PRR 2006

PRRcover07 final:PRR2006 5/4/07 3:12 PM Page 1
PRR 2006
PRR 2006 - May 2007

An Assessment of Air Traffic Management in Europe
during the Calendar Year 2006
Performance Review
Report
Performance Review Report
May 2007
For any further information please contact: Performance Review

Performance Review Unit, 96 Rue de la Fusée,
Commission
B-1130 Brussels, Belgium
Tel: +32 2 729 3956

Fax: +32 2 729 9108
pru@eurocontrol.int
http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc
† This Report is respectfully dedicated to the

memory of Frank Morisseau, PRC Member,
who died on 5 September 2006
Background About the Performance Review Commission

This Report has been produced by the Performance Review Commission (PRC).
The Performance Review Commission (PRC) is an independent body which advises the Permanent
Commission of EUROCONTROL through the Provisional Council on European Air Traffic Management
The PRC was established in 1998 by the Commission of EUROCONTROL, in accordance with the ECAC
(ATM) Performance.
Institutional Strategy (1997).
The PRC was established by the Permanent Commission in 1998 following adoption of the European
One objective in this Strategy is “to introduce strong, transparent and independent performance review
Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) Institutional Strategy in 1997. This strategy provided that “an inde-
and target setting to facilitate more effective management of the European ATM system, encourage
pendent Performance Review System covering all aspects of ATM in the ECAC area will be established
mutual accountability for system performance and provide a better basis for investment analyses
to put greater emphasis on performance and improved cost-effectiveness, in response to objectives
and, with reference to existing practice, provide guidelines to States on economic regulation to assist
set at a political level”.
them in carrying out their responsibilities”.
The PRC reviews the performance of the European ATM System under various Key Performance Areas.
The PRC’s website address is http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc
It analyses performance and trends, identifies and encourages best practices and benchmarks the
cost-effectiveness and productivity of Air Navigation Service Providers. The PRC also proposes per-
formance targets, assesses to what extent agreed targets and high level objectives are met, and
makes recommendations to enhance performance.
Notice
The PRC is composed of twelve independent members with senior managerial and technical expe-
The PRC has made every effort to ensure that the information and analysis contained in this document
rience of aviation. They are nominated by the EUROCONTROL Member States and appointed by the
are as accurate and complete as possible. Only information from quoted sources has been used and
Provisional Council. Nominees are required to have professional experience of air traffic management
information relating to named parties has been checked with the parties concerned. Despite these
(planning, technical, operational or economic aspects), safety or economic regulation in one or
precautions, should you find any errors or inconsistencies we would be grateful if you could please bring
more of the following areas: government regulatory bodies, air navigation services, airports, aircraft
them to the PRU’s attention.
operations and research and development.
The PRU’s e-mail address is PRU@eurocontrol.int

The Commissioners who prepared this report are:
Mr Jozsef Bakos Mr Frank Morisseau † Mr Adrian Serban
Dr. Harry Bush Mr Serafim Petrou Mr Lauri Vänskä
Mr Francisco Cal Pardo Mr Vittorio Pimpinelli Mr Jean-François Vivier
Mr Cees Gresnigt Prof. Dr Johannes Reichmuth Mr Keith Williams
Copyright notice and Disclaimer The Performance Review Unit (PRU) supports the PRC and operates administratively under, but inde-
pendently of, the EUROCONTROL Agency.
© European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL)
The PRC can be contacted via the Performance Review Unit, Rue de la Fusée 96, B-1130
This document is published by the Performance Review Commission in the interest of the exchange of
Brussels, Belgium. Tel: +32 2 729 3956. The PRU’s e-mail address is: PRU@eurocontrol.int.
information.
The PRC can also be contacted through its website. The address is: http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc.
It may be copied in whole or in part providing that the copyright notice and disclaimer are included. The
PRC processes
information contained in this document may not be modified without prior written permission from the
The PRC reviews ATM performance issues on its own initiative, at the request of the deliberating
Performance Review Commission.
bodies of EUROCONTROL or of third parties. It prepares annual Performance Review Reports,
benchmarking reports on Air Navigation Service Providers and ad hoc reports.
The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views or policy of EUROCONTROL,
which makes no warranty, either implied or express, for the information contained in this document,
The PRC gathers relevant information, consults concerned parties, draws conclusions, and sub-
neither does it assume any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness or usefulness
mits its reports and recommendations for decision to the Permanent Commission, through the
of this information.
Provisional Council. These reports are made available in printed and electronic form
(http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc) and on request from the PRU (PRU@eurocontrol.int), after they
Printed by EUROCONTROL, 96, rue de la Fusée, B-1130 Brussels, Belgium.
have been seen by the Provisional Council, unless the latter requests otherwise.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION SHEET
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
Document Title
Performance Review Commission

Performance Review Report covering the calendar year 2006 (PRR 2006)
PROGRAMME REFERENCE INDEX EDITION: EDITION DATE:

PRC Performance Review Report FINAL 10 May 2007
SUMMARY
This report of the Performance Review Commission analyses the performance of the European
Air Traffic Management System in 2006 under a number of Key Performance Areas: Safety,
Delays, Cost-effectiveness and Flight-efficiency.
Keywords
Air Traffic Management Performance Measurement
Performance Indicators ATM ANS
Performance Review Unit, EUROCONTROL, 96 rue de la Fusée
CONTACT: B-1130 Brussels, Belgium. Tel: +32 2 729 3956
E-mail: pru@eurocontrol.int; Web site:http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc
DOCUMENT STATUS AND TYPE

STATUS DISTRIBUTION
Draft General Public ;
Proposed Issue EUROCONTROL Organisation
Released Issue ; Restricted
INTERNAL REFERENCE NAME: PRR 2006

European ATM Performance in 2006 - 37 States
Key Performance Indicator Commentary & Data
12
Sustained air traffic growth in 2006 (4.1% on
average) resulted from heterogeneous growth
million flights per year
10
across States (0 to 19%). A similar trend is
8
Tra ffic
2 0 0 7 F o re c a s t anticipated for the future.
Traffic
4
6% 6%
4%
6 % 5% 6 %
5%
7%
5% 4 % 4 % 4 % 3 %3 % 3 %3 % 3 %
Actual Variation
5%
2
2% 2%
0%
3%
2006 2006/2005
0
Y e a r o n ye a r v ariat io n -2 %
IFR flights 9.6M +4.1%
2006
2010
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2008
2012
IFR flight-hours 14.0M +4.9%
Traffic demand and forecast Service units 101.3M +4.5%
35
33 Re g u l a to rs Some progress is noted concerning incident
30 30 28
24
reporting and transparency. Legal and cultural
25 ANS P s
22
19
impediments to incident reporting still exist in
20
many States.
Safety
15 24 regulatory authorities and 19 ANSPs did

10 not meet the acceptable maturity level (70%)
5 In te rim in 2006. All regulatory authorities and ANSPs
ta rg e t
0
0
should reach this level by end 2008, as agreed.
2002 2004 2006 2008
This is a prerequisite for further progress.
Number of ANSPs/Regulators with maturity score below 70%
6 Summer (May-October) 6 000
5 5 000
Average en-route ATFM delays in the summer
(1.4 min/flight) increased slightly and did not
Flights in Summer ('000)
4 Target: 1.0min/flight 4 000

minutes per flight
3
Actual: 1.4min/flight
3 000
meet the agreed target (1.0 min/flight).
En route
2
target En route
2 000 Airport ATFM delays (bottom part of the
Delays
optimum
1 1 000
graph) have remained relatively high in the
0
2.9 4.1 5.5 3.6 3.1 1.8 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4
0
past years.
0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.8
ATFM Estimated
-1 -1 000
Minutes
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
delays Cost
En-route ATFM delay per flight (May-Oct.)
Airport ATFM delay per flight (May-Oct.) 2005 17.6 M € 1 000 M
source : EUROCONTROL/CFMU
Average ATFM delay per flight (Summer) 2006 18.4 M € 1 050 M

0.9 250
Cost-effectiveness is a major ATM
Average 1997-2003
0.8 220
performance issue. A break in the unit cost
PRC
proposed target
trend is visible since 2003. ANSP projections
are in line with PRC’s proposed target.
Euro 2005/ km
0.7 190
Cost-effectiveness
Savings from 2003 to 2008 would then

0.6 160
amount to more than two billion Euros.
0.5 130 En –route
Year ANS costs Unit cost
0.4 100 (€2005/km)
2006P
2007P
2008P
2009P
2010P
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Total: €7 430 M
Cost Per Km Total Costs (1997= index 100) Traff ic (1997=index 100) 2005 Route: €5 743 M 0.77 (-3.4%)
All States in CRCO system so urce : EUROC ONT ROL
En-route unit cost (deflated) 2006 est. Route: €6 073 M 0.76 (-1.0%)
60 Flight-efficiency is also a major ATM

50 performance issue. It slightly improved in
route extension (km/flight)
- 2 km per flight
2006. The cost of route extensions increased
Flight-efficiency
40
further due to higher fuel prices.
30
Route extension Estimated
Year
20
Direct en route Per flight Total Cost
10 TMA Interf ace
Proposed target 2005 49.2 km 435M km €2 130M
0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2006 48.6 km 441M km €2 230M
Route extension (km)
Figure 1: Key Performance Indicators in 2006
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Key messages of this report
TRAFFIC
Sustained air traffic growth continued in Annual growth in IFR Movements 2006
2006 (4.1% on average). It resulted from Below 0%
heterogeneous growth across States (0 to 0% to 3%

3% to 6%
19%). A similar trend is anticipated for the 2%

6% to 9%
9% to 12%
future.
6% 4% Above 12%
11%
The high traffic growth observed in 2005 in 2%

13%
11%
new EU States and Turkey tended to slow

5%
3%
6% 19%
down in 2006, except in Poland and the 5% 4% 13%
P roduced by the D ata Inform ation & Analysis (DIA) B us ine ss Division. © EURO CO NT RO L 2006.
0%
6%
Baltic States. The traffic in these States

7%
4% 4% 5%
2%
4%4% 1%
remains however well above the forecast

6%
5% 9%
Azores 2%
4%
7%
made 3 years ago.

6% 8%
5% 2%
3%
5%
3%
“Low-cost” and Business aviation enjoyed Canarias 0%

data source : EUROCONTROL/STATFOR
higher than average growth. In 2006,

respective traffic shares were 16% and 7%, Yearly Traffic Variation
and growth rates were 24% and 11%.
SAFETY
This review of safety performance focuses on key issues in terms of ATM-related accidents,
incidents and maturity of safety processes. More details can be found in Safety Regulation
Commission and EUROCONTROL Agency reports.
There has been no ATM-related accident involving civil transport aircraft in 2006.
Incident reporting has improved significantly since 2001, which gives better visibility on ATM
safety issues, and more opportunities to prevent accidents. However, incident reporting remains
inadequate in a number of States.
Based on a subset of 15 States with mature safety processes, there appears to be no significant
change in high risk incidents in the airspace in spite of growing traffic, which is broadly in
conformity with the “ATM 2000+” safety objective. The growing number of runway incursion
reports, apparently linked with improved reporting and classification processes, indicates that
high priority should continue to be given to runway incursions.
1400
1200
1000 Severity C,D,E
Classified events
800 Severity B
600 Severity A
400 % : Proportion of Severity A+B
38% 28% 21% 23%
200
0
2002 2003 2004 2005P
15 States D ata so urce : EUROCONT ROL SR U
“Airspace event” reports from 15 States

Safety maturity needs to reach a sufficient level in all States. This, inter alia, is a prerequisite for
safety performance review. The PRC fully supports the agreed target that all States should reach
the safety maturity level of 70% by the end of 2008. 24 regulatory authorities and 19 ANSPs did
not meet this maturity level in 2006.
Executive Summary ii PRR 2006

Legal impediments to incident reporting continue to remain significant in many States.
EUROCONTROL, the States and possibly the European Commission should tackle legal issues
with the relevant priority.
Furthermore, the safety reporting culture still remains low in a significant number of ANSPs and
States. An improvement to this culture is equally important, even if it may be more difficult to
achieve.
Compliance with legislation, safety maturity assessments and other aggregate safety information
concerning regulators and ANSPs fall under the protection of a confidentiality policy, namely
EUROCONTROL’s publication and confidentiality policy in relation to safety data
(EAM 2/GUI 2 dated 12-11-1999). The PRC considers this confidentiality policy to be over-
restrictive.
Transparency on safety-related information needs to increase in a majority of States. While
preserving the confidentiality of individuals in the safety reporting process, States and ANSPs
have a public responsibility to show that their safety performance levels are adequate.
PUNCTUALITY, PREDICTABILITY
Arrival punctuality (on time performance) of scheduled air transport deteriorated for the third
consecutive year. Late arrivals have increased by one fourth since 2003, reaching 21.4% in 2006
(23.1% in US). Late departures increased by one third in the same period.
Delays originate principally from airline/airport turnaround processes (79% of primary departure
delays). Efforts should focus on these processes, which are outside the scope of ATM. ATM also
has a role to play by reducing ATFM delays where possible (21% of primary delays).
69.0% 74.4% 75.2% 82.5% 83.6% 81.8% 79.8% 78.1% Departure Punctuality
35%
source: AEA source: eCODA
% of flights with departure delay > 15 min.
30%
25% 13%
20% 10% 9%
Primary delay
10% distribution (2006)
9%
15% 7% 7%
10% 6%
9% 10%
10%
9%
8% 8% 9% 10%
8% 79%
5% 12%
7.9%
5.6% 4.5% 1.1% 1.2% 1.2% 1.1%
2.1% 1.6% 1.4% 1.5% 1.6%
0%
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
En-route ATFM regulations due to ATC Airport ATFM regulations (weather, capacity)
Turnaround delays (airline, airport, etc.) Reactionary delays
Departure punctuality and delay causes

The European air transport network is increasingly sensitive to reactionary delays (due to late
arrival of earlier flights). On average, every minute of primary delay resulted in 0.76 minute of
reactionary delay in 2006 (up from 0.54 in 2003). The increased sensitivity is most likely driven
by increased aircraft and airport utilisation levels, not compensated by adequate processes, which
brings more variability in the air transport system.
This growing variability has a negative impact on predictability, i.e. the ability of airlines and
airports to build and operate reliable and efficient schedules. Improved predictability enables
airlines and airports to improve the punctuality/financial performance trade-off. Standard
deviations of departure and arrival times reached 18 and 20 minutes respectively (~ +2.7 minutes
vs. 2003). Pre-departure processes play a main role in this poor predictability, and ATM only a
minor role.
Executive Summary iii PRR 2006

Air transport punctuality and predictability could be improved in several ways:
• Priority should be given to improving adherence to scheduled departure times, which
requires a collaborative effort from all actors, including ATM for ATFM delays;
• Future ATM strategies and improvement programmes should seek to maximise the use of
airport capacity whilst minimising delays. ATM can improve the airport capacity/delay
trade-off. This requires a coordinated approach of all stakeholders, improved involvement
of ATM in the scheduling of major airports, a more integrated (network) flow
management strategy to deliver accurate TMA entry times and landing intervals, Co-
operative Decision Making (CDM), a reduction of the capacity gap between good and
bad weather conditions, some en-route capacity headroom, etc.;
• Optimising the ground vs. airborne holding trade-off.
Today’s air transport system operates with wide margins (Punctuality margins and ATFM slots
are 15 minutes). The ACARE punctuality target (99%) is demanding. Such improvements in air
transport punctuality and predictability would require a simultaneous tightening of airline, airport
and ATM processes, and imply some coupling between them, i.e. some form of air transport
network coordination.
ATFM DELAYS
The growth of demand starts to outpace the provision of en-route capacity again. En-route ATFM
delays (1.4 minutes/flight) exceeded the agreed target (1 minute/flight). In addition to specific
circumstances (postponement of Swiss UAC implementation), weather and staffing issues were
the main contributing factors to increasing en-route ATFM delays. In 2006, the most constraining
ACCs were Zagreb, Zurich, Madrid, Warsaw, Barcelona and Prague.
300 30
Traffic volume (km)
275 Effective capacity
En-route ATFM delay 25
250
225
km index 1990=100
20
million minutes
200
175 15
150
10
125
100
5
75 Closing Widening Closing
capacity gap capacity gap capacity gap
50 0
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
source : EUROCONTROL
Matching capacity and demand

The ATFM delay situation improved at some airports such as Istanbul (IST), Zurich (ZRH),
Amsterdam (AMS) and Munich (MUC) in 2006. Nevertheless, airport ATFM delays remain a
concern at a number of airports such as Milan-Malpensa (MXP), Vienna (VIE) and Rome (FCO),
where a continuous high level of Aerodrome/ATC capacity related ATFM delay was observed.
As the present en-route delay target is commonly accepted, proven to be achievable, and widely
considered as a satisfactory performance level, the PRC proposes that this system-level target
(1 minute/flight) be maintained for the coming years.
The development of more tactical ATFM measures should be encouraged. Best practice should
be identified and promoted within a consistent and coordinated European framework.
Measures for the evaluation of tactical ATFM measures (including airborne holdings) should be
developed and analysed along with ATFM delays to have a more complete understanding of
ATFM performance.
Executive Summary iv PRR 2006

FLIGHT-EFFICIENCY
ATM flight-efficiency is a major ATM performance issue. The economic impact of horizontal
route extension on airspace users is estimated at €2.2 billion in 2006, to which vertical and TMA
inefficiencies have to be added. Moreover, the environmental impact is also significant
(4.7 million tons of CO2 per annum).
The strategic design and use of airspace are the main drivers for the route extension. There
appears to be room for significant improvements:
• Intra-European routes are significantly less efficient than domestic routes. If the
European route network was as efficient as the domestic networks, as one would expect
under the Single European Sky, €150 million to €300 million could be saved every year;
• Only minimal improvements in flight-efficiency are observed during weekends, when
there are essentially no airspace restrictions. €130 million could be saved every year if
the route network was one third more efficient during weekends.
Domestic Intra-European Domestic-AVG Intra-European-AVG
7%
Direct route extension (%)
6%
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
0%
0-400 km 400-800 km 800-1200 km 1200-1600 km 1600 -2000 km >2000 km
Great Circle Distance (between TMA)
Flight-efficiency of domestic and European networks

There are however practical limitations to the speed and magnitude of improvements in flight-
efficiency: the network is very complex, changes need to be thoroughly tested, and thousands of
city-pairs or hundreds of constraining points need to be addressed.
To date, airspace design has tended to focus on capacity. While there are limitations in addressing
flight-efficiency, this issue is of such magnitude that it calls for much more attention and
proactive resolution of problems. Capacity and flight-efficiency must be addressed in a balanced
way, so that the total cost to users, comprising the marginal cost of capacity and cost of route
extension, is minimised.
More generally, the feasibility of creating an efficient Trans-European network of upper air
routes aligned with major flows and independent of national boundaries should be assessed.
A performance target should be adopted for flight-efficiency as a matter of urgency. It would not
only focus stakeholders’ attention, but would also constitute a success criterion for successive
reviews of SES implementation by the European Commission. A decrease of the additional route
extension per flight by 15% to 20% within the next 5 years would appear to constitute a
challenging but achievable target.
The European dimension of airspace design, the need for a balanced approach to capacity/delays
and flight-efficiency, and for the avoidance of distortions to airspace design linked with ANSP
revenues, should be recognised in drawing up SES implementing rules for route and sector
design.
Executive Summary v PRR 2006

CIVIL/MILITARY USE OF AIRSPACE
The application of FUA principles and practices has been a major enabler for the continuous
ATC capacity increase and flight-efficiency improvements in Europe. However, allocation and
use of airspace could be further improved.
Shared airspace during daytime 04h00-22h00 UTC, which can be used alternatively for civil
traffic and military activities, is allocated as follows:
• On average, military activities are conducted 246 days a year. Airspace is therefore fully
available for civil use for the remaining 119 days;
• On the 246 days with military activity, the shared airspace is reserved for military usage
on average for 7 hours per day, of which 3 hours are actually used;
• The shared airspace for the remaining 11 hours of the 246 days is available for civil
traffic with one day advance notice.
Therefore, on average, shared airspace is available for civil traffic 74% of the daytime per annum
in the “Core Area”. Airspace is generally even more available to civil traffic outside the Core
Area.
Although shared airspace is available for civil traffic most of the time, in fact it is under-used for
two reasons: (1) principally due to the absence of routes and (2) when routes are available, due to
the lack of flexibility of the ATM system (procedures, training programmes, organisational
issues) and/or aircraft operators.
Potential demand by civil traffic (week) Actual usage by civil traffic (week)
traffic density
very low low medium high very high Core area
Potential and accommodated civil demand (weekdays)

Consequently, designing and managing more routes inside shared airspace is fundamental to
improving performance when military activity is absent. In addition, it is necessary to enhance
ATM and aircraft operators’ flexibility in using routes inside shared airspace when available to
civil traffic.
There is in fact little relationship between military airspace utilisation and the ability to
accommodate civil traffic. Experience in Belgium (TRA-SOUTH), in the UK (Portsmouth area)
Executive Summary vi PRR 2006

and in Germany (TRA-LAUTER) shows that shared airspace which is intensively used by
military activities can also be extensively used by civil traffic where there is good civil/military
integration. It is therefore possible to reduce traffic complexity, thereby increasing ATC capacity,
whilst ensuring better flight-efficiency.
The organisation of real-time operations (systems, procedures, training) needs to be strengthened
at European level by applying best practices where necessary and by enhancing the role of CFMU
in disseminating airspace status and traffic load information.
Information contained in the annual FUA report as specified by SES regulation No 2150/2005
(flexible use of airspace) will be essential to identify best practices. It would be useful to identify
a European forum which ensures the “cooperation for the efficient and consistent application of
the concept of flexible use of airspace across national borders” as provided for by the same
regulation.
COST-EFFECTIVENESS
Overall, the cost-effectiveness of European ATM has been improving since 2003, where a break
in the unit cost trend is clearly visible.
Improvements observed from 2002 to 2005 result from unit costs decreases in a majority of
States. However, cost increases in Spain, due to its relative weight, cancelled out performance
improvements in 15 smaller States. EUROCONTROL Agency costs have grown by +27% in this
period, mainly due to the introduction of pension related-costs in 2005. Strict cost management is
required from all stakeholders, which have a collective responsibility to improve European ATM
cost-effectiveness, and in particular from the five largest States (66% of costs).
0.9 250
Average 1997-2003
0.8 220
PRC
proposed target
Euro 2005/ km
0.7 190
0.6 160
0.5 130
0.4 100
2006P
2007P
2008P
2009P
2010P
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Cost Per Km Total Costs (1997= index 100) Traf f ic (1997=index 100)
A ll States in CRCO system so urc e : EUROCONTR OL
Real en-route unit costs per km (KPI), total costs and traffic
Although there has been significant improvement, cost-effectiveness nevertheless remains a
major ATM performance issue. In 2005, total en-route and terminal ANS costs amounted to some
€7 430M. High level comparisons indicate that there is room for further improvements in cost-
effectiveness, which could be achieved by increasing productivity, reducing fragmentation and
support costs, and effectively managing employment costs
According to States’ cumulated projections, the European ATM system is on track to meet the
PRC’s notional target for 2008 (-14% with respect to 2003). The cumulative savings from 2003 to
2008 would then amount to more than two billion Euros.
Executive Summary vii PRR 2006

This indicates that a Pan-European cost-effectiveness target of reducing the real unit cost by 3%
per annum is both reasonable and achievable. Moreover, this target is in line with the strategic
design objectives of the ATM industry until 2010, as stated in SESAR performance targets (a -3%
yearly reduction of real unit costs until 2010 followed by a -5% yearly reduction until 2020).
It is therefore proposed to formally adopt a Pan-European cost-effectiveness target of reducing the
European average real unit cost by 3% per annum until 2010. This target should also be used as a
performance criterion for the European Commission’s triennial reports on SES implementation to
the European Parliament and Council. The next report is due in 2010.
Should the combination of current performance improvement drivers such as benchmarking, cost-
effectiveness planning, cooperation among ANSPs, and setting of performance objectives prove to
be insufficient to reach the agreed target, policy makers should consider a range of stronger tools
to this effect. These could include such initiatives as independent economic regulation “à la UK”,
the setting of five years unit rates, and/or a contractual approach between ANSPs and airspace
users, based on agreed performance objectives, with minimal regulatory intervention.
Recommendations
The Provisional Council is invited:
a) to note the PRC’s Performance Review Report (PRR 2006) and to submit it to the
Permanent Commission;
Safety
b) to confirm that all National Regulators and ANSPs providing en-route services should
reach the agreed minimum level of safety management and regulation maturity (70%) by
end 2008 and to formally adopt this as an interim European safety performance target,
pending the adoption of European safety target(s) based on Key Performance Indicators
being developed;
c) to request the Director General to undertake a review of EUROCONTROL’s publication
and confidentiality policy, to ensure the appropriate balance between confidentiality and
transparency of safety information;
Capacity/delays
d) to agree that the European performance target for en-route ATFM delays remains set at
one minute per flight for each summer period (May to October inclusive) until 2010;
Flight-efficiency, Environmental impact
e) to adopt as a flight-efficiency target a reduction in the European average route extension
per flight of two kilometres per annum until 2010;
f) to note that achieving the flight-efficiency target would reduce carbon dioxide emissions
in proportion;
Cost-effectiveness
g) to adopt the cost-effectiveness target of reducing the European average real unit cost by
3% per annum until 2010.
Executive Summary viii PRR 2006

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary..........................................................................................................................ii
1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 1
1.1 SCOPE OF THE REPORT .................................................................................................................... 1
1.2 NEW ITEMS IN THIS REPORT............................................................................................................. 2
1.3 PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF AIR NAVIGATION SERVICES ................................................................. 2
1.4 PERFORMANCE REVIEW COMMISSION ............................................................................................ 3
1.5 CONSULTATION PROCESS ................................................................................................................ 3
1.6 MAPPING OF THE REPORT ................................................................................................................ 4
1.7 EVALUATION OF IMPACT OF SES INITIATIVE ON ATM PERFORMANCE ........................................... 4
1.8 IMPLEMENTATION STATUS OF PAST PRC RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................ 6
2 Traffic....................................................................................................................................... 7
2.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 7
2.2 TRAFFIC STATISTICS AND FORECAST ............................................................................................... 7
2.3 TRAFFIC COMPOSITION AND EVOLUTION ......................................................................................... 9
2.4 TRAFFIC FORECASTS ..................................................................................................................... 11
2.5 TRAFFIC COMPLEXITY ................................................................................................................... 13
2.6 CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................... 14
3 Safety...................................................................................................................................... 15
3.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 15
3.2 ATM CONTRIBUTION TO AVIATION ACCIDENTS ............................................................................. 15
3.3 INCIDENT REPORTING .................................................................................................................... 16
3.4 IMPEDIMENTS TO OCCURRENCE REPORTING BY INDIVIDUALS ....................................................... 19
3.5 COMPLIANCE WITH SAFETY REGULATIONS AND TRANSPARENCY................................................... 21
3.6 ATM SAFETY MATURITY .............................................................................................................. 22
3.7 CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................... 24
4 Air transport Punctuality/Predictability ................................................................................. 27
4.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 27
4.2 AIR TRANSPORT PUNCTUALITY (ON TIME PERFORMANCE)............................................................. 27
4.3 PREDICTABILITY OF AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS ......................................................................... 31
4.4 IMPROVING PUNCTUALITY AND PREDICTABILITY........................................................................... 33
4.5 CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................... 36
5 ATFM delays.......................................................................................................................... 37
5.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 37
5.2 ATFM DELAYS ............................................................................................................................. 37
5.3 ATFM DELAY TARGETS ................................................................................................................ 40
5.4 EN-ROUTE ATFM DELAYS ............................................................................................................ 41
5.5 AIRPORT ATFM DELAYS .............................................................................................................. 45
5.6 ATFCM PERFORMANCE ............................................................................................................... 47
5.7 CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................... 48
6 Flight-efficiency ..................................................................................................................... 49
6.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 49
6.2 KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT .................................................. 49
6.3 ROUTE DESIGN AND USAGE ........................................................................................................... 51
6.4 LIMITATIONS TO IMPROVING HORIZONTAL FLIGHT-EFFICIENCY ..................................................... 53
6.5 FLIGHT-EFFICIENCY TARGET ......................................................................................................... 56
6.6 CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................... 56
7 Civil/Military use of airspace................................................................................................. 59
7.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 59
7.2 ALLOCATION OF SHARED AIRSPACE .............................................................................................. 60
7.3 ACTUAL USAGE OF SHARED AIRSPACE........................................................................................... 61
7.4 REASONS FOR SUB-OPTIMAL USE OF SHARED AIRSPACE ................................................................ 62
7.5 CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................... 66
8 Cost-effectiveness .................................................................................................................. 69
8.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 69
8.2 EN-ROUTE COST-EFFECTIVENESS KPI FOR EUROCONTROL AREA ............................................ 69
8.3 PERFORMANCE TARGETS FOR COST-EFFECTIVENESS ..................................................................... 71
ix
8.4 EN-ROUTE ANS COST-EFFECTIVENESS KPI AT STATE LEVEL........................................................ 73
8.5 THE COMPONENTS OF EN-ROUTE ANS COSTS (EUROPEAN AND STATE LEVEL) ............................. 78
8.6 GATE-TO-GATE ATM/CNS COST-EFFECTIVENESS BENCHMARKING (ANSP LEVEL)...................... 81
8.7 CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................... 85
ANNEX I - PRC Recommendations on Single European Sky....................................................... 87
ANNEX II - ACC Traffic and Delay data (2003-2006)................................................................. 88
ANNEX III - Traffic Complexity................................................................................................... 89
ANNEX IV - Safety Reporting: Legislative Vs. cultural environment ......................................... 91
ANNEX V - Airport Capacity/Delay Trade-offs ........................................................................... 94
ANNEX VI - Top 50 Most-constraining Points & Maps............................................................... 95
ANNEX VII - Flexible Use of Airspace Concept .......................................................................... 97
ANNEX VIII - ANSP Performance Sheets .................................................................................. 100
ANNEX IX - Glossary ................................................................................................................. 102
ANNEX X - References ............................................................................................................... 107
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Key Performance Indicators in 2006 .................................................................................i
Figure 2: EUROCONTROL Member States (2006)........................................................................ 1
Figure 3: Role of performance review ............................................................................................. 2
Figure 4: Approach to ATM performance used in this report ......................................................... 4
Figure 5: Key messages from PRC’s evaluation of SES.................................................................. 5
Figure 6: Implementation status of PC decisions on PRC recommendations.................................. 6
Figure 7: Yearly, monthly traffic and variations (2006) .................................................................. 7
Figure 8: Key traffic indicators ........................................................................................................ 7
Figure 9: Yearly traffic variation per charging areas ....................................................................... 8
Figure 10: Top 15 highest traffic growth from 2003 to 2006 .......................................................... 8
Figure 11: Largest traffic increases in additional movements ......................................................... 9
Figure 12: Distribution of IFR flights by type .................................................................................9
Figure 13: Distribution of IFR flights by airport size ...................................................................... 9
Figure 14: Evolution of “Low-cost” flight movements.................................................................. 10
Figure 15: Evolution of Business Aviation movements................................................................. 11
Figure 16: Average fuel costs in real terms.................................................................................... 11
Figure 17: Medium-term traffic forecast (STATFOR) .................................................................. 12
Figure 18: Actual traffic and successive forecasts......................................................................... 12
Figure 19: 2006 Traffic compared to forecast published in February 2003 (State level).............. 13
Figure 20: Complexity scores (2006)............................................................................................. 14
Figure 21: Commercial air transport accidents in EUROCONTROL States................................. 15
Figure 22: Total numbers of investigated ATM incidents, as reported to EUROCONTROL ...... 16
Figure 23: Number of ATM incident reports from 15 States......................................................... 17
Figure 24: “Airspace event” reports from 15 States ...................................................................... 18
Figure 25: Reported high risk runway incursions in 15 States ...................................................... 18
Figure 26: PRC’s assessment of cultural and legal issues in safety reporting............................... 20
Figure 27: Incident reporting to EUROCONTROL through ESARR 2 mechanisms.................... 21
Figure 28: Public availability of information on ATM safety ....................................................... 22
Figure 29: Maturity scores for ANSPs and National ATM Regulators ......................................... 23
Figure 30: Number of ANSPs and Regulators with maturity score below acceptable level ......... 24
Figure 31: Air transport punctuality drivers................................................................................... 27
Figure 32: Air transport departure and arrival punctuality ............................................................ 27
Figure 33: Framework for the analysis of ATM-related aspects in punctuality ............................ 28
Figure 34: Departure punctuality and delay causes ....................................................................... 29
Figure 35: Sensitivity of the European air transport network to primary delays ........................... 30
Figure 36: Distribution of ATFM delays > 30 minutes by cause .................................................. 31
Figure 37: Variability of flight phases ........................................................................................... 32
Figure 38: Initiatives for reducing air transport system variability................................................ 34
x
Figure 39: Linking variability of operation and airport scheduling levels..................................... 35
Figure 40: ATFM delays and en-route delay target ....................................................................... 37
Figure 41: Key European traffic and delay data ............................................................................ 38
Figure 42: ATFM delay distribution by delay reason.................................................................... 38
Figure 43: ATFM delay distribution by length of delay ................................................................ 39
Figure 44: Estimated ATFM delay costs (including reactionary).................................................. 40
Figure 45: Weekly distribution of en-route ATFM delays ............................................................ 41
Figure 46: ACC congestion............................................................................................................ 42
Figure 47: Evolution of traffic and en-route ATFM delays........................................................... 42
Figure 48: En-route delay causes at the highly congested ACCs................................................... 43
Figure 49: Map of ACC congestion (days with en-route delay > 1 min/flight)............................. 43
Figure 50: Matching capacity and demand (Summer) ................................................................... 44
Figure 51: ATFM delays due to combined/elementary sectors ..................................................... 44
Figure 52: Concentration of airport ATFM delay (2006) .............................................................. 45
Figure 53: Evolution of arrival traffic and airport ATFM arrival delay ........................................ 45
Figure 54: Top 15 airports with highest ATFM airport delay by cause ........................................ 46
Figure 55: Drivers of weather- related ATFM delays in 2006....................................................... 47
Figure 56: ATFCM indicators........................................................................................................ 47
Figure 57: En-route flight-efficiency indicators............................................................................. 49
Figure 58: Route extension ............................................................................................................ 50
Figure 59: Economic and environmental impact of route extension ............................................. 50
Figure 60: Breakdown of route extension (2006) .......................................................................... 51
Figure 61: Direct route extension - week/weekend........................................................................ 52
Figure 62: Route extension on domestic and intra-European routes ............................................. 52
Figure 63: Systemisation of traffic flows to reduce structural complexity.................................... 53
Figure 64: Impact of TMA on traffic flows ................................................................................... 54
Figure 65: Interconnectivity of the European network .................................................................. 54
Figure 66: Distribution of additional distance flown ..................................................................... 55
Figure 67: MOU: one of the “most constraining points”............................................................... 55
Figure 68: Focus area for civil-military study................................................................................ 59
Figure 69: Military airspace utilisation in “Core Area” ................................................................ 60
Figure 70: Potential and accommodated civil demand (weekdays) ............................................... 61
Figure 71: Actual usage of shared airspace by civil and military on weekdays (2005)................. 61
Figure 72: Changes in civil utilisation of shared airspace between weekdays and weekends....... 62
Figure 73: Drivers of sub-optimal use of shared airspace.............................................................. 63
Figure 74: Route network inside shared airspace in the Core Area............................................... 63
Figure 75: Route availability in selected parts of Europe.............................................................. 65
Figure 76: Factors impacting on route utilisation .......................................................................... 65
Figure 77: Breakdown of gate-to-gate ANS costs at European system level (2005)..................... 69
Figure 78: En-route ANS cost-effectiveness KPI for EUROCONTROL Area ............................. 70
Figure 79: Real en-route unit costs per km (KPI), total costs and traffic ...................................... 70
Figure 80: High level cost-effectiveness comparison of US-Europe (2005) ................................. 72
Figure 81: Long term trend of traffic and costs ............................................................................. 72
Figure 82: Real en-route ANS unit costs per EUROCONTROL Member State ........................... 73
Figure 83: Changes in en-route real unit costs (2002-2005).......................................................... 75
Figure 84: Projected real ANS en-route unit costs (2006-2010).................................................... 76
Figure 85: Trend of en-route unit costs per geographical area (2002-2010 in real terms) ............ 77
Figure 86: Changes in en-route MET costs at European and State level....................................... 78
Figure 87: EUROCONTROL Agency costs relative to total European en-route ANS costs ........ 79
Figure 88: EUROCONTROL Agency costs per establishment & expenditure (Parts I & IX)...... 80
Figure 89: Forward-looking EUROCONTROL Agency costs 2005-2010 (Parts I & IX)............. 81
Figure 90: Breakdown of gate-to-gate ATM/CNS provision costs (2005) .................................... 82
Figure 91: ATM/CNS cost-effectiveness comparisons (2002-2005)............................................. 83
Figure 92: Change in ATCO-hour productivity and employment costs (2002-2005) ................... 84
xi
Chapter 1: Introduction
1 Introduction
1.1 Scope of the report

1.1.1 Air Navigation Services (ANS) ensure the safe, regular, efficient and economical
operation of air traffic for the benefit of Air transport, Military and General Aviation.
1.1.2 “Air transport contributes €220 billion to European gross domestic product and employs
3.1 million people. It is also an important aspect of European cohesion ensuring the
rapid and efficient movement of people and goods, but also providing essential access to
remote regions” [Ref. 1].
1.1.3 Military aviation, being an integral part of the defence forces, is an important user of
European airspace with specific needs, and as a result, an important stakeholder in
European Air Traffic Management (ATM).
1.1.4 Another important stakeholder is General Aviation, which encompasses business

aviation, aerial work, training flights and leisure activities.
1.1.5 This performance review report (PRR 2006) reviews European ATM performance during
2006, under the Key Performance Areas (KPA)1 of Safety, Delays, Cost-effectiveness
and Flight-efficiency. It indirectly addresses ATM environmental impact, whose global
aspects are closely related to Flight-efficiency.
1.1.6 Unless otherwise indicated, PRR 2006 refers to the airspace controlled by the 37 Member
States of EUROCONTROL2 (see Figure 2), hereinafter referred to as “Europe”, in the
calendar year 2006.
Figure 2: EUROCONTROL Member States (2006)
1
The PRC focuses on a subset of KPAs defined by ICAO, which are: Safety, Capacity, Predictability, Efficiency,
Environment, Cost-effectiveness, Access and Equity, Global Interoperability, Flexibility, Participation by the
ATM community, Security.
2
See list in Glossary. Armenia joined EUROCONTROL on 1 March 2006. Lithuania became EUROCONTROL’s
37th Member State on 1 September 2006.
PRR 2006 1 Chapter 1 - Introduction

1.2 New items in this report
LINKING ATM PERFORMANCE AND AIR TRANSPORT PERFORMANCE
1.2.1 Chapter 4 analyses air transport performance in terms of punctuality and predictability,
and ATM contributions to it. New features include a closer look at interrelationships
between ATM, airports and airlines in delivering ATM and air transport performance.
CIVIL/MILITARY USE OF AIRSPACE
1.2.2 Chapter 7 explores the usage of airspace above FL 200 in the Core Area by civil and
military operations. It summarises the key points of a report commissioned by the PRC
which has been published separately [Ref. 2].
1.3 Performance Review of Air Navigation Services

1.3.1 The aim of performance review is to provide independent advice on ATM performance to
policy makers and relevant information to all stakeholders (e.g. benchmarking and best-
practices), based on research, observation of achieved performance, consultation and
information provided by relevant parties.
1.3.2 ATM performance results from complex interactions between:

• Applicable legislation (e.g. SES Regulations) and supervision of its application;
• Supervisory authorities;
• ATM provision and its industrial organisation, so that the goals of individual Air
Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) are aligned with common policy objectives;
• Institutions such as EUROCONTROL;
• Civil and military airspace users;
• Airport operators.
Legislation Airspace Airport
Institutions users operators
Industrial Organisations
Air Navigation
Policy
Policy objectives Achieved
ANS Providers
makers Supervisory authorities Performance
European functions
Advice on e.g. CFMU
performance
issues
Performance Consultation
information Performance Raw information
Review
Figure 3: Role of performance review
1.3.3 In 1998, performance review of European ATM was established in the EUROCONTROL
Organisation, i.e. the EUROCONTROL Member States plus the Agency, through the
creation of the independent PRC. It was one major objective of the ECAC Institutional
Strategy for Air Traffic Management (ATM) in Europe [Ref. 3] “to introduce a strong,
transparent and independent performance review and target setting system to facilitate
more effective management of the European ATM system, encourage mutual
accountability for system performance and provide a better basis for investment
analyses…”
1.3.4 SES regulations include provisions for performance review of European ANS by the
European Commission. Article 11 of the SES Framework Regulation [Ref. 4] states, inter

alia, that “The Commission shall ensure the examination and evaluation of air
navigation performance, drawing upon the expertise of EUROCONTROL”. It is
envisaged that the PRC will play a major role in the examination and evaluation of ANS
performance by the European Commission.
1.4 Performance Review Commission

1.4.1 The PRC is an independent body which advises the Permanent Commission through the
Provisional Council on European ATM Performance. It is composed of twelve Members
(including the Chairman and one vice-Chairman) who are appointed on the basis of
ability, competence, experience and professional reputation. The PRC Members act
completely independent of States, national and international organisations.
1.4.2 The PRC typically meets 15 days a year. The Performance Review Unit (PRU) supports
the PRC and operates administratively under, but independent of, the EUROCONTROL
Agency. More details on the PRC can be found on the inside-back cover page.
1.4.3 The PRC analyses performance and trends, identifies and encourages best practices and
benchmarks ANSP cost-effectiveness. The PRC also proposes performance targets,
assesses to what extent agreed targets and high-level objectives, such as ATM 2000+
Strategy objectives [Ref. 5] are met, and makes recommendations to enhance
performance. It produces annual PRRs and commissions ad hoc reports. All PRC
publications can be found on the website http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc.
1.4.4 Through its reports, the PRC seeks to assist stakeholders in understanding from a global
perspective why, where, when, and possibly how, ATM performance should be
improved, in knowing which areas deserve special attention, and in learning from past
successes and shortcomings. The spirit of PRC reports is neither to praise nor to criticise,
but to help everyone involved in effectively improving performance in the future.
1.5 Consultation process

1.5.1 Communication and consultation are major priorities for the PRC. Stakeholders received
the draft final PRR 2006 for a four-week consultation period (8 February-8 March 2007).
1.5.2 PRR 2006 was also discussed at an open-forum consultation meeting with stakeholders
held on 8 March 2007.
1.5.3 The PRC took due account of all stakeholder comments received when drawing up its
conclusions and recommendations, which can be found in the Executive Summary.

1.6 Mapping of the report
1.6.1 Figure 4 shows PRR 2006 mapping, using the same colour code as chapter headers3.
Performance Performance ANS Air Transport
Drivers Indicators Key Performance performance
Areas
Legislative Safety maturity

framework
Culture
Accidents Safety Airline Performance
(Chapter 3)
Incidents
Safety
Management (a/c proximities)
Systems Punctuality &
Predictability
Traffic demand (Chapter 4)
En-route delays
(Chapter 2) ATFM
Delays
Capacity Airport delays (Chapter 5)
ANS
Complexity Productivity AIS, MET costs Performance
Cost
Cost of living ATCO Unit Costs ANSP costs Effectiveness
(Chapter 8) Airport Performance
Fragmentation Support Costs EUROCONTROL

costs
Airspace design & Flight

Horizontal Flight
use Efficiency
efficiency
(Chapter 6)
Civil/Military use
of airspace Vertical Flight
(Chapter 7) Efficiency
Figure 4: Approach to ATM performance used in this report
1.6.2 The analytical framework is based on the ICAO performance framework described in
ICAO Document “Global Air Traffic Management Operational Concept”[Ref. 6]
endorsed by ICAO’s 11th Air Navigation Conference. The ICAO KPAs are listed in
Footnote 1.
1.7 Evaluation of Impact of SES Initiative on ATM performance

1.7.1 At the request of the European Commission in view of its report to the European
Parliament and the Council on SES implementation, the PRC conducted in 2006 an
independent evaluation of the impact of SES legislation on ATM Performance in the
European Union (EU) and associated States. The findings, which were developed
through extensive consultation, are fully documented in a specific report [Ref .7].
1.7.2 The evaluation assessed past and foreseeable ATM performance since the SES
Regulations entered into force in 2004, identified the main ATM performance issues and
how they were addressed by SES Regulations. Finally, the evaluation suggested further
improvements to address remaining issues and achieve the objectives of the SES by
3
This is not a definitive performance framework: only links explored are shown in Figure 4.

making 31 specific recommendations (see Annex I) addressed to Member States, the
European Commission, EUROCONTROL and ANSPs, who share the collective
responsibility to achieve a truly effective SES.
1.7.3 The evaluation concluded that there was considerable scope for improvement under the
existing SES framework through non-regulatory actions such as guidance material,
support to National Supervisory Authorities (NSAs), provision of information and
facilitation of cooperation between the various parties, without necessarily introducing
new European regulations.
1.7.4 Quantified performance criteria should be adopted to focus collective efforts, and as a
basis for the European Commission to assess achieved performance in its successive
reports on SES implementation to the European Parliament and Council.
1.7.5 The key messages from the PRC’s evaluation of SES impact on ATM performance can
be summarised as follows:
Supervision of ANSPs
Ensure effective and efficient supervision by and of NSAs;
Check compliance with the air navigation charging scheme;
Develop NSA competences to act as independent economic, safety, and airspace
regulators.
Performance criteria and objectives
ANSPs to develop a strong performance culture, which comprises the setting of
own performance objectives on safety, efficiency and quality of service, in a
transparent way and after effective consultation;
NSAs to develop incentives for ANSPs to meet these objectives;
Adopt Europe wide performance criteria.
Organisation of service provision
Reduce fragmentation and remove existing barriers for the consolidation of the ATM
sector by:
developing rules for designation of ATSPs;
organising CNS and AIS under market condition;
creating a contestable environment for the provision of ATS at certain airports.
Rationalisation of airspace and service provision

Support the creation of FABs by clarifying the expectations and objectives, by
adopting simple success criteria and common binding principles, and by providing
financial support where necessary;
Optimize the European route network by developing common binding principles in
order to create true “European motorways of the sky”.
Civil/Military cooperation
Implement effectively the statement by States on military issues in order to
improve efficiency in the use of airspace.
Develop success criteria to measure improvements in civil/military cooperation.
Figure 5: Key messages from PRC’s evaluation of SES

1.8 Implementation status of past PRC recommendations
1.8.1 Overall, the PRC’s assessment is that 56% of Provisional Council (PC) decisions based
on PRC recommendations requiring action have been fully implemented. Figure 6
summarises the implementation status of PRC recommendations. The complete status
report can be consulted on the PRC’s website [Ref. 8].
Implementation
PRC summary comments
of PC decisions
Safety Implementation of PC decisions related to safety is much too slow.
While some progress is noted, PC decisions must be acted upon in all
1 out of 13
States.
Delays & Capacity All recommendations related to ATM capacity and delays have been
implemented. Co-operative capacity management arrangements have
22 out of 22
led to significant improvements, but ATFM delays are increasing
again, which may require further action.
Cost-effectiveness There was further progress in 2006, but adoption of a European cost-
effectiveness target and action on aeronautical MET costs are pending.
11 out of 20
Flight-efficiency Progress made on improved route networks, addressing both civil and
military requirements, appears to be slow. Adoption of a flight-
0 out of 2
efficiency target is expected to accelerate improvements.
Miscellaneous
(2 out of 2)
Total: 33 out of 59
(56%)
Figure 6: Implementation status of PC decisions on PRC recommendations

Chapter 2: Traffic
2 Traffic
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 This chapter examines the demand for Air Navigation Services and its trend.
2.2 Traffic statistics and forecast

TRAFFIC IN 2006
2.2.1 In 2006, 9.6 million General Air Traffic (GAT) flights were controlled in Europe. Traffic
increased in average by 4.1%. This corresponds to the high growth range of the medium
term forecast that was made in February 2006. The daily traffic record was broken on
15 September 2006 with 31 914 flights in the CFMU Area. 4
30
12
28
million flights per year
10
thousands daily flights

26
8 2007 Forecas t
Traffic
24
6
TRAFFIC :9.6 M GROWTH : +4.1%
22
4 6% 6% 7%
6% 4% 5% 6 % 5%
2%
5% 3% 5% 4% 4% 4 % 3%3% 3 %3 % 3%
2%
0% 20 5% 5% 5%
2 4% 3% 5%
1%
4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
Year o n year variatio n -2%
18
0
Jul
Oct
Jan
Feb
Jun
Mar
May
Nov
Dec
Sep
Aug
Apr
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2006/2005 2004 2005 2006

( before 1997, estimation based on Euro 88 traffic variation)
data so urce : EUROC ON TROL/C FM U
so urce : EUR OCONTROL
Figure 7: Yearly, monthly traffic and variations (2006)
2.2.2 Key traffic indicators are given in Figure 8. Historical traffic data is in Annex II.
Year 2006 Actual Variation Index
2006/2005 100 in 1990
IFR flights5 9.6 M +4.1% 182
IFR flight-hours5 14.1M +4.8% N/A
Distance charged6 (Km) 7 823 M +4.7% 2167
Total Service Units6 101.3 M +4.5% 2217
data source: EUROCONTROL/CFMU&CRCO
Figure 8: Key traffic indicators
2.2.3 Traffic growth was again very contrasted across States, ranging from 0 to 19%, as can be
seen in Figure 9. Growth was especially high in Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic States. It
is however worth noting that traffic growth is slowing down in several new EU States
and Turkey, as shown in Figure 10.
4
The variation of traffic of 1% between April 06/05 is due to the different dates on which Easter occurred.
5
EUROCONTROL Member States in 2006 (see Glossary).
6
States participating in the Route Charges System in 2006, excluding Santa Maria (see Glossary).
7
States participating in the Route Charges System in 1988 (see Glossary).
PRR 2006 7 Chapter 2 - Traffic

Annual growth in IFR Movements 2006
Annual growth in IFR Movements 2005 Below 0%
Below 0%
0% to 3%
0% to 3%
3% to 6%
3% to 6%
6% to 9%
0%
9% to 12%
6% to 9%
3% 1% Above 12% 2%
9% to 12%
7%
10%
6% 4% Above 12%
1% 12%
7%
6%
4% 16%
3% 6% 11% 11%
9%
18%
9%
3% 3%
10% 11%
11%
13%
16%18%
4% 2% 11%
15% 11%
4%
5%
5% 14%
5%
7%
11%
3%
3%
2%
6% 19%
3%
5% 4%
13%
Prod uced by the D a ta In form ation & A nalysis (DIA) Bus ine ss Div is ion . © EU RO CO N T RO L 2 00 6.
0%
6%
7%
4% 4% 5%
2%
4%4% 1%
6%
5% 9%
Azores 2%
4%
6% 7% 8%
5% 2%
3%
5%
3%
Canarias 0%
Figure 9: Yearly traffic variation per charging areas

40%
2004 2005 2006
% growth of traffic
30%
20%
10%
0%
Ukraine
Romania
Turkey
Croatia
Poland
Slovakia
Montenegro
Estonia
Moldova
Hungary
Republic
Slovenia
Latvia
Lithuania
Bulgaria
Czech
Serbia &
data so urce : EUROCONTROL/STA TFOR-CRCO
Figure 10: Top 15 highest traffic growth from 2003 to 2006
2.2.4 Differences were also observed in the volume and proportion of traffic growth in terms
of over-flights, international and domestic traffic, as can be seen in Figure 11.
2.2.5 The FIFA football World cup added more than 7000 aircraft movements in Germany
between 9 June and 9 July 2006. This was 3% above normal traffic in Germany, and
nearly 1% above normal European traffic for that period. Thanks to specific measures by
ANSPs concerned and the CFMU, the additional traffic generated only moderate
additional delays (see section 5.4).
PRR 2006 8 Chapter 2 -Traffic

400 1 00%
Additional Movements per Day - 2006 vs 2005

4% Overflights
350 International
Internal
0%
300 4%
% Movement Growth
5%
250 19% 3%
-1 00%
4%
200
6%
5% 8%
-2 00%
150 4%
13%
100 9% 5%
5% 6%
-3 00%
50
-4 00%
Ukraine
Belgium/Luxembourg
Germany
Turkey
UK
Poland
Ireland
France
Montenegro
Hungary
Italy
Netherlands
Spain
Austria
Norway
Serbia &
-50 -5 00%
data so urce : EUROCONTROL/STA TFOR-CRCO
Figure 11: Largest traffic increases in additional movements
2.3 Traffic composition and evolution

2.3.1 Figure 12 gives a breakdown of controlled General Air Traffic in Europe in 2005 and
20068. Note that the “Military IFR” segment does not include the substantial portion of
military traffic under military control. Similarly, “Other” does not include General
Aviation flying purely under Visual Flight Rules (VFR).
Military
Non-Sched. Other Cargo
% of flights by size of airport
Commercial
Business Aviation All Categories 14% 40% 28% 17%
1.7%
2.1%
2.5%
7.3% 7.4%
Low-cost
2.6%
1.9%
2.2%
Scheduled 20% 42% 24% 13%

7.7% 6.9%
15.8%
13.3%
All IFR Low -cost 6% 52% 35% 7%
Flights
65.4%
Business 3% 27% 37% 33%
2005
63.2% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
2006 Very large airport (> 500 daily departures)

Scheduled Large airport (100 to 500 daily departures)
source : EUROCONTROLl/STA TFOR
Medium airport (20-100 daily departures)
Small airport (1-20 daily departures)
Figure 12: Distribution of IFR flights by type Figure 13: Distribution of IFR flights by airport size
8
The classification used is the one defined by STATFOR as follows:
IFR movements are classified by the following rules, in this order:
1. Business aviation: All IFR movements by aircraft types in the list of business aircraft types (see STATFOR
Business Aviation Report, May 2006, for the list);
2. Military IFR: ICAO Flight type= 'M', plus all flights by operators or aircraft types for which 70%+ of 2003
flights were 'M';
3. Cargo: All movements by operators with fleets consisting of 65% or more all-freight airframes ;
4. Low-cost: See STATFOR Document 150 for list.
5. Scheduled (other): ICAO Flight Type = 'S', e.g. flag carriers.
6. Non-Scheduled Commercial: ICAO Flight Type = 'N', e.g. charter plus air taxi not included in (1).

2.3.2 Figure 13 shows the distribution of traffic by airport size. “Low-cost” tends to operate
from the same airports as the scheduled airlines, although they are less present at very
large airports. Business Aviation mainly operates from small to medium-sized airports.
“LOW-COST” AIRLINES
2.3.3 There are many different definitions of “Low-cost” airlines. Several studies have been
published concerning “Low-cost” airlines”. Two recent examples are a UK study of the
UK market [Ref. 9] and a DLR study/project [Ref. 10].
2.3.4 The information provided here is based on the definition by STATFOR (ref: STATFOR
Low-Cost Carriers Panel).
2.3.5 In 2006, the market share of “Low-cost” flights reached 15.8% of all traffic, compared to
13.3% in 2005.
18 % 9000
16 % 8000
14 % Low-cost market share 7000
Low-cost IFR movements/day in ESRA

Low-cost share of IFR movements in ESRA
(left-hand scale)
12 % 6000
10 % 5000
8% 4000
Low-cost traffic
6% (right-hand scale) 3000
4% 2000
2% 1000
0% 0
02/91
02/92
02/93
02/94
02/95
02/96
02/97
02/98
02/99
02/00
02/01
02/02
02/03
02/04
02/05
02/06
Earlier years are estimated from data for a smaller geographical region.
Figure 14: Evolution of “Low-cost” flight movements9
BUSINESS AVIATION
2.3.6 STATFOR [Ref. 11] estimates that “over the next ten years, 1000 aircraft will be added
to the existing fleet of 2000 aircrafts, generating some 1100 extra flights/day by 2015.
This would add 0.4% per year to the total growth in flight movements. The growth might
be even higher based on manufacturer’s expectations (especially for very light jets (VLJ)
manufacturers)”.
2.3.7 In 2006, about 700 000 flights (7.4% of IFR flights) were Business Aviation, as can be
seen in Figure 15. This is an increase of 11% compared to 2005.
2.3.8 Business Aviation traffic is more spread than scheduled traffic10, using mostly smaller
airports, as can be seen in Figure 13. They mainly serve city-pairs where no scheduled
services are available.
9
STATFOR updates its panel of low-cost airlines in January each year, to capture most of the re-branding effect in
a single month. This explains the jump in market share in January. Low-cost flight movements are increasingly
being influenced by seasonality following the same pattern as traditional carriers.
10
Approximately 60% of business flights depart from airports with less than 50 departures per day, compared to
~40% for other flights.

Bus ines s Aviation IFR flights % of Total Flights
800 000 8%
700 000 7%
600 000 6%
500 000 5%
400 000 4%
300 000 3%
200 000 2%
100 000 1%
0 0%
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Jet Piston Turboprop % of Total Flights
data source : EUROCONTROL/STATFOR ESRA Area)
Figure 15: Evolution of Business Aviation movements
2.3.9 Business jets now tend to fly at the same altitude as scheduled traffic, but generally at
lower speeds and with completely different traffic patterns. This adds horizontal, vertical
and speed interactions in the ATM system, i.e. more structural complexity (see § 2.4.6).
2.4 Traffic forecasts

2.4.1 Figure 7 shows a long term trend of sustained traffic growth (4% on average over 1990-
2006), albeit with a temporary dip in traffic in the period 2001-2003.
2.4.2 The long-term trend is anticipated to continue, in spite of high fuel costs shown in Figure
16. Jet fuel prices in real terms averaged $81.5 a barrel in 2006, up from $74 in 2005, and
an average of $32 a barrel in the period 1993-2003.
120
100
US$ 2006 per barrel
80
60
40
20
0
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
data so urce : U.S. D epartm ent o f Energy (R o tterdam Jet Fuel Spo t P rice)
Figure 16: Average fuel costs in real terms
2.4.3 Higher growth is forecasted for Central and Eastern States (see Figure 17). However, in
some of these countries the actual traffic in 2006 was less than forecasted.

Figure 17: Medium-term traffic forecast (STATFOR)
2.4.4 Figure 18 shows the successive forecasts and actual traffic at European level. Actual
traffic is some 3 years behind the forecast made in 2001, and is in line with the forecast
made in 2003.
13
IFR Movements in European Statistic Reference Area (Millions)
Forecast published in :
Feb 03
12 (H igh fo recast)
Feb 05
Jul 01
11 Feb 02 Feb 03
Feb 04
10
Feb 03
(Lo w fo rec ast)
8
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Source :EUROCONTROL/ STATFOR
Figure 18: Actual traffic and successive forecasts

2.4.5 The difference compared to forecast can be larger at State level, as can be seen in Figure
19, which compares 2006 actual traffic with the baseline forecast published in February
2003. 11
Figure 19: 2006 Traffic compared to forecast published in February 2003 (State level)
2.4.6 Some of the factors influencing these differences include:

• Opening of new routes to South-East Europe which were not anticipated;
• Impact of deregulation which was underestimated in the new EU States, in Ukraine
and Turkey;
• Volatility of tourism flow (e.g. high traffic growth to Turkey in 2004 and 2005).
2.4.7 There are inherent limits to forecasting accuracy. For example, changes in routing or
opening/closure of new services by airlines are decided in the short term. Their influence
is not known when forecasting traffic for the medium and long term.
2.4.8 ANSP business plans should therefore take account of likely forecasting errors, and
include some flexibility to adapt to unforeseen changes in traffic volume without undue
additional costs.
2.5 Traffic complexity

2.5.1 Traffic complexity is generally regarded as an important factor to be considered when
analysing ATM performance. The PRC commissioned a specific report on air traffic
complexity indicators, prepared in close collaboration with ANSPs [Ref. 12].
2.5.2 Complexity indicators12 are now computed on a systematic basis. Average complexity
scores for the year 2006 are illustrated in Figure 20. The results have been computed over
365 days and are therefore not directly comparable with the results published in previous
reports, which were based on a two-week sample.
11
The comparison with forecast made 3 years in advance has been selected as it corresponds to the time needed to
plan and deploy new resources.
12
See more detailed information in Annex III.

Complexity score = Traffic density x Structural index
Line of equal complexity score
Figure 20: Complexity scores (2006)
2.5.3 For example, traffic is two times denser in Bulgaria (BU) than in Norway (NO), but
structural complexity is higher in Norway, where most flights are in vertical evolution,
than in Bulgaria. The product of both components for the two ANSPs results in similar
aggregate complexity scores.
2.5.4 The relationship between complexity and ATM performance is not straightforward (see
in particular Ref. 13). Work needs to continue to better understand the impact of
complexity and how complexity indicators can be used in the analysis of ATM
performance.
2.6 Conclusions
2.6.1 Sustained air traffic growth continued in 2006 (4.1% on average). It resulted from
heterogeneous growth across States (0 to 19%). A similar trend is anticipated for the
future.
2.6.2 The high traffic growth observed in 2005 in new EU States and Turkey tended to slow
down in 2006, except in Poland and the Baltic States. The traffic in these States remains
however well above the forecast made 3 years ago.
2.6.3 “Low-cost” and Business Aviation enjoyed higher than average growth. In 2006,
respective traffic shares were 16% and 7%, and growth rates were 24% and 11%.

Chapter 3: Safety
3 Safety
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 In PRR 8 addressing year 2004 and in PRR 2005, the PRC highlighted that:
• “The quality, quantity and consistency of ATM incident reporting and safety
information are wholly inadequate for the purposes of safety management and
performance review across Europe.”
• “There are no reliable key performance indicators for ATM safety.”
• “There is no Europe-wide analysis of ATM-related incidents.”
3.1.2 This review of safety performance focuses on key issues and progress made in terms of
ATM-related accidents, incidents and maturity of safety processes; more details can be
found in the annual reports of the Safety Regulation Commission (SRC) [Ref. 14] and of
the EUROCONTROL Agency [Ref. 15]. It also summarises the conclusions of a specific
report commissioned by the PRC on Impediments to Occurrence Reporting, which
highlights that legal and cultural impediments prove to be a significant issue.
3.2 ATM contribution to aviation accidents

3.2.1 There was no ATM-related accident13 involving civil transport aircraft in Europe in 2006.
20
Direct ATM
18
Accidents
16 Trend
Total number of acccidents
14
12
10
0
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Data source: Flight Safety Foundation - Aviation Safety Net
Figure 21: Commercial air transport accidents in EUROCONTROL States
3.2.2 Figure 21 shows the number of accidents involving commercial aviation aircraft14 in
Europe, and accidents directly caused by ATM15. Although traffic nearly doubled from
1992 to 2006, the absolute number of accidents in commercial aviation clearly shows a
descending trend.
3.2.3 The strategic objective set by the ATM 2000+ Strategy is that the absolute number of
13
The definition of “accident” is given by the ICAO Annex 13. See also the Glossary of this report.
14
Survey of accidents conducted by the PRU, using information from the Flight Safety Foundation about accidents
involving fixed-wing aircraft over 5,700kg Maximum Take-Off Weight, occurring in EUROCONTROL Member
States (membership as at end-2006).
15
1997 - Amsterdam Schiphol airport, Netherlands, B757; 1998 – Yerevan airport, Armenia, Yak 40; 2000 – Paris
CDG airport, France, Shorts 330/MD80; 2001: Milan Linate airport, Italy, MD87/Cessna Citation; 2002 –
Überlingen, Germany, B757/Tu154; 2002 – Stuttgart airport, Germany, B717/Cessna 172; 2004: Ronchi dei
Legionari, Gorizia airport, Italy, MD82.
PRR 2006 15 Chapter 3 - Safety

ATM-related accidents and serious incidents should not increase, and if possible
decrease, irrespective of traffic growth. However, the number of ATM-related accidents
is too small for a trend to be readily observable. Depending on sources, the contribution
of ATM to accidents is estimated to be in the range of 2 to 6%.
3.3 Incident reporting

3.3.1 The PRC has called for improved incident reporting since 2001, based on airline
experience where greater visibility on safety issues allowed reducing the number of
severe safety events [Ref. 16].
3.3.2 The PRC has no access to incident data, only to aggregated and dis-identified data
provided to it by the SRC. However, on the basis of the data provided, it would appear
that there is increased incident reporting and investigated reports, as shown in Figure 22.
This is encouraging. However, important problems remain at local levels (as shown in
the next section on impediments to reporting), and also at European level, as illustrated
below.
3.3.3 The backlog of incident reports still under investigation at the end of each year appears to
be increasing. This may be an indication of inadequate resources allocated to this task, or
of resources not matching the increasing amount of data resulting from better reporting.
3.3.4 A distinction must be made between incident reporting within a State and the reports sent
annually to EUROCONTROL as part of the ESARR 2 process. While poor quality in
local reports results in poor quality in reports to EUROCONTROL, good local quality
does not necessarily result in good reports to EUROCONTROL.
10 25%
Total incidents ('000)
Still under investigation (%)
8 20%
6 15%
4 10%
2 5%
0 0%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Data source: EUROCONTROL SRU
Figure 22: Total numbers of investigated ATM incidents, as reported to EUROCONTROL
3.3.5 At European level, incident data continues to come essentially from manual reporting.
Only a minority of incident data come from some sort of automatic reporting, such as
ASMT16-like tools. To date, only France, Switzerland and the UK are known to use such
tools on a systematic and regular basis.
3.3.6 Even reports on Airborne Collision and Avoidance System (ACAS) events are filed
manually at present. While both on-board and ground equipment able to report and
collect ACAS events automatically are widely installed, this functionality is either not
16
ASMT: ATM Safety Monitoring Tool

configured or not used. A significant source of safety information, free of human
subjectivity and willingness to report, is therefore not exploited.
3.3.7 EUROCONTROL’s publication and confidentiality policy in relation to safety data

(EAM 2/GUI 2 dated 12-11-1999) deals with “the sharing of safety information between
ATM service providers, the reporting of safety information to ATM regulators and the
provision of safety information to the public, including those provided to the PRC”.
3.3.8 The PRC is concerned that this confidentiality policy is over-restrictive. Safety being the
principal outcome of ANS, there should be a duty of accountability and transparency to
users and the public concerning safety of ANS. There is a need to ensure the appropriate
balance between maintaining confidentiality of safety data and ensuring transparency of
safety information for the general public.
3.3.9 Moreover, under this confidentiality policy, the PRC only receives dis-identified, high-
level safety data, which does not allow the PRC to review safety performance as
specified in its Terms of Reference. For instance, the PRC is not informed of the identity
of ANSPs/Regulators who have not yet achieved a maturity score of 70%. Although
restrictions to the publication of information can apply, the PRC should have maximum
visibility on safety matters for performance review purposes.
PRELIMINARY ATM SAFETY INDICATORS IN A SAMPLE OF 15 EUROCONTROL STATES
3.3.10 This analysis is based on data from the Safety Regulation Unit (SRU), checked for
quality and consistency by the SRU and the PRU. The new reporting format of 2006
allows an improved analysis, better categorisation and quality checking, as well as
segregation by phases of flight and severity.
3.3.11 In PRR 2005, a sample of 15 EUROCONTROL States showing robust and regular
incident reporting was selected in order to discern ATM safety trends. Although not
complete, this sample represents 82% of flight-hours in the EUROCONTROL area.
Incident data from the same 15 States is used in this section.
3.3.12 In this sample of 15 States, incident reporting rates have improved in all three categories
under review (runway incursions, inadequate separation and separation minima
infringement), as shown in Figure 23. Education campaigns, better methodologies, new
legislation and more mature cultures played a role in this positive development. Improved
reporting gives better visibility on safety occurrences and incidents, and provides more
information to safety management systems for the prevention of future accidents.
2500
2000
1500 Runw ay Incursions
Inadequate Separation
1000
Separation Min. Infringement
500
0
2002 2003 2004 2005P
15 States Data so urce : EUROCONTROL SRU
Figure 23: Number of ATM incident reports from 15 States
3.3.13 Although both traffic and the number of incident reports have increased since 2002, the

number of high severity17 incidents in the airspace (Categories A and B) tends to remain
relatively constant18, as shown in Figure 24. This is a positive signal concerning the ATM
safety trend in the subset of 15 States, which appears to be in line with the safety
objective of the ATM 2000+ Strategy (see § 3.2.3).
1400
1200
1000 Severity C,D,E
Classified events
800 Severity B
600 Severity A
400 % : Proportion of Severity A+B
38% 28% 21% 23%
200
0
2002 2003 2004 2005P
15 States Data so urce : EUROCONTROL SRU
Figure 24: “Airspace event” reports from 15 States
3.3.14 Information on runway incursions appears to be improving, but remains of lower overall
quality than information on airspace events, with significant variations in data quality
among the 15 States.
3.3.15 The number of reported runway incursions increased by 11% in 2005 compared to 2004.
Importantly, this does not necessarily indicate lower safety performance, but possibly
improved visibility on actual incidents. The number of “Severity A” runway incursions is
on a decreasing trend since 2004, as shown in Figure 25. The number of “Severity B”
runway incursions shows an increasing trend, which likely originates from improved
reporting practices and use of the severity classification scheme. Keeping in mind the
variable data quality and yet unreported incidents, these trends must be taken with
caution.
3.3.16 In view of the number of high severity runway incursions and of the variable quality of
incident reports, runway incursions must remain an area of high focus.
70
60
Number of incidents
50
40 Severity B
30 Severity A
20
10
0
2003 2004 2005P
Unclassified: 15% 26% 19%

Data so urce: EUROCONTROL SRU
Figure 25: Reported high risk runway incursions in 15 States
17
ESARR 2 classifies incidents by classes of severity: A – serious incident to E – no safety effect. Full details are in
the SRC’s EAM 2/GUI 1: “Severity Classification Scheme for Safety Occurrences in ATM.”
18
The increase in “Severity B” incidents visible in 2005 is due mainly to a major change in the classification
scheme of one State. In any case, it is too early to say if this is a trend reversal.

3.3.17 This section has focused on a sample of 15 States with relatively reliable incident
reporting. However, reporting still needs to improve significantly in 22 States. A
minimum level of maturity in all States (see section 3.6) is a prerequisite for the
publication of reliable European safety Key Performance Indicators. The following
section addresses impediments to incident reporting.
3.4 Impediments to occurrence reporting by individuals

3.4.1 The PRC has published a report on Legal and Cultural Issues in relation to ATM Safety
Occurrence Reporting in Europe [Ref. 17], based on an extensive survey of each State’s
legal and regulatory provisions on safety reporting. Meetings were held with
representatives of ANSPs, Regulatory authorities and ATCOs in some 20 States. In
addition, information was obtained by correspondence and through studying international
and national legislation.
3.4.2 The report highlights that effective legislation is crucial to the development of aviation
safety in general and of “just culture” in particular. The EUROCONTROL definition of
“just culture”, also adopted by other European aviation stakeholders, is a culture in which
“front line operators or others are not punished for actions, omissions or decisions taken
by them that are commensurate with their experience and training, but where gross
negligence, wilful violations and destructive acts are not tolerated.”
3.4.3 However, in a number of States, the legislative framework underpinning their aviation
safety reporting systems is inadequate. These States do not have an effective safety
occurrence reporting system that protects the identity of the reporter and contains the
elements for a “just culture”, as defined above.
3.4.4 The importance of there being mutual trust and dialogue between the judicial and
aviation authorities, in the public interest, cannot be overstated. The judicial authorities
must be reassured that aviation authorities will not tolerate any unlawful behaviour on
the part of staff, and avoid intervening inappropriately in safety investigations that do not
involve unlawful actions or gross negligence.
3.4.5 The report also places emphasis on the key role played by cultural issues in fostering
effective safety reporting systems. It describes a number of areas where insufficient
safety reporting cultures exist at managerial and ATCO level. To this, training, better
dialogue and willingness to build trust and mutual respect are the keys to remedying the
situation. In particular, ATCOs and managers must work closely together to devise a
healthy safety reporting system where all occurrences are systematically reported and
analysed, lessons are disseminated and necessary changes swiftly implemented.

3.4.6 Figure 26 summarises the PRC’s assessment of legal and cultural issues for each of the
individual States that were reviewed in 2006. More details and criteria used for this
assessment can be found in Annex IV.
Legislation Culture
Austria
█ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █
█ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █
Belgium
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus Legend
Czech Republic
Denmark Good
Finland
France Neutral
Germany
Greece Insufficient
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
UK
Source: PRC
Figure 26: PRC’s assessment of cultural and legal issues in safety reporting
3.4.7 A number of other issues also emerged from the survey. One main item is the role of
media in sensationalising safety occurrences. Experience shows that less scrupulous and
sensation-seeking media will use any method to obtain information on a safety
occurrence. It is better, therefore, for Regulators and ANSPs to be pro-active and to have
good communication policies. Some ANSPs expressed concerns that having greater
transparency in safety reporting could damage their image with the general public,
insurance companies and investors.
3.4.8 Co-operation within the ANSP and between different safety-related bodies in the State
backed by a good communication strategy, both internal and external, were always found
to be crucial ingredients of successful systems. A small but growing number of such
systems exist across Europe.
3.4.9 Finally, the report presents a number of best-practice examples, as well as a list of
elements that should be part of any successful safety reporting system. These are fully in
line with activities being undertaken by the EUROCONTROL Agency through its
European Safety Programme for ATM (ESP), stemming from the final report of the first
SAFREP TF [Ref. 18].

3.5 Compliance with safety regulations and transparency
COMPLIANCE WITH EC LEGISLATION AND EUROCONTROL REGULATIONS
3.5.1 Directive 2003/42/EC became mandatory on 4th July 2005 for some 30 States19, which
represent the majority of EUROCONTROL Member States. This creates an obligation to
report any safety occurrence by relevant aviation personnel, including ATCOs. By the
end of 2006, the Directive was transposed in national legislation by all but 4 EU-Member
States. As such, reporting has become legally mandatory in all these States. The Directive
also requires Member States “to put in place a mechanism to collect, evaluate, process
and store occurrences reported”.
3.5.2 Notwithstanding the obligation to report arising from this Directive, EUROCONTROL
Member States were already under the obligation to implement ESARR 2. However, in
spite of this obligation and repeated calls from numerous fora, to date only eight States
have fully implemented ESARR 2 and eight more are above 80% implementation. While
this is a small improvement, it still falls well short of fulfilling legal obligations arising
from ESARR 2 and the related EC Directives 2003/42/EC and 94/56/EC.
3.5.3 One of the causes identified for the low ESARR 2 implementation rate is the advent of
EC Regulation 2096/2005, expected to transpose ESARRs in Community law. As such, a
number of States preferred to wait for the Regulation before making any further steps
towards ESARR implementation. It is however important to note that ESARR 2 is more
wide-ranging than the relevant EC Directives or Regulations. Therefore implementing
ESARR 2 would automatically mean compliance with the EU legislation, at least for
ATM.
COMPLIANCE WITH ESARR 2 REGULATION ON INCIDENT REPORTING

3.5.4 Although the ESARR 2 regulation of incident reporting was applicable, Figure 27 shows
that five States have failed to submit a single report to EUROCONTROL in the period
2003-2005, and nine other States reported irregularly. This may be due to changes within
organisations or due to the lack of adequate resources at the State and/or ANSP level.
3.5.5 During the past three years, only 24 States constantly submitted data to
EUROCONTROL. The number of States doing so appears to have reached a plateau and
further efforts may be needed to bring more States into the “constant reporting” category.
3.5.6 Even when submitting reports, not all States send good quality data. Some States submit
very few data or details. While it is true that the quality has slowly but constantly
improved, only 15 States have passed the quality check mentioned in paragraph 3.3.11
above, and were subsequently used for further analyses.
2003 - 2005
30
Number of EUROCONTROL
Member States including
25
Maastricht UAC
20
15
10
0
No Reporting Intermittent Constant
Reporting
So urce: EUR OCON TR OL SR U
Figure 27: Incident reporting to EUROCONTROL through ESARR 2 mechanisms
19
The then-25 EU Member States plus Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and then-acceding Bulgaria and Romania.

3.5.7 Compliance with legislation, safety maturity assessments and other aggregate safety
information concerning regulators and ANSPs fall under the protection of a
confidentiality policy, namely EUROCONTROL’s publication and confidentiality policy
in relation to safety data (EAM 2/GUI 2 dated 12-11-1999). The PRC considers this
confidentiality policy to be over-restrictive.
TRANSPARENCY OF SAFETY DATA
3.5.8 Safety being the principal output of ATM, and ATM being of public interest, one would
expect at least a minimal level of transparency concerning ATM safety.
3.5.9 In fact, the degree of transparency on ATM safety is widely variable across States. While
some States make a whole range of data publicly available (e.g. airprox details can be
found on the UK Airprox Board website), some States publish limited safety data, and a
majority of States do not provide any easily accessible information on ATM safety. This
is contrary to ICAO Annex 13 and Directive 94/56/EC, which require the publication of
reports from accidents and serious incidents.
3.5.10 Figure 28 shows the results of a survey20 of safety information that is published by State
authorities and ANSPs21. States not present in the table do not make safety data publicly
available.
Detailed safety data Aggregated safety
made publicly available data
Austria* Italy* Slovak Republic* Belgium
Czech Republic* Lithuania Spain Finland
Denmark MUAC* Sweden Moldova
France* Netherlands* Switzerland*
Germany* Norway* Turkey*
Hungary* Poland UK*
Ireland* Portugal * ATM related
Source: PRC
Figure 28: Public availability of information on ATM safety
3.5.11 Data relating to individuals need to be protected, as this is part of the just culture.
However, it is the duty of States and ANSPs to demonstrate that a certain level of safety
is achieved, as well as to prove their compliance with international regulations. As long
as safety data are not disclosed, the PRC will find it impossible to assess the safety
performance levels at European level.
3.5.12 The PRC continues to be concerned about the lack of proper transparency with regards to
safety data as well as to the implementation of international standards at State and ANSP
level. Such data are vital for a proper performance measurement.
3.6 ATM safety maturity

3.6.1 EUROCONTROL has organised periodic self assessments of ATM safety maturity22 by
20
Details of this survey are available on the PRC web-site, through the electronic version of this report.
21
Criteria used in this PRC survey of ATM safety information readily available to the public were:
o While some States/ANSPs may make locally available some data in printed forms or press releases, for the
purpose of this survey only annual reports and data on the Internet were considered.
o Detailed safety data: Full reports published and/or detailed statistical data on
accidents/incidents/occurrences with severity classification and/or causal factors;
o High-level data: no full reports and no detailed statistics, but aggregated data with no severity and no
causal factors published.
22
These are data resulting from the maturity surveys that have been run by an independent consultant on behalf of
the EUROCONTROL Agency in 2002, 2004 and 2006.

National ATM Regulators and ANSPs since 2002. Maturity scores reflect the presence of
the relevant safety processes and documentation. Maturity levels above 70% are
considered as acceptable at this stage.
3.6.2 While maturity assessments should be publicly available, the PRC only has access to dis-
identified information. The following analysis is therefore limited in scope.
ANSPs
100
2002
90 2004
2006
80
70
60
Maturity Score
50
40
30
20
10
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
REGULATORS
100
2002
90 2004
2006
80
70
60
Maturity Score
50
40
30
20
10
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Source: EUROCONTROL
Figure 29: Maturity scores for ANSPs and National ATM Regulators
3.6.3 As shown in Figure 29, the assessed safety maturity of ANSPs has improved from an
average of 55% in 2002 to 70% in 2006 for the EUROCONTROL Member States23.
While progress is clearly visible, with 12 more ANSPs showing acceptable safety
maturity levels, 19 ANSPs remained below acceptable levels in 2006.
23
Membership as of end-2006.

3.6.4 The maturity of National ATM Regulators24 is less satisfactory. The average level rose
from 52% in 2002 to 65% in 2006. The Safety Regulator in one State did not respond in
2006 and three others were still below the 40% maturity level. Only 14 Regulators were
at or above the acceptable maturity level (70%) in 2006.
3.6.5 It is important that safety maturity reaches acceptable levels in all ANSPs and National
ATM Regulators.
SAFETY TARGET
3.6.6 In the absence of other indicators on which quantified targets could be set concerning
ATM safety, the PRC fully supports the agreed target25 that all ANSPs and national ATM
regulators should reach the acceptable safety maturity level (70%) by the end of 2008.
3.6.7 Figure 30 shows progress made, and progress that has still to be made, to achieve this
target.
35
33 Regulators
30 30 28
25 ANSPs 24
22
19
20
15
10
5 Interim
target
0
0
2002 2004 2006 2008
Data source: EUROCONTROL
Figure 30: Number of ANSPs and Regulators with maturity score below acceptable level
3.6.8 This target is proposed as an interim target addressing safety processes. Achieving this
target is a prerequisite for reliable safety indicators across Europe, upon which safety
performance targets could be set.
3.7 Conclusions
3.7.1 This review of safety performance focuses on key issues in terms of ATM-related
accidents, incidents and maturity of safety processes. More details can be found in Safety
Regulation Commission and EUROCONTROL Agency reports.
3.7.2 There has been no ATM-related accident involving civil transport aircraft in 2006.
3.7.3 Incident reporting has improved significantly since 2001, which gives better visibility on
ATM safety issues, and more opportunities to prevent accidents. However, incident
reporting remains inadequate in a number of States.
24
This includes the EUROCONTROL Agency Safety Regulatory Oversight Unit (ASRO), as the safety regulator
for Maastricht UAC.
25
Paper PC/05/24/11 (November 2005) states: "The aim is to get all State ATM Regulators and ANSPs to a 70%
minimum maturity level". In adopting the ESP programme which ends in 2008, PC 24 (November 2005) agreed
to this target. The Safety team has since then confirmed that this target should be reached by end 2008. The SRC
has agreed that 70% represents a meaningful initial target capable of being reached within a reasonable timescale
(i.e. ESP timescales).

3.7.4 Based on a subset of 15 States with mature safety processes, there appears to be no
significant change in high risk incidents in the airspace in spite of growing traffic, which
is broadly in conformity with the “ATM 2000+” safety objective. The growing number of
runway incursion reports, apparently linked with improved reporting and classification
processes, indicates that high priority should continue to be given to runway incursions.
3.7.5 Safety maturity needs to reach a sufficient level in all States. This, inter alia, is a
prerequisite for safety performance review. The PRC fully supports the agreed target that
all States should reach the safety maturity level of 70% by the end of 2008. 24 regulatory
authorities and 19 ANSPs did not meet this maturity level in 2006.
3.7.6 Legal impediments to incident reporting continue to remain significant in many States.
EUROCONTROL, the States and possibly the European Commission should tackle legal
issues with the relevant priority.
3.7.7 Furthermore, the safety reporting culture still remains low in a significant number of
ANSPs and States. An improvement to this culture is equally important, even if it may be
more difficult to achieve.
3.7.8 Compliance with legislation, safety maturity assessments and other aggregate safety
information concerning regulators and ANSPs fall under the protection of a
confidentiality policy, namely EUROCONTROL’s publication and confidentiality policy
in relation to safety data (EAM 2/GUI 2 dated 12-11-1999). The PRC considers this
confidentiality policy to be over-restrictive.
3.7.9 Transparency on safety-related information needs to increase in a majority of States.

While preserving the confidentiality of individuals in the safety reporting process, States
and ANSPs have a public responsibility to show that their safety performance levels are
adequate.

PRR 2006 26
Chapter 4: Air Transport Punctuality/Predictability
4 Air transport Punctuality/Predictability
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 This chapter analyses the performance of the European air transport network in terms of
punctuality and predictability. It positions the contribution of ATM in this respect, and
considers how ATM could help improving air transport performance. New features
include a closer look at interrelationships between ATM, airports and airlines in
delivering air transport and ATM performance. Chapter 5 reviews ATM-related delays in
more detail.
4.1.2 Punctuality26 belongs to ICAO’s “Efficiency” Key Performance Area. It is essential from
a passenger’s viewpoint and a key determinant of airline and airport service quality.
Airport Airlines ANS
4.1.3 Air transport punctuality is the “end
product” of complex interactions Scheduling of operations
between airlines, airports and ANS,

from the planning and scheduling Punctuality
phases up to the day of operation, as
illustrated in Figure 31. Strong Performance on actual day of operations
network effects are expected in air
Airport Airlines ANS
transport performance.
Figure 31: Air transport punctuality drivers
4.1.4 Predictability is also one of ICAO’s Key Performance Areas. It addresses the strategic
ability of airlines and airports to build and operate reliable and efficient schedules, which
impacts both their punctuality and financial performance.
4.2 Air transport punctuality (on time performance)

KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATOR
4.2.1 Figure 32 shows developments in punctuality26 of the European air transport network.
After improvements between 1999 and 2003, overall punctuality deteriorated for the
third consecutive year: 21.4% of flights arrived late in 2006 (23.1% in US), up from
17.2% in 2003. Late departures increased by one third in the same period (from 16.4% to
21.9%).
100%
95%
16.4%
17.2%
17.5%
18.3%
18.2%
18.8%
20.2%
20.4%
21.4%
21.9%
24.8%
25.2%
90%
25.6%
26.9%
31.0%
33.8%
85%
80%
75%
83.6%
82.8%
82.5%
81.8%
81.7%
81.2%
79.8%
79.6%
78.6%
78.1%
70%
75.2%
74.8%
74.4%
73.1%
69.0%
Arrival 66.2%
65%
60%
Departure
Departure
Departure
Departure
Departure
Departure
Departure
Departure
Arrival
Arrival
Arrival
Arrival
Arrival
Arrival
Arrival
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Flights delayed by more than 15. min. compared to schedule

Flights within +/- 15 min. of schedule
Figure 32: Air transport departure and arrival punctuality
26
The generally accepted Key Performance Indicators for air transport punctuality are the percentage of late arrivals
(arriving later than 15 minutes after scheduled time) or the equivalent on-time performance (% flights arriving no
later than 15 minutes after scheduled time).
PRR 2006 27 Chapter 4 - Punctuality/Predictability

4.2.2 While very few flights depart early, some 6% of flights arrive more than 15 minutes
ahead of schedule (down from 7% in 2005). Early arrivals appear to be a problem at
some congested airports as they put additional pressure on airport resources: gates are
occupied longer than planned and additional resources are needed to cope with
unforeseen work load.
ANALYSIS OF ATM CONTRIBUTION TO AIR TRANSPORT PUNCTUALITY
4.2.3 To analyse ATM contribution to air transport punctuality, a high-level framework

addressing ATM-related areas was developed. The framework distinguishes between:
• Scheduling of operations (reference point for punctuality);
• Departure efficiency (pre-departure processes) resulting in departure punctuality;
and,
• Gate-to-gate efficiency, broken down into flight phases.
DEPARTURE ARRIVAL
PUNCTUALITY PUNCTUALITY
Scheduling of operations
(planned travel times, distances, etc.)
Departure efficiency Gate-to-gate efficiency

(Pre-departure delays) (observed travel times, distances, etc.)
Reactionary delays
Taxi-in efficiency
Taxi-out /holding
Local turnaround
TMA transit
efficiency
efficiency
efficiency
delays
Flight
(airline, airport, security, etc.) Off-block On-block

times times
Airport ATFM delays
En-route ATFM delays

Chapter 5 Chapter 6
ATFM Flight
delays efficiency
Figure 33: Framework for the analysis of ATM-related aspects in punctuality

Reactionary delays (e.g. late arrival of incoming aircraft) result from primary27 or
reactionary delays on earlier flights.
Local turnaround delays are caused by airlines (tight scheduling, technical, boarding,
etc.), airports (equipment, security, etc.) or other parties such as ground handlers. The
focus being on ATM performance, a detailed analysis of local turnaround delays is
beyond the scope of this report.
ATFM delays result from a mismatch between demand and available airport/en-route
ATM capacity. Aircraft are held at their origin through “ATFM slots”, which may
cause delays to the concerned flights. A detailed analysis of ATFM delays is provided
in Chapter 5.
27
Primary delay: Any delay, except reactionary delay.

DEPARTURE DELAYS
4.2.4 Figure 34 shows the trend of departure delays and a breakdown of underlying drivers.
69.0% 74.4% 75.2% 82.5% 83.6% 81.8% 79.8% 78.1% Departure Punctuality
35%
% of flights with departure delay > 15 min.
30%
25% 13%
20% 10% 9%
Primary delay
10% distribution (2006)
9%
15% 7% 7%
10% 6%
9% 10%
10%
9%
8% 9% 10%
8% 8%
79%
5% 12%
7.9%
5.6% 4.5% 1.1% 1.2% 1.1%
1.2%
2.1% 1.6% 1.4% 1.5% 1.6%
0%
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
En-route ATFM regulations due to ATC Airport ATFM regulations (weather, capacity)
Turnaround delays (airline, airport, etc.) Reactionary delays
Figure 34: Departure punctuality and delay causes
4.2.5 The proportion of flights delayed at departure increased by one third since 2003.
Turnaround delays - which are outside the control of ATM - and reactionary delays are
by far the principal drivers of late departures (respectively 45% and 43%). They are also
at the origin of increases in departure delays, while the proportion of ATM-related delays
remained essentially constant.
4.2.6 In 2006, turnaround delays constituted 79% of primary delays. They were also at the
origin of approximately the same proportion of reactionary delays28. Turnaround delays
were therefore at the origin of approximately 4/5 of late departures.
4.2.7 Late arrivals are very closely linked to late departures, as shown in Figure 32. Air
transport delays therefore originate principally from turnaround delays, i.e. from airport
land-side. In other words, air transport congestion is not in the air, but on the ground.
This is all the more surprising as the demand for capacity at major airports is rationed
through airport scheduling processes. This issue requires careful attention from
concerned parties.
4.2.8 ATM-related delays nevertheless account for approximately 1/5 of air transport delays
(in 2006, en-route and airport ATFM delays accounted respectively 12% and 9% of
primary delays). ATFM delays are not negligible and should be further reduced where
possible, even more so as they may propagate in the network as reactionary delays. This
is examined in Chapter 5. It is important to note however that not all ATFM delays are
attributable to ATM29.
4.2.9 Significant improvements in air transport punctuality would require a detailed analysis of
28
In a first approximation, the original causes of reactionary delays can be attributed in proportion of causes in
primary delays.
29
Causes of ATFM delays presented in § 5.2 include weather and other events which ATM does not control.

scheduling and operations at major airports, addressing airline, airport and ATM aspects.
Network aspects would also need to be addressed.
REACTIONARY DELAYS
4.2.10 Due to the interconnected nature of the air transport network, long primary delays can
propagate throughout the network until the end of the same operational day.30 Long
primary delays may not only affect the initially delayed airframe on successive legs but
- depending on airline strategies - also the operating schedule as other aircraft may be
required to wait for delayed passengers or crew.
4.2.11 Two main elements determine the level of reactionary delay:

a) the profile of the primary delays (time of day, length, etc.); and,
b) the ability built into the air transport system to absorb primary delay (buffers in
airline schedules, reserve aircraft, margins in declared airport capacity, etc.).
4.2.12 Strategies aimed at reducing the level of reactionary delay can therefore aim at reducing
or avoiding long primary delays and/or measures to reduce the sensitivity of the air
transport system to primary delays.
4.2.13 The sensitivity of the air transport network to primary delays can be measured using the
reactionary/primary delay ratio. The higher the ratio, the more sensitive is the system to
primary delays.
4.2.14 After a significant reduction between 1999 and 2003, the sensitivity of the air transport
network to primary delays has risen sharply, as shown in Figure 35. The
reactionary/primary delay ratio reached 76%31 in 2006, meaning that every minute of
primary delay resulted in 0.76 minute of additional reactionary delay, on average
[Ref. 19].
Sensitivity of the European air transport network to primary delays
0.80
ratio reactionary to primary delay
0.75
0.70
0.65
0.60
0.55
0.50
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
AEA data eCODA data
Primary delay includes local turnaround delays and en-route and airport ATFM delays
Figure 35: Sensitivity of the European air transport network to primary delays
30
The magnitude of the delay propagation effect on the air transport network depends on many parameters such as:
• time of the day (when was the primary delay experienced);
• length of the primary delay;
• aircraft utilisation (scheduled block and turnaround times);
• airline business model (hub-and-spoke versus point- to-point);
• contingency procedures to absorb primary delays;
• turnaround efficiency at airports; and,
• capacity demand ratio (airline load factors, airport and ATM capacity).
31
This ratio is lower in the US (59%).

4.2.15 The increased sensitivity to delays is most likely driven by increased aircraft and airport
utilisation levels. Tighter schedules bring increased resource utilisation, hence financial
performance, but make the system more unstable and reduce predictability. There is a
clear trade-off.
4.2.16 Scheduled turnaround and block times, as well as reserve fleet, play an important role in
reducing the impact of earlier delays, especially for carriers operating a hub-and-spoke
network. A wide variation of the reactionary/primary delay ratio can be observed among
airlines, reflecting different strategies and operating conditions.
AVOIDING LONG ATM-RELATED DELAYS
4.2.17 The value of reducing or avoiding primary delay varies with the time of the day and the
length of the initial delay. Reducing or avoiding long primary delays is most efficient in
the morning as such delays may propagate throughout the day. All stakeholders should
strive to avoid long primary delays, especially in the morning in order to keep the level of
reactionary delay to a minimum.
4.2.18 Figure 36 shows the distribution and causes of ATFM delays larger than 30 minutes
during the day.
ATFM delays > 30 minutes
6%
% of total ATFM delays > 30 min.
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
0%
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
Airport ATFM delays En-route ATFM delay

Planned departure time (UTC)
Capacity-related ATFM delays Weather-related ATFM delays
Other ATFM delays
Figure 36: Distribution of ATFM delays > 30 minutes by cause
4.2.19 A significant proportion of long ATM capacity-related delays is observed in the morning,
including outside peak hours. Every effort should be made to ensure that ATM capacity
matches demand, especially in early hours of the day (e.g. earlier ATCO shifts).
4.3 Predictability of air transport operations

4.3.1 Predictability of operations at the scheduling phase (i.e. several months in advance) is an
essential element for airlines and airports in building reliable and efficient schedules.
Improved predictability enables airlines and airports to improve the punctuality/financial
performance trade-off.
4.3.2 To maintain schedule integrity and deliver satisfactory punctuality to their customers,

airlines include time buffers in their schedules and use reserve aircraft which improves
punctuality but which lowers resource utilisation and therefore profitability. Airport
scheduling also influences air transport and ATM performance [Ref. 20]. High value is
therefore attached to predictability32.
4.3.3 Predictability is one of ICAO’s Key Performance Areas. It is strongly affected by the
variability of operations. Predictability is measured in this report as the standard
deviation of departure/arrival times and gate-to-gate flight phases.
4.3.4 The analysis of operational variability in Figure 37 highlights several issues that have an
impact on air transport performance:
• Departure variability is the principal component of arrival variability. It is mainly due
to airline/airport processes and reactionary delays and to a lesser extent, ATFM
delays33. Moreover, there was a notable increase in departure time variability
between 2003 and 2006 (+2.7 minutes). Initiatives should therefore focus on accurate
departure times.
• It should be noted that the standard deviation of departure time (15 to 20 minutes) is
higher than the punctuality threshold (15 minutes). This means that punctuality is
jeopardised even before aircraft depart.
• Gate-to-gate variability - which is to a large extent influenced by ATM - is relatively
small and therefore has a minor impact on arrival variability. Its components (taxi
out/in, flight times) did not change significantly since 2002.
• Intercontinental flights from/to Europe clearly have different and somewhat higher
variability (e.g. influence of jet streams), as shown on the right-hand side of Figure
37. Intercontinental flights require specific processes.
Intra European flights (89%) Flights from/to Europe (11%)

27.5 27.5
25.0 25.0
Standard deviation (minutes)
22.5 22.5
20.0 20.0
17.5 17.5
15.0 15.0
12.5 12.5
10.0 10.0
7.5 7.5
5.0 5.0
2.5 2.5
0.0 0.0
waiting for
waiting for
Departure
Arrival time
Taxi out +
Taxi out +
Flight times
Flight times
Departure
Arrival time
(cruising +
(cruising +
Taxi in +
Taxi in +
holding
holding
terminal)
terminal)
time
gate
time
gate
Gate-to-gate variability Gate-to-gate variability
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Figure 37: Variability of flight phases
32
PRR 2005 estimated that approximately one billion euro per annum could be saved if half of schedules could be
compressed by 5 minutes (see PRR 2005 § 4.5.6).
33
In 2006, the departure variability was 16.9 min for intra-European flights without ATFM regulations, and 17.8
min. for all intra-European flights.

4.4 Improving punctuality and predictability
4.4.1 Today’s air transport system operates with wide time and flow margins. For airlines,
even short haul flights are considered as being on time if they are less than 15 minutes
late. At airports, it is not unusual to have up to 10 flights scheduled to depart or arrive at
the same time. In ATM, the departure window is 15 minutes wide (-5/+10 min.) if ATFM
regulations are in place, and 30 minutes wide otherwise.
4.4.2 Because of the high level of built-in variability, much flexibility is needed in the way the
current system is operated. However, this flexibility contributes to higher variability of
flight operations, thus creating some kind of vicious circle.
4.4.3 Improvements in air transport punctuality and predictability would require a

simultaneous tightening of airline, airport and ATM processes, and imply some coupling
between them. This section outlines some fields of action towards such improvements.
REDUCING DEPARTURE TIME VARIABILITY
4.4.4 As illustrated in Figure 34 and Figure 37, punctuality and variability are largely driven by
departure delays. Priority should be given to improving adherence to scheduled departure
times, which requires a collaborative effort from all actors, including ATM for ATFM
delays.
4.4.5 It is encouraging to see that SESAR plans to introduce a much higher degree of accuracy
in the execution of flights (4D business trajectories). Paradoxically, the highest
variability is currently before departure and on the ground (tens of minutes). Accurate
management of departure and taxi times would need to be part of the SESAR concept.
MAKING BEST USE OF EXISTING AIRPORT CAPACITY
4.4.6 Airport capacity is one of the most critical factors in future air transport growth [Ref. 21].
Increasing airport capacity through new infrastructure or improved systems and
procedures is of course one option to improve the punctuality and predictability of air
transport. This is however beyond the scope of this report. This part focuses on making
best use of existing airport capacity, while minimising delays and related costs.
4.4.7 Whereas en-route capacity is due to accommodate demand in typical busy hours (ATM
2000+ Strategy [Ref. 5]), demand at congested airports must be adapted to available
capacity if delays are to remain at acceptable levels.
4.4.8 At coordinated airports in Europe, demand is rationed in the strategic phase through the
airport capacity declaration process34 and the subsequent airport slot allocation process
[Ref. 22]. Airport scheduling represents a (commercial) trade-off between airport
capacity utilisation (runway utilisation ratio35) and service quality (ground and airborne
holding).
4.4.9 Future ATM strategies and improvement programmes should seek to maximise the use of
airport capacity whilst minimising delays. ATM can improve the airport capacity/delay
trade-off. This requires a coordinated approach of all stakeholders (see also Figure 38):
a) Collaborative effort from all actors to reduce the variability of operations (notably
departure delays) to a minimum.
b) A more integrated (gate-to-gate) flow management approach spanning from the
departure airport (push-back, taxi and take-off), the en-route, terminal and landing
phases, so as to ensure a more continuous and accurate traffic flow into airports (e.g.
34
Analysing the adequacy and efficiency of the airport scheduling process is beyond the scope of this report.
35
Ratio between the scheduled runway capacity and the peak arrival capacity.

Required Time of Arrival, wake vortex monitoring).
c) Some en-route capacity headroom so as to ensure that the en-route ATM system does
not unduly constrain the use of airport capacity, and actively contributes to the
optimisation of traffic flows into airports.
d) The delivery of airport throughput close to declared capacity under most weather
conditions (longer term goal).
Airspace users ATM Airports

• Reduce airline- • Deliver En-route and TMA • Accurate and realistic capacity
related operational capacity as necessary declaration at commonly agreed
delays (pre-departure including the management of levels of delay;
delays); unexpected traffic peaks;36 • Reduce airport-related
• Plan realistic • A more integrated (gate-to- operational delays (pre-departure
turnaround times. gate) flow management delays);
approach to manage arrival • Delivery of airport throughput
flows into airports; close to declared capacity under
• Sustain declared airport most weather conditions (longer
capacity in most weather term goal).
operations (reduce weather
related capacity degradation
to a minimum) [Ref. 23].
Figure 38: Initiatives for reducing air transport system variability
OPTIMISING THE GROUND VS AIRBORNE HOLDING TRADE-OFF
4.4.10 While ATC sequencing results in flight inefficiencies (vectoring, holding, speed
limitations), aircraft subject to ATFM regulations are held at the departure airports.
Holding on the ground is more economic than in the air and enables considerable
environmental savings, estimated at 1.1 million tonnes of CO2 per annum [Ref. 24].
4.4.11 However, due to uncertainties in the system (weather, take-off window, etc), not all
delays should be absorbed on the ground, and there is a trade-off between airborne and
ground holding.37 This trade-off would need to be better understood.
36
See NATS ATM Service Strategy, July 2005.
37
“In order to minimise the sum of ground and airborne delay costs in a system with uncertainty, the aircraft should
be held on the ground until the probability that further (airborne) delay will be incurred by releasing the aircraft
equals the ground/air delay cost ratio... A decision maker who perceives ground holding to be inexpensive
compared with airborne holding will hold the aircraft on the ground until he feels very confident that all delays
have been absorbed. An operator who feels that ground and airborne holding costs are equal will release an
aircraft when there is the slightest probability of being able to land without further delay at destination.”(Source:
ATC Quarterly)

AIR TRANSPORT NETWORK CO-ORDINATION
4.4.12 Figure 39 illustrates the interdependence of airport/airline performance and ATM

performance.
Network delivery
(volume and variability
of TMA entry flow)
TMA
Departure time
variability Arrival time
variability
Reactionary
Departure airport Arrival airport
delays Pre-departure Airborne
delays holding
Local Landing interval
turnaround En-route
(actual throughput)
delays ATFM delays Airport
Management of
scheduling
arrival flows
(utilisation ratio)
Airport
ATFM delays
Figure 39: Linking variability of operation and airport scheduling levels

• Airport and airlines operations put specific performance requirements on ATM. For
example, the high variability of departure times, mostly due to airport and airlines (see
Figure 34), implies a high degree of flexibility in ATM. This may be detrimental to its
efficiency.
• Airport and airlines scheduling influences ATM performance. For example, airborne
holding in terminal areas is sensitive to the runway utilisation ratio, i.e. airport
scheduling. Annex V quantifies this influence in a simplified case.
• Conversely, ATM influences airport/airline performance. ATM-related delays have a
negative impact on air transport punctuality, which should be reduced as far as possible.
But ATM could also have a positive impact on air transport performance. For example,
the delay/capacity trade-off faced by airport scheduling committees is influenced by the
smoothness of arrival and landing flows, as illustrated in Annex V.
4.4.13 The opportunity of added value from ATM in air transport is currently underexploited.
ATM currently has no mandate and very limited scope to help improve punctuality and
predictability. Initial measures where ATM could help in this respect include:
a) Better coordination between airport scheduling process and the way the arrival traffic
flow is managed by ATM;
b) Introduction of a “serve by schedule” bias (e.g. for airborne holdings and for the
allocation of ATFM slots). In the US, such a schedule bias is already applied to
prioritise flights during ground holding programmes; and,
c) Improved flexibility offered to airlines to swap ATFM slots of arrival flights
according to their business needs. This requires some en-route capacity headroom, so
that each flight is subject to no more than one constraint.
4.4.14 The added value of all three measures should be further investigated, lessons learnt
should be carefully examined, and best practices applied where possible. This would
require decisions to be taken concerning priority rules, possibly resulting in new SES
regulation or implementing rules. Co-operative decision making (CDM) and the network
management function would need to be developed accordingly.
4.4.15 More profound changes can however be anticipated in the longer term. The ACARE
[Ref. 25] punctuality target (99%) is well beyond current performance levels (78%).

4.4.16 Better schedule accuracy and execution would improve the airport capacity/delay trade-
off, resulting in less holding, fuel burn, noise and emissions for a given level of traffic.
Associated environmental benefits are not quantified yet, but expected to be very
significant.
4.4.17 Airport, airline and ATM planning and operational processes would need to be much
more tightly coupled in order to reach such performance levels (i.e. linking ATM, airport
and airline scheduling at system level). CDM would have to be extended and some form
of air transport network management may well be required, addressing planning,
scheduling and operations of airlines, major airports and ATM.
4.5 Conclusions
4.5.1 Arrival punctuality (on time performance) of scheduled air transport deteriorated for the
third consecutive year. Late arrivals have increased by one fourth since 2003, reaching
21.4% in 2006 (23.1% in US). Late departures increased by one third in the same period.
4.5.2 Delays originate principally from airline/airport turnaround processes (79% of primary
departure delays). Efforts should focus on these processes, which are outside the scope of
ATM. ATM also has a role to play by reducing ATFM delays where possible (21% of
primary delays).
4.5.3 The European air transport network is increasingly sensitive to reactionary delays (due to
late arrival of earlier flights). On average, every minute of primary delay resulted in 0.76
minute of reactionary delay in 2006 (up from 0.54 in 2003). The increased sensitivity is
most likely driven by increased aircraft and airport utilisation levels, not compensated by
adequate processes, which brings more variability in the air transport system.
4.5.4 This growing variability has a negative impact on predictability, i.e. the ability of airlines
and airports to build and operate reliable and efficient schedules. Improved predictability
enables airlines and airports to improve the punctuality/financial performance trade-off.
Standard deviations of departure and arrival times reached 18 and 20 minutes
respectively (~ +2.7 minutes vs. 2003). Pre-departure processes play a main role in this
poor predictability, and ATM only a minor role.
4.5.5 Air transport punctuality and predictability could be improved in several ways:
• Priority should be given to improving adherence to scheduled departure times, which

requires a collaborative effort from all actors, including ATM for ATFM delays;
• Future ATM strategies and improvement programmes should seek to maximise the
use of airport capacity whilst minimising delays. ATM can improve the airport
capacity/delay trade-off. This requires a coordinated approach of all stakeholders,
improved involvement of ATM in the scheduling of major airports, a more integrated
(network) flow management strategy to deliver accurate TMA entry times and
landing intervals, CDM, a reduction of the capacity gap between good and bad
weather conditions, some en-route capacity headroom, etc.;
• Optimising the ground vs. airborne holding trade-off.
4.5.6 Today’s air transport system operates with wide margins (Punctuality margins and
ATFM slots are 15 minutes). The ACARE punctuality target (99%) is demanding. Such
improvements in air transport punctuality and predictability would require a
simultaneous tightening of airline, airport and ATM processes, and imply some coupling
between them, i.e. some form of air transport network coordination.

Chapter 5: ATFM Delays
5 ATFM delays
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 This chapter reviews Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) delays originating from en-
route and airport capacity restrictions, capacity-demand balancing and ATFM
performance.
5.1.2 One of the main objectives of the ATM 2000+ Strategy [Ref. 5] is the provision of
sufficient capacity to accommodate demand in typical busy hour periods without
imposing significant operational, economic or environmental penalties under normal
conditions.
5.1.3 When traffic demand is anticipated to exceed the available capacity in en-route control
centres or at an airport, ATC units may call for “ATFM regulations”. Aircraft subject to
ATFM regulations are held at the departure airport according to “ATFM slots” allocated
by the Central Flow Management Unit (CFMU). The ATFM delay of a given flight is
attributed to the most constraining ATC unit, either en-route (en-route ATFM delay) or
departure/arrival airport (airport ATFM delay). In 2006, total ATFM delays accounted
for 21% of all primary departure delays (see Chapter 4).
5.1.4 The imbalance between traffic demand and available capacity and resulting ATFM
delays can have various ATM-related (staffing, etc.) and non-ATM related reasons
(weather, airport scheduling, etc.). A clear cut allocation between ATM and non-ATM
related causes is difficult, especially in the airport environment. While ATM is not
always the root cause of the problem, the way the situation is handled by ATM can have
a significant influence on the overall level of delay.
5.2 ATFM delays

PERFORMANCE - SUMMER 2006
5.2.1 The Provisional Council set the following target in April 2001: “to reduce progressively
to a cost-optimum average ATFM delay of one minute per flight en route by the Summer
2006, as a basis for the cooperative planning and provision of capacity”.
6 Summer (May-October) 6 000
5 5 000
Flights in Summer ('000)
4 Target: 1.0min/flight 4 000

minutes per flight
Actual: 1.4min/flight
3 3 000
En route
target En route
2 optimum
2 000
1 1 000
2.9 4.1 5.5 3.6 3.1 1.8 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4
0 0
0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.8
-1 -1 000
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
En-route ATFM delay per flight (May-Oct.)

Airport ATFM delay per flight (May-Oct.)
source : EUROCONTROL/CFMU
Figure 40: ATFM delays and en-route delay target
PRR 2006 37 Chapter 5 - ATFM Delays

5.2.2 After significant improvements between 1999 and 2004, average en-route ATFM delays
show a slow increase between 2004 and 2006, however limited in view of relatively
strong traffic growth (+4.1% in 2006), special events, and high weather-related delays
(see Figure 45).
5.2.3 The average en-route ATFM delay increased from 1.3 minutes to 1.4 minutes per flight
in 2006. Therefore, the en-route ATFM performance target set by the Provisional
Council (1 min. per flight) was not met.
TOTAL ATFM DELAYS
5.2.4 After a significant increase of 17.6% in 2005, total ATFM delays have further increased
by 4.6% in 2006 (see Figure 41), due to increasing en-route ATFM delays. Airport
ATFM delays decreased slightly, but remain relatively high.
FULL YEAR source: EUROCONTROL SUMMER (May-Oct)
Year Traffic ATFM delays Average ATFM delay per flight
% of flights
Traffic Total ATFM En route Airport Target
Average Daily with ATFM Total ATFM Total delay En route
Volume (km) delays ATFM delays ATFM delays en-route
Traffic delays > delays (min) (min/flight) (min/flight)
index* index (min) (min) (min/flight)
15min
1997 19 658 100 7% 20.9M 100 15.5M 5.4M 3.7 2.9
1998 20 681 107 9% 27.4M 131 21.7M 5.7M 5.0 4.1
1999 22 064 116 12% 43.3M 207 36.3M 7.0M 6.3 5.5
2000 23 071 122 9% 31.9M 152 24.4M 7.4M 4.5 3.6
2001 23 001 123 8% 27.6M 132 20.8M 6.8M 3.9 3.1
2002 22 567 121 9% 18.0M 86 11.9M 6.0M 2.5 1.8 2.5
2003 23 197 126 6% 14.8M 71 8.0M 6.8M 1.8 1.2 2.1
2004 24 238 134 4% 14.9M 71 7.6M 7.3M 1.9 1.2 1.7
2005 25 244 142 4% 17.6M 84 8.9M 8.7M 2.2 1.3 1.4
2006 26 286 149 5% 18.4M 88 10.2M 8.2M 2.2 1.4 1
*For States participating in the EUROCONTROL Route Charges System in 1997
Figure 41: Key European traffic and delay data
5.2.5 Due to the decrease in airport ATFM delays and the rise in en-route ATFM delay in
2006, the relative share of en-route ATFM delays has increased to 56% of all ATFM
delay in 2006.
Airport ATFM delays En-route ATFM delays

1997 26% 74%
1997 51% 14% 79% 1997

1998 21% 79%
1998 64% 30% 95% 1998
1999 16% 84%
1999 55% 34% 89% 1999
2000 53% 36%

2000 23% 77% 88% 2000
2001 46% 41% 2001 25% 75% 87% 2001

2002 44% 50% 77% 2002
2002 34% 66%
2003 47% 43% 77% 2003
2003 46% 54%
2004 47% 46%
80% 2004
2005 49% 43% 2004 49% 51%
74% 2005
2006 47% 44%
2005 49% 51% 72% 2006
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100
% 2006 44% 56% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100
%
ATC + Aerodrome capacity 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% ATC capacity/ staffing
Weather Weather
Other Airport ATFM delay Other
En-route ATFM delay source: EUROCONTROL
Figure 42: ATFM delay distribution by delay reason

5.2.6 Airport operations are strongly affected by weather, especially when they are close to
capacity limit. Hence, weather-related ATFM delays play an important role at airports
where they account for almost half of all airport ATFM delay. Figure 42 shows also a
continuous increase in weather-related en-route ATFM delays over the past years.
5.2.7 Whereas long en-route ATFM delays (>15 minutes) increased noticeably for the second
consecutive year, long airport ATFM delays decreased in 2006 (see Figure 43).
5.2.8 In 2006, only 5% of all IFR flights suffered ATFM delays longer than 15 minutes, but
generated 78% of all ATFM delays in 2006.
10
9 Airport ATFM delay
Million minutes of ATFM delay
8 En-route ATFM delay
7 Total ATFM delay
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
01-15 16-30 31-45 46-60 > 60
source: EUROCONTROL
Figure 43: ATFM delay distribution by length of delay
COST OF ATFM DELAYS
5.2.9 Long delays cause most disruption in aircraft operations and generate highest delay costs.
Costs of delays on the ground (engine off) were estimated in 2004 to be close to zero for
delays shorter than 15 minutes and €72 per minute on average for delays longer than 15
minutes38 [Ref. 26]. These costs mainly arise from crew costs, passenger compensation
and passenger opportunity costs. Inevitably, there are margins of uncertainty in this €72
estimate, so this figure should be handled with care.
5.2.10 Figure 44 shows an approximation of total “tactical” costs incurred by airspace users due
to ATFM delays and associated reactionary delays. The “strategic” costs of buffers
included in airline schedules are not included in this calculation.
38
This estimate includes direct costs, the network effect (i.e. the costs of reactionary delays that are generated by
primary delays) and the opportunity cost to an airline of lost passengers. The passenger opportunity costs
represent an estimate of the value an airline places on passenger loyalty in order to avoid the loss of future
earnings.

Total ATFM ATFM Delays > 15 minutes Estimated cost of ATFM delays (Euro)
Year
delays (min.)
En-route Airport Total En-route Airport Total
2001 27.6 M 16.2 M 5.7 M 21.9 M €1150 M €400 M €1550 M
2002 18.0 M 9.0 M 4.9 M 13.9 M €650 M €350 M €1000 M
2003 14.8 M 5.7 M 5.5 M 11.2 M €400 M €400 M €800 M
2004 14.9 M 5.3 M 5.9 M 11.3 M €400 M €400 M €800 M
2005 17.6 M 6.6 M 7.1 M 13.6 M €500 M €500 M €1000 M
2006 18.4 M 7.7 M 6.7 M 14.4 M €550 M €500 M €1050 M
source: EUROCONTROL
Figure 44: Estimated ATFM delay costs (including reactionary)
5.3 ATFM delay targets

5.3.1 The delay target set in 2001 by the Provisional Council (§ 5.2.1) applies only to system
wide en-route ATFM delay and is not specified beyond 2006, which makes a review of
the ATFM delay target necessary.
5.3.2 At the time it was set, the delay target was considered to be very challenging. Joint
efforts towards increased capacity and the temporary reduction of traffic in 2001-2002
led to remarkable improvements in ATFM delays, even faster than originally anticipated.
5.3.3 It is important to note that those improvements were achieved through Pan-European
coordination and cooperation, generally without any form of regulation, incentives or
sanctions. This is certainly one of the least intrusive ways to improve performance.
5.3.4 Although ATCO productivity and capital expenditure are better described in ANSP
benchmarking reports [Ref. 27], there is still no precise understanding of the marginal
cost of capacity, and there is still spare capacity in many parts of the European ATM
system, with virtually nil marginal cost. The notion of economic optimum on which the
en-route target was based cannot therefore be much refined at this stage.
5.3.5 As the one minute en-route delay target is commonly accepted, proven to be achievable,
and widely considered as a satisfactory performance level, the PRC proposes to maintain
the target of one minute per flight for the European average en-route ATFM delay.
5.3.6 In order to account for differences in the performance of individual ACCs, the benefit of
developing complementary performance targets for ACCs should be evaluated. The
performance indicator used in Figure 46 (maximum number of days with average en-
route ATFM delay larger than one minute) is consistent with the ATM 2000+ Strategy
objective, “to provide sufficient capacity to accommodate the demand in typical busy
hours”.

5.4 En-route ATFM delays
5.4.1 This section provides an overview of the en-route ATFM delay situation including an
analysis of the most penalising en-route centres in 2006.
5.4.2 Figure 45 shows a distribution of en-route ATFM delays by delay cause for 2006 and the
total level of en-route ATFM delay in comparison.
Weekly en-route ATFM delay distribution Annual

700 12 000
600 10 000
En-route ATFM delay ('000)
500
8 000
400
6 000
300
4 000
200
2 000
100
0 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
2004
2005
2006
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
ATC capacity (2006) ATC industrial action (2006)

ATC staffing (2006) Weather (2006)
Other (2006) Total en-route ATFM delay (2005) source: EUROCONTROL
Figure 45: Weekly distribution of en-route ATFM delays
5.4.3 Total en-route ATFM delay increased for the third consecutive year in 2006. ATC
industrial action in France in March-April, effects of the FIFA football world cup in
June-July and an unusually high level of weather related en-route ATFM delays during
the summer are clearly visible.
5.4.4 Overall, special events such as the FIFA world cup (traffic 3% above normal in
Germany, and nearly 1% above normal European traffic) and the security alert in London
in August 2006 were handled well, with only moderate additional ATFM delays.
ACC PERFORMANCE
5.4.5 Figure 46 shows the evolution of the number of congested39 ACCs between 1999 and
2006. After an increase of congested ACCs between 2002 and 2005, a slight decrease can
be observed in 2006. There was however a further increase in the number of highly
congested ACC in 2006.
5.4.6 The most constraining ACCs in 2006 were Zagreb, Zurich, Madrid, Warsaw, Barcelona
and Prague (see Figure 46). Together, those six highly congested ACCs accounted for
65% of all ATFM en-route delays in 2006.
39
ACCs with more than 30 days of average ATFM en-route delay > 1 minute.

Nr. of ACCs
30
25
En-route
ACC Days
8 Milano 32
delay ('000)
188
20 Manchester 41 272
11 Sevilla 42 145
13 Bodo 43 78
15 Canarias 44 96
Copenhagen 46 176
London ACC 55 1 133
10 12 9 Geneva 57 402
18 Nicosia
Prague
74
106
165
495
13 10 Barcelona 112 694
5 10 5 6 Warsaw
Madrid
133
143
468
946
6 Zurich 168 912
2 2 2 4 Zagreb 179 472
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Congested (>30 days with average en-route delay >1 min.)

Highly congested (>100 days with average en-route delay >1 min.)
source: EUROCONTROL
Figure 46: ACC congestion

5.4.7 Figure 47 shows the evolution of traffic and en-route ATFM delays for the 15 most
congested ACCs in 2006.
1 200 1 min.
London ACC
2004 2005 2006
1 000 Madrid 0.5 min.

Zurich
ATFM en-route Delay ('000 minutes)
800
Barcelona
Warszawa
600 Geneva 0.3 min.
Prague
ATFM delay
Average
Zagreb
400
Copenhagen
Nicosia
Manchester
Canarias
200 Milano
Sevilla
Bodo
0
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
IFR flights ('000) source: EUROCONTROL
Figure 47: Evolution of traffic and en-route ATFM delays
5.4.8 Apart from genuine ATC capacity shortages, factors that led to the increase in ATFM en-
route delays included the introduction of new systems, staffing issues, weather and
infrastructure problems.

100%
Zagreb: Transition phase for the opening of the new
OTHER
centre). Significant reduction of en-route 90%
ATFM delay since September 2006. 80%
WEATHER
Zurich: Unsuccessful transfer of operations to UAC
% of en-route ATFM delay

70%
and subsequent staff shortages.
60% ATC
Madrid: Planned capacity increase did not EQUIPMENT
materialise. Lower en-route sectors in the 50%
vicinity of the airport “mask” airport related 40% ATC

STAFFING
delay.
30%
Warsaw: High traffic growth (+16%) and radar ATC
20% CAPACITY
problems.
10%
AERODROME
Barcelona: ATC capacity and staffing issues. 0%
CAPACITY
Zagreb
Zurich
Madrid
Barcelona
Prague
Warsaw
Prague: ATC capacity issues. The opening of the
new centre in late 2006 is expected to
reduce delay levels over the next years. source: EUROCONTROL
Figure 48: En-route delay causes at the highly congested ACCs
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION
2005 2006
Figure 49: Map of ACC congestion (days with en-route delay > 1 min/flight)
5.4.9 Figure 49 shows the geographical distribution of congested ACCs in 2005 and 2006.
Geographically, en-route ATFM delays were not distributed in an equal manner across
the network.
5.4.10 The situation in Spain has further deteriorated and congestion in some of the Eastern
European States remains high.

EN-ROUTE CAPACITY MANAGEMENT
5.4.11 Figure 50 shows historic and forecast evolution of traffic volume, effective capacity40 and
en-route ATFM delay for the summer period.
300 30
Traffic volume (km)
275 Effective capacity
En-route ATFM delay 25
250
225
km index 1990=100
20
million minutes
200
175 15
150
10
125
100
5
75 Closing Widening Closing
capacity gap capacity gap capacity gap
50 0
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Figure 50: Matching capacity and demand (Summer)
5.4.12 The three-year gap in traffic increase following the September 2001 events together with
strong initiatives towards increased en-route capacity significantly reduced the gap
between traffic and effective capacity. Since 2004, capacity increase has not exactly
matched traffic growth, resulting in an increase of en-route ATFM delays.
5.4.13 Figure 51 shows that en-route

3
million minutes of en-route delay
ATFM delays originating Elementary Sectors

from combined41 sectors
2 Combined Sectors
start to increase again. This is
an indication of ATC staffing
issues and/or non-optimal 1
deployment of resources in
some centres. 0
Summer Summer Summer Summer Summer
5.4.14 The ACCs with the highest 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
level of delay from combined Top 25 most penalising en-route delay sectors
sectors were Zurich, Prague, so urce : EUROCONTROL
London, Madrid, Geneva, and
Barcelona. Figure 51: ATFM delays due to combined/elementary sectors
5.4.15 In order to avoid the recurrence of high ATFM delays, increased flexibility in managing
capacity and coordinated capacity planning at local and at network level to accommodate
traffic demand are essential.
40
Traffic level that can be handled with optimum delay (cf. PRR 5, Annex 6).
41
Maximum sector configuration cannot be exploited due to staffing issues.

5.5 Airport ATFM delays
5.5.1 The following section focuses on airport ATFM delays. Airport ATFM delays have
increased between 2002 and 2005 (see Figure 41), and continue to be a concern in 2006,
although there was a small improvement.
5.5.2 In order to evaluate ATM performance at airports, ATFM delays and the airport/TMA
performance (airborne holdings) need to be evaluated together. The extensive use of
airborne holdings and/or the systematic application of ATFM regulations at certain
airports indicate a potential for improvements.
100%
5.5.3 This section focuses on the
90%
fifteen airports which
80%
generated the highest
Cumulated share (%)

70%
airport ATFM delays in
60%
Europe in 2006. Figure 52
50%
shows that airport ATFM
40%
delays tend to be
30%
concentrated at a relatively IFR Flights
20%
small number of airports.
ATFM airport delay
In 2006, the fifteen most 10%
penalising airports 0%
1
15
29
43
57
71
85
99
113
127
141
155
169
183
197
accounted for some 70%
Nr. of airports
of all airport ATFM delays
and only 27% of IFR Figure 52: Concentration of airport ATFM delay (2006)
traffic.
5.5.4 Figure 53 shows the evolution of traffic and airport arrival ATFM delays for the 15 most
penalising airports in 2006. Despite high traffic growth, Istanbul (IST) managed to return
to a lower level of delay in 2006. Significant improvements are also noted in Zurich
(ZRH), Amsterdam (AMS) and Munich (MUC).
4 min. 3 min.
900
2004
800 2005
2006 Istanbul (IST) London (LHR)
ATFM airport arrival delay ('000 minutes)
700
Frankfurt (FRA)
Milan (MXP) Paris (CDG)

600 2 min.
Vienna (VIE) Munich (MUC)

ATFM delay
500
Average
Rome (FCO)
400 Madrid (MAD)
300 1 min.
Zurich (ZRH)
200 Heraklion (HER) Warsaw (WAW)
Brussels (BRU) Amsterdam (AMS)
100
Paris (ORY)
0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Arrival traffic ('000) source: EUROCONTROL
Figure 53: Evolution of arrival traffic and airport ATFM arrival delay

5.5.5 Most airport ATFM delays originate from the arrival airport (see Figure 54). A
noticeable exception is Paris Charles de Gaulle (CDG) where in 2006 some 15% were
caused by ATFM departure regulations.
5.5.6 Weather is an important driver of ATFM delays at the analysed airports, especially at
hubs operating close to capacity (FRA, LHR, CDG, AMS and MUC). A noticeable
reduction of weather-related ATFM delays in 2006 could be observed at Amsterdam
(AMS) and Munich (MUC).
% Weather
Total ATFM
delay ('000)
% of total
CODE
IATA
900
LHR 716 83% 8.8%
CDG/LBG* 700 62% 8.6%
800 FRA 672 89% 8.2%
MXP 627 24% 7.7%
VIE 535 20% 6.6%
700 FCO 464 33% 5.7%
MAD 388 32% 4.8%
Airport ATFM delay ('000 min.)
MUC 358 89% 4.4%

600 ZRH 249 39% 3.0%
ORY 243 41% 3.0%
IST 216 25% 2.6%
500 WAW 196 17% 2.4%
HER 159 0% 1.9%
AMS 152 89% 1.9%
400 BRU 152 45% 1.9%
71%
300
200
100
0
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
LHR CDG/LBG* FRA MXP VIE FCO MAD MUC ZRH ORY IST WAW HER BRU AMS
Airport ATFM arrival delay * Note: LFPG includes

joint regulations
ATC+Aerodrome Weather Others Departure Global (Arrival + Departure) with Le Bourget airport
Figure 54: Top 15 airports with highest ATFM airport delay by cause
5.5.7 There are also a number of airports with high ATC/Aerodrome capacity related delays.
This includes: Vienna (VIE), Milan (MXP), Rome (FCO), and Madrid (MAD).
5.5.8 ATC/Aerodrome related ATFM arrival regulations are applied routinely at some of those
airports. This situation seems to be suboptimal and may indicate a mismatch between
scheduling, airport operations and ATC capacity during certain periods of the day, a non-
optimal use of ATFM regulations or an improper use of airport slots.
5.5.9 Madrid (MAD) is a special case as airport ATFM performance needs to be seen together
with en-route performance in the vicinity of the airport (lower sectors), which has
deteriorated compared to the previous year.
5.5.10 Figure 55 provides a further breakdown of weather related airport ATFM delays by
cause. Frankfurt (FRA), London (LHR) and Amsterdam (AMS) were mainly affected by
wind whereas Paris (CDG), Munich (MUC) and Rome (FCO) were affected by reduced
visibility and fog. No weather related airport ATFM delays were experienced at
Heraklion (HER).

Weather related ATFM delays at the 15 most penalising airports in 2006
700
Airport ATFM delay ('000 min.)

600
500
400
300
200
100
0
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
LHR CDG/LBG FRA MXP VIE FCO MAD MUC ZRH ORY IST WAW HER BRU AMS
100%
80%
% of delay
60%
40%
20%
0%
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
2004
2005
2006
LHR CDG/LBG FRA MXP VIE FCO MAD MUC ZRH ORY IST WAW HER BRU AMS
Wind Visibility Note: LFPG includes joint regulations

with Le Bourget airport
Figure 55: Drivers of weather- related ATFM delays in 2006
5.6 ATFCM performance

5.6.1 Due to the complexity of interactions between airlines, airports and ANS, it is difficult to
assess overall Air Traffic Flow and Capacity Management (ATFCM) performance. Three
indicators are presently used to monitor overall ATFCM performance levels:
• Over-deliveries (excess demand42 > 10%);
• Delays due to inefficient regulations (filed demand below capacity); and,
• Slot adherence (% of take-offs outside the slot allocation window).
% of ATFM delays due to % regulated hours with actual % of take-offs outside the
inappropriate regulations demand/ capacity >110% allocated ATFM window
(no excess demand) (excess demand)
10.0% 15.0% 25.0%
12.5%
20.0%
7.5%
10.0%
15.0%
5.0% 7.5%
10.0%
5.0%
2.5%
5.0%
2.5%
21.3%
20.2%
21.9%
21.3%
10.8%
10.0%
10.7%
11.1%
0.0%
6.9%
8.7%
6.9%
7.1%
6.9%
9.4%
0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2002
2003
2004
2005
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2006
source: EUROCONTROL/ CFMU
Figure 56: ATFCM indicators
42
Excess demand: difference between the actual flow entering a resource (e.g. sector, airport) and the maximum
flow specified by the ATFM regulation.

5.6.2 Over recent years, the European ATM system is progressively becoming more proactive
and flexible in managing flows, using not only ground regulations, but also airborne flow
measures (re-routing, level capping, etc.).
5.6.3 At local level, many ANSPs in Europe have been working on developing measures to
dynamically adjust ATM capacity (configuration change, level capping, tunnelling, re-
routing, airborne holdings at airports, etc.). Only when those local measures prove to be
insufficient, ATFM regulations are implemented by the CFMU.
5.6.4 This evolution of the ATM system is positive and should be encouraged. However there
are two important points which need to be highlighted in this context:
a) The first point concerns the measure of performance. The impact of tactical
ATFM measures (re-routing, flight level capping, etc.) needs to be assessed and
evaluated along with ATFM delays in order to have a more complete
understanding of ATM performance.
b) The second point concerns the need for a consistent European framework.
Presently, the CFMU is sometimes not aware when local tactical flow measures
are applied (en-route and airport holdings) and it is important to close this
information gap. Furthermore, best practices developed locally need to be
identified and promoted and procedures need to be harmonized.
5.7 Conclusions
5.7.1 The growth of demand starts to outpace the provision of en-route capacity again. En-
route ATFM delays (1.4 minutes/flight) exceeded the agreed target (1 minute/flight). In
addition to specific circumstances (postponement of Swiss UAC implementation),
weather and staffing issues were the main contributing factors to increasing en-route
ATFM delays. In 2006, the most constraining ACCs were Zagreb, Zurich, Madrid,
Warsaw, Barcelona and Prague.
5.7.2 The ATFM delay situation improved at some airports such as Istanbul (IST), Zurich
(ZRH), Amsterdam (AMS) and Munich (MUC) in 2006. Nevertheless, airport ATFM
delays remain a concern at a number of airports such as Milan-Malpensa (MXP), Vienna
(VIE) and Rome (FCO), where a continuous high level of Aerodrome/ATC capacity
related ATFM delay was observed.
5.7.3 As the present en-route delay target is commonly accepted, proven to be achievable, and
widely considered as a satisfactory performance level, the PRC proposes that this system-
level target (1 minute/flight) be maintained for the coming years.
5.7.4 The development of more tactical ATFM measures should be encouraged. Best practice
should be identified and promoted within a consistent and coordinated European
framework.
5.7.5 Measures for the evaluation of tactical ATFM measures (including airborne holdings)
should be developed and analysed along with ATFM delays to have a more complete
understanding of ATFM performance.

Chapter 6: Flight-efficiency
6 Flight-efficiency
6.1 Introduction
6.1.1 Flight-efficiency is part of ICAO’s Efficiency Key Performance Area. It has horizontal
and vertical components, which can be split into en-route and terminal flight segments.
6.1.2 This chapter focuses on the horizontal dimension of flight-efficiency in the en-route
flight segment. Insufficient information is presently available to address flight-efficiency
in the vertical dimension and in Terminal Manoeuvring Areas (TMAs).
6.1.3 Trade-offs (flight-efficiency versus capacity, ground versus airborne delay43, etc.), as
well as the need to maintain safety, have to be considered in assessing flight-efficiency.
6.2 Key performance indicators and environmental impact

6.2.1 A high-level framework44 for the analysis of horizontal en-route flight-efficiency was
introduced by the PRC in 2005 (Figure 57).
6.2.2 Only flight trajectories outside the immediate terminal area (radius of 30 Nautical Miles
(NM)) are analysed. Hence, flights shorter than 60 NM are excluded from the analysis.
Circular flights returning to the departure airport are also excluded. Where the flight
departs or arrives outside Europe, only the portion of flight within European airspace is
taken into account.
Airport B Actual route 874.6 km

(A)
Direct route
D extension 4.0%
G 32.9 km
A En-route
Direct Course 841.7 km 5.9%
extension
(D)
48.6 km
TMA interface
1.9%
15.7 km
30 NM
Great Circle 826.0 km
Airport A (G)
Figure 57: En-route flight-efficiency indicators
6.2.3 The key performance indicator for horizontal en-route flight-efficiency is the route
extension. It measures the difference between the actual flight length between TMA entry
and exit points (A) and the great circle distance (G).
43
See §4.4.10.
44
The framework focuses on extra distance instead of extra time. The distance based approach has the advantage
that the great circle distance (G) can be used as a constant benchmark which is independent of travelling speed
and influence from wind. Distances shown in Figure 57 are averages for all origin-destination pairs in Europe in
2006.
PRR 2006 49 Chapter 6 - Flight-efficiency

60
50
route extension (km/flight)

- 2 km per flight
40
30
20
Direct en route
10 TMA Interface
Proposed target
0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Figure 58: Route extension
6.2.4 The route extension per flight has reduced by 0.6 km from 50.1 km in 2005 to 48.6 in
2006. However, as shown in Figure 59, the additional distance flown remained close to
440 million km, which is equivalent to 11 000 flights round the world per annum.
Direct TMA
Total 2005 Total 2006 2006-2005
extension Interface
Extension (%) 6.0% 4.0% 1.9% 5.9% -0.1%
Extension per flight 49.2 km 32.9 km 15.7 km 48.6 km -0.6 km
Additional distance 435 M km 298 M km 143 M km 441 M km 6 M km
Estimated costs to €2 130M €1 510M €720M €2 230M €100M
airspace users
Additional CO2 4.8 M tons 3.2 M tons 1.5 M tons 4.7 M tons -0.1 M tons
emissions
Figure 59: Economic and environmental impact of route extension
6.2.5 Overall costs to airspace users continued to rise due to increasing average jet fuel
prices45, and reached an estimated 2.2 billion Euro in 2006.
6.2.6 Route extension also has a direct environmental impact (emissions, fuel burn). Hence,
any flight-efficiency improvement benefits the environment. Figure 59 shows estimated
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions related to horizontal route extension.
6.2.7 In conclusion, ATM flight-efficiency is a major issue. The economic impact of horizontal
route extension on airspace users is estimated at 2.2 billion euro in 2006, to which
vertical and TMA inefficiencies have to be added. Moreover, the environmental impact is
also significant (4.7 million tons of CO2 per annum).
45
See Figure 16 in Chapter 2.

DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF FACTORS AFFECTING EN ROUTE FLIGHT-EFFICIENCY
6.2.8 Figure 60 shows a further breakdown of factors affecting horizontal en-route flight-
efficiency into ATC routing, route selection and en-route design.
Actual route 874.6 km

(A)
Direct route TMA
ATC routing extension interface Total
-1.0%
- 8.2 km ATC routing - 6.6 km - 1.6 km - 8.2 km
Route selection + 5.6 km + 3.1 km + 8.7 km
Filed Route 882.8 km En-route design + 33.9 km + 14.2 km + 48.1 km
(F) Total + 32.9 km + 15.7 km + 48.6 km
En-route
Route selection extension
+ 8.7 km 1.1%
+ 48.6 km
5.9%
Shortest Route 874.1 km
(S) Direct route TMA
extension interface Total
En-route design ATC routing -0.8% -0.2% -1.0%
5.8%
+ 48.1 km Route selection 0.7% 0.4% 1.1%
En-route design 4.1% 1.7% 5.8%
Total 4.0% 1.9% 5.9%
Great Circle 826.0 km
(G)
Figure 60: Breakdown of route extension (2006)
6.2.9 Of these three factors, en-route design is the principal one. It is addressed in more detail
in subsequent sections, and also in Chapter 7.
ATC ROUTING (AIRBORNE PHASE)
6.2.10 Improvement in the actual route flown (A) as compared with the filed route (F) is
approximately 1%. It results from tactical ATC shortcuts, including through shared
airspace thanks to Flexible Use of Airspace (see Chapter 7). In some instances however,
the actual route may be longer.
6.2.11 Those improvements are generally local improvements as the current concept of
operation and limitations in data exchanged between ACCs prevent direct routes being
given across several ACCs, and even more across several States.
6.2.12 Tactical ATC routings only partially alleviate inefficiencies produced by en-route design.
ROUTE SELECTION (PLANNING PHASE)
6.2.13 Route selection measures the extent to which the route filed (F) by aircraft operators is
longer than the shortest available route (S) joining the two TMAs. In some cases the
shortest route passes through shared airspace and may not be available at the time of the
flight. In other cases, the shortest route is passing through a congested area, and users
may prefer longer routes to avoid ATFM delays. Airspace users may also select longer
routes because of wind conditions or differences in route charges.
6.2.14 Given the complexity of the route network, of rules for its usage46, and of information on
route availability47, there would be added-value if the CFMU informed airspace users of
the existence or availability of shorter routes, where applicable.
6.3 Route design and usage

6.3.1 A sub-optimal design and use of the European route network is suggested: (i) by minimal
46
e.g. limitations specified in the Route Availability Document (RAD).
47
CRAM: Conditional Route Availability Message.

improvements at weekends and (ii) by the fact the European route network is less
efficient than the domestic route network.
MINIMAL IMPROVEMENTS AT WEEKENDS
6.3.2 There is minimal military activity during weekends, and virtually all airspace is available
for civil traffic in a predictable way. However, flight-efficiency does not improve
significantly during weekends, as illustrated in Figure 61.
6.3.3 PRR 2005 [Ref. 28] 5%

estimated that 4.1% 4.1%
3.8% 3.8%
improving en route 4%
horizontal efficiency
3% 2005
by one-third during 2006
weekends would 2%
generate annual
1%
savings in the order
of €130 Million and 0%
related environmental W eek Days W eek End
benefits.
Figure 61: Direct route extension - week/weekend
6.3.4 Chapter 7 is dedicated to a more detailed examination of the availability and use of
shared airspace48 (temporarily reserved for military activities).
ROUTE NETWORK: EUROPEAN LESS EFFICIENT THAN DOMESTIC
6.3.5 Figure 62 shows that domestic flights are on average 15% more efficient than intra-
European traffic. Furthermore, the relative difference is greater if one compares flights of
similar length (e.g. the route extension for an intra-European flight <400 km is almost
40% higher than for a domestic flight of similar distance).
Domestic Intra-European Domestic-AVG Intra-European-AVG
7%
Direct route extension (%)
6%
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
0%
0-400 km 400-800 km 800-1200 km 1200-1600 km 1600 -2000 km >2000 km
Great Circle Distance (between TMA)
Direct route
Additional.
great circle
Total extra
extension
per flight
of flights
category
Average
distance
distance
distance
distance
Number
% Total
% Total
flights
Flight
extra
Domestic 3.3 M 35% 303 km 12 km 39 M km 13% 4.0%

Intra-European 4.7 M 49% 958 km 44 km 194 M km 65% 4.6%
From/to Europe 1.5 M 16% 1 528 km 43 km 62 M km 21% 2.8%
Over-flight 0.1 M 1% 1 614 km 59 km 3 M km 1% 3.7%
Total 9.6 M 100% 826 km 33 km 298 M km 100% 4.0%
Figure 62: Route extension on domestic and intra-European routes
6.3.6 This provides evidence that flight-efficiency of the European route network can be
significantly improved. Improving the efficiency of intra-European routes (representing
48
Airspace shared between civil and military users.

65% of the current extra distance flown) to the current level of the domestic route
network would reduce the total extra distance flown by 10% to 20%, a saving of
€150 Million to €300 Million per annum.
6.3.7 This is also an indication that the European route network is significantly influenced by
national considerations, which is at odds with SES objectives. Connectivity of the
European route network would need to be ensured at pan-European level (e.g. by
adoption of convergence criteria as proposed in the PRC’s Evaluation of the Impact of
the SES on ATM Performance (see §1.7).
6.4 Limitations to improving horizontal flight-efficiency
6.4.1 While there are economic and

environmental benefits in improving
flight-efficiency, there are also
inherent limitations. Trade-offs with
capacity and the need to preserve
safety have to be taken into account.
CONSTRAINTS TO ROUTE DESIGN (STRATEGIC PHASE)
6.4.2 The difference between the shortest route (S) joining the two TMAs and the great circle
distance (G) is a measure of the impact of the en-route design. A certain level of route
extension is unavoidable to ensure safety and adequate capacity. Considerations include:
• Basic rules for sectorisation and route design. For safety reasons, a minimum
separation has to be applied between routes, and crossing points should not be
located close to sector boundaries.
Figure 63: Systemisation of traffic flows to reduce structural complexity
• Systemisation of traffic flows to reduce complexity. Structuring the traffic can be an

efficient way to reduce traffic complexity (see Figure 63). The systematisation of
traffic flows generates more ATC capacity at the expense of flight-efficiency.
• Strategic constraints on the route utilisation. Systemisation of traffic flows is
achieved through the route design itself (e.g. one way or specialised route) but also as
a result of a number of rules that govern the utilisation of the network. Those rules
are generally set by the local ATC unit to avoid excessive traffic complexity and/or
an excessive load in critical sectors. A compilation of those rules is made by
EUROCONTROL and published in the Route Availability Document (RAD).
• Interaction with major TMAs. Major TMAs tend to be more and more structured. As
traffic grows, departure traffic and arrival traffic are segregated and managed by
different sectors. This TMA organisation has a strong influence on the route structure
as over-flying traffic has to be kept sufficiently far away, or needs to be aligned with
the TMA arrival and departure structure (see Figure 64).

High proportion of
evolving traffic
Frankfurt
Paris TMA TMA
Departure
Madrid Arrival
Figure 64: Impact of TMA on traffic flows
6.4.3 In addition to those understandable trade-offs, there appear to be some ATM-related

shortcomings which unnecessarily contribute to increases route distance:
• Interconnectivity of national route networks: Although coordination exists at

European level, airspace planning remains under the authority of the States. The
European network is therefore affected by national airspace design (routes, sector
strategies) and by institutional constraints (FIR boundaries, etc.), which negatively
affect the efficiency of European route network (see Figure 62). This is contrary to
the principles of the Single European Sky.
Connecting efficient national route networks does not necessarily create an efficient
Pan-European route network49, as illustrated in Figure 65.
State B
State A State C
Figure 65: Interconnectivity of the European network
• Speed of change: Both traffic demand and airspace design are in constant evolution,
but at a different pace. Whereas new scheduled services between city-pairs may
appear at short notice, the adjustment of the route network takes considerably more
time and is sometimes impeded by local interests (e.g. in case of loss of traffic and
associated revenues).
• Lack of routes through shared airspace. This subject is considered in more detail
in Chapter 7 “Civil/Military Use of Airspace”.
COMPLEXITY OF EUROPEAN AIRSPACE DESIGN
6.4.4 The European route network is a very complex structure, which has been developed
gradually over time. Any proposed change needs to be thoroughly validated, which limits
the speed of change.
6.4.5 Moreover, Figure 66 shows that routings for some 2100 origin-destination would need to
be made nearly perfect in order to resolve 50% of the flight-efficiency issue.
Alternatively, the top 150 most constraining points would need to be removed to achieve
49
See concrete examples in Figure 64 and Figure 67.

the same result. Improving flight-efficiency is therefore a major undertaking.
100% 100%
Cumulative share of extra km generated

Cumulative share of extra km generated
90% 90%
80% 80%
70% 70%
60% 60%
50% 50%
50% of the flight 50% of the flight
40% 40%
inefficiencies are inefficiencies are
30% generated by 2100 30% generated by
20% origin-destination 20% 150 points
10% 10%
0% 0%
0 2000 4000 6000 0 200 400 600 800 1000
Number of origin-destination Number of constraining points
Figure 66: Distribution of additional distance flown
6.4.6 The concept of “most constraining points”50 has been introduced as a way to identify and
focus the attention on the most critical problems. Annex VI provides a list of the top fifty
most constraining points (which are responsible for 27% of the additional distance
flown).
6.4.7 Figure 67 shows one of the most constraining points (MOU in France). The actual routes
are marked in red and the theoretical routes for all flights affected by the constraining
point are shown in blue.
MOU
Figure 67: MOU: one of the “most constraining points”
6.4.8 This example shows how flows between England and South-Eastern Europe are
structured. This structure has been developed based mainly on safety and capacity
considerations. However, the extra distance flown due to this route structure is
50
The most constraining point is the point along the trajectory that contributes most to the additional distance.

220 000 km per annum, with significant economic impact (~€1 Million per annum) and
related environmental impact.
6.4.9 Investment in capacity in upper airspace (e.g. new upper sectors and routes) could well
be more than offset by flight-efficiency gains. The solution minimising the total cost to
airspace users, comprising both the cost of capacity (route charges) and costs of route
extension, would in principle need to be applied.
6.4.10 To date, airspace design has tended to focus on capacity. While there are limitations in
addressing flight-efficiency, this issue is of such magnitude that it calls for much more
attention and proactive resolution of problems. Capacity and flight-efficiency must be
addressed in a balanced way.
6.4.11 More generally, the feasibility of creating an efficient Trans-European network of upper
air routes aligned with major flows and independent of national boundaries should be
assessed.
6.5 Flight-efficiency target

6.5.1 At present, there is no agreed flight-efficiency target. Such a target would focus
stakeholders’ attention and would also serve as a test criterion for improvement
initiatives, such as the Single European Sky (see §1.7).
6.5.2 The foregoing sections show that there is scope for an improved design and utilisation of
airspace, which is the main issue for flight-efficiency. This is illustrated by the fact that
domestic route networks are significantly more efficient (approximately 15%) than the
European equivalent. Domestic route networks themselves are not optimum. Raising the
efficiency of the European network to the current level of the domestic networks would
therefore be a realistic target and yet would realise significant improvements.
6.5.3 Reducing the additional distance flown due to route extension by 15% to 20% within the
next 5 years would appear to constitute a challenging but achievable target. This would
correspond to a reduction of the average distance flown per flight by 10 km over five
years.
6.6 Conclusions
6.6.1 ATM flight-efficiency is a major ATM performance issue. The economic impact of
horizontal route extension on airspace users is estimated at €2.2 billion in 2006, to which
vertical and TMA inefficiencies have to be added. Moreover, the environmental impact is
also significant (4.7 million tons of CO2 per annum).
6.6.2 The strategic design and use of airspace are the main drivers for the route extension.
There appears to be room for significant improvements:
• Intra-European routes are significantly less efficient than domestic routes. If the
European route network was as efficient as the domestic networks, as one would
expect under the Single European Sky, €150 Million to €300 Million could be saved
every year.
• Only minimal improvements in flight-efficiency are observed during weekends, when
there are essentially no airspace restrictions. €130 million could be saved every year
if the route network was one third more efficient during weekends.
6.6.3 There are however practical limitations to the speed and magnitude of improvements in
flight-efficiency: the network is very complex, changes need to be thoroughly tested, and

thousands of city-pairs or hundreds of constraining points need to be addressed.
6.6.4 To date, airspace design has tended to focus on capacity. While there are limitations in
addressing flight-efficiency, this issue is of such magnitude that it calls for much more
attention and proactive resolution of problems. Capacity and flight-efficiency must be
addressed in a balanced way, so that the total cost to users, comprising the marginal cost
of capacity and cost of route extension, is minimised.
6.6.5 More generally, the feasibility of creating an efficient Trans-European network of upper
air routes aligned with major flows and independent of national boundaries should be
assessed.
6.6.6 A performance target should be adopted for flight-efficiency as a matter of urgency. It

would not only focus stakeholders’ attention, but would also constitute a success
criterion for successive reviews of SES implementation by the European Commission. A
decrease of the additional route extension per flight by 15% to 20% within the next 5
years would appear to constitute a challenging but achievable target.
6.6.7 The European dimension of airspace design, the need for a balanced approach to
capacity/delays and flight-efficiency, and for the avoidance of distortions to airspace
design linked with ANSP revenues, should be recognised in drawing up SES
implementing rules for route and sector design.

PRR 2006 58
Chapter 7: Civil/Military Use of Airspace
7 Civil/Military use of airspace
7.1 Introduction
7.1.1 “Shared airspace51” can be used alternatively for civil traffic52 and military activities53.
This chapter summarises the findings and conclusions of a forthcoming report
commissioned by the PRC [Ref. 29] on the usage of shared airspace, which was prepared
at the Provisional Council’s request.
7.1.2 This report addresses shared airspace in seven States (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Switzerland, and United Kingdom) above Flight Level 200 (FL 200) during
the busy part of the day (04h00-22h00 UTC, i.e. 18 hours), hereinafter called “daytime”.
There is high civil and military demand for airspace in these States, where 32% of upper
airspace is shared airspace [Ref. 30], as shown in Figure 68.
Potential demand by civil traffic (week)
traffic density
very low low medium high very high Core Area
Figure 68: Focus area for civil-military study
7.1.3 Airspace is a scarce resource. Therefore, it is vital that its usage is maximised. In order to
best satisfy both civil and military demand for airspace, EUROCONTROL has developed
rules and standards for the sharing of airspace known as “Flexible Use of Airspace”
(FUA) since 1984. The application of FUA principles and practices has been a major
enabler for ATC capacity increases and flight-efficiency improvements in Europe. A
short description of the FUA concept is available in Annex VII.
7.1.4 Efficient sharing and use of shared airspace results in:

• better flight-efficiency;
51
“Shared airspace” is a generic term used here to identify Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA) structures, such as
Temporary Reserved Areas, Temporary Segregated Areas, and Danger Areas.
52
For the purpose of this chapter, civil traffic is defined as IFR general air traffic (GAT).
53
Military activities conducted according to Operational Air Traffic (OAT) rules as defined by relevant authorities.
PRR 2006 59 Chapter 7 - Civil/Military use of airspace

• reduction of traffic complexity with potentially increased ATC capacity; and,
• better utilisation of available ATC capacity and consequently fewer ATFM delays.
7.1.5 The following sections focus on the “Core Area” outlined in blue in Figure 68, where
demand for airspace is highest for civil traffic, and high for military activities.
7.2 Allocation of shared airspace

7.2.1 Most areas54 affected by military activities are shared between civil traffic and military
activities during the daytime.
7.2.2 Figure 69 provides an average breakdown for the allocation and use of shared airspace in
the above-mentioned “Core Area”.
• On average, military activities are conducted 246 days a year. Airspace is therefore
fully available for civil use for the remaining 119 days;
• On the 246 days with military activity, the shared airspace is reserved for military
usage on average for 7 hours per day, of which 3 hours are actually used;
traffic with one day’s advance notice.
On average, shared airspace is therefore available for civil traffic 74% of the daytime per
annum in the “Core Area”. Airspace is generally even more available to civil traffic
outside the Core Area.
Days
Days fully
fully released
released
to
to civil
civil usage
usage
(i.e
(i.e weekends,
weekends, etc.)
etc.) Shared
Shared airspace
airspace
(119
(119 days
days -- 33%)
33%) NOT
NOT booked
booked by
by
military
military
Utilisation
Utilisation of
of (74%)
(74%)
shared
shared airspace
airspace Hours NOT booked and
(365
(365 days
days == 100%)
100%) not used by military
(11hrs - 41%)
Days
Days with
with military
military Hours booked but
activities
activities NOT used by military Shared
Shared airspace
airspace
(246
(246 days-
days- 67%)
67%) (4hrs - 15%) booked
booked byby
military
military
Hours booked AND used (26%)
by military
(26%)
(3hrs - 11 %)
Utilisation during the busy

period of the day
(0400 UTC and 2200 UTC
= 18 hours)
Figure 69: Military airspace utilisation in “Core Area” 55
7.2.3 It should be noted that ATC units can exploit on a tactical basis the airspace booked but
not used by the military, provided that airspace availability is notified few hours in
advance, and that airspace users and ATC are sufficiently flexible to adapt their
operations.
54
There are exceptions, e.g. the East Anglia MTRA area (North East of London TMA), which is used solely for
military activities during weekdays, i.e. not shared with civil traffic.
55
Booked time by military is the time allocated to military activities as published in the initial AUP (e.g. TSA,
CBA). See also KPI 4, “Efficient booking procedures in the Military KPI”, Pilot Project Final Report (2005).

7.3 Actual usage of shared airspace
7.3.1 Figure 70 shows differences between potential demand56 and actual usage by civil traffic.
The actual level of utilisation by the military was provided by the military authority of
each State.
Potential demand by civil traffic (week) Actual usage by civil traffic (week)
traffic density
very low low medium high very high Core area
Figure 70: Potential and accommodated civil demand (weekdays)
7.3.2 Figure 71 measures the ability to accommodate civil traffic57 and military activities
during weekdays (i.e. actual airspace utilisation).
ANGLIA
PORTSMOUTH
CBA-1
TRA-SOUTH
LAUTER
TSA20
TSA22
No data < 25%
Less than 3h 25%-50%
3h to 6h 50%-75%
Non Manageable >75%
Actual use by military Percentage of
civil demand accomodated
Figure 71: Actual usage of shared airspace by civil and military on weekdays (2005)
7.3.3 As shown on the left side of Figure 71, the actual level of utilisation varies among the
56
Civil traffic flying a theoretical profile based on the great circle route.
57
Comparison of actual observed routes with theoretical great circle routes between city-pairs.

shared airspace booked by the military. TSA-20, LAUTER and TRA-SOUTH are
extensively booked and used by the military, while CBA-1 and TSA-22 show a lower
level of utilisation. Only limited comparable data on the actual level of military
utilisation of the Portsmouth and Anglia areas in the United Kingdom were available, but
the level of utilisation was indicated to be high during weekdays.
7.3.4 The right side of Figure 71 provides an indication of the extent to which civil traffic can
be accommodated on weekdays with potential military activity. It is interesting to note
that some areas with a high military utilisation show a high percentage of accommodated
civil demand (LAUTER, TRA-SOUTH), which is clearly not the case for other areas less
used by the military (CBA-1, TSA-22).
7.3.5 Figure 72 examines to what extent civil demand is accommodated at weekends58, when
the shared airspace is fully released for civil use. During this time there is considerable
scope for improving civil use in all areas.
Increase in the percentage of

civil demand accomodated
<= 0%
0%-5%
5%-10%
>10%
Figure 72: Changes in civil utilisation of shared airspace between weekdays and weekends
7.3.6 However, whereas only a moderate increase is expected in areas which accommodate
already a considerable level of civil demand on weekdays (LAUTER, TRA-SOUTH), it
is surprising that there is little or no change in the level of civil utilisation of shared
airspace in CBA-1 and TSA-22, even when it is fully released for civil use at weekends.
7.4 Reasons for sub-optimal use of shared airspace

7.4.1 As outlined in Figure 73, the reasons (drivers) for sub-optimum use of shared airspace
can be divided into “primary” drivers (i.e. how the ATM system is strategically
organised) and “secondary” drivers (i.e. how it is operated).
7.4.2 The framework distinguishes between route density (i.e. the existence of routes), route
availability and route utilisation in flight planning (i.e. how much flight dispatchers and
flow managers use the available route).
58
Flight density comparison weekend against week = [(actual density weekend) / (potential density weekend)] –
[(actual density week) / (potential density week)]

7.4.3 The organisation of real-time operations refers to all system equipments, ATC
procedures and training programmes which are supporting the real-time management of
traffic and airspace on weekdays. It is recognised that civil-military system integration
(same ATM system, shared flight data, same traffic display) is the cornerstone of any
effective ATM civil-military arrangement [Ref. 2].
Use of airspace by
military activities
Primary Drivers Secondary drivers
Route
Performance
density
Route
gap
availability and
utilisation
Organisation of
real-time
operations
Factors driving sub-optimal use

of shared airspace
Use of airspace by
civil traffic
Figure 73: Drivers of sub-optimal use of shared airspace
ROUTE DENSITY
7.4.4 A fundamental requirement for maximising the use of shared airspace, under the current
mode of operation, is the existence of sufficient routes in shared airspace. If the route
density is low, the airspace utilisation will remain low.
7.4.5 Figure 74 shows that the route network density is low inside shared airspace, which is the
main reason why civil traffic does not efficiently use shared areas.
Week availability of conditional routes
during the period 04h-22h
Not plannable
Closed more than 9 hours
Open more than 9 hours
Permanent week and week-end
Airac 273 - FL300
Figure 74: Route network inside shared airspace in the Core Area
7.4.6 Especially in case of an increased route density, when no military activities take place
(i.e. at weekends), it is necessary to plan and to deploy the appropriate resource
configuration (ATC sectors, ATCOs, etc.) which arguably is quite a challenging request
in terms of ATM flexibility.
7.4.7 The lack of routes represents a loss of opportunity to reduce traffic complexity which has
a positive impact on ATC capacity and the potential to improve flight-efficiency.

ORGANISATION OF REAL-TIME OPERATIONS DURING WEEKDAYS
7.4.8 The organisation of real-time operations has a high impact on civil traffic and military
activities during weekdays. Where the organisation is not efficient, the impact of pre-
tactical operations59 on ATM performance remains unsatisfactory in any case.
7.4.9 The European Union has put an obligation on Member States to achieve an efficient
organisation of real-time operations. SES Regulation 2150/2005 (flexible use of airspace)
[Ref. 31] unambiguously defines obligations (see Article 6).
7.4.10 There are certain areas where the military booking period is more than six hours per day
and the real utilisation is more than three hours a day. For organising ATM civil-military
arrangements, it is therefore important to distinguish between areas where military
activities are an “exception” and areas where military activities are “regularly” present
during week days.
7.4.11 Provided there is a high level of integration and coordination at tactical level, a
significant share of civil demand can be accommodated on weekdays, even in areas
where military airspace utilisation is high. As a matter of fact, where the organisation of
real-time operations is efficient, there is a substantial positive impact on ATM
performance. Some good examples are:
• The shared use of Portsmouth Danger Areas (South UK): high technical integration
between RAF ATC, NATS and Royal Navy systems, sophisticated procedures of
airspace management and the proactive role of the Royal Navy in ensuring separation
between civil traffic and military exercises.
• The shared use of TRASOUTH in Belgium: technical integration, sophisticated ASM
procedures and the good interface between military activities, ASM, ATFM and
capacity management at ACCs. This rather innovative concept of operations was
introduced in July 2005. It resulted in a capacity increase at Maastricht UAC and in
an improvement in flight-efficiency. More benefits are expected from extending the
application of procedures to other shared areas and from integrating the airspace data
flow in Flight Data Processing (FDP) systems.
• The shared used of TRA LAUTER in Germany: further gains in terms of airspace
utilisation may be expected after the implementation of the new FDP system in Rhine
ACC.
7.4.12 While examples of good real-time operations can be identified in some areas, there is no
integration of the European civil-military network.
• It is noteworthy that there is not yet an exchange of airspace data between all ACCs
in the European Core Area. Where there is an exchange of data, it is generally not
integrated in FDP Systems.
• There is a lack of appropriate solutions to estimate the impact of opening routes
through shared airspace on downstream ACCs.
• At international level, military-military coordination still has margins of
improvement in order to increase airspace utilisation (both civil and military) from a
European viewpoint.
ROUTE AVAILABILITY AND UTILISATION IN FLIGHT PLANNING
7.4.13 Although routes are available during the full weekend, the airspace utilisation does not
59
i.e. route management and flight planning before real-time operations.

increase significantly (see Figure 72). This is mainly related to the low route density
inside shared airspace.
7.4.14 During weekdays, route availability can remain a limiting factor inside shared airspace:
• There is a gap in the order of 3 to 6 hours when airspace is not used by military and
yet not available for flight planning. This significant gap needs to be addressed.
• Some route categories [Ref. 32] are more efficient than others: the category CDR-1
allows more flexible operations for civil users than categories CDR-2 and CDR-3.
This could explain why CDR-2 are less and less used by airspace designers and the
relatively high route availability in Southern France, Italy and in the UK over the
North Sea where the CDR-1 route concept is applied (see Figure 75).
• Airspace availability is disseminated to aircraft operators on the day before
operations (i.e. the CRAM message issued by CFMU). However, it is not
continuously updated.
Week availability of conditional routes during 04h00-22h00
Airac 273 - FL300
Not plannable Closed more than 9 hours Open more than 9 hours Permanent week and week-end
Figure 75: Route availability in selected parts of Europe
7.4.15 In Southern France, Italy and in the UK (over the North Sea), the route availability is
higher than in other parts of Europe. The CDR-1 concept is applied: i.e. the route is
available for flight planning but closed by NOTAM and/or its avoidance is provided for
by tactical clearance.
7.4.16 Once routes are made Airspace

Airspace Flow
Flow
management management
available for flight management
decisions
management
decisions
decisions decisions
planning, their utilisation
is in the hand of flight
Airline
Airline Flight
Flight
dispatchers and flow Planning
Planning issues:
issues:
managers. Figure 76 Route
Route Route
Route ••Weather
Weather
illustrates the processes availability
availability Utilisation
Utilisation ••ATFM
ATFMdelay
delay avoidance
avoidance
••Route
Routecharges
charges
which link route •• Organisational
Organisationalissues
issues
availability and route
utilisation. Figure 76: Factors impacting on route utilisation

7.4.17 Between 50-60% of the interested traffic files a conditional route when it is available60.
Reasons why there is a low level of utilisation of available routes by civil traffic include:
• The route availability inside shared airspace is masked by other route constraints
such as RAD-type constraints;
• Low benefits for some flights: aircraft operators may not always re-route if the
difference in distance is small or when there are other prevailing reasons (wind aloft,
ATFM delay avoidance, etc.); and,
• Lack of resources: many airlines prepare flight plans based on fixed route catalogues
and do not have the tools/resources61 to benefit from shorter routes when available.
Aircraft operators often rely on tactical ATC routings.
7.4.18 The CFMU suggests re-routings primarily to avoid ATFM delays, and not to improve
flight-efficiency. Given the relatively high costs of flight planning, there may be scope
for the CFMU to play a role in assisting aircraft operators in route selection which in turn
would result in better utilisation airspace.
7.4.19 It should however be noted that extended route availability and improved route utilisation
by aircraft operators and CFMU will not create significant added value unless route
density is increased (i.e. new additional routes are designed).
7.5 Conclusions
7.5.1 The application of FUA principles and practices has been a major enabler for the
continuous ATC capacity increase and flight-efficiency improvements in Europe.
However, allocation and use of airspace could be further improved.
7.5.2 Shared airspace during daytime 04h00-22h00 UTC, which can be used alternatively for
civil traffic and military activities, is allocated as follows:
• On average, military activities are conducted 246 days a year. Airspace is therefore
fully available for civil use for the remaining 119 days;
• On the 246 days with military activity, the shared airspace is reserved for military
usage on average for 7 hours per day, of which 3 hours are actually used;
traffic with one day advance notice.
Therefore, on average, shared airspace is available for civil traffic 74% of the daytime
per annum in the “Core Area”. Airspace is generally even more available to civil traffic
outside the Core Area.
7.5.3 Although shared airspace is available for civil traffic most of the time, in fact it is under-
used for two reasons: (1) principally due to the absence of routes and (2) when routes are
available, due to the lack of flexibility of the ATM system (procedures, training
programmes, organisational issues) and/or aircraft operators.
7.5.4 Consequently, designing and managing more routes inside shared airspace is fundamental
to improving performance when military activity is absent. In addition, it is necessary to
enhance ATM and aircraft operators’ flexibility in using routes inside shared airspace
when available to civil traffic.
7.5.5 There is in fact little relationship between military airspace utilisation and the ability to
60
Quarterly assessment of CDR route usage made by the EUROCONTROL Airspace Management Sub-Group.
61
Considering the small number of conditional routes available, there is little incentive for airlines to invest
resources.

accommodate civil traffic. Experience in Belgium (TRA-SOUTH), in the UK
(Portsmouth area) and in Germany (TRA-LAUTER) shows that shared airspace which is
intensively used by military activities can also be extensively used by civil traffic where
there is good civil/military integration. It is therefore possible to reduce traffic
complexity, thereby increasing ATC capacity, whilst ensuring better flight-efficiency.
7.5.6 The organisation of real-time operations (systems, procedures, training) needs to be

strengthened at European level by applying best practices where necessary and by
enhancing the role of CFMU in disseminating airspace status and traffic load
information.
7.5.7 Information contained in the annual FUA report as specified by SES Regulation
2150/2005 (flexible use of airspace) will be essential to identify best practices. It would
be useful to identify a European forum which ensures the “cooperation for the efficient
and consistent application of the concept of flexible use of airspace across national
borders” as provided for by the same regulation.

PRR 2006 68
Chapter 8: Cost-effectiveness
8 Cost-effectiveness
8.1 Introduction
2005
8.1.1 ANS costs can be Gate-to-gate ANS costs (European level)
~€7 430M
broken down into En-route ANS costs Terminal ANS costs
ATM/CNS, MET, (European level)

~€5 870M
(European level)
~€1 560M
EUROCONTROL and
ATM/CNS ATM/CNS ANSP Benchmarking
payment to regulatory ~€5 000M ~€1 490M
analysis (Section 8.6)
and governmental
authorities. In 2005, the En-route ANS costs
MET
~€320M
MET
~€70M
last year for which analysis (Sections
8.2 - 8.5)
Payment to Payment to
actual costs data were regulatory & regulatory &
governmental governmental
available, total en-route authorities authorities
and terminal ANS costs ~€60M ~€2M
amounted to some EUROCONTROL
€7 430M. The bulk of ~€490M
ANS costs relates to the

provision of ATM/CNS Figure 77: Breakdown of gate-to-gate ANS costs at
services as indicated in European system level (2005)
Figure 77.
8.1.2 The aggregation of the en-route costs and traffic data provided by all the Member States
for the purposes of the Enlarged Committee for Route Charges allows computing the en-
route cost-effectiveness Key Performance Indicator (KPI) for the EUROCONTROL
Area. Since the en-route business represents more than 75% of the total ANS (see Figure
77 above) the focus of this chapter is mainly en-route. However, data on terminal ANS
available for the purpose of the PRC Information Disclosure also allows for the
underlying gate-to-gate cost-effectiveness KPI which is used to benchmark the
performance of individual ANSPs.
8.1.3 Section 8.2 presents the en-route cost-effectiveness KPI for the EUROCONTROL Area.
Section 8.3 provides further insights on performance targets for cost-effectiveness.
Section 8.4 describes each Member States’ en-route ANS unit costs over the 2002-2005
period and its forward-looking projections for 2006-2010. A more detailed analysis of the
main components (such as ATM/CNS, MET, and EUROCONTROL) is presented in
Section 8.5. Finally, Section 8.6 highlights the main results of the ATM Cost-
effectiveness (ACE 2005 [Ref. 33]) analysis which benchmarks ANSPs’ underlying cost-
effectiveness performance.
8.2 En-route cost-effectiveness KPI for EUROCONTROL Area

8.2.1 The en-route cost-effectiveness KPI is obtained by dividing the total real en-route costs
(i.e. deflated costs) used to compute the Route Charges by the number of kilometres
charged to airspace users. Figure 78 shows the changes in the cost-effectiveness KPI62
between 2002 and 2008 for the EUROCONTROL Area.
62
Note that the growth rates displayed in the last two columns of Figure 78 are computed for consistent samples of
Member States for which a time series was available (i.e. 30 over the 2002-2005 period and 32 over the 2005-
2008 period).
PRR 2006 69 Chapter 8 - Cost-effectiveness

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006P 2007P 2008P 05/02 08/05
Contracting States 30 31 31 32 32 32 32 30 32
Total en-route ANS costs (M€) 4 906 5 147 5 488 5 743 6 073 6 241 6 465 17% 13%
National costs (M€) 4 440 4 650 4 976 5 138 5 440 5 595 5 787 15% 13%
EUROCONTROL Maastricht (M€) 103 110 112 112 124 126 136 9% 21%
EUROCONTROL Agency (Parts I & IX) (M€) 364 387 401 493 509 521 542 37% 10%
Kilometre (Million) 6 293 6 581 7 047 7 472 7 823 8 119 8 399 18% 12%
Unit costs (Euro/km) 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.77 0.77 -1% 0%
63
Price index 1.109 1.133 1.157 1.182 1.208 1.234 1.261 7% 7%
Real unit costs (Euro2005/km) 0.83 0.82 0.80 0.77 0.76 0.74 0.72 -7% -6%
Figure 78: En-route ANS cost-effectiveness KPI for EUROCONTROL Area
8.2.2 Between 2002 and 2005, real unit costs decreased by -7% (i.e. around -2.6% per annum).
Compared to a few years ago when costs used to grow faster than traffic, this is
definitively an encouraging trend which indicates an improvement in the cost-
effectiveness of the European ANS system. The decrease in unit costs benefited from the
solid increase in the distance controlled (+18%), while total en-route ANS costs
increased by +10% in real terms.
8.2.3 Over the 2002-2005 period, EUROCONTROL Agency costs increased by +27% in real
terms, the establishment of the EUROCONTROL pension fund as of 2005 being the
essential driver for the increase (see §8.5.9 to §8.5.18 for a more detailed analysis of
EUROCONTROL Agency costs).
8.2.4 Between 2005 and 2008, as traffic is expected to increase faster (+12%) than total en-
route ANS costs (+6% in real terms), real en-route unit costs are forecasted to further
decrease by -6% (i.e. around -2.1% per annum) to a level equivalent to €0.72 per km.
0.9 250
A verage 1997-2003
0.8 220
PRC
proposed target
Euro 2005/ km
0.7 190
0.6 160
0.5 130
0.4 100
2006P
2007P
2008P
2009P
2010P
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Cost Per Km Total Costs (1997= index 100) Traf f ic (1997=index 100)
A ll States in CRCO system so urce : EUROC ONT R OL
Figure 79: Real en-route unit costs per km (KPI), total costs and traffic
8.2.5 Figure 79 displays the en-route cost-effectiveness KPI trend along with the notional cost-
effectiveness objective proposed by the PRC back in 2003 (a -14% reduction in unit costs
over a 5-year period from 2003 until 2008, i.e. an average yearly reduction of -3%).
63
EUROSTAT MUIC: Monetary Union Index of Consumer Price.

8.2.6 Projections show that the real en-route unit cost in 2008 would be at around €0.72/km
(2005 prices). This would indicate that the PRC’s proposed target for the European
ATM system will be nearly met if States/ANSPs respect their plans (see Figure 79). Such
an achievement would translate into cumulative “savings” of more than €2 billion
between 2003 and 2008 with respect to constant 2003 unit costs.
8.2.7 It is noticeable that in November 2006, for the purposes of the Enlarged Committee for
Route Charges, all EUROCONTROL Member States provided planned 5-years forward-
looking en-route costs. This is in line with the PC decision at its 25th Session (April
2006) to request “that every State provides its projected en-route real unit cost objective,
for the years 2007-2011 inclusive, to the EUROCONTROL Agency”. This information
contributes to improve the reliability and the consistency of the European en-route cost-
effectiveness KPI trend as computed in Figure 79 above.
8.2.8 The decrease of en-route unit costs at European level (see Figure 79) is often the result of
genuine performance improvements due to tighter cost management and greater cost-
effectiveness awareness. In some cases, the latter has led some States (e.g. Italy,
Switzerland) to implement ad-hoc transitional measures such as explicit subsidies, use of
special reserves, deferring of current costs for future periods, in order to stabilise or
decrease their chargeable cost-base and hence their en-route unit cost/rate. Although
these measures contribute to reducing the cost-base charged to airspace users, they are
not genuine performance improvements. If tighter cost control is not implemented during
the transitional period, unit costs/rates are likely to increase in future periods.
8.3 Performance targets for cost-effectiveness

MEDIUM TERM TARGET
8.3.1 Cumulated projections from Member States result in approximately 3% yearly reduction
in average real unit costs until 2010. This indicates that a Pan-European cost-
effectiveness target of 3% per annum is both reasonable and achievable.
8.3.2 Moreover, these planned reductions are in line with the strategic objectives of the ATM
industry until 2010, as stated in SESAR Deliverable 2 on performance targets (a -3%
yearly reduction of real unit costs until 2010 followed by a -5% yearly reduction until
2020).
8.3.3 The momentum has now to be maintained in order to secure the cost-effectiveness
improvements stemming from Member States' own plans and strategic design objectives
of the industry. It is therefore proposed to formally adopt a Pan-European cost-
effectiveness target of reducing the European average real unit cost by 3% per annum
until 2010.
8.3.4 Adopting this cost-effectiveness target would be of major economic significance since it
could lead to very significant savings. It is therefore of utmost importance that every
effort is made to meet this target.
8.3.5 In order to focus collective effort, this target should also be used as a performance
criterion for the European Commission’s triennial reports on SES implementation to the
European Council and Parliament. The next report is due in 2010 (see Section 1.8).

LONGER TERM TARGET
8.3.6 The European Commission has stated a long term European cost-effectiveness objective
to halve the 2004 European gate-to-gate ATM unit costs to reach €400 per flight in 2020.
The SESAR D2 performance strategic design target is consistent with this objective,
although various trade-offs would have to be carefully considered and articulated in the
forthcoming SESAR D3 Implementation Plan Definition.
8.3.7 The European unit cost in 2020 would then be close to the US unit cost in 2005 (see
Figure 80), which itself is not the ultimate level of performance
1 000
US ATO European FAA
772
800
€2005 per IFR flight

(FY2005) Area (2005) European Area
Gate-to-gate ANS costs 600
US$8 900M €7 100M
(without MET) 417
IFR flights 18.3M 9.2M 400
Costs per IFR flight US$486 €772
Costs per IFR flight in € €417 €772 200
0
Costs per IFR flight in 2005
Figure 80: High level cost-effectiveness comparison of US-Europe (2005)
8.3.8 Figure 81 illustrates the long-term trend of traffic, costs and unit costs.
€0.8/km €0.6/km
7 000
2010
6 000 2005
€0.4/km
2003 2020
5 000 Medium-term
ANS costs (Million € 2005)
target
Total en-route
4 000 SESAR
1995 long-term
3 000 target
1990
2 000
1 000
0
0 2 000 4 000 6 000 8 000 10 000 12 000 14 000
Traffic (Million Km )
Figure 81: Long term trend of traffic and costs
COST-EFFECTIVENESS DRIVERS
8.3.9 The cost-effectiveness improvement observed between 2002 and 2005 (see Figure 79)
was achieved due to a combination of several factors such as continuous pressure from
airspace users and external benchmarking. Looking ahead until 2010, further
improvements of the European ATM cost-effectiveness are expected from greater
cooperation among ANSPs (e.g. joint definition and procurement of ATM systems),
more effective cost-effectiveness planning, and setting performance objectives according
to the SES requirements. Beyond 2010, even more improvements are expected from
SESAR, implementation of Functional Airspace Blocks, and other initiatives.

8.3.10 There is however no guarantee that these improvements will materialize. Several policy
options could be envisaged to improve cost-effectiveness if improvements do not
materialise fast enough, in particular:
• independent economic regulation with an explicit incentive mechanism à la UK;

• the setting of five years unit rates. States/ANSPs would be committed to their costs
projections when setting five years unit rates; and,
• some sort of contract between ANSPs and airspace users, based on agreed
performance objectives, with minimal regulatory intrusiveness.
8.4 En-route ANS cost-effectiveness KPI at State level

2002-2005 TRENDS
8.4.1 The decrease of the en-route unit costs at European level results from contrasted levels
and trends across EUROCONTROL Member States as illustrated in Figure 82 over the
2002-2005 period.
8.4.2 Firstly, the absolute level of the unit costs varies significantly among States, ranging for
2005 from €1.09 in the United Kingdom to €0.42 per km in the Czech Republic: a factor
of 2.6. The levels of the unit costs should also be seen in the light of exogenous factors
such as local economic conditions and traffic complexity, which considerably vary across
States.
1.2
2002
2003
2004
1.0 2005
2005 EUROCONTROL Area

Euro 2005/km
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
Slovenia
Moldova
Portugal (FIR Lisboa)
Slovak Republic
Ireland
Italy
Turkey
Switzerland
Austria
Bulgaria
Romania
France
Sweden
Croatia
Malta
Greece
Finland
Spain Continental
Belgium/Lux.
United Kingdom
FYROM
Spain Canarias
Germany
Netherlands
Denmark
Norway
Cyprus
Hungary
Czech Republic
Figure 82: Real en-route ANS unit costs per EUROCONTROL Member State64
8.4.3 Secondly, Figure 82 also highlights the dynamic trend during the 2002-2005 period
which indicates the responsiveness of the various States/ANSPs to the general upturn in
traffic since 2002. It is noteworthy that between 2002 and 2005, en-route unit costs
decreased in 25 out of 29 States. In fact, the combination of tighter cost management
64
In the UK the en-route ANSP (NATS) does not operate under the full cost-recovery regime but under a regime of
economic regulation (price cap). Therefore, the costs reported by UK for the purposes of the Enlarged Committee
for Route Charges can differ from the charges collected from en-route airspace users. For comparability purposes,
Figure 82 discloses the en-route costs charged to UK airspace users. These costs are computed as the product of
the chargeable service units with the UK unit rate. Unit costs are obtained by division of these costs with the
chargeable km.

control and sustained increases of traffic, has allowed a majority of European States to
improve their cost-effectiveness.
8.4.4 Figure 82 shows that for Austria, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, France, Sweden, Slovak
Republic, Hungary and Finland, en-route unit costs continuously decreased between 2002
and 2005.
8.4.5 On the other hand, for Spain (for both Continental and Canarias), Cyprus, and, to a lesser
extent, Ireland, en-route unit costs significantly increased between 2002 and 2005:
• For Spain: the unit costs increase (+10%) is mainly due to an increase in staff
employment costs while the number of total staff in Aena moderately increased. In
fact, employment costs for air traffic controllers in Aena seem somehow
disconnected with the cost of living and the level of productivity65. Furthermore, the
unit costs increase cannot be explicitly linked with an improvement of the quality of
service provided by Aena since high ATFM delays have been observed during 2002-
2005 for Barcelona and Madrid (see Section 5.3). However, it should be noted that
between 2004 and 2005, supported by a strong increase in the distance flown (+8%),
en-route unit costs for Spain slightly decreased (see Figure 82);
• For Cyprus: the en-route unit costs increase (i.e. +11%) is mainly due to the
depreciation of the new ATM system for Nicosia ACC which should allow further
ATC capacity increase and reduction of AFTM delays;
• Between 2002 and 2004, Ireland en-route unit costs increased by +12%. This
increase is mainly due to higher depreciation costs relating to the new ACC at
Ballycasey and to the new ATM systems in Dublin and Shannon as of 2004.
However, it should be noted that between 2004 and 2005, Ireland en-route unit costs
significantly reduced (-8%) to reach €0.55 per km (a level close to 2003).
8.4.6 In a number of cases there are noticeable large swings in unit costs. It is noteworthy that
en-route unit costs in Switzerland significantly decreased between 2004 and 2005 (-
27%), after having significantly increased between 2003 and 2004. This decrease is due
to three main drivers:
• Switzerland’s 2004 cost-base comprised exceptional costs relating to Skyguide’s

decision to abandon and write-off the development of its ATM system programme;
• To comply with IAS 16, staff costs related to projects development have been
capitalised in the balance sheet and not included in the Skyguide 2005 cost-base.
These deferred costs will hence be reflected in future cost-bases, and;
• As of 2005, part of the Swiss en-route cost-base is borne by the Swiss authorities and
therefore not charged to airspace users66.
65
These findings are more detailed in the ATM Cost-effectiveness (ACE) 2005 Benchmarking Report which will be
available mid-2007.
66
This is a temporary measure to compensate Skyguide for services provided in airspace where no financial
arrangements exist.

Cumulative shares of traffic and en-route costs
100% 40%
75% Changes in en-route unit costs (2002-2005) 30%

66%
Changes in en-route unit costs

Cumulative shares of traffic
50% 20%
Cumulative shares of en-route costs
25% 10%
0% 0%
-25% -10%
-50% -20%
European system average
(2002-2005): -7%
-75% -30%
-100% -40%
Hungary
Switzerland
Italy
Belgium/Lux.
Norway
FYROM
Czech Republic
Cyprus
Slovak Republic
Sweden
Bulgaria
Slovenia
Moldova
Spain Continental
Germany
United Kingdom
Turkey
Netherlands
Denmark
Spain Canarias
France
Greece
Romania
Austria
Ireland
Croatia
Finland
Malta
Figure 83: Changes in en-route real unit costs (2002-2005)
8.4.7 Figure 83 above shows that in 2005, the en-route costs of France, Germany, United
Kingdom, Spain Continental and Italy represented 66% of the en-route costs of the
European ANS system. Between 2002 and 2005, en-route real unit costs decreased for
France (-8%), Germany (-9%), the United Kingdom (-8%) and Italy (-1%). These
changes significantly contributed to the en-route real unit costs decrease observed at
European system level (-7%).
8.4.8 On the other hand, due to its weight the en-route unit costs increase in Spain during
2002-2005 (+10%) inevitably impacts the performance improvement at European system
level and effectively cancels the efforts made by 15 smaller States to reduce their unit
costs. Clearly, the higher the weight the higher the impact on the European system
performance.
8.4.9 Therefore, strict cost management is required from all stakeholders, and in particular the
largest ANSPs which have a collective responsibility to improve European ATM cost-
effectiveness.
2006-2010 TRENDS
8.4.10 On 6 December 2006, the European Commission adopted a Regulation laying down a
common charging scheme for ANS (Commission Regulation (EC) No 1794/2006). This
Regulation defines which costs are eligible and how airspace users will be charged for
ANS. The elements of this regulation related to the establishment and transparency of
cost-bases will apply as of 1 January 2007. It provides common mandatory rules which
will improve transparency and comparability of ANS costs. Individual accountability
will also be improved since each State/ANSP will also be responsible for the provision of
its cost-base and related explanatory information.

8.4.11 In November 2006, for the first time, all EUROCONTROL Member States provided their
planned 5-years (2007-2011) en-route costs for the purposes of the Enlarged Committee
for Route Charges. This contributes to more meaningful and effective consultation and
allows for a more reliable and consistent aggregation of en-route unit costs at European
system level. Figure 84 below displays each Member State’s 5-years unit costs
objectives.
1.2
2006
2007
1.0 2008
2009
2010
Euro2005/km
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
FYROM
Moldova
Slovak Rep.
Czech Rep.
Italy
Norway
Hungary
Turkey
Switzerland
Slovenia
Malta
Albania
Belgium-Lux.
Germany
Cyprus
Spain Continental
Austria
France
Bulgaria
Greece
Sweden
Croatia
Ireland
Finland
Spain Canarias
Netherlands
Denmark
United Kingdom
Romania
Figure 84: Projected real ANS en-route unit costs (2006-2010)
8.4.12 The trend in (real) unit costs between 2006 and 2010 as shown in Figure 84 is briefly
examined by geographical area since these areas tend to face similar characteristics in
terms of traffic forecast, traffic complexity, traffic variability and cost of living. Figure
85 below displays these six geographical areas. Figure 85 also indicates the relative
weight of each area according to the total European en-route costs, and shows a break
down of the changes in en-route unit costs into planned changes in costs (“cost effect”)
and kilometres flown (“traffic effect”). Cost-effectiveness is expected to improve in each
of the six geographical areas, most noticeably in the South Eastern European area where
unit costs are planned to decrease by -23% in real terms between 2006-2010.
8.4.13 It is important that the forward-looking figures on costs and traffic levels provided by the
States/ANSPs through the cost-effectiveness planning process are mature, based on
sound assumptions supported by a robust business plan, and do not significantly change
from one year to another. The PRC is committed to monitor the traffic and costs
projections established by the States/ANSPs as part of the cost-effectiveness planning
process and to analyse deviations that could arise between planned and actual
performance.
8.4.14 A strong commitment is expected from the States so that the decreases of the en-route
unit costs detailed in Figure 84 and Figure 85 actually materialise. The option of setting
unit rates for a five-year period would formalise the States/ANSPs commitment to
maintain the disclosed cost-base profile.

States Comments
Changes in en-route
unit costs (2006-2010)
Changes in kilometres
flown (2006-2010)
Changes in en-route
costs (2006-2010)
Denmark -9% 14% 3%
Finland -7% 11% 4%
The increase in costs (+13%) is mainly due to a renegotiation of staff employment
Nordic Area (Weight: 5%) Norway -2% 15% 13%
conditions.
2002 2006 2010P Sweden -10% 15% 3%
Unit costs 0.72 0.61 0.56 Austria -18% 16% -5%
UK and Ireland Area (Weight: 15%)
Croatia -16% 23% 3%
Costs index 100 100 105
2002 2006 2010P
Km flown index 100 118 136 Czech Rep. 6% 14% 20%
Unit costs 1.09 0.97 0.86 The en-route costs increase (+20%) is linked with the amortisation of the new ACC.
Costs index 100 111 115 Hungary -23% 15% -12% The unit costs decrease (-23%) is due to the implementation of a TNC (i.e. reallocation from
Km flown index 100 125 147 en-route to the terminal cost-base) and to cost containment measures.
Slovak Rep. -15% 23% 4%
Central Eastern European Area (Weight: 6%) The costs increase (+28%) is mainly due to the new ACC building and the new ATM system
Slovenia -1% 30% 28%
2002 2006 2010P which are planned to be operational in 2008.
Unit costs 0.74 0.62 0.55 Albania -14% 20% 3%
The costs decrease (-20%) is due to a change in the computation of interest costs and to
Costs index 100 120 123 Bulgaria -26% 8% -20%
cost containment measures.
Km flown index 100 143 166 Cyprus -11% 20% 6%
Central Western European Area
FYROM -11% 20% 6%
(Weight: 37%)
The costs decrease (-15%) is in line with Greece objective to stabilize its cost base in
Greece -27% 17% -15%
2002 2006 2010P nominal terms.
Unit costs 0.88 0.79 0.73 Moldova -23% 16% -11%
Costs index 100 107 111 Romania -25% 22% -9%
Km flown index 100 119 134 Turkey -20% 30% 4%
Ireland -6% 19% 12%
NATS operates under a regime of economic regulation. As part of this regime, the unit
United Kingdom -14% 17% 0% charge (expressed in £ per km) shall decrease by -3.4% p.a. over the 2006-2010 period
(CP2).
Belgium-Lux. -15% 18% 0%
South Western European Area (Weight: 24%)
The unit costs decrease (-3%) is in line with France's objective that the unit rate should not
2002 2006 2010P France -3% 13% 9%
South Eastern European Area (Weight: 11%) increase in real terms.
Unit costs 0.84 0.87 0.77 2002 2006 2010P Germany -14% 15% -1%
Costs index 100 126 132 Unit costs 0.66 0.60 0.46 Netherlands -8% 15% 6%
Km flown index 100 121 143 The costs increase (+16%) is mainly due to the depreciation of the new air navigation
Costs index 100 119 112 Switzerland 2% 14% 16%
facility in Dubendorf (Zurich).
Km flown index 100 133 163 The unit costs decrease in Italy (-11%) is consistent with Italy’s objective to stabilize its
Italy -11% 14% 2% nominal unit rate by drawing financial resources from ENAV’s reserves (“stabilisation fund”)
until 2011.
Malta -5% 12% 7%
Portugal (FIR Lisboa) -18% 14% -6%
Spain Canarias 0% 9% 9%
Spain Continental -12% 25% 10%
Figure 85: Trend of en-route unit costs per geographical area (2002-2010 in real terms)

8.5 The components of en-route ANS costs (European and State level)
8.5.1 It is important to consider each of the ANS components in order to identify the drivers
for the European States performance in terms of cost-effectiveness. ANS costs comprise:
• ATM/CNS provision costs (including AIS and SAR);
• Aeronautical MET costs;
• EUROCONTROL costs, and;
• Payments to governmental or regulatory authorities.
ATM/CNS PROVISION COSTS
8.5.2 The bulk of total ANS costs (i.e. around 90%) relate to the provision of ATM/CNS.
These costs are largely under the direct control and responsibility of ANSPs. They are
linked to the capacity to be provided for a safe and expeditious treatment of traffic
demand.
8.5.3 The ATM/CNS provision costs form the basis of the ANSP cost-effectiveness
benchmarking analysis presented in Section 8.6 of this chapter.
AERONAUTICAL MET COSTS
8.5.4 The left-hand side of Figure 86 shows the trend at European level of MET costs
recovered through en-route charges between 2002 and 2007 for a consistent sample of 29
EUROCONTROL Member States for which data for a time-series analysis was available.
315%
25% 48% 50%
% change of en-route MET costs in real terms (2002-2005)
20% Share in total en-route MET costs 40%
29%
Changes in gate-to-gate MET costs

Share in total European MET costs
400 15%
24% 24%
30%
-3% -1% -5% -3% 20%
23%
-4% 10% 18% 18% 20%
15% 14% 15%
300 12%
8% 7% 8%
5% 6% 10%
M€ (2005)
3% 3%
200
0% 0%
-1%
-2%
100 -5% -10%
-9% -11%
-11%
-13%
-10% -15% -20%
0 -22%
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006P 2007P -15%
-25%
-30%
-64%
Contracting States 29 29 29 29 29 29 -20% -40%
Switzerland
Italy
Cyprus
Hungary
Czech Republic
Norway
Slovak Republic
United Kingdom
Belgium/Lux.
FYROM
Spain Continental
France
Austria
Greece
Ireland
Romania
Sweden
Bulgaria
Croatia
Finland
Slovenia
Malta
Moldova
Germany
Turkey
Netherlands
Spain Canarias
Denmark
MET costs (M€) 332.8 331.1 333.5 323.8 322.4 316.1

MET costs (M€ 2005) 354.7 345.4 340.7 323.8 315.5 302.8
Figure 86: Changes in en-route MET costs at European and State level
8.5.5 At European level, en-route MET costs amounted to some €324M in 2005, i.e. some 6%
of en-route ANS costs. It should be noted that these costs decreased by -9% in real terms
between 2002 and 2005 and are expected to further decrease by -7% until 2007.
Therefore at the European level the en-route MET cost-base charged to airspace users is
decreasing in absolute terms. This is an encouraging trend, which has also to be seen in
the light of the traffic increase during the period (some +18%).
8.5.6 The chart on the right-hand side of Figure 86 shows the changes of MET costs between
2002 and 2005 at State level and indicates the relative share of each State in the total
MET costs. Figure 86 also shows that the decrease at European system level (-9%) is
mainly due to decreases in Italy (-22%) and Germany (-13%) where MET costs represent
respectively 12% and 15% of the total MET costs at European system level. In Italy, the

decrease is due to the recent implementation of an accounting system which allowed for a
more accurate assessment of MET costs in 2005. Germany which reassessed its cost
allocation and rationalised its MET service provision decreased its MET costs by some
€10M. Furthermore, it should be noted that as of 2007, a part of Germany MET costs
will be reallocated from en-route ANS to terminal ANS and recovered through TNC.
8.5.7 Figure 86 also indicates that between 2002 and 2005, several States managed to reduce
the en-route MET costs, often as a result of tighter cost management measures and
rationalisation. This is particularly the case for Austria (-11%), Belgium/Lux. (-11%)
and the Netherlands (-9%). The significant MET costs decrease in Norway (-64%) is due
to the renegotiation of the agreement with the national MET provider and to the use of a
different cost allocation as part of Avinor’s reorganisation.
8.5.8 There are also a number of States which between 2002 and 2005 report an increase of
more than 20%. These increases should warrant further attention. The massive MET
costs increase in FYROM (+48%) and Moldova (+315%) should be seen in the light of a
very small MET cost-base in 2002.
EUROCONTROL AGENCY COSTS (EXCLUDING MUAC & CEATS)
8.5.9 EUROCONTROL Agency costs67 can be split into two main categories: the
EUROCONTROL cost base (Parts I and IX, €492.7M in 2005) and the CRCO costs (Part
II, €17.7M in 2005).
8.5.10 In 2005, the EUROCONTROL

Agency cost base (Parts I and IX)
represents around 8.4% of total 8%
European en-route ANS costs,
which is higher than in 2004. 6%
The main driver for this increase

4%
is due to the progressive increase
of pensions in charge of the 2%
budget (see Pensions) and the
implementation of the Pension 0%
reform with the reconstruction of 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006P 2007P
the Projected Benefit Obligations PBO

Pens ions
(PBO) as indicated in Figure 87.
EUROCONTROL Agency cos ts (excl. Pens ion Schem e + PBO)
The relative share of
EUROCONTROL Agency costs Figure 87: EUROCONTROL Agency costs relative to total
is expected to stabilise in 2007 European en-route ANS costs
around the 8% threshold.
67
Maastricht UAC and CEATS costs are not included.

8.5.11 Figure 88 displays the breakdown of EUROCONTROL Agency costs per establishment
and expenditure between 2002 and 2005.
Yearly costs (M€) Yearly costs (M€)
Establishment % % Type of expenditure % %
2002 2003 2004 2005 2002 2003 2004 2005
05/02 05/04 05/02 05/04
EATM/ASRO/MIL 106.2 110.9 119.7 126.3 19% 5%
EAD 9.2 9.5 8.0 9.7 5% 22% Staff costs 168.7 176.1 188.1 192.9 14% 3%
Logistics 62.3 65.5 68.2 73.5 18% 8% PBO - - - 35.4 - -
CFMU 86.0 91.9 91.9 103.8 21% 13% Pensions 18.3 20.0 20.7 48.6 165% 135%
EEC 66.9 70.7 72.7 75.6 13% 4% Operating costs 66.8 71.1 89.2 99.5 49% 11%
IANS 13.4 12.2 13.3 13.5 0% 2% Depreciation costs 96.9 108.1 93.0 107.8 11% 16%
Institutional bodies 4.4 6.2 6.4 6.4 46% 0% Interest 12.8 11.6 9.7 8.6 -33% -12%
Other (mainly pensions) 15.2 20.0 20.7 48.6 220% 135%
PBO - - - 35.4 - -
Total Parts I & IX 363.5 386.9 400.8 492.7 36% 23% Total Parts I & IX 363.5 386.9 400.8 492.7 36% 23%
Price Index 1.109 1.132 1.157 1.184 7% 2% Price Index 1.109 1.132 1.157 1.184 7% 2%
Real costs (€2005) Total Real costs (€2005)
388.1 404.7 410.1 492.7 27% 20% 388.1 404.7 410.1 492.7 27% 20%
Parts I & IX Total Parts I & IX
Figure 88: EUROCONTROL Agency costs per establishment & expenditure (Parts I & IX)68
8.5.12 Figure 88 above indicates that between 2002 and 2005, EUROCONTROL Agency costs
have grown in real terms by +27%, which can be broken down as follows:
• +17% due to pension related-costs (pension charged to the budget and PBO) which
are non-discretionary costs for the EUROCONTROL Agency; and
• +10% in discretionary costs which are controlled by the EUROCONTROL Agency.
8.5.13 The right-hand side of Figure 88 indicates that between 2004 and 2005, besides the
pension-related costs, the increases in operating costs (+€10M) and depreciation costs
(+€15M) significantly contributed to increase the total EUROCONTROL cost-base. The
increase in the 2005 operating costs is mainly driven by an anticipation of the
introduction of IAS 38 in 2006 which requires external effort to be reported as operating
costs rather than investments. Similarly, the increase in the 2005 depreciation costs
results from the reduction of the depreciation period for some investments from three to
one year (accelerated depreciation).
8.5.14 EUROCONTROL Agency actual costs for 2005 (i.e. €492.7M) are some €8.7M less than
the initial forecast cost-base established in November 2005 (i.e. €501.4M). This is lower
than the savings achieved the previous year since the EUROCONTROL Agency actual
costs for 2004 were €15.1M less than the planned costs submitted in November 2004 to
the Enlarged Committee for Route Charges. The main drivers for these savings are a
tighter cost control by the Agency, lower interest costs than forecasted, and the
postponement of some projects.
8.5.15 Figure 89 below displays the forward-looking projections of EUROCONTROL Agency

costs (Parts I and IX) between 2005 and 201069.
68
In Figure 88 and Figure 89, the item “Pensions” corresponds to the pensions charged to EUROCONTROL
budget.
69
It should be noted that according to a decision of the Provisional Council through the Standing Committee on
Finance, the total EUROCONTROL cost-base for 2006 and 2007 will be limited at 98% of the planned costs.

EATM/ASRO/MIL EAD Logistics Staff costs Operating costs
CFMU EEC IANS Depreciation costs Interest
Institutional bodies Pensions PBO Pensions PBO
600 600
+2.8% +0.1% -0.4% +0.2% -1.0% +2.8% +0.1% -0.4% +0.2% -1.0%
500 500
M€ (2005 Prices)
400
M€ (2005 prices)
400
300 300
200 200
100 100
0 0
2005 2006P 2007P 2008P 2009P 2010P 2005 2006P 2007P 2008P 2009P 2010P
Figure 89: Forward-looking EUROCONTROL Agency costs 2005-2010 (Parts I & IX)
8.5.16 The left-hand side of Figure 89 shows that in 2006 EATM costs are planned to increase
(+14%). On the other hand, the reduction in EEC costs (-18%) somewhat contributes to
stabilise the overall discretionary costs. The pensions charged to EUROCONTROL
budget are expected to further increase in 2006 (+24%).
8.5.17 The right-hand side of Figure 89 emphasises the reallocation from depreciation costs to
operating costs as of 2006. The main driver for these changes is the introduction of IAS
38, which induces a shift of the costs of external effort (previously considered as
investments i.e. capitalised and subsequently depreciated) to operating costs from 2006
onwards.
8.5.18 It should be noted that the overall increase of +2.8% in 2006 is higher than the forward-
looking projections of last year (+1%). Figure 89 also indicates that after the 2.8%
increase in 2006, EUROCONTROL costs are planned to remain constant in real terms
until 2010. If this trend materialises, this will positively contribute to the reduction of the
European en-route unit cost towards the achievement of the PRC notional objective in
2008.
8.6 Gate-to-gate ATM/CNS cost-effectiveness benchmarking (ANSP

level)
8.6.1 The findings from this section are further detailed in the ATM Cost-effectiveness (ACE)
2005 Benchmarking Report [Ref. 33] which extensively documents the analysis and
comparison of 35 European ANSPs’ cost-effectiveness. This analysis is based on the
information provided by the ANSPs70 through the EUROCONTROL Specification for
Information Disclosure.
8.6.2 This section analyses ANSPs cost-effectiveness according to the framework presented in
Figure 77. The ANSP cost-effectiveness analysis focuses on ATM/CNS provision costs
which are under the direct control and responsibility of the ANSP.
8.6.3 Figure 90 shows a detailed breakdown of gate-to-gate71 ATM/CNS provision costs. Since
there are differences in cost-allocation between en-route and terminal ANS among
ANSPs, it is important to keep a “gate-to-gate” perspective when comparing ANSPs cost-
effectiveness.
70
Unfortunately, only partial analysis is provided for HCAA/Greece since both the quantity and the quality of the
data submitted are currently not adequate for cost-effectiveness performance measurement.
71
That is the aggregation of en-route and terminal ANS.

Exceptional
Items
0.6%
ATM/CNS provision costs (€ M) Total %
Staff costs 3 923 60.5%
Direct (non-staff) operating costs 1 207 18.6%
Staff costs Depreciation costs 910 14.0%
Cost of capital 60.5%
Direct (non- Cost of capital 410 6.3%
6.3%
staff) operating Exceptional Items 38 0.6%
Depreciation costs Total 6 487 100.0%
costs 18.6%
14.0%
Figure 90: Breakdown of gate-to-gate ATM/CNS provision costs (2005)
8.6.4 This section analyses both the “financial” cost-effectiveness and the “economic” cost-
effectiveness, where the latter -less narrow- measure of cost-effectiveness also takes into
account the additional costs incurred by airspace users for ATFM delays generated by
ANSPs72. The indicator of “economic” cost-effectiveness is computed as the ATM/CNS
provision costs plus the costs of ATFM delays per unit of composite flight-hour73. These
are factual indicators of cost-effectiveness. The measurement of cost inefficiencies would
require to properly account for exogenous factors such as traffic complexity
characteristics74 and economic factors (e.g. the cost of living) which may significantly
differ among European ANSPs.
GATE-TO-GATE COST-EFFECTIVENESS
2002-2005 TRENDS
8.6.5 The top of Figure 91 displays the trend at European level of the gate-to-gate “economic”
cost-effectiveness indicator between 2002 and 2005 for a consistent sample of 32 ANSPs
for which data for a time-series analysis was available.
8.6.6 At European level, the unit economic costs per composite flight-hours decreased from
€500 in 2002 to €472 in 2005 (i.e. -6%). Until 2004, this improvement has been largely
driven by a reduction in ATFM delays. However, in 2005, there was a small increase in
delays which was not off-set by the decrease of unit ATM/CNS provision costs.
8.6.7 At ANSP level (see right-hand side of Figure 91), the unit economic costs range from
€776 to €148 per composite flight-hour, confirming the wide dispersion of this indicator
among ANSPs. The gradual fall in the economic cost per composite flight-hour at
European level between 2002-2005 masks contrasted levels and trends across the various
ANSPs. Figure 91 shows that economic costs per composite flight-hour have increased
since 2002 in 12 ANSPs. The largest increases have been in Croatia Control (+62%) and
DCAC Cyprus (+32%). In several ANSPs, economic costs significantly decreased as a
result of improved quality of service and/or greater financial cost-effectiveness. The
largest decreases have been in LGS (-54%), MUAC75 (-34%), NATS (-34%), FYROM
CAA (-31%), Avinor (-24%), EANS (-23%), and ATSA Bulgaria (-20%).
72
Airborne delays as well as flight inefficiency are not consistently measured and therefore not taken into account.
73
Composite flight-hour: see Glossary.
74
See Chapter 2.
75
The costs reported for MUAC do not include costs of the CNS infrastructure which is made available for joint use
and provided free of charge by the ANSPs (Belgocontrol, LVNL and DFS) operating in the Four States’ airspace
(Benelux and Germany).

€ per composite flight-hours (2005 prices) € per ATCO-hour on duty (2005 prices) Composite flight-hour per ATCO-hour on duty € per composite flight-hour (2005 prices)
0
15
30
45
60
75
90
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0
100
200
300
400
0
200
400
600
€70
2002
0.69
2002
€ 500
2002
2002
€ 324
PRR 2006
€78
0.71
2003
2003
€ 316
2003
2003
€ 485
€81
2004
€ 302
0.73
€ 470
2004
2004
2004
Delay costs per composite flight-hour
€84
0.72
2005
2005
2005
2005
€ 472
€ 289
ATM/CNS provision costs per composite flight-hour
83
€ per composite flight-hours (2005 prices) € per ATCO-hour on duty (2005 prices) Composite flight-hour per ATCO-hour on duty € per composite flight-hour (2005 prices)
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
LVNL Aena MUAC LVNL
Belgocontrol Skyguide EANS Belgocontrol
ATSA Bulgaria Belgocontrol Skyguide Skyguide
ROMATSA MUAC* ANS CR Croatia Control
FYROM CAA NAV Portugal (FIR Lisboa) DCAC Cyprus Aena
ENAV Austro Control NATS ENAV
NATA Albania DFS Austro Control DFS
NATS LVNL HungaroControl NATS
DFS NATS NAV Portugal (FIR Lisboa) ATSA Bulgaria
Gate-to-gate ATCO-hour productivity
Skyguide ENAV NAVIAIR Austro Control

Economic gate-to-gate cost-effectiveness
LPS Avinor LVNL ANS CR
ATCO-hour productivity 2005

NAV Portugal (FIR Lisboa) Finavia DFS LPS
DSNA IAA IAA ROMATSA
Gate-to-gate employment costs per ATCO-hour
Employment costs per ATCO-hour 2005

Oro Navigacija DSNA LGS DSNA
Gate-to-gate support costs per composite flight-hour

MoldATSA NAVIAIR PPL/PATA NAV Portugal (FIR Lisboa)
UkSATSE ANS Sweden DSNA FYROM CAA
DHMI ANS CR ANS Sweden Slovenia Control
Austro Control Slovenia Control Finavia DCAC Cyprus
ANS CR HungaroControl ENAV NATA Albania
DCAC Cyprus PPL/PATA Belgocontrol DHMI
Figure 91: ATM/CNS cost-effectiveness comparisons (2002-2005)

MATS Croatia Control DHMI Oro Navigacija
Aena DCAC Cyprus Avinor UkSATSE
Croatia Control LPS Aena HungaroControl
NAVIAIR ATSA Bulgaria NATA Albania MoldATSA
Slovenia Control ROMATSA Croatia Control NAVIAIR
Support costs per composite flight-hour 2002

Support costs per composite flight-hour 2005
IAA EANS LPS PPL/PATA
Avinor LGS ATSA Bulgaria HCAA
Chapter 8 - Cost-effectiveness
PPL/PATA NATA Albania Slovenia Control Finavia
Finavia MATS MATS Avinor
HungaroControl FYROM CAA Oro Navigacija MATS
ROMATSA
ATCO-hour productivity 2002
LGS Oro Navigacija IAA

HCAA DHMI FYROM CAA ANS Sweden
Employment costs per ATCO-hour 2002

ANS Sweden UkSATSE UkSATSE MUAC*
Unit economic costs 2002
MUAC* MoldATSA MoldATSA LGS

EANS HCAA HCAA EANS
8.6.8 For the purpose of Figure 91, the financial cost-effectiveness indicator is broken down
into three key economic drivers: (1) ATCO-hour productivity, (2) employment costs per
ATCO-hour and (3) support costs per composite flight-hours.
GATE-TO-GATE ATCO-HOUR PRODUCTIVITY
8.6.9 Figure 91 shows that in 2005, the overall productivity indicator for the 32 ANSPs is 0.72
composite flight-hours per ATCO-hour on duty which is 4% higher than the productivity
achieved at European system level in 2002 (0.69).
8.6.10 Raising the European average productivity (0.72) by some 20% (i.e. level achieved by
ANSPs which operate in complex environment (see Chapter 2)) would lead to significant
gains in cost-effectiveness. While it is clear that achieving large improvements in
ATCO-hour productivity could have an impact on the other components of cost-
effectiveness (e.g. employment costs), productivity improvements could be achieved by
optimising and rationalising the actual processes for ATM/CNS provision and/or by more
effective OPS room management making better use of existing resources (for example by
adaptation of rosters and shift times, and adaptation of sector opening times to traffic
demand patterns).
8.6.11 Figure 91 indicates that since 2002, ATCO-hour productivity has improved in all but six
ANSPs (LVNL, NAVIAIR, DSNA, ENAV, NATS and to a lesser extent ANS Sweden).
Due to their relative weights, ATCO-hour productivity improvements in DSNA, ENAV
and NATS would have a significant positive impact on the European average.
GATE-TO-GATE EMPLOYMENT COSTS PER ATCO-HOUR
8.6.12 Figure 91 shows that at European system level, the gate-to-gate employment costs per
ATCO-hour increased from €70 to €84 (i.e. +20%). Employment costs per ATCO-hour is
typically subject to complex bargaining agreements between management and staff,
although some differences can be explained by local conditions which are outside
management control.
8.6.13 Over time, changes in productivity are expected to be reflected in employment costs
changes. This is illustrated in Figure 92. When employment costs rise significantly more
than productivity, all other things being equal, the unit ATM/CNS provision costs
increase, hence the importance of effectively managing employment costs.
% Changes in ATCO-hour productivity 2002-2005 % Changes in hourly employment costs 2002-2005 ATCO-hour productivity 2002
90% 1.8
Composite flight-hour per ATCO-hours on duty
60% 1.2
% Changes 2002-2005
30% 0.6
0% 0.0
-30% -0.6
Skyguide
Belgocontrol
HungaroControl
Slovenia Control
Oro Navigacija
DCAC Cyprus
EANS
NAV Portugal (FIR Lisboa)
DFS
DSNA
ENAV
IAA
Avinor
LGS
LPS
FYROM CAA
MUAC*
LVNL
NAVIAIR
Austro Control
ANS Sweden
ANS CR
Finavia
Aena
ATSA Bulgaria
Croatia Control
DHMI
NATS
MATS
ROMATSA
MoldATSA
NATA Albania
Figure 92: Change in ATCO-hour productivity and employment costs (2002-2005)

8.6.14 Figure 92 also shows that the largest productivity increases are observed for ANSPs
starting with a relatively low base in 2002 (see red dots). These increases were achieved
in a context of high traffic growth and more effective use of spare capacity and existing
resources.
8.6.15 As shown in Figure 92 above, between 2002 and 2005, for several ANSPs employment
costs increased by far more than productivity. These increases equally occurred where
employment costs are already relatively high (e.g. Aena, DFS, NAV Portugal) and where
they are relatively low (e.g. ANS CR, DHMI).
8.6.16 In a labour intensive industry such as the ATM sector, there is a need to effectively
manage ATCO employment costs and non-ATCO staff costs (which are part of support).
GATE-TO-GATE SUPPORT COST PER COMPOSITE FLIGHT-HOUR
8.6.17 Figure 91 shows the trend at European level of gate-to-gate support costs per composite
flight-hour between 2002 and 2005. At European level, unit support costs decreased
from €324 to €289 per composite flight-hours between 2002 and 2005 (i.e. -11%).
8.6.18 The right-hand side of Figure 91 shows that the European average support cost per
composite flight-hours results from contrasted levels and trends. Since 2002, unit
support costs decreased for most of the ANSPs, this shows that there is continued
pressure to manage these costs. On the other hand, unit support costs increased for nine
ANSPs. For ENAV, Belgocontrol and LVNL, these increases occurred where unit
support costs were already high.
8.6.19 Support costs represent on average 71% of total ATM/CNS provision costs. Therefore
significant cost-effectiveness improvements could be achieved by reducing support costs.
ATM/CNS fragmentation throughout Europe contributes to higher support costs [Ref.
34]. Reducing the current level of fragmentation should therefore decrease the support
costs and improve cost-effectiveness.
8.7 Conclusions
8.7.1 Overall, the cost-effectiveness of European ATM has been improving since 2003, where
a break in the unit cost trend is clearly visible.
8.7.2 Improvements observed from 2002 to 2005 result from unit costs decreases in a majority
of States. However, cost increases in Spain, due to its relative weight, cancelled out
performance improvements in 15 smaller States. EUROCONTROL Agency costs have
grown by +27% in this period, mainly due to the introduction of pension related-costs in
2005. Strict cost management is required from all stakeholders, which have a collective
responsibility to improve European ATM cost-effectiveness, and in particular from the
five largest States (66% of costs).
8.7.3 Although there has been significant improvement, cost-effectiveness nevertheless
remains a major ATM performance issue. In 2005, total en-route and terminal ANS costs
amounted to some €7 430M. High level comparisons indicate that there is room for
further improvements in cost-effectiveness, which could be achieved by increasing
productivity, reducing fragmentation and support costs, and effectively managing
employment costs.
8.7.4 According to States’ cumulated projections, the European ATM system is on track to
meet the PRC’s notional target for 2008 (-14% with respect to 2003). The cumulative
savings from 2003 to 2008 would then amount to more than two billion Euros.

8.7.5 This indicates that a Pan-European cost-effectiveness target of reducing the real unit cost
by 3% per annum is both reasonable and achievable. Moreover, this target is in line with
the strategic design objectives of the ATM industry until 2010, as stated in SESAR
performance targets (a -3% yearly reduction of real unit costs until 2010 followed by a -
5% yearly reduction until 2020).
8.7.6 It is therefore proposed to formally adopt a Pan-European cost-effectiveness target of

reducing the European average real unit cost by 3% per annum until 2010.
8.7.7 This target should also be used as a performance criterion for the European
Commission’s triennial reports on SES implementation to the European Parliament and
Council. The next report is due in 2010.
8.7.8 Should the combination of current performance improvement drivers such as

benchmarking, cost-effectiveness planning, cooperation among ANSPs, and setting of
performance objectives prove to be insufficient to reach the agreed target, policy makers
should consider a range of stronger tools to this effect. These could include such
initiatives as independent economic regulation “à la UK”, the setting of five years unit
rates, and/or a contractual approach between ANSPs and airspace users, based on agreed
performance objectives, with minimal regulatory intervention.

ANNEX I - PRC RECOMMENDATIONS ON SINGLE EUROPEAN SKY
SHORT TERM MEDIUM TERM LONG TERM

(0-2 years) (2-5 years) (over 5 years)
1
Provide
Provide support
support to
to NSAs
NSAs
Supervision
of Supervision
4 C
C
2 Promote
Promote cooperative
cooperative forum
forum for
for Improve
Improve recognition
recognition O
O
Recognised
Recognised Orgs
Regulation
NSAs Orgs
and Regulation
NSAs N
N
3 Promote C
C
Promote use
use of
of Recognised
Recognised EU
EU level
level audits
audits and
and O
O
Organisations
Organisation of
Organisations 6 inspections
inspections ofof NSAs
NSAs N
N
Organisation
5 Start
Start peer
peer review
review procedure
procedure for
for RR
8
and
Common
Common regulatory
regulatory
NSAs
NSAs EE
framework
framework for
for NSAs
NSAs QQ
7 Review
Review of
of compliance
compliance ofof
9 RR
principles
principles for
for charges
charges Unify
Unify safety
safety regulatory
regulatory EE
framework
framework QQ
10 Transparency
Transparency of of performance
performance
Criteria
Performance Criteria
setting
setting // reporting
reporting mechanisms
mechanisms
Objectives
and Objectives
11 Minimum Minimum performance criteria Minimum performance criteria

Minimum performance
performance criteria
criteria to
to
support to support periodic review to support periodic review
support periodic
periodic review
review
Performance
12 Support 13 Include safety indicators

Support development
development of
of safety
safety Include safety indicators
indicators
indicators in
in SES
SES
and
14 Framework 15 C
C
Framework for
for setting
setting efficiency
efficiency Mandatory
Mandatory efficiency
efficiency O
incentives incentives O
incentives incentives on
on ANSP
ANSP N
N
16
service
and service
Make
Make objectives
objectives of
of FABs
FABs clearer
clearer
17 EU
EU financial
financial support
support for
for creation
creation
airspace and
of
of FABs
FABs consistency
of airspace
18 Common
Common general
general principles
principles for
for
provision
provision
FABs
FABs 20 Reassess C
C
Reassess mechanism
mechanism for
for O
creation O
19 Indicators to assess performance
Indicators to assess performance creation of
of FABs
FABs N
N
Rationalisation of
improvements
improvements from
from FABs
FABs
Rationalisation
21 Implementing 22 C
C
Implementing rules
rules on
on optimised
optimised Reassess
Reassess process
process for
for O
route O
route and
and sector
sector design
design route
route &
& sector
sector design
design N
N
23 European
European financial
financial support
support
consistency
consistent
consistent with
with SES
SES objectives
objectives
24 Implement
Implement States’
States’ Statement
Statement onon
military
military issues
issues related
related to
to SES
Civil/Military
Cooperation
SES
Cooperation
Civil/Military
25 Develop
Develop success
success criteria
criteria for
for full
full
application
application of
of FUA
FUA
26 Mechanism
Mechanism forfor EU
EU
funding
funding for
for cooperation
cooperation
27 Criteria RR
Criteria for
for designation
designation of
Provision
of
Service Provision
EE
of
Organisation of
monopoly
monopoly ATSP/METSP
ATSP/METSP QQ
Organisation
28 Develop R
R
Develop contestability
contestability of
of E
ATS E
ATS and
and MET
MET at
at airports
airports QQ
Service
RR
29 Ensure
Ensure CNS/AIS
CNS/AIS under
under EE
market
market conditions
conditions QQ
30 Develop
Develop aa common
common long
long term
Orientation
term
Orientation
SES
for SES
policy
policy orientation
orientation for
for SES
Policy
SES
Policy
for
31 Ensure
Ensure balance
balance between
between
process
making
process
mandatory
mandatory requirements
requirements and
making
and
Rule
Rule
voluntary means of compliance

voluntary means of compliance
for interoperability
for interoperability
Non-regulatory measure Priority action Recommendation number

Use of existing SES rules REQ Required actions Assess performance improvement
New SES regulation CON Conditional actions Assess actual use
87
ANNEX II - ACC TRAFFIC AND DELAY DATA (2003-2006)
State ACC Name Daily Traffic Delay per flight (min/flight) Airport delay share of total delay
2003 2004 2005 2006 2003 2004 2005 2006 2003 2004 2005 2006
Albania Tirana 255 286 318 327 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 84% 58% 0% 0%
Austria Wien 1417 1637 1820 1897 0.3 1.3 1.0 1.1 99% 61% 80% 73%
Belgium/Lux. Brussels 1322 1359 1502 1556 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 50% 99% 87% 73%
Bosnia-Herz. Sarajevo 3 3 3 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0% 0% 0% 0%
Bulgaria Sofia 493 552 609 619 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0% 0% 0% 0%
Bulgaria Varna 336 392 433 434 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0% 0% 0% 0%
Croatia Zagreb 580 704 818 829 0.0 0.0 2.4 1.6 100% 0% 0% 1%
Cyprus Nicosia 543 562 568 590 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.8 0% 0% 1% 1%
Czech Republic Prague 1188 1452 1565 1597 0.4 1.2 1.2 1.0 5% 22% 32% 18%
Denmark Copenhagen 1248 1370 1378 1430 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.6 100% 50% 97% 41%
Estonia Tallin 0 0 237 332 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0% 0% 0% 0%
Finland Rovaniemi 89 92 91 96 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0% 0% 0% 0%
Finland Tampere 460 481 495 475 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.1 31% 48% 65% 70%
France Bordeaux 1943 2005 2056 2178 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.2 5% 18% 11% 16%
France Brest 2070 2158 2243 2320 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.5 0% 0% 0% 1%
France Marseille ACC 2453 2461 2557 2661 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0% 0% 0% 0%
France Paris 3153 3222 3259 3358 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.2 66% 64% 65% 67%
France Reims 2047 2121 2181 2306 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.4 2% 0% 0% 1%
FYROM Skopje 256 278 294 315 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0% 0% 0% 0%
Germany Berlin 1693 1909 1445 913 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4 2% 1% 38% 42%
Germany Bremen 927 929 949 1001 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 51% 49% 72% 75%
Germany Duesseldorf 1281 1385 1395 1424 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.2 5% 21% 45% 25%
Germany Frankfurt 2335 2385 2476 2569 1.4 1.1 0.6 0.7 86% 92% 98% 98%
Germany Munchen 2475 2607 2940 3522 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.4 73% 78% 77% 60%
Germany Rhein 2276 2467 3350 3712 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0% 0% 0% 0%
Greece Athinai 1051 1070 1059 1090 0.9 0.8 0.5 1.0 92% 95% 97% 78%
Greece Makedonia 492 658 739 766 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 99% 83% 94% 91%
Hungary Budapest 1158 1326 1476 1553 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.1 32% 29% 73% 67%
Ireland Dublin 510 526 539 567 0.3 1.5 0.2 0.2 56% 27% 69% 77%
Ireland Shannon 844 857 1101 1146 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0% 1% 0% 13%
Italy Brindisi 769 758 752 778 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.1 80% 96% 94% 99%
Italy Milano 1639 1645 1703 1786 1.4 0.9 1.3 1.4 63% 73% 78% 79%
Italy Padova 1493 1548 1639 1715 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.3 49% 35% 26% 21%
Italy Roma 2283 2309 2413 2478 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.8 95% 83% 84% 76%
Latvia Riga 0 0 354 416 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0% 0% 0% 0%
Lithuania Vilnius 0 0 282 356 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0% 0% 0% 0%
Maastricht Maastricht 3569 3713 3975 4209 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.3 0% 0% 0% 0%
Malta Malta 192 200 207 207 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0% 0% 0% 100%
Moldova Chisinau 56 64 70 75 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0% 0% 0% 0%
Netherlands Amsterdam 1372 1381 1372 1433 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.4 92% 84% 86% 80%
Norway Bodo 300 381 504 508 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 100% 0% 18% 8%
Norway Oslo 694 731 768 830 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.1 78% 18% 25% 48%
Norway Stavanger 433 459 479 523 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 3% 27% 8% 1%
Norway Trondheim 274 255 0 0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0% 0% 0% 0%
Poland Warszawa 780 935 1071 1246 0.2 0.7 0.8 1.5 30% 11% 37% 30%
Portugal (FIR Lisboa) Lisboa 902 934 978 1035 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 66% 89% 96% 82%
Romania Bucuresti 889 1013 1121 1136 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0% 0% 0% 0%
Serbia & Montenegro Beograde 0 907 950 1045 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0% 0% 0% 4%
Slovak Republic Bratislava 617 744 840 855 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.1 0% 0% 0% 0%
Slovenia Ljubjana 379 446 520 539 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0% 0% 0% 0%
Spain Canarias Canarias 728 758 798 830 0.4 0.9 0.3 0.5 23% 27% 26% 31%
Spain Continental Barcelona 1666 1787 1908 1912 0.5 0.6 1.3 1.0 90% 87% 37% 4%
Spain Continental Madrid 2255 2401 2567 2691 0.3 0.6 1.1 1.6 2% 26% 31% 41%
Spain Continental Palma 629 643 668 712 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3 98% 89% 99% 99%
Spain Continental Sevilla 839 882 976 1025 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 4% 22% 21% 11%
Sweden Malmo 1146 1254 1282 1324 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0% 24% 0% 13%
Sweden Stockholm 982 1015 999 1068 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 96% 83% 30% 90%
Sweden Sundsvall 218 232 231 241 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0% 0% 0% 0%
Switzerland Geneva 1558 1601 1648 1703 0.4 0.5 1.2 0.8 35% 25% 21% 19%
Switzerland Zurich 1874 1918 1994 2039 1.9 1.7 1.1 1.6 35% 53% 53% 22%
Turkey Ankara 874 1047 1196 1310 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0% 1% 12% 100%
Turkey Istanbul 865 939 1077 1165 0.0 0.1 2.2 0.5 100% 100% 100% 96%
United Kingdom Manchester 1449 1557 1609 1621 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.6 12% 19% 27% 20%
United Kingdom Prestwick 1525 1637 1699 1739 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 13% 28% 35% 30%
United Kingdom London ACC 4774 4896 5191 5352 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.6 0% 0% 0% 1%
United Kingdom London TMA 3349 3468 3623 3738 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 87% 90% 84% 89%
data source : EUROCONTROL/CFMU
88
ANNEX III - TRAFFIC COMPLEXITY
The PRU, in close collaboration with ANSPs, has defined a set of complexity indicators that
could be applied in ANSP benchmarking [Ref. 12]. The complexity indicators are computed on a
systematic basis for each day of the year. This annex presents for each ANSP the complexity
score computed over the full year (365 days).
The complexity indicators are based on the concept of “interactions”. Interactions arise when
there are two aircraft in the same “place” at the same time. For the purpose of this study, an
interaction is defined as the simultaneous presence of two aircraft in a cell of 20x20 nautical
miles and 3,000 feet in height.
For each ANSP the complexity score is the product of two components:
Complexity score = Traffic density x Structural index
Traffic density indicator is a measure of the potential number of interactions between aircraft.
The indicator is defined as the total duration of all interactions (in hours) per flight-hour
controlled in a given volume of airspace.
The structural complexity originates from horizontal, vertical, and speed interactions. The
Structural index is computed as the sum of the three indicators
Horizontal interactions indicator: A measure of the

complexity of the flow structure based on the potential
interactions between aircraft on different headings. The
indicator is defined as the ratio of the duration of
horizontal interactions to the total duration of all
interactions.
Vertical interactions indicator: A measure of the

complexity arising from aircraft in vertical evolution
based on the potential interactions between climbing,
cruising and descending aircraft. The indicator is
defined as the ratio of the duration of vertical
interactions to the total duration of all interactions.
Speed interactions indicator: A measure of the

complexity arising from the aircraft mix based on the
potential interactions between aircraft of different
speeds. The indicator is defined as the ratio of the
duration of speed interactions to the total duration of all
interactions.
89
ANSP Complexity score (2006)
Complexity Adjusted
Vertical Horizontal Speed Structural index
Country ANSP score Density
a*e a b c d e=b+c+d
BE Belgocontrol 0.197 0.15 0.41 0.52 0.41 1.35
UK NATS 0.194 0.17 0.39 0.42 0.30 1.11
CH Skyguide 0.189 0.17 0.31 0.55 0.23 1.09
DE DFS 0.188 0.17 0.31 0.54 0.26 1.12
MUAC 0.158 0.17 0.25 0.50 0.16 0.91
NL LVNL 0.145 0.15 0.24 0.37 0.33 0.94
AT Austro Control 0.118 0.12 0.22 0.50 0.22 0.95
CZ ANS CR 0.101 0.11 0.18 0.49 0.21 0.89
FR DSNA 0.098 0.14 0.16 0.38 0.15 0.70
IT ENAV 0.095 0.09 0.29 0.54 0.23 1.07
SK LPS 0.074 0.09 0.16 0.50 0.18 0.85
SI Slovenia Control 0.072 0.07 0.20 0.56 0.21 0.98
HU HungaroControl 0.071 0.11 0.10 0.40 0.13 0.63
ES Aena 0.066 0.09 0.20 0.40 0.13 0.73
DK NAVIAIR 0.061 0.07 0.17 0.52 0.22 0.92
MK FYROM CAA 0.055 0.09 0.09 0.42 0.09 0.60
HR Croatia Control 0.053 0.08 0.07 0.51 0.11 0.69
SE ANS Sweden 0.052 0.06 0.21 0.40 0.26 0.87
PL PATA 0.049 0.06 0.15 0.49 0.24 0.87
RO ROMATSA 0.041 0.09 0.05 0.33 0.10 0.48
TR DHMI 0.041 0.07 0.15 0.37 0.11 0.62
GR HCAA 0.035 0.06 0.14 0.37 0.11 0.62
PT NAV Portugal 0.035 0.06 0.15 0.39 0.08 0.62
NO Avinor 0.034 0.03 0.36 0.49 0.29 1.14
CY DCAC Cyprus 0.034 0.05 0.18 0.35 0.11 0.64
BU ATSA Bulgaria 0.032 0.09 0.05 0.24 0.07 0.37
LV LGS 0.030 0.05 0.11 0.38 0.13 0.62
IE IAA 0.029 0.08 0.09 0.20 0.08 0.38
EE EANS 0.029 0.06 0.13 0.23 0.14 0.50
LT Oro Navigacija 0.027 0.03 0.15 0.45 0.19 0.78
AL NATA Albania 0.026 0.06 0.07 0.32 0.06 0.45
FI Finavia 0.026 0.03 0.24 0.23 0.31 0.78
UA UkSATSE 0.021 0.04 0.05 0.33 0.12 0.50
MT MATS 0.011 0.02 0.20 0.37 0.12 0.70
MD MoldATSA 0.008 0.01 0.12 0.36 0.12 0.60
Grand Total 0.100 0.11 0.24 0.44 0.20 0.89
90
ANNEX IV - SAFETY REPORTING: LEGISLATIVE VS. CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT
Legislative versus cultural environment for safety reporting in EUROCONTROL States.
This assessment was made based on the data collected during the survey into legal and cultural
impediments to safety reporting. For full details on each State in the table below, please refer to
the final report of the survey that was published in 2006 [Ref. 17].
State Legislation Culture

Austria + • EU Directives implemented + • confidence to report
• no FOIA • good management support
• protection within the limits of the • ATCOs supportive
EU Directives • incidents accepted
• access of judiciary only for criminal • CISM in place
behaviours & in case of damage
claims
Belgium + • EU Directives implemented O • Reluctance to report
• no FOIA • Reactive safety management
• protection within the limits of the • Training reduced, dissemination wanted
EU Directives • ANSP reserved in publicly releasing any
• access of judiciary granted, safety data
interference minimal (excepting
crimes)
Bulgaria - • Directives 94/56/EC & 03/42/EC - • reluctance to report
not transposed • low trust, improving
• penal sentences possible for • incidents hardly accepted by ATCOs
incidents
• recommendation follow-up uneven
• no regulation for ESARRs
Croatia - • penalties for incidents established - • reluctance to report
by law • pay loss & automatic suspension during
• police witnesses CAA or investigations
independent investigations • not enough support from ATCOs or
management
• only serious incidents reported
Cyprus + • EU Directives implemented - • reluctance to report
• no FOIA • low trust
• reporters protected from employer • ATCOs not fully aware of law & system
and confidentiality ensured by law • local culture hardly accepts mistakes
• judiciary only involved if clear
evidence of crime
Czech - • no protection afforded by law O • some fear of reporting
Republic • judiciary may take over an • not all occurrences reported
investigation (theory, no records)
Denmark + • EU Directives implemented + • strong management support
• protection from FOIA • high trust
• clear protection for justified cases • strong peer support & team spirit
• judiciary access only when duly • incidents accepted
warranted • CISM in place
91
Spain - • Law on Air Safety controversial - • reluctance to report
• penalties for incidents • low trust
• full access of judiciary to • mistakes hardly accepted
investigations • recommendations rarely followed-up
• no ESARR transposed into • weak safety management
legislation • very slow external investigation process
Finland + • EU Directives implemented + • ATCOs willing to report
• Protection from FOIA • trust medium to high
• protection provided as per Directive • incidents accepted
03/42/EC • mature CISM
• judiciary not involved in
investigations, access granted
France + • EU Directives implemented + • good management support
• clear protection for justified cases • ATCOs supportive (with differences
• judiciary access granted (sometimes between centres)
impeding the technical • incidents accepted
investigation)
Germany O • no formal protection from FOIA + • strong management support
• no formal protection of reporters • medium trust, but improving
• strong team spirit
• incidents accepted
Greece + • EU Directives implemented O • reluctance to report due to mistrust &
• confidentiality and protection fear of media
provided by law • incidents not always accepted
• judiciary not involved in
investigations, access granted
Hungary - • penal/civil sanctions exist in law - • fear of sanctions (regulator & justice)
• access of judiciary granted in all • consequences for ATCOs following an
investigations incident unclear
• ATCOs not supportive
• low acceptance of incidents
Ireland - • Directive 03/42/EC not yet + • good management support
transposed • high trust
• no legal or formal protection • ATCOs supportive
• access of judiciary granted (not a • Good team spirit
common practice) • incidents accepted
• CISM in place
Italy - • legal protection still imperfect - • major reservation in reporting
• full access of judiciary • fear of justice and aggressive media
• judiciary can impede an • mistrust
investigation or seize control of • bad history
evidence
Luxembourg - • Directive 2003/42/EC not yet - • reluctance to report
transposed • threat of police interference
• no confidentiality protection • no separated safety dept.
• no legal or formal protection • weak management support
• frequent access of judiciary in • under-reporting
investigations • low acceptance
Netherlands + • EU Directives implemented + • strong management support
• confidentiality and protection • high trust
provided by law • ATCOs very supportive
• judiciary not involved in • incidents accepted
investigations • CISM in place
Norway + • EU Directives implemented + • good management support
• clear protection for reporters • ATCOs supportive
• limited use of information by • CISM in place
judiciary • ATCOS part of investigating team
92
Poland - • no legal protection - • management support perceived as
• full access of judiciary to all data insufficient
• blaming culture
• low trust
Portugal O • Penal code considered as a threat + • strong management support
• high trust
• ATCOs supportive
• CISM in place
• Incidents accepted
Romania O • Air Law ambiguous and potentially O • some reluctance to report
punitive • trust not high
• team spirit not always present
• incidents not fully accepted
Slovakia O • Criminal Law ambiguous and O • low trust
potentially punitive • low incident acceptance
Slovenia O • legislation potentially punitive O • some reluctance
• incidents not fully accepted
Sweden - • very strong FOIA + • strong management support
• Directive 03/42/EC not yet transposed • high trust
• no protection • good ATCOs support
Switzerland O • legislation potentially punitive O • some fear of legislation
• police assist all investigations • trust not high
Turkey + • protection for ATCOs as public - • fear to report
servants • low trust
• legal support from ANSP • incidents hardly accepted by ATCOs
• investigations qualified as secret
• data available to judiciary only with
minister permission
UK + • EU Directives implemented + • strong management commitment
• clear protection for reporters • CISM & TRM in place
• limited access for judiciary • good ATCOs support
The signs in the left hand column and corresponding colours (reproduced in Figure 26 in
Chapter 3 Safety) represent the PRC's assessment of the respective ANSP/State in terms of
culture and legislation, as at 2006. The reasons for attributing a certain sign are briefly listed.
- sign: suboptimal characteristics, with elements that inhibit the "just culture";
0 : neutral, i.e. no clear support but no clear “threat” either;
+ sign: good legislation and/or culture, positive and supporting elements for "just culture”.
93
ANNEX V - AIRPORT CAPACITY/DELAY TRADE-OFFS
The figure below shows results from a simplified model analysing the relationship between
airport scheduling levels (runway utilisation ratio), variability of the TMA entry flow, and the
variability of the landing interval.
There is a clear interrelation between ATM performance expressed as queue length (Y Axis), the
variability of ATM operations (arrival flow, landing interval), and airport scheduling levels
(runway utilisation ratio – X Axis).
5
Variability of TMA entry flow (std. dev.)
4.5 =20 MIN
QUEUE LENGTH (units of landing interval)
=2 MIN
4 Reduced variability of
landing interval
3.5
3
Reduced variability of
2.5 TMA entry flow
1.5
1
Variability of landing interval (std. dev.)
0.5 39 Sec. 30 Sec.
18 Sec. 0 Sec.
0
0.8 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.9 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 1
Runway utilisation ratio
Airport capacity/delay trade-off

Some preliminary conclusions can be drawn:
• The service quality (queue length) shows a high sensitivity to changes in the runway
utilisation ratio, particularly for utilisation ratios above 90% (e.g. London Heathrow);
• With increasing runway utilisation ratios, the queue length can only be significantly
reduced if the variability of the TMA entry time is reduced to a level which is close to
the mean landing time.
• With increasing runway utilisation ratios, the queue length shows a disproportional
sensitivity to increases in the variability of the landing interval.
The airport capacity/delay trade-off, which is important information for airport scheduling
committees, can be significantly enhanced through tighter control of arrival rates into TMAs and
of landing intervals. Improvements can be very significant, especially at high airport utilisation
ratios.
94
ANNEX VI - TOP 50 MOST-CONSTRAINING POINTS & MAPS
Extra miles Extra miles

On Constrained per On Constrained Per
Waypoint State total Waypoint State total
border flights flight border flights flight
1 520
RIDSU Germany No 33 245 321 46 NTS France No 21 173 474 430 22
1 275
MOU France No 55 315 312 23 MOLUS Switzerland No 20 322 466 403 23
1 151
RESMI France No 46 783 005 25 MASEK Germany No 14 939 452 442 30
MAKOL Bulgaria Turkey Yes 30 152 899 230 30 *BCN Spain No 29 549 450 660 15
KUDES Switzerland No 45 751 872 537 19 MAXIR France No 16 041 439 670 27
PAM Netherlands No 47 370 794 696 17 BZO Italy No 27 125 438 806 16
TRA Switzerland No 37 738 763 785 20 PIGOS France No 16 840 434 928 26
SPY Netherlands No 40 212 727 190 18 STG Spain No 23 123 431 257 19
SUMIR Italy No 24 078 697 056 29 DIDAM Netherlands No 26 918 424 705 16
LERGA France No 46 880 685 212 15 MHN Spain No 16 137 411 893 26
LOHRE Germany No 32 104 681 430 21 ALSUS Cyprus No 12 064 402 696 33
ARTAX France No 52 334 647 428 12 MJV Spain No 18 856 400 158 21
BOMBI Germany No 57 950 646 958 11 KEPER France No 15 430 393 907 26
GEN Italy No 42 302 635 538 15 OBLAD France No 12 210 391 450 32
VADOM France No 14 584 600 793 41 LAM UK No 21 652 387 338 18
BRD Italy No 17 400 582 304 33 PIXIS France No 22 289 383 949 17
MUT Turkey No 17 148 574 492 34 RODOL UK No 35 159 382 126 11
GOW UK No 20 858 531 360 25 RDS Greece No 21 398 379 305 18
ALG Italy No 22 871 524 076 23 LGL France No 24 197 372 123 15
CPT UK No 37 425 517 882 14 VIBAS Spain No 22 323 362 538 16
MILPA France No 28 380 502 753 18 POL UK No 34 958 361 890 10
OLBEN Switzerland No 22 460 492 251 22 ROMIR Germany No 11 764 358 243 30
WAL UK No 69 458 490 167 7 ELB Italy No 38 025 356 394 9
BAG Turkey No 29 508 489 851 17 RKN Netherlands No 20 210 351 552 17
DJL France No 33 055 477 157 14 RLP France No 24 091 346 018 14
95
Maps of most-constraining points
The maps below show direct routes and actual routes through most-constraining points. The most
frequently flown routes for flights passing through waypoints are illustrated in red. The
corresponding theoretical direct routes are shown in blue.
RIDSU
MOU
RESMI MAKOL
PAM
KUDES
96
ANNEX VII - FLEXIBLE USE OF AIRSPACE CONCEPT
Introduction
The Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA) concept provides that airspace should no longer be
designated as either military or civil airspace but should be considered as one continuum and
used flexibly on a day-to-day basis.
The FUA Concept is based on three levels of airspace management (ASM) which are defined by
the Airspace Management Handbook:
• ASM Level 1: Strategic Airspace Management
• ASM Level 2: Pre-Tactical Airspace Management
• ASM Level 3: Tactical Airspace Management.
Airspace Management ASM Level 1
Phase Strategic Airspace Policy and Planning (e.g. co-ordination of major events such
as large scale major exercises)
Time and Means of Until the day before operations (D-1, 0600)
Publication Any type of AIS publication can be used.
Priority Rules & Established by the ASM level 1 in the State.
Negotiation Procedures

Phase Pre-tactical Airspace Allocation
Time and Means of Day before operation
Publication D-1 0600 --- D 0600
AUP to be issued by D-1 1400 to cover the period D 0600 to D+1 0600.
Priority Rules & Established by the ASM level 1 in the State.

Phase Real time use of airspace
Time and Means of Day of operations
Publication D 0600 --- D+1 0600.
Any cancellation of airspace allocated in the AUP would be notified through a
UUP issued at least one hour before change in affected airspace. However the
airspace status in real-time may differ from the one published in the AUP or
UUP.
Thus ATC shall ensure that pilots in command receive pertinent information on
the status of airspace.
In such a case, arrangements shall be in place to inform both the military and
civil ATC about the status of airspace in real-time, when such units are not
directly responsible to manage the airspace.
Priority Rules & Established by the ASM Level 1 and specified in local agreements.
97
ASM Level 1: Strategic Airspace Management
According to the FUA concept, a permanent high-level policy body should be responsible for
formulating a national policy and framework for airspace management matters. ASM Level 1
also spans the area from the collection of airspace requirements to the airspace design publication
(see illustration below).
Co-ordination and
Collection and Validation Conciliation
of Airspace Requirements of Airspace Requirements
Publication Airspace Design

of Airspace Design and Validation
Specific Competencies of
Level 1
Airspace Design Pre-Tactical Airspace Real-time Operations

Implementation Management (ASM Level 3)
(ASM level 2)
The ASM Handbook lists and identifies the core functions of the Strategic ASM Level 1,
disregarding issues relating to the separation between regulatory and service provision.
According to the ASM Handbook, this permanent national high-level policy body is required to
establish a joint civil and military process to perform, at a minimum, certain functions. These
include the following:
• reassess the national airspace structure and ATS route network annually with the aim of
planning (as far as possible) for flexible airspace structures and procedures;
• validate activities requiring airspace segregation, and assess the level of risk for other
airspace users;
• periodically review the national airspace needs and (where applicable) cross-border
airspace utilisation;
• periodically review the procedures and efficiency of ASM Level 2 operations, the
submission of airspace requests by the national Approved Agencies (AAs), the
negotiating procedures and priority rules for AMC airspace allocation).
The ASM Level 1 policy body also has the task of co-ordinating major events planned long
before the day of operation (such as large scale military exercises that require additional
segregated airspace), and notify these activities by AIS-publication. Depending on the State’s
ASM organisation, this co-ordination may take place in the AMC or another ASM organisation.
Major events are only occasional requirements, thus they require only ’temporary’ airspace
design implementation.
98
ASM Level 2: Pre-Tactical Airspace Management
ASM Level 2 is the act of conducting operational management within the framework of pre-
determined airspace structure, priority rules and negotiation procedures defined by Level 1.
The ASM Handbook recommends only the application of priority rules and negotiation
procedures during the pre-tactical phase. ASM Level 2 involves the day-to-day management and
temporary allocation of airspace and the communication of airspace allocation data to all parties
involved through a daily Airspace Use Plan (AUP). National or sub-regional Airspace
Management Cells (AMC) undertake ASM Level 2 activities. These may be full or part-time
units jointly staffed by civil and military personnel.
In order to promulgate the Airspace Use Plan (AUP) at the agreed time (by 1400 on the day
before operations), the planning of military activity (e.g. wing squadrons, naval shooting units,
etc.) must be prepared in advance. Equally the organisation and technical systems of the ATFM,
ATC, AIS and AO flight planning units should be adequate in order to make use of any airspace
released for civil operations (i.e. Conditional Routes).
Upstream, during ASM Level 1 activities the design and categorisation of conditional routes
should be done in such a way as to allow significant reduction in flight time and significant
savings in ATC delays. Where these benefits cannot be achieved, for instance, because the
TSA/CBA is located in a zone of no interest for GAT, then a pre-tactical activity should not
apply to such an area and military units should use the zone freely.
ASM Level 3: Tactical Airspace Management
The FUA concept provides that tactical operations conducted in real-time shall follow the rules
decided at the Strategic ASM level 1.
Normal ATC tasks are carried out in real-time operations, and in particular the following in the
context of FUA:
• Management of the airspace in real-time.
• Separation of GAT/OAT from temporary segregated airspace.
• Provision of separation between GAT and OAT, which fly in the same controlled
airspace or when GAT penetrates an active military training area.
Many activities have to be conducted in accordance with the rules and procedures and be
supported by specific technical systems in order to fulfil these tasks (co-ordination between ATC
units and between ATC and Air Defence Units, monitoring of active military areas, etc.). The
questionnaires, interviews and visits have assessed how these activities are conducted and
whether the tasks are adequately completed.
The ASM Handbook only covers common aspects applicable at ASM Level 3, leaving the
specifics to the definition by the ASM Level 1 body For example, OAT flight rules are decided at
national level. Different rules from one State to another may have an impact on civil/military co-
ordination..
The method of conducting real-time operations has a direct impact on safety.
99
ANNEX VIII - ANSP PERFORMANCE SHEETS
Data Source
Note: data from ACE are provisional as the final ACE report 2005 will be published in mid-2007
TRAFFIC Source
76
IFR Flight ACE D10 - Total IFR flights controlled by the ANSP.
F4 - IFR flights controlled by the ANSP (Forecast).
Seasonal Variation CFMU
Complexity Report Complexity metrics for ANSP Benchmarking analysis (report by the ACE Working
group on Complexity ([Ref. 12].
KEY DATA
Total IFR flights controlled ACE D10 - Total IFR flights controlled by the ANSP.
(‘000) F4 - IFR flights controlled by the ANSP (Forecast).
IFR flight-hours controlled ACE D14 - Total IFR flight-hours controlled by the ANSP.
(‘000) F6 - Total IFR flight-hours controlled by the ANSP (Forecast).
IFR airport movements ACE D16 - IFR airport movements controlled by the ANSP.
controlled (‘000) F7- IFR airport movements controlled by the ANSP (Forecast).
En Route ATFM delays CFMU ATFM delays due to a regulation applied on a sector or an en-route point.
(‘000 minutes) ATFM delays: see Glossary.
Airport ATFM Delays CFMU ATFM delays due to a regulation applied on an airport or a group of airports
(‘000 minutes) controlled by the ANSP.
Total Staff ACE C14 -TOTAL STAFF [En route + Terminal] (FTE = full time equivalent).
ATCOs in OPS ACE C4 - ATCOs in OPS [En route + Terminal].
F10 + F13 :Number of “ATCOs in OPS” planned to be operational at year end
[ACC+APP+TWR].
ATM/CNS provision costs ACE A12 - TOTAL “Controllable ANSP costs” [En-route + Terminal] in real terms.
(million €2004) F14 - TOTAL “Controllable ANSP costs” [En-route + Terminal] in real terms.
Capital Investment ACE F34 - TOTAL En route + Terminal CAPEX.
(million €) CAPEX: see Glossary.
SAFETY ANSP Annual Report published by the ANSP.
COST-EFFECTIVENESS
ATM/CNS provision Cost Per ACE ATM/CNS provision costs in real terms / Composite Flight hours.
composite Flight hour Composite Flight-hours: see Glossary.
Employment Cost Per ATCO ACE Employment Costs for “ATCOs in OPS” in real terms:
hour C15: Staff costs for “ATCOs in OPS” [En-route + Terminal].
ATCO hours: D20: Sum of “ATCO in OPS” hours on duty [ACC+APP+TWR].
Support Cost Per Composite ACE Support Cost in real terms: [ATM/CNS provision costs - Employment Costs for
Flight-hour “ATCOs in OPS”].
Composite flight-hour: see Glossary.
Composite flight-hours per ACE Composite flight-hours: see Glossary.
ATCO hours ATCO hours: D20: Sum of “ATCO in OPS” hours on duty [ACC+APP+TWR].
EN ROUTE ATFM DELAY

Days with En route delay per CFMU Number of days where en route ATFM delay per flight > 1 min in the ACC.
flight > 1 minute En-route ATFM delay: see Glossary.
En route AFM delay per flight CFMU The ACC selected is the ACC which as the maximum number of days with en-route
delay per flight > 1 minute in the year covered by the report.
En route ATFM delay CFMU Days with delays: Days with En route delay greater than 1 minute in the ACC.
% flights delayed CFMU Number of flights delayed due to en-route ATFM regulation divided by the total
number of flights.
Delay per delayed flight CFMU En route ATFM delay divided by the number of flights.
AIRPORT ATFM DELAY

ATFM Delay per Arrival flight CFMU ATFM Delay due to airport arrival regulations divided by the number of flights
landing at these airports. (For all the airports controlled by the ANSP).
ATFM Delay per Arrival flight CFMU Same as above but with the split between delay due to weather or other delays.
(Weather – Other)
Airports with ATFM delays CFMU List of Top 10 Airports with the highest Airport ATFM Arrival delay per arrival flight.
76
See EUROCONTROL “Specification for Information Disclosure, Version 2.5” (May 2006) document for
description of code (e.g.: D10).
100
ANSP name Country Page
Aena Spain A-1
ANS CR Czech Republic A-2
ANS Sweden Sweden A-3
ATSA Bulgaria Bulgaria A-4
Austro Control Austria A-5
Avinor Norway A-6
Belgocontrol Belgium A-7
Croatia Control Croatia A-8
DCAC Cyprus Cyprus A-9
DFS Germany A-10
DHMİ Turkey A-11
DSNA France A-12
EANS Estonia A-13
ENAV Italy A-14
Finavia Finland A-15
FYROM CAA FYROM A-16
HCAA Greece A-17
HungaroControl Hungary A-18
IAA Ireland A-19
LGS Latvia A-20
LPS Slovak Republic A-21
LVNL Netherlands A-22
MATS Malta A-23
MoldATSA Moldova A-24
MUAC A-25
NATA Albania Albania A-26
NATS United Kingdom A-27
NAV Portugal (FIR Lisboa) Portugal A-28
NAVIAIR Denmark A-29
Oro Navigacija Lithuania A-30
PATA Poland A-31
ROMATSA Romania A-32
Skyguide Switzerland A-33
Slovenia Control Slovenia A-34
UkSATSE Ukraine A-35
101
Aena, Spain
Traffic Key data 2004 2005 2006(F)
IFR Flights Seasonal variation Complexity

Total IFR flights controlled ('000) 1553 1646 1717
in thousand flights Peak Week / Avg Week = 116% IFR flight-hours controlled ('000) 1197 1269 1324
+7% +6% +4% +3% in flights per week High IFR airport movements controlled ('000) 1769 1892 1973
2500 6000
2000 5000 Avg En Route ATFM delays ('000 minutes) 672 1356 1881
4000 Airport ATFM delays ('000 minutes) 596 762 706
1500
3000
1000 Total Staff 3847 3936
2000 ATCOs in OPS 1825 1884 1948
500 1000
0 ATM/CNS provision costs (million €2005 ) 865 908 991
0
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F Low Capital Investment (million €) 173 160 114
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
No information found in ANSP's 2005 annual report.
Cost effectiveness
ATM/CNS provision Costs ATM/CNS provision Costs Employment Cost Support Cost per Productivity
per composite flight hour Composite flight hours per ATCO hour comp. flight hour composite flight hour
in €2005 per hour in €2005 per hour in €2005 per hour
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
600 140
400 120
100 262
200 141 158 161 241 242 0.56 0.60 0.58
80
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
Days with en route delay En route ATFM delay per flight En route ATFM delay
flight
per flight > 1 minute

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Madrid

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
200
% flig
dela
4 ACC
150
3 Madrid □ 143 6.3% 15 946
100 Barcelona ∆ 112 5.7% 17 694
2
50 Canarias ◊ 44 1.6% 19 96
1
Sevilla ○ 42 2% 20 145
0 0 Palma − 1 0% 19 1
2003 2004 2005 2006 Jan Mar May Jul Sep Nov
Airport ATFM delay

ATFM Delay per arrival flight ATFM Delay per arrival flight Airports with ATFM Delay
flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
in minute per flight All Airports in minute per flight All Airports
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
1.0 3
Airport
2 Madrid/Bara. 1.8 217 Alicante 0.2 38
0.5
Arrecife Lan. 1.6 24 Fuerteventur. 0.1 21
1
Ibiza 1.1 25 Barcelona 0.1 164
0.0 Palma De Mal. 0.4 95 Reus 0.1 6
0
Malaga 0.3 62 Mahon 0.1 16
A-1
ANS CR, Czech Republic

800 2500
2000 Avg En Route ATFM delays ('000 minutes) 485 476 495
600
Airport ATFM delays ('000 minutes) 134 225 106
1500
400 Total Staff
1000 769 828
200 ATCOs in OPS 157 160 174
500
0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
No case was recorded in 2005 in which ANS CR employees were

involved in or directly caused an air accident or seriously
endangered the safety of air transport. ... Seven incidents
occurred in 2005; in accordance with the ICAO classification five
were assessed as “Significant Incident”, one as “Serious Incident”
and one as “No effect”. Taking into account the significant
increase of air traffic recently (by 55% since 2002), it is a positive
trend of safety where the number of incidents converted to the
operation unit permanently declines. (Extract from ANSP's 2005
annual report).
ESSAR 2 compliant severity classification
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
500 180
400 160
300 140
120 278 0.93
0.77 0.90
200 256 258
100 61
100 44 48
80
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Prague

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
150
% flig
dela
4 ACC
100 3 Prague □ 106 5.3% 16 495
2
50
1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
3.0 3
2.5 Airport
2.0 2 Prague/Ruzy. 1.3 80
1.5
1.0 1
0.5
0.0 0
A-2
ANS Sweden, Sweden

1000 2500

600 1500
400 1000
Total Staff 919 927
ATCOs in OPS 489 505 508
200 500
0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
No accidents have been caused by the operations of the ANS

Division. Within the framework of proactive aviation safety work,
staff members participate actively by openly reporting events that
in any way adversely affect aviation safety. (Extract from ANSP's
2005 annual report).
ESSAR 2 compliant severity classification.
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
300 120
110
200 100
90 183
100 63 61 62 168 158 0.71 0.72 0.69
80
70
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Malmo

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Malmo □ 1 0.2% 15 14
Stockholm ∆ 0 0.0% 37 2
40 2
20 1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
1.0 3
Airport
2 Stockholm/A. 0.1 113
0.5
Gotenborg/La. 0.1 33
1
Stockholm-Br. 0.0 21
0.0 0
A-3
ATSA Bulgaria, Bulgaria

Total IFR flights controlled ('000) 361 399 n/a
in thousand flights Peak Week / Avg Week = 147% IFR flight-hours controlled ('000) 121 130 n/a
+14% +10% in flights per week High IFR airport movements controlled ('000) 62 69
500 2000

1500
300
1000 Total Staff
200 1329 1353
500 ATCOs in OPS 271 252 252
100
0 ATM/CNS provision costs (million €2005 ) 68 73 n/a
0
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F Low Capital Investment (million €) 7 n/a n/a
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
600 120
110
400 100
90 37
200 33 34
80 423 410 408 0.38 0.41 0.45
70
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Sofia

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Sofia □ 0 0.0% 0
Varna ∆ 0 0.0% 0
40 2
20 1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
1.0 3
Airport
2
0.5
1
0.0 0
A-4
Austro Control, Austria

1200 3500
1000 3000
Avg En Route ATFM delays ('000 minutes) 309 138 201
800
2000
600 Total Staff
1500 824 816
400 ATCOs in OPS
1000 259 261 261
200 500
0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
National severity classification. Source: 2006 erneute Verkehrszunahme im österr. Luftraum - Handout
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
500 140
400
120
300
100
200
97 104
335 298 262 0.80 0.86 0.90
100 80
96
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Wien

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Wien □ 25 1.4% 21 201

40 2
20 1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
3.5 5
3.0 Airport
4
2.5
2.0 3 Vienna 4.2 129
1.5
2 Salzburg 0.2 17
1.0
1
Innsbruck 0.0 10
0.5
0.0 0
A-5
Avinor, Norway

700 2000
500 1500
400
1000 Total Staff
300 947 904
200 500 ATCOs in OPS 383 444 419
100
0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
In 2005, 1 air accident and 15 serious incidents were registered in

which Avinor was a contributory party, compared with 0 air
accidents and 13 serious incidents in 2004. It is Avinor’s aim that
there should be no air accidents in which Avinor has a
contributory part and that the number of incidents in which Avinor
has a contributory part should not increase, regardless of any
increase in the volume of traffic. The total number of reported
undesired incidents in 2005 was 1,577, which is at the same level
as 2004. (Extract from ANSP's 2005 annual report).
ESSAR 2 compliant severity classification. Source: AVINOR: Årsrapport sikkerhet 2005
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
400 110
300 100
200 90
80 72 70 73 0.62 0.68 0.59
100 213 189
70 144
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Bodo

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Bodo □ 43 2.7% 16 78
Oslo ∆ 10 0.4% 18 23
40 2
Stavanger ◊ 9 0.6% 18 22
20 1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
1.0 3
Airport
2 Tromso/Lang. 0.2 18
0.5
Oslo/Garderm. 0.2 108
1
Bodo 0.1 20
0.0 Alta 0.1 5
0
Bergen/Flesl. 0.0 44
A-6
Belgocontrol, Belgium

700 2000
500 1500
400
1000 Total Staff
300 1013 979
200 500 ATCOs in OPS 235 233 232
100
0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
The ratio of the total number of incidents divided by the total

number of movements is 0.00201%. The total number of incidents
is 21. To give a meaningful picture, aviation safety statistics need
to relate to a period longer than one year. Thus, 2004 was
exceptional with 18 incidents and a ratio of 0.00168%. This is well-
below the ratio for 2000 (0.00371%) and 2001 (0.00236%). The
number of Class "A" and Class "B" incidents, which are the most
serious incidents, was 12 in 2005. There was a historically low
number of 6 in 2004, 12 in 2003, 13 in 2002, 19 in 2001 and 22 in
2000. (Extracted and translated from ANSP's 2005 annual
report).
ESSAR 2 severity classification. Source: 2005 Annual report
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
800 110
600 100
400 90
467 499 519
200
80
100 98 114 0.58 0.57 0.64
70
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Brussels

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Brussels □ 11 0.5% 21 58
40 2
20 1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
1.5 4
Airport
3
1.0 Brussels 1.2 124
2 Liege/Liege 0.1 14
0.5
1
0.0 0
A-7
Croatia Control, Croatia

500 1400
400
1200
300 800
200 600 Total Staff 723 735
400 ATCOs in OPS 196 201 207
100
200
0
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F Low Capital Investment (million €) n/a 5 4
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
ANSP's 2005 Annual report not available.
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
400 160
300 140
200 120
100 43 48 48 256 245 230 0.51 0.54
100 0.42
80
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Zagreb

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
200
% flig
dela
4 ACC
150
3 Zagreb □ 179 9.5% 16 472
100
2
50
1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
1.0 3
Airport
2 Split 0.3 7
0.5
Dubrovnik 0.1 7
1
Zagreb 0.0 19
0.0 0
A-8
DCAC Cyprus, Cyprus

300 800
700 En Route ATFM delays ('000 minutes) 105 180 165
250 Avg
600
500
150 400 Total Staff 213 179
100 300
200 ATCOs in OPS 57 60 65
50
100
0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
400 160
300 140
200 120
100 44 43 223 251 0.86 0.90 0.91
100 42 180
80
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Nicosia

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Nicosia □ 74 3.6% 21 165

40 2
20 1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
1.0 3
Airport
2 Paphos 0.1 7
0.5
1
0.0 0
A-9
DFS, Germany

3500 10000
2000 6000
1500 4000
Total Staff 4804 4880
1000 ATCOs in OPS 1531 1655 1716
500 2000
0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
in 2005, the number of aircraft proximities fell for the fourth

consecutive year and reached a new low. Three cases were
classified as Category A (immediate risk) or B (possible risk),
compared to six in 2004, and none of them were caused by air
traffic control (compared to 3 in 2004). The number of
infringements of separation, a DFS quality indicator for air safety,
increased slightly. (Extract from ANSP's 2005 annual report).
ESSAR 2 compliant severity classification. Source: DFS Mobility report 2005
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
600 120
110
400 100
90 369
200 343 316 0.83 0.86 0.82
80 100 104 104
70
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Munchen

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Munchen □ 20 0.8% 22 230

Rhein ∆ 13 0.7% 20 191
40 2
Berlin ◊ 2 0.4% 58 76
20 1
Langen ○ 2 0% 17 99
0 0 Bremen − 0 0% 15 5
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
1.5 3
Airport
1.0 2 Frankfurt 2.7 244 Stuttgart 0.1 75
Munich 1.8 204 Cologne/Bonn 0.0 75
0.5 1
Berlin-Tegel 0.7 69 Leipzig/Hall. 0.0 18
0.0 Dusseldorf 0.2 107 Hanover 0.0 40
0
Hamburg 0.2 79
A - 10
DHMI, Turkey

1000 3000

600
1500
400 Total Staff 4442 4688
1000 ATCOs in OPS 505 566 612
200 500
0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
In 2005, a total of 100 incident reports have been investigated, 48

of which were classified as ATM-related. (Extract from ANSP's
2005 annual report).
ESSAR 2 severity classification. Source : 2005 DHMI Annual report
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
400 160
300 140
200 120
16 359 309
100
100
14 268 0.55 0.62 0.62
80 11
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Istanbul

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Istanbul □ 1 0.1% 26 9
Ankara ∆ 0 0.0% 0
40 2
20 1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
3.5 5
3.0 Airport
4
2.5
2.0 3 Istanbul/At. 1.8 114
1.5
2 Antalya 0.6 48
1.0
1
Mugla-Dalama. 0.0 10
0.5
0.0 0
A - 11
DSNA, France

3500 10000
2000 6000
1500 4000
1000 ATCOs in OPS 2512 2595 2595
500 2000
0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
Trends.These figures have not been classified according to

incident cause or seriousness. The increase in the number of
notified incursions is a consequence of the efforts to raise
employee awareness about these incidents and their reporting.
(Extract from ANSP's 2005 annual report).
National severity classification. Source: Rapport d'activité de la DGAC 2005
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
500 120
400 110
300 100
200 90 0.75 0.74 0.73
80 63 61 64 318 306 298
100
70
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Brest

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Brest □ 27 1.9% 26 412

Reims ∆ 22 2.3% 15 297
40 2
Bordeaux ◊ 16 0.6% 22 107
20 1
Marseille A. ○ 10 0% 23 83
0 0 Paris − 10 2% 18 498
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
1.5 3
Airport
1.0 2 Cannes Mand. 10.6 7 Toussus Le N. 0.3 5
Paris/Charle. 2.2 270 Lyon/Sartola. 0.2 64
0.5 1
Paris/Orly 1.9 117 Bordeaux/Mer. 0.2 29
0.0 Paris/Le Bou. 1.5 31 Nice 0.2 68
0
Toulouse/Bla. 0.3 45 Marseille/Pr. 0.1 48
A - 12
EANS, Estonia

200 500

150
300
100 Total Staff
200 100 106
100
0
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F Low Capital Investment (million €) 0.4 0.3 2
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
There have been no accidents caused by ATC in the history of

EANS and there were no incidents recorded in 2005 according to
EUROCONTROL definition under the responsibilities of the
company. (Extract from ANSP's 2005 annual report)
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
250 140
200
120
150
100 100
32 34 159
50
28 133 118 1.05 1.15
80 0.79
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Tallin

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Tallin □ 0 0.0% 0
40 2
20 1
0 0
2005 2006 Jan Mar May Jul Sep Nov
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
1.0 3
Airport
2
0.5
1
0.0 0
A - 13
ENAV, Italia

2000 6000
1500
1000 3000
2000 ATCOs in OPS
500 1252 1297 1297
1000
0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
The indicators show a substantial performance improvement, from

an annual index of 5.6 significant events in 2003 to an index of
3.1 significant events in 2005. This improvement reaches even
higher values if the component of serious events is considered,
where in 2005 there were only 5 such events, compared to 21 in
2003, which results in a 77% better performance over the three
years. (Extracted and translated from ENAV S.p.A. Bilancio di
esercizio 2005). There were 138 separation minima infringement
and TCAS activation reports filed in 2005. This is a much higher
figure than 36 in 2003 and 44 in 2004. The substantial difference
can be explained mainly by the implementation of the ANSV-
ENAV SpA agreement, signed on January 25th 2005. Under this
agreement, the ANSV is informed promptly of all ATM safety
events that occur in airspace where ATS is provided by ENAV.
(Extracted and translated from ANSV - Rapporto Informativo
sull'Attività Svolta dall'Agenzia anno 2005).
ESSAR 2 compliant severity classification. Source: ANSV - Rapporto Informativo sull'Attività Svolta dall'Agenzia Anno 2005
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
600 110
100
400
90
200 80 78 90 82 349 357 352 0.77 0.74 0.66
70
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Milano

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Milano □ 32 1.4% 21 188

Roma ∆ 21 0.9% 23 185
40 2
Padova ◊ 19 1.5% 16 143
20 1
Brindisi ○ 0 0% 21 0
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
2.5 3
2.0 Airport
1.5 2 Milan/Malpe. 4.8 126 Olbia Costa . 0.6 15
1.0 Rome/Fiumici. 2.9 158 Catania Font. 0.6 27
1
0.5 Bergamo/Orio. 0.9 28 Torino/Casel. 0.4 27
0.0 Napoli Capod. 0.9 31 Firenze/Pere. 0.4 13
0
Milan/Linate 0.6 65 Palermo Punt. 0.2 24
A - 14
Finavia, Finland

+6% -0% +2% +4% in flights per week High IFR airport movements controlled ('000) 259 259 263
300 800
250 Avg
600
500
150 400 Total Staff 525 559
100 300
200 ATCOs in OPS 200 199 204
50
100
0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
In 2005, 924 occurrence reports were made within the CAA

concerning air navigation, of which 281 reports were required by
the authority and concerned aviation as a whole. ...The number of
reports has risen from previous years. The increase over 2003
was 46 %, which indicates a favourable trend in reporting
activity... A total of 107 runway incidents were reported
throughout the year to the end of December, of which 77 were
runway incursions (RI) and 30 runway safety occurrences (RSO)...
The first fatal accident to occur in Finnish commercial aviation
since 1996 occurred when a helicopter on a regular, scheduled
flight crashed into the sea in August. As far as general aviation
was concerned, the year was slightly better than the previous two.
Not a single fatal accident occurred despite a slight rise in the
number of flying hours. The number of accidents and damage
incidents remained the same as for the year before. (Extract from
ANSP's 2005 annual report).
Unknown severity classification.
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
400 120
300 110
100
200 90
68 67 69 0.63 0.65 0.67
100 80 191 185 182
70
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Tampere

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Tampere □ 1 0.2% 19 7
Rovaniemi ∆ 0 0.0% 0
40 2
20 1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
1.0 3
Airport
2 Helsinki-Va. 0.2 89
0.5
1
0.0 0
A - 15
FYROM CAA, FYROM

150 600
100 400 Airport ATFM delays ('000 minutes) 0 0 0
300
Total Staff 274 300
50 200 ATCOs in OPS 64 58 62
100
0
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F Low Capital Investment (million €) 5 2 0.2
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
ANSP's 2005 annual report not available.
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
800 140
600 120
400 100
17 17 19 527
433 0.32
200
80 357 0.25 0.26
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Skopje

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Skopje □ 0 0.0% 0
40 2
20 1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
1.0 3
Airport
2
0.5
1
0.0 0
A - 16
HCAA, Greece

Total IFR flights controlled ('000) 534 548 n/a
in thousand flights Peak Week / Avg Week = 150% IFR flight-hours controlled ('000) 439 428 n/a
700 2500
400 1500
300 1000
200 ATCOs in OPS 599 599 599
100 500
0
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F Low Capital Investment (million €) 8 n/a n/a
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
300 140
200 120
100
100 55 56 173 0.52 0.56
133 130
80
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Athinai+Mak.

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Athinai+Mak. □ 14 0.3% 47 88
40 2
20 1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
2.0 4
Airport
1.5 3
Iraklion/Ni. 6.9 23 Athens 0.0 92
1.0 2 Kos 3.5 7
0.5 1 Diagoras 2.3 16
0.0 Ioannis/Kapo. 1.0 8
0
Makedonia 0.3 25
A - 17
HungaroControl, Hungary

800 2500

600
1500
400 Total Staff
1000 664 662
200 ATCOs in OPS 182 183 177
500
0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
ESSAR 2 severity classification. Source: Költségvetési Alapokmány 2006
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
400 160
300 140
200 120
100 51 242 0.84
100 40 42 207 179 0.63 0.76
80
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Budapest

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Budapest □ 3 0.1% 21 13
40 2
20 1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
3.5 3
3.0 Airport
2.5
2 Budapest/Fe. 0.4 62
2.0
1.5
1.0 1
0.5
0.0 0
A - 18
IAA, Ireland

700 2000
500 1500
400
1000 Total Staff
300 463 463
200 500 ATCOs in OPS 226 234 238
100
0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
ESSAR 2 compliant severity classification. Source: Irish Aviation Authority - Air Proximity Occurrences
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
400 140
300 120
200 100
60 67 66 222 248 0.73 0.73 0.81
100 199
80
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Dublin

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Dublin □ 3 0.3% 14 8
Shannon ∆ 0 0.0% 13 0
40 2
20 1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
1.0 3
Airport
2 Dublin 0.3 96
0.5
1
0.0 0
A - 19
LGS, Latvia

200 600
150
100 300
Total Staff 218 249
200 ATCOs in OPS
50 53 51 54
100
0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
400 180
300 160
140
200 120
100 100 21 292 0.79
16 16 197 176 0.58
80 0.37
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Riga

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Riga □ 0 0.0% 0
40 2
20 1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
1.0 3
Airport
2
0.5
1
0.0 0
A - 20
LPS, Slovak Republic

500 1400
400
1200
300 800
200 600 Total Staff 483 466
400 ATCOs in OPS 123 116 125
100
200
0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
The system of reporting incidents in the air traffic considerably

improved, which, together with raising public awareness, was
manifested on the increased number of reported incidents. In
2005 the number of reported extraordinary air incidents in the
Slovak Republic was 214, which in comparison with 108 incidents
in 2004 represents increase of 98%. Positive trend was recorded
in comparison with the year 2004, when LPS SR, š. p. directly
participated in one serious incident and indirectly in 1 incident,
while in 2005 it indirectly participated only in one incident. (Extract
from ANSP's 2005 annual report).
ESSAR 2 severity classification.
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
600 160
140
400
120
200 100 409 0.49
28 31 39 359 312 0.37 0.41
80
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Bratislava

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Bratislava □ 3 1.0% 14 43
40 2
20 1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
1.0 3
Airport
2
0.5
1
0.0 0
A - 21
LVNL, Netherlands

in flights per week High IFR airport movements controlled ('000) 469 467 481
700 +1% -1% +4% +5% 2000
1500
400
1000 Total Staff
300 1050 1002
200 500 ATCOs in OPS 166 202 207
100
0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
In the year under review 3 516 incidents with relevance for safety
were reported. The greater part of the reported incidents
concerned a V1 or V2 report, so without any consequences for air
traffic control. 2005 shows a slightly rising trend in the numbers of
reported V3 and V4 incidents, which means the incidents leading
to a (potentially) dangerous situation, including accidents. At the
same time there is a substantial decline in the number of reported
incidents demonstrably (partly) caused by air traffic control. This
decline cannot be accounted for. There was a stable ATM
situation: few system modifications and more stable traffic flows.
This resulted in few mistakes. Again the role of the public
prosecutor may have led to a decline in willingness to report
incidents with a causal role of LVNL. (Extract from ANSP's 2005
annual report).
ESSAR 2 compliant severity classification. Source: ANSP's 2005 Annual report
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
800 120
600 110
100
400 90
83 94 83
200 80 514 508 597 1.02 1.03 0.83
70
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Amsterdam

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Amsterdam □ 4 0.5% 14 39
40 2
20 1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
2.0 3
Airport
1.5
2 Amsterdam 0.7 217
1.0
0.5 1
0.0 0
A - 22
MATS, Malta

100 300

60
150
40 Total Staff 183 178
20 50
0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
400 120
300 110
100
200 90
330
100 80 18 19 19 255 247 0.41 0.41 0.42
70
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Malta

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Malta □ 0 0.0% 0
40 2
20 1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
1.0 3
Airport
2 Malta/Luqa 0.0 14
0.5
1
0.0 0
A - 23
MoldATSA, Moldova

35 120
20
60 Total Staff
15 308 314
40 ATCOs in OPS
10 48 53 53
5 20
0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety

Source of figure : Administraţia de Stat a Aviaţiei Civile a
Republicii Moldova, Raport cu privire la rezultatele activităţii
Administraţiei de Stat a Aviaţiei Civile pe anul 2006 - The State
Administration for Civil Aviation of the Republic of Moldova -
Report on the activities of the State Administration for Civil
Aviation in 2006.
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
400 180
300 160
140
200 120
4.3 4.4 298 282 279 0.13 0.13 0.13
100 100 3.5
80
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

Days with en route delay
00 min)
En route ATFM delay per flight En route ATFM delay

flight

1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Chisinau

delayed
delays>
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
100 5
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Chisinau □ 0 0.0% 0
40 2
20 1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
1.0 3
Airport
2
0.5
1
0.0 0
A - 24
MUAC

+4% +7% +6% +4% in flights per week High IFR airport movements controlled ('000)
2000 5000
1500
3000
1000 Total Staff
2000 587 576
500 ATCOs in OPS 206 210 212
1000
0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
During 2005, there were no category A incidents (risk of collision),

10 Category B incidents (safety not assured) and 24 category C
incidents (no risk of collision). Maastricht UAC contributed directly
or indirectly to 8 Category B and 16 category C incidents. (Extract
from ANSP's 2005 annual report).
ESSAR 2 severity classification. Source: ANSP's 2005 annual report
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
300 140
200 120
100
100 108 107 110 193 1.59 1.53 1.65
80 172 153
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Maastricht

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Maastricht □ 21 2.0% 15 447

40 2
20 1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
1.0 3
Airport
2
0.5
1
0.0 0
A - 25
NATA Albania, Albania

150 600
300
Total Staff 149 168
50 200 ATCOs in OPS 30 26 36
100
0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
500 180
400 160
300 140
200 120 349 0.56
100 20 279 271 0.41 0.44
100 15
80 12
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Tirana

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Tirana □ 0 0.0% 0
40 2
20 1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
1.0 3
Airport
2
0.5
1
0.0 0
A - 26
NATS, United Kingdom

3500 10000
2000 6000
1500 4000
1000 ATCOs in OPS 1314 1387 1411
500 2000
0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
Airprox: annual totals for the financial year ended 31 March
Despite the increasing volumes of traffic, our staff continued to
demonstrate an overriding commitment to safety. The number of
airproxes where NATS was providing a service fell from 71 to 57
and the number attributable to NATS fell from 27 to 18. None of
these was risk-bearing. In assessing one risk-bearing Airprox B to
a pilot, the UK Airprox Board also cited NATS as being
contributory. (Extract from ANSP's 2006 annual report).
ESSAR 2 compliant severity classification. Source: ANSP's 2006 annual report and accounts
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
500 120
400 110
300 100
200 90 0.92 0.92 0.91
79 87 83
100 80 382 329 335
70
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight London ACC

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
120
% flig
dela
100 4 ACC
80 London ACC □ 55 3.1% 19 1133
3
60 Manchester ∆ 41 2.7% 17 272
2
40 London TMA ◊ 4 0.5% 19 127
20 1
Prestwick ○ 2 0% 15 32
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
1.5 5
4 Airport
1.0 London/Heat. 3.0 239 London/Luton 0.4 55
3
2 London/City 2.8 40 Edinburgh 0.2 62
0.5
1
London/Gatwi. 0.6 132 Bristol/Luls. 0.1 36
0.0 Manchester 0.5 113 Birmingham 0.1 58
0
London/Stans. 0.5 103 Glasgow 0.0 52
A - 27
NAV Portugal (FIR Lisboa), Portugal

500 1400
400
1200
300 800
200 600 Total Staff 727 723
400 ATCOs in OPS 204 195 200
100
200
0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
No information found in ANSP's 2005 annual report, NAV Portugal

is required by law to supply all its safety data to the State
authorities for publication; no specific ATM-data published.
"With reference to the investigation of accidents and serious
incidents, 161 occurrences between 1 January 2001 and 31
December 2005 were the subject of an investigation process, the
occurrences being ranged according to their type of aereal
activity. 96 of these occurrences were classified as accidents
"ACCID" and the remaining 65 as serious incidents "INCID", being
ranged according to the respective years of occurrence".
(Extracted and translated from Gabinete de Prevenção e
Investigação de Acidentes com Aeronaves (GPIAA) –
Estatísticas de 2005)
ESSAR 2 compliant severity classification. Source: GPIAA - Estatísticas de 2005
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
500 120
400 110
300 100
200 90
110 315 333 308 0.73 0.78 0.84
100 80 93 97
70
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Lisboa

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Lisboa □ 1 0.0% 25 4
40 2
20 1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
1.0 3
Airport
2 Porto 0.3 24
0.5
Lisbon 0.1 68
1
Faro 0.0 20
0.0 0
A - 28
NAVIAIR, Denmark

800 2000

600 1500
400 1000 Total Staff 672 635
200 500 ATCOs in OPS 214 221 229

0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
Number of incidents : The number of incidents concerning near

collision (ACC, TWR/APP CPH and domestic airports) where
Naviair has been directly or indirectly involved, shall in 2005 be
below 20.
Status for the year: The requirement is met. The number of
incidents concerning near collision where Naviair has been
directly or indirectly involved are for 2005 recorded to
17.(Extracted and translated from ANSP's 2005 annual report).
ESSAR 2 severity classification.
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
400 110
300 100
200 90
80 65 62 62 211 222 219 0.84 0.88 0.83
100
70
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Copenhagen

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Copenhagen □ 46 2.1% 16 176

40 2
20 1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
1.0 3
Airport
2 Copenhagen/. 1.0 129
0.5
Billund 0.0 19
1
0.0 0
A - 29
Oro Navigacija, Lithuania

200 500

150
300
100 Total Staff
200 323 326
100
0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
Unknown severity classification. Source : Lithuanian CAA Website.
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
500 180
400 160
300 140
200 120 0.37
16 17
100 100 15 381 313 0.27 0.32
296
80
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Vilnius

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Vilnius □ 0 0.0% 0
40 2
20 1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
1.0 3
Airport
2
0.5
1
0.0 0
A - 30
PATA, Poland

Total IFR flights controlled ('000) n/a 404 436
in thousand flights Peak Week / Avg Week = 118% IFR flight-hours controlled ('000) n/a 254 285
600 2000
1500
300 1000 Total Staff n/a 1087
200 ATCOs in OPS
500 n/a 332 356
100
0 ATM/CNS provision costs (million €2005 ) n/a 78 118
0
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F Low Capital Investment (million €) n/a 0.0 n/a
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
PATA ensures a high air traffic safety level. Though 2005

witnessed a considerable growth of air traffic, no accident or
serious incident caused directly by ATM was reported. (Extract
from ANSP's annual report 2005)
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2005
400 180
300 160
140
200 120 187 0.75
100 48
100
80
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Warszawa

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
140
% flig
dela
120 4 ACC
100
3 Warszawa □ 133 5.5% 19 468
80
60 2
40
20 1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
1.5 5
4 Airport
1.0 Warsaw/Okec. 2.1 72
3
0.5 2
1
0.0 0
A - 31
ROMATSA, Romania

500 1600
400 1200 Avg
300 1000
800 Total Staff
200 1892 1896
600
400 ATCOs in OPS 504 537 537
100
200
0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
600 160
140
400
120
200 100
38 389 367 358 0.30 0.33 0.35
35 36
80
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Bucuresti

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Bucuresti □ 0 0.0% 0
40 2
20 1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
1.0 3
Airport
2
0.5
1
0.0 0
A - 32
Skyguide, Switzerland

1400 4000
1200 3500 En Route ATFM delays ('000 minutes) 792 956 1314
3000 Avg
2500
800
2000 Total Staff
600 1194 1203
1500
400 1000 ATCOs in OPS 286 290 293
200 500
0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
No information found in 2005 ANSP's annual report.
ESSAR 2 compliant severity classification. OFAC - Statistique des cas de proximité d’aéronefs dans l’espace aérien suisse (airprox) 2005
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
600 120
110
400 100
90
200
80 119 115 114 382 1.07 1.11 1.13
328 314
70
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Zurich

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
200
% flig
dela
4 ACC
150
3 Zurich □ 168 7.6% 16 912
100 Geneva ∆ 57 3.6% 18 402
2
50
1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
3.5 3
3.0 Airport
2.5
2 Zurich 1.9 124
2.0
1.5
1.0 1
0.5
0.0 0
A - 33
Slovenia Control, Slovenia

250 1000

150 600
100 400
Total Staff 153 166
ATCOs in OPS 60 64 71
50 200
0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
500 160
400 140
300 120
200 100 51 56 257 239
45 207 0.41 0.44
100 0.31
80
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Ljubjana

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Ljubjana □ 5 0.3% 15 10
40 2
20 1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
1.0 3
Airport
2
0.5
1
0.0 0
A - 34
UkSATSE, Ukraine

500 1400
400
1200
300 800
200 600 Total Staff 5596 5583
400 ATCOs in OPS 1381 1278 1278
100
200
0
May
Mar
Jul
Oct
Apr
Dec
Jan
Feb
Jun
Aug
Sep
Nov
Safety
Cost effectiveness
per ATCO hour
index 100 in 2003
500 160
400 140
300 120
200 100 9 330 0.19
7 6 266 276 0.16
100 0.12
80
0
60
2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2007F 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
En Route ATFM delay

00 min)
flight

>1m
ith
r
Delay pe
Delay ('0
hts
in days in minute per flight Ljubjana

delayed
yed
ACC(s)
Days w
5
delays
100
% flig
dela
80 4 ACC
60 3 Ljubjana □ 5 0.3% 15 10
40 2
20 1
0 0
Airport ATFM delay

flights
flights
Weather Other
ht
flight
r
er
arrival flig
Delay pe
Delay p
Arrival
Arrival
arrival
('000)
('000)
1.0 3
Airport
2
0.5
1
0.0 0
A - 35
ANNEX IX - GLOSSARY
ACARE Advisory Council for Aeronautics Research in Europe

ACAS Airborne Collision Avoidance System
ACC Area Control Centre. That part of ATC that is concerned with en-route traffic coming
from or going to adjacent centres or APP. It is a unit established to provide air traffic
control service to controlled flights in control areas under its jurisdiction.
Accident An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between
the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all
(ICAO Annex 13) such persons have disembarked, in which:
a) a person is fatally or seriously injured as a result of:
• Being in the aircraft, or
• Direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts which have become
detached from the aircraft, or
• Direct exposure to jet blast,
except when the injuries are from natural causes, self-inflicted or inflicted by other
persons, or when the injuries are to stowaways hiding outside the areas normally
available to the passengers and crew; or
b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which:
• Adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight characteristics
of the aircraft, and
• Would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected
component, except for engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited
to the engine, its cowlings or accessories, or for damage limited to propellers,
wing tips, antennas, tyres, brakes, fairings, small dents or puncture holes in the
aircraft skin;
c) the aircraft is missing or completely inaccessible.
ACE Air Traffic Management Cost-effectiveness
AEA Association of European Airlines (http://www.aea.be)
Aena Aeropuertos Españoles y Navegación Aérea, ANS Provider in Spain
Agency The EUROCONTROL Agency
Airprox Aircraft proximity report. A situation in which, in the opinion of a pilot or an air traffic
services personnel, the distance between aircraft as well as their relative positions and
(ICAO Doc 4444) speed have been such that the safety of the aircraft involved may have been
compromised.
Airspace events Separation infringements and inadequate separation (PRU definition)
AIS Aeronautical Information Service
ANS Air Navigation Service. A generic term describing the totality of services provided in
order to ensure the safety, regularity and efficiency of air navigation and the
appropriate functioning of the air navigation system.
ANS CR Air Navigation Services of the Czech Republic
ANSP Air Navigation Services Provider
ANS Sweden ANS Department of Swedish Civil Aviation Administration (LFV)
APP Approach Control Unit
ASM Airspace Management
ASMT ATM Safety Monitoring Tool
ATC Air Traffic Control. A service operated by the appropriate authority to promote the
safe, orderly and expeditious flow of air traffic.
ATCO Air Traffic Control Officer
ATFCM Air Traffic Flow and Capacity Management.
ATFM Air Traffic Flow Management. ATFM is established to support ATC in ensuring an
optimum flow of traffic to, from, through or within defined areas during times when
demand exceeds, or is expected to exceed, the available capacity of the ATC system,
including relevant aerodromes.
ATFM delay The duration between the last Take-Off time requested by the aircraft operator and the
(CFMU) Take-Off slot given by the CFMU.
102
ATFM Regulation When traffic demand is anticipated to exceed the declared capacity in en-route control
centres or at the departure/arrival airport, ATC units may call for “ATFM regulations”.
ATM Air Traffic Management. A system consisting of a ground part and an air part, both of
which are needed to ensure the safe and efficient movement of aircraft during all
phases of operation. The airborne part of ATM consists of the functional capability
which interacts with the ground part to attain the general objectives of ATM. The
ground part of ATM comprises the functions of Air Traffic Services (ATS), Airspace
Management (ASM) and Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM). Air traffic services
are the primary components of ATM.
ATS Air Traffic Service. A generic term meaning variously, flight information service,
alerting service, air traffic advisory service, air traffic control service.
ATSA Bulgaria Air Traffic Services Authority of Bulgaria
Austro Control Österreichische Gesellschaft für Zivilluftfahrt mbH.b. ANS Provider Austria.
AVINOR ANS Provider in Norway
Bad weather For the purpose of this report, “bad weather” is defined as any weather condition (e.g.
strong wind, low visibility, snow) which causes a significant drop in the available
airport capacity.
Belgocontrol ANS Provider, Belgium
CAA Civil Aviation Authority
CDM Collaborative Decision Making
CDR Conditional Routes
CEATS Central European Air Traffic System
CFIT Controlled Flight Into Terrain
CFMU EUROCONTROL Central Flow Management Unit
CNS Communications, Navigation, Surveillance.
CO2 Carbon dioxide
CODA EUROCONTROL Central Office for Delay Analysis
Composite flight-hour En-route flight-hours plus IFR airport movements weighted by a factor that reflected
the relative importance of terminal and en-route costs in the cost base (see ACE
reports)
CRAM Conditional Route Availability Message
CRCO EUROCONTROL Central Route Charges Office
Croatia Control Hrvatska kontrola zračne plovidbe d.o.o., Croatian Air Navigation Services
DCAC Cyprus Department of Civil Aviation of Cyprus
DFS DFS Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH, ANS Provider, Germany
DHMi Devlet Hava Meydanlari Isletmesi Genel Müdürlügü (DHMi),
General Directorate of State Airports Authority, Turkey
DLR Deutsches Zentrum für Luft und Raumfahrt, Köln, Germany
DSNA Direction des Services de la Navigation Aérienne, ANS Provider in France
EANS Estonian Air Navigation Services Provider
EATM European Air Traffic Management (EUROCONTROL)
E-CODA Enhanced Central Office for Delay Analysis (EUROCONTROL)
ECAC European Civil Aviation Conference.
EEC EUROCONTROL Experimental Centre, Brétigny
Effective capacity The traffic level that can be handled with optimum delay (cf. PRR 5 Annex 6)
ENAV Ente Nazionale di Assistenza al Volo (ENAV), ANS Provider, Italy
EN COM Enlarged Committee for Route Charges
ESARR EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirement
ESARR 1 “Safety Oversight in ATM”
ESARR 2 “Reporting and Analysis of Safety Occurrences in ATM”
ESARR 3 “Use of Safety Management Systems by ATM Service Providers”
ESARR 4 “Risk Assessment and Mitigation in ATM”
ESARR 5 “Safety Regulatory Requirement for ATM Services' Personnel”
ESARR 6 “Safety Regulatory Requirement for Software in ATM Systems”
ESRA European Statistical Reference Area (see STATFOR Reports)
103
EU European Union. There were 27 Member States at 1 January 2007 (Austria; Belgium;
Bulgaria; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany;
Greece; Hungary; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Netherlands;
Poland; Portugal; Romania; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; United Kingdom).
EUROCONTROL The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation. It comprises Member
States and the Agency.
EUROCONTROL There were 37 Member states at 31 December 2006: Albania, Armenia, Austria,
Member States Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Monaco,
the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and the United
Kingdom.
EUROCONTROL 1988 (11 States): Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, France, United Kingdom,
Route Charges System Netherlands, Ireland, Switzerland, Portugal, Austria, Spain.
1997 (23 States): idem + Greece, Turkey, Malta, Cyprus, Hungary, Norway, Denmark,
Slovenia, Czech Republic, Sweden, Italy, Slovak Republic.
2000 (28 States): idem + Romania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Monaco, FYROM.
2001 (29 States): idem + Moldova.
2002 (30 States): idem + Finland.
2003 (31 States): idem + Albania
2004 (31 States): idem
2005 (32 States): idem + Bosnia & Herzegovina
2006 (32 States): idem.
Armenia, Lithuania, Poland, Serbia and Ukraine are still in the process of being
technically integrated into the Route Charges System.
EUROSTAT The Statistical Office of the European Community
EUROSTAT MUIC Monetary Union Index of Consumer Price
FAB Functional Airspace Blocks
FDP Flight Data Processing
FIFA World cup Fédération Internationale de Football Association, 9 June - 9 July 2006, Germany
FINAVIA Air navigation services provider, Finland
FIR Flight Information Region. An airspace of defined dimensions within which flight
information service and alerting service are provided.
FL Flight Level. Altitude above sea level in 100 feet units measured according to a
standard atmosphere. Strictly speaking a flight level is an indication of pressure, not of
altitude. Only above the transition level (which depends on the local QNH but is
typically 4000 feet above sea level) flight levels are used to indicate altitude, below the
transition level feet are used.
FUA Flexible Use of Airspace
Level 1 Strategic Airspace Management
Level 2 Pre-tactical Airspace Management
Level 3 Tactical Airspace Management
FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
FYROM CAA Civil Aviation Authority of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GAT General Air Traffic. Encompasses all flights conducted in accordance with the rules
and procedures of ICAO.
General Aviation All civil aviation operations other than scheduled air services and non-scheduled air
transport operations for remuneration or hire.
HCAA Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority, ANS Provider in Greece
HungaroControl Air navigation services provider, Hungary
IAA Irish Aviation Authority, Ireland
IANS EUROCONTROL Institute for Air Navigation Services, Luxembourg
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IFR Instrument Flight Rules. Properly equipped aircraft are allowed to fly under bad-
weather conditions following instrument flight rules.
Incident An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft
(Source ICAO Annex 13) which affects or could affect the safety of operation.
104
Interaction The simultaneous presence of two aircraft in a cell of 20x20 nautical miles and 3,000
feet in height.
Interested parties Government regulatory bodies, Air Navigation Service Providers, airport authorities,
airspace users, international civil aviation organisations, EUROCONTROL Agency,
the advisory bodies to the Permanent Commission, representatives of airspace users,
airports and staff organisations and other agencies or international organisations which
may contribute to the work of the PRC.
Just culture EUROCONTROL Definition “front line operators or others are not punished for
actions, omissions or decisions taken by them that are commensurate with their
experience and training, but where gross negligence, wilful violations and destructive
acts are not tolerated.”
KPA Key Performance Area
KPI Key Performance Indicator
LCIP Local Convergence and Implementation Plan
LGS SJSC Latvijas Gaisa Satiksme (LGS), ANS Provider in Latvia
LPS Letové Prevádzkové Služby, ANS Provider in Slovak Republic
LVNL Luchtverkeersleiding Nederland, ANS Provider in The Netherlands
M Million
Maastricht UAC The EUROCONTROL Upper Area Centre (UAC) Maastricht. It provides ATS in the
upper airspace of Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Northern Germany.
MATS Malta Air Traffic Services Ltd.
MET Meteorological Services for Air Navigation
MIL Military flights
MoldATSA Moldavian Air Traffic Services Authority, ANS Provider in Moldova
MTOW Maximum Take-off Weight
MUAC Maastricht Upper Area Control Centre, EUROCONTROL
MUIC EUROSTAT Monetary Union Index of Consumer Price
NATA Albania National Air Traffic Agency, ANS Provider in Albania
NATS National Air Traffic Services, ANS Provider in United Kingdom
NAV Portugal Navegação Aérea de Portugal E.P.E. ANS Provider in Portugal
NAVIAIR Air Navigation Services - Flyvesikringstjenesten, ANS Provider in Denmark
NM Nautical mile (1.852 km)
NOTA Northern Oceanic Transition Area
NSA National Supervisory Authorities
Occurrence Accidents, serious incidents and incidents as well as other defects or malfunctioning of
(Source: ESARR 2) an aircraft, its equipment and any element of the Air Navigation System which is used
or intended to be used for the purpose or in connection with the operation of an aircraft
or with the provision of an air traffic management service or navigational aid to an
aircraft.
OPS Operational Services
Organisation See “EUROCONTROL”.
Oro Navigacija State Enterprise Oro Navigacija, ANS Provider in Lithuania
PATA Polish Air Traffic Agency
PBO Past Benefit Obligations
PRC Performance Review Commission
PRR Performance Review Report
PRR 1 First Performance Review Report, covering the calendar year 1998
PRR 2 Second Performance Review Report - special report on Delays, Jan-Sept 1999
PRR 3 Third Performance Review Report, covering the calendar year 1999
PRR 4 Fourth Performance Review Report, covering the calendar year 2000
PRR 5 Fifth Performance Review Report, covering the calendar year 2001
PRR 6 Sixth Performance Review Report, covering the calendar year 2002
PRR 7 Seventh Performance Review Report, covering the calendar year 2003
PRR 8 Eighth Performance Review Report, covering the calendar year 2004
PRR 2005 Performance Review Report, covering the calendar year 2005
PRR 2006 Performance Review Report, covering the calendar year 2006
PRU Performance Review Unit
Primary Delay A delay other than reactionary
105
Productivity Hourly productivity is measured as Flight-hours per ATCO-hour (see ACE reports)
PC Provisional Council of EUROCONTROL
Permanent The governing body of EUROCONTROL. It is responsible for formulating the
Commission Organisation’s general policy.
Punctuality On-time performance with respect to published departure and arrival times
RAD Route availability document
R&D Research & Development
Reactionary delay Delay caused by late arrival of aircraft or crew from previous journeys
Revised Convention Revised EUROCONTROL International Convention relating to co-operation for the
Safety of Air Navigation of 13 December 1960, as amended, which was opened for
signature on 27 June 1997.
ROMATSA Romanian Air Traffic Services Administration, ANS Provider in Romania
Runway incursion European definition: Any unauthorised presence on a runway of aircraft, vehicle,
person or object where an avoiding action was required to prevent a collision with an
aircraft. Source: ESARR 2.
US definition: Any occurrence at an airport involving an aircraft, vehicle, person, or
object on the ground, that creates a collision hazard or results in a loss of separation
with an aircraft taking-off, intending to takeoff, landing or intending to land. Source:
US (FAA order 8020.11A).
SAFREP EUROCONTROL, Director General’s Safety Reporting Taskforce
SAR Search & Rescue
Separation minima Separation Minima is the minimum required distance between aircraft. Vertically
usually 1000 ft below flight level 390, 2000 ft above flight level 390. Horizontally,
3 NM or more. In the absence of radars horizontal separation is achieved through time-
separation (e.g. 15 minutes between passing a certain navigation point).
Serious incident An incident involving circumstances indicating that an accident nearly occurred.
(ICAO Annex 13)
SES Single European Sky (EU)
http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/air/single_sky/index_en.htm
SESAR The Single European Sky implementation programme (formerly known as SESAME).
SID Standard Instrument Departure (Route)
Skyguide Air navigation services provider, Switzerland
Slot (ATFM) A take-off time window assigned to an IFR flight for ATFM purposes
Slovenia Control Civil Aviation Authority of the Republic of Slovenia. Slovenia Control provides ANS
(excluding aeronautical MET services) in Slovenia with effect from 1 May 2004.
SRC Safety Regulation Commission
SRU Safety Regulation Unit
STAR Standard Arrival Route(s)
STATFOR EUROCONTROL Statistics & Forecasts Service
Summer period May to October inclusive
Taxi-in The time from touch-down to arrival block time.
Taxi-out The time from off-block to take-off, including eventual holding before take-off.
TCAS Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System. An airborne collision avoidance system
based on radar beacon signals which operates independent of ground based equipment.
TCAS-I generates traffic advisories only. TCAS-II generates traffic advisories, and
resolution (collision avoidance) advisories in the vertical plane.
TMA Terminal manoeuvring area
UAC Upper Airspace Area Control Centre
UK CAA United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority
UK NATS United Kingdom National Air Traffic Services
UkSATSE Ukrainian State Air Traffic Service Enterprise
UR Unit Rate
US United States of America
VFR Visual Flight Rules
VLJ Very Light Jets
106
ANNEX X - REFERENCES
PRC Reports are available on-line from the PRC website
http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc/index.html
1 Communication from the Commission to the Council on the project to develop the new generation European
air traffic management system (SESAR) and the establishment of the SESAR Joint Undertaking, European
Commission (25.11.2005)
2 EUROCONTROL Report “Status of Civil-Military Co-ordination in Air Traffic Management (2001)
3 ECAC Institutional Strategy for Air Traffic Management in Europe, adopted by ECAC Ministers of Transport
on 14 February 1997.
4 Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the framework for
the creation of the Single European Sky (“Framework Regulation”).
5 EUROCONTROL, ATM Strategy for 2000+ (November 1998).
6 ICAO Doc 9854 - First Edition - 2005.
7 Performance Review Commission, Evaluation of the impact of the Single European Sky initiative on ATM
Performance, December 2006, http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc/index.html
8 Performance Review Commission, Implementation status of PRC recommendations, April 2006,
http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc/index.html
9 UK CAA “No-frills Carriers – Revolution or Evolution?” (November 2006) (www.caa.co.uk/publications).
10 DLR “Low-cost Monitor 2/2006 “Der aktuelle Low-cost Carrier Markt in Deutschland (Oktober 2006)
11 EUROCONTROL STATFOR Study “Getting to the Point: Business Aviation in Europe” (May 2006).
http://www.eurocontrol.int/statfor/public/subsite_homepage/homepage.html
12 Complexity Metrics for ANSP Benchmarking Analysis (Report by the ACE Working Group on complexity)
2006, Report commissioned by the EUROCONTROL Performance Review Commission.
13 Cost benchmarking of Air Navigation Service Providers, NERA Economic Consulting, November 2006,
report prepared by under contract from the Performance Review Unit,
http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc/gallery/content/public/Docs/Cost_benchmarking_stochastic_analysis%20.pdf
14 Safety Regulation Commission, Annual Safety Report 2006, http://www.eurocontrol.int/src
15 EUROCONTROL Annual Report, http://www.eurocontrol.int/epr/public/standard_page/AnnualReport.html
16 Performance Review Commission, Fourth Performance Review Report (PRR 4), An assessment of Air Traffic
Management in Europe during the calendar year 2000 (April 2001).
17 Legal and Cultural Issues in relation to ATM Safety Occurrence Reporting in Europe (December 2006),
Report commissioned by the Performance Review Commission.
18 Report on ATM incident Reporting Culture: Impediments and Practices (SAFREP report),
EUROCONTROL, DAP/SAF/126, 13 October 2005
19 US Department of Transport, Air travel Consumer report, January 2007, http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/
20 Aerospace Science and Technology 9 (2005), “Depeaking – economic optimization of air traffic systems”.
21 EUROCONTROL, Challenges to Growth Report, 2004.
22 Study on the usage of available (declared) capacity at major German airports, 2007, RWTH Aachen
University, in co-operation with the Performance Review Unit.
23 Report on Punctuality Drivers at Major European Airports (May 2005), Report commissioned by the
24 “EUROCONTROL Contributes to Curbing Aircraft Emissions”, Press release, 21/12/2006,
http://www.eurocontrol.int/corporate/gallery/content/public/docs/pdf/pressreleases/2006/061221_Emission%
20Trading_final.pdf
25 ACARE (Advisory Council for Aeronautics Research in Europe) “Strategic Research Agenda” Volume 1
(October 2002) – www.acare4europe.org
26 Evaluating the true cost to airlines of one minute of airborne or ground delay (2003) (University of
Westminster), Report commissioned by the Performance Review Commission
27 ATM Cost-effectiveness (ACE) 2004 Benchmarking Report (June 2006), Report commissioned by the
28 Performance Review Commission, Performance Review Report 2005 (PRR 2005). An assessment of Air
107
Traffic Management in Europe during the Calendar Year 2005 (April 2006).
29 Report on the Civil/Military Use of Airspace (to be published in 2007), Report commissioned by the
Performance Review Commission;
30 Military KPI Handbook, Edition 1.0, EUROCONTROL, 09 February 2006 (Military KPI 1 – Measurement 2
– Percentage Airspace Designated Segregated – Area based)
31 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2150/2005 of 23 December 2005 laying down common rules for the
flexible use of airspace Official Journal L 342, 24-Dec-05, p20-25
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:342:0020:0025:EN:PDF
32 EUROCONTROL Handbook for Airspace Management, Edition : 2.0, Edition Date : 22 October 03
33 ATM Cost-Effectiveness (ACE) 2005 Benchmarking Report (to be published in mid-2007), Report
commissioned by the Performance Review Commission.
34 The Impact of Fragmentation in European ATM/CNS, Report commissioned by the PRC, April 2006.
108
† This Report is respectfully dedicated to the

memory of Frank Morisseau, PRC Member,
who died on 5 September 2006
Background About the Performance Review Commission

This Report has been produced by the Performance Review Commission (PRC).
The Performance Review Commission (PRC) is an independent body which advises the Permanent
Commission of EUROCONTROL through the Provisional Council on European Air Traffic Management
The PRC was established in 1998 by the Commission of EUROCONTROL, in accordance with the ECAC
(ATM) Performance.
Institutional Strategy (1997).
The PRC was established by the Permanent Commission in 1998 following adoption of the European
One objective in this Strategy is “to introduce strong, transparent and independent performance review
Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) Institutional Strategy in 1997. This strategy provided that “an inde-
and target setting to facilitate more effective management of the European ATM system, encourage
pendent Performance Review System covering all aspects of ATM in the ECAC area will be established
mutual accountability for system performance and provide a better basis for investment analyses
to put greater emphasis on performance and improved cost-effectiveness, in response to objectives
and, with reference to existing practice, provide guidelines to States on economic regulation to assist
set at a political level”.
them in carrying out their responsibilities”.
The PRC reviews the performance of the European ATM System under various Key Performance Areas.
The PRC’s website address is http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc
It analyses performance and trends, identifies and encourages best practices and benchmarks the
cost-effectiveness and productivity of Air Navigation Service Providers. The PRC also proposes per-
formance targets, assesses to what extent agreed targets and high level objectives are met, and
makes recommendations to enhance performance.
Notice
The PRC is composed of twelve independent members with senior managerial and technical expe-
The PRC has made every effort to ensure that the information and analysis contained in this document
rience of aviation. They are nominated by the EUROCONTROL Member States and appointed by the
are as accurate and complete as possible. Only information from quoted sources has been used and
Provisional Council. Nominees are required to have professional experience of air traffic management
information relating to named parties has been checked with the parties concerned. Despite these
(planning, technical, operational or economic aspects), safety or economic regulation in one or
precautions, should you find any errors or inconsistencies we would be grateful if you could please bring
more of the following areas: government regulatory bodies, air navigation services, airports, aircraft
them to the PRU’s attention.
operations and research and development.
The PRU’s e-mail address is PRU@eurocontrol.int

The Commissioners who prepared this report are:
Mr Jozsef Bakos Mr Frank Morisseau † Mr Adrian Serban
Dr. Harry Bush Mr Serafim Petrou Mr Lauri Vänskä
Mr Francisco Cal Pardo Mr Vittorio Pimpinelli Mr Jean-François Vivier
Mr Cees Gresnigt Prof. Dr Johannes Reichmuth Mr Keith Williams
Copyright notice and Disclaimer The Performance Review Unit (PRU) supports the PRC and operates administratively under, but inde-
pendently of, the EUROCONTROL Agency.
© European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL)
The PRC can be contacted via the Performance Review Unit, Rue de la Fusée 96, B-1130
This document is published by the Performance Review Commission in the interest of the exchange of
Brussels, Belgium. Tel: +32 2 729 3956. The PRU’s e-mail address is: PRU@eurocontrol.int.
information.
The PRC can also be contacted through its website. The address is: http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc.
It may be copied in whole or in part providing that the copyright notice and disclaimer are included. The
PRC processes
information contained in this document may not be modified without prior written permission from the
The PRC reviews ATM performance issues on its own initiative, at the request of the deliberating
bodies of EUROCONTROL or of third parties. It prepares annual Performance Review Reports,
benchmarking reports on Air Navigation Service Providers and ad hoc reports.
The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views or policy of EUROCONTROL,
which makes no warranty, either implied or express, for the information contained in this document,
The PRC gathers relevant information, consults concerned parties, draws conclusions, and sub-
neither does it assume any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness or usefulness
mits its reports and recommendations for decision to the Permanent Commission, through the
of this information.
Provisional Council. These reports are made available in printed and electronic form
(http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc) and on request from the PRU (PRU@eurocontrol.int), after they
Printed by EUROCONTROL, 96, rue de la Fusée, B-1130 Brussels, Belgium.
have been seen by the Provisional Council, unless the latter requests otherwise.
PRR 2006
PRR 2006 - May 2007

An Assessment of Air Traffic Management in Europe
during the Calendar Year 2006
Performance Review
Report
Performance Review Report
May 2007
For any further information please contact: Performance Review

Performance Review Unit, 96 Rue de la Fusée,
Commission
B-1130 Brussels, Belgium
Tel: +32 2 729 3956

Fax: +32 2 729 9108
pru@eurocontrol.int
http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc

PRR 2006

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Оригинальное название

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

PRR 2006

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

PRRcover07 final:PRR2006 5/4/07 3:12 PM Page 1

PRR 2006 - May 2007

Performance Review Report

For any further information please contact: Performance Review

Tel: +32 2 729 3956

† This Report is respectfully dedicated to the

Background About the Performance Review Commission

The PRU’s e-mail address is PRU@eurocontrol.int

Mr Jozsef Bakos Mr Frank Morisseau † Mr Adrian Serban

Dr. Harry Bush Mr Serafim Petrou Mr Lauri Vänskä

Mr Francisco Cal Pardo Mr Vittorio Pimpinelli Mr Jean-François Vivier

Mr Cees Gresnigt Prof. Dr Johannes Reichmuth Mr Keith Williams

Performance Review Commission

PROGRAMME REFERENCE INDEX EDITION: EDITION DATE:

DOCUMENT STATUS AND TYPE

INTERNAL REFERENCE NAME: PRR 2006

15 24 regulatory authorities and 19 ANSPs did

4 Target: 1.0min/flight 4 000

Average ATFM delay per flight (Summer) 2006 18.4 M € 1 050 M

Savings from 2003 to 2008 would then

60 Flight-efficiency is also a major ATM

heterogeneous growth across States (0 to 0% to 3%

19%). A similar trend is anticipated for the 2%

The high traffic growth observed in 2005 in 2%

new EU States and Turkey tended to slow

down in 2006, except in Poland and the 5% 4% 13%

Baltic States. The traffic in these States

remains however well above the forecast

made 3 years ago.

“Low-cost” and Business aviation enjoyed Canarias 0%

higher than average growth. In 2006,

“Airspace event” reports from 15 States

Executive Summary ii PRR 2006

Departure punctuality and delay causes

Executive Summary iii PRR 2006

Matching capacity and demand

Executive Summary iv PRR 2006

Flight-efficiency of domestic and European networks

Executive Summary v PRR 2006

Potential and accommodated civil demand (weekdays)

Executive Summary vi PRR 2006

A ll States in CRCO system so urc e : EUROCONTR OL

Executive Summary vii PRR 2006

Executive Summary viii PRR 2006

1.1 Scope of the report

1.1.4 Another important stakeholder is General Aviation, which encompasses business

Figure 2: EUROCONTROL Member States (2006)

PRR 2006 1 Chapter 1 - Introduction

CIVIL/MILITARY USE OF AIRSPACE

1.3 Performance Review of Air Navigation Services

1.3.2 ATM performance results from complex interactions between:

PRR 2006 2 Chapter 1 - Introduction

1.4 Performance Review Commission

1.5 Consultation process

PRR 2006 3 Chapter 1 - Introduction

Legislative Safety maturity

Fragmentation Support Costs EUROCONTROL

Airspace design & Flight

Figure 4: Approach to ATM performance used in this report

1.7 Evaluation of Impact of SES Initiative on ATM performance

PRR 2006 4 Chapter 1 - Introduction

Rationalisation of airspace and service provision

PRR 2006 5 Chapter 1 - Introduction