a representative body, a unanimity rule would
place extreme pressure on anyone deviating from the norm to conform. This pressure
would be necessary to allow any political decisions to be made. For example, an endless
deliberation, due to the continued dissent of a few, on highway funding would lead to the
denigration of highways, etc. Individuals who rely on highways, or any other of the
Sirolly 89
government services or decisions, would undoubtedly become frustrated at the dissenters.
They might even resort to non-deliberative means such as threats of physical force, in
order to force consensus. When three hundred million individuals join together to decide
what action to take, and a lone dissenter can prevent that action, the pressures of
All hope, however, is not lost for minorities in a deliberation. For example,
“groups charged only with discussion for its own sake may be much more amenable to
giving an inflexible minority a full hearing.” 14 In deliberative processes akin to town hall
participants' desire for education, information-sharing, and the pursuit of consensus and
unity tended to push aside conflict.” 15 These kitchen table discussions were constructed
to purposefully create a civil, friendly, and cooperative atmosphere, very like what would
This begs the question, what differs between deliberations where the minorities
are “steamrolled” and those where minorities are included as integral members of the
deliberation? On a basic level, all minorities “can prod members of the majority to ask
themselves why the minority thinks as it does – in other words, through its arguments it
can force the majority to become more empathetic.” 16 But there seems to be a critical
point in the range of typologies of deliberation at which the appeal of minority arguments
no longer hold weight with the majority. That critical point is dependent upon the “social
Sirolly 90
appeal,” or the extent to which minority groups are viewed as socially acceptable and
non-divisive to the majority group. 17 This scale of social acceptability depends upon
both the ideological location of the group in contrast with the mean ideology of the
majority as well as the amount of resistance the minority group presents to the goal of the
majority deliberators. Also, minorities are most effective when they are not perceived as
socially divisive. 18
pressures are minimized. Social pressures are in general reduced under a majority rule
system. 19 However, the effect of a unanimous versus a majority decision rule seems to
be complex and has not been extensively studied. 20 Mendelberg gives the explanation,
In friendship groups, [strong social] forces need not mean that the minority
is silenced, coopted, or brought to obedient conformity. By contrast, in
groups lacking genuine ties of friendship, conformity often can mean
silence, cooption, or alienation. Where inequalities are small unanimous
rule probably works well; where they are large, unanimous rule may
exacerbate them.” 21
In Mendelberg's description, the picture of the effect of decision rules relies largely on
the type of deliberation. This seems intuitive, in that a group with strong social ties is
more likely to listen kindly to dissenters, whereas a large group that has many levels of
ideological stratification and life backgrounds has more difficulty incorporating every
deliberator into the final decision. However, Mendelberg also points to a way out, we
can change the amount of social pressure by changing the decision rule. Thus, majority
rule can be called upon to reduce social pressures within the context of an ongoing
Sirolly 91
deliberation when decisions are necessary.
The ideal deliberation almost certainly involves a finely tuned mixed of both
are ideally coming together by their own choosing to solve collective problems of action
consensus, by keeping an open mind and defending their own preferences. However, at
the same time social norms and temporal considerations can create great pressure on the
deliberators to find a way to induce or force consensus. Real world deliberations which
are forced to come to consensus then violate the second of Habermas's principles of a
connection to communicative action and voting within deliberation this context reduces
social pressure. By keeping deliberation and the orientation at consensus central, the
negative effects of voting are constrained (as shown in chapters 3 and 4) and the social
room on a hot summer day without air conditioning, eleven jurors enter the deliberation
ready to convict the defendant who is charged with murder. Because they must reach a
unanimous verdict, the majority, eleven strong, immediately express anger and
resentment towards the stand-alone dissenter once his position becomes clear. The social
pressures against dissent are clearly high to everyone in the room. In the process of
deliberation, the lone dissenter begins his argument, and is met only with greater anger
and increased pressure to acquiesce. The debate comes to an impasse, where his voice is
the only one against conviction, and so he asks for a vote to be taken. Surprisingly, the
Without the use of a vote, the second individual might have never spoken up. The
societal pressures being as great as they were, his voice would have likely been silenced
quickly. However, his voice was heard clearly and distinctly in his vote. 8 The privacy of
an anonymous vote allowed for a sincerity of statement not available in the deliberation.
As the deliberation progressed, the pivotal points in individuals’ decisions were not
moments of great argument, but rather the counting of votes. Though a fictional account,
“12 Angry Men” offers a revealing picture about how important voting can be for an
8
A bothersome empirical finding in jury deliberations is that, “typically, in a jury of twelve, three
members contribute over half of the statements, and over 20% remain silent” (Mendelberg 165).
Integrating voting as a part of the deliberative process may be a way to give naturally quiet individuals a
voice in the deliberation.
Sirolly 93
The jury deliberation example introduces a familiar concept in a new light. In the
earlier conversation about the deliberative citizen, there are two conceptions of the
citizen, the public and the private. The public view, derived from civic republicanism,
conceives of the citizen in the context of their public life. Their life is best developed
lived in a social and public -almost communitarian- context. The liberal conception, on
the other hand, views the citizen as a generally private individuals whose only
interactions were done in an economic, or market based, sense. These individuals pursue
The deliberative citizen is at the same time both, and neither, public and private.
Deliberative democracy requires that citizens are both public and private in order to
explains that:
A legal order is legitimate to the extent that it equally secures the co-
original private and political autonomy of its citizens; at the same time,
however, it owes its legitimacy to the forms of communication in which
civic autonomy alone can express and prove itself.... A well-protected
private autonomy helps secure the generation of public autonomy as much
as, conversely, the appropriate exercise of public autonomy helps to secure
the genesis of private law. 23
The deliberative citizen must be conceived of as both public and private. At the most
basic level, the public citizen enables for the authorship of law, whereas the private
citizen is able to secure individual autonomy. This conception is not solely theoretical.
As I have shown with the “12 Angry Men” example, the conception of the citizen as
Jean Cohen conceives of the private component of life as enabling some of our
Sirolly 94
most important capacities. She claims that, “moral autonomy, psychic integrity, and the
privacy does or should protect.” 24 Here the deep connection between private rights and
an ability to act as a public citizen becomes clear. Without “moral autonomy, psychic
is without standing and they are unable to make decisions. Without private personal
general creates social pressures. Under a majority rule, these pressures boil up quickly
when dissent is in the way of a necessary decision. Even within near-ideal deliberations,
participants. Deliberators in their pursuit of consensus, yet failing to convince the other
parties for an extended period of time will likely loose enthusiasm at some point. As the
time wears on, and agreement is still not found, deliberators might become exasperated
with the dissenters. At the very least, they will feel frustrated in not being able to help
the dissenters see their point of view. This deliberative steam, so to speak, builds up over
time, until it can find some release. However, like letting the steam out of a boiling pot, a
majority vote has the capacity to release any building deliberative pressure.
rule. This release of deliberative steam can depolarize the group and reintroduce the
of the citizen.
Majority rule vote provides a moment of private sincerity, away from the
deliberative forces. The act of voting is a time when individuals are able to take their
deliberatively formed preferences and re-evaluate them privately in a way that can reduce
the biases induced by social pressure. Without a private vote, deliberation is a wholly
public act, where participants must actively defend their ideals. At every moment,
hope for, one which forces the rationalization of individuals' arguments because of the
constant defense for those arguments. Empirical evidence shows that such an
especially likely when strong social pressures or identities exist [and] conflict is deep.” 26
In an especially intense deliberative process where the arguments and social pressures are
especially fierce, many people would likely feel attacked and vulnerable.
minorities, because those minorities feel like their one voice will be responded to by
many, sometimes angry, others. Furthermore, there is some evidence that suggests that
individuals are extremely hesitant to reverse their opinions publicly. 27 Politicians are
especially hesitant to admit any past mistakes because any such admittance would be
argumentative as well as the social pressure placed upon that individual. If individuals
reconsider their public statements and privately determine what they truly believe, they
may not have a public outlet in the deliberation immediately, but they can find their voice
Furthermore, the vote is the great equalizer, guaranteeing each individual one vote
and one voice. Whereas some speakers might have a better command of rhetoric or
the agreement of everyone. Voting is perhaps then the clearest indicator of how far we
must go in the search for consensus, or how deep a disagreement runs. Voting expresses
or idea can be quickly denied in deliberation through a flurry of argument, their vote must
be taken seriously. No longer must individuals worry about being embarrassed in the
public realm; instead they can vote sincerely and without fear of repercussion.
voting a publicly accountable act, where everyone's choices are made public
knowledge. 28 The argument goes that legitimate deliberation requires some insurance
that individuals are following through with their public arguments. Dryzek's worry is
orderings – yet still vote based on different private preference orderings.” 29 Therefore, if
voting is made public, “it is implausible that individuals would vote one way while
simultaneously talking another way.” 30 The spirit of this argument is almost certainly in
Sirolly 97
the right place, in that a deliberation is only valid if its participants are actually
internalizing and following through with their arguments. However, the idea that voting
should be made public feels very anti-democratic, and in fact under the deliberative
free from coercion. However, there are some occasions where deliberations cannot be
shielded from implicit and uncontrollable social and temporal pressures. Voting, in being
private, is largely able to protect individuals from coercion and social violence, at least
within the voting booth. This protection in the voting booth allows that un-coerced voice
private votes don't match up, then the deliberation is having little to no effect.
Furthermore, if the deliberation is not having an effect, then the very legitimacy of the
First, there is empirical evidence which shows that pubic statements are
and contexts, it appears that discussion does create a change in preferences for
deliberators. Secondly, when voting is private, it does not remove the burden of proof
from the voters. If there is some divergence in what was thought to be public opinion and
the outcome of a vote, public deliberation often shifts focus to that divergence. However,
Sirolly 98
the deliberation must now proceed under the new assumptions about individuals' issue
positions. This way, the deliberators are forced to confront the reality of individuals'
actual preferences, rather than those few preferences stated in deliberation. Therefore,
voting actually allows for a deeper debate and more consideration of arguments on both
sides. Thus, because the deliberation is necessary before and after the vote is important,
when it is understood as a pause the larger deliberation which registers the privately held
beliefs of all and makes their aggregate result available to the deliberators.
environment is able to protect itself against coercion and force. However, voting must
not become the center of the deliberative process. Voting viewed out of the context of a
deliberation aimed at consensus has almost innumerable negative effects. The negatives
offered by Riker, where democracy becomes a game of power, rather than a collective
voting as a market process, where the candidates or propositions are products, each
marketing themselves to be sold to more citizens than the next in order to find that all
important majority coalition. 32 Voting must be a tool, called upon at the right times, in a
deliberative process.
Voting must be only brief rest, where the deliberators gather themselves and
Sirolly 99
reassess their positions, rather than a full stop to debate. When voting signals the end of
debate, it almost certainly becomes too central and prevents the deliberation from
approaching the communicative ideal. The deliberation must always maintain an internal
connection to its original purpose, consensus, and if that purpose is explicitly denied, as
in the case of a vote ending deliberation, so then is the legitimacy of deliberation itself.
between the influences of deliberation and voting. In essence, the deliberation must
occur in such a way that the participants are invested in consensus, but that consensus is
not a requirement. Though this sounds like an almost impossible task, it is the task of
collectively, while coming from divergent life backgrounds. Every day citizens try to
stance. Though agreement is unexpected, it is still sought. It is when this process breaks
down, when both sides give up trying to convince and focus only on winning the next
I began with the question: Can deliberation and voting exist together without
harming one another, and if they can, is aggregation able to represent the outcomes of a
deliberation properly? The work social choice theory gave proof that there were times
when voting fails to determine a majority winner. However, a deliberative decision will
correct the problems of aggregation. On the question of whether voting and deliberation
are reconcilable normatively and psychologically, it appears that they are symbiotic, in
that where one fails, the other strives. Where deliberation is too public, and invades
individuals’ privacy too much, voting allows for private sovereignty. On the other hand,
If voting and deliberation must be made to work together, the key to success is
citizens’ orientations to consensus in a deliberative manner both on the practical and the
normative level. When voting becomes too important, when it rather than deliberation is
seen as the method of solving problems, democracy can be irrational and meaningless.
However, when voting is a tool, used to protect private rights in the context of a public
hardly extraordinary. I did not show the way to some new, more perfect form of
governance. Instead, what I have shown is almost tautological, in that I have “shown”
that democracy works. If deliberation and voting were irreconcilable, democracy would
almost certainly be a futile endeavor. Yet, democracy continues to flourish around the
world. All that I have shown is that both deliberation and voting must play important
roles in that endeavor. Even this conclusion seems obvious on a second thought. In our
democracy, we often speak of two negative extremes, when politics is all talk and no
action, and when politics becomes a game of strategy where talking heads do not talk to
Sirolly 101
each other, rather they talk at each other. In the first, politics needs a healthy injection of
majority-rule voting to enable decision making. In the second, politics has become
centered on voting and has lost its connection to ideal deliberation. Maybe then an
unstated criterion for the good government has always been, and will continue to be, the
constant search for the right balance of political deliberation and anonymous voting.
Sirolly 102
Endnotes
Abstract:
1
John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Chirchester: Columbia University Press, 1996).
Chapter 1:
1 Abraham Lincoln “Gettysburg Address” [final draft] November 19, 1863, Transcript
of Gettysburg Address [internet] available from
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=36&page=transcript.
2 James Bohman and William Regh, eds., Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason
and Politics (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997), xii.
3 Jon Elster, “The Market and the Forum', in Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland, eds,
Foundations of Social Choice Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1986), 103-132, at 112.
Chapter 2:
1 Dryzek argues that the more descriptive term is discursive democracy, but agrees that
the general usage is deliberative. John Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and
Beyond:Liberals, Critics, Contestations. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
2 Cohen mentions that he, Elster and Manin present parallel conceptions of Deliberative
Democracy. He comments that “the overlap is explained by the fact that Elster,
Manin, and I all draw on Habermas. Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic
Legitimacy in Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics. ed. Bohman
and Regh, Pg 88. Also ”Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond.
3 Though I generally cite only primary source material, I am indebted to the following
works in my understanding of Habermas's ideas of communicative action and
deliberative democracy: Bohman and Regh eds., Deliberative Deomocracy., Stephen
White ed. The Cambridge Companion to Habermas (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995)., David Rasmussen, Reading Habermas (Cambridge: Basil
Blackwell, 1990)., James Finlayson, Habermas: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005).,
4 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651).
5 James Johnson, “Habermas on Strategic and Communicative Action” Political Theory
19 (May 1991): 181-183.
6 Joseph Heath, Communicative Action and Rational Choice (Cambridge: The MIT
Sirolly 103
40 Ibid., 28.
41 Ibid., 29.
42 Amy Guntman and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2004), 133.
43 Ibid., 133
44 Ibid., 134
45 Ibid., 182
46 Ibid., 182
47 David Braybrook, “Changes of Rules, Issue-Circumscription and Issue Processing”
(forthcoming) in Democracy and Deliberation Democracy and Deliberation, James
Fishkin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991) 36-37.
48 James Bohman, Complexity, Pluralism, and the Constitutional State: On Habermas’s
Faktizitat und Geltung,” Law and Society Review, 28, no. 4 (1994) 921, 897-930.
49 Ibid., 922.
50 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 179.
Chapter 3:
20 Ibid., 47.
21 Ibid., 51.
22 Ibid., 41-64.
23 Ibid., 59-64.
24 Ibid., 60.
25 Ibid., 60.
26 Ibid., 65. Proof of the general manipulability of voting systems can be found in: Allan
Gibbard, “Manipulation of Voting Schemes, a General Result,” Econometrica, 41
(July, 1973): 587-601.
27 Paul Kiel, “GOP Donors Funded Entire PA Green Party Drive,” TPMmuckraker.com.
August 2, 2006 http://www.tpmmuckraker.com/archives/001256.php. (accessed
February 2007).
28 Riker, Liberalism Against Populsim. 141.
29 Ibid., 141.
30 Ibid., 145.
31 Ibid., 152.
32 Ibid., 152.
33 Ibid., 154.
34 Ibid.,155.
35 Ibid., 166.
36 Ibid., 166.
37 James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations
of Modern Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), 132.
38 This Example is taken with modification from: Gerry Mackie, Democracy Defended
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
39 The first two are from: John Dryzek and Christian List “Social Choice Theory and
Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation”, British Journal of Political Science, 33
(2003): 10, 1-28. The third is a natural extension of Habermas’s Between Facts and
Norms.
40 Dryzek and List, A Reconciliation, 10.
41 Ibid.
42 Gerry Mackie ‘All men are liars: Is deliberation meaningless?’ in John Elster, ed.,
Delibereative Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 97-122.
43 Dryzek and List, A Reconciliation, 10.
44 Ibid., 9.
45 Ibid., 11.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 This explanation of voter action is very similar to Strom’s idea of sophisticated voters
in: Gerald Strom, The Logic of Lawmaking: A special Theory Approach (Baltimore:
Sirolly 106
Chapter 4
32 Pg 11 Ibid
33 Pg 11 Ibid
34 Cynthia Farrar, Donald P. Green, Elizabeth Levy Paluck, Christian List, Robert
Luskin, and James Fishkin, “Experimenting with Deliberative Democracy:
Effects on Policy Preferences and Social Choice” (presentation, Marburg, Germany,
September, 18-21, 2003).
35 Ibid.,13-15, 28
36 Ibid., 16-18 Ibid.
37 A special thanks here to Professor Fleming and his course on Wittgenstien. Without
his guidance through the Philosophical Investigations this point would likely have
never presented itself to me.
38 Mackie, Democracy Defended, 387.
39 Ibid.
Chapter 5
20 Ibid., 178
21 Ibid.,
22 12 Angry Men, dir. Sidney Lumet, Orion-Nova Productions, 1957.
23 Jurgen Habermas, “Habermas on Law and Democracy: The Critical Exchanges:
Habermas's Proceduralist Paradigm of Law: Paradigms of Law,” Cardoza Law
Review, 17 (March 1996): 776-778.
24 Jean Cohen, Democray, Difference, and the Right of Privacy, in Democracy and
Difference ed. Sayla Benhabib (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 207.
25 Mendelberg, Deliberative Citizen,180-181.
26 Ibid., 181.
27 Diego Gambetta, “Claro! An Essay on Discursive Machisimo” in Jon Elster ed,
Deliberative Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 19-43.
28 Dryzek, A Reconciliation, 16.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., and Mendelberg, Deliberative Citizen, 178., and James Johnson “Is Talk Really
Cheap? Prompting Conversation Between Critical Theory and Rational Choice,”
American Political Science Review, 87 (March 1993): 81.
32 Bernard Manin, Elly Stein and Jane Mansbridge, “On Legitimacy and Political
Deliberation” Political Theory, 15 (Aug., 1987): 350 – 368. pp. 338-368.
Sirolly 109
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