ALBENSON vs.

COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. A Pacific Banking Corporation Check was paid and drawn
against the account of EL Woodworks. Check was later dishonored for the reason “Account Closed.” Company traced source of
check and later discovered that the signature belonged to one Eugenio Baltao. Albenson made an extrajudical demand upon Baltao
but the latter denied that he issued the check or that the signature was his. Company filed a complaint against Baltao for violation
of BP 22. It was later discovered that private respondent had son: Eugene Baltao III, who manages the business establishment,
EL Woodworks. No effort from the father to inform Albenson of such information. Rather the father filed complaint for damages
against Albenson.

ISSUE: Whether there is indeed cause for the damages against Albenson Enterprise.

RULING:
Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the civil code, petitioners didn’t have the intent to cause damage to the respondent or enrich
themselves but just to collect what was due to them. There was no abuse of right on the part of Albenson on accusing Baltao of
BP 22. There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act must be intentional. However, Article 20 does
not distinguish: the act may be done either "willfully", or "negligently".

Albenson Corp. honestly believed that it was private respondent who issued check based on ff inquiries:
 SEC records showed that president to Guaranteed was Eugene Baltao
 Bank said signature belonged to EB
 EB did not do his part in clarifying that there were in fact 3 Ebs, Jr., Sr. and the III.

There was no malicious prosecution on the part of Albenson: there must be proof that:
 the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person and
 that damages was initiated deliberately by defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless

Elements of abuse of right under Article 19:

1. there is a legal right or duty
2. exercised in bad faith
3. for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another

Elements under Article 21: contra bonus mores:

1. there is an act which is legal
2. but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public policy
3. it is done with intent to injure

A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal
for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission
or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the
action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the
right to litigate.

Alfredo Velayo vs Shell Company

FACTS: Prior to 1948, Commercial Airlines (CALI) owed P170k (abt. $79k) to Shell Company. CAL offered its C-54 plane as
payment to Shell Company (the plane was in California) but Shell at that time declined as it thought CALI had sufficient money
to pay its debt. In 1948 however, CALI was going bankrupt so it called upon an informal meeting of its creditors. In that
meeting, the creditors agreed to appoint representatives to a working committee that would determine the order of preference
as to how each creditor should be paid. They also agreed not to file suit against CALI but CALI did reserve that it will file
insolvency proceedings should its assets be not enough to pay them up. Shell Company was represented by a certain Fitzgerald
to the three man working committee. Later, the working committee convened to discuss how CALI’s asset should be divided
amongst the creditors but while such was pending, Fitzgerald sent a telegraph message to Shell USA advising the latter that
Shell Philippines is assigning its credit to Shell USA in the amount of $79k, thereby effectively collecting almost all if not the
entire indebtedness of CALI to Shell Philippines. Shell USA got wind of the fact that CALI has a C-54 plane is California and so
Shell USA petitioned before a California court to have the plane be the subject of a writ of attachment which was granted.

Meanwhile, the stockholders of CALI were unaware of the assignment of credit made by Shell Philippines to Shell USA and they
went on to approve the sale of CALI’s asset to the Philippine Airlines. In September 1948, the other creditors learned of the
assignment made by Shell. This prompted these other creditors to file their own complaint of attachment against CALI’s assets.
CALI then filed for insolvency proceedings to protect its assets in the Philippines from being attached. Alfredo Velayo’s
appointment as CALI’s assignee was approved in lieu of the insolvency proceeding. In order for him to recover the C-54 plane in
California, it filed for a writ of injunction against Shell Philippines in order for the latter to restrain Shell USA from proceeding
with the attachment and in the alternative that judgment be awarded in favor of CALI for damages double the amount of the C-
54 plane. The C-54 plane was not recovered. Shell Company argued it is not liable for damages because there is nothing in the
law which prohibits a company from assigning its credit, it being a common practice.

ISSUE: Whether or not Shell is liable for damages considering that it did not violate any law.

HELD: Yes. The basis of such liability, in the absence of law, is Article 21 of the Civil Code which states:

“Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage”.

Thus, at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy
for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. A
moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law, should be compensated by damages. Moral
damages (Art. 2217) may be recovered (Art. 2219). In Article 20, the liability for damages arises from a willful or negligent act
contrary to law. In this article, the act is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

Heirs of Nala v. Cabansag

FACTS: Artemio bought a 50-square meter property from spouses Eugenio and Felisa, part of a 400-square meter lot registered
in the name of the Gomez spouses.. In October, 1991, he received a demand letter from Atty. Alexander demanding payment for
rentals from 1987 to 1991 until he leaves the premises, as said property is owned by Purisima; failing which, civil and criminal
charges will be brought against him. This demand letter was followed by another demand letter. According to Artemio, the demand
letter caused him damages prompting him to file a complaint for damages against Purisima and Atty. Alexander. In their defense,
Atty. Alexander alleged that he merely acted in behalf of his client Purisima, who contested the ownership of the lot by Artemio.
Purisima alleged that the lot was pat of an 800-sq. meter property owned by her late husband, Eulogio, which was divided into
two parts. The 400-square meter lot was conveyed to the spouses Gomez by virtue of a fictitious deed of sale, with the agreement
that it will be held in trust by the Gomezes in behalf of their (Eulogio and Purisima) children. Artemio is only renting the property
which he occupies. She only learned of the deed of sale by the Gomez spouses to Artemio when the latter filed the case for
damages against her and Atty. Alexander.

ISSUE: Whether or not Artemio and Atty. Alexander and Purisima liable for damages, which the Court of Appeals affirmed.

HELD: In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle, the following requisites must concur: (a) the existence
of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. In the
present case, there is nothing on record which will prove that Nala and her counsel, Atty. Del Prado, acted in bad faith or malice
in sending the demand letters to respondent. In the first place, there was ground for Nala’s actions since she believed that the
property was owned by her husband Eulogio Duyan and that respondent was illegally occupying the same. She had no knowledge
that spouses Gomez violated the trust imposed on them by Eulogio and surreptitiously sold a portion of the property to respondent.
It was only after respondent filed the case for damages against Nala that she learned of such sale. Nala was acting well within her
rights when she instructed Atty. Del Prado to send the demand letters. She had to take all the necessary legal steps to enforce her
legal/equitable rights over the property occupied by respondent. One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury. Thus,
whatever damages are suffered by respondent should be borne solely by him.

Tenchavez v Escano (1965)

Facts:
Pastor Tenchavez), 32, married Vicenta Escano, 27, on Feb. 24, 1948, in Cebu City. As of June 1948, the newly-weds were already
estranged. On June 24, 1950, Escano left for the US. On Agugust 22, 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the
plaintiff in the State of Nevada on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character."
On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court. On September 13, 1954, Escano married an American
Russel Leo Moran in Nevada. She now lives with him in California and by him, has begotten children. She acquired American
citizenship on August 8, 1958. On July 30, 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint for legal separation and damages against VE and her
parents in the CFI-Cebu.
Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and Mina Escaño are undeserving of an award for damages because they are
guilty of contributory negligence in failing to take up proper and timely measures to dissuade their daughter Vicenta from leaving
her husband Tenchavez obtaining a foreign divorce and marrying another man (Moran). This theory cannot be considered: first,
because this was not raised in the court below; second, there is no evidence to support it; third, it contradicts plaintiff's previous
theory of alienation of affections in that contributory negligence involves an omission to perform an act while alienation of affection
involves the performance of a positive act.

Issues:
1. WON at the the time Escano was still a Filipino citizen when the divorce decree was issued.
2. WON the award of moral damages against Escaño may be given to Tenchavez on the grounds of her refusal to perform her
wifely duties, her denial of consortium, and desertion of her husband.

Held:
1. YES
At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine
law under Art. 15 of the NCC. Philippine law, under the NCC then now in force, does not admit absolute divorce but only provides
for legal separation.
For Phil. courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees bet. Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the declared policy of the
State, especially in view of the 3rd par. of Art. 17, NCC. Moreover, recognition would give rise to scandalous discrimination in favor
of wealthy citizens to the detriment of those members of our society whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and
obtain absolute divorce outside the Phils.
Therefore, a foreign divorce bet. Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the NCC, is not entitled to recognition
as valid in this jurisdiction.
2. YES
The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce, for grounds not countenanced by our law, which was hers at the time)
constitute a wilful infliction of injury upon plaintiff's feelings in a manner "contrary to morals, good customs or public policy" (Civ.
Code, Art. 21) for which Article 2219 (10) authorizes an award of moral damages.
It is also argued that, by the award of moral damages, an additional effect of legal separation has been added to Article 106. It
was plain in the decision that the damages attached to her wrongful acts under the codal article (Article 2176) expressly cited.
But economic sanctions are not held in our law to be incompatible with the respect accorded to individual liberty in civil cases.
Thus, a consort who unjustifiably deserts the conjugal abode can be denied support (Art. 178, Civil Code of the Phil.). And where
the wealth of the deserting spouse renders this remedy illusory, there is no cogent reason why the court may not award damage
as it may in cases of breach of other obligations to do intuitu personae even if in private relations physical coercion be barred
under the old maxim "Nemo potest precise cogi and factum".

Pe vs. Pe

FACTS:

Alfonso Pe, the defendant, was a married man, agent of La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory in Gasan Marinduque who was
treated like a son by Cecilio Pe, one of the petitioners. Cecilio introduced Alfonso to his children and was given access to visit
their house. Alfonso got fond of Lolita, 24 year old single, daughter of Cecilio. The defendant frequented the house of Lolita
sometime in 1952 on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Eventually they fell in love with each
other. Plaintiff brought action before lower court of Manila and failed to prove Alfonso deliberately and in bad faith tried to win
Lolita’s affection. The case on moral damages was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolita’s family on the ground of moral, good custom and public policy due to their
illicit affair.

HELD: The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides: Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner which is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he
who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by
the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary.
Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and
was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs
not only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs
reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs
even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love
affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of
events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of
Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable
considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00
as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.
Wassmer vs. Velez

Facts:

Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love decided to get married on September 4,
1954. On the day of the supposed marriage, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be that day to postpone their wedding because his
mother opposes it. Therefore, Velez did not appear and was not heard from again. Beatriz sued Velez for damages and Velez
failed to answer and was declared in default. Judgement was rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff P2.000 as actual
damages P25,000 as moral and exemplary damages, P2,500 as attorney’s fees. Later, an attempt by the Court for amicable
settlement was given chance but failed, thereby rendered judgment hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case.

Held:

Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But formally set a wedding and go through
all the necessary preparations and publicity and only to walk out of it when matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpable and unjustifiable to good customs which holds liability in accordance with Art. 21 on the New Civil
Code. When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under the same, moral and exemplary damages may not be awarded
when it is proven that the defendanr clearly acted in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.

TANJANCO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

From December, 1957, petitioner APOLONIO TANJANCO courted the respondent, ARACELI SANTOS, both being of legal age.
Tanjanco expressed and professed his undying love and affection for Santos who eventually reciprocated such feelings. With
Tanjanco’s promise of marriage in mind, Santos acceded to his pleas for carnal knowledge sometime in July, 1958. For one year,
Tanjanco had carnal access to Santos which eventually led to Santos getting pregnant. As a result of her pregnancy, Santos had
to resign from her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc. In her state of unemployment Santos became unable to support
herself and her baby, and because Tanjanco did not fulfill his promise of marriage she suffered mental anguish, a besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. Santos prayed to the court that Tanjanco be compelled to
recognize the unborn child she was bearing, and pay her for support and damages.

Tanjanco filed a motion to dismiss which the court granted for failure to state cause of action. Santos appealed the case to the
Court of Appeals and the latter decided the case, stating that no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of the unborn
child nor for its support, but a cause of action was present for damages, under Article 21 of the Civil Code. Tanjanco appealed
such decision pleading that actions for breach of a promise to marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction.

Issue: WON Tanjanco is compelled to pay for damages to Santos for breach of his promise to marry her.

Held:

No case can be made since the plaintiff Araceli was a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant
with repeated acts of intercourse. Such is not compatible to the idea of seduction. Plainly, there is voluntariness and mutual
passion; for had the appellant been deceived she would not have again yielded to his embraces much less for one year without
exacting fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage and she would have cut all relationship upon finding that the defendant
did not intend to fulfill his promises. One cannot be held liable for a breach of promise to marry.

In its decision, Court of Appeals relied upon the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to
support the original draft of the Civil Code. In the example set forth by the memorandum, Court of Appeals failed to recognize
that it refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. Seduction connotes the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or
abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. That definition of seduction is not consistent
with the position of Santos, who was of legal age, and granted carnal access to Tanjanco and had sexual relations with him for
one whole year. Rather than being deceived, Santos exhibited mutual passion to Tanjanco which is incompatible with the
premise behind the idea of seduction.

Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)

The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable, except upon lawful order of the court, or when public
safety or order requires otherwise as prescrbied by law. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceeding section, shall
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

FACTS:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1962, petitioner entered the
clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary,
forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private respondents
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs.
The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the
practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful means are admissible
as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical practice.

HELD:
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injuction declaring "the
privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks
herself aggrieved by her husband's infedility) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The
only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if there is a "lawful order from the court or which public safety or order
require otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other
and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infedility. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed her/his
integrity or her/his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife
may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be
examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one
to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

ROGELIO ABERCA, et al. vs. FABIAN VER, et al.

FACTS:

Sometime in the early 1980s, various Intelligence units of the AFP known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) were ordered
by respondents then Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground
houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila. In compliance thereof, the TFM raided
several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants. During these raids, certain members of the
raiding TFM confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to the 20 petitioners. Petitioners were arrested without
proper arrest warrants issued by the courts. For some period after their arrest, they were arrested without denied visits of relatives
and lawyers; interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel, through threats, torture and other forms of violence in
order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them.

Plaintiffs then filed an action for damages before the RTC of Quezon City against respondents-officers of the AFP headed
by Ver. Respondents, in their motion to dismiss, claimed that (1) the wrti of habeas corpus was suspended, thus giving credence
to petitioners’ detention; (2) respondents were immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties, and
that (3) the complaint did not state a cause of action against respondents.

On November 8, 1983, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss the case. A motion to set aside the order dismissing the
complaint, and a supplemental motion for reconsideration were filed by petitioners. On May 11, 1984, the trial court, without
acting on the motion to set aside the Order of Nov. 8, 1983, declared the finality of said Order against petitioners. After their
motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC, petitioners then filed the instant petition for certiorari, on March 15, 1985,
seeking to annul and set aside the respondent court’s resolutions and order.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches
conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution;

(2) Whether or not respondents may invoke state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of official duties and
functions;
(3) Whether or not a superior officer, under the notion of respondeat superior, be answerable for damages jointly and severally
with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated.

HELD:

(1) The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus (PWHC) does not destroy petitioners’ right and cause
of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not
render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from
detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for damages are explicitly recognized in PD 1755
which amended Art. 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following text: However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the
plaintiff or for quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers
or authority arising from martial law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within
one year.

Even assuming that the suspension of the PWHC suspends petitioners’ right of action for damages for illegal arrest and
detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents’ confiscation
of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.

The question became moot and academic since the suspension of the PWHC had been lifted with the issuance of then
Pres. Corazon Aquino of Proclamation No. 2 on March 25, 1986.

(2) It may be that the respondents, as members of the AFP, were merely responding to their duties, as they claim, “to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion” in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of Pres.
Marcos, despite the lifting of Martial Law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre-emptive strikes
against alleged CT underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or roving commission untrammeled by
any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined and protected
by the Constitution.

Article 32 of the Civil Code, which renders any public officer or employees, or any private individual, liable in damages
for violating the constitutional rights and liberties of another, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges
are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Revised Penal
Code or other penal statute.

This is not say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their mission
with vigor, to protect the Philippines from its enemies, whether of the left or of the right, or from within or without, seeking to
destroy or subvert our democratic institutions and imperil their very existence. What is meant is that in carrying out their task
and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed; otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. In
the battle of competing ideologies, the struggle of mind is just as vital as the struggle of arms. The linchpin in that psychological
struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or compromised, the struggle may well be abandoned.

(3) The doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable in this case. It has been generally limited in its application to
principal and agent or to master and servant relationships. No such relationship exists superiors of the military and their
subordinates. However, the decisive factor in this case is the language of Art. 32, Civil Code; the law speaks of an officer or
employee or person “directly” or “indirectly” responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus,
it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Art. 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the
damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Art. 32 makes the persons who are directly as well as indirectly responsible for
the transgression joint tortfeasors.

MHP GARMENTS, INC vs. CA

FACTS:

In February 1983, petitioner MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the exclusive
franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum
Agreement, MHP was given the authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal
sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies." Sometime in October 1983, MHP received information that private
respondents were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority. Larry de Guzman (“Larry”), an
employee of MHP, was then tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to make a report to the Philippine
Constabulary (PC).
 On October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 A.M., Larry, Captain Renato M. Peñafiel, and 2 other constabulary men of the
Reaction Force Battalion went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina Public Market. WITHOUT any warrant, they
seized the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and suits on display at respondents' stalls. The seizure caused a
commotion and embarrassed private respondents. Receipts were issued for the seized items and the items were then
turned over to MHP for safekeeping.

A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private respondents but during its pendency, Larry
exacted from respondent Lugatiman P3,100.00 in order to be dropped from the complaint. However, after the
preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint against all the private respondents and
ordered the return of the seized items. The seized items were not immediately returned despite demands. Private
respondents had to go personally to petitioners' place of business to recover their goods, and even then, not all the
seized items were returned and the other items returned were of inferior quality.

Private respondents filed a civil case for sums of money and damages against MHP and Larry (note: the PC officers were
not sued for damages). The RTC ruled in favor of the private respondents which was later on affirmed by CA.

ISSUES:

1. Did CA err in imputing liability for damages to petitioners who did not effect the seizure?

NO. While undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding team should have been included in the complaint for violation of
the private respondents' constitutional rights, still, the omission will not exculpate petitioners. Despite the sufficiency of
time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents. In doing so, they took the risk of
a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of private respondents against
unreasonable search and seizure. In the case at bench, the search and seizure were clearly illegal. There was no
probable cause for the seizure.

The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman did not lift a finger to stop the
seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he was liable to the same
extent as the officers themselves.

In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, we ruled for the recovery of damages for violation of constitutional rights and
liberties from public officer or private individual. The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal.
It is NOT necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat
the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights.

In, Aberca vs. Ver, the court held that in Art. 32, the law speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or
indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor
alone (i.e., the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party… it should nonetheless be made
clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as
indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.

2. Did CA err in finding that the seizure was done in a tortious manner but penalized the petitioners who did not
commit the act of confiscation?

NO. The respondent court correctly granted damages to private respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved in
transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure:

 FIRST, They instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake the
prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies.
 SECOND, Under Letter of Instruction No. 1299, petitioners miserably failed to report the unlawful peddling of
scouting goods to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines for the proper application of a warrant.
 THIRD, If petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they should have filed a third-party complaint against the
raiding team for contribution or any other relief, in respect of respondents' claim for Recovery of Sum of Money
with Damages. Again, they did not.