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On June 30, 1983, pursuant to the memorandum of agreement, the parties inked a
contract of lease of the same three lots.
After the execution of the contract, the Gojoccos executed a power of attorney
granting Huibonhoa the authority to obtain “credit facilities” in order that the three
lots could be mortgaged for a limited one-year period from July 1983.
On September 12, 1983, Huibonhoa obtained from China Banking Corporation “credit
facilities” not exceeding One Million (P1,000.000.00) Pesos. Simultaneously, she
mortgaged the three lots to the creditor bank.[2] Fifteen days later or on September
27, 1983, to be precise, Huibonhoa signed a contract amending the real estate
mortgage in favor of China Banking Corporation whereby the “credit facilities” were
increased to the principal sum of Three Million (P3,000,000.00) Pesos.[3]
During the construction of the building which later became known as Poulex
Merchandise Center,[4] former Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. was assassinated. The
incident must have affected the country’s political and economic stability. The
consequent hoarding of construction materials and increase in interest rates allegedly
affected adversely the construction of the building such that Huibonhoa failed to
complete the same within the stipulated eight-month period from July 1, 1983. It
was finished seven months later
Under the contract, Huibonhoa was supposed to start paying rental in March 1984
but she failed to do so. Consequently, the Gojoccos made several verbal demands
upon Huibonhoa for the payment of rental arrearages and, for her to vacate the
leased premises.
On December 19, 1984, lessors sent lessee a final letter of demand to pay the rental
arrearages and to vacate the leased premises. The former also notified the latter of
their intention to terminate the contract of lease.
On January 14, 1985, the Gojoccos filed for “cancellation of lease, ejectment and
collection” against Huibonhoa.
On January 31, 1985, Rufina Gojocco Lim entered into an agreement with Huibonhoa
to put an end to the case the former filed. However, there was no record that Rufina
Gojocco Lim was dropped as a defendant, but only Loretta Gojocco Chua and the
Spouses Severino and Priscilla Gojocco filed the memorandum for the defendants in
that case.
Huibonhoa’s Case RTC Decision: No clear and convincing evidence to justify the
reformation of the lease contract.
Gojocco’s Case MTC Decision: granted Huibonhoa’s prayer that the case be excluded
from the operation of the Rule on Summary Procedure
On July 21, 1986, Severino Gojocco and Huibonhoa entered into an agreement that
altered certain terms of the lease contract in the same way that the agreement
between Huibonhoa and Rufina G. Lim “novated” the ontract.
ISSUES: Whether or not the inflation which happened during the assassination of
Benigno Aquino can justify the adjustment of the terms of the contract of lease.
The order of ejectment by the MTC is UPHELD. However, it is rendered MOOT and
ACADEMIC.
RATIONALE:
NIA V GAMIT
Facts: On 23 January 1985, the Plaintiff Estanislao Gamit (private respondent herein)
filed with the RTC of Roxas, Isabela, a complaint against the defendant National
Irrigation Administration for reformation of contract, recovery of possession and
damages, alleging, among others that in the contract of lease entered into, the real
agreement or intention of the parties was only for the lease of the twenty five
(25,000) thousand square meters by defendant at the rate of P0.10 centavos per
square meter, for a period of ten (10) years from date of execution with the right of
defendant to purchase the area upon the termination of the lease, on a price certain
or consideration to be negotiated and agreed upon, by and between the parties after
the lapse of the ten (10) year period; That it was not the real agreement or intention
of the parties, at least that of herein plaintiff, to have the rentals paid as forming part
of the purchase price later to be negotiated or agreed upon, much less was it their
intention at least on the part of herein plaintiff, that the price shall not exceed
P25,000.00, otherwise, there will be a gross inadequacy of the purchase price,
enough to shock the conscience of man and that of the court; that it was not also the
intention or agreement of the parties, at least that of herein plaintiff, that in case the
lease contract is not renewed after the lapse of the ten (10) year period, for failure
of the parties to make bilateral communication, the lessor or his successors or assigns
are deemed to have allowed continued use of the land in suit without any additional
compensation whatsoever (see stipulation no. 8, contract of lease) and neither was
it the true agreement or real intention of the parties, at least on the part of herein
plaintiff, that upon payment of the rental amount of P25,000.00, herein plaintiff shall
be deemed to have conveyed and ceded all his rights and interest on the subject
property, in favor of herein defendant. RTC ruled in favor of plaintiff and against
herein defendant. CA affirmed. Hence, the present petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not the court of appeals has properly interpreted the contract.
Held: NO. A perusal of the complaint at bar and the relief prayed for therein shows
that this is clearly a case for reformation of instrument
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated 20 March 1986 as well as
the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 14 November 1988 are hereby SET ASIDE
and the case should be, as it is hereby, REMANDED to the court of origin for further
proceedings in accordance with this decision. Without costs.
HELD: Yes. The agreement between the parties has become too one sided in favor
of the petitioner to the great disadvantage of the respondent. Continuing with the
agreement will result in the petitioner’s unjust enrichment at the expense of the
respondent.
PRYCE CORP. V PAGCOR
The RTC ruled 50 percent reduction for the payment of the amount PPC was claiming
and 2 percent penalty was to be imposed from the date of the promulgation of the
Decision, not from the date stipulated in the Contract. It did not rule that the Contract
of Lease had already been terminated as early as September 21, 1993, or at the
latest, on October 14, 1993, when PPC received PAGCOR's letter dated October 12,
1993. Hence, did not find also PPC liable for the reimbursement of PAGCOR'S cash
deposits and of the value of improvements. It did not also consider that PPC was
entitled to avail itself of the provisions of Article XX only when PPC was the party
terminating the Contract. Finally, it did not find that there were valid, justifiable and
good reasons for terminating the Contract.
CA ruled that the PAGCOR'S pretermination of the Contract of Lease was unjustified.
The appellate court explained that public demonstrations and rallies could not be
considered as fortuitous events that would exempt the gaming corporation from
complying with the latter's contractual obligations. Therefore, the Contract continued
to be effective until PPC elected to terminate it on November 25, 1993. As PAGCOR
had admitted its failure to pay the rentals for September to November 1993, PPC
correctly exercised the option to terminate the lease agreement. Previously, the
Contract remained effective, and PPC could collect the accrued rentals. However,
from the time it terminated the Contract on November 25, 1993, PPC could no longer
demand payment of the remaining rentals as part of actual damages, the CA added.
Upon the other hand, future rentals cannot be claimed as compensation for the use
or enjoyment of another's property after the termination of a contract. We stress that
by abrogating the Contract in the present case, PPC released PAGCOR from the
latter's future obligations, which included the payment of rentals. To grant that right
to the former is to unjustly enrich it at the latter's expense.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not there was only a right to termination, and not rescission thereby
entitling PPC to future rentals or lease payments for the unexpired period of its
Contract of Lease between with PAGCOR.
(2) Whether or not public demonstrations and rallies could be considered as fortuitous
events that would exempt the PAGCOR from complying with its contractual
obligations.
RULING:
(1) YES. The actions and pleadings of PPC show that it never intended to rescind the
Lease Contract from the beginning. This fact was evident when it first sought to
collect the accrued rentals from September to November 1993 because, as previously
stated, it actually demanded the enforcement of the Lease Contract prior to
termination. Any intent to rescind was not shown, even when it abrogated the
Contract on November 25, 1993, because such abrogation was not
the rescission provided for under Article 1659.
(2) NO. In this case, PAGCOR's breach was occasioned by events that, although not
fortuitous in law, were in fact real and pressing. From the CA's factual findings, which
are not contested by either party, we find that PAGCOR conducted a series of
negotiations and consultations before entering into the Contract. It did so not only
with the PPC, but also with local government officials, who assured it that the
problems were surmountable. Likewise, PAGCOR took pains to contest the
ordinances before the courts, which consequently declared them unconstitutional. On
top of these developments, the gaming corporation was advised by the Office of the
President to stop the games in Cagayan de Oro City, prompting the former to cease
operations prior to September 1993.
RATIO:
(1) PPC anchors its right to collect future rentals upon the provisions of the Contract.
Likewise, it argues that termination, as defined under the Contract, is different from
the remedy of rescission prescribed under Article 1659 of the Civil Code. On the other
hand, PAGCOR contends, as the CA ruled, that Article 1659 of the Civil Code governs;
hence, PPC is allegedly no longer entitled to future rentals, because it chose
to rescind the Contract.
Article 1159 of the Civil Code provides that "obligations arising from
contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and
should be complied with in good faith." In deference to the rights of the
parties, the law allows them to enter into stipulations, clauses, terms
and conditions they may deem convenient; that is, as long as these are
not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy. Likewise, it is settled that if the terms of the contract clearly
express the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of
the stipulations would be controlling.
In this case, Article XX of the parties' Contract of Lease provides in part as follows:
a) The LESSEE agrees that all the terms, conditions and/or covenants
herein contained shall be deemed essential conditions of this contract,
and in the event of default or breach of any of such terms, conditions
and/or covenants, or should the LESSEE become bankrupt, or
insolvent, or compounds with his creditors, the LESSOR shall have the
right to terminate and cancel this contract by giving them fifteen (15
days) prior notice delivered at the leased premises or posted on the
main door thereof. Upon such termination or cancellation, the LESSOR
may forthwith lock the premises and exclude the LESSEE therefrom,
forcefully or otherwise, without incurring any civil or criminal liability.
During the fifteen (15) days notice, the LESSEE may prevent the
termination of lease by curing the events or causes of termination or
cancellation of the lease.
b). . .
c) Moreover, the LESSEE shall be fully liable to the LESSOR for the rentals
corresponding to the remaining term of the lease as well as for any
and all damages, actual or consequential resulting from such default
and termination of this contract.
d). . . " (Italics supplied)
The above provisions show that the parties have covenanted 1) to give PPC the right
to terminate and cancel the Contract in the event of a default or breach by the lessee;
and 2) to make PAGCOR fully liable for rentals for the remaining term of the lease,
despite the exercise of such right to terminate.
Plainly, the parties have voluntarily bound themselves to require strict compliance
with the provisions of the Contract by stipulating that a default or breach, among
others, shall give the lessee the termination option, coupled with the lessor's liability
for rentals for the remaining term of the lease.
Section XX (c) was intended to be a penalty clause. That fact is manifest from a
reading of the mandatory provision under subparagraph (a) in conjunction with
subparagraph (c) of the Contract. A penal clause is "an accessory obligation which
the parties attach to a principal obligation for the purpose of insuring the performance
thereof by imposing on the debtor a special prestation (generally consisting in the
payment of a sum of money) in case the obligation is not fulfilled or is irregularly or
inadequately fulfilled." In obligations with a penal clause, the general rule is that the
penalty serves as a substitute for the indemnity for damages and the payment of
interests in case of noncompliance; that is, if there is no stipulation to the contrary,
in which case proof of actual damages is not necessary for the penalty to be
demanded. There are exceptions to the aforementioned rule, however, as
enumerated in paragraph 1 of Article 1226 of the Civil Code: 1) when there is a
stipulation to the contrary, 2) when the obligor is sued for refusal to pay the agreed
penalty, and 3) when the obligor is guilty of fraud. In these cases, the purpose of the
penalty is obviously to punish the obligor for the breach. Hence, the obligee can
recover from the former not only the penalty, but also other damages resulting from
the nonfulfillment of the principal obligation. In the present case, the first exception
applies because Article XX (c) provides that, aside from the payment of the rentals
corresponding to the remaining term of the lease, the lessee shall also be liable "for
any and all damages, actual or consequential, resulting from such default and
termination of this contract." Having entered into the Contract voluntarily and with
full knowledge of its provisions, PAGCOR must be held bound to its obligations. It
cannot evade further liability for liquidated damages.
CHINA BANKING CORP. V CA (327 SCRA 378)
FACTS: Alfonso Roxas Chua and his wife Kiang Ming Chu Chua were the owners of a
residential land in San Juan, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
410603. On June 19, 1985, petitioner China Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 29, an action for collection of sum of money against Pacific Multi
Agro-Industrial Corporation and Alfonso Chua which was docketed as Civil Case No.
85-31257. On November 7, 1985, the trial court promulgated its decision in Civil
Case No. 85-31257 in favor of China Banking Corporation.On November 21, 1988,
Alfonso Roxas Chua executed a public instrument denominated as "Assignment of
Rights to Redeem," whereby he assigned his rights to redeem the one-half undivided
portion of the property to his son, private respondent Paulino Roxas Chua. Paulino
redeemed said one-half share on the very same day. On the other hand, in connection
with Civil Case No. 85-31257, another notice of levy on execution was issued on
February 4, 1991 by the Deputy Sheriff of Manila against the right and interest of
Alfonso Roxas Chua in TCT 410603. Thereafter, a certificate of sale on execution
dated April 13, 1992 was issued by the Sheriff of Branch 39, RTC Manila in Civil Case
No. 85-31257, in favor of China Bank and inscribed at the back of TCT 410603 as
Entry No. 01896 on May 4, 1992. On May 20, 1993, Paulino Roxas Chua and Kiang
Ming Chu Chua instituted Civil Case No. 63199 before the RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila
against China Bank, averring that Paulino has a prior and better right over the rights,
title, interest and participation of China Banking Corporation in TCT 410603. The trial
court rendered a decision on July 15, 1994 in favor of private respondent Paulino
Roxas Chua.:On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the assignment of the right of redemption made by Alfonso
Roxas Chua in favor of private respondent Paulino was done to defraud his creditors
and may be rescinded under Article 1387 of the Civil Code.
FACTS: Southern Rolling Mills was renamed into Visayan Integrated Steel Corp
(VISCO). On Dec. 11, 1961-VISCO obtained a loan from DBP amounting to P836,000.
It was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage covering VISCO's 3 parcels of land including
the machinery and equipments therein. Second Loan: VISCO entered a Loan
Agreement with respondent banks ( referred as "Consortium") to finance its
importation for various raw materials. VISCO executed a second mortgage over the
previous properties mentioned, however they were unrecorded VISCO was unable to
pay its second mortgage with the consortium, which resulted in the latter acquiring
90% of the equity of VISCO giving the Consortium the control and management of
VISCO. Despite the acquisition, VISCO still remained indebted to the Consortium.
On the loan to DBP: To pay its first mortgage with DBP, VISCO sold 2 of its generators
to FILMAG Phils, Inc. DBP executed a Deed of Assignment of the mortgage in favor
of the consortium. The Consortium foreclosed the mortgage and was the highest
bidder in an auction sale of VISCO's properties. The Consortium later sold the
properties in favor of National Steel Corporation.
Coastal files a civil action for Annulment or Rescission of Sale, Damages with
Preliminary Injunction. Coastal imputes bad faith on the action of the Consortium,
the latter being able to sell the properties of VISCO despite the attachment of the
properties, placing them beyond the reach of VISCO's other creditors.
The lower court ruled in favor of VISCO, declaring the sale valid and legal. The CA
affirmed this.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether the consortium disposed VISCO's assets in fraud of creditors?
2.) Whether petitioner is entitled to moral damages?
RULING:
1) Yes. What the consortium did was to pay to them the proceeds from the sale
of the generator sets which in turn they used to pay DBP. Due to the Deed of
Assignment issued by DBP, the respondent banks recovered what they
remitted to DBP & it allowed the Consortium to acquire DBP's primary lien on
the mortgaged properties. Allowing them as unsecured creditors ( as the
mortgage was unrecorded) to foreclose on the assets of the corporation
without regard to inferior claims.
In its 31 May 2001 Decision, the Court of Appeals found the appeal meritorious. The
Court of Appeals ruled that Caltex has no personality to sue PSTC. The Court of
Appeals held that non-compliance with the Agreement could only be questioned by
the signatories to the contract, namely, LUSTEVECO and PSTC. The Court of Appeals
stated that LUSTEVECO and PSTC are the only parties who can file an action to
enforce the Agreement. The Court of Appeals considered fatal the omission of
LUSTEVECO, the real party in interest, as a party defendant in the case. The Court
of Appeals further ruled that Caltex is not a beneficiary of a stipulation pour autrui
because there is no stipulation in the Agreement which clearly and deliberately favors
Caltex. The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated June 1, 1994,
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 51, is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING the complaint filed by appellee
[Caltex], against appellant [PSTC], for want of cause of action. SO ORDERED. Caltex
filed a motion for reconsideration of the 31 May 2001 Decision. In a Resolution
promulgated on 9 November 2001, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack
of merit. Hence, this petition before this Court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether PSTC is bound by the Agreement when it assumed all the obligations
of LUSTEVECO.
2. Whether Caltex is a real party in interest to file an action to recover from PSTC
the judgment debt against LUSTEVECO.
RULING: The petition is meritorious. Caltex may recover the judgment debt from
PSTC not because of a stipulation in Caltex’s favor but because the Agreement
provides that PSTC shall assume all the obligations of LUSTEVECO.
- and -
WITNESSETH : T h a t –
2. ASSIGNEE shall have complete control in the conduct of any and all
litigations now pending or may be filed with respect to the actions and claims
enumerated and described in Annexes “A” and “B”;
3. ASSIGNOR shall deliver and convey unto ASSIGNEE all papers, documents,
files and any other records appertaining to the actions and claims
enumerated and described in Annexes “A” and “B”;
When PSTC assumed all the properties, business and assets of LUSTEVECO pertaining
to LUSTEVECO’s tanker and bulk business, PSTC also assumed all of LUSTEVECO’s
obligations pertaining to such business. The assumption of obligations was stipulated
not only in the Agreement of Assumption of Obligations but also in the Agreement of
Transfer. The Agreement specifically mentions the case between LUSTEVECO and
Caltex, docketed as AC-G.R. CV No. 62613, then pending before the IAC. The
Agreement provides that PSTC may demand and receive any claim out of counter-
suits or counterclaims arising from the actions enumerated in the Annexes.
PSTC is bound by the Agreement. PSTC cannot accept the benefits without assuming
the obligations under the same Agreement. PSTC cannot repudiate its commitment
to assume the obligations after taking over the assets for that will amount to
defrauding the creditors of LUSTEVECO. It will also result in failure of consideration
since the assumption of obligations is part of the consideration for the transfer of the
assets from LUSTEVECO to PSTC. Failure of consideration will revert the assets to
LUSTEVECO for the benefit of the creditors of LUSTEVECO. Thus, PSTC cannot escape
from its undertaking to assume the obligations of LUSTEVECO as stated in the
Agreement.
The disposition of all or substantially all of the assets of a corporation is allowed under
Section 40 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, otherwise known as The Corporation Code of
the Philippines (“Corporation Code”). Section 40 provides:
xxx
While the Corporation Code allows the transfer of all or substantially all the properties
and assets of a corporation, the transfer should not prejudice the creditors of the
assignor. The only way the transfer can proceed without prejudice to the creditors is
to hold the assignee liable for the obligations of the assignor. The acquisition by the
assignee of all or substantially all of the assets of the assignor necessarily includes
the assumption of the assignor’s liabilities, unless the creditors who did not consent
to the transfer choose to rescind the transfer on the ground of fraud. To allow an
assignor to transfer all its business, properties and assets without the consent of its
creditors and without requiring the assignee to assume the assignor’s obligations will
defraud the creditors. The assignment will place the assignor’s assets beyond the
reach of its creditors.
Here, Caltex could not enforce the judgment debt against LUSTEVECO. The writ of
execution could not be satisfied because LUSTEVECO’s remaining properties had been
foreclosed by lienholders. In addition, all of LUSTEVECO’s business, properties and
assets pertaining to its tanker and bulk business had been assigned to PSTC without
the knowledge of its creditors. Caltex now has no other means of enforcing the
judgment debt except against PSTC.
In Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRC, which involved the illegal dismissal of the
employees of Pepsi-Cola Distributors of the Philippines (PCD), the Court has ruled
that Pepsi Cola Products Philippines, Inc. (PCPPI) which acquired the franchise of PCD
is liable for the reinstatement of PCD’s employees. The Court rejected PCPPI’s
argument that it is a company separate and distinct from PCD. The Court ruled that
the complaint was filed when PCD was still in existence. Further, there was no
evidence that PCPPI, as the new entity or purchasing company, was free from any
liabilities incurred by PCD.
In this case, PSTC was aware of the pendency of the case between Caltex and
LUSTEVECO. PSTC assumed LUSTEVECO’s obligations, including specifically any
obligation that might arise from Caltex’s suit against LUSTEVECO. The Agreement
transferred the unencumbered assets of LUSTEVECO to PSTC, making any money
judgment in favor of Caltex unenforceable against LUSTEVECO. To allow PSTC to
renege on its obligation under the Agreement will allow PSTC to defraud Caltex. This
militates against the statutory policy of protecting creditors from fraudulent
contracts.
Article 1313 of the Civil Code provides that “creditors are protected in cases of
contracts intended to defraud them.” Further, Article 1381 of the Civil Code provides
that contracts entered into in fraud of creditors may be rescinded when the creditors
cannot in any manner collect the claims due them. Article 1381 applies to contracts
where the creditors are not parties, for such contracts are usually made without their
knowledge. Thus, a creditor who is not a party to a contract can sue to rescind the
contract to prevent fraud upon him. Or, the same creditor can instead choose to
enforce the contract if a specific provision in the contract allows him to collect his
claim, and thus protect him from fraud.
If PSTC does not assume the obligations of LUSTEVECO as PSTC had committed under
the Agreement, the creditors of LUSTEVECO could no longer collect the debts of
LUSTEVECO. The assignment becomes a fraud on the part of PSTC, because PSTC
would then have inveigled LUSTEVECO to transfer the assets on the promise to pay
LUSTEVECO’s creditors. However, after taking over the assets, PSTC would now turn
around and renege on its promise.
The Agreement, under Article 1291 of the Civil Code, is also a novation of
LUSTEVECO’s obligations by substituting the person of the debtor. Under Article 1293
of the Civil Code, a novation which consists in substituting a new debtor in place of
the original debtor cannot be made without the consent of the creditor. Here, since
the Agreement novated the debt without the knowledge and consent of Caltex, the
Agreement cannot prejudice Caltex. Thus, the assets that LUSTEVECO transferred to
PSTC in consideration, among others, of the novation, or the value of such assets,
remain even in the hands of PSTC subject to execution to satisfy the judgment claim
of Caltex.
SEC. 2. Parties in interest. ─ A real party in interest is the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Ordinarily, one who is not a privy to a contract may not bring an action to enforce it.
However, this case falls under the exception. In Oco v. Limbaring, we ruled:
The parties to a contract are the real parties in interest in an action upon it, as
consistently held by the Court. Only the contracting parties are bound by the
stipulation in the contract; they are the ones who would benefit from and could violate
it. Thus, one who is not a party to a contract, and for whose benefit it was not
expressly made, cannot maintain an action on it. One cannot do so, even if the
contract performed by the contracting parties would incidentally inure to one’s
benefit.
As an exception, parties who have not taken part in a contract may show that
they have a real interest affected by its performance or annulment. In other words,
those who are not principally or subsidiarily obligated in a contract, in which they had
no intervention, may show their detriment that could result from it. x x x
Caltex may enforce its cause of action against PSTC because PSTC expressly assumed
all the obligations of LUSVETECO pertaining to its tanker and bulk business and
specifically, those relating to AC-G.R. CV No. 62613. While Caltex is not a party to
the Agreement, it has a real interest in the performance of PSTC’s obligations under
the Agreement because the nonperformance of PSTC’s obligations will defraud Caltex.
Even if PSTC did not expressly assume to pay the creditors of LUSTEVECO, PSTC
would still be liable to Caltex up to the value of the assets transferred. The transfer
of all or substantially all of the unencumbered assets of LUSTEVECO to PSTC cannot
work to defraud the creditors of LUSTEVECO. A creditor has a real interest to go after
any person to whom the debtor fraudulently transferred its assets.
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the 31 May 2001 Decision and 9
November 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 46097. We
AFFIRM the 1 June 1994 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 51, in
Civil Case No. 91- 59512. Costs against respondent.