Natural Obligations distinguished from Moral Obligations

Although the action to recover the original debt has prescribed and when the lawsuit was filed in
this case, the question raised in this appeal is primarily whether, notwithstanding such
1. Villaroel vs. Estrada, 71 Phil 140 requirement, the action taken is appropriate. However, this action is based on the original
obligation contracted by the mother of the defendant, who has already prescribed, but in which
the defendant contracted theAugust 9, 1930 (Exhibito B) by assuming the fulfillment of that
Republic of the Philippines obligation, as prescribed. Being the only defendant in the original herdero debtor eligible
SUPREME COURT successor into his inheritance, that debt brought by his mother in law, although it lost its
Manila effectiveness by prescription, is now, however, for a moral obligation, that is consideration
enough to create and make effective and enforceable obligation voluntarily contracted its
EN BANC August 9, 1930 in Exhibito B.

GR No. L-47362 December 19, 1940 The rule that a new promise to pay a debt prrescrita must be made by the same person
obligated or otherwise legally authorized by it, is not applicable to the present case is
JOHN F. VILLARROEL, appellant-appellant, not required in compliance with the mandatory obligation orignalmente but which would give
vs. it voluntarily assumed this obligation. It confirms the judgment appealed from, with
BERNARDINO ESTRADA, turned-appellee. costs against the appellant. IT IS SO ORDERED.

D. Felipe Agoncillo in representation of the appellant-appelante.

D. Crispin Oben in representation of the defendant-appellee.

DECISION

Avanceña,J.:

On May 9, 1912, Alejandro F. Callao, mother of defendant John F. Villarroel, obtained from
thespouses Mariano Estrada and Severina a loan of P1, 000 payable after seven years
(ExhibitoA). Alejandra died, leaving as sole heir to the defendant.Spouses Mariano Estrada
and Severina alsodied, leaving as sole heir to the plaintiff Bernardino Estrada. On August 9,
1930, the defendant signeda document (Exhibito B) by which the applicant must declare in the
amount of P1, 000, with aninterest of 12 percent per year. This action relates to the recovery
of this amount.

The Court of First Instance of Laguna, which was filed in this action, condemn the defendant
to paythe claimed amount of P1, 000 with legal interest of 12 percent per year since the August
9, 1930until full pay. He appealed the sentence.

It will be noted that the parties in the present case are, respectively, the only heirs and creditors
of the original debtor. This action is brought under the defendant's liability as the only son of
the original debtor in favor of the plaintiff contracted, sole heir of primitive loa creditors. It is
recognized that the amount of P1, 000 to which contracts this obligation is the same debt of
the mother's parents sued the plaintiff.

2. Fisher vs. Robb, 69 Phil 101 (1939)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 46274 November 2, 1939
A.O. FISHER, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOHN C. ROBB, defendant-appellant.
Marcial P. Lichauco and Manuel M. Mejia for appellant.
Wolfson, Barrion and Baradi and Ignacio Ycaza for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
The defendant John C. Robb appeals to this Court from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, the dispositive part of which reads:
Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, who is ordered
to pay to the former the sum of P2,000, with interest at the legal rate from March 11, 1938, until
paid, plus costs.
The facts established at the trial without discussion are the following:
In September, 1935, the board of directors of the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., told the
herein defendant-appellant John C. Robb, to make a business trip to Shanghai to study the
operation of a dog racing course. In Shanghai, the defendant-appellant stayed at the American
Club where be became acquainted with the plaintiff-appellee, A. O. Fisher, through their mutual
friends. In the course of a conversation, the defendant-appellant came to know that the plaintiff-
appellee was the manager of a dog racing course. Upon knowing the purpose of the defendant-
appellant's trip, the plaintiff-appellee showed great interest and invited him to his establishment
and for several days gave him information about the business. It seems that the plaintiff
became interested in the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., and asked the defendant if he could
have a part therein as a stockholder. As the defendant-appellant answered in the affirmative,
the plaintiff-appellee thereupon filled a subscription blank and, through his bank in Shanghai,
sent to the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., in Manila telegraphic transfer for P3,000 in
payment of the first installment of his subscription.
Later on the defendant-appellant returned to Manila from Shanghai.
Some months thereafter, when the board of directors of the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc.,
issued a call for the payment of the second installment of the subscriptions, the defendant-
appellant sent a radiogram to the plaintiff-appellee did so and sent P2,000 directly to the
Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., in payment of the said installment. Due to the manipulations
of those who controlled the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., during the absence of the
defendant-appellant undertook the organization of a company called The Philippine Racing
Club, which now manages the race track of the Santa Ana park. The defendant immediately
endeavored to save the investment of those who had subscribed to the Philippine Greyhound
Club, Inc., by having the Philippine Racing Club acquire the remaining assets of the Philippine
Greyhound Club, Inc. The defendant-appellant wrote a letter to the plaintiff-appellee in
Shanghai explaining in detail the critical condition of the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., and
outlining his plans to save the properties and assets of the plaintiff-appellee that he felt morally
responsible to the stockholders who had paid their second installment (Exh. C). In answer to
said letter, the plaintiff-appellee wrote the defendant-appellant requiring him to return the entire
amount paid by him to the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., (exhibit E). Upon receiving this
letter, the defendant-appellant answered the plaintiff-appellee for any loss which he might have
suffered in connection with the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., in the same way that he could
not expect anyone to reimburse him for his own losses which were much more than those of
the plaintiff-appellee (Exh. B).
The principal question to be decided in this appeal is whether or not the trial court erred in
holding that there was sufficient consideration to justify the promise made by the defendant-
appellant in his letters Exhibits B and C.
In the fifth paragraph of the letter Exhibit B, dated March 16, 1936, addressed by the defendant-
appellant to the plaintiff-appellee, the former said: "I feel a moral responsibility for these second
payments, which were made in order to carry out my plan (not the first payments, as you have
it in your letter), and Mr. Hilscher and I will see to it that stockholders who made second
payments receive these amounts back as soon as possible, out of our own personal funds. "As
it is, I have had to take my loss along with everyone else here, and so far as I can see that is
what all of us must do. The corporation is finally flat, so it is out of the question to receive back
any of your investment from that source; the only salvage will be the second payment that you
made, and that will come from Hilscher and me personally, as I say, not because of any
obligation, but simply because we have taken it on ourselves to do that. (And I wish I could find
someone who would undertake to repay a part of my own losses in the enterprise!)" And in the
seventh paragraph of the letter Exhibit C, dated February 21, 1936, addressed by the same
defendant-appellant to the same plaintiff-appellee the former said the following:
However, Mr. Fischer and I feel a personal responsibility to those few stockholders who made
their second payments, including yourself, and it is our intention to personally repay the
amounts of the second payments made by those few.
. . . And, finally, paragraph 8 of the same letter Exhibit C states: "We are to receive a certain
share of the new Philippine Racing Club for our services as promoters of that organization, and
as soon as this is received by us, we will be in a position to compensate you and the few others
who made the second payments. That, as T have said, will come from us personally, in an
effort to make things easier for those who were sportsmen enough to try to save the Greyhound
organization by making second payments.
Article 1254 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
A contract exists from the moment one or more persons consent to be bound with respect to
another or others to deliver something or to render some services.
And article 1261 of the same Civil Code provides the following:
ART. 1261. There is no contract unless the following requisites exists:
1. The consent of the contracting parties;
2. A definite object which is the subject-matter of the contract;
3. A consideration for the obligation established.
In the present case, while the defendant-appellant told the plaintiff-appellee that he felt morally
responsible for the second payments which had been made to carry out his plan, and that Mr.
Hilscher and he would do everything possible so that the stockholders who had made second
payments may receive the amount paid by them from their personal funds because they
voluntarily assumed the responsibility to make such payment as soon as they receive from the
Philippine racing Club certain shares for their services as promoters of said organization, it
does not appear that the plaintiff-appellee had consented to said form of reimbursement of the
P2,000 which he had directly paid to the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., in satisfaction of the
second installment.
The first essential requisite, therefore, required by the cited article 1261 of the Civil Code for
the existence of a contract, does not exists.
As to the third essential requisite, namely, "A consideration for the obligation established,"
article 1274 of the same Code provides:lawphi1.net
In onerous contracts the consideration as to each of the parties is the delivery or performance
or the promise of delivery or performance of a thing or service by the other party; in
remuneratory contracts the consideration is the service or benefit for which the remuneration
is given, and in contracts of pure beneficence the consideration is the liberality of the
benefactors.
And article 1275 of the same Code provides:
ART. 1275. Contracts without consideration or with an illicit consideration produce no effect
whatsoever. A consideration is illicit when it is contrary to law or morality.
Manresa, in volume 8, 4rth edition, pages 618-619 of his Commentaries on the Civil Code, has
this to say:
Considering the concept of the consideration as the explanation and motive of the contract, it is related
to the latter's object and even more to its motives with which it is often confused. It is differentiated from
them, however, in that the former is the essential reason for the contract, while the latter are the particular
reasons of a contracting party which do not affect the other party and which do not preclude the existence
of a different consideration. To clarify by an example: A thing purchased constitutes the consideration for
the purchaser and not the motives which have influenced his mind, like its usefulness, its perfection, its
relation to another, the use thereof which he may have in mind, etc., a very important distinction, which
precludes the annulment of the contract by the sole influence of the motives, unless the efficacy of the
former had been subordinated to compliance with the latter as conditions.
The jurisprudence shows some cases wherein this important distinction is established. The consideration
of contracts, states the decision of February 24, 1904, is distinct from the motive which may prompt the
parties in executing them. The inaccuracies committed in expressing its accidental or secondary details
do not imply lack of consideration or false consideration, wherefore, they do not affect the essence and
validity of the contract. In a loan the consideration in its essence is, for the borrower the acquisition of the
amount, and for the lender the power to demand its return, whether the money be for the former or for
another person and whether it be invested as stated or otherwise.
The same distinction between the consideration and the motive is found in the decisions of November
23, 1920 and March 5, 1924.
The contract sought to be judicially enforced by the plaintiff-appellee against the defendant-appellant is
onerous in character, because it supposes the deprivation of the latter of an amount of money which
impairs his property, which is a burden, and for it to be legally valid it is necessary that it should have a
consideration consisting in the lending or or promise of a thing or service by such party. The defendant-
appellant is required to give a thing, namely, the payment of the sum of P2,000, but the plaintiff-appellee
has not given or promised anything or service to the former which may compel him to make such payment.
The promise which said defendant-appellant has made to the plaintiff-appellee to return to him P2,000
which he had paid to the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., as second installment of the payment of the
amount of the shares for which he has subscribed, was prompted by a feeling of pity which said defendant-
appellant had for the plaintiff-appellee as a result of the loss which the latter had suffered because of the
failure of the enterprise. The obligation which the said defendant-appellant had contracted with the
plaintiff-appellee is, therefore, purely moral and, as such, is not demandable in law but only in conscience,
over which human judges have no jurisdiction.1awphi1.net
As to whether a moral obligation is a sufficient consideration, read in volume 12 of the American
Jurisprudence, pages 589-590, paragraphs 96, 67, the following:

SEC. 96. Moral obligation. — Although there is authority in support of the board proposition that a moral
obligation is sufficient consideration, such proposition is usually denied. . . . .
The case presenting the question whether a moral obligation will sustain an express executory promise
may be divided into five classes: (1) Cases in which the moral obligation arose wholly from ethical
considerations, unconnected with any legal obligations, perfect or imperfect, and without the receipt of
actual pecuniary or material benefit by the promisor prior to the subsequent promise; (2) cases in which
the moral obligation arose from a legal liability already performed or still enforceable; (3) cases in which
the moral obligation arose out of, or was connected with, a previous request or promise creating originally
an enforceable legal liability, which, however, at the time of the subsequent express promise had become
discharged or barred by operation of a positive rule of law, so that at that time there was no enforceable
legal liability; (4) cases in which the moral obligation arose from, or was connected with, a previous
request or promise which, however, never created any enforceable legal liability, because of a rule of law
which rendered the original agreement void, or at least unenforceable; and (5) cases in which the moral
obligation arose out of, or was connected with, the receipt of actual material or pecuniary benefit by the
promisor, without, however, any previous request or promise on his part, express or implied, and
therefore, of course, without any original legal liability, perfect or imperfect.
SEC. 97. Moral obligation unconnected with legal liability or legal benefit. — Although, as subsequently
shown was formerly some doubt as to the point, it is now well established that a mere moral obligation or
conscience duty arising wholly from ethical motives or a mere conscientious duty unconnected with any
legal obligation, perfect or imperfect, or with the receipt of benefit by the promisor of a material or
pecuniary nature will not furnish a consideration for an executory promise. . . . .
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold, that the promise made by an
organizer of a dog racing course to a stockholder to return to him certain amounts paid by the latter in
satisfaction of his subscription upon the belief of said organizer that he was morally responsible because
of the failure of the enterprise, is not the consideration rquired by article 1261 of the Civil Code as an
essential element for the legal existence of an onerous contract which would bind the promisor to comply
with his promise.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the costs to the plaintiff.
Quasi-delicts
1. Bariedo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil 607 (1942)
G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Jose G. Advincula for respondents.
BOCOBO, J.:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo,
liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro
Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and
Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab
driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was
overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from
which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one
year and one day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted
the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea
Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and
employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded
damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint.
This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with
legal interest from the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's
negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and
at high speed. As to Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact
it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for
violation of the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) — violation which appeared in the
records of the Bureau of Public Works available to be public and to himself. Therefore, he must
indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised
Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against
Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case.
The petitioner's brief states on page 10:
... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to exercise all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to
prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In other words, The Court of Appeals insists on
applying in the case article 1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in
Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said article to a civil liability
arising from a crime as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of
the Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is applicable only to
"those (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or commission not punishable by
law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be imposed upon him
in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro
Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his
negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant or employee.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action
against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903
of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's
negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an employer is
only subsidiary, according to said Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action
and his property has not been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut through the
tangle that has, in the minds of many confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos,
or crimes under the Penal Code and fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
Code. This should be done, because justice may be lost in a labyrinth, unless principles and
remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in our inquiry by the luminous
presentation of the perplexing subject by renown jurists and we are likewise guided by the
decisions of this Court in previous cases as well as by the solemn clarity of the consideration
in several sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely
apart and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit
article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely
anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:
CIVIL CODE
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and from acts and
omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be governed by the
provisions of the Penal Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not
punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this
book.
xxx xxx xxx
ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or
negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages
caused by the minor children who live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject to their
authority and living with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any damages caused
by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or on
occasion of the performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but not if the
damage shall have been caused by the official upon whom properly devolved the duty of doing
the act performed, in which case the provisions of the next preceding article shall be applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils
or apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned therein prove
that they are exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may recover from the
latter what he may have paid.
REVISED PENAL CODE
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every person criminally liable for a felony
is also civilly liable.
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from criminal liability
established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this
Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced to the following
rules:
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts committed by any
imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but
under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment shall devolve upon those having
such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or
negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal
guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall
respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with
the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose benefit the
harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have
received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each
one shall be liable.
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the
liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and,
in all events, whenever the damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or
their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or
regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using violence or
causing the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those
doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from
execution.
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of
establishment. — In default of persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any
other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments,
in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police
regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft
within their houses lodging therein, or the person, or for the payment of the value thereof,
provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person
representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have
followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with
respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery
with violence against or intimidation against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the
innkeeper's employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the
next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period; if
it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad
enough to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits
cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence,
the fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out.
It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse confounded." However, a closer study
shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the
distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos
or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability
arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-
delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable. This
legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the
Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa
aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or negligence
under the Civil Code; for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer
emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas en daño al otro, pero acaescio por
su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089, one
of the five sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual:
"los actos . . . en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then article 1093
provides that this kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV,
meaning articles 1902-0910. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal
institution of culpa aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or
cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil
Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there
is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any
king of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations of the
penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation
of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant,
"Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts and the
employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica Española" (Vol.
XXVII, p. 414) says:
El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y comprende a
diferentes personas. Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil propiamente dicha, que en ningun
casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal alguna, y otra que es consecuencia indeclinable
de la penal que nace de todo delito o falta."
The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises different persons.
Thus, there is a civil responsibility, properly speaking, which in no case carries with it any
criminal responsibility, and another which is a necessary consequence of the penal liability as
a result of every felony or misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had been a
collision between two trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the
Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of the latter had been prosecuted in a criminal case, in
which the company had been made a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The
employee had been acquitted in the criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del Norte,
had also been exonerated. The question asked was whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico could
still bring a civil action for damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in
the affirmative, stating in part (Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-513):
Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos, todavia menos
parece sostenible que exista cosa juzgada acerca de la obligacion civil de indemnizar los
quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los trenes. El titulo en que se funda la
accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con las responsabilidades
civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera exista en este, sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas
agravatorias que motivan sanciones penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion causada por
delito o falta en los derechos civiles, requiere restituciones, reparaciones o indemnizaciones,
que cual la pena misma atañen al orden publico; por tal motivo vienen encomendadas, de
ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es que si por esta via se enmiendan los quebrantos y
menoscabos, el agraviado excusa procurar el ya conseguido desagravio; pero esta eventual
coincidencia de los efectos, no borra la diversidad originaria de las acciones civiles para pedir
indemnizacion.
Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no vendrian a cuento
y que tiene otro regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, de toda accion u
omision, causante de daños o perjuicios, en que intervenga culpa o negligencia. Es trivial que
acciones semejantes son ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente, sin que la
Justicia punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128 del
Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales y politicos del mismo, desenvuelven y
ordenan la materia de responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, en terminos separados del
regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se denomina aquiliana, por alusion a precedentes
legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria intempestivo un paralelo entre aquellas ordenaciones, y la
de la obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de culpa civil; pero viene al caso y es necesaria una de
las diferenciaciones que en el tal paralelo se notarian.
Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las responsabilidades
civiles, entre los que sean por diversos conceptos culpables del delito o falta, las hacen
extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al servicio de los cuales estan los
delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el texto literal, en defecto de los que
sean responsables criminalmente. No coincide en ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo articulo 1903, dice;
La obligacion que impone el articulo anterior es exigible, no solo por los actos y omisiones
propios, sino por los de aquellas personas de quienes se debe responder; personas en la
enumeracion de las cuales figuran los dependientes y empleados de los establecimientos o
empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion de sus funciones. Por esto acontece, y
se observa en la jurisprudencia, que las empresas, despues de intervenir en las causas
criminales con el caracter subsidiario de su responsabilidad civil por razon del delito, son
demandadas y condenadas directa y aisladamente, cuando se trata de la obligacion, ante los
tribunales civiles.
Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero postulado de
nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre justicia punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de suerte
que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de
proceder, habiendose, por añadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la Compañia del
Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece innegable que la de
indemnizacion por los daños y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub judice ante el
Tribunal del Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo
de 21 de marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose mas
arriba, que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada para despues del proceso; pero al
declararse que no existio delito, ni responsabilidad dimanada de delito, materia unica sobre
que tenian jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se redobla el motivo para la obligacion civil ex
lege, y se patentiza mas y mas que la accion para pedir su cumplimiento permanece incolume,
extraña a la cosa juzgada.
As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less tenable that
there should be res judicata with regard to the civil obligation for damages on account of the
losses caused by the collision of the trains. The title upon which the action for reparation is
based cannot be confused with the civil responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists
in the latter, whatever each nature, a culpa surrounded with aggravating aspects which give
rise to penal measures that are more or less severe. The injury caused by a felony or
misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications which, like
the penalty itself, affect public order; for this reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the office
of the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this means the losses and damages are
repaired, the injured party no longer desires to seek another relief; but this coincidence of
effects does not eliminate the peculiar nature of civil actions to ask for indemnity.
Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which are not
pertinent and belong to another scope) are derived, according to article 1902 of the Civil Code,
from every act or omission causing losses and damages in which culpa or negligence
intervenes. It is unimportant that such actions are every day filed before the civil courts without
the criminal courts interfering therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal Code,
bearing in mind the spirit and the social and political purposes of that Code, develop and
regulate the matter of civil responsibilities arising from a crime, separately from the regime
under common law, of culpa which is known as aquiliana, in accordance with legislative
precedent of the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed comparison between
the former provisions and that regarding the obligation to indemnify on account of civil culpa;
but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to one of such differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the civil responsibilities
among those who, for different reasons, are guilty of felony or misdemeanor, make such civil
responsibilities applicable to enterprises and establishments for which the guilty parties render
service, but with subsidiary character, that is to say, according to the wording of the Penal
Code, in default of those who are criminally responsible. In this regard, the Civil Code does not
coincide because article 1903 says: "The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is
demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
another is responsible." Among the persons enumerated are the subordinates and employees
of establishments or enterprises, either for acts during their service or on the occasion of their
functions. It is for this reason that it happens, and it is so observed in judicial decisions, that
the companies or enterprises, after taking part in the criminal cases because of their subsidiary
civil responsibility by reason of the crime, are sued and sentenced directly and separately with
regard to the obligation, before the civil courts.
Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between punitive justice
and the civil courts being a true postulate of our judicial system, so that they have different
fundamental norms in different codes, as well as different modes of procedure, and inasmuch
as the Compaña del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained from taking part in the criminal case
and has reserved the right to exercise its actions, it seems undeniable that the action for
indemnification for the losses and damages caused to it by the collision was not sub judice
before the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the subject of a sentence, but it remained intact when
the decision of March 21 was rendered. Even if the verdict had not been that of acquittal, it has
already been shown that such action had been legitimately reserved till after the criminal
prosecution; but because of the declaration of the non-existence of the felony and the non-
existence of the responsibility arising from the crime, which was the sole subject matter upon
which the Tribunal del Jurado had jurisdiction, there is greater reason for the civil obligation ex
lege, and it becomes clearer that the action for its enforcement remain intact and is not res
judicata.
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on which the
Spanish Civil Code is largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-
contractual are similar to those of the Spanish Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of the
French Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without
including the author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that
it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary
in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act or
at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of the employer)
is in itself a principal action. (Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol.
20, pp. 734-735.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430), declares that
the responsibility of the employer is principal and not subsidiary. He writes:
Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u omisiones de
aquellas personas por las que se debe responder, es subsidiaria? es principal? Para contestar
a esta pregunta es necesario saber, en primer lugar, en que se funda el precepto legal. Es que
realmente se impone una responsabilidad por una falta ajena? Asi parece a primera vista; pero
semejante afirmacion seria contraria a la justicia y a la maxima universal, segun la que las
faltas son personales, y cada uno responde de aquellas que le son imputables. La
responsabilidad de que tratamos se impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa, pero no por
causa de ellos, sino por causa del causi delito, esto es, de la imprudencia o de la negligencia
del padre, del tutor, del dueño o director del establecimiento, del maestro, etc. Cuando
cualquiera de las personas que enumera el articulo citado (menores de edad, incapacitados,
dependientes, aprendices) causan un daño, la ley presume que el padre, el tutor, el maestro,
etc., han cometido una falta de negligencia para prevenir o evitar el daño. Esta falta es la que
la ley castiga. No hay, pues, responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, sino en la apariencia; en
realidad la responsabilidad se exige por un hecho propio. La idea de que esa responsabilidad
sea subsidiaria es, por lo tanto, completamente inadmisible.
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or omissions of those
persons for who one is responsible, subsidiary or principal? In order to answer this question it
is necessary to know, in the first place, on what the legal provision is based. Is it true that there
is a responsibility for the fault of another person? It seems so at first sight; but such assertion
would be contrary to justice and to the universal maxim that all faults are personal, and that
everyone is liable for those faults that can be imputed to him. The responsibility in question is
imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of the same, but because of the
cuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the father, guardian, proprietor or
manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever anyone of the persons
enumerated in the article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices)
causes any damage, the law presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, etc. have committed
an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is condemned
by the law. It is, therefore, only apparent that there is a responsibility for the act of another; in
reality the responsibility exacted is for one's own act. The idea that such responsibility is
subsidiary is, therefore, completely inadmissible.
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo Civil
Español," says in Vol. VII, p. 743:
Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su propia culpa, doctrina
del articulo 1902; mas por excepcion, se responde de la ajena respecto de aquellas personas
con las que media algun nexo o vinculo, que motiva o razona la responsabilidad. Esta
responsabilidad, es directa o es subsidiaria? En el orden penal, el Codigo de esta clase
distingue entre menores e incapacitados y los demas, declarando directa la primera (articulo
19) y subsidiaria la segunda (articulos 20 y 21); pero en el orden civil, en el caso del articulo
1903, ha de entenderse directa, por el tenor del articulo que impone la responsabilidad
precisamente "por los actos de aquellas personas de quienes se deba responder."
That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only for his
own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is liable for the acts of
those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility. Is this
responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the order of the penal law, the Penal Code distinguishes
between minors and incapacitated persons on the one hand, and other persons on the other,
declaring that the responsibility for the former is direct (article 19), and for the latter, subsidiary
(articles 20 and 21); but in the scheme of the civil law, in the case of article 1903, the
responsibility should be understood as direct, according to the tenor of that articles, for
precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of those persons for whom one should be
responsible."
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld the
principles above set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and
distinct legal institution, independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability,
and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible
for the negligent acts of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In that case,
Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been run over by a street car owned by the
"compañia Electric Madrileña de Traccion." The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal case
but he was acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a civil action against the street car company,
paying for damages in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower court awarded damages; so
the company appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of
the Civil Code because by final judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had been
declared. The Supreme Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:
Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado supuesto de que el
Tribunal a quo, al condonar a la compañia Electrica Madrileña al pago del daño causado con
la muerte de Ramon La fuente Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y efectos juridicos de la sentencia
absolutoria deictada en la causa criminal que se siguio por el mismo hecho, cuando es lo cierto
que de este han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as pectos, y como la de lo
criminal declrao dentro de los limites de su competencia que el hecho de que se trata no era
constitutivo de delito por no haber mediado descuido o negligencia graves, lo que no excluye,
siendo este el unico fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el concurso de la culpa o negligencia no
califacadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo, y que alcanzan,
segun el 1903, netre otras perosnas, a los Directores de establecimientos o empresas por los
daños causados por sus dependientes en determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la de
lo civil, al conocer del mismo hehco baho este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la compañia
recurrente a la indemnizacion del daño causado por uno de sus empleados, lejos de infringer
los mencionados textos, en relacion con el articulo 116 de la Ley de Enjuciamiento Criminal,
se ha atenido estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones ajenas a su jurisdiccion propia, ni
contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo recaido en la causa.
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken supposition that the
trial court, in sentencing the Compañia Madrileña to the payment of the damage caused by the
death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, disregards the value and juridical effects of the sentence
of acquittal rendered in the criminal case instituted on account of the same act, when it is a fact
that the two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same act in its different aspects, and as
the criminal jurisdiction declared within the limits of its authority that the act in question did not
constitute a felony because there was no grave carelessness or negligence, and this being the
only basis of acquittal, it does no exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence which is not
qualified, and is a source of civil obligations according to article 1902 of the Civil Code,
affecting, in accordance with article 1903, among other persons, the managers of
establishments or enterprises by reason of the damages caused by employees under certain
conditions, it is manifest that the civil jurisdiccion in taking cognizance of the same act in this
latter aspect and in ordering the company, appellant herein, to pay an indemnity for the damage
caused by one of its employees, far from violating said legal provisions, in relation with article
116 of the Law of Criminal Procedure, strictly followed the same, without invading attributes
which are beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way contradicting the decision in that
cause. (Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the street car
company. This is precisely what happens in the present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not
been sued in a civil action, either alone or with his employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the Supreme
Tribunal of Spain said that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence, which is
not qualified, on the part of the conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil Code. In the present
case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for his
civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held primarily liable for civil
damages, and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs
are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed
negligence — which he did not overcome — under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities
of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from
the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an employer under
article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and they preferred the
second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights. It might be observed in
passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective method of relief, because
Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and besides, he was probably without
property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment against him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer was held
liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal
case, with greater reason should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held liable for
damages in a civil suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been convicted. The degree
of negligence of the conductor in the Spanish case cited was less than that of the taxi driver,
Fontanilla, because the former was acquitted in the previous criminal case while the latter was
found guilty of criminal negligence and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one
year and one day to two years of prision correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.)
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action was
brought against a railroad company for damages because the station agent, employed by the
company, had unjustly and fraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles consigned to the
plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Spain held that this action was properly under article 1902 of
the Civil Code, the court saying:
Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos que consigna con
relacion a las pruebas del pleito: 1.º, que las expediciones facturadas por la compañia
ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las vasijas vacias que en su demanda relacionan
tenian como fin el que este las devolviera a sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes; 2.º, que
llegadas a su destino tales mercanias no se quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por el
jefe de la estacion sin motivo justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3.º, que la falta de entrega
de estas expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el demandante le originaron daños y perjuicios
en cantidad de bastante importancia como expendedor al por mayor que era de vinos y
alcoholes por las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de servir los pedidos que se
le habian hecho por los remitentes en los envases:
Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro motivos que integran
este recurso, porque la demanda inicial del pleito a que se contrae no contiene accion que
nazca del incumplimiento del contrato de transporte, toda vez que no se funda en el retraso
de la llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun otro vinculo contractual entre las partes
contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo de Comercio, en
que principalmente descansa el fallo recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir la reparaction de los
daños y perjuicios producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la injustificada y dolosa negativa
del porteador a la entrega de las mercancias a su nombre consignadas, segun lo reconoce la
sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente sancionada en el articulo 1902 del Codigo
Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la Compañia demandada como ligada con el causante de
aquellos por relaciones de caracter economico y de jurarquia administrativa.
Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which it declares,
in relation to the evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by the railroad company in
favor of the plaintiff contemplated that the empty receptacles referred to in the complaint should
be returned to the consignors with wines and liquors; (2) that when the said merchandise
reached their destination, their delivery to the consignee was refused by the station agent
without justification and with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery of these goods
when they were demanded by the plaintiff caused him losses and damages of considerable
importance, as he was a wholesale vendor of wines and liquors and he failed to realize the
profits when he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by the consignors of the receptacles:
Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments of error, as
the original complaint did not contain any cause of action arising from non-fulfillment of a
contract of transportation, because the action was not based on the delay of the goods nor on
any contractual relation between the parties litigant and, therefore, article 371 of the Code of
Commerce, on which the decision appealed from is based, is not applicable; but it limits to
asking for reparation for losses and damages produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on
account of the unjustified and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods consigned
to the plaintiff as stated by the sentence, and the carrier's responsibility is clearly laid down in
article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of the next article, the defendant company,
because the latter is connected with the person who caused the damage by relations of
economic character and by administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the
Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and
fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held
to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be
noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365 [year
1907]), the trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because the
latter had negligently failed to repair a tramway in consequence of which the rails slid off while
iron was being transported, and caught the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court held:
It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the necessary conclusion
from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries through negligence lies only in a criminal
action in which the official criminally responsible must be made primarily liable and his employer
held only subsidiarily to him. According to this theory the plaintiff should have procured the
arrest of the representative of the company accountable for not repairing the track, and on his
prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed, payable primarily by him and
secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. Article 1093 of
the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or negligence not punished by the law,
subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Title XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:
"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is demandable, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be
responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages caused by
the minors who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed
or in the performance of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove
that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to point out
that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain
safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore is one 'not punished by the laws' and
falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be a broader one. We
should be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of these scientific
codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these articles of effect,
would shut out litigants against their will from the civil courts, would make the assertion of their
rights dependent upon the selection for prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and render
recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof prevailing in criminal actions. Even if
these articles had always stood alone, such a construction would be unnecessary, but clear
light is thrown upon their meaning by the provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain
(Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though never in actual force in these Islands, was
formerly given a suppletory or explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes of
action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while the penal action
was pending the civil was suspended. According to article 112, the penal action once started,
the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had been waived by the party injured or
been expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone was
prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be enforced only on private complaint, the penal
action thereunder should be extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of
articles 23 and 133 of our Penal Code on the same subject.
An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of these articles
suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even to
be suspended thereby, except as expressly provided in the law. Where an individual is civilly
liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that the injured party should seek out a
third person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to the
enforcement of the civil right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be regarded as
subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees only while they are in process
of prosecution, or in so far as they determine the existence of the criminal act from which liability
arises, and his obligation under the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred
thereby unless by the election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had
been instituted, growing our of the accident in question, the provisions of the Penal Code can
not affect this action. This construction renders it unnecessary to finally determine here whether
this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions has survived the laws that fully regulated it or has
been abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure now in force in the Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears from the
briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault or
negligence not punished by law," as applied to the comprehensive definition of offenses in
articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been shown that the liability of an employer
arising out of his relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived
from negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093. More than
this, however, it cannot be said to fall within the class of acts unpunished by the law, the
consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to
which these articles are applicable are understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing
duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed give rise to duties,
whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to
articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. A typical application of this distinction may be
found in the consequences of a railway accident due to defective machinery supplied by the
employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of employment, that to
the passengers out of the contract for passage, while that to the injured bystander would
originate in the negligent act itself.
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old child
Salvador Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to recover damages resulting from the
death of the child, who had been run over by an automobile driven and managed by the
defendant. The trial court rendered judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This Court in affirming the judgment, said in part:
If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street, had to stop
his auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles which were going along the
latter street or were coming from the opposite direction along Solana Street, it is to be believed
that, when he again started to run his auto across said Real Street and to continue its way
along Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the auto which he was
operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and had completely reached a clear way on
Solana Street. But, as the child was run over by the auto precisely at the entrance of Solana
Street, this accident could not have occurred if the auto had been running at a slow speed,
aside from the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing Real Street and entering
Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the child in the act of crossing the
latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left, and if the accident had occurred
in such a way that after the automobile had run over the body of the child, and the child's body
had already been stretched out on the ground, the automobile still moved along a distance of
about 2 meters, this circumstance shows the fact that the automobile entered Solana Street
from Real Street, at a high speed without the defendant having blown the horn. If these
precautions had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the death
of the child would not have occurred.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal
case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code.
Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter
either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely
separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil
Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana
under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act
for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for
which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his
crime.
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine. In Bernal and
Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of the
five-year-old child, Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to recover damages for the child's
death as a result of burns caused by the fault and negligence of the defendants. On the evening
of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso
with her daughter Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality to attend the same.
After the procession the mother and the daughter with two others were passing along Gran
Capitan Street in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by
defendants J. V. House, when an automobile appeared from the opposite direction. The little
girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the automobile that she turned to
run, but unfortunately she fell into the street gutter where hot water from the electric plant was
flowing. The child died that same night from the burns. The trial courts dismissed the action
because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. But this Court held, on appeal, that
there was no contributory negligence, and allowed the parents P1,000 in damages from J. V.
House who at the time of the tragic occurrence was the holder of the franchise for the electric
plant. This Court said in part:
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he nevertheless was
led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs.
It is from this point that a majority of the court depart from the stand taken by the trial judge.
The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte,
on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in
allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the
coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch
filled with hot water. The doctrine announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic
Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again
be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate
as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages.
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the
Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for
reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his
criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action
for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for damages for the
death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the servant
in driving an automobile over the child. It appeared that the cause of the mishap was a defect
in the steering gear. The defendant Leynes had rented the automobile from the International
Garage of Manila, to be used by him in carrying passengers during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas.
Leynes was ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to the plaintiff. On appeal
this Court reversed the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had shown that the
exercised the care of a good father of a family, thus overcoming the presumption of negligence
under article 1903. This Court said:
As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family. He obtained the machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far as
appeared, in good condition. The workmen were likewise selected from a standard garage,
were duly licensed by the Government in their particular calling, and apparently thoroughly
competent. The machine had been used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is
clear from the evidence that the defendant had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the
defective condition of the steering gear.
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also
provides when the liability shall cease. It says:
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove
that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence
of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence
on the part of the matter or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and
not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and
he is relieve from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on
that of his servant.
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37
[year 1915]). In the latter case, the complaint alleged that the defendant's servant had so
negligently driven an automobile, which was operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that
said automobile struck and damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court, applying article 1903
and following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or director of a
business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while the servant is engaged in
his master's employment as such owner.
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison vs.
Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case was an action for damages
brought by Cuison for the death of his seven-year-old son Moises. The little boy was on his
way to school with his sister Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell from a truck and pinned
the boy underneath, instantly killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and Francisco Bautista,
who were working for Ora, an employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to
the crime of homicide through reckless negligence and were sentenced accordingly. This
Court, applying articles 1902 and 1903, held:
The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater familias.
This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of
his servant. (Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes [1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad
Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year 1930) the
plaintiff brought an action for damages for the demolition of its wharf, which had been struck
by the steamer Helen C belonging to the defendant. This Court held (p. 526):
The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed was a duly
licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that the
appellee contracted his services because of his reputation as a captain, according to F. C.
Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion that the presumption of liability against the
defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a
family in selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court in the
cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore absolved from all liability.
It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is negatived by
the six cases above set forth. He is, on the authority of these cases, primarily and directly
responsible in damages under article 1903, in relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study first, City
of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision between a truck of the
City of Manila and a street car of the Manila Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925. The truck
was damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for
the crime of damage to property and slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was found
guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the City of Manila for P1,788.27, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio,
the City of Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric Company to obtain payment,
claiming that the defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was that the defendant
had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The lower court
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This Court held, in part, that this case was governed
by the Penal Code, saying:
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that the
provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable language
authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code negatives its application by
providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the
provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling under
article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent act or
omission not punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up with the
Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other words, the Penal Code affirms
its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal
negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil negligence.
xxx xxx xxx
Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the Civil Code.
Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling would permit the master to escape
scot-free by simply alleging and proving that the master had exercised all diligence in the
selection and training of its servants to prevent the damage. That would be a good defense to
a strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a civil action either as a part of or predicated
on conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it may be said further that
the statements here made are offered to meet the argument advanced during our deliberations
to the effect that article 0902 of the Civil Code should be disregarded and codal articles 1093
and 1903 applied.)
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, because the Court
of Appeals based its decision in the present case on the defendant's primary responsibility
under article 1903 of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability arising from Fontanilla's
criminal negligence. In other words, the case of City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is
predicated on an entirely different theory, which is the subsidiary liability of an employer arising
from a criminal act of his employee, whereas the foundation of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in the present case is the employer's primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil
Code. We have already seen that this is a proper and independent remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the defendant. A
motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric Company had been convicted o homicide by
simple negligence and sentenced, among other things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the
sum of P1,000. An action was then brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant
as employer under the Penal Code. The defendant attempted to show that it had exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed
exemption from civil liability. But this Court held:
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that the exemption
from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who have acted with the
diligence of a good father of a family, is not applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided in
article 20 of the Penal Code.
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case, because
the action there had for its purpose the enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary liability under
the Penal Code, while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's cause of action is based on the
defendant's primary and direct responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the
above case destroys the defendant's contention because that decision illustrates the principle
that the employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is different in
character from his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to recognize
the distinction between civil liability arising from a crime, which is governed by the Penal Code,
and the responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code, and has likewise
failed to give the importance to the latter type of civil action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case need not
be set forth. Suffice it to say that the question involved was also civil liability arising from a
crime. Hence, it is as inapplicable as the two cases above discussed.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil
liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for
fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent
act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more
concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer —
in this case the defendant-petitioner — is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the
Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to
dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little
understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code,
the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life.
Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence — even
the slightest — would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising
from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so
absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the
letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the
law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant
pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown
beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases,
the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910
of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi
jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to
sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling
the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such
a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the
primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view
of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated
by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge
that professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyance usually do not have sufficient
means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to
go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In construing the
laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and
their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and
employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It
is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these
servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct
for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach
themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their
negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such
responsibility should fall upon the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and
prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could not exercise such selection and
who used such employee because of his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p.
622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle
of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited
(Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and employee "vienen a ser como una
sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien le emplea y utiliza."
("become as one personality by the merging of the person of the employee in that of him who
employs and utilizes him.") All these observations acquire a peculiar force and significance
when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the
responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil
Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it
has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective
remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked
to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm
done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no
longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for
the better safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional
remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the
issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party
wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby affirmed,
with costs against the defendant-petitioner.
2. Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113 (1975)
G.R. No. L-32599 June 29, 1979
EDGARDO E. MENDOZA, petitioner
vs.
HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of
Manila, FELINO TIMBOL, and RODOLFO SALAZAR, respondents.
David G. Nitafan for petitioner.
Arsenio R. Reyes for respondent Timbol.
Armando M. Pulgado for respondent Salazar.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
Petitioner, Edgardo Mendoza, seeks a review on certiorari of the Orders of respondent Judge
in Civil Case No. 80803 dismissing his Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict against
respondents Felino Timbol and Rodolfo Salazar.
The facts which spawned the present controversy may be summarized as follows:
On October 22, 1969, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a three- way vehicular accident
occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao, Bulacan, involving a Mercedes Benz owned and
driven by petitioner; a private jeep owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar; and a
gravel and sand truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya.
As a consequence of said mishap, two separate Informations for Reckless Imprudence
Causing Damage to Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya with the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The race against truck-driver Montoya, docketed as Criminal
Case No. SM-227, was for causing damage to the jeep owned by Salazar, in the amount of
Pl,604.00, by hitting it at the right rear portion thereby causing said jeep to hit and bump an
oncoming car, which happened to be petitioner's Mercedes Benz. The case against jeep-
owner-driver Salazar, docketed as Criminal Case No. SM 228, was for causing damage to the
Mercedes Benz of petitioner in the amount of P8,890.00
At the joint trial of the above cases, petitioner testified that jeep-owner- driver Salazar overtook
the truck driven by Montoya, swerved to the left going towards the poblacion of Marilao, and
hit his car which was bound for Manila. Petitioner further testified that before the impact,
Salazar had jumped from the jeep and that he was not aware that Salazar's jeep was bumped
from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Petitioner's version of the accident was adopted
by truck driver Montoya. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar, on the other hand, tried to show that, after
overtaking the truck driven by Montoya, he flashed a signal indicating his intention to turn left
towards the poblacion of Marilao but was stopped at the intersection by a policeman who was
directing traffic; that while he was at a stop position, his jeep was bumped at the rear by the
truck driven by Montova causing him to be thrown out of the jeep, which then swerved to the
left and hit petitioner's car, which was coming from the opposite direction.
On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V, Sta. Maria, rendered
judgment, stating in its decretal portion:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused Freddie Montoya GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of damage to property thru reckless imprudence in Crime. Case
No. SM-227, and hereby sentences him to pay a fine of P972.50 and to indemnify Rodolfo
Salazar in the same amount of P972.50 as actual damages, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, both as to fine and indemnity, with costs.
Accused Rodolfo Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED from the offense charged in Crime. Case No.
SM-228, with costs de oficio, and his bond is ordered canceled
SO ORDERED. 1
Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability, civil and criminal, in
view of its findings that the collision between Salazar's jeep and petitioner's car was the result
of the former having been bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Neither was
petitioner awarded damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but
only against jeep-owner-driver Salazar.
On August 22, 1970, or after the termination of the criminal cases, petitioner filed Civil Case
No. 80803 with the Court of First Instance of Manila against respondents jeep-owner-driver
Salazar and Felino Timbol, the latter being the owner of the gravel and sand truck driven by
Montoya, for indentification for the damages sustained by his car as a result of the collision
involving their vehicles. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar and truck-owner Timbol were joined as
defendants, either in the alternative or in solidum allegedly for the reason that petitioner was
uncertain as to whether he was entitled to relief against both on only one of them.
On September 9, 1970, truck-owner Timbol filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 80803 on
the grounds that the Complaint is barred by a prior judgment in the criminal cases and that it
fails to state a cause of action. An Opposition thereto was filed by petitioner.
In an Order dated September 12, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Complaint against
truck-owner Timbol for reasons stated in the afore- mentioned Motion to Dismiss On September
30, 1970, petitioner sought before this Court the review of that dismissal, to which petition we
gave due course.
On January 30, 1971, upon motion of jeep-owner-driver Salazar, respondent Judge also
dismissed the case as against the former. Respondent Judge reasoned out that "while it is true
that an independent civil action for liability under Article 2177 of the Civil Code could be
prosecuted independently of the criminal action for the offense from which it arose, the New
Rules of Court, which took effect on January 1, 1964, requires an express reservation of the
civil action to be made in the criminal action; otherwise, the same would be barred pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 111 ... 2 Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof was denied in the order
dated February 23, 1971, with respondent Judge suggesting that the issue be raised to a higher
Court "for a more decisive interpretation of the rule. 3
On March 25, 1971, petitioner then filed a Supplemental Petition before us, also to review the
last two mentioned Orders, to which we required jeep-owner-driver Salazar to file an Answer.
The Complaint against truck-owner Timbol
We shall first discuss the validity of the Order, dated September 12, 1970, dismissing
petitioner's Complaint against truck-owner Timbol.
In dismissing the Complaint against the truck-owner, respondent Judge sustained Timbol's
allegations that the civil suit is barred by the prior joint judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. SM-
227 and SM-228, wherein no reservation to file a separate civil case was made by petitioner
and where the latter actively participated in the trial and tried to prove damages against jeep-
driver-Salazar only; and that the Complaint does not state a cause of action against truck-
owner Timbol inasmuch as petitioner prosecuted jeep-owner-driver Salazar as the one solely
responsible for the damage suffered by his car.
Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the
following requisites must concur: (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) it must have been rendered
by a Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, Identity
of parties, Identity of subject matter and Identity of cause of action.
It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata are present. However, we agree with
petitioner that there is no Identity of cause of action between Criminal Case No. SM-227 and
Civil Case No. 80803. Obvious is the fact that in said criminal case truck-driver Montoya was
not prosecuted for damage to petitioner's car but for damage to the jeep. Neither was truck-
owner Timbol a party in said case. In fact as the trial Court had put it "the owner of the Mercedes
Benz cannot recover any damages from the accused Freddie Montoya, he (Mendoza) being a
complainant only against Rodolfo Salazar in Criminal Case No. SM-228. 4 And more
importantly, in the criminal cases, the cause of action was the enforcement of the civil liability
arising from criminal negligence under Article l of the Revised Penal Code, whereas Civil Case
No. 80803 is based on quasi-delict under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil
Code As held in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al. 5
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate in. individuality of cuasi-delitos or
culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between
civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility
for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent
act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more
concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in
this case the defendant- petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil
Code.
That petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on quasi-delict is
evident from the recitals in the complaint to wit: that while petitioner was driving his car along
MacArthur Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned and driven by Salazar suddenly swerved
to his (petitioner's) lane and collided with his car That the sudden swerving of Salazar's jeep
was caused either by the negligence and lack of skill of Freddie Montoya, Timbol's employee,
who was then driving a gravel and sand truck iii the same direction as Salazar's jeep; and that
as a consequence of the collision, petitioner's car suffered extensive damage amounting to
P12,248.20 and that he likewise incurred actual and moral damages, litigation expenses and
attorney's fees. Clearly, therefore, the two factors that a cause of action must consist of,
namely: (1) plaintiff's primary right, i.e., that he is the owner of a Mercedes Benz, and (2)
defendant's delict or wrongful act or omission which violated plaintiff's primary right, i.e., the
negligence or lack of skill either of jeep-owner Salazar or of Timbol's employee, Montoya, in
driving the truck, causing Salazar's jeep to swerve and collide with petitioner's car, were alleged
in the Complaint. 6
Consequently, petitioner's cause of action being based on quasi-delict, respondent Judge
committed reversible error when he dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said
case may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
But it is truck-owner Timbol's submission (as well as that of jeep-owner-driver Salazar) that
petitioner's failure to make a reservation in the criminal action of his right to file an independent
civil action bars the institution of such separate civil action, invoking section 2, Rule 111, Rules
of Court, which says:
Section 2. — Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34
and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the
criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil
action shau proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia vs. Florida 7 said:
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil
liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The
former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence,
having always had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that
in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed
independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of
the latter. Hence, 'the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and
34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were
drafted ... and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now
Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an
unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which
do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso ... .
In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice Antonio Barredo further observed that
inasmuch as Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code create a civil liability distinct and different
from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code, no
reservation, therefore, need be made in the criminal case; that Section 2 of Rule 111 is
inoperative, "it being substantive in character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court
to promulgate; and even if it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its
inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of
1940."
We declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner Timbol is concerned, Civil Case No. 80803
is not barred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his right to file
an independent civil action based on quasi-delict.
The suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar
The case as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, who was acquitted in Criminal Case No. SM-
228, presents a different picture altogether.
At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as civil liability co-exists with criminal
responsibility in negligence cases, the offended party has the option between an action for
enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2177 of
the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under section
1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is deemed simultaneously instituted with the criminal action,
unless expressly waived or reserved for separate application by the offended party. 8
The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner had opted
to base his cause of action against jeep-owner-driver Salazar on culpa criminal and not on
culpa aquiliana as evidenced by his active participation and intervention in the prosecution of
the criminal suit against said Salazar. The latter's civil liability continued to be involved in the
criminal action until its termination. Such being the case, there was no need for petitioner to
have reserved his right to file a separate civil action as his action for civil liability was deemed
impliedly instituted in Criminal Case No. SM-228.
Neither would an independent civil action he. Noteworthy is the basis of the acquittal of jeep-
owner-driver Salazar in the criminal case, expounded by the trial Court in this wise:
In view of what has been proven and established during the trial, accused Freddie Montoya
would be held able for having bumped and hit the rear portion of the jeep driven by the accused
Rodolfo Salazar,
Considering that the collision between the jeep driven by Rodolfo Salazar and the car owned
and driven by Edgardo Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck
driven by Freddie Montoya, this Court behaves that accused Rodolfo Salazar cannot be held
able for the damages sustained by Edgardo Mendoza's car. 9
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall
so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of
the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
In so far as the suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is concerned, therefore, we sustain
respondent Judge's Order dated January 30, 1971 dismissing the complaint, albeit on different
grounds.
WHEREFORE, 1) the Order dated September 12, 1970 dismissing Civil Case No. 80803
against private respondent Felino Timbol is set aside, and respondent Judge, or his successor,
hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing on the merits; 2) but the Orders dated January 30,
1971 and February 23, 1971 dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 80803 against
respondent Rodolfo Salazar are hereby upheld.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Crystal clear is the trial Court's pronouncement that under the facts of the case, jeep-owner-
driver Salazar cannot be held liable for the damages sustained by petitioner's car. In other
words, "the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. " Accordingly, inasmuch as
petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be held to have been extinguished
in consonance with Section 3(c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court 10 which provides:

Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not included in the preceding
section the following rules shall be observed:

xxx xxx xxx

c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil night arise did
not exist. ...

And even if petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar were not ex-
delictu, the end result would be the same, it being clear from the judgment in the criminal case
that Salazar's acquittal was not based upon reasonable doubt, consequently, a civil action for
damages can no longer be instituted. This is explicitly provided for in Article 29 of the Civil Code
quoted here under:

Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence ...