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1.2 Definition
A financial market is efficient when widely available information to participant is reflected in stock prices.
Weak Form: Stock prices reflect all of the information contained in past stock prices. The inference drawn from this is that you cannot
consistently profit by spotting trends and patterns in stock prices.
Semi-strong Form: Stock prices all of publicly available information (including company accounts, industry data etc.). This simply
implies you cannot consistently profit by analysing company accounts and other public data.
Strong Form: Stock prices reflect all information (including information known only to company insiders. The insinuation is that no one
can earn excess returns by stock picking, even people with inside information.
However, this dissertation will concentrate more on using fundamental analysis to disprove the efficient market hypothesis which assets
that stock markets impounds all publicly available information about a company into stock prices in an instantaneous and unbiased
manner. The implication of this assertion is that publicly available information such as financial statement figures cannot be used to detect
mispriced securities; any investment strategy designed on the basis of published financial information should not prove profitable.
However, in contrast to this argument, fundamental analysts believe that the markets may misprice securities and that it is possible to
make an informed financial projections using financial statement information to earn an abnormal returns.
According to Fama (1970) he established the efficient market model after it has been tested and found supported by different wider
markets and this became widely in use by financial communities, applied economist and financial economist. The weak forms of the
efficient market hypothesis is strongly supported by evidence and the result follow and consistent with random walk model, while the
strong form test is strongly supported by the efficient market hypothesis Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) found that the real time
information such as the time of stock split, the future information on future dividend is fully reflected in this price
Grossman and Stigliz 1980 argues that if the market efficiency theory hypothesis govern the way price respond to information, then
Institutional investors and security analyst who engage in equity research will not arrive at any meaningful conclusion and the whole
research will be a complete waste of time and resources. To mention but a few other argument includes the market anomalies: such as
the post earning drifts, value versus growth and small cap stocks anomalies.
According to Ball and Brown (1968), even after earnings are announced, cumulative abnormal returns for stocks with unexpected positive
(negative) earnings surprise continue to drift upwards (downwards). This anomaly is known as Post Earnings Announcement Drift
(PEAD). Foster, Olson and Shevlin (1984) noted that sixty days prior to an earnings announcement, combining a long position in stocks
with unexpected earnings in the highest decile with a short position in stocks in the lowest decile generates an abnormal return of 25%
p.a. before accounting for transaction cost, which confirms the existence of the PEAD anomaly.
Many other researchers who have argued in favour of fundamentals analysis includes: Basu (1977) studied the relationship between price-
earning (P/E) ratios and excess returns, and was the first to uncover evidence that appeared to oppose the efficient market hypothesis
(EMH). Basu concluded that there was an information content present in publicly available P/E ratios, and portfolios built from low P/E
stocks earned excess returns even after adjusting for risk. Banz in 1981, did analysis on monthly returns over the period 1931-1975 on
listed shares on the New York stock exchange. Over this interval, he observed that the fifty smallest outperformed the largest by an
average of one percentage point per month. He observed a size effect, and concluded that there was a relationship between market
capitalization of a firm, and its returns, even after adjusting for risk. Also In 1981, Reinganum confirmed that data on firm size could be
used to create portfolios that earn excess returns.
Further fundamental anomalies were discovered, such as the book-to-market effect described by Rosenberg et al. (1984), which found
that stocks with a high book-to-market value yielded higher long-term returns. Fama and French (1992) surveyed the above styles of
anomaly detection, and concluded that if asset pricing is rational, then size and ratio of book to market value must be proxies for risk.
History of Fundamental Analysis As A Trading Mechanism
Lakonishok et al in 1994 evidence in the US by considering a time horizon up to five years found a wide range of value strategies (based
on sales growth, book-to-market, cash flow, earnings, etc) all produced higher returns, and refuted Fama and French's claims that these
value strategies are fundamentally riskier. In 1995, Fama and French responded to Lakonishok by stating that size and book-to-market
equity are proxies for sensitivity to risk factors in returns. Their results also suggest that there is a size factor in fundamentals that might
lead to a size related factor in returns. Later, Fama and French (1998) studied returns on market, value and growth portfolios for the US
and 12 major EAFE countries (Europe, Australia and the Far East). They found that value stocks tend to have higher returns than growth
stocks, and conclude that these returns are explained by a one-state variable Intertemporal Capital and Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) (or
a two-factor APT), that explains returns with the global market return and a risk factor for relative distress.
Frankel and Lee also in 1998 estimate firms fundamental values (V), using I/B/E/S consensus forecasts, and a residual income model.
They find V is highly correlated with stock price, and that V/P is a good predictor of long term returns. Piotroski focused on high book
to market securities, and shows that the mean return earned by a high book-to-market investor can achieve a return of at least 7.5%
annually. Piotroski 2000 also studied a number of different fundamental ratios and criteria with similar outcomes, and notes that returns
are concentrated in small and medium size companies, companies with low share turnover, and firms with low analyst following.
In 2001 Aby et al. focus on using fundamentals to screen stocks for value. Also in 2001 Aby et al. concentrated on four fundamental
conditions, namely, single valued P/E's; Market price less than Book Value; established track record of return (established by ROE), and
dividend payout ratio. The authors conclude that when the four criteria are used to screen stocks, quality investments seem to result. It is
interesting to note that in earlier work, the authors had simply focused on shares with low P/E and a market price below book value, and
concluded this filtering method did not produce satisfactory returns.
1.2 Contributions
Fundamental Analysis provides a framework for modelling the financial technicalities of a company. Primarily, it aids in the development
of company or industry specific models, and provides a means of evaluating the performance of a given company in terms of those
models. A considerable contribution of the fundamental models is that they provide for the calculation of a number of financial ratios.
These ratios are then used to assess the financial health of a company, and to compare directly to the ratios for different companies for
alternative investment decision.
There is a long established tradition of attempting to use these fundamental ratios as predictors of a companies future share price.
Primarily, this started with the work of Benjamin Graham in 1928, and forms the heart of an investment philosophy known as 'Value
Investing'. Value investors believe that the market does not price securities accurately, and that the true price of a security, its 'intrinsic'
value, only rarely coincides with the market price. The trading manner of value investors is to determine the intrinsic value of a security,
and acquire the security as long as the intrinsic value is above the price the market will sell at but according to the conventional definition,
a value investor is one who invest in low price book value or low price-earnings ratios stocks while the generic definition defines it as
one who pays a price which is less than the value of the assets in place of a firm. For example firms with high E/P, D/P or B/P ratios earns
positive capital asset pricing model (CAPM) – adjusted abnormal returns.
However, on the contrast growth investor focuses on the potential of a company with much less emphasis on its present price. They invest
on company that are trading higher than their current intrinsic worth in anticipation that the company intrinsic worth will grow and exceed
the current valuation
1.5 Structure
One important issue, the subject of this dissertation, is to apply fundamental analysis to two UK listed insurance companies namely :
Beazley Group Plc and Hardy Underwriting as a case study to investigate how detailed the financial statement information can be used
to implement an active investment strategy with the hope of making abnormal returns. The remainder of the dissertation proceeds as
follows: Section II provides a brief review of the relevant literature on various market anomalies such as post earning drift, value and
growth anomalies and small cap anomalies. Section III describes the methodology by explaining relevant descriptive financial ratios and
valuation dynamics procedure. The analysis of the result is explained in Section IV. The last section offers the conclusion.
Various competing hypotheses try to explain the PEAD phenomenon. One school of thought attributes the phenomenon to ‘delayed
response' due to investors' failure to appreciate the full implication of earnings announcement and high transaction costs that restrain
immediate response to earnings news. Another school of thought suggests that there is misspecification in the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM) because the model fails to adjust returns for risk and thus, the abnormal return is a compensation for bearing risk not captured
in the CAPM (Ball et al 1988 in Bernard and Thomas, 1989).
History of Fundamental Analysis As A Trading Mechanism
Finally, most of the drift appears within the first sixty days, almost all of the effect happens within nine/six months for small/large firms
and the largest part occur during the first five days. Bernard and Thomas reject the hypothesis of CAPM misspecification but find evidence
consistent to delayed price response as an explanation for PEAD. They conclude that the 12 existence of PEAD is due to investors' failure
to realise the serial correlation of quarterly earnings. Ball and Bartov (1996) however suggest that investors understand this implication
but underestimate the degree of serial correlation between current and future earnings by 50%. However, the UK evidence Liu, Strong
and Xu (2003) are consistent with that of Bernard and Thomas (1989) their result shows evidence of PEAD in the UK. The PEAD
portfolio (highest decile minus lowest decile) yields significant profit of 2.9%, 5.2%, 8.2%, and 10.8% over 3-, 6-, 9-, and 12 months
investment horizon respectively. After controlling for risk and market microstructure effect, the price based earnings surprise measure
gives the strongest drift effect. Other evidences by Forner et al. (2009) in the Spanish stock market, Truong (2010) in New Zealand,
Booth et al (1996) in Finland. The overall results justify the presence of PEAD in their respective stock markets.
2.1.2. Conclusion
Since PEAD is observed in several countries, it is evident that investors do not respond efficiently to public information like earnings
announcements, thereby questioning the efficient market hypothesis. A delayed response to information is accepted as an explanation by
a few scholars, while models misspecification is less convincing due to insufficient evidence. A new area of research into a possible
explanation of PEAD is the ‘Inflation Illusion Hypothesis' where investors fail to consider the inflation effect while predicting future
earnings growth rate. This may partly explain the delay in stock price response ‘to information as visible and freely available as publicly
announced earnings' (Chordia and Shivakumar, 2005).
In summary, the behaviour of security prices over the 14 –year period studied is, possibly, not fully described by the efficient market
hypothesis to the extent that low P/E portfolios actually earn higher returns on a risk-adjusted basis which validate the price-ratio
hypothesis on the relationship between investment performance and their P/E ratios. Other recent researchers includes Ahmed and Nanda
(2001) use the growth in earnings-per-share (EPS) to capture growth in the US markets from 1982 to 1997. They show that strategies
focusing on investing in stocks that have the dual characteristics of a high E/P ratio (ie value stocks) and a high growth in EPS outperform
a high E/P alone. Bird and Whitaker (2003, 2004) focus on seven European markets (United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy,
Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Spain) from January 1990 to June 2002. They indicate that a combination of value and earnings
momentum results in a small improvement when compared to using the sole book-to-market criterion.
History of Fundamental Analysis As A Trading Mechanism
2.3.3 Conclusion
Over a forty year period, The analysis revealed that CAPM is misspecified on average, small NYSE firms had had significantly larger
risk adjusted return than large NYSE firms. Although the size effect is not in any way linear in the market proportion but it is most
pronounced for the smallest firms in the sample.
In summary, the size effect exists but the reason still remains questionable until we find an answer to it. As a result of this extra caution
is required during interpretation
2.4 EQUITY VALUATION M
Through its Syndicate 382, the company underwrites commercial business except motor and liability sectors. The company is involved
in reinsurance to other underwriters against the risks in non-marine catastrophes such as hurricanes and earthquake. The major coverage
of the syndicate includes non-marine insurance lines such as direct property, accident and medical cover and financial institutions,
property treaty, political risks and conveyancing. Syndicate 382 is specialized in airline and general aviation business, mainly focused on
helicopters insurance. In addition, the company also has a business insuring ships and their cargo. The company is involved in a wide
range of non-marine underwriting, which includes direct insurance and reinsurance.
The company conducts its business operations through four reportable segments: Marine and Aviation, Specialty Lines, Non-Marine
Property and Property Treaty. The Marine and Aviation is a company's core business segment. It principally focuses on risk coverage for
general aviation, marine, and cargo and specie. In aviation insurance, the company is a market leader in risk coverage to rotor wing
aircraft. The company underwrites range of marine risks, including fishing vessels, harbour craft and loss of hire. The company's cargo
and specie insurance products include coverage for jewelers block, fine art, small motor, classic cars and other niche areas. The company
is organised into four business operating divisions: Management service, Adjusting service, Insurance support service and Insurance
Company's run-off.
The Specialty Lines segment provides insurance for financial institutions, political risks, terrorism and conveyancing and other
miscellaneous niche lines and schemes. To financial institutions, the company offers bankers bond and professional indemnity coverages.
Political insurance includes contract frustration, confiscation, trade credit, war on land and overseas terrorism. The conveyancing
insurance portfolio include defective title, restrictive covenant, chancel repair, search and title risk coverage; offered to lenders,
History of Fundamental Analysis As A Trading Mechanism
purchasers, sellers, owners and conveyancers of residential and commercial property. The Non-Marine segment provides risk coverages
for direct & facultative insurance and direct property insurance. In Property Treaty, the company mainly offers Cat XL.
The company generated net insurance premium revenue of GBP 61.8 million from Marine and Aviation segment in 2009 as compare to
GBP 43.862 million in 2008, followed by Specialty Lines generated GBP 33.968 millions in 2009 as compare to GBP 29.493 millions in
2008, Non-Marine Property segment generated GBP 37.468 millions in 2009 as compare to GBP 16.777 million in 2008, Property Treaty
generated GBP 51.050 millions in 2009 as compare to GBP 33.469 millions in 2008.
The company carries out its operations through seven wholly owned subsidiaries: Hardy Underwriting Group Plc, Hardy Re Limited,
Hardy Bermuda Limited, Hardy Underwriting Limited, Hardy Names Limited, Hardy (Underwriting Agencies) Limited and Hardy
Insurance Services Limited (HIS).
Business Description
Beazley is one the ultimate holding company for the Beazley Group, a global specialist risk insurance and reinsurance business. The
company operates through Lloyd's syndicate 2623 and 623 in the UK and BICI, a US-admitted carrier in the US. In the US, the
underwriters of the company concentrate on writing the specialist insurance products in the admitted market, backed by Beazley Insurance
Company, Inc., an admitted property/casualty carrier in all 50 states and the surplus lines risks are backed by the Beazley syndicates at
Lloyd's. The participation in the Lloyd's market gives the company an opportunity to access to the brokered business all around the world
and also enables the company to underwrite the admitted business in the US.
The company operations are divided into four reportable segments namely Marine, Property, Reinsurance and Specialty Lines.
The company through its Marine segment offers long term insurance solutions to the maritime related industries. It underwrites all marine
classes. The clients include ship-owners, chatterers, port authorities, cargo owners and energy companies. It provides specialist coverage
for specie & cargo, hull, war and energy risks as well as other risks exposed to catastrophes. In addition, it includes coverage to voyage
and towage risks, total loss only, building risks, port risks,yachts/pleasure craft, mortgages interest and offshore and onshore exposures
of production and exploration companies.
The company helps to insure 10% of the world's oceangoing tonnage and cover 35% of the top 200 oil and gas companies.
The Property segment of the company comprised of insures engineering property, commercial property and high-value homeowners. The
clients include companies in mining, steel, utilities, retail, commercial real estate, homeowners, jewelers, art dealers, private collectors
and construction. The company operates its underwriting business in the US, Singapore and London. The company underwrites the
commercial property risks in the US for large risks, small risks, US both admitted
and non-admitted and Binding Authorities; engineering and construction risks for Contractors All Risks (CAR), Erection All Risks
(EAR), Machinery Breakdown (MB), Machinery Loss of Profits (MLOP), Electronic Equipment (EEI) and Plant and Equipment All
Risks (P.A.R) in Singapore; and homeowners for high value homeowners risks in the UK & overseas, the US high value and Binding
authorities. The company's clients range from Fortune 1000 companies to homeowners.
The company through its Reinsurance segment provides reinsurance products and services to general insurers. It concentrates in the areas
of casualty catastrophe, aggregate excess of loss, property catastrophe, pro-rata business and property per risk. The company is specialized
in writing the property catastrophe excess of loss on a worldwide basis. The diverse client base includes regional cedants, large nationwide
carriers and multi regional companies. Under the casualty
clash risk the company's portfolio mainly comprises of programmes protecting client's auto and workers compensation accounts. The
segment covers the areas of Australasia, the US, UK, Canada, Continental Europe, West Indies and Japan.
Under its Specialty Lines segment, the company underwrites specialty insurance and reinsurance, including professional liability,
directors' and officers' liability, employment practices' liability, healthcare, terrorism, contingency and political risks. The segment even
underwrites management liability business on both a primary and excess basis, from Europe, North America and around the world. The
US clients of the company are served by underwriters at Lloyd's and by private enterprise team who focus on smaller scale clients. The
clients of the professional liability include Lawyers, Healthcare, Architects & Engineers, Programmes, Technology, Media & Business
History of Fundamental Analysis As A Trading Mechanism
Services, Specialty treaty and Programmes. The clients of the management liability include: Public company D&O, Employment practices
liability, Non-profit organizations, Private company management liability, Crime and Fiduciary.
he subsidiaries of the company are Tasman Corporate Limited, Beazley Furlonge Holdings Limited, Beazley Furlonge Limited and
Beazley Pte. Limited, BFHH Limited, Beazley Investments Limited, Beazley Corporate Member No. 2, Beazley Corporate Member
Limited, Global Two Limited, Beazley Underwriting Limited, Beazley Management Limited, Beazley Staff Underwriting Limited,
Beazley Solutions Limited, Beazley Corporate Member No. 3, Beazley USA Services, Inc., Beazley Holdings, Inc., Beazley Insurance
Company, Inc., Beazley Limited Hong Kong, Beazley Group (USA) General Partnership and Beazley Dedicated No.2 Limited.
During the fiscal year 2007, the company generated 49.12% of total revenue from Specialty lines segment, 24.75% from Property, 7.96%
from Reinsurance and 18.15% from Marine segment.
Management service
The management service includes the following: mutual management, investment management, underwriting services, captive
management, and risk management
The mutual management is engaged in the development and management of mutual insurance associations. It provides the full range of
management skills including underwriting, risk assessment, accounting, documentation, claims negotiation and paying, investment and
regulatory and compliance functions.
The captive management is engaged in the identification, evaluation and implementation of a captive insurance solution. Its activities are
carried out principally in Bermuda through CTC Allegro Insurance and Risk Management Services. Captives are also managed by the
CTC group in the Isle of Man, and in other domiciles through independently-owned partner management companies.
The investment management provides investment management serves to both clients mutual's and group owned insurance companies.
The risk management provides solutions for risk management and insurance problems through its division Taylor Risk Consulting. It
specializes in helping corporate risk management teams on a day-to-day or project basis in a variety of industries including energy,
manufacturing, construction and transportation.
The underwriting facilities operates through the company's subsidiary, Charles Taylor Underwriting Agencies. This division acts as a
cover holder in the business areas including property and liability covers for ports and terminals operators, property and liability covers
for the public sector, scheme and affinity business, and professional liability risks.
Adjusting Services
The loss adjusting division provides loss adjusting capabilities to the world's insurance markets and Average Adjusting to ship owners.
• The firm must bear these ratios in mind to ensure that they appear a good investment prospect, to enable them to raise lower cost funds
when they are required.
• Investors tend to focus on the risk and return of purchasing a share in the firm.
History of Fundamental Analysis As A Trading Mechanism
This ratio measures the dividend announced during the year per each share in issue. It gives a measure of the absolute returns to the
investor in terms of the relevant
currency. It is useful in monitoring the returns of a particular firm through time though
is less useful for comparing firms as the size of DPS obviously depends on the value
of each share. Also, it measures only part of the returns to investors as it does not
take into account the capital gain they may receive for holding the share.
This ratio helps to overcome the problems with the DPS measure by showing the cash dividend returns to equity investors as a proportion
of the share's current market value i.e. it shows equity dividend returns as a yield. This return can then be more easily compared with the
returns available on other shares or other forms of investment (e.g. bonds). The numerator DPS must be ‘grossed up' for tax to allow
comparison with other forms of investment which are also quoted in terms of gross yields.
This ratio measures the proportion of its earnings which are actually distributed (paid out) to shareholders. The higher is this ratio, the
more the firm is focused on keeping shareholders happy by distributing the created wealth, though if this ratio is high then the firm may
suffer by not retaining funds for updating or expanding its productive capacity.
generating power of the firm, regardless of its current dividend policy. However, as it gives an absolute currency figure it is not a useful
measure for comparing across firms, rather it is useful for comparing an individual firm's performance through time.
• They help in assessing the financial risk of the firm, that is the possibility that the firm will encounter financial distress in the coming
financial periods.
This ratio measures the ratio of external financing to internal (equity) financing and shows the reliance of the firm on outside funds. A
higher gearing ratio can signify a firm which finds it difficult to raise new equity finance. A rule of thumb for gearing is that a ratio greater
than 1 represents a fairly financially risky firm i.e. a firm which has more debt than risk capital to support its operations. However, the
rule of thumb will vary across industries and some industries having very highly geared but successful firms.
History of Fundamental Analysis As A Trading Mechanism
claimholders i.e. debt investors and others with a long-term claim on the firm. It is more encompassing than the debt-equity ratio as it
includes other long-term claims. The higher the gearing ratio, the higher the probability that equity holders will be left with very little
residual income (i.e. income left after debt holders have been paid) and therefore this is a good measure of financial risk.
This ratio measures the ‘financial safety' of the firm i.e. to what extent can it cover the interest payments to its debt holders? It is sometimes
referred to as ‘income gearing'. A rule of thumb for income gearing is that firms should be concerned if this ratio falls below about 5.
Certainly a firm which has a ratio approaching 1 should be very concerned as it is approaching a situation of financial distress.
• They tend to tell us how successful those managing the firm are at generating wealth from the sales made and capital employed by the
firm.
This ratio measures the profitability of purchasing or manufacturing goods and selling them. Gross profit here is simply sales less the
cost of sales.
This ratio measures the profitability of the firm, regardless of its form of financing or tax position. It is a very useful measure for comparing
profitability across firms. If a healthy gross profit margin produces only a small net profit margin then the firm has incurred significant
indirect or overhead costs in its trading operations.
• They tell how us well the firm can cover its short-term commitments (current liabilities) from its short-term cash and ‘near-cash' (current
liabilities)
2. Current ratio
Current ratio =
This ratio also measures the ability of the business to meet its maturing obligations, but concentrates on balance sheet measures i.e. how
many times can the firm ‘cover' its maturing obligations (current liabilities) from its current asset base (cash and ‘near cash' assets).
Obviously the firm would like this ratio to be higher, rather than lower and an ideal ratio of 2 is often suggested. However, if the ratio is
too high then it suggests that the firm has invested too high a proportion of its available resources in current assets which do not, of
themselves, earn profits for the firm. It would be preferable in this case to reduce the investment in current assets and invest the funds
instead in fixed assets which are productive.
3. Quick ratio
Quick ratio =
This ratio is another measure of liquidity, similar to the current ratio, though it excludes stock from the numerator. The reason for this is
that in the real world stock (inventory) can be difficult to convert into cash quickly in times of need and therefore should not be considered
part of our definition of ‘cash and near-cash'. Again, a rule of thumb is that this ratio should not fall below 1 for firms, otherwise they
may experience liquidity problems.
This ratio measures how effectively managers employ the long-term capital of the firm to produce sales. The higher it is, the more
effectively such capital is being employed, though a very high ratio signifies that the firm does not have enough capital to support its
current level of sales i.e. it is ‘over-stretching' itself.
2. Debtors days
Debtors days =
This ratio measures how many days, on average, it takes for debtors (those customers who have been sold goods on credit) take to pay.
The firm would ideally like to keep this period short, though if it chases its customers for payment too vigorously then it might lose
custom
to its competitors.
3. Creditors days
Creditors days =
This ratio measures how many days, on average, it takes for creditors (those suppliers from whom inputs have been bought on credit) to be
paid. The firm would ideally like to extend this period (as it is a form of free finance), though delaying payment for too long can damage the
firm's relationship with its suppliers.
Basu (1977) Investment Performance of Common relationship b/w price-earning (P/E) that rejected (EMH)
Stocks in Relation to their Price- ratios and excess returns.
History of Fundamental Analysis As A Trading Mechanism
Banz (1981),. The Relationship between Return and observed market capitalization and
Market Value of Common Stocks return, smallest firms outperformed
largest ones. examines the empirical
relationship between the return and
the total market value of NYSE
common stocks
Fama and French (1992), A Cross Section of Stock Returns if asset pricing is rational, then size
and ratio of book-to-market value
must be proxies for risk.
Fama and French (1995) Size and Book-to-Market Factors in respond to Lakonishok (1994), size
Earnings and Returns and book-to-market equity are proxies
for sensitivity to risk factors in return
Fama and French (1998) Value Versus Growth: The value stocks tend to have higher
International Evidence returns than growth stocks,
Frankel and Lee (1998) Accounting valuation, market firm fundamental values highly
expectation, and cross-sectional stock correlated with stock prices, and
returns that V/P is a good predictor of long-
term return.
Piotroski (2000) Value Investing: The Use of High book-to-market returns more.
Historical Financial Statement returns are concentrated in small
Information to Separate Winners from and medium size companies, low
Losers share turnover, and firms with low
analyst following.
Aby et al. (2001) fundamentals to screen stocks for Four criteria are used to screen
value stocks, quality investments seem to
result
Ball et al 1988 in
Bernard and Thomas, (1989) (PEAD) Post Earnings ‘+’ Sample Methodology with Foster
Announcement Drift. et al. (1984)
PEAD exists for all stocks and it ‘-‘ reject CAPM’s hypothesis
increases monotonically from the
lowest to the highest SUE decile. Find evidence to delayed price
The effect of PEAD is more response as an explanation for PEAD
significant for smaller firms.
Ahmed and Nanda (2001) Style Investing: Incorporating Used growth in EPS,
Growth Characteristics in Value
Stocks Investing in stock with dual
characteristics of a high E/P ratio
(Value Stocks) and a high growth in
EPS outperform a high E/P alone
JSTOR, Emorld,
Intr
Obj
Statmnt
Systematic risk, total risk and size as determinants of stock market returns