1
Section 7 – Right to Information
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Legaspi vs. CSC G.R. No. L-72119, May 29, 1987
Facts: The respondent CSC had denied petitioner Valentin Legaspi’s request for information on
the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas who were employed as
sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. Sibonghanoy and Agas had allegedly
represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for
sanitarians.
Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas is guaranteed
by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire
the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to
compel the respondent CSC to disclose said information.
The respondent CSC takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring the suit. It is
asserted that the petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi’s actual interest in the civil
service eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit
Held: The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held in the
case of Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, that when the question is one of public right and the
object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are
regarded as the real party in interest, and the person at whose instigation the proceedings are
instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being
sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws.
It becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a
citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right.
The petitioner, being a citizen who as such, is clothed with personality to seek redress for the
alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right.
Valmonte vs Belmonte
FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke
their right to information and pray that respondent be directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the
list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban
who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish
petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans;
and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information On June
20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and
Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent
another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves
free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in
pursuance of public interest."
ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS
records on behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa
members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.
HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality
as regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on
considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare
what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy
issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people
themselves as the repository of all State power. The concerned borrowers themselves may not
succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were
holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that
because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially
those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as
compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny The
"transactions" used here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to
a contract, and already a consummated contract, Considering the intent of the framers of the
Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and
considering further that government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing
proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced
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that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings. Although citizens are afforded
the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral
lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of
domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
public concern.
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
RULINGS:
G.R. No. 183591 October 14 2008
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the
Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines
local government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from
their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the
FACTS:
mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of
Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur,
transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and
Malaysia.
intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They
also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged
GRP from signing the same.
action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other
overt act . Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to
ISSUES:
awaken judicial duty.x x x x
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling
concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
Code of 1991)

3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
would be binding itself
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters
of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions

involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand
information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody
demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its
complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject
only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest
in the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and
negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as
to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and
local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant
information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned
sectors of society.
3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest
in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having
an “associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies
powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional
government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the
Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part
of Philippine territory for independence.
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The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the
Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship
with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed,
BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a
capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of
Philippine territory, the spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept
of association – runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the
BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the
specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with
the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even
assuming that it is covered by the term “autonomous region” in the constitutional provision
just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the
existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact
and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of
the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the
MILF the amendment of the Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to
preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to
allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or
revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the
proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation
need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments,
she cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be
put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these

proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers
are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral
domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous
peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines
“Bangsamoro people” as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and
their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only
“Moros” as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao
and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples
shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined.
The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is
vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both
parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public
domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut
procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other
things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive
Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral
domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices
to conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human
ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in
such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally
and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could
pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of
inhabitants from their total environment.
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CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion
when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3,
Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD
was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to
a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross
evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship
envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes -
that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
Echegaray v Secretary G.R. No. 132601 October 12, 1998
Per Curiam
Facts:
The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the
10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death
penalty for the said crime.
He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court denied
both motions.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death
penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT
DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS
AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.
The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him
under the grounds that it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being violative
of due process, a violation of the Philippines' obligations under international covenants, an
undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent

Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the
Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.
In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.
The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has already upheld the
constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the death penalty
is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by lethal injection, as
authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection
being the most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier to apply (than
electrocution or the gas chamber); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does
not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty; R.A. No. 8177 properly
delegated legislative power to respondent Director; and that R.A. No. 8177 confers the power
to promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Health and the
Bureau of Corrections.
The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and/or
Appear as Amicus Curiae with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus
Curiae. They alleged similarly with Echegaray’s arguments.
The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The court gave due course to the
petition.
Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass
constitutional muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our international treaty obligations, (c)
being an undue delegation of legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory.
Issue:
1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment?
2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?
3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?
4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?
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Held:
No 1st three. Yes to last. Petition denied.
Ratio:
1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in
carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be administered, and the procedure in
administering said drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are
uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date
of execution, which uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3)
the possibility of "botched executions" or mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal
injection inherently cruel.
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment.
Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering
death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in
the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the
mere extinguishment of life." Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in
the execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court
believes not. For reasons discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters
which are properly left to the competence and expertise of administrative officials.
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court" will fix the
time and date of execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of the death
convict. As petitioner already knows, the "court" which designates the date of execution is the
trial court which convicted the accused. The procedure is that the "judgment is entered fifteen
(15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the court
below including a certified copy of the judgment for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty
as to the date of execution nor the time of notification. As to the date of execution, Section 15
of the implementing rules must be read in conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of
R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out "not earlier than one
(1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death
penalty became final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his
executive clemency powers at all times." Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of
eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final

and executor wherein he can seek executive clemency and attend to all his temporal and
spiritual affairs.
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible
complications in the intravenous injection that respondent Director is an untrained and
untested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned,
renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. This is unsubstantiated.
First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the
expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be
administered are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the United States
wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for
the convict, without any other evidence whatsoever.
Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires that
all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance
of such task. We must presume that the public officials entrusted with the implementation of
the death penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.
Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution
of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel,
degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated
to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may
be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that
crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished." The cruelty against which the Constitution protects
a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering
involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public
opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
2. International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states:
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed
only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the
commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only
be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court."
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The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes".
Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the
General Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said
document.
3. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its
limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates
the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177
specifically requires that "the death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings
of the person under the sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the proceedings
prior to the execution." Further, "the Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to
ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous
death of the convict." The legislature also mandated that "all personnel involved in the
administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such task." The
Court cannot see that any useful purpose would be served by requiring greater detail. The
question raised is not the definition of what constitutes a criminal offense, but the mode of
carrying out the penalty already imposed by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is
sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion by the administrative officials concerned is,
canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer serious flaws
that could not be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears missing in Section 19 of
the implementing rules which provides a manual for the execution procedure. It was supposed
to be confidential.
The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a vacuum. The
Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the
execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a mode
of review and approval. Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the
Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of
the administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authority under R.A.
No. 8177. Such apparent abdication of departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph
invalid.
4. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is unconstitutional for being
discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent

Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be
suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution by lethal
injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of
the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of age. In
this latter case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
the accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code."
Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for
being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists
that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an
express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A.
No. 7659, stating that the death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is
pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age.
While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No.
7659, suspends the implementation of the death penalty while a woman is pregnant or within
one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules omits the one (1) year period
following delivery as an instance when the death sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for
suspension of sentence no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended, which is the three-year reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in
petitioner's view, tantamount to a gender-based discrimination sans statutory basis, while the
omission is an impermissible contravention of the applicable law.
Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but instead
remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement.
CHAVEZ VS PCGG – CASE DIGEST (CONSTI 2: RIGHT TO INFORMATION)]March 8, 2010
Right to Information, access to public documents
CHAVEZ vs PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
Facts:
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-Petitioner Francisco I Chavez (in his capacity as taxpayer, citizen and a former government
official) initiated this original action seeking (1) to prohibit and “enjoin respondents [PCGG and
its chairman] from privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the
heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos . . . relating to and concerning the properties
and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or abroad — including the so-
called Marcos gold hoard"; and (2) to “compel respondent[s] to make public all negotiations
and agreement, be they
ongoing or perfected, and all documents related to or relating to such negotiations and
agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs."
-Chavez is the same person initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who
committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the
country's economy; he says that what impelled him to bring this action were several news
reports 2 bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news
items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in
various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise,
between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these
assets.
-PETITIONER DEMANDS that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements
pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any
compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount public
interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be greatly
prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a
right to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government.
-RESPONDENT ANSWERS that they do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the
Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's action is premature, because there is no
showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And
even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed
terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.
-PETITIONER INVOKES Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law.

Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
-RESPONDENT ANSWERS that the above constitutional provisions refer to completed and
operative official acts, not to those still being considered.
Issue:Whether or not the Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of
any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses.
Ruling: “WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreement
dated December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared
NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG, its officers
and
all government functionaries and officials who are or may be directly ot indirectly involved in
the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED
to disclose to the public the terms of any proposed compromise settlment, as well as the final
agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance with the discussions
embodied in this Decision. No pronouncement as to cost.”
RD:
- The "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the subject provisions of the
Constitution
have as yet no defined scope and extent. There are no specific laws prescribing the exact
limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be
obliged.
However, the following are some of the recognized restrictions:
(1) national security matters and intelligence information
- there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets
regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters. 24 But where there is
no need to protect such state secrets, the privilege may not be invoked to withhold
documents and other information, 25 provided that they are examined "in strict
confidence" and given "scrupulous protection." (2) trade secrets and banking transactions
8
-trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code 27 and other related
laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act 28)
are also exempted from compulsory disclosure (3) criminal matters
- Also excluded are classified law enforcement matters, such as those relating to the
apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of criminals, which courts neither may
nor inquire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution. Efforts at effective law
enforcement would be seriously jeopardized by free public access to, for example, police
information regarding rescue operations, the whereabouts of fugitives, or leads on covert
criminal activities.(4) other confidential information.
- The Ethical Standards Act 31 further prohibits public officials and employees from using
or divulging "confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of
their office and not made available to the public." Other acknowledged limitations to
information access include diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and
executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the
Supreme Court.
- In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., the Court emphasized that the information sought must be
"matters of public concern," access to which may be limited by law. Similarly, the state policy
of
full public disclosure extends only to "transactions involving public interest" and may also be
"subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."
- As to the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public concern," the Court, in Legaspi
v.
Civil Service Commission, elucidated: “In determining whether or not a particular information is
of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. “ “Public concern" like "public
interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or
simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final
analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is
of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.”
-As to whether or not the above cited constitutional provisions guarantee access to
information regarding ongoing negotiations or proposals prior to the final agreement, this
same clarification was sought and clearly addressed by the constitutional commissioners
during their deliberations, MR. SUAREZ. And when we say "transactions" which should be
 9

distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer
to the steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract
itself?

MR. OPLE. The "transactions" used here, I suppose, is generic and, therefore, it can cover both

steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the

transaction?

MR. OPLE. Yes, subject to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.

- Considering the intent of the Constitution, the Court believes that it is incumbent upon the
PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public
information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible
owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite
propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the
process of being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. There is a need, of course, to
observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed above—
such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and
other classified information.