The Journal of Politics, Vol. 75, No. 2, April 2013, E14 the ‘fleet in being’’’ (503).
n being’’’ (503). Heuser argues insurgencies,
doi:10.1017/S002238161300025X
The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity
to the Present. By Beatrice Heuser. (Cambridge
University Press, 2010.)
Carl von Clausewitz famously declared war as ‘‘the
continuation of politics by other means,’’ a statement
which has underpinned much scholarship and under-
standing of strategy. Despite his prevalence in ex-
planations of strategy, Clausewitz is but one of many
authors who eloquently theorized and considered the
role of force and its association with the aims of
political actors. While many see little need to look at
Clausewitz’s intellectual predecessors and contempo-
raries to understand strategy, Beatrice Heuser, a Pro-
fessor at the University of Reading, bucks this trend in
The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity
to the Present. The book provides a comprehensive
history in the evolution of strategic thought, making
apparent the contribution of many scholars who have
received little attention.
In her book, Heuser examines how strategy, that is,
‘‘the link between political aims and the use of force, or
its threat’’ (3), has been conceptualized over time by
military leaders, intellectuals, politicians and academics.
The Evolution of Strategy is structured logically—it
examines early writers on the use of military force
from Vegetius of the Roman era, through to the
commonly known Machiavelli, through to figures lesser
known to the general public such as Christine De Pisan
and Paul Hay Du Chastelet. Heuser adopts a historical
approach to identify the contemporary situation of the
writers, their relevant experience, both of which lead to
a nuanced understanding of their views vis-à-vis what
we would now call strategy.
Heuser examines the conceptual changes that
followed the Napoleonic period, particularly the evo-
lution of the perception of war as a possible change
agent linked to ‘‘Social Darwinism.’’ Heuser then
examines the ‘‘total war’’ of the First World War and
naval and maritime strategy. Heuser argues that
although naval and maritime strategies were influenced
by land-based strategy, they were largely a product of
respective countries’ geographical and unique factors.
Heuser finds air strategy and nuclear strategy drew
upon multiple concepts from naval strategy, ‘‘adopting
primarily the concepts of the blockade, deterrence and
Ó Southern Political Science Association, 2013
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along with ‘‘civil wars’’ and ‘‘people’s wars,’’ have
existed for centuries in various forms in addition to
major or ‘‘traditional’’ wars. Through her review of
wars and conflict, Heuser finds, ‘‘it is rarely, if ever,
possible to point to any precise dividing line between
politics and the use of armed force as its tool’’ (488).
While not an earth-shattering argument, as she points
out, this delineation is arbitrary, especially given his-
torical periods where the same person controlled both
politics and force, and the conflation of the politics and
armed force, which arose in the Second World War,
where the combatants involved their entire societies,
expansive military commitments, and political mach-
inations to bring about victory.
Heuser posits that while the evolution of thinking
about war and strategy has altered over time and is
best characterized as a history of ‘‘fluctuation, not
constants,’’ there are discernible thoughts that have
resurfaced over time (504). Namely, while there has
been a belief amongst notable authors that wars or
conflicts should only be conducted for just causes; they
have been conducted for many unjust or other
abhorrent reasons. Heuser finds that in such wars,
where the population is ‘‘mobilised by religion or other
ideologies to think of a cause as their own, the greater
the tendency towards total war’’ (500). Heuser also
concludes from her study that the desire for a decisive
battle without thoughts about the aftermath have also
altered over time, arising as an ideal between Napoleon
and the Second World War but again receding follow-
ing the introduction of nuclear weapons. Following the
rise of nuclear weapons came the rise of deterrence and
coercion in line with the weapons’ destructive power
and the return to prominence of limited wars to avoid
a nuclear exchange.
Heuser concludes with an interesting, if unex-
pected, plea for action. Heuser argues that while
humanitarian concepts and ethical conflict guided by
‘‘just war’’ principles and associated concepts have a
long historical history, for a number of centuries these
concepts were ignored to society’s detriment. Heuser
argues it is therefore incumbent upon each generation to
ensure the concepts remain accepted guidelines in
strategy and that strategists should ‘‘discard the notion
derived from Clausewitz that the aims of strategy should
be to impose our will unilaterally upon the enemy’’
(505). Heuser argues it is necessary to constantly
remember the benefits of peace and nonviolent means
ISSN 0022-3816
2 book review

to address grievances and slights, which are so common
in international relations, and to seek mutually advanta-
geous outcomes even in conflict. As actors must ensure
the losing party makes peace with their ‘‘new situation,
which they will only do if they have a stake in it, and the
prospect of a better life’’ (505).
As the introduction states, Heuser has compiled a
‘‘magisterial’’ analysis of the evolution of strategy and
her ability to synthesize such a collection of material
and present it coherently and critically over 594 pages
without losing the reader’s attention is a feat. Heuser
examines the works of a multitude of scholars over
time including leading Greek, Roman, French,
German, British, Australian, and modern American
scholars. Heuser draws upon a considerable range of
authors, from military leaders, public intellectuals, and
historians. It is the assortment of differing perspectives,
experiences, and cultures and its accessibility that
makes the book such a contribution to strategic
literature. Heuser contextualizes the unique addition
of each author, noting their contemporary situation,
their drawing on previous thought and their continu-
ation or deviation from the then prevailing thoughts
on strategy. Heuser adopts the role of an informed
observer, yet this is precisely what Heuser sought to
achieve, and were she to adopt a more polemical
approach or champion a particular author, the reader
would benefit less as a result. This book deserves a
place in the library of any reader with an interest in
war, strategy, history and well-written prose.
Thomas Messer

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All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).