Republic of the Philippines 11. Aquino, Martina 66.

94%
SUPREME COURT 12. Bassig, Pio P. 66.84%
Manila 13. Rumpon, Danilo P. 65.61%
EN BANC 14. Zareno, Bernardo 65.57%
15. Madrid, Angel S. 65.57%
G.R. No. 101251 November 5, 1992 16. Callangan, Napoleon 65.45%
ELISEO A. SINON, petitioner, 17. Fiesta, Felicisimo 65.29%
vs. 18. Alvarez, Benefranco 64.99%
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE-REORGANIZATION 19. Baggayan, Samuel O. 64.42%
APPEALS BOARD AND JUANA BANAN, respondents. 20. Umbay, Pedro T. 64.01%
21. De la Cruz, Florencio M. 62.07%
CAMPOS, JR., J.: 22. Leonador, Ernesto T. 61.88%
This petition for certiorari seeks to annul the following Resolutions of the public respondents 23. Miguel, Jose 61.86%
Civil Service Commission (the "CSC") * and Department of Agriculture Reorganization Appeals 24. Berlan, Herminia C. 61.76%
Board (the "DARAB"), ** to wit: 25. Soliman, Clemente 61.52%
1. Resolution No. 97 dated August 23, 1989, issued by respondent DARAB which revoked 26. Llopis, Lino 61.47%
petitioner's permanent appointment as Municipal Agriculture Officer (MAO) and appointed, in 27. Baliuag, Felicidad 61.39%
his stead, private respondent Juana Banan (Rollo 17); 28. Aresta, Leticia 60.67%
2. Resolution dated February 8, 1991 issued by the respondent CSC affirming the aforemen- 29. Sinon, Eliseo A. 60.66% 2
tioned Resolution of respondent DARAB (Rollo 22); (Emphasis supplied)
3. Resolution dated July 11, 1991 issued by the respondent CSC which denied petitioner's Thus, respondents Banan filed an appeal with the DARAB for re-evaluation of the qualification
motion for the reconsideration of the respondent Commission's Resolution dated February 8, of all those included in the aforementioned list made by the Placement Committee.
1991. 1 On August 23, 1989, the DARAB released Resolution No. 97 in which the ranking for 29 MAO
The antecedent facts are as follows: prepared by the Placement Committee was re-evaluated as follows:
Prior to the reorganization of the then Minister of Agriculture and Food (the "MAF"), the private 1. Binoya, Vicente 76.20%
respondent Juana Banan was the incumbent Municipal Agricultural Officer (MAO) of the afore- 2. Cabana, Isidro 75.01%
said Minister in Region II, Cagayan, while the petitioner Eliseo Sinon occupied the position of 3. Sebastian, Alice 72.18%
Fisheries Extension Specialist (FES) II in the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources 4. Zingapan, Benjamin 70.73%
(BFAR) in the same region. 5. Guzman, Wilhemina de la P. 70.50%
However, the reorganization of the MAF into the Department of Agriculture (the "DA"), with the 6. Gervacio, Agnes 70.04%
issuance of Executive Order No. 116 dated 30 January 1987, called for the evaluation of the 7. Somera, Hilario S. 68.13%
following employees for twenty nine position of MAO in Region II, Cagayan. The list as pre- 8. Tolentino, Julian Jr. 67.22%
pared by the Placement Committee included the herein petitioner Sinon but excluded the re- 9. Guillermo, Pedro 67.22%
spondent Banan: 10. Tambio, Rodolfo 67.00%
1. Binoya, Vicente 76.20% 11. Aquino, Martina D. 66.94%
2. Cabana, Isidro 75.01% 12. Bassig, Pio P. 66.84%
3. Sebastian, Alice 74.18% 13. Rumpon, Danilo P. 65.61%
4. Zingapan, Benjamin 70.73% 14. Madrid, Angel 65.57%
5. Guzman, Wilhemina de la P. 70.50% 15. Callangan, Napoleon 65.45%
6. Gervacio, Agnes 69.86% 16. Fiesta, Felicisimo 65.29%
7. Somera, Hilario S. 68.13% 17. Alvarez, Benefranco 64.99%
8. Tolentino, Julian R. 67.64% 18. Baggayan, Samuel O. 64.42%
9. Guillermo, Pedro 67.22% 19. Umbay, Pedro T. 64.01%
10. Tambio, Rodolfo 67.00% 20. De la Cruz, Florencio M. 62.07%
21. Leonador, Ernesto T. 61.88%
22. Miguel, Jose L. 61.86%
23. Berlan, Herminia C. 61.76%
24. Soliman, Clemente 61.52%
25. Zareno, Bernardo 61.50%
26. Llopis, Lino 61.47%
27. Baliuag, Felicidad 61.39%
28. Aresta, Leticia 60.67%
29. Banan, Juana 59.32% 2
(Emphasis supplied)
In this re-evaluation, petitioner Sinon was displaced by the respondent Banan and this same
resolution was duly approved by the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, Carlos G.
Dominguez, who also affixed his signature on the same date.
However, on August 30, 1988, Sinon received an appointment as MAO for Region II in Caga-
yan as approved by Regional Director Gumersindo D. Lasam on the basis of the first evaluation
made by the Placement Committee.
Thus, Sinon filed an appeal docketed as Civil Service Case No. 573 on November 22, 1989 to
the CSC. This appeal was granted mainly for two reasons: first, the respondent DARAB failed
to file its Comment within the period required; and second, the evaluation of the qualification of
the employees is a question of fact which the appointing authority or the Placement Committee
assisting him is in a better position to determine. Hence, the Resolution dated 28 February
1989 of the DARAB was set aside. 4
On March 19, 1990, Banan filed a Motion for Reconsideration in which she pitted her qualifica-
tions against Sinon for the last slot in the 29 available MAO positions. At the same time, she
pointed out that to allow the findings of the Placement Committee to supersede the DARAB
resolution which the Secretary of Agriculture had approved would be tantamount to giving prec-
edence to the Placement Committee over the head of the agency.
Finally, on February 8, 1991, CSC, after reviewing the Comment filed by the DARAB which had
not been considered earlier in the Civil Service Case No. 573, the CSC granted respondent
Banan's Motion for Reconsideration and gave due course to her appointment by the DARAB.
On March 21, 1991, Sinon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the February 8, 1991 Resolu-
tion which however was denied by the CSC in its assailed Resolution dated July 11, 1991.
According to the respondent CSC:
Mr. Sinon strongly argued that the findings of the Placement Committee on the qualifications
of the parties should be accorded deference and greater weight over that of the RAB. Under
the Placement Committee's evaluation, Mr. Sinon garnered 60.66 while Ms. Juana Banan
earned 57.32 after assessing the contending parties qualification in education, relevant expe-
rience, eligibility and other factors. Following the request of several parties for reevaluation, the
RAB in their decision gave Mr. Sinon 57.66 while Ms. Banan obtained 59.32. Seemingly the
findings of the two bodies are in conflict. Mr. Sinon argues that the findings of the Placement
Committee should prevail since it is specially mandated by RA 6656.
We disagree. The Placement Committee's function is recommendatory in nature. The agency's
Reorganization Appeals Board was specially created by the Circular of the Office of the Presi-
dent dated October 2, 1987 and conferred with authority to review appeals and complaints of
officials and employees affected by the reorganization. the decision of the agency RAB has the
imprimatur of the Secretary of that agency and is therefore controlling in matters of and is
therefore controlling in matters of appointment. Under this principle, the decision of the DARAB
in this case enjoys precedence over the Placement Committee. 5
Hence, this petition was filed with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order to enjoin the execution of the assailed resolutions.
Without giving due course to the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction, the court required
the parties to file their respective Comments. 6
On 12 November 1991, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective Memoranda. 7
The main issue for Our consideration is this: whether or not the CSC committed grave abuse
discretion in reviewing and re-evaluating the ring or qualification of the petitioner Sinon.
The arguments of the petitioner can be summed up as follows:
1). In issuing the Resolution of 8 February 1991, the CSC in effect revoked the appointment
that the petitioner received as early as 30 August 1989 and which was deemed permanent by
virtue of the approval of the Regional Director of the Department of Agriculture:
2). In giving petitioner a rating of only 57.66%, 8 from his previous rating of 60.66% and at the
same time according a rating of 59.32% to private respondent from a rating of only 57.32%,
the CSC departed from its power which is limited only to that of "review", and hence encroached
upon the power of appointment exclusively lodged in the appointment authority;
3) In giving due course to the appointment of respondent Banan in its Resolution of 8 February
1991, CSC was directing the appointment of a substitute of their own choice when the power
to appoint was exclusively lodged in the appointing authority.
We rule as follows.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility.9
Contrary to the allegations of the petitioner, We do not find any evidence of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CSC when it issued Resolution dated 8 February 1991 which in
effect approved the appointment of respondent Banan over petitioner Sinon.
With the reorganization of the MAF into the DA with Executive order No. 116, it became imper-
ative to "protect the security of tenure of Civil Service Officers and employees in the implemen-
tation of government reorganization". Thus, Congress passed Republic Act No. 6656. 10
It was under the same law of R.A. 6656 that the Placement Committee was created:
Section 6. In order that the best qualified and mot deserving persons shall be appointed in any
reorganization, there shall be created a Placement Committee in each department or agency
to assist the appointing authority in the judicious selection and placement of personnel. The
Committee shall consist of two (2) members appointed by the head of the department or
agency, a representative of the appointing authority, and two (2) members duly elected by the
employees holding positions in the first and second levels of the career service: Provided, that
if there is a registered employee association with a majority of the employees as members, that
employee association shall also have a representative in the Committee: Provided, Further,
that immediately upon the approval of the staffing pattern of the department or agency con- Neither do we find in the Resolution of 8 February 1991, any statement by the CSC directing
cerned, such staffing pattern shall be made known to all officers and employees of the agency the appointment of the respondent Banan. Hence, there was no directive from the CSC that
who shall be invited to apply for any of the positions authorized therein. Such application shall may be misinterpreted as a usurpation of any appointing power. 18
be considered by the committee in the placement and selection of personnel. (Emphasis sup- Besides, in affirming the appointment of Banan as recommended by the DARAB and approved
plied). by the Secretary of Agriculture, the CSC is only being consistent with the law. Section 4 or R.A.
To "assist" mean to lend an aid to, 11 or to contribute effort in the complete accomplishment of 6656 mandates that officers and employees holding permanent appointments shall be given
an ultimate purpose intended to be effected by those engaged. 12 preference for appointment to the new positions in the approved staffing pattern comparable
In contrast, to "recommend" 13 is to present one's advice or choice as having one's approval to their former positions. Also, the term incumbent officer and the privileges generally accorded
or to represent or urge as advisable or expedient. It involves the Idea that another has the final to them would more aptly refer to Banan and not to petitioner Sinon whose appointment was
decision. never confirmed completely. 19 There is no dispute that the position of MAO in the old staffing
Clearly, the Placement Committee was charged with the duty of exercising the same discre- pattern is most comparable to the MAO in the new staffing pattern.
tionary functions as the appointing authority in the judicious selection and placement of per- Finally, the Solicitor General in behalf of the CSC correctly noted that the petitioner Sinon had
sonnel when the law empowered it to "assist" the appointment authority. conveniently omitted the then Secretary of Agriculture who had affixed his approval on the
The same law also allows any officer or employee aggrieved by the appointments to file an findings of the DARAB. Petitioner Sinon knew fully well that as head of the agency, the Secre-
appeal with the appointing authority who shall made a decision within thirty (30) days from the tary of Agriculture was the appointing authority.
filing thereof. If the same employee is still not satisfied with the decision of the appointing au- It must be recalled that the whole purpose of reorganization is that is it is a "process of restruc-
thority, he may further appeal within ten (10) days from the receipt thereof the CSC. 14 turing the bureaucracy's organizational and functional set-up, to make it more viable in terms
In the case at bar, the Circular dated October 2, 1987 of the Office of the President created the of the economy, efficiency, effectiveness and make it more responsive to the needs of its public
agency Reorganization Appeals Board to address the problem of the employees affected by clientele as authorized by law." 20 For as long as the CSC confines itself within the limits set
the reorganizations. out by law and does not encroach upon the prerogatives endowed to other authorities, this
The foregoing legal measures spell out the remedies of aggrieved parties which make it im- Court must sustain the Commission.
possible to give the status of finality to any appointment until all protests or oppositions are duly WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED with costs against the petitioner.
heard. SO ORDERED.
Thus, while it is true that the appointment paper received by petitioner Sinon on 30 August
1989 for the position of MAO had not conferred any permanent status and was still subject to
the following conditions attached to any appointment in the civil service:
Provided that there is no pending administrative case against the appointee, no pending protest
against the appointment, nor any decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the
approval of the appointment . 15
Hence, for as long as the re-evaluation of the qualification filed by Banan was pending, the
petitioner cannot claim that he had been issued with a "complete" appointment. Neither is there
any point in asserting that his appointment had "cured" whatever changes was subsequently
recommended by the DARAB. 16
The fact that the DARAB is capable of re-evaluating the findings of the Placement Committed
only to find that Sinon is not qualified should no be taken as a grave abuse of discretion.
We cannot subscribe to petitioner Sinon's insistence that the public respondent CSC had dis-
regarded the findings of the Placement Committee. The truth is, these findings of the Place-
ment Committee. The truth is, these findings were re-evaluated and the report after such re-
evaluation was submitted to and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture. The CSC affirmed
the findings of the DARAB.
Because of all the foregoing circumstances, the jurisprudence cited by the petitioner Sinon
appears to be incorrect. 17
 The Case
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order, seeking to declare as unconstitutional Executive Order No. 13, entitled, "Abol-
ishing the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission and Transferring Its Investigative, Adjudicatory
and Recommendatory Functions to the Office Of The Deputy Executive Secretary For Legal
Affairs, Office of the President",1 and to permanently prohibit respondents from administratively
proceeding against petitioner on the strength of the assailed executive order.
The Facts
On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12
(E.O. 12) creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power
to investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption,
among others, against presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations
to the President. Pertinent portions of E.O. 12 provide:
Section 4. Jurisdiction, Powers and Functions. –
(a) x x x xxx xxx
(b) The Commission, acting as a collegial body, shall have the authority to investigate or hear
administrative cases or complaints against all presidential appointees in the government and
any of its agencies or instrumentalities xxx
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Section 8. Submission of Report and Recommendations. – After completing its investigation or
hearing, the Commission en banc shall submit its report and recommendations to the Presi-
dent. The report and recommendations shall state, among others, the factual findings and legal
conclusions, as well as the penalty recommend (sic) to be imposed or such other action that
may be taken."
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13
(E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Exec-
utive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investi-
gative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD). The full text of the assailed executive order reads:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 13
ABOLISHING THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION AND TRANSFERRING ITS
Republic of the Philippines INVESTIGATIVE, ADJUDICATORY AND RECOMMENDATORY FUNCTIONS TO THE OF-
SUPREME COURT FICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE
Manila PRESIDENT
EN BANC WHEREAS, this administration has a continuing mandate and advocacy to fight and eradicate
G.R. No. 196425 July 24, 2012 corruption in the different departments, bureaus, offices and other government agencies and
PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., Petitioner, instrumentalities;
vs. WHEREAS, the government adopted a policy of streamlining the government bureaucracy to
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGA- promote economy and efficiency in government;
TIVE AND ADJUDICATORY DIVISION, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as WHEREAS, Section VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the President shall
Executive Secretary, and HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Fi- have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices;
nance, and as an ex-officio member of the Monetary Board, Respondents. WHEREAS, Section 31 Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of Executive Order 292 (Administrative
DECISION Code of 1987) provides for the continuing authority of the President to reorganize the adminis-
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: trative structure of the Office of the President;
WHEREAS, Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1416 (Granting Continuing Authority to the President
of the Philippines to Reorganize the National Government), as amended by PD 1722, provides
that the President of the Philippines shall have continuing authority to reorganize the adminis-
trative structure of the National Government and may, at his discretion, create, abolish, group,
consolidate, merge or integrate entities, agencies, instrumentalities and units of the National
Government, as well as, expand, amend, change or otherwise modify their powers, functions
and authorities;
WHEREAS, Section 78 of the General Provisions of Republic Act No. 9970 (General Appropri-
ations Act of 2010) authorizes the President of the Philippines to direct changes in the organi-
zational units or key positions in any department or agency;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, do hereby order the following:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the government to fight and eradicate graft
and corruption in the different departments, bureaus, offices and other government agencies
and instrumentalities.
The government adopted a policy of streamlining the government bureaucracy to promote
economy and efficiency in the government.
SECTION 2. Abolition of Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC). To enable the Office of
the President (OP) to directly investigate graft and corrupt cases of Presidential appointees in
the Executive Department including heads of government-owned and controlled corporations,
the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) is hereby abolished and their vital functions and
other powers and functions inherent or incidental thereto, transferred to the Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), OP in accordance with the provisions of this
Executive Order.
SECTION 3. Restructuring of the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs,
OP. In addition to the Legal and Legislative Divisions of the ODESLA, the Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division shall be created.
The newly created Investigative and Adjudicatory Division shall perform powers, functions and
duties mentioned in Section 2 hereof, of PAGC.
The Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (DESLA) will be the recommending authority
to the President, thru the Executive Secretary, for approval, adoption or modification of the
report and recommendations of the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division of ODESLA.
SECTION 4. Personnel Who May Be Affected By the Abolition of PAGC. The personnel who
may be affected by the abolition of the PAGC shall be allowed to avail of the benefits provided
under existing laws if applicable. The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is hereby
ordered to release the necessary funds for the benefits of the employees.
SECTION 5. Winding Up of the Operation and Disposition of the Functions, Positions, Person-
nel, Assets and Liabilities of PAGC. The winding up of the operations of PAGC including the
final disposition or transfer of their functions, positions, personnel, assets and liabilities as may
be necessary, shall be in accordance with the applicable provision(s) of the Rules and Regu-
lations Implementing EO 72 (Rationalizing the Agencies Under or Attached to the Office of the
President) dated March 15, 2002. The winding up shall be implemented not later than 31 De-
cember 2010.
The Office of the Executive Secretary, with the assistance of the Department of Budget and
Management, shall ensure the smooth and efficient implementation of the dispositive actions
and winding-up of the activities of PAGC.
SECTION 6. Repealing Clause. All executive orders, rules, regulations and other issuances or
parts thereof, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, are hereby
revoked or modified accordingly.
SECTION 7. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication
in a newspaper of general circulation.
On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODE-
SLA a complaint affidavit2 for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr.,
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well
as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco, Susana
Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin, which arose from the
purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven
(445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order3 signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their respective written explanations
under oath. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad
Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and charge of grave miscon-
duct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-
10-0426-I, is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Now alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available to him in the ordi-
nary course of law, petitioner has resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition
upon the following grounds:
I. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE
TO CREATE A PUBLIC OFFICE.
II. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE
TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS.
III. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO
DELEGATE QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.
IV. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR ENCROACHING UPON THE POWERS OF THE
OMBUDSMAN.
V. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE GUARANTEE OF DUE PRO-
CESS.
VI. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
Our Ruling
In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13, petitioner asseverates that the President is not
authorized under any existing law to create the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, Office
of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA) and that by creating a new,
additional and distinct office tasked with quasi-judicial functions, the President has not only
usurped the powers of congress to create a public office, appropriate funds and delegate quasi-
judicial functions to administrative agencies but has also encroached upon the powers of the
Ombudsman. Petitioner avers that the unconstitutionality of E.O. 13 is also evident when
weighed against the due process requirement and equal protection clause under the 1987
Constitution.
The contentions are unavailing.
The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department under E.O.
292.
Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code
of 1987, vests in the President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in
order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. E.O. 292 sanctions the following actions
undertaken for such purpose:
(1)Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the im-
mediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff
Support System, by abolishing, consolidating, or merging units thereof or transferring functions
from one unit to another;
(2)Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency
as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and Agen-
cies; and
(3)Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency
as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other departments or agencies.4
In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora5 the Court affirmed that the President's
authority to carry out a reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department is
an express grant by the legislature by virtue of E.O. 292, thus:
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or
agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very
source of the power – that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31,
Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987),
"the President, subject to the policy of the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other
Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. (Emphasis supplied)
And in Domingo v. Zamora,6 the Court gave the rationale behind the President's continuing
authority in this wise:
The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President
to reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of the Pres-
ident is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office
of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner
he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the
command post of the President. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created
within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing
"delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.
Generally, this authority to implement organizational changes is limited to transferring either an
office or a function from the Office of the President to another Department or Agency, and the
other way around.7
Only Section 31(1) gives the President a virtual freehand in dealing with the internal structure
of the Office of the President Proper by allowing him to take actions as extreme as abolition,
consolidation or merger of units, apart from the less drastic move of transferring functions and
offices from one unit to another. Again, in Domingo v. Zamora8 the Court noted:
However, the President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2)
and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the Pres-
ident Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the
President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from
one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President's power
to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the
President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President
to Departments or Agencies, and vice versa.
The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under Section 31(1) on the one
hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects employees' tenurial
security but also insofar as it touches upon the validity of the reorganization, that is, whether
the executive actions undertaken fall within the limitations prescribed under E.O. 292. When
the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of a Chairman and two (2) Commis-
sioners who held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively,9 and was placed
directly "under the Office of the President."10 On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the
functions of the PAGC have now been transferred, is an office within the Office of the President
Proper.11 Since both of these offices belong to the Office of the President Proper, the reorgan-
ization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the ODESLA is allowable
under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.
Petitioner, however, goes on to assert that the President went beyond the authority granted by
E.O. 292 for him to reorganize the executive department since his issuance of E.O. 13 did not
merely involve the abolition of an office but the creation of one as well. He argues that nowhere
in the legal definition laid down by the Court in several cases does a reorganization include the
act of creating an office.
The contention is misplaced.
The Reorganization Did not Entail the Creation of a New, Separate and Distinct Office.
The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct office
as the duties and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred
to the ODESLA, which is an existing office within the Office of the President Proper. The reor-
ganization required no more than a mere alteration of the administrative structure of the ODE-
SLA through the establishment of a third division – the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division
– through which ODESLA could take on the additional functions it has been tasked to discharge
under E.O. 13. In Canonizado v. Aguirre,12 We ruled that –
Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government
offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them.
It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of
economy or redundancy of functions.
The Reorganization was Pursued in Good Faith.
A valid reorganization must not only be exercised through legitimate authority but must also be
pursued in good faith. A reorganization is said to be carried out in good faith if it is done for
purposes of economy and efficiency.13 It appears in this case that the streamlining of functions
within the Office of the President Proper was pursued with such purposes in mind.
In its Whereas clauses, E.O. 13 cites as bases for the reorganization the policy dictates of
eradicating corruption in the government and promoting economy and efficiency in the bureau-
cracy. Indeed, the economical effects of the reorganization is shown by the fact that while Con-
gress had initially appropriated P22 Million for the PAGC's operation in the 2010 annual
budget,14 no separate or added funding of such a considerable amount was ever required after
the transfer of the PAGC functions to the IAD-ODESLA.
Apparently, the budgetary requirements that the IAD-ODESLA needed to discharge its func-
tions and maintain its personnel would be sourced from the following year's appropriation for
the President's Offices under the General Appropriations Act of 2011.15 Petitioner asseverates,
however, that since Congress did not indicate the manner by which the appropriation for the
Office of the President was to be distributed, taking therefrom the operational funds of the IAD-
ODESLA would amount to an illegal appropriation by the President. The contention is without
legal basis.
There is no usurpation of the legislative power to appropriate public funds.
In the chief executive dwell the powers to run government. Placed upon him is the power to
recommend the budget necessary for the operation of the Government,16 which implies that he
has the necessary authority to evaluate and determine the structure that each government
agency in the executive department would need to operate in the most economical and efficient
manner.17 Hence, the express recognition under Section 78 of R.A. 9970 or the General Ap-
propriations Act of 2010 of the President’s authority to "direct changes in the organizational
units or key positions in any department or agency." The aforecited provision, often and con-
sistently included in the general appropriations laws, recognizes the extent of the President’s
power to reorganize the executive offices and agencies under him, which is, "even to the extent
of modifying and realigning appropriations for that purpose."18
And to further enable the President to run the affairs of the executive department, he is likewise
given constitutional authority to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law using the
savings in other items of the appropriation for his office.19 In fact, he is explicitly allowed by law
to transfer any fund appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies
of the Executive Department which is included in the General Appropriations Act, to any pro-
gram, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropri-
ations Act or approved after its enactment.20
Thus, while there may be no specific amount earmarked for the IAD-ODESLA from the total
amount appropriated by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the President, the
necessary funds for the IAD-ODESLA may be properly sourced from the President's own office
budget without committing any illegal appropriation. After all, there is no usurpation of the leg-
islature's power to appropriate funds when the President simply allocates the existing funds
previously appropriated by Congress for his office.
The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not vested with quasi-judicial
powers.
Petitioner next avers that the IAD-ODESLA was illegally vested with judicial power which is
reserved to the Judicial Department and, by way of exception through an express grant by the
legislature, to administrative agencies. He points out that the name Investigative and Adjudica-
tory Division is proof itself that the IAD-ODESLA wields quasi-judicial power.
The argument is tenuous. As the OSG aptly explained in its Comment,21 while the term "adju-
dicatory" appears part of its appellation, the IAD-ODESLA cannot try and resolve cases, its
authority being limited to the conduct of investigations, preparation of reports and submission
of recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly states that the IAD-ODESLA shall "perform powers,
functions and duties xxx, of PAGC."22
Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear administrative cases
or complaints against all presidential appointees in the government"23 and to "submit its report
and recommendations to the President."24 The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommend-
atory body to the President, not having the power to settle controversies and adjudicate cases.
As the Court ruled in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights,25 and later reiterated in Biraogo
v. The Philippine Truth Commission:26
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascer-
taining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such,
the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be ac-
companied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to
such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
The President's authority to issue E.O. 13 and constitute the IAD-ODESLA as his fact-finding
investigator cannot be doubted. After all, as Chief Executive, he is granted full control over the
Executive Department to ensure the enforcement of the laws. Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution provides:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
The obligation to see to it that laws are faithfully executed necessitates the corresponding
power in the President to conduct investigations into the conduct of officials and employees in
the executive department.27
The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers and duties of the Ombudsman.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the IAD-ODESLA did not encroach upon the Ombudsman's
primary jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the complaint affidavit filed against him notwith-
standing the earlier filing of criminal and administrative cases involving the same charges and
allegations before the Office of the Ombudsman. The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
to investigate and prosecute cases refers to criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
and not to administrative cases. It is only in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the
Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the investigation being conducted by another inves-
tigatory agency. Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, empowers
the Ombudsman to –
(1)Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency of government, the investigation of such cases. (Emphasis sup-
plied)
Since the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an administrative disciplinary case for grave
misconduct, petitioner may not invoke the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to prevent
the IAD-ODESLA from proceeding with its investigation. In any event, the Ombudsman's au-
thority to investigate both elective and appointive officials in the government, extensive as it
may be, is by no means exclusive. It is shared with other similarly authorized government
agencies.28
While the Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of the existence of probable
cause and the adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation, the investigative authority of
the IAD- ODESLA is limited to that of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations and
recommendations remain so until acted upon by the President. As such, it commits no usurpa-
tion of the Ombudsman's constitutional duties.
Executive Order No. 13 Does Not Violate Petitioner's Right to Due Process and the Equal
Protection of the Laws.
Petitioner goes on to assail E.O. 13 as violative of the equal protection clause pointing to the
arbitrariness of limiting the IAD-ODESLA's investigation only to presidential appointees occu-
pying upper-level positions in the government. The equal protection of the laws is a guaranty
against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.29 It is embraced under
the due process concept and simply requires that, in the application of the law, "all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed."30 The equal protection clause, however, is not absolute but subject to reasonable
classification so that aggrupations bearing substantial distinctions may be treated differently
from each other. This we ruled in Farinas v. Executive Secretary,31 wherein we further stated
that –
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege,
as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which
it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that
all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all per-
sons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those
who fall within such class and those who do not. (Emphasis supplied)
Presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining authority of the President. This pro-
ceeds from the well settled principle that, in the absence of a contrary law, the power to remove
or to discipline is lodged in the same authority on which the power to appoint is vested.32 Having
the power to remove and/or discipline presidential appointees, the President has the corollary
authority to investigate such public officials and look into their conduct in office.33 Petitioner is
a presidential appointee occupying the high-level position of Chairman of the LWUA. Neces-
sarily, he comes under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President, who is well within his right
to order an investigation into matters that require his informed decision.
There are substantial distinctions that set apart presidential appointees occupying upper-level
positions in government from non-presidential appointees and those that occupy the lower po-
sitions in government. In Salumbides v. Office of the Ombudsman,34 we had ruled extensively
on the substantial distinctions that exist between elective and appointive public officials, thus:
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The for-
mer occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office
for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other
hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing
authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to
security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
xxxx
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sover-
eign power of the people.1âwphi1 It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public
office by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents
for a definite term, x x x complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they
be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast,
there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned. (Emphasis supplied)
Also, contrary to petitioner's assertions, his right to due process was not violated when the IAD-
ODESLA took cognizance of the administrative complaint against him since he was given suf-
ficient opportunity to oppose the formal complaint filed by Secretary Purisima. In administrative
proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged
to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process,35
which simply means having the opportunity to explain one’s side.36 Hence, as long as petitioner
was given the opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the requirements of due
process are satisfactorily complied with because what the law abhors is an absolute lack of
opportunity to be heard.37 The records show that petitioner was issued an Order requiring him
to submit his written explanation under oath with respect to the charge of grave misconduct
filed against him. His own failure to submit his explanation despite notice defeats his subse-
quent claim of denial of due process.
Finally, petitioner doubts that the IAD-ODESLA can lawfully perform its duties as an impartial
tribunal, contending that both the IAD-ODESLA and respondent Secretary Purisima are con-
nected to the President. The mere suspicion of partiality will not suffice to invalidate the actions
of the IAD-ODESLA. Mere allegation is not equivalent to proof. Bias and partiality
cannot be presumed.38 Petitioner must present substantial proof to show that the lAD-ODES
LA had unjustifiably sided against him in the conduct of the investigation. No such evidence
has been presented as to defeat the presumption of regularity m the performance of the fact-
finding investigator's duties. The assertion, therefore, deserves scant consideration.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
one.39 Petitioner has failed to discharge the burden of proving the illegality of E.O. 13, which IS
indubitably a valid exercise of the President's continuing authority to reorganize the Office of
the President.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition IS hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
 MILAGROS H., AQUINO, PASCASIO E., ARABE, MELINDA M., ARCANGEL, AGUSTIN S.,
Republic of the Philippines JR., ARPON, ULPLIANO U., JR., ARREZA, ARTEMIO M., JR., ARROJO, ANTONIO P.,
SUPREME COURT ARVISU, ALEXANDER S., ASCAÑ;O, ANTONIO T., ASLAHON, JULAHON P., ASUNCION,
Manila VICTOR R., ATANGAN, LORNA S., ATIENZA, ALEXANDER R., BACAL, URSULINO C.,
EN BANC BAÑ;AGA, MARLOWE, Z., BANTA, ALBERTO T., BARREDO, JOSE B., BARROS, VICTOR
G.R. No. 81954 August 8, 1989 C., BARTOLOME, FELIPE A., BAYSAC, REYNALDO S., BELENO, ANTONIO B.,
CESAR Z. DARIO, petitioner, BERNARDO, ROMEO D., BERNAS, MARCIANO S., BOHOL, AUXILIADOR G., BRAVO,
vs. VICTOR M., BULEG, BALILIS R., CALNEA, MERCEDES M., CALVO, HONESTO G.,
HON. SALVADOR M. MISON, HON. VICENTE JAYME and HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, CAMACHO, CARLOS V., CAMPOS, RODOLFO C., CAPULONG, RODRIGO G.,
JR., in their respective capacities as Commissioner of Customs, Secretary of Finance, CARINGAL, GRACIA Z., CARLOS, LORENZO B., CARRANTO, FIDEL U., CARUNGCONG,
and Executive Secretary, respondents. ALFREDO M., CASTRO, PATRICIA J., CATELO, ROGELIO B., CATURLA, MANUEL B.,
G.R. No. 81967 August 8, 1989 CENIZAL, JOSEFINA F., CINCO, LUISITO, CONDE0, JOSE C., JR., CORCUERA, FIDEL
VICENTE A. FERIA JR., petitioner, S., CORNETA, VICENTE S., CORONADO, RICARDO S., CRUZ, EDUARDO S., CRUZ,
vs. EDILBERTO A., CRUZ, EFIGENIA B., CRUZADO, MARCIAL C., CUSTODIO, RODOLFO
HON. SALVADOR M. MISON, HON. VICENTE JAYME, and HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, M., DABON, NORMA M., DALINDIN, EDNA MAE D., DANDAL, EDEN F., DATUHARON,
JR., in their respective capacities as Commissioner of Customs, Secretary of Finance, SATA A., DAZO, GODOFREDO L., DE CASTRO, LEOPAPA, DE GUZMAN, ANTONIO A.,
and Executive Secretary, respondents. DE GUZMAN, RENATO E., DE LA CRUZ, AMADO A., JR., DE LA CRUZ, FRANCISCO C.,
G.R. No. 82023 August 8, 1989 DE LA PEÑ;A, LEONARDO, DEL CAMPO, ORLANDO, DEL RIO, MAMERTO P., JR.,
ADOLFO CASARENO, PACIFICO LAGLEVA, JULIAN C. ESPIRITU, DENNIS A. DEMESA, WILHELMINA T., DIMAKUTA, SALIC L., DIZON, FELICITAS A., DOCTOR,
AZARRAGA, RENATO DE JESUS, NICASIO C. GAMBOA, CORAZON RALLOS NIEVES, HEIDY M., DOLAR, GLICERIO R., DOMINGO, NICANOR J., DOMINGO, PERFECTO V., JR.,
FELICITACION R. GELUZ, LEODEGARIO H. FLORESCA, SUBAER PACASUM, ZENAIDA DUAY, JUANA G., DYSANGCO, RENATO F., EDILLOR, ALFREDO P., ELEVAZO,
LANARIA, JOSE B. ORTIZ, GLICERIO R. DOLAR, CORNELIO NAPA, PABLO B. SANTOS, LEONARDO A., ESCUYOS, MANUEL M., JR., ESMERIA, ANTONIO E., ESPALDON, MA.
FERMIN RODRIGUEZ, DALISAY BAUTISTA, LEONARDO JOSE, ALBERTO LONTOK, LOURDES H., ESPINA, FRANCO A., ESTURCO, RODOLFO C., EVANGELINO, FERMIN I.,
PORFIRIO TABINO, JOSE BARREDO, ROBERTO ARNALDO, ESTER TAN, PEDRO FELIX, ERNESTO G., FERNANDEZ, ANDREW M., FERRAREN, ANTONIO C., FERRERA,
BAKAL, ROSARIO DAVID, RODOLFO AFUANG, LORENZO CATRE, LEONCIA CATRE, WENCESLAO A., FRANCISCO, PELAGIO S., JR., FUENTES, RUDY L., GAGALANG,
ROBERTO ABADA, petitioners, RENATO V., GALANG, EDGARDO R., GAMBOA, ANTONIO C., GAN, ALBERTO R.,
vs. GARCIA, GILBERT M., GARCIA, EDNA V., GARCIA, JUAN L., GAVIOLA, LILIAN V.,
COMMISSIONER SALVADOR M. MISON, COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, GEMPARO, SEGUNDINA G., GOBENCIONG, FLORDELIZ B., GRATE, FREDERICK R.,
respondent. GREGORIO, LAURO P., GUARTICO, AMMON H., GUIANG, MYRNA N., GUINTO, DELFIN
G.R. No. 83737 August 8, 1989 C., HERNANDEZ, LUCAS A., HONRALES, LORETO N., HUERTO, LEOPOLDO H., HULAR
BENEDICTO L. AMASA and WILLIAM S. DIONISIO, petitioners, , LANNYROSS E., IBAÑ;EZ, ESTER C., ILAGAN, HONORATO C., INFANTE, REYNALDO
vs. C., ISAIS, RAY C., ISMAEL, HADJI AKRAM B., JANOLO, VIRGILIO M., JAVIER, AMADOR
PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, in her capacity as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission L., JAVIER, ROBERTO S., JAVIER, WILLIAM R., JOVEN, MEMIA A., JULIAN, REYNALDO
and SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, V., JUMAMOY, ABUNDIO A., JUMAQUIAO, DOMINGO F., KAINDOY, PASCUAL B., JR.,
respondents. KOH, NANIE G., LABILLES, ERNESTO S., LABRADOR, WILFREDO M., LAGA,
G.R. No. 85310 August 8, 1989 BIENVENIDO M., LAGLEVA, PACIFICO Z., LAGMAN, EVANGELINE G., LAMPONG,
SALVADOR M. MISON, in his capacity as Commissioner of Customs, petitioner, WILFREDO G., LANDICHO, RESTITUTO A., LAPITAN, CAMILO M., LAURENTE,
vs. REYNALDO A., LICARTE, EVARISTO R., LIPIO, VICTOR O., LITTAUA, FRANKLIN Z.,
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ABACA, SISINIO T., ABAD, ROGELIO C., ABADIANO, LOPEZ, MELENCIO L., LUMBA, OLIVIA., MACAISA, BENITO T., MACAISA, ERLINDA C.,
JOSE P., ABCEDE, NEMECIO C., ABIOG, ELY F., ABLAZA, AURORA M., AGBAYANI, MAGAT, ELPIDIO, MAGLAYA, FERNANDO P., MALABANAN, ALFREDO C., MALIBIRAN,
NELSON I., AGRES ANICETO, AGUILAR, FLOR, AGUILUCHO MA. TERESA R., AGUSTIN, ROSITA D., MALIJAN, LAZARO V., MALLI, JAVIER M., MANAHAN, RAMON S., MANUEL,
BONIFACIO T., ALANO, ALEX P., ALBA, MAXIMO F. JR., ALBANO, ROBERT B., ELPIDIO R., MARAVILLA, GIL B., MARCELO, GIL C., MARIÑ;AS, RODOLFO V.,
ALCANTARA, JOSE G., ALMARIO, RODOLFO F., ALVEZ, ROMUALDO R., AMISTAD MAROKET, JESUS C., MARTIN, NEMENCIO A., MARTINEZ, ROMEO M., MARTINEZ,
RUDY M., AMOS, FRANCIS F., ANDRES, RODRIGO V., ANGELES, RICARDO S., ANOLIN, ROSELINA M., MATIBAG, ANGELINA G., MATUGAS, ERNESTO T., MATUGAS,
FRANCISCO T., MAYUGA, PORTIA E., MEDINA, NESTOR M., MEDINA, ROLANDO S.,
MENDAVIA, AVELINO I., MENDOZA, POTENCIANO G., MIL, RAY M., MIRAVALLES,
ANASTACIA L., MONFORTE, EUGENIO, JR., G., MONTANO, ERNESTO F., MONTERO,
JUAN M. III., MORALDE, ESMERALDO B., JR., MORALES, CONCHITA D.L., MORALES,
NESTOR P., MORALES, SHIRLEY S., MUNAR, JUANITA L., MUÑ;OZ, VICENTE R.,
MURILLO, MANUEL M., NACION, PEDRO R., NAGAL, HENRY N., NAPA, CORNELIO B.,
NAVARRO, HENRY L., NEJAL, FREDRICK E., NICOLAS, REYNALDO S., NIEVES,
RUFINO A., OLAIVAR, SEBASTIAN T., OLEGARIO, LEO Q., ORTEGA, ARLENE R.,
ORTEGA, JESUS R., OSORIO, ABNER S., PAPIO, FLORENTINO T. II, PASCUA,
ARNULFO A., PASTOR, ROSARIO, PELAYO, ROSARIO L., PEÑ;A, AIDA C., PEREZ,
ESPERIDION B., PEREZ, JESUS BAYANI M., PRE, ISIDRO A., PRUDENCIADO, EULOGIA
S., PUNZALAN, LAMBERTO N., PURA, ARNOLD T., QUINONES, EDGARDO I., QUINTOS,
AMADEO C., JR., QUIRAY, NICOLAS C., RAMIREZ, ROBERTO P., RAÑ;ADA, RODRIGO
C., RARAS, ANTONIO A., RAVAL, VIOLETA V., RAZAL, BETTY R., REGALA, PONCE F.,
REYES, LIBERATO R., REYES, MANUEL E., REYES, NORMA Z., REYES, TELESFORO F.,
RIVERA, ROSITA L., ROCES, ROBERTO V., ROQUE, TERESITA S., ROSANES, MARILOU
M., ROSETE, ADAN I., RUANTO, REY, CRISTO C., JR., SABLADA, PASCASIO G.,
SALAZAR, SILVERIA S., SALAZAR, VICTORIA A., SALIMBACOD, PERLITA C.,
SALMINGO, LOURDES M., SANTIAGO, EMELITA B., SATINA, PORFIRIO C., SEKITO,
COSME B., JR., SIMON, RAMON P., SINGSON, MELECIO C., SORIANO, ANGELO L.,
SORIANO, MAGDALENA R., SUMULONG, ISIDRO L., JR., SUNICO, ABELARDO T.,
TABIJE, EMMA B., TAN, RUDY, GOROSPE, TAN, ESTER S., TAN, JULITA S., TECSON,
BEATRIZ B., TOLENTINO, BENIGNO A., TURINGAN, ENRICO T., JR., UMPA, ALI A.,
VALIC, LUCIO E., VASQUEZ, NICANOR B., VELARDE, EDGARDO C., VERA, AVELINO A.,
VERAME, OSCAR E., VIADO, LILIAN T., VIERNES, NAPOLEON K., VILLALON, DENNIS
A., VILLAR, LUZ L., VILLALUZ, EMELITO V., ZATA, ANGEL A., JR., ACHARON,
CRISTETO, ALBA, RENATO B., AMON, JULITA C., AUSTRIA, ERNESTO C., CALO,
RAYMUNDO M., CENTENO, BENJAMIN R., DE CASTRO, LEOPAPA C ., DONATO,
ESTELITA P., DONATO, FELIPE S., FLORES, PEDRITO S., GALAROSA, RENATO,
MALAWI, MAUYAG, MONTENEGRO, FRANCISCO M., OMEGA, PETRONILO T., SANTOS,
GUILLERMO F., TEMPLO, CELSO, VALDERAMA, JAIME B., and VALDEZ, NORA M., re-
spondents.
G.R. No. 85335 August 8, 1989
FRANKLIN Z. LITTAUA, ADAN I. ROSETE, FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, MA. J. ANGELINA
G. MATIBAG, LEODEGARDIO H. FLORESCA, LEONARDO A. DELA PEÑ;A, ABELARDO
T. SUNICO, MELENCIO L. LOPEZ, NEMENCIO A. MARTIN, RUDY M. AMISTAD, ERNESTO
T. MATUGAS, SILVERIA S. SALAZAR, LILLIAN V. GAVIOLA, MILAGROS ANOLIN, JOSE
B. ORTIZ, ARTEMIO ARREZA, JR., GILVERTO M. GARCIA, ANTONIO A. RARAS,
FLORDELINA B. GOBENCIONG, ANICETO AGRES, EDGAR Y. QUINONES, MANUEL B.
CATURLA, ELY F. ABIOG, RODRIGO C. RANADA, LAURO GREGORIO, ALBERTO I.
GAN, EDGARDO GALANG, RAY C. ISAIS, NICANOR B. VASQUEZ, MANUEL ESCUYOS,
JR., ANTONIO B. BELENO, ELPIO R. MANUEL, AUXILIADOR C. BOHOL, LEONARDO
ELEVAZO, VICENTE S. CORNETA, petitioners,
vs.
COM. SALVADOR M. MISON/BUREAU OF CUSTOMS and the CIVIL SERVICE COMMIS-
SION, respondents.
G.R. No. 86241 August 8, 1989
SALVADOR M. MISON, in his capacity as Commissioner of Customs, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, SENEN S. DIMAGUILA, ROMEO P. ARABE BERNARDO
S. QUINTONG, GREGORIO P. REYES, and ROMULO C. BADILLO respondents
SARMIENTO, J.:
The Court writes finis to this contreversy that has raged bitterly for the several months. It does
so out of ligitimate presentement of more suits reaching it as a consequence of the government
reorganization and the instability it has wrought on the performance and efficiency of the bu-
reaucracy. The Court is apprehensive that unless the final word is given and the ground rules
are settled, the issue will fester, and likely foment on the constitutional crisis for the nation, itself
biset with grave and serious problems.
The facts are not in dispute.
On March 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3, "DECLAR-
ING A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE,
PROTECTING THEIR BASIC RIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION, AND
PROVIDING FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW CON-
STITUTION." Among other things, Proclamation No. 3 provided:
SECTION 1. ...
The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people to:
(a) Completely reorganize the government, eradicate unjust and oppressive structures, and all
iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime; 1
...
Pursuant thereto, it was also provided:
SECTION 1. In the reorganization of the government, priority shall be given to measures to
promote economy, efficiency, and the eradication of graft and corruption.
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution
shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the
appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year
from February 25, 1986.
SECTION 3. Any public officer or employee separated from the service as a result of the or-
ganization effected under this Proclamation shall, if entitled under the laws then in force, re-
ceive the retirement and other benefits accruing thereunder.
SECTION 4. The records, equipment, buildings, facilities and other properties of all government
offices shall be carefully preserved. In case any office or body is abolished or reorganized
pursuant to this Proclamation, its FUNDS and properties shall be transferred to the office or
body to which its powers, functions and responsibilities substantially pertain. 2
Actually, the reorganization process started as early as February 25, 1986, when the President,
in her first act in office, called upon "all appointive public officials to submit their courtesy res-
ignation(s) beginning with the members of the Supreme Court."3 Later on, she abolished the
Batasang Pambansa4 and the positions of Prime Minister and Cabinet 5 under the 1973 Con- tive duties and responsibilities in a hold-over capacity, and that those incumbents whose posi-
stitution. tions are not carried in the new reorganization pattern, or who are not re- appointed, shall be
Since then, the President has issued a number of executive orders and directives reorganizing deemed separated from the service.
various other government offices, a number of which, with respect to elected local officials, has In this connection, we regret to inform you that your services are hereby terminated as of Feb-
been challenged in this Court, 6 and two of which, with respect to appointed functionaries, have ruary 28, 1988. Subject to the normal clearances, you may receive the retirement benefits to
likewise been questioned herein. 7 which you may be entitled under existing laws, rules and regulations.
On May 28, 1986, the President enacted Executive Order No. 17, "PRESCRIBING RULES In the meantime, your name will be included in the consolidated list compiled by the Civil Ser-
AND REGULATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE vice Commission so that you may be given priority for future employment with the Government
FREEDOM CONSTITUTION." Executive Order No. 17 recognized the "unnecessary anxiety as the need arises.
and demoralization among the deserving officials and employees" the ongoing government Sincerely yours,
reorganization had generated, and prescribed as "grounds for the separation/replacement of (Sgd) SALVADOR M. MISON
personnel," the following: Commissioner15
SECTION 3. The following shall be the grounds for separation replacement of personnel: As far as the records will yield, the following were recipients of these notices:
1) Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil Service Law; 1. CESAR DARIO
2) Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as 2. VICENTE FERIA, JR.
determined by the Mnistry Head concerned; 3. ADOLFO CASARENO
3) Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions; 4. PACIFICO LAGLEVA
4) Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes; 5. JULIAN C. ESPIRITU
5) Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the service or 6. DENNIS A. AZARRAGA
his separation/replacement is in the interest of the service.8 7. RENATO DE JESUS
On January 30, 1987, the President promulgated Executive Order No. 127, "REORGANIZING 8. NICASIO C. GAMBOA
THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE." 9 Among other offices, Executive Order No. 127 provided for 9. CORAZON RALLOS NIEVES
the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs 10 and prescribed a new staffing pattern therefor. 10. FELICITACION R. GELUZ
Three days later, on February 2, 1987, 11 the Filipino people adopted the new Constitution. 11. LEODEGARIO H. FLORESCA
On January 6, 1988, incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison issued a Memo- 12. SUBAER PACASUM
randum, in the nature of "Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Or- 13. ZENAIDA LANARIA
ders," 12 prescribing the procedure in personnel placement. It also provided: 14. JOSE B. ORTIZ
1. By February 28, 1988, the employees covered by Executive Order 127 and the grace period 15. GLICERIO R. DOLAR
extended to the Bureau of Customs by the President of the Philippines on reorganization shall 16. CORNELIO NAPA
be: 17. PABLO B. SANTOS
a) informed of their re-appointment, or 18. FERMIN RODRIGUEZ
b) offered another position in the same department or agency or 19. DALISAY BAUTISTA
c) informed of their termination. 13 20. LEONARDO JOSE
On the same date, Commissioner Mison constituted a Reorganization Appeals Board charged 21. ALBERTO LONTOK
with adjudicating appeals from removals under the above Memorandum. 14 On January 26, 22. PORFIRIO TABINO
1988, Commissioner Mison addressed several notices to various Customs officials, in the tenor 23. JOSE BARREDO
as follows: 24. ROBERTO ARNALDO
Sir: 25. ESTER TAN
Please be informed that the Bureau is now in the process of implementing the Reorganization 26. PEDRO BAKAL
Program under Executive Order No. 127. 27. ROSARIO DAVID
Pursuant to Section 59 of the same Executive Order, all officers and employees of the Depart- 28. RODOLFO AFUANG
ment of Finance, or the Bureau of Customs in particular, shall continue to perform their respec- 29. LORENZO CATRE
30. LEONCIA CATRE
31. ROBERTO ABADA
32. ABACA, SISINIO T.
33. ABAD, ROGELIO C.
34. ABADIANO, JOSE P
35. ABCEDE, NEMECIO C.
36. ABIOG, ELY F.
37. ABLAZA, AURORA M.
38. AGBAYANI, NELSON I.
39. AGRES, ANICETO
40. AGUILAR, FLOR
41. AGUILUCHO, MA. TERESA R.
42. AGUSTIN, BONIFACIO T.
43. ALANO, ALEX P.
44. ALBA, MAXIMO F. JR.
45. ALBANO, ROBERT B.
46. ALCANTARA, JOSE G.
47. ALMARIO, RODOLFO F.
48. ALVEZ, ROMUALDO R.
49. AMISTAD, RUDY M.
50. AMOS, FRANCIS F.
51. ANDRES, RODRIGO V.
52. ANGELES, RICARDO S.
53. ANOLIN, MILAGROS H.
54. AQUINO, PASCASIO E. L.
55. ARABE, MELINDA M.
56. ARCANGEL, AGUSTIN S, JR.
57. ARPON, ULPIANO U., JR.
58. ARREZA, ARTEMIO M, JR.
59. ARROJO, ANTONIO P.
60. ARVISU, ALEXANDER S.
61. ASCAÑ;O, ANTONIO T.
62. ASLAHON, JULAHON P.
63. ASUNCION, VICTOR R.
64. ATANGAN, LORNA S.
65. ANTIENZA, ALEXANDER R.
66. BACAL URSULINO C.
67. BAÑ;AGA, MARLOWE Z.
68. BANTA, ALBERTO T.
69. BARROS, VICTOR C.
70. BARTOLOME, FELIPE A.
71. BAYSAC, REYNALDO S.
72. BELENO, ANTONIO B.
73. BERNARDO, ROMEO D.
74. BERNAS, MARCIANO S.
75. BOHOL, AUXILIADOR G.
76. BRAVO, VICTOR M.
77. BULEG, BALILIS R.
78. CALNEA, MERCEDES M.
79. CALVO, HONESTO G.
80. CAMACHO, CARLOS V.
81. CAMPOS, RODOLFO C.
82. CAPULONG, RODRIGO G.
83. CARINGAL, GRACIA Z.
84. CARLOS, LORENZO B.
85. CARRANTO, FIDEL U.
86. CARUNGCONG, ALFREDO M.
87. CASTRO, PATRICIA J.
88. CATELO, ROGELIO B.
89. CATURLA, MANUEL B.
90. CENIZAL, JOSEFINA F.
91. CINCO, LUISITO
92. CONDE, JOSE C., JR.
93. CORCUERA, FIDEL S.
94. CORNETA, VICENTE S.
95. CORONADO, RICARDO S.
96. CRUZ, EDUARDO S.
97. CRUZ, EDILBERTO A,
98. CRUZ, EFIGENIA B.
99. CRUZADO,NORMA M.
100. CUSTODIO, RODOLFO M.
101. DABON, NORMA M.
102. DALINDIN, EDNA MAE D.
103. DANDAL, EDEN F.
104. DATUHARON, SATA A.
105. DAZO, GODOFREDO L.
106. DE CASTRO, LEOPAPA
107. DE GUZMAN, ANTONIO A.
108. DE GUZMAN, RENATO E.
109. DE LA CRUZ, AMADO A., JR.
110. DE LA CRUZ, FRANCISCO C.
111. DE LA PEÑ;A, LEONARDO
112. DEL CAMPO, ORLANDO
113. DEL RIO, MAMERTO P., JR.
114. DEMESA, WILHELMINA T.
115. DIMAKUTA, SALIC L.
116. DIZON, FELICITAS A.
117. DOCTOR, HEIDY M.
118. DOMINGO, NICANOR J.
119. DOMINGO, PERFECTO V., JR.
120. DUAY, JUANA G.
121. DYSANGCO, RENATO F.
122. EDILLOR, ALFREDO P.
123. ELEVAZO, LEONARDO A
124. ESCUYOS, MANUEL M., JR.
125. ESMERIA, ANTONIO E.
126. ESPALDON, MA. LOURDES H.
127. ESPINA, FRANCO A.
128. ESTURCO, RODOLFO C.
129. EVANGELINO, FERMIN I.
130. FELIX, ERNESTO G.
131. FERNANDEZ, ANDREW M.
132. FERRAREN, ANTONIO C.
133. FERRERA, WENCESLAO A.
134. FRANCISCO, PELAGIO S, JR.
135. FUENTES, RUDY L.
136. GAGALANG, RENATO V.
137. GALANG, EDGARDO R.
138. GAMBOA, ANTONIO C.
139. GAN, ALBERTO P
140. GARCIA, GILBERT M.
141. GARCIA, EDNA V.
142. GARCIA, JUAN L.
143. GAVIOIA, LILIAN V.
144. GEMPARO, SEGUNDINA G.
145. GOBENCIONG, FLORDELIZ B.
146. GRATE, FREDERICK R.
147. GREGORIO, LAURO P.
148. GUARTICO, AMMON H.
149. GUIANG, MYRNA N.
150. GUINTO, DELFIN C.
151. HERNANDEZ, LUCAS A.
152. HONRALES, LORETO N.
153. HUERTO, LEOPOLDO H.
154. HULAR, LANNYROSS E.
155. IBAÑ;EZ, ESTER C.
156. ILAGAN, HONORATO C.
157. INFANTE, REYNALDO C.
158. ISAIS, RAY C.
159. ISMAEL, HADJI AKRAM B.
160. JANOLO, VIRGILIO M.
161. JAVIER, AMADOR L.
162. JAVIER, ROBERTO S.
163. JAVIER, WILLIAM R.
164. JOVEN, MEMIA A.
165. JULIAN, REYNALDO V.
166. JUMAMOY, ABUNDIO A.
167. JUMAQUIAO, DOMINGO F.
168. KAINDOY, PASCUAL B., JR.
169. KOH, NANIE G.
170. LABILLES, ERNESTO S.
171. LABRADOR, WILFREDO M.
172. LAGA, BIENVENIDO M.
173. LAGMAN, EVANGELINE G.
174. LAMPONG, WILFREDO G.
175. LANDICHO, RESTITUTO A.
176. LAPITAN, CAMILO M.
177. LAURENTE, REYNALDO A.
178. LICARTE, EVARISTO R.
179. LIPIO, VICTOR O.
180. LITTAUA, FRANKLIN Z.
181. LOPEZ, MELENCIO L.
182. LUMBA, OLIVIA R.
183. MACAISA, BENITO T.
184. MACAISA, ERLINDA C.
185. MAGAT, ELPIDIO
186. MAGLAYA, FERNANDO P.
187. MALABANAN, ALFREDO C.
188. MALIBIRAN, ROSITA D.
189. MALIJAN, LAZARO V.
190. MALLI, JAVIER M.
191. MANAHAN, RAMON S.
192. MANUEL, ELPIDIO R.
193. MARAVILLA, GIL B.
194. MARCELO, GIL C.
195. MARIÑ;AS, RODOLFO V.
196. MAROKET ,JESUS C.
197. MARTIN, NEMENCIO A.
198. MARTINEZ, ROMEO M.
199. MARTINEZ, ROSELINA M.
200. MATIBAG, ANGELINA G.
201. MATUGAS, ERNESTO T.
202. MATUGAS, FRANCISCO T.
203. MAYUGA, PORTIA E.
204. MEDINA, NESTOR M.
205. MEDINA, ROLANDO S.
206. MENDAVIA, AVELINO
207. MENDOZA, POTENCIANO G.
208. MIL, RAY M.
209. MIRAVALLES, ANASTACIA L.
210. MONFORTE, EUGENIO, JR. G.
211. MONTANO, ERNESTO F.
212. MONTERO, JUAN M. III
213. MORALDE, ESMERALDO B., JR.
214. MORALES, CONCHITA D. L
215. MORALES, NESTOR P.
216. MORALES, SHIRLEY S.
217. MUNAR, JUANITA L.
218. MUÑ;OZ, VICENTE R.
219. MURILLO, MANUEL M.
220. NACION, PEDRO R.
221. NAGAL, HENRY N.
222. NAVARRO, HENRY L.
223. NEJAL FREDRICK E.
224. NICOLAS, REYNALDO S.
225. NIEVES, RUFINO A.
226. OLAIVAR, SEBASTIAN T.
227. OLEGARIO, LEO Q.
228. ORTEGA, ARLENE R.
229. ORTEGA, JESUS R.
230. OSORIO, ABNER S.
231. PAPIO FLORENTINO T. II
232. PASCUA, ARNULFO A.
233. PASTOR, ROSARIO
234. PELAYO, ROSARIO L.
235. PEÑ;A, AIDA C.
236. PEREZ, ESPERIDION B.
237. PEREZ, JESUS BAYANI M.
238. PRE, ISIDRO A.
239. PRUDENCIADO, EULOGIA S.
240. PUNZALAN, LAMBERTO N.
241. PURA, ARNOLD T.
242. QUINONES, EDGARDO I.
243. QUINTOS, AMADEO C., JR.
244. QUIRAY, NICOLAS C.
245. RAMIREZ, ROBERTO P.
246. RANADA, RODRIGO C.
247. RARAS, ANTONIO A.
248. RAVAL, VIOLETA V.
249. RAZAL, BETTY R.
250. REGALA, PONCE F.
251. REYES, LIBERATO R.
252. REYES, MANUEL E.
253. REYES, NORMA Z.
254. REYES, TELESPORO F.
255. RIVERA, ROSITA L.
256. ROCES, ROBERTO V.
257. ROQUE, TERESITA S.
258. ROSANES, MARILOU M.
259. ROSETE, ADAN I.
260. RUANTO, REY CRISTO C., JR.
261. SABLADA, PASCASIO G.
262. SALAZAR, SILVERIA S.
263. SALAZAR, VICTORIA A.
264. SALIMBACOD, PERLITA C.
265. SALMINGO, LOURDES M.
266. SANTIAGO, EMELITA B.
267. SATINA, PORFIRIO C.
268. SEKITO, COSME B JR.
269. SIMON, RAMON P.
270. SINGSON, MELENCIO C.
271. SORIANO, ANGELO L.
272. SORIANO, MAGDALENA R.
273. SUNICO, ABELARDO T .
274. TABIJE, EMMA B.
275. TAN, RUDY GOROSPE
276. TAN, ESTER S.
277. TAN, JULITA S.
278. TECSON, BEATRIZ B.
279. TOLENTINO, BENIGNO A.
280. TURINGAN, ENRICO T JR.
281. UMPA, ALI A.
282. VALIC, LUCIO E.
283. VASQUEZ, NICANOR B.
284. VELARDE, EDGARDO C.
285. VERA, AVELINO A.
286. VERAME, OSCAR E.
287. VIADO, LILIAN T.
288. VIERNES, NAPOLEON K
289. VILLALON, DENNIS A.
290. VILLAR, LUZ L.
291. VILLALUZ, EMELITO V.
292. VILLAR, LUZ L.
293. ZATA, ANGELA JR.
294. ACHARON, CRISTETO
295. ALBA, RENATO B.
296. AMON, JULITA C.
297. AUSTRIA, ERNESTO C.
298. CALO, RAYMUNDO M.
299. CENTENO, BENJAMIN R.
300. DONATO, ESTELITA P.
301. DONATO, FELIPE S
302. FLORES, PEDRITO S.
303. GALAROSA, RENATO
304. MALAWI, MAUYAG
305. MONTENEGRO, FRANSISCO M.
306. OMEGA, PETRONILO T.
307. SANTOS, GUILLERMO P.
308. TEMPLO, CELSO
309. VALDERAMA, JAIME B.
310. VALDEZ, NORA M.
Cesar Dario is the petitioner in G.R. No. 81954; Vicente Feria, Jr., is the petitioner in G.R. No.
81967; Messrs. Adolfo Caserano Pacifico Lagleva Julian C. Espiritu, Dennis A. Azarraga
Renato de Jesus, Nicasio C. Gamboa, Mesdames Corazon Rallos Nieves and Felicitacion R.
Geluz Messrs. Leodegario H. Floresca, Subaer Pacasum Ms. Zenaida Lanaria Mr. Jose B.
Ortiz, Ms. Gliceria R. Dolar, Ms. Cornelia Napa, Pablo B. Santos, Fermin Rodriguez, Ms.
Daligay Bautista, Messrs. Leonardo Jose, Alberto Lontok, Porfirio Tabino Jose Barredo,
Roberto Arnaldo, Ms. Ester Tan, Messrs. Pedro Bakal, Rosario David, Rodolfo Afuang,
Lorenzo Catre,, Ms. Leoncia Catre, and Roberto Abaca, are the petitioners in G.R. No. 82023;
the last 279 16 individuals mentioned are the private respondents in G.R. No. 85310.
As far as the records will likewise reveal, 17 a total of 394 officials and employees of the Bureau
of Customs were given individual notices of separation. A number supposedly sought reinstate-
ment with the Reorganization Appeals Board while others went to the Civil Service Commis-
sion. The first thirty-one mentioned above came directly to this Court.
On June 30, 1988, the Civil Service Commission promulgated its ruling ordering the reinstate-
ment of the 279 employees, the 279 private respondents in G.R. No. 85310, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that:
1. Appellants be immediately reappointed to positions of comparable or equivalent rank in the
Bureau of Customs without loss of seniority rights;
2. Appellants be paid their back salaries reckoned from the dates of their illegal termination
based on the rates under the approved new staffing pattern but not lower than their former
salaries.
This action of the Commission should not, however, be interpreted as an exoneration of the
appellants from any accusation of wrongdoing and, therefore, their reappointments are without
prejudice to:
1. Proceeding with investigation of appellants with pending administrative cases, and where
investigations have been finished, to promptly, render the appropriate decisions;
2. The filing of appropriate administrative complaints against appellants with derogatory reports
or information if evidence so warrants.
SO ORDERED. 18
On July 15, 1988, Commissioner Mison, represented by the Solicitor General, filed a motion
for reconsideration Acting on the motion, the Civil Service Commission, on September 20,
1988, denied reconsideration. 19
On October 20, 1988, Commissioner Mison instituted certiorari proceedings with this Court,
docketed, as above-stated, as G.R. No. 85310 of this Court.
On November 16,1988, the Civil Service Commission further disposed the appeal (from the
resolution of the Reorganization Appeals Board) of five more employees, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that:
1. Appellants be immediately reappointed to positions of comparable or equivalent rank in the
Bureau of Customs without loss of seniority rights; and
2. Appellants be paid their back salaries to be reckoned from the date of their illegal termination
based on the rates under the approved new staffing pattern but not lower than their former
salaries.
This action of the Commission should not, however, be interpreted as an exoneration of the
herein appellants from any accusation of any wrongdoing and therefore, their reappointments
are without prejudice to:
1. Proceeding with investigation of appellants with pending administrative cases, if any, and
where investigations have been finished, to promptly, render the appropriate decisions; and
2. The filing of appropriate administrative complaints against appellant with derogatory reports
or information, if any, and if evidence so warrants.
SO ORDERED. 20
On January 6, 1989, Commissioner Mison challenged the Civil Service Commission's Resolu-
tion in this Court; his petitioner has been docketed herein as G.R. No. 86241. The employees
ordered to be reinstated are Senen Dimaguila, Romeo Arabe, Bemardo Quintong,Gregorio
Reyes, and Romulo Badillo. 21
On June 10, 1988, Republic Act No. 6656, "AN ACT TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF TEN-
URE OF CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION," 22 was signed into law. Under Section 7, thereof:
Sec. 9. All officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service Commission to have
been separated in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reap-
pointed as the case may be without loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full pay for the
period of separation. Unless also separated for cause, all officers and employees, including
casuals and temporary employees, who have been separated pursuant to reorganization shall,
if entitled thereto, be paid the appropriate separation pay and retirement and other benefits
under existing laws within ninety (90) days from the date of the effectivity of their separation or
from the date of the receipt of the resolution of their appeals as the case may be: Provided,
That application for clearance has been filed and no action thereon has been made by the
corresponding department or agency. Those who are not entitled to said benefits shall be paid
a separation gratuity in the amount equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service.
Such separation pay and retirement benefits shall have priority of payment out of the savings
of the department or agency concerned. 23
On June 23, 1988, Benedicto Amasa and William Dionisio, customs examiners appointed by
Commissioner Mison pursuant to the ostensible reorganization subject of this controversy, pe-
titioned the Court to contest the validity of the statute. The petition is docketed as G.R. No.
83737.
On October 21, 1988, thirty-five more Customs officials whom the Civil Service Commission
had ordered reinstated by its June 30,1988 Resolution filed their own petition to compel the
Commissioner of Customs to comply with the said Resolution. The petition is docketed as G.R.
No. 85335.
On November 29, 1988, we resolved to consolidate all seven petitions.
On the same date, we resolved to set the matter for hearing on January 12, 1989. At the said
hearing, the parties, represented by their counsels (a) retired Justice Ruperto Martin; (b) retired
Justice Lino Patajo. (c) former Dean Froilan Bacungan (d) Atty. Lester Escobar (e) Atty.
Faustino Tugade and (f) Atty. Alexander Padilla, presented their arguments. Solicitor General
Francisco Chavez argued on behalf of the Commissioner of Customs (except in G.R. 85335,
in which he represented the Bureau of Customs and the Civil Service Commission).lâwphî1.ñèt
Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla also appeared and argued as amicus curiae Thereafter, we
resolved to require the parties to submit their respective memoranda which they did in due
time.
There is no question that the administration may validly carry out a government reorganization
— insofar as these cases are concerned, the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs — by
mandate not only of the Provisional Constitution, supra, but also of the various Executive Or-
ders decreed by the Chief Executive in her capacity as sole lawmaking authority under the
1986-1987 revolutionary government. It should also be noted that under the present Constitu-
tion, there is a recognition, albeit implied, that a government reorganization may be legitimately
undertaken, subject to certain conditions. 24
The Court understands that the parties are agreed on the validity of a reorganization per se the
only question being, as shall be later seen: What is the nature and extent of this government
reorganization?
The Court disregards the questions raised as to procedure, failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, the standing of certain parties to sue, 25 and other technical objections, for two rea-
sons, "[b]ecause of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public
service,"26 and because of the serious implications of these cases on the administration of the
Philippine civil service and the rights of public servants.
The urgings in G.R. Nos. 85335 and 85310, that the Civil Service Commission's Resolution
dated June 30, 1988 had attained a character of finality for failure of Commissioner Mison to
apply for judicial review or ask for reconsideration seasonalbly under Presidential Decree No.
807, 27 or under Republic Act No. 6656, 28 or under the Constitution, 29 are likewise rejected.
The records show that the Bureau of Customs had until July 15, 1988 to ask for reconsideration
or come to this Court pursuant to Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 807. The records like-
wise show that the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration on July 15, 1988.30 The
Civil Service Commission issued its Resolution denying reconsideration on September 20,
1988; a copy of this Resolution was received by the Bureau on September 23, 1988.31 Hence
the Bureau had until October 23, 1988 to elevate the matter on certiorari to this Court.32 Since
the Bureau's petition was filed on October 20, 1988, it was filed on time.
We reject, finally, contentions that the Bureau's petition (in G.R. 85310) raises no jurisdictional
questions, and is therefore bereft of any basis as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. 33 We find that the questions raised in Commissioner Mison's petition (in G.R.
85310) are, indeed, proper for certiorari, if by "jurisdictional questions" we mean questions
having to do with "an indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness and caprice, or omission to
weigh pertinent considerations, a decision arrived at without rational deliberation, 34 as distin-
guished from questions that require "digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment
35 which is the office, on the other hand, of review under Rule 45 of the said Rules. What cannot
be denied is the fact that the act of the Civil Service Commission of reinstating hundreds of
Customs employees Commissioner Mison had separated, has implications not only on the en-
tire reorganization process decreed no less than by the Provisional Constitution, but on the
Philippine bureaucracy in general; these implications are of such a magnitude that it cannot be
said that — assuming that the Civil Service Commission erred — the Commission committed
a plain "error of judgment" that Aratuc says cannot be corrected by the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari or any special civil action. We reaffirm the teaching of Aratuc — as regards re-
course to this Court with respect to rulings of the Civil Service Commission — which is that
judgments of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court through certiorari alone,
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In Aratuc we declared:
It is once evident from these constitutional and statutory modifications that there is a definite
tendency to enhance and invigorate the role of the Commission on Elections as the independ-
ent constitutional body charged with the safeguarding of free, peaceful and honest elections.
The framers of the new Constitution must be presumed to have definite knowledge of what it
means to make the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission "subject to review by the
Supreme Court'. And since instead of maintaining that provision intact, it ordained that the
Commission's actuations be instead 'brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari", We cannot
insist that there was no intent to change the nature of the remedy, considering that the limited
scope of certiorari, compared to a review, is well known in remedial law.36
We observe no fundamental difference between the Commission on Elections and the Civil
Service Commission (or the Commission on Audit for that matter) in terms of the constitutional
intent to leave the constitutional bodies alone in the enforcement of laws relative to elections,
with respect to the former, and the civil service, with respect to the latter (or the audit of gov-
ernment accounts, with respect to the Commission on Audit). As the poll body is the "sole
judge" 37 of all election cases, so is the Civil Service Commission the single arbiter of all con-
troversies pertaining to the civil service.
It should also be noted that under the new Constitution, as under the 1973 Charter, "any deci-
sion, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari,"
38 which, as Aratuc tells us, "technically connotes something less than saying that the same
'shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court,' " 39 which in turn suggests an appeal by
petition for review under Rule 45. Therefore, our jurisdiction over cases emanating from the
Civil Service Commission is limited to complaints of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, complaints that justify certiorari under
Rule 65.
While Republic Act No. 6656 states that judgments of the Commission are "final and execu-
tory"40 and hence, unappealable, under Rule 65, certiorari precisely lies in the absence of an
appeal. 41
Accordingly, we accept Commissioner Mison petition (G.R. No. 85310) which clearly charges
the Civil Service Commission with grave abuse of discretion, a proper subject of certiorari,
although it may not have so stated in explicit terms.
As to charges that the said petition has been filed out of time, we reiterate that it has been filed
seasonably. It is to be stressed that the Solicitor General had thirty days from September 23,
1988 (the date the Resolution, dated September 20,1988, of the Civil Service Commission,
denying reconsideration, was received) to commence the instant certiorari proceedings. As we
stated, under the Constitution, an aggrieved party has thirty days within which to challenge
"any decision, order, or ruling" 42 of the Commission. To say that the period should be counted
from the Solicitor's receipt of the main Resolution, dated June 30, 1988, is to say that he should
not have asked for reconsideration But to say that is to deny him the right to contest (by a
motion for reconsideration) any ruling, other than the main decision, when, precisely, the Con-
stitution gives him such a right. That is also to place him at a "no-win" situation because if he
did not move for a reconsideration, he would have been faulted for demanding certiorari too
early, under the general rule that a motion for reconsideration should preface a resort to a
special civil action. 43 Hence, we must reckon the thirty-day period from receipt of the order of
denial.
We come to the merits of these cases.
G.R. Nos. 81954, 81967, 82023, and 85335:
The Case for the Employees
The petitioner in G.R. No. 81954, Cesar Dario was one of the Deputy Commissioners of the
Bureau of Customs until his relief on orders of Commissioner Mison on January 26, 1988. In
essence, he questions the legality of his dismiss, which he alleges was upon the authority of
Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127, supra, hereinbelow reproduced as follows:
SEC. 59. New Structure and Pattern. Upon approval of this Executive Order, the officers and
employees of the Ministry shall, in a holdover capacity, continue to perform their respective
duties and responsibilities and receive the corresponding salaries and benefits unless in the
meantime they are separated from government service pursuant to Executive Order No. 17
(1986) or Article III of the Freedom Constitution.
The new position structure and staffing pattern of the Ministry shall be approved and prescribed
by the Minister within one hundred twenty (120) days from the approval of this Executive Order
and the authorized positions created hereunder shall be filled with regular appointments by him
or by the President, as the case may be. Those incumbents whose positions are not included
therein or who are not reappointed shall be deemed separated from the service. Those sepa-
rated from the service shall receive the retirement benefits to which they may be entitled under
existing laws, rules and regulations. Otherwise, they shall be paid the equivalent of one month
basic salary for every year of service, or the equivalent nearest fraction thereof favorable to
them on the basis of highest salary received but in no case shall such payment exceed the
equivalent of 12 months salary.
No court or administrative body shall issue any writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order
to enjoin the separation/replacement of any officer or employee effected under this Executive
Order.44
a provision he claims the Commissioner could not have legally invoked. He avers that he could
not have been legally deemed to be an "[incumbent] whose [position] [is] not included therein
or who [is] not reappointed"45 to justify his separation from the service. He contends that neither
the Executive Order (under the second paragraph of the section) nor the staffing pattern pro-
posed by the Secretary of Finance 46 abolished the office of Deputy Commissioner of Customs,
but, rather, increased it to three. 47 Nor can it be said, so he further maintains, that he had not
been "reappointed" 48 (under the second paragraph of the section) because "[[r]eappointment
therein presupposes that the position to which it refers is a new one in lieu of that which has
been abolished or although an existing one, has absorbed that which has been abolished." 49
He claims, finally, that under the Provisional Constitution, the power to dismiss public officials
without cause ended on February 25, 1987,50 and that thereafter, public officials enjoyed secu-
rity of tenure under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution.51
Like Dario Vicente Feria, the petitioner in G.R. No. 81967, was a Deputy Commissioner at the
Bureau until his separation directed by Commissioner Mison. And like Dario he claims that
under the 1987 Constitution, he has acquired security of tenure and that he cannot be said to
be covered by Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127, having been appointed on April 22, 1986
— during the effectivity of the Provisional Constitution. He adds that under Executive Order No.
39, "ENLARGING THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CUS-
TOMS,"52 the Commissioner of Customs has the power "[t]o appoint all Bureau personnel,
except those appointed by the President," 53 and that his position, which is that of a Presidential
appointee, is beyond the control of Commissioner Mison for purposes of reorganization.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 82023, collectors and examiners in venous ports of the Philippines,
say, on the other hand, that the purpose of reorganization is to end corruption at the Bureau of
Customs and that since there is no finding that they are guilty of corruption, they cannot be
validly dismissed from the service.
The Case for Commissioner Mison
In his comments, the Commissioner relies on this Court's resolution in Jose v. Arroyo54 in which
the following statement appears in the last paragraph thereof:
The contention of petitioner that Executive Order No. 127 is violative of the provision of the
1987 Constitution guaranteeing career civil service employees security of tenure overlooks the
provisions of Section 16, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) which explicitly authorize the re-
moval of career civil service employees "not for cause but as a result of the reorganization
pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the
ratification of this Constitution." By virtue of said provision, the reorganization of the Bureau of
Customs under Executive Order No. 127 may continue even after the ratification of the Consti-
tution, and career civil service employees may be separated from the service without cause as
a result of such reorganization.55
For this reason, Mison posits, claims of violation of security of tenure are allegedly no defense.
He further states that the deadline prescribed by the Provisional Constitution (February 25,
1987) has been superseded by the 1987 Constitution, specifically, the transitory provisions
thereof, 56 which allows a reorganization thereafter (after February 25, 1987) as this very Court
has so declared in Jose v. Arroyo. Mison submits that contrary to the employees' argument,
Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 is applicable (in particular, to Dario and Feria in the
sense that retention in the Bureau, under the Executive Order, depends on either retention of
the position in the new staffing pattern or reappointment of the incumbent, and since the dis-
missed employees had not been reappointed, they had been considered legally separated.
Moreover, Mison proffers that under Section 59 incumbents are considered on holdover status,
"which means that all those positions were considered vacant." 57 The Solicitor General denies
the applicability of Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz 58 because that case supposedly involved a
mere transfer and not a separation. He rejects, finally, the force and effect of Executive Order
Nos. 17 and 39 for the reason that Executive Order No. 17, which was meant to implement the
Provisional Constitution, 59 had ceased to have force and effect upon the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, and that, under Executive Order No. 39, the dismissals contemplated were "for
cause" while the separations now under question were "not for cause" and were a result of
government reorganize organization decreed by Executive Order No. 127. Anent Republic Act
No. 6656, he expresses doubts on the constitutionality of the grant of retroactivity therein (as
regards the reinforcement of security of tenure) since the new Constitution clearly allows reor-
ganization after its effectivity.
G.R. Nos. 85310 and 86241
The Position of Commissioner Mison
Commissioner's twin petitions are direct challenges to three rulings of the Civil Service Com-
mission: (1) the Resolution, dated June 30, 1988, reinstating the 265 customs employees
above-stated; (2) the Resolution, dated September 20, 1988, denying reconsideration; and (3)
the Resolution, dated November 16, 1988, reinstating five employees. The Commissioner's
arguments are as follows:
1. The ongoing government reorganization is in the nature of a "progressive" 60 reorganization
"impelled by the need to overhaul the entire government bureaucracy" 61 following the people
power revolution of 1986;
2. There was faithful compliance by the Bureau of the various guidelines issued by the Presi-
dent, in particular, as to deliberation, and selection of personnel for appointment under the new
staffing pattern;
3. The separated employees have been, under Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127, on
mere holdover standing, "which means that all positions are declared vacant;" 62
4. Jose v. Arroyo has declared the validity of Executive Order No. 127 under the transitory
provisions of the 1987 Constitution;
5. Republic Act No. 6656 is of doubtful constitutionality.
The Ruling of the Civil Service Commission
The position of the Civil Service Commission is as follows:
1. Reorganizations occur where there has been a reduction in personnel or redundancy of
functions; there is no showing that the reorganization in question has been carried out for either
purpose — on the contrary, the dismissals now disputed were carried out by mere service of
notices;
2. The current Customs reorganization has not been made according to Malacañ;ang guide-
lines; information on file with the Commission shows that Commissioner Mison has been ap-
pointing unqualified personnel;
3. Jose v. Arroyo, in validating Executive Order No. 127, did not countenance illegal removals;
4. Republic Act No. 6656 protects security of tenure in the course of reorganizations.
The Court's ruling
Reorganization, Fundamental Principles of. —
I.
The core provision of law involved is Section 16 Article XVIII, of the 1987 Constitution. We
quote:
Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause but as a result
of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorgani-
zation following the ratification of this Constitution shag be entitled to appropriate separation
pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of general application
in force at the time of their separation. In lieul thereof, at the option of the employees, they may
be considered for employment in the Government or in any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities,
or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
This provision also applies to career officers whose resignation, tendered in line with the exist-
ing policy, had been accepted. 63
The Court considers the above provision critical for two reasons: (1) It is the only provision —
in so far as it mentions removals not for cause — that would arguably support the challenged
dismissals by mere notice, and (2) It is the single existing law on reorganization after the ratifi-
cation of the 1987 Charter, except Republic Act No. 6656, which came much later, on June 10,
1988. [Nota been Executive Orders No. 116 (covering the Ministry of Agriculture & Food), 117
(Ministry of Education, Culture & Sports), 119 (Health), 120 (Tourism), 123 (Social Welfare &
Development), 124 (Public Works & Highways), 125 transportation & Communications), 126
(Labor & Employment), 127 (Finance), 128 (Science & Technology), 129 (Agrarian Reform),
131 (Natural Resources), 132 (Foreign Affairs), and 133 (Trade & Industry) were all promul-
gated on January 30,1987, prior to the adoption of the Constitution on February 2, 1987].64
It is also to be observed that unlike the grants of power to effect reorganizations under the past
Constitutions, the above provision comes as a mere recognition of the right of the Government
to reorganize its offices, bureaus, and instrumentalities. Under Section 4, Article XVI, of the
1935 Constitution:
Section 4. All officers and employees in the existing Government of the Philippine Islands shall
continue in office until the Congress shall provide otherwise, but all officers whose appoint-
ments are by this Constitution vested in the President shall vacate their respective office(s)
upon the appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within
a period of one year from the date of the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
65
Under Section 9, Article XVII, of the 1973 Charter:
Section 9. All officials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic of the Philip-
pines shall continue in office until otherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent Pres-
ident of the Philippines, but all officials whose appointments are by this Constitution vested in
the Prime Minister shall vacate their respective offices upon the appointment and qualification
of their successors. 66
The Freedom Constitution is, as earlier seen, couched in similar language:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution
shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the
appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year
from February 25, 1986.67
Other than references to "reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution," there is
no provision for "automatic" vacancies under the 1987 Constitution.
Invariably, transition periods are characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. They
are dictated by the need to hasten the passage from the old to the new Constitution free from
the "fetters" of due process and security of tenure.
At this point, we must distinguish removals from separations arising from abolition of office (not
by virtue of the Constitution) as a result of reorganization carried out by reason of economy or
to remove redundancy of functions. In the latter case, the Government is obliged to prove good
faith.68 In case of removals undertaken to comply with clear and explicit constitutional man-
dates, the Government is not hard put to prove anything, plainly and simply because the Con-
stitution allows it.
Evidently, the question is whether or not Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is
a grant of a license upon the Government to remove career public officials it could have validly
done under an "automatic" vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason.
As we have seen, since 1935, transition periods have been characterized by provisions for
"automatic" vacancies. We take the silence of the 1987 Constitution on this matter as a restraint
upon the Government to dismiss public servants at a moment's notice.
What is, indeed, apparent is the fact that if the present Charter envisioned an "automatic" va-
cancy, it should have said so in clearer terms, as its 1935, 1973, and 1986 counterparts had
so stated.
The constitutional "lapse" means either one of two things: (1) The Constitution meant to con-
tinue the reorganization under the prior Charter (of the Revolutionary Government), in the
sense that the latter provides for "automatic" vacancies, or (2) It meant to put a stop to those
'automatic" vacancies. By itself, however, it is ambiguous, referring as it does to two stages of
reorganization — the first, to its conferment or authorization under Proclamation No. 3 (Free-
dom Charter) and the second, to its implementation on its effectivity date (February 2,
1987).lâwphî1.ñèt But as we asserted, if the intent of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution were to extend the effects of reorganize tion under the Freedom Constitution, it
should have said so in clear terms. It is illogical why it should talk of two phases of reorganiza-
tion when it could have simply acknowledged the continuing effect of the first reorganization.
Second, plainly the concern of Section 16 is to ensure compensation for victims" of constitu-
tional revamps — whether under the Freedom or existing Constitution — and only secondarily
and impliedly, to allow reorganization. We turn to the records of the Constitutional Commission:
INQUIRY OF MR. PADILLA
On the query of Mr. Padilla whether there is a need for a specific reference to Proclamation
No. 3 and not merely state "result of the reorganization following the ratification of this Consti-
tution', Mr. Suarez, on behalf of the Committee, replied that it is necessary, inasmuch as there
are two stages of reorganization covered by the Section.
Mr. Padilla pointed out that since the proposal of the Commission on Government Reorganiza-
tion have not been implemented yet, it would be better to use the phrase "reorganization before
or after the ratification of the Constitution' to simplify the Section. Mr. Suarez instead suggested
the phrase "as a result of the reorganization effected before or after the ratification of the Con-
stitution' on the understanding that the provision would apply to employees terminated because
of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 and even those affected by the reorgani-
zation during the Marcos regime. Additionally, Mr. Suarez pointed out that it is also for this
reason that the Committee specified the two Constitutions the Freedom Constitution — and the
1986 [1987] Constitution. 69
Simply, the provision benefits career civil service employees separated from the service. And
the separation contemplated must be due to or the result of (1) the reorganization pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986, (2) the reorganization from February 2, 1987, and
(3) the resignations of career officers tendered in line with the existing policy and which resig-
nations have been accepted. The phrase "not for cause" is clearly and primarily exclusionary,
to exclude those career civil service employees separated "for cause." In other words, in order
to be entitled to the benefits granted under Section 16 of Article XVIII of the Constitution of
1987, two requisites, one negative and the other positive, must concur, to wit:
1. the separation must not be for cause, and
2. the separation must be due to any of the three situations mentioned above.
By its terms, the authority to remove public officials under the Provisional Constitution ended
on February 25, 1987, advanced by jurisprudence to February 2, 1987. 70 It Can only mean,
then, that whatever reorganization is taking place is upon the authority of the present Charter,
and necessarily, upon the mantle of its provisions and safeguards. Hence, it can not be legiti-
mately stated that we are merely continuing what the revolutionary Constitution of the Revolu-
tionary Government had started. We are through with reorganization under the Freedom Con-
stitution — the first stage. We are on the second stage — that inferred from the provisions of
Section 16 of Article XVIII of the permanent basic document.
This is confirmed not only by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, supra, but is
apparent from the Charter's own words. It also warrants our holding in Esguerra and Palma-
Fernandez, in which we categorically declared that after February 2, 1987, incumbent officials
and employees have acquired security of tenure, which is not a deterrent against separation
by reorganization under the quondam fundamental law.
Finally, there is the concern of the State to ensure that this reorganization is no "purge" like the
execrated reorganizations under martial rule. And, of course, we also have the democratic
character of the Charter itself.
Commissioner Mison would have had a point, insofar as he contends that the reorganization is
open-ended ("progressive"), had it been a reorganization under the revolutionary authority,
specifically of the Provisional Constitution. For then, the power to remove government employ-
ees would have been truly wide ranging and limitless, not only because Proclamation No. 3
permitted it, but because of the nature of revolutionary authority itself, its totalitarian tendencies,
and the monopoly of power in the men and women who wield it.
What must be understood, however, is that notwithstanding her immense revolutionary powers,
the President was, nevertheless, magnanimous in her rule. This is apparent from Executive
Order No. 17, which established safeguards against the strong arm and ruthless propensity
that accompanies reorganizations — notwithstanding the fact that removals arising therefrom
were "not for cause," and in spite of the fact that such removals would have been valid and
unquestionable. Despite that, the Chief Executive saw, as we said, the "unnecessary anxiety
and demoralization" in the government rank and file that reorganization was causing, and pre-
scribed guidelines for personnel action. Specifically, she said on May 28, 1986:
WHEREAS, in order to obviate unnecessary anxiety and demoralization among the deserving
officials and employees, particularly in the career civil service, it is necessary to prescribe the
rules and regulations for implementing the said constitutional provision to protect career civil
servants whose qualifications and performance meet the standards of service demanded by
the New Government, and to ensure that only those found corrupt, inefficient and undeserving
are separated from the government service; 71
Noteworthy is the injunction embodied in the Executive Order that dismissals should be made
on the basis of findings of inefficiency, graft, and unfitness to render public service.*
The President's Memorandum of October 14, 1987 should furthermore be considered. We
quote, in part:
Further to the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 on the same subject, I have ordered that
there will be no further layoffs this year of personnel as a result of the government reorganiza-
tion. 72
Assuming, then, that this reorganization allows removals "not for cause" in a manner that would
have been permissible in a revolutionary setting as Commissioner Mison so purports, it would
seem that the Commissioner would have been powerless, in any event, to order dismissals at
the Customs Bureau left and right. Hence, even if we accepted his "progressive" reorganization
theory, he would still have to come to terms with the Chief Executive's subsequent directives
moderating the revolutionary authority's plenary power to separate government officials and
employees.
Reorganization under the 1987 Constitution, Nature, Extent, and Limitations of; Jose v. Arroyo,
clarified. —
The controversy seems to be that we have, ourselves, supposedly extended the effects of
government reorganization under the Provisional Constitution to the regime of the 1987 Con-
stitution. Jose v. Arroyo73 is said to be the authority for this argument. Evidently, if Arroyo indeed
so ruled, Arroyo would be inconsistent with the earlier pronouncement of Esguerra and the
later holding of Palma-Fernandez. The question, however, is: Did Arroyo, in fact, extend the
effects of reorganization under the revolutionary Charter to the era of the new Constitution?
There are a few points about Arroyo that have to be explained. First, the opinion expressed
therein that "[b]y virtue of said provision the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs under
Executive Order No. 127 may continue even after the ratification of this constitution and career
civil service employees may be separated from the service without cause as a result of such
reorganization" 74 is in the nature of an obiter dictum. We dismissed Jose's petition 75 primarily
because it was "clearly premature, speculative, and purely anticipatory, based merely on news-
paper reports which do not show any direct or threatened injury," 76 it appearing that the reor-
ganization of the Bureau of Customs had not been, then, set in motion. Jose therefore had no
cause for complaint, which was enough basis to dismiss the petition. The remark anent sepa-
ration "without cause" was therefore not necessary for the disposition of the case. In Morales
v. Parades,77 it was held that an obiter dictum "lacks the force of an adjudication and should
not ordinarily be regarded as such."78
Secondly, Arroyo is an unsigned resolution while Palma Fernandez is a full-blown decision,
although both are en banc cases. While a resolution of the Court is no less forceful than a
decision, the latter has a special weight.
Thirdly, Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz comes as a later doctrine. (Jose v. Arroyo was promul-
gated on August 11, 1987 while Palma-Fernandez was decided on August 31, 1987.) It is well-
established that a later judgment supersedes a prior one in case of an inconsistency.
As we have suggested, the transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution allude to two stages
of the reorganization, the first stage being the reorganization under Proclamation No. 3 —
which had already been consummated — the second stage being that adverted to in the tran-
sitory provisions themselves — which is underway. Hence, when we spoke, in Arroyo, of reor-
ganization after the effectivity of the new Constitution, we referred to the second stage of the
reorganization. Accordingly, we cannot be said to have carried over reorganization under the
Freedom Constitution to its 1987 counterpart.
Finally, Arroyo is not necessarily incompatible with Palma-Fernandez (or Esguerra).
As we have demonstrated, reorganization under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution is not as
stern as reorganization under the prior Charter. Whereas the latter, sans the President's sub-
sequently imposed constraints, envisioned a purgation, the same cannot be said of the reor-
ganization inferred under the new Constitution because, precisely, the new Constitution seeks
to usher in a democratic regime. But even if we concede ex gratia argumenti that Section 16 is
an exception to due process and no-removal-"except for cause provided by law" principles
enshrined in the very same 1987 Constitution, 79 which may possibly justify removals "not for
cause," there is no contradiction in terms here because, while the former Constitution left the
axe to fall where it might, the present organic act requires that removals "not for cause" must
be as a result of reorganization. As we observed, the Constitution does not provide for "auto-
matic" vacancies. It must also pass the test of good faith — a test not obviously required under
the revolutionary government formerly prevailing, but a test well-established in democratic so-
cieties and in this government under a democratic Charter.
When, therefore, Arroyo permitted a reorganization under Executive Order No. 127 after the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, Arroyo permitted a reorganization provided that it is done
in good faith. Otherwise, security of tenure would be an insuperable implement. 80
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in
good faith. 81 As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case
of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in
that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition,"
which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to
defeat sty of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition' takes place and whatever
"abolition' is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a
change of nomenclature of positions, 82 or where claims of economy are belied by the existence
of ample funds. 83
It is to be stressed that by predisposing a reorganization to the yardstick of good faith, we are
not, as a consequence, imposing a "cause" for restructuring. Retrenchment in the course of a
reorganization in good faith is still removal "not for cause," if by "cause" we refer to "grounds"
or conditions that call for disciplinary action.**
Good faith, as a component of a reorganization under a constitutional regime, is judged from
the facts of each case. However, under Republic Act No. 6656, we are told:
SEC. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause
and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona
fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need to
merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other
lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following
circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result
of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved
party: (a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing
pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) Where an office is abolished and another
performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) Where incumbents are replaced by
those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d) Where there
is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified of-
fices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices; (e) Where the removal
violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof. 84
It is in light hereof that we take up questions about Commissioner Mison's good faith, or lack
of it.
Reorganization of the Bureau of Customs,
Lack of Good Faith in. —
The Court finds that after February 2, 1987 no perceptible restructuring of the Customs hierar-
chy — except for the change of personnel — has occurred, which would have justified (an
things being equal) the contested dismisses. The contention that the staffing pattern at the
Bureau (which would have furnished a justification for a personnel movement) is the same s
pattern prescribed by Section 34 of Executive Order No. 127 already prevailing when Commis-
sioner Mison took over the Customs helm, has not been successfully contradicted 85 There is
no showing that legitimate structural changes have been made — or a reorganization actually
undertaken, for that matter — at the Bureau since Commissioner Mison assumed office, which
would have validly prompted him to hire and fire employees. There can therefore be no actual
reorganization to speak of, in the sense, say, of reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices,
or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions, but a revamp of person-
nel pure and simple.
The records indeed show that Commissioner Mison separated about 394 Customs personnel
but replaced them with 522 as of August 18, 1988. 86 This betrays a clear intent to "pack" the
Bureau of Customs. He did so, furthermore, in defiance of the President's directive to halt fur-
ther layoffs as a consequence of reorganization. 87 Finally, he was aware that layoffs should
observe the procedure laid down by Executive Order No. 17.
We are not, of course, striking down Executive Order No. 127 for repugnancy to the Constitu-
tion. While the act is valid, still and all, the means with which it was implemented is not. 88
Executive Order No. 127, Specific Case of. —
With respect to Executive Order No. 127, Commissioner Mison submits that under Section 59
thereof, "[t]hose incumbents whose positions are not included therein or who are not reap-
pointed shall be deemed separated from the service." He submits that because the 394 re-
moved personnel have not been "reappointed," they are considered terminated. To begin with,
the Commissioner's appointing power is subject to the provisions of Executive Order No. 39.
Under Executive Order No. 39, the Commissioner of Customs may "appoint all Bureau person-
nel, except those appointed by the President." 89
Accordingly, with respect to Deputy Commissioners Cesar Dario and Vicente Feria, Jr., Com-
missioner Mison could not have validly terminated them, they being Presidential appointees.
Secondly, and as we have asserted, Section 59 has been rendered inoperative according to
our holding in Palma-Fernandez.
That Customs employees, under Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 had been on a mere
holdover status cannot mean that the positions held by them had become vacant. In Palma-
Fernandez, we said in no uncertain terms:
The argument that, on the basis of this provision, petitioner's term of office ended on 30 January
1987 and that she continued in the performance of her duties merely in a hold over capacity
and could be transferred to another position without violating any of her legal rights, is untena-
ble. The occupancy of a position in a hold-over capacity was conceived to facilitate reorgani-
zation and would have lapsed on 25 February 1987 (under the Provisional Constitution), but
advanced to February 2, 1987 when the 1987 Constitution became effective (De Leon. et al.,
vs. Hon. Benjamin B. Esquerra, et. al., G.R. No. 78059, 31 August 1987). After the said date
the provisions of the latter on security of tenure govern. 90
It should be seen, finally, that we are not barring Commissioner Mison from carrying out a
reorganization under the transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution. But such a reorganiza-
tion should be subject to the criterion of good faith.
Resume. —
In resume, we restate as follows:
1. The President could have validly removed government employees, elected or appointed,
without cause but only before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987 (De
Leon v. Esguerra, supra; Palma-Fernandez vs. De la Paz, supra); in this connection, Section
59 (on non-reappointment of incumbents) of Executive Order No. 127 cannot be a basis for
termination;
2. In such a case, dismissed employees shall be paid separation and retirement benefits or
upon their option be given reemployment opportunities (CONST. [1987], art. XVIII, sec. 16;
Rep. Act No. 6656, sec. 9);
3. From February 2, 1987, the State does not lose the right to reorganize the Government
resulting in the separation of career civil service employees [CONST. (1987), supra] provided,
that such a reorganization is made in good faith. (Rep. Act No. 6656, supra.)
G.R. No. 83737
This disposition also resolves G.R. No. 83737. As we have indicated, G.R. No. 83737 is a
challenge to the validity of Republic Act No. 6656. In brief, it is argued that the Act, insofar as
it strengthens security of tenure 91 and as far as it provides for a retroactive effect, 92 runs
counter to the transitory provisions of the new Constitution on removals not for cause.
It can be seen that the Act, insofar as it provides for reinstatament of employees separated
without "a valid cause and after due notice and hearing" 93 is not contrary to the transitory
provisions of the new Constitution. The Court reiterates that although the Charter's transitory
provisions mention separations "not for cause," separations thereunder must nevertheless be
on account of a valid reorganization and which do not come about automatically. Otherwise,
security of tenure may be invoked. Moreover, it can be seen that the statute itself recognizes
removals without cause. However, it also acknowledges the possibility of the leadership using
the artifice of reorganization to frustrate security of tenure. For this reason, it has installed safe-
guards. There is nothing unconstitutional about the Act.
We recognize the injury Commissioner Mison's replacements would sustain. We also commis-
serate with them. But our concern is the greater wrong inflicted on the dismissed employees
on account of their regal separation from the civil service.
WHEREFORE, THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DATED JUNE
30, 1988, SEPTEMBER 20, 1988, NOVEMBER 16, 1988, INVOLVED IN G.R. NOS. 85310,
85335, AND 86241, AND MAY 8, 1989, INVOLVED IN G.R. NO. 85310, ARE AFFIRMED.
THE PETITIONS IN G.R. NOS. 81954, 81967, 82023, AND 85335 ARE GRANTED. THE PE- Republic of the Philippines
TITIONS IN G.R. NOS. 83737, 85310 AND 86241 ARE DISMISSED. SUPREME COURT
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS IS ORDERED TO REINSTATE THE EMPLOYEES Manila
SEPARATED AS A RESULT OF HIS NOTICES DATED JANUARY 26, 1988. EN BANC
THE EMPLOYEES WHOM COMMISSIONER MISON MAY HAVE APPOINTED AS RE- G.R. No. 93355 April 7, 1992
PLACEMENTS ARE ORDERED TO VACATE THEIR POSTS SUBJECT TO THE PAYMENT LUIS B. DOMINGO, petitioner,
OF WHATEVER BENEFITS THAT MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW. vs.
NO COSTS. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, re-
IT IS SO ORDERED. spondents.

REGALADO, J.:
This special civil action impugns the resolution 1 of respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC)
promulgated on April 10, 1990 in CSC Case No. 473 setting aside its earlier resolution of No-
vember 27, 1989 and affirming the separation of petitioner Luis B. Domingo as Senior Training
and Career Development Officer of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
Petitioner was employed by DBP as Senior Training and Career Development Officer on per-
manent status from February, 1979 to December 1986.
On December 3, 1986, Executive Order No 81 (The Revised Charter of DBP) was passed
authorizing the reorganization of DBP in this wise:
Sec. 32. Authority to Reorganize. — In view of the new scope of operations of the Bank, a
reorganization of the Bank and a reduction in force are hereby authorized to achieve simplicity
and economy in operations, including adopting a new staffing pattern to suit the reduced oper-
ations envisioned. The formulation of the program of reorganization shall be completed within
six months after the approval of this Charter, and the full implementation of the reorganization
program within thirty months thereafter.
Further, Sections 33 and 34 thereof provide:
Sec. 33. Implementing Details; Organization and Staffing of the Bank.
xxx xxx xxx
In the implementation of the reorganization of the Bank, as authorized under the preceding
section, qualified personnel of the Bank may be appointed to appropriate positions in the new
staffing pattern thereof and those not so appointed are deemed separated from the service. No
preferential or priority rights shall be given to or enjoyed by any officer or personnel of the Bank
for appointment to any position in the new staffing pattern nor shall any officer or personnel be
considered as having prior or vested rights with respect to retention in the Bank or in any posi-
tion as may have been created in its new staffing pattern, even if he should be the incumbent
of a similar position therein.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 34. Separation Benefits. — All those who shall retire from the service or are separated
therefrom on account of the reorganization of the Bank under the provisions of this Charter
shall be entitled to all gratuities and benefits provided for under existing laws and/or supple-
mentary retirement plans adopted by and effective in the Bank: . . .
Pursuant thereto, DBP issued Board Resolution No. 304-87 allowing the issuance of temporary
appointments to all DBP personnel in order to fully implement the reorganization. The resolu-
tion states in part:
It is understood that pursuant to Section 32 of the new DBP Charter full implementation of the
reorganization program shall be completed within a period of thirty-six (36) months from the
approval of this Charter. In this connection, the plantilla approved and appointments issued are
purely interim and the Bank is reserving its right to put in place the permanent structure of the
Bank as well as the permanent appointments thereto until the end of the 36-month period. 2
In effect, said resolution authorized the issuance of temporary appointments to all DBP per-
sonnel to allow maximum flexibility in the implementation of the reorganization. Such temporary
appointments issued had a maximum period of twelve (12) months during which period the
performance of the incumbents were assessed on the basis of the results of their evaluation.
With the passage of Executive Order No. 81 and Board Resolution No. 304 87, DBP undertook
the evaluation and comparative assessment of all its personnel under the CSC approved New
Performance Appraisal System, a peer and control rating process which served as an assess-
ment tool of DBP's screening process.
Petitioner Domingo was issued a temporary appointment on January 2, 1987 for a period of
one (1) year, which was renewed for another period up to November 30, 1988. Thereafter, in
a memorandum 3 dated November 23, 1988 issued by the Final Review Committee, petitioner
got a performance rating of "below average," by reason of which his appointment was "made
to lapse."
Consequently, petitioner, together with a certain Evangeline Javier, filed with the CSC a joint
verified complaint 4 against DBP for illegal dismissal. The complainants therein alleged that
their dismissal constituted a violation of the Civil Service Law against the issuance of temporary
appointments to permanent employees, as well as of their right to security of tenure and due
process.
On November 27, 1989, CSC issued a resolution 5 in CSC Case No. 473 directing "the reap-
pointment of Mr. Domingo and Ms. Javier as Senior Training and Career Development Officer
and Research Analyst or any such equivalent rank under the staffing pattern of DBP." The
order for reappointment was premised on the findings of the CSC that "(t)he action of the DBP
to issue temporary appointments to all DBP personnel in order to allow for the maximum flexi-
bility in evaluating the performance of incumbents is not in accord with civil service law rules,"
in that "(t)o issue a temporary appointment to one who has been on permanent status before
will deprive the employee of benefits accorded permanent employees and will adversely affect
his security of tenure," aside from the fact that such an act is contrary to Section 25 (a) of
Presidential Decree No. 807.
DBP filed a motion for reconsideration 6 on December 27, 1989 alleging, inter alia, that the
issuance of temporary appointments to all the DBP employees was purely an interim arrange-
ment; that in spite of the temporary appointment, they continued to enjoy the salary, allowances
and other benefits corresponding to permanent employees; that there can be no impairment of
herein petitioner's security of tenure since the new DBP charter expressly provides that "qual-
ified personnel of the bank may be appointed to appropriate positions in the new staffing pattern
and those not so appointed are deemed separated from the service;" that petitioner was eval-
uated and comparatively assessed under a rating system approved by the respondent com-
mission; and that petitioner cannot claim that he was denied due process of law considering
that, although several appeals were received by the Final Review Committee from other em-
ployees similarly situated, herein petitioner never appealed his rating or the extension of his
temporary appointment although he was advised to do so by his direct supervisor.
On April 10, 1990, CSC rendered the questioned resolution setting aside its previous decision
and affirming the separation of herein petitioner. In so ruling, CSC explained that:
While it is true that this Commission ruled that the issuance of temporary appointment to all
DBP personnel in order to allow "for maximum flexibility" in evaluating the performance of in-
cumbents is not in accord with civil service laws and rules, however it cannot lose sight of the
fact that appellants are among those who indeed got a below average rating (unsatisfactory)
when their performance were reevaluated and comparatively reassessed by the Final Review
Committee of the Bank approved by the Vice Chairman.
xxx xxx xxx
In effect, the determinative factor for retention and the separation from the service is the indi-
vidual performance rating.
While the Commission supports the principle of merit and fitness and strongly protects the
security of tenure of civil service officials and employees which are the essence of careerism
in the civil service, it does not however, sanction the reappointment of said officials and em-
ployees who have fallen short of the performance necessary in order to maintain at all times
efficiency and effectiveness in the Office.
It bears stressing that the DBP submitted the records and documents in support of its allega-
tions that Mr. Domingo and Ms. Javier have indeed got(ten) a below average rating (unsatis-
factory) during the filing of the instant motion for reconsideration. Had DBP promptly submitted
the records/documents supporting its allegations, this Commission at the outset should have
sustained the separation of the appellants from the service on ground of poor performance
(below average rating, unsatisfactory) after the reassessment and re-evaluation by the Bank
through the Final Review Committee. The CSC could not have guessed that such was the
basis of the DBP's termination of Domingo and Javier until the papers were submitted to it. . .
.
It must be pointed out that appellants' separation from the service was the lapse of their tem-
porary appointment. The non-extension or non-issuance of permanent appointments were prin-
cipally based on their below average rating (unsatisfactory) performance after they were reeval-
uated and comparatively reassessed by the Final Review Committee of the Bank. After all, the
1986 DBP Revised Charter (E.O. No. 81) gives the Bank a wide latitude of discretion in the
reappointment of its personnel, subject to existing civil service laws, rules and regulations.
There is no doubt that the DBP conducted a reevaluation and comparative reassessment of its
employees for placement/retention (for permanent) and for separation from the service and
found out that appellants are wanting of performance, having been rated as "Below Average."
7 Civil Service rules and regulations.
Hence this petition, whereby petitioner raises the following issues:
1. Petitioner's tenure of office was violated by respondents;
2. Petitioner was not afforded a day in court and was denied procedural due process in the
unilateral evaluation by his peers of his efficiency ratings for the years 1987 and 1988;
3. Average and below average efficiency ratings are not valid grounds for termination of the
service of petitioner;
4. Section 5 of the rules implementing Republic Act No. 6656 is repugnant to the constitutional
mandate that "no officer or employee of the Civil Service be removed or suspended except for
cause provided by law;" and
5. Section 16, Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions of the New Constitution was also violated by
respondents. 8
I. Petitioner puts in issue the validity of the reorganization implemented by DBP in that the
same violates his right to security of tenure. He contends that government reorganization can-
not be a valid ground to terminate the services of government employees, pursuant to the ruling
in the case of Dario vs. Mison, et al.9
This statement of petitioner is incomplete and inaccurate, if not outright erroneous. Either peti-
tioner misunderstood or he totally overlooked what was stated in the aforecited decision which
held that "reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are
pursued in good faith." As we said in Dario:
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in
good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose
of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of dis-
missal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that
case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall.
Clearly, from our pronouncements in Dario, reorganization is a recognized valid ground for
separation of civil service employees, subject only to the condition that it be done in good faith.
No less than the Constitution itself in Section 16 of the Transitory Provisions, together with
Sections 33 and 34 of Executive Order No. 81 and Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6656, support
this conclusion with the declaration that all those not so appointed in the implementation of said
reorganization shall be deemed separated from the service with the concomitant recognition of
their entitlement to appropriate separation benefits and/or retirement plans of the reorganized
government agency.
The facts of this case, particularly the evaluation process adopted by DBP, bear out the exist-
ence of good faith in the course of reorganization.
As a tool in the assessment process, a bank-wide peer and control rating process was imple-
mented. Under this process, the peers and supervisors rated the DBP employees. 10
To make the reorganization as open, representative and fair as possible, two principal groups
were formed: (1) the Group Placement Screening Committee (GPSC) and (2) the Central
Placement Screening Committee (CPSC), to review all recommendations (for retention or sep-
aration) prior to submissions to the Chairman an the Board of Directors. The members of the
two screening committees were the Department and Group Heads and representatives from
the Career Officials Association and the DBP Employees Union. The CPSC was further repre-
sented by the DBP Civil Service Officer, who sat as consultant to help resolve questions on
As an assessment tool to the Bank's screening process, a peer and control rating process was
implemented bank-wide, the results of which were used as a gauge to determine the suitability
of an employee to stay in the Bank. Through this rating, the Bank determines the value of the
individual employee to the Bank with the help of his peers (peer rating) and his supervisors
(control
rating). 11
Also, as part of the evaluation process, a Final Review Committee, composed of the group,
department or unit head, the heads of the Human Resource Center and of the Personnel Ser-
vices, and representatives from the Career Officials Association and the Employees Union,
was created to screen further and to recommend the change in status of the employee's ap-
pointment from temporary to permanent beginning 1988. For the rank and file level, the com-
mittee was chaired by the Vice-Chairman while the officer level was presided over by the Chair-
man of the Bank. 12
The performance rating system used and adopted by DBP was duly approved by the Civil
Service Commission. Herein petitioner was evaluated and comparatively assessed under this
approved rating system. This is shown by the memorandum to the Vice-Chairman from the
DBP Final Review Committee wherein petitioner, among other DBP employees, was evaluated
and rated on his performance, and was shown to have gotten a rating of "below average." 13
In the comment 14 filed by DBP with the CSC, respondent bank explained the procedure it
adopted in the evaluation of herein petitioner, together with one Evangeline Javier, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
4. During the second phase of the screening process, the Bank used several instruments for
determining proficiency or skills on the job. More than skills, however, the evaluation also cov-
ered trait factors to determine a positive work attitude. The Bank placed a premium on work
attitude because it believes that technical and professional skills can easily be acquired by an
ordinary normal individual as long as he has the right attitude towards learning.
5. These attitudes are part of the new corporate culture outlined in the corporate philosophy
instituted for the Bank and disseminated thru the various corporate culture seminars, monthly
tertulias, speeches of the Chairman and numerous various internal communications and bulle-
tins. One of the most important values emphasized was TEAMWORK due to the very lean
personnel force that the Bank was left with and the competition it has to contend with in the
industry.
6. Mr. Domingo and Miss Javier were subjected to this rating process as all other employees
of the Bank were.
xxx xxx xxx
8. Mr. Domingo and Miss Javier were recommended for a renewal of temporary status after
assessment of their performance because of several indications of lack of skill and their inability
to work with others in the department where they were stationed. In a compassionate stance,
it was considered in the Central Personnel Committee to transfer them to another department
or unit of the Bank where they may be more effective and productive, but they expressed pref-
erence to stay in the training unit of the Bank, the Human Resource Center.
9. Along with others whose performance for 1987 was found wanting, Mr. Domingo and Miss
Javier were recommended for reappointment as temporary for another period from January to
November 1988 to give the Bank sufficient time to consider their cases. However, in an evalu-
ation of performance for all extendees in November 1988, Mr. Domingo and Miss Javier were
again found wanting having both acquired a rating of "Below Average."
In addition, it is not disputed that DBP now has less than 2,000 employees from a former high
level of around 4,000 employees in 1986. And, under Section 27 of Presidential Decree No.
807, the Government is authorized to lay off employees in case of a reduction due to reorgan-
ization, thus:
Sec. 27. Reduction in Force. — Whenever it becomes necessary because of lack of work or
funds or due to a change in the scope or nature of an agency's program, or as a result of
reorganization, to reduce the staff of any department or agency, those in the same group or
class of positions in one or more agencies within the particular department or agency wherein
the reduction is to be effected shall be reasonably compared in terms of relative fitness, effi-
ciency and length of service, and those found to be least qualified for the remaining positions
shall be laid off.
Lastly, petitioner failed to invoke the presence of any of the circumstances enumerated under
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6656 which would show or tend to show the existence of bad
faith in the implementation of the reorganization.
Quintessentially, the reorganization having been conducted in accordance with the mandate of
Dario, it can safely be concluded that indeed the reorganization was attended by good faith,
ergo, valid. The dismissal of herein petitioner is a removal for cause which, therefore, does not
violate his security of tenure.
As a final note on this issue, we quote with approval the statement of Mme. Justice Ameurfina
A. Melencio-Herrera in her dissenting opinion in the above-cited case:
To be sure, the reorganization could affect the tenure of members of the career service as
defined in Section 5, Article IV of Presidential Decree No. 807, and may even result in the
separation from office of some meritorious employees. But even then, the greater good of the
greatest number and the right of the citizenry to a good government, and as they themselves
have mandated through the vehicle of Proclamation No. 3, provide the justification for the said
injury to the individual. In terms of values, the interest of an employee to security of tenure must
yield to the interest of the entire populace and to an efficient and honest government.
II. Petitioner also maintains that "average" and "below average" efficiency ratings are not valid
grounds for his termination from the service.
It has become a basic and primordial concern of the State to insure and promote the constitu-
tional mandate that appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and
fitness pursuant to its adopted policy of requiring public officers and employees to serve with
the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. 15 As a matter of fact, the
development and retention of a competent and efficient work force in the public service is con-
sidered as a primary concern of the Government. 16 Hence, employees are selected on the
basis of merit and fitness to perform the duties and assume the responsibilities of the position
to which they are appointed. 17 Concomitantly, the government has committed itself to engen-
der a continuing program of career and personnel development for all government employees,
18 by establishing a performance evaluation system to be administered in such manner as to
continually foster the improvement of individual employee efficiency and organizational effec-
tiveness. 19
All these abundantly show that the State puts a premium on an individual's efficiency, merit
and fitness before one is accepted into the career service. A civil service employee's efficiency
rating, therefore, is a decisive factor for his continued service with the Government. The ines-
capable conclusion is that a "below average" efficiency rating is sufficient justification for the
termination of a government employee such as herein petitioner. This is the reason why, painful
as it may be, petitioner's separation must be affirmed if public good is to be subserved. In the
words of respondent commission in its questioned resolution, it cannot "sanction the reappoint-
ment of said officials and employees who have fallen short of the performance necessary in
order to maintain at all times efficiency and effectiveness in the Office." 20
III. Petitioner finally contends that where the purpose of the evaluation proceeding is to ascer-
tain whether he should be retained or separated from the service, it is a proceeding to deter-
mine the existence of a ground for his termination and, therefore, he should be afforded a day
in court, pursuant to the requirements of procedural due process, to defend himself against any
adverse findings in the process of evaluation of his performance.
Petitioner's contention cannot be sustained.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6656 provides that "no officer or employee in the career service
shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing." Thus, there is no
question that while dismissal due to a bona fide reorganization is recognized as a valid cause,
this does not justify a detraction from the mandatory requirement of notice and hearing. How-
ever, it is equally true and it is a basic rule of due process that "what the law prohibits is not the
absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be
heard." 21 There is no violation of procedural due process even where no hearing was con-
ducted for as long as the party was given a chance to present his evidence and defend himself.
The records show that petitioner had the opportunity to present his side and/or to contest the
results of the evaluation proceedings. In DBP's motion for the reconsideration of the original
decision of respondent commission, respondent bank averred:
It may be stated that although several appeals were received by the Final Review Committee
from other employees similarly situated (i.e., also given temporary appointments for 1988), Mr.
Domingo and Miss Javier never appealed their ratings or the extension of their temporary ap-
pointments in 1988. Even at this writing, the Bank has not received any formal appeal from
them although they were advised to do so by their direct supervisor. 22
The fact that petitioner made no appeal to the Final Review Committee was duly considered
by respondent commission in resolving said motion for reconsideration and in affirming the
separation of petitioner from the service, noting that "appellants Mr. Domingo, and Miss Javier
did not file or submit their opposition to the motion for reconsideration." Consequently, peti-
tioner cannot, by his own inaction, legally claim that he was denied due process of law.
Considering petitioner's years of service, despite the unfortunate result of the reorganization
insofar as he is concerned, he should be allowed separation and other retirement benefits ac-
cruing to him by reason of his termination, as provided for in Section 16, Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution, as well as in Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6656 and Section 34 of Executive
Order No. 81.
WHEREFORE, no grave abuse of discretion having been committed by respondent Civil Ser-
vice Commission, its challenged resolution of April 10, 1990 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 103121 September 10, 1993
REMEDIOS T. BLAQUERA, HERMINIO GUTIERREZ, AUGUSTO R. ORAA, VIRGINIA
MALLILLIN, NENA T. AQUINO, RIZALYN DELA CRUZ, SATURNINO Y. CANMANGONAN,
ALICIA S. UMEREZ, PRESENTACION C. DIEZ, VICTORIO M. VILLAGRACIA, FELISA C.
GALARAGA, NELIA D. CANUELA, EDITHA P. FRIGILLANA, GLORIA T. DACANAY,
BERNARD M. DE LARA, NORMA G. SORIANO, ADELAIDA CALOOY, VIRGINIA B.
MILLANO, ADONIS S. JAVIER, SYLVIA C. ABUNGAN, BENJAMIN S. CADAWAN, NOEL
V. FERRER, JOSUE PEREZ, RAMON QUEBRAL, ALFONSO DELA CRUZ, JOEL
ALMOSARA, IMELDA CLARION, ANTONIO P. GUANSING, JR., WILFREDO
VILLANUEVA, WENCESLAO MAGO, ANTONIO DEQUINA, ANGELO A. JAVIER, JOSE DE
GUZMAN, REYNALDO VECINO, JOSEFA CAABAY, EXPEDITO SORIA, LAMBERTO
MELAD, REBE LOZANO, DANILO C. ADINA, JOSE P. ARZADON, EDWIN L. DE VERA,
BERNARDO M. MENDOZA, TITA H. MACARAEG, FELIFE B. SANTOS, LUCIO R. SUYAT,
SANTIAGO R. FRAGANTE, FRANCISCA D. CANUEL, EVELYN B. LORQUE, LUIS
MENDOZA, JAIME GATAN, PROTACIO ARAGON, JR., ARTURO T. SANTOS, R0GELIO S.
GALANG, JOSEFA B. PELIAS, EDWARD P. FRANCO, DOMINADOR ABAD, MAXIMIANO
ISADA, JR., MAMAO C. MACAPODI, JUAN CANLAS, SALVADOR PATA, ROLANDO
LACANDASO, ALFONSO DE LEON, RODOLFO VELASCO, JR., DALMACIO H. NADAL,
RENE CILINDRO, ELENA CASIS, ISABEL AMISCARAY, ELIZABETH VIDAL, MANUEL D.
DE GUZMAN, ESTRELLA S. PABAIRA, VIOLETA S. TUVERA, LILIA T. TABENA, EDNA L.
DOLLAGA, RODOLFO E. SIBAYAN, ALEXANDER R. PAYUMO, VIRGILIO R. ABAYA,
TEMPOLOK G. AMIR, VICTOR B. BALDE, LULLA V. BERNANDO, ANGEL CADIZ, LUZ F.
CADIZ, GUADALUPE P. CORLONCITO, FLORDELIZA P. FEDERIS, BERNANDO P. IBE,
SALAMBAI A. KADATUAN, ZENAIDA A. LEANDER, TEDDY B. MARASIGAN,
PASTOLERO A. NOEMI, ROBERTO C. DELA PAZ, AUGUSTO J. SANTOS, SAGUNDINA
A. SARONA, IRISH S. TINO, CRISENTE C. MANIO, PUREZA T. SAYON, PETRONIO
TADIOSA, HERMINIGILDO S. ALLASCO, ELVIRA C. SABANDO, SERGIO ABUAN,
MITCHELL A. LACHICA, CELEDONIO C. BERNABE, MA. THERESA G. AQUINO,
ALEJANDRO R. SIBUCAO, JR., EVELYN V. MENDEZ, DIGNICITA G. SERRANO, LILIA, J.
RADA, NICASIO F. ROMERO, ANGELINA B. FERNANDEZ, INOCENCIA M. SANTOS,
WILFREDO H. ZAPANTA, SATURNINA V. VITE, GUADENCIA V. FLORES, PEDRO
VICTORIA, CATALINO ALCONIZ, MARIA REBECCA B. BURGOS, MA. MAGDALENA
ESPEJO-MORENO, ROLANDO I. ETEROSA, ROMEO L. MANOSO, SATOR H.
ALTAREJOS, NENITA N. AQUINO, FAUSTO S. BERNARDO, ROSARION MERLINDA B.
BELLEDO, MANUEL V. DELA CRUZ, EMMIE L. IGNACIO, ANABELL C. LABORTE,
ALBERT A. MAGALANG, JAIME P. MALLARE, CONCEPCION C. OCAMPO, FLORENTINO
C. PALO, REGULO S. QUEJADA, LUIS FIDEL B. RONQUILLO, NELIA M. SANTOS,
MALANE DELOS SANTOS, REBECCA E. SARACHO, LIZ Y. VELARDE, ANITA R. ABIERA,
ARMANDO V. ACOSTA, ADVINCULA B. ADVINCULA, FELIMON J. ALANO, ASUNCION
T. AMIN, LORELIE N. ANDRES, RAUEL A. BALAJADIA, ROSARIO B. BATOON,
DOLORES B. BETRAN, PRIMA M. CABRAL, ROSARIO H. CAPILI, BRIGIDA N. DE
CASTRO, TEODORO A. DE CASTRO, DUNN HERMANN C. DALIRE, JOCOBO G.
FESALBON, FE G. GAMBA, MARIA JAY A. GENCIANA, ROSARIO G. GUIRON,
CONSTANTINO C. GODOY, FRANCISCO F. GODOY, JOVITA C. GOMEZ, TEODORA R.
KUIZON, JOSEPHINE G. L. LAUCHENGCO, PUBLIO P. MALLINLLIN, JULIE C. MANALO,
ROSALINDA P. MEMPIN, HERNANI G. DEL MUNDO, EDERLINA C. MUSNGI, FE V.
NOCHE, PERCIDA G. NORTON, EVA A. NUGUIM, EMELITA S. DEL PRADO, EMERICO B.
PUMARADA, BENJAMINA QUINACUAN, ISABEL C. RIVERA, RAQUEL P. DEL ROSARIO,
OLYMPIA M. DE SAGUN, JAIME F. SANTOS, MARIO L. SANTOS, VIRGILIO M.
SARMIENTO, LILIBETH M. SOAN, LOIDA S. VALENCIA, ANGELINA A. VELASQUEZ,
ADELINA B. VICTORIA, MA. ROSARIO MANZANO, ROSALINDA C. BALANCIO, GLORIA
KABIGTING, MARIO N. TOLENTINO, VICTORIA C. TIONGSON, EMILIO S. MEDINA,
SYLVIA H. CASTRO ABUNGAN, DEMCIA T. BRAGANZA, MARINO K. SANTOS,
TERESITA B. TOMAS, PEDRILLO B. ALFAREJOS, JANETTE L. GARCIA, DON E.
ABARRIENTOS, REYNALDO M. CENTENO, CRISTETA A. CASTRO, WILFREDO B.
BONILLA, DELIA C. SERRANO, CONCESA IMPOS-ALDAY, RESTITUTO P. PARDIÑAS,
EVANGELINE T. CORCUERA, ANICETO D. ORDEN, ESTELITA S.I. FLORES, PATRIA
ABUNALES, SELFA C. FERNANDEZ, VIOLETA A. BUAGAS, LYDIA VILLARIN, LULU
CORRALES, ZENAIDA MALLATE, RAQUEL FUENTES, EMELINA GAMBA, JEAN MIN LA-
DIA, CHONA ZAMORA, ALICIA CIMATU, REYNALDO P. ALCANCES, MARINELA CECILIA
T. PASCUA and DOLORES T. TOLENTINO, petitioners, CONRADO SALVADOR and MI-
GUEL CAISIP, Intervenors,
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., as the Secre-
tary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, HON. GUILLERMO N.
CARAGUE, as the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, respondents.
Padilla, Jimenez, Kintanar & Asuncion Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
The petitioners and intervenors who are permanent employees in the Department of Environ-
ment and Natural Resources (DENR) filed this petition for prohibition and mandamus with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order, to stop the
respondents from removing them from their positions in the DENR pursuant to the 1987 reor-
ganization of that department under Executive Order No. 192 dated June 10, 1987.
To carry out said reorganization, and pursuant to Executive Order
No. 165 of May 5, 1987 which abolished the Commission of Government Reorganization and
transferred its remaining functions1 to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM for
brevity), DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. submitted to the DBM a staffing pattern
consisting of 28,106 positions. The DBM approved only 22,956 positions and the petitioners'
positions were among those trimmed off the new plantilla. As the lean plantilla did not meet the
manpower requirements of the DENR, Secretary Factoran submitted a staffing pattern consist-
ing of 24,614 positions.
On July 4, 1988, the DBM released a revised staffing pattern containing 23,612 positions only
which was 1,002 positions less than what the DENR Secretary requested and which still did
not include the positions of the petitioners.
On July 29, 1988, the DENR requested the DBM to restore 839 positions which DBM had
disapproved earlier. The request was approved on September 14, 1988 after long negotiations
between the DENR and DBM, subject to the condition that these positions shall be coterminous
with the appointees but not to exceed three (3) years. The implications of this are:
1. If the appointee desires to retire, resign, transfer to other office or leave his employment for
any reason whatsoever, the position is automatically abolished, even if the three-year period
has not lapsed.
2. By the end of the 3rd year, the employee holding a coterminous position is automatically
separated. (p. 7, Rollo.)
Meanwhile, on June 10, 1988, Republic Act No. 6656 "An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure
of Civil Service Officers and Employees In the Implementation of Government Reorganization,"
was passed. Section 11 thereof orders all departments and agencies to complete the 1987
reorganization of the executive branch within ninety (90) days from the approval of the law, or
on or before September 8, 1988.
The directors of the affected bureaus (the Environmental Management Bureau, Forestry Man-
agement Bureau, Parks and Wildlife Bureau, Mines and Geosciences Bureau) requested the
DENR and DBM Secretaries to convert the coterminous positions to permanent. The DENR
Secretary favorably endorsed their request citing changes in the functions of the DENR as
justification for the request (Annex B). The request was reiterated by the DENR Assistant Sec-
retary for Services Management but it was denied on December 19, 1990 by DBM Secretary
Guillermo Carague.
The DENR Secretary's motion for reconsideration was not acted upon by Secretary Carague.
Meanwhile, the General Appropriations Act of FY 1991 (R.A. No. 7078) provided for the sala-
ries of the coterminous employees in the DENR until December 31 ,1991.
On August 6, 1991, DENR Secretary Factoran submitted a memorandum to President Aquino,
through Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon, requesting that the 597 coterminous positions of
the DENR (which would expire on September 15, 1991) be extended up to December 31, 1991,
without prejudice to DBM's action on his (Secretary Factoran's) motion for reconsideration. The
Office of the President granted the request.
But as Secretary Factoran's request for reconsideration of Secretary Carague's order remained
unacted upon, the petitioners filed in this Court on December 19, 1991, the present petition for
prohibition2 and mandamus 3 with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order/preliminary
injunction.
The grounds relied upon by the petitioners are:
1. That the impending mass dismissal of petitioners from employment on December 31, 1991
would violate their right to security of tenure and the provisions of Republic Act. No. 6656;
2. That the appointment of the petitioners to the so-called coterminous positions deprived them
of the right to due process;
3. The creation of positions "coterminous with the incumbent but not exceeding three years" is
not in accordance with civil service laws, rules and regulations; and
4. Respondent DBM Secretary has no discretion but to grant respondent DENR Secretary's
request for regularization of the coterminous positions.
Upon receipt of the petition, the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing the DENR
Secretary to "cease and desist from terminating the services of the petitioners effective De-
cember 31, 1991 and from preventing them from performing their duties and functions as offi-
cials and employees of the DENR corresponding to their respective positions" (p. 51, Rollo).
On January 23, 1992, petitioners filed an "Urgent Motion to Cite Respondents for Contempt"
for failure to pay their salaries, allowances and such other benefits due them while they con-
tinue to perform their respective duties and responsibilities in the DENR. On March 2, 1992,
petitioners filed a Supplemental Motion for Contempt on the ground that besides not paying
their salaries respondents made them sign new appointments making them "coterminous with
the incumbent." These acts of the respondents allegedly violate the Restraining Order issued
by this Court on December 27, 1991.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General denied that public respondents have violated
the temporary restraining order. Respondent DENR Secretary complied with the TRO by not
terminating the services of the petitioners. Non-payment of the petitioners' salaries was due to
the lack of an appropriation of funds for their salaries. Besides, the TRO did not require the
DBM to appropriate funds for their salaries. The DBM did not violate the TRO when it required
petitioners to sign new appointments making their positions coterminous with the incumbent
for it (DBM) was not directed by the TRO to desist from committing any act.
On January 23, 1992, Reynaldo Alcances, Marinela Cecilia T. Pascua and Dolores T. To-
lentino, through the petitioners counsel, asked to be included as petitioners because their
names had been inadvertently omitted from the list of petitioners. Their motion may be granted
for they are similarly situated as the original petitioners who have continued to work in the
DENR beyond December 31, 1991.
On February 24, 1992, a Motion for Leave to Intervene was filed by Conrado Salvador and
Miguel Caisip which was not opposed by the petitioners. Before the Court could grant them
leave to intervene, they filed a complaint in Intervention on July 20, 1993.
On March 6, 1992, Alfredo S. Marchadesch, Jr. and Carolina S. Cavan withdrew as petitioners
because they had accepted new appointments in the DENR.
On April 13, 1992, the public respondents, through the Solicitor General, filed their Comment
on the petition.
The petitioners argue that their dismissal on December 31, 1991, would violate their right to
security of tenure safeguarded by paragraph (3), Section 2 of Article IX-B of the Constitution,
and the 2nd paragraph, Section 3 of Article XIII thereof. They also invoke Sections 1 and 11 of
Republic Act No. 6656, which provide that "departments and agencies of the government have
only ninety (90) days from the approval of the Act to undertake the complete implementation
of their respective reorganization plan, hence, the DENR had only up to September 8, 1988, to
reorganize. Their dismissal on December 31, 1991, goes beyond the period allowed by law for
the reorganization of the DENR.
We find merit in the petition.
It may be recalled that upon her assumption of office as President of the Philippines after the
EDSA Revolution, President Corazon Aquino invested herself under Sections 1 and 2, Article
III of the Freedom Constitution (Proclamation No. 3, March 25, 1986) with power and authority
to reorganize the Government "by proclamation or executive order or by designation or ap-
pointment and qualification of the successor of any elective and appointive officials under the
1973 Constitution." The reorganization was to be completed within one year from February 25,
1986, or by February 25, 1987.
Sec. 1. In the reorganization of the government, priority shall be given to measures to promote
economy, efficiency, and the eradication of graft and corruption.
Sec. 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall
continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the des-
ignation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of
one year from February 25, 1986. (Emphasis ours.)
However, "in order to obviate unnecessary anxiety and demoralization among the deserving
officials and employees, particularly in the Career Civil Service" arising from the reorganization
of the government, the President issued E. O. No. 17 on May 28, 1986 providing guidelines for
the implementation of the reorganization "to protect career civil servants whose qualifications
and performance meet the standards of service demanded by the new Government, and to
ensure that only those found corrupt, inefficient and undeserving are separated from the gov-
ernment service." The head of each Ministry (now Department) was tasked to "see to it that the
separation and replacement of officers and employees is made only for justifiable reasons"
which are:
Sec. 3. The following shall be the grounds for separation/ replacement of personnel:
1. Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil Service Law;
2. Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act as
determined by the Ministry Head concerned;
3. Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions;
4. Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes;
5. Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the service or
his separation/replacement is in the interest of the service. (E.O. No. 17.)
Excluded from the protection of E.O. No. 17 are:
Sec. 11. This Executive Order shall not apply to elective officials or those designated to replace
them, presidential appointees, casual and contractual employees, or officials and employees
removed pursuant to disciplinary proceedings under the Civil Service Law and Rules, and to
those laid off as a result of the reorganization undertaken pursuant to Executive Order No. 5.
(Emphasis supplied.)
As a result of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution by the nation, the reorganization deadline
in Proclamation No. 3 (February 25, 1987) was advanced to February 2, 1987.
Although the security of tenure of government employees is protected by Section 2, subpar.
(3), Title B, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, thus:
Sec. 2. (3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except
for cause provided by law.
Section 16 of Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the Constitution still allows the separation
of employees "not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No.
3 . . . and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution." Section 16 is quoted
hereunder:
Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause but as a result
of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorgani-
zation following the ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to appropriate separation
pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of general application
in force at the time of their separation. In lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may
be considered for employment in the Government or in any of its subdivision, instrumentalities,
or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
This provision also applies to career officers whose resignation, tendered in line with the exist-
ing policy, had been accepted. (Emphasis ours.)
E. O. No. 192 dated June 10, 1987 "PROVIDING FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF THE DE-
PARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, RENAMING IT
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES" is a "reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution." Although im-
pliedly sanctioned under Section 16 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, it
must nevertheless pass the test of good faith to be valid. Good faith, we ruled in Dario vs.
Mison4 is a basic ingredient for the validity of any government reorganization. It is the golden
thread that holds together the fabric of the reorganization. Without it, the cloth would disinte-
grate.
Reorganization is a recognized valid ground for separation of civil service employees, subject
only to the condition that it be done in good faith. No less than the Constitution itself in Section
16 of the Transitory Provisions, together with Sections 33 and 34 of Executive Order No. 6656,
support this conclusion with the declaration that all those not so appointed in the implementa-
tion of said reorganization shall be deemed separated from the service with the concomitant
recognition of their entitlement to appropriate separation benefits and/or retirement plans of the
reorganized government agency. (Domingo vs. Development Bank of the Phils., 207 SCRA
766.)
A reorganization in good faith is one designed to trim the fat off the bureaucracy and institute
economy and greater efficiency in its operation. It is not a mere tool of the spoils system to
change the face of the bureaucracy and destroy the livelihood of hordes of career employees
in the civil service so that the new-powers-that-be may put their own people in control of the
machinery of government.
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in
good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose
of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of dis-
missal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that
case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which
is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat
security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever
"abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a
change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are belied by the existence
of ample funds. (Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84, 92-93.)
There is no dispute over the power to reorganize — whether traditional, progressive, or what-
ever adjective is appended to it. However, the essence of constitutional government is adher-
ence to basic rules. The rule of law requires that no government official should feel free to do
as he pleases using only his avowedly sincere intentions and conscience to guide him. The
fundamental standards of fairness embodied in the bona fide rule cannot be disregarded. More
particularly, the auto-limitations imposed by the President when she proclaimed the Provisional
Constitution and issued executive orders as sole law maker and the standards and restrictions
prescribed by the present Constitution and the Congress established under it, must be obeyed.
Absent this compliance, we cannot say that a reorganization is bona fide. (Mendoza vs.
Quisumbing, 186 SCRA 108.)
In fact, the right of the state to reorganize the Government resulting in the separation of career
civil service employees under the 1987 Constitution is beyond dispute, but as emphasized in
the Mison case (G.R. Nos. 81954, 81967 and 82023, August 8, 1989) and in the cases of
Bondoc vs. Sec. of Science and Technology (G.R. No. 83025), Quisumbing vs. Tupas (G.R.
No. 87401) and Hamed vs. Civil service Commission (G.R. No. 89069), all of which having
been promulgated on July 19, 1990, said reorganization, ouster, and appointments of succes-
sors must be made in GOOD FAITH. (Emphasis supplied; Siete vs. Santos, 190 SCRA 50, 51-
52.)
There appears to be no sufficient justification for the reorganization of the DENR, as revised
by the DBM. The fact that Section 25 of E.O. No. 192 changed the status of all the officers and
employees of the DENR from permanent or regular to mere "hold-overs," flagrantly violating
the employees' right to due process, taints the reorganization process. Section 25 provides:
Sec. 25. New Structure and Pattern. — Upon approval of this executive Order, the officers and
employees of the Department shall in a hold-over capacity, continue to perform their respective
duties and responsibilities and receive the corresponding salaries and benefits unless in the
meantime they are separated from government service.
. . . Those incumbents whose positions are not included therein, or, who are not reappointed,
shall be deemed separated from the
service. . . .
In Domingo vs. DBP, 207 SCRA 766, the Court emphasized that a reorganization "does not
justify a detraction from the mandatory requirement of notice and hearing" (emphasis ours) to
the affected officials and employees.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6656 provides that "no officer or employee in the career service
shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing." Thus, there is no
question that while dismissal due to a bona fide reorganization is recognized as a valid cause,
this does not justify a detraction from the mandatory requirement of notice and hearing. . . .
(Emphasis supplied; Domingo vs. Development Bank of the Philippines, 207 SCRA 766.)
In Mendoza vs. Quisumbing, 186 SCRA 108, the Court noted the pernicious effect of the "hold-
over" provision (Sec. 24) in Executive Order
No. 117 reorganizing the Department of Education and Culture which uprooted thousands of
school teachers and employees, thus:
. . . Pursuant to the above provision [Sec. 24, E. O. No. 117], around 400,000 school teachers,
janitors, clerks, principals, supervisors, administrators, and higher officials were placed on
"hold-over status." When a public officer is placed on hold-over status, it means that his term
has expired or his services terminated but he should continue holding his office until his suc-
cessor is appointed or chosen and has qualified. (See Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12
[1946]). (Mendoza vs. Quisumbing, 186 SCRA 108, 110-111.)
That the reorganization of the DENR was not intended to achieve economy and efficiency, is
revealed by the admission in page 16 of the public respondents' Comment that the new staffing
pattern of the department contains "991 positions more than the total number of permanent
positions in the DENR before the reorganization." In fact, DENR Secretary Fulgencio Factoran
(who is presumed to know better than anyone else the needs of his department) had urged the
DBM to restore the positions of the petitioners because they are "vital to the functions, man-
dates and objectives of the DENR" (p. 30, Comment). Since the abolition of their positions will
not conduce to either "efficiency" or "economy" in the Service, which are the principal justifica-
tions for any government overhaul, then, obviously, the reorganization of the DENR is not jus-
tified.
The conversion of the petitioners from permanent to "coterminous" employees is a wholesale
demotion of personnel which is tantamount to removal without cause and without due process.
(Floreza vs. Ongpin, 182 SCRA 692, 693.) It is therefore null and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in GRANTED. The removal of the petitioners and in-
tervenors from office is declared null and void. The respondent Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), or his successor in office, is ordered to reinstate
the petitioners to their former or equivalent positions in the DENR without loss of seniority and
other benefits, and to issue regular and permanent appointments to them for the positions in
the new organization and staffing pattern corresponding to their positions in the 1986 plantilla.
The respondent Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, or his successor in
office, is ordered to reinstate the appropriation for the salaries of the petitioners and interve-
nors. The temporary restraining order which the Court issued in this case is made permanent.
The petitioners' motion to cite the public respondents for contempt of court is DENIED for hav-
ing become moot after the latter's resignation from office upon the change of administration on
June 30, 1992. No costs.
SO ORDERED.