Sec 3 – Privacy of Communication and Correspondence

RAMIREZ VS CA
Facts: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that
the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and
personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought damages. The
transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes.”

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.

The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied the petitioner’s MR, hence the instant petition.

Issue: W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversationb

Held: es. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all
the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought
to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent
to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier
“any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court’s conclusion that
in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of
private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons.

The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need
not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere
allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape
recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General
pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: “Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that
before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a
third person should be professed.”

Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include
“private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of absurdity.
The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning “to share or to impart.” In its
ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the “process by which meanings
or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or
gestures)”

These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications
of “meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22,
1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s office. Any doubts about the
legislative body’s meaning of the phrase “private communication” are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact
that the terms “conversation” and “communication” were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his
Explanatory Note to the Bill.

ZULUETA VS CA

FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1962,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a
driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband's clinic
and took 157 documents consisting of private respondents between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours, greeting cards, cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful
means are admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical
practice.

HELD: Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injuction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infedility) who is
the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition
in the constitution is if there is a "lawful order from the court or which public safety or order require
otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infedility. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed her/his integrity or her/his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse
while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to
share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to
the other.

NAVARRO V CA

FACTS: Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in Lucena City wnet to the police station
to report alledged indecent show in one of the night establishment shows in the City. At the station, a heated
confrontation followed between victim Lingan and accused policeman Navarro who was then having drinks
outside the headquarters, lead to a fisticuffs. The victim was hit with the handle of the accused's gun below
the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow, resulted the victim to fell and died under treatment. The exchange
of words was recorded on tape, specifically the frantic exclamations made by Navarro after the altercation
that it was the victim who provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena, the other media man , testified.
Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice recording he had made of the heated discussion
at the police station between the accused police officer Navarro and the deceased, Lingan, which was
taken without the knowledge of the two.

ISSUES: Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view of RA 4200, which
prohibits wire tapping.

HELD:
1. The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible in view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire tapping.
Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made.

The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications (Ramirez v
Cpourt of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Snce the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was
not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
 OPLE V TORRES

FACTS:

A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996 for the Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System. It was published in four newspapers of general
circulation on January. Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, on the grounds that:

1. it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate,

2. it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of privacy.

ISSUE:

Whether there is a violation of the Right to Privacy as enshrined in the Bill of Rights.

HELD:

The essence of privacy is the “right to be left alone.” The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.

The Court prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations:

1. the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic
service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and ;
2. the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons
seeking basic services.

It is debatable whether the interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of the said order. The
broadness, vagueness, and overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people’s right
to privacy in clear and present danger. In the case at bar, the threat comes from which by issuing A.O.
No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the
pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services.

Petition is granted. A.O. No. 308 is unconstitutional.

 POLLO V CONSTANTINO-DAVID

Facts: CSC Chairperson Karina David received a document from an anonymous source, making her
aware that there is a corrupt official in the Commission. She then formed personnel and directed them to
back up all the files of the computers found therein.

David found, in Bricio Pollo, petitioner, legal pleading or documents that are related to administrative
cases and were for on the behalf of parties who were facing charges. David inferred that he was willfully
aiding their adverse interests and it was a practice that he pursued regularly.

Pollo argued that he was not even a lawyer to pursue such acts. He also asserted that the CSC
conducted a fishing expedition and his right to privacy was violated and that the source of the complaint
was anonymous. The CSC charged Pollo in violation of RA 6713. After some motions filed to the CSC, he
filed his motion to the CA wherein he was ordered to be dismissed of his governmental duties. The CA
ruled that the search was legal because in their capacity as employers, the government agencies could
validly conduct search and seizure in the governmental workplace without meeting the “probable cause”
or warrant requirement for search and seizure.

Issue: Whether there was illegal search.

Held: No, The SC ruled in favor of the CSC. Basing their decision on other cases, the SC asked whether
Pollo has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files and was the search
reasonable in its inception and scope.

On regards the first inquiry, the SC found that he had no actual expectation of privacy on his work
computer. He did not have a separate office space nor did he use a password for his computer. He would
have visitors which he let them use his computer. The CSC also implemented a policy that its employees
on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything on their office computers, and that the CSC
may monitor their use. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer
resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes.

On the second inquiry, the SC said that the search Pollo's files were conducted in connection with
investigation of work-related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint. A search by a
government employer of an employee’s office is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds
for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.

VIVARES V CONSTANTINO-DAVID

Facts: In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded on
Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing only
their undergarments.
Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero,
through her students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She showed the said pictures to STC’s
Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.

Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s handbook and banned them from “marching” in
their graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012.

The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the Cebu RTC enjoining
the school from barring the students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still barred said students.

Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for the issuance of
the writ of habeas data against the school. They argued, among others, that:

1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends Only.” They, thus, have a
reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.

2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their consent.
Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing
them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of the children were intruded upon;

3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital images
happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory;

They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the
subject data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right to privacy.

The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.

Held: Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.

Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of extralegal killing or
enforced disappearance; and

2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity engaged in the business
of “gathering, collecting, or storing data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party”.

First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases of extralegal killings or
enforced disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall
be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and
collecting of data.

Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)

The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy tools, and the
user makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy (right to
informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy must be respected and protected.

In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of such privacy tools.
Evidence would show that that their post (status) on Facebook were published as “Public”.

Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a user’s posts on his “wall” (profile page):

(a) Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;

(c) Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;

(d) Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook user; and

(e) Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

The default setting is “Public” and if a user wants to have some privacy, then he must choose any setting
other than “Public”. If it is true that the students concerned did set the posts subject of this case so much
so that only five people can see them (as they claim), then how come most of their classmates were able
to view them. This fact was not refuted by them. In fact, it was their classmates who informed and showed
their teacher, Escudero, of the said pictures. Therefore, it appears that Tan et al never use the privacy
settings of Facebook hence, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy on the pictures of them scantily
clad.

STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner which the school gathered the pictures cannot
be considered illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the students who showed the picture to their
teacher and the latter, being the recipient of said pictures, merely delivered them to the proper school
authority and it was for a legal purpose, that is, to discipline their students according to the standards of the
school (to which the students and their parents agreed to in the first place because of the fact that they
enrolled their children there).
 ALEJANO V CABUAY

Facts: Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers,
entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (“Oakwood”), an upscale apartment
complex, located in the business district of Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the security officers of
Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly
renounced their support for the administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members.

Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several
negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had
earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks. On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of
Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior
officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The transfer took place while military and civilian authorities were
investigating the soldiers’ involvement in the Oakwood incident.

On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in the 27 July 2003 Oakwood incident. The
government prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup d’etat as defined and penalized under Article 134-A
of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as amended. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
03-2784. The trial court later issued the Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG
Antonio Trillanes IV (“Trillanes”) and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding Officers of ISAFP. On 2
August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the
military personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident except the detained junior
officers who were to remain under the custody of ISAFP.

Petitioners filed a petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA, however the same was denied. The Court of
Appeals found the petition bereft of merit. The appellate court pointed out that the detainees are already
charged of coup d’etat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case
as the detainees’ confinement is under a valid indictment, the legality of which the detainees and
petitioners do not even question.

ISSUE: WON the denial of the petition for Habeas Corpus was valid

HELD: YES

For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the
determination of the propriety of the remedy. If a court finds the alleged cause of the detention unlawful,
then it should issue the writ and release the detainees. In the present case, after hearing the case, the
Court of Appeals found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After actively participating in the hearing
before the Court of Appeals, petitioners are estopped from claiming that the appellate court had no
jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of their petition.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to
address the detainees’ complaint against the regulations and conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center.
The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person. The
purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty.If the inquiry
reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is
proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.

The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither can it substitute for an
appeal.
A mere allegation of a violation of one’s constitutional right is not sufficient. The courts will extend the
scope of the writ only if any of the following circumstances is present: (a) there is a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to
impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as to the excess.

AS TO DENIAL OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL: The scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable access to
the detainees, giving petitioners sufficient time to confer with the detainees. The detainees’ right to
counsel is not undermined by the scheduled visits. Even in the hearings before the Senate and the
Feliciano Commission, petitioners were given time to confer with the detainees, a fact that petitioners
themselves admit.23 Thus, at no point were the detainees denied their right to counsel.

AS TO INHUMANE PUNISHMENT: The boarding of the iron grills is for the furtherance of security within
the ISAFP Detention Center. This measure intends to fortify the individual cells and to prevent the
detainees from passing on contraband and weapons from one cell to another. The boarded grills ensure
security and prevent disorder and crime within the facility. The diminished illumination and ventilation are
but discomforts inherent in the fact of detention, and do not constitute punishments on the detainees.

The limitation on the detainees’ physical contacts with visitors is a reasonable, non-punitive response to
valid security concerns.
AS TO RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION: The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP
authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who
received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees’
personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case,
since the letters were not confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the
officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters
but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees.