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G.R. No. 160261; November 10, 2003.

From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial
power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this
creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that
Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is
gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which
"are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for
respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.


G.R.No. L-32717; November 26, 1970

The Court held that “the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same
kind or class as those specifically referred to”. The COMELEC’s contention that a candidate’s jingle form part of
the prohibition, categorized under the phrase “and the like”, could not merit the court’s approval by principle
of Ejusdem Generis. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets
of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for
its distribution.


G.R. No. 161872; April 13, 2004

Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right.
There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation
of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and
there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of
the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional
right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not
give rise to any cause of action before the courts.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who
have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to
ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. To add into the mix candidates with no
serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the
factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further
evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the
question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69
of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus more
qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article
VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered
voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of
the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.


GR No. 122156; February 3, 1997

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is
usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the
nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that
they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating
that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the
legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution,
further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a
convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable
safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or
prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a
provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express
provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended
to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust
legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the
exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not
necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against
constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have
often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner
similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one
more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine,
Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of
national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have
very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. In the granting of
economic rights, privileges, and concessions, especially on matters involving national patrimony, when a choice
has to be made between a “qualified foreigner” and a “qualified Filipino,” the latter shall be chosen over the



GR No. 174153; October 25, 2006

Lambino was able to gather the signatures of 6,327,952 individuals for an initiative petition to amend the 1987
Constitution. That said number of votes comprises at least 12 per centum of all registered voters with each
legislative district at least represented by at least 3 per centum of its registered voters. This has been verified
by local COMELEC registrars as well. The proposed amendment to the constitution seeks to modify Secs 1-7 of
Art VI and Sec 1-4 of Art VII and by adding Art XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions”. These proposed changes
will shift the president bicameral-presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.

The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents present favorably their
proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents bear the
burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures – that
the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments. The
proponents failed to prove that all the signatories to the proposed amendments were able to read and
understand what the petition contains. Petitioners merely handed out the sheet where people can sign but
they did not attach thereto the full text of the proposed amendments.

Lambino et al are also actually proposing a revision of the constitution and not a mere amendment. This is also
in violation of the logrolling rule wherein a proposed amendment should only contain one issue. The proposed
amendment/s by petitioners even includes a transitory provision which would enable the would-be parliament
to enact more rules.


270 SCRA 106; March 19, 1997
Sec 2 of Article 17 of the Constitution provides: “Amendments to this constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least there per centum of the
registered voters therein. . . The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right”
This provision is obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed by Congress.

Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system
of inititative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. The people cannot exercise such right, though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for
whatever reason does not provide for its implementation.

***Note that this ruling has been “reversed” on November 20, 2006 when ten justices of the SC ruled that RA
6735 is adequate enough to enable such initiative. HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution which reads
in part:

Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various opinions already given when
the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the
Constitution thru a people’s initiative.

As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare decisis.


GR No. 187883; June 16, 2009


GR No. L-34150 ; April 2, 1981

Petitioners assailed that the resolutions where so extensive in character as to amount to a revision rather than
amendments. To dispose this contention, the court held that whether the Constitutional Convention will only
propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely
new Constitution based on an ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment, because the same
will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate
about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced
with a new one ... is no argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision'
or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part
or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign

"Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or



GR No. L-32443; September 11, 1970

The Congress has authority to call a constitutional convention as the constituent assembly. The Congress also
has the authority to enact implementing details, since such details are within the competence of the Congress
in exercise of its legislative power.


41 SCRA 702; 1971

This is the “Doctrine of Submission” which means that all the proposed amendments to the Constitution shall
be presented to the people for the ratification or rejection at the same time, NOT piecemeal.



G.R. No. 183591; October 14 2008

Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend
the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the
Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to
recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and
revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.

The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in
whom constituent powers are vested.


272 SCRA 18; May 2, 1997

By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law,
which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda – international agreements must
be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on
the parties.

Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a
regulation of commercial relations among nations.

What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or
viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review.

13. YNOT vs. IAC

GR No. 74457; March 20, 1987

EO 626-A amending EO 626 in basic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions.
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do
not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another.
Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving
them to another province will make it easier to kill them there.

14. MIRASOL vs. CA

351 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 128448; 1 Feb 2001

Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power: First, there must be
before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before the
Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing
to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and
lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.


472 SCRA 505

There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the President may contract or
guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country with prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no
distinction whatsoever and the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant. On the other hand, the
President can delegate this power to her direct subordinates. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of
Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the
fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep
within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of
funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals. If the
President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to
pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activities–the
propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the many methods that may be taken
toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence
of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not,
flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would
negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are
accorded and would unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in running the government.

EXCEPTIONS: The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of
the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this
special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list
is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas
and exceptional import.

G.R. No. 155336; November 25, 2004

We echoed the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special
technical knowledge and training of such agencies.


GR 159357; April 28, 2004

The decision shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based, signed by the issuing magistrate, and filed with the clerk of court. In
general, the essential parts of a good decision consist of the following: (1) statement of the case; (2) statement
of facts; (3) issues or assignment of errors; (4) court ruling, in which each issue is, as a rule, separately
considered and resolved; and, finally, (5) dispositive portion. The ponente may also opt to include an
introduction or a prologue as well as an epilogue, especially in cases in which controversial or novel issues are


63 PHIL 139
The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof,
the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the
conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies,
and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution,
which is the source of all authority.

That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to
execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two
departments of the government.

The Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly.


201 SCRA 792

The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without encroaching upon the function of the legislature
particularly a part thereof, HRET. The issue here is a judicial question. It must be noted that what is being
complained of is the act of HRET not the act of Congress.


195 SCRA 444


GR No. 148334; January 21, 2004

The Court held that unless there had been a patent showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not
interfere with the affairs and conduct of the Comelec.


GR No. 102940; November 6, 1992

Requisites for judicial review/judicial inquiry:

In actions involving constitutional issues, the firmly settled rule is that a constitutional question will not be
heard and resolved by the courts unless the following requirements of judicial inquiry are met: [1] the existence
of an actual case or controversy;
[2] the party raising the constitutional issue must have a personal and substantial interest in the resolution
[3] the controversy must be raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity; and
[4] that the resolution of the constitutional issue must, be indispensable for the final determination of the

The DOLE circular does not establish an absolute and comprehensive prohibition of the deployment abroad of
entertainers below 23 years of age. Item No.1 provides that the Sec. of Labor & employment may exempt
someone from the coverage of this law for justifiable reasons. Grounds for such exemption are provided for in
a set of Administrative Guidelines Implementing Dept. Circular No. 01-91.

The Court is not compelled to indulge in speculation that public respondent would deny any and all applications
for exemption for coverage of DOLE circular No. 01-91. It is presumed that administrative orders and
regulations are entitled to the presumption of constitutionality and, that official duty has been or will be
regularly performed.

"Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one of
petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy.” (Phil. Association of Colleges and
Universities v. Secretary of Education)

Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein, however
intellectually solid the problem may be. This is especially true where the issues reach constitutional dimensions,
for then there comes into play regard for the court's duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless
avoidance becomes evasion.' (Rice vs. Sioux City)


95 SCRA 392

There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the
existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the
constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.

In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.

The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and
that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them
from office as null and void.

The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are
based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another


GR No. 135385; December 6, 2000


GR No. 140835; August 14 2000

A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action;
and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established
that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution.


136 SCRA 27; April 24, 1985


122 SCRA 759

FACTS: Quezon City enacted an ordinance which provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the
memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have
been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City
Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.

HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between the
said ordinance and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people.

The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery
for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.


151 SCRA 208
175 SCRA 343

Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in
certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the
following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the
rights conferred and the liabilities imposed.

It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However, there is no law
which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation. In fact, just
compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the landowner and the government – even without judicial
intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and
if the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that,
the just compensation determined by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not
agree with the finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then it can go to court and the
determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper
jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.

The program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash – if everything
is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares
of stocks, may be used for just compensation.


GR No. 144681; June 21, 2004

NBI found that “the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads
to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions.

It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of
study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the
State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus,
persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be
required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers.


GR No. 135962; March 27, 2000

The MMDA is merely a “development authority” and not a political unit of government since it is neither an
LGU nor a public corporation endowed with legislative power.

In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the LGUs, acting
through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of
Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.


GR No. 166501; November 16, 2006

A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and (3) a favorable action will likely redress the injury. On the other hand,
a party suing as a taxpayer must specifically show that he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement
of the questioned statute.

As an exception to the standing requirement, the transcendental importance of the issues raised relates to the
merits of the petition. Thus, the party invoking it must show, among others, the presence of a clear disregard
of a constitutional or statutory prohibition.


119 SCRA 329

FACTS: On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-
42 which reads:
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis

ISSUE: Would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the
petitioners’ constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?

HELD: As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is
the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in
the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of
society. It may also regulate property rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando “the
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded”.


GR No. 148339; February 23, 2005

FACTS: The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which provides, inter alia, that: all buses, mini-buses and out-
of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city and are hereby directed to proceed to
the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers; and (b) all temporary terminals in
the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this ordinance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance satisfies the requisite of valid exercise of police power, i.e. lawful subject
and lawful means.

HELD: The local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the
following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise
stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.

The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of
Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper
exercise of police power is thus present. This leaves for determination the issue of whether the means
employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth.
They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally, since the compulsory
use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such
measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. What should have been done was to
determine exactly where the problem lies and then to stop it right there.

The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are
exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. It is its
reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law
were measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen to be


GR No. L-63419; December 18, 1986

The enactment of the BP 22 or the Bouncing Check Law is a valid exercise of Police power and is not repugnant
to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. It may be constitutionally impermissible for the
legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of debt ex contractu, but certainly it is within the prerogative
of the lawmaking body to prescribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala
in se are not only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong,
hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and
criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.

The enactment of the said statute is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the
making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal


GR No. 115044; January 27, 1995


152 SCRA 730

We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for
admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.

The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the
sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of the
general community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well-
being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort
and regulation.


GR No. 119694; May 22, 1995

The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use need to be examined here: one is
the necessity for the taking; another is the legal authority to effect the taking.

To compel print media companies to donate “Comelec-space” amounts to “taking” of private personal property
for public use. The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial measured by the advertising rates
ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers, whether in cities or in non-urban areas.
207 SCRA 157; GR No. 40243; March 11, 1992

The storage of abaca and copra in petitioner’s warehouse is a nuisance under the provisions of Article 694 of
the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise
of its police power. It is valid because it meets the criteria for a valid municipal ordinance: 1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be unfair or oppressive, 3) must not be partial or
discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade, 5) must be general and consistent with public
policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. The purpose of the said ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and
life in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of government.



299 SCRA 549; GR No. 129079; December 2, 1998

Under Section 7 of EO 1035, when the government or its authorized agent makes the required deposit, the
trial court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession. The expropriation of real property does not
include mere physical entry or occupation of land. Although eminent domain usually involves a taking of title,
there may also be compensable taking of only some, not all, of the property interests in the bundle of rights
that constitute ownership.

In the instant case, it is manifest that the petitioner, in pursuit of an objective beneficial to public interest,
seeks to realize the same through its power of eminent domain. In exercising this power, petitioner intended
to acquire not only physical possession but also the legal right to possess and ultimately to own the subject
property. Hence, its mere physical entry and occupation of the property fall short of the taking of title, which
includes all the rights that may be exercised by an owner over the subject property.

2. NPC vs. CA
GR No. 106804; August 12, 2004

In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiff’s matter of right to automatically dismiss the
complaint precisely because the landowner may have already suffered damages at the start of the taking. If
the propriety of the taking of private property through eminent domain is subject to judicial scrutiny, the
dismissal of the complaint must also pass judicial inquiry because private rights may have suffered in the
meantime. The dismissal, withdrawal or abandonment of the expropriation case cannot be made arbitrarily.
Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure no longer makes the dismissal of the complaint
automatic. The right of the plaintiff to dismiss his action before the defendant has filed his answer or asked for
summary judgment must be first confirmed by the court in an order issued by it.
(It is not Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court that is applicable to this case but Rule 67 of the same
Rules, as well as jurisprudence on expropriation cases. Rule 17 referred to dismissal of civil actions in general
while Rule 67 specifically governed eminent domain cases.
GR No. 152230 August 9, 2005

Issue: Whether or not a letter to purchase is sufficient enough as a definite and valid offer to expropriate.

No. Failure to prove compliance with the mandatory requirement of a valid and definite offer will result in the
dismissal of the complaint. The purpose of the mandatory requirement to be first made to the owner is to
encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the
expense and delay of a court of action.
292 SCRA 676; GR No. 127820; July 20, 1998

Whether a Local Government Unit can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution by its
law-making body.

Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as the first requisite that LGUs
can exercise its power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by its legislative body enabling the
municipal chief executive. A resolution is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a law-making body,
the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner involves BP 337, which was the previous Local Government
Code, which is obviously no longer in effect. RA 7160 prevails over the Implementing Rules, the former being
the law itself and the latter only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former.


495 SCRA 591; GR No. 155650; July 20, 2006

Under the Local government code, government owned and controlled corporations are not exempted from
real estate tax. MIAA is not a government owned and controlled corporation, for to become one MIAA should
either be a stock or non-stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation for its capital is not divided into
shares. It is not a non-stock corporation since it has no members. MIAA is an instrumentality of the government
vested with corporate powers and government functions.

Under the civil code, property may either be under public dominion or private ownership. Those under public
dominion are owned by the State and are utilized for public use, public service and for the development of
national wealth. The ports included in the public dominion pertain either to seaports or airports. When
properties under public dominion cease to be for public use and service, they form part of the patrimonial
property of the State. The court held that the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion. Since
the airport is devoted for public use, for the domestic and international travel and transportation. Even if MIAA
charge fees, this is for support of its operation and for regulation and does not change the character of the
land and buildings of MIAA as part of the public dominion. As part of the public dominion the land and buildings
of MIAA are outside the commerce of man. To subject them to levy and public auction is contrary to public
policy. Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the airport land and buildings from public use,
these properties remain to be of public dominion and are inalienable. As long as the land and buildings are for
public use the ownership is with the Republic of the Philippines.


GR No. L-12792; February 28, 1961

The courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to
determine whether or not there is a genuine necessity therefor.

It does not need extended argument to show that whether or not the proposed opening of the Azcarraga
extension is a necessity in order to relieve the daily congestion of traffic on Legarda St., is a question of fact
dependent not only upon the facts of which the trial court very liberally took judicial notice but also up on
other factors that do not appear of record and must, therefore, be established by means of evidence.

The parties should have been given an opportunity to present their respective evidence upon these factors and
others that might be of direct or indirect help in determining the vital question of fact involved, namely, the
need to open the extension of Azcarraga street to ease and solve the traffic congestion on Legarda street.


GR 14355 (1D); October 31, 1919

The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be
of a public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the
taking of the land.


26 SCRA 620; 1969

In the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may require the telephone company
to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just
compensation. The use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection between the both telephone
systems, through expropriation can be a subject to an easement of right of way.


193 SCRA 1; GR No. 60077; January 18, 1991

The acquisition of the right of way constitutes taking. It perpetually deprives Respondents of their proprietary
rights. No plant higher than three meters is allowed below the transmission lines. Because of high tension
current conveyed through the transmission lines, danger to life and limbs cannot be discounted. The owner of
the property is entitled to just compensation.


GR No. L-20620; August 15, 1974

ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered and occupied
the property as lesse.

HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959.

The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more than a
momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise
informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.

In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied the property
under a contract of lease.


GR No. 147511; January 20, 2003

When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent
domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned,
or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any
reversion to the former owner.


125 SCRA 220

The state’s power of eminent domain extends to the expropriation of land for tourism purposes although this
specific objective is not expressed in the constitution. The policy objectives of the framers can be expressed
only in general terms such as social justice, local autonomy, conservation and development of the national
patrimony public interest, and general welfare, among others. The programs to achieve these objectives vary
from time to time and according to place. To freeze specific programs like tourism into express provisions
would make the constitution more prolix than bulky code and require of the framers a prescience beyond
Delphic proportions. The particular mention in the constitution of agrarian reform and transfer of utilities and
other private enterprises to public ownership merely underscores the magnitude of the problems sought to be
remedied by this programs. They do not preclude nor limit the exercise of the power of eminent domain for
the purposes like tourism and other development program.
148 SCRA 305; GR No. L-59603; April 29, 1987

The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial

prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it
for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors
in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount
should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial
function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party
claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use
without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination
shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of
the decreed compensation.


GR No. L-59791; February 13, 1992

This agreement was merely attached to the motion to withdraw from petitioner's deposit. Respondent judge
arrived at the amount of just compensation on its own, without the proper reception of evidence before the
Board of Commissioners.

The appointment of at least three (3) competent persons as commissioners to ascertain just compensation for
the property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. While it is true that the
findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of the value, the
latter may only do so for valid reasons, i.e., where the Commissioners have applied illegal principles to the
evidence submitted to them or where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the
amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive (Manila Railroad Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286).
Thus, trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously
or for no reason at all.

All premises considered, this Court is convinced that the respondent judge's act of determining and ordering
the payment of just compensation without the assistance of a Board of Commissioners is a flagrant violation
of petitioner's constitutional right to due process and is a gross violation of the mandated rule established by
the Revised Rules of Court.


GR No. 160453; November 12, 2012

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively
establish the existence of a positive act of the Government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive
order, administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or
statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of the
Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State.18 It follows
that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the State as its property of public
dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds should belong to some other

16. NPC vs. CA

254 SCRA 577


360 SCRA 230; GR No. 146062; June 28 2001

In this case, just compensation is defined as not only the correct amount to be paid but the reasonable time
for the Government to pay the owner. The CA erred in this point by stating that the market value (just
compensation) of the land is determined in the filing of the complaint in 1991.The determination of such value
should be from the time of its taking by the NIA in 1981.


560 SCRA 41

In a long line of cases, it has been held that it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling
for purposes of compensation.


GR No. 168732; June 28, 2007
The Supreme Court cited Article 437 of the Civil Code which provides that: The owner of a parcel of land is the
owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any
plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special
laws and ordinances.

If the government takes property without expropriation and devotes the property to public use, after many
years, the property owner may demand payment of just compensation in the event restoration of possession
is neither convenient nor feasible. This is in accordance with the principle that persons shall not be deprived of
their property except by competent authority and for public use and always upon payment of just


GR No. 155407; November 11, 2008


40 PHIL 163

With respect to artificial persons, the protection is only insofar as their property is concerned.


86 SCRA 275

The Municipal Board of Manila enacted ordinance 6537 requiring some aliens to procure the requisite mayor’s
permit so as to be employed or engage in trade in the City of Manila.

Ordinance is invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus
deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore violates the due process and equal protection
clause of the Constitution.

Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor who may withhold or refuse
it at his will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means
of livelihood.


39 PHIL 660

One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the
Mangyans is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Not
can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law
and equal protection of the laws, there exist a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to
the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.


43 PHIL 103

FACTS: Sing, on behalf of Chinese laundrymen, questioned the validity of Ordinance 532 by the City of Manila.
The said ordinance requires that the receipt be in duplicate in English and Spanish.

ISSUE: W/N Ordinance 532 is a class legislation that infringes property rights.

HELD: No. Ordinance invades no fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. The ordinance is neither
discriminatory nor unreasonable. It applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether they belong to
Americans, Filipinos, or any other nationality.


144 SCRA 194

The SC has repeatedly and consistently demanded “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” as an
indispensable imperative of due process.


274 SCRA 358

The composition of the NLRC guarantees equal representation and impartiality among its members. Thus,
litigants are entitled to a review of 3 commissioners who are impartial right from the start of the process of
review. Commissioner can hardly be considered impartial of he was the arbiter who decided the case under


166 SCRA 316

Canon 11: A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should
insist in similar conduct by others.


GR No. 148571; September 24, 2002
Potential extradites are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. The doctrine of right
to due process and fundamental fairness does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent
opportunity to be heard is enough.


GR No. 153675; April 19, 2007

A potential extradite is entitled to bail. In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis
is given to the worth of individual and the sanctity of human rights, the courts departed from the ruling in
Purganan, and held that an extradite may be allowed to post bail.


146 SCRA 446

The publication of laws “of a public nature” or “of general applicability” is a requirement of due process. It is a
rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its

11. GO vs. CA
206 SCRA 138

Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure Arrest without warrant, when lawful: When
an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person
to be arrested has committed it. When complaint was filed to the prosecutor, preliminary investigation should
have been scheduled to determine probable cause.


69 PHIL 635

Motion for New Trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence is allowed since the said evidence were
inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not expected
to have obtained them and offered as evidence in court.


95 SCRA 392

The SC ruled that the provision “barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the
filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office”
is null and void.

The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings
are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from
another class.


244 SCRA 286

Ombudsman can oblige Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau by virtue of subpoena to provide
documents relating to personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB employees.


GR No. 158793; June 8, 2006

The administrative regulation banning the use of motorcycles at the toll way is constitutional. The use of public
highways by motor vehicle is subject to regulation as an exercise of the police power. The sole standard in
measuring its exercise is reasonableness. The said regulation does not impose unreasonable restrictions, but
outlines precautionary measure designed to ensure public safety.
289 SCRA 337

All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Radio and television
broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which
they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them.

To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry

As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the
requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.


22 SCRA 603

Ormoc City’s ordinance is violative to equal protection because it expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc.
as the entity to be levied upon. The classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future
conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be significant and exclusive.


227 SCRA 703

Withdrawal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is invalid. The SC ruled that there is a violation of the
equal protection clause. The judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation.

The equal protection clause does not require universal application of the laws on all persons or things without

What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.


GR No. 132875-76; February 3, 2000

Jalosjos, a member of Congress, is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape
and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. He is not allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman.
To allow him to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will
virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. It will not only elevate him to
that of special class, it would also be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
GR No. 163858; June 28, 2005

Plain View Doctrine applies when the following requisites concur:

a. The law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in
a position from which he can view a particular area;
b. The discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
c. It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

Sealed boxes; NBI failed to present any officers who were present when the warrant was enforced to prove
that the sealed boxes was discovered inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were incriminating
and immediately apparent.


GR No. 116720; October 2, 1997

In this case, appellant was not committing a crime in the presence of the policemen. Moreover, the lawmen
did not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed an


20 SCRA 283

He can only assail the search conducted in the residences but not those done in the corporation's premises.
The petitioner has no cause of action in the second situation since a corporation has a personality separate and
distinct from the personality of its officers or herein petitioner regardless of the amount of shares of stock or
interest of each in the said corporation, and whatever office they hold therein. Only the party whose rights
have been impaired can validly object the legality of a seizure--a purely personal right which cannot be
exercised by a third party.


212 SCRA 457; GR No. 93516

The search in the dwelling of the accused-appellant without his knowledge is a violation of the constitutional
immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures.


GR No. 81561; January 18, 1991

Evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private
capacity and without the intervention and participation of state authorities.


GR No. 91107; June 19, 1991

The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:

“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a

a. When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
b. When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
c. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporary confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another”

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was actually being committed
by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the search made upon his personal effects falls
squarely under paragraph 1 of the foregoing provision of law, which allows a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest.


G.R. No. 83988; September 29, 1989

Military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and


GR No. 148712-15; January 21, 2004

When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present
evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.

The filing by Cachola and Amay of a demurrer to evidence in the absence of prior leave of court was a clear
waiver of their right to present their own evidence. To sustain their claim that they had been denied due
process because the evidence they belatedly sought to offer would have exculpated them would be to allow
them to “wager on the outcome of judicial proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints whenever
dictated by convenience.”


GR No. 81510; March 14, 1990

It is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting

We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants.

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:
a. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue
warrants of arrest and search:
b. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the
Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the
purpose of deportation.


232 SCRA 249

Search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main
case, if one has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. Since a search warrant is a judicial process,
not a criminal action, no legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a
jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of enforceability. Moreover, in our jurisdiction, no period is provided
for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within ten days from the delivery of the warrant of
arrest for execution a return thereon must be made to the issuing judge, said warrant does not become functus
officio but is enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled. The following are the guidelines
when there are possible conflicts of jurisdiction where the criminal case is pending in one court and the search
warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in said
criminal case:

a. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants
necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a search warrant may be filed with
another court only under extreme and compelling circumstances that the applicant must prove to the
satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due course to the application depending on
the validity of the justification offered for not filing the same in the court with primary jurisdiction
there over.

b. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall
be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by
the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available,
existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the
warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.

c. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the
interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as
evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said
purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion
to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative
remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by
the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during
the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress.
The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy
in the appropriate higher court.

d. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is not
otherwise prevented from further proceeding thereon, all personal property seized under the warrant
shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case is pending, with the
necessary safeguards and documentation therefore.

e. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged in different
informations or complaints and filed in two or more courts with concurrent original jurisdiction over
the criminal action. Where the issue of which court will try the case shall have been resolved, such
court shall be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on applications for search warrants
incident to the criminal case.


GR No. 155832; December 7, 2010

Under Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution, an order of sequestration may only issue upon a showing
"of a prima facie case" that the properties are ill-gotten wealth under Executive Orders 1 and 2. When a court
nullifies an order of sequestration for having been issued without a prima facie case, the Court does not
substitute its judgment for that of the PCGG but simply applies the law.

The Republics supposed evidence does not show how the Marcoses acquired the sequestered property, what
makes it "ill-gotten wealth," and how former President Marcos intervened in its acquisition. Taking the
foregoing view, the resolution of the issue surrounding the character of the property sequestered whether or
not it could prima facie be considered ill-gotten should be necessary.


GR No. L-22196; June 30, 1967

In consequence, the constitutional guarantee set forth in Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution aforesaid,
requiring that the issue of probable cause be determined by a judge, does not extend to deportation


162 SCRA 840; GR No. 82544; June 28, 1988

a. Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending
determination of existence of probable cause.
b. Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents.
c. Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners.

HELD: The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule.
There are at least three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.) Search in a moving
vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the foregoing, the search done was incidental to the

The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops
them from questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and the hearing presently conducted
by the Board of Special Inquiry made their detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not
be granted when confinements or has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning.

The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with Sec37 (a) of
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised Administrative code. Section 37 (a)
provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation
against them. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and never construed as a punishment
but a preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court
proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alienintended to be arrested
and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a counsel if desired.

Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of the sovereign power.
It a police measure against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be
injurious to the public good and tranquility of the people.


126 SCRA 463; GR No. L-60349-62; December 29, 1983
Under Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. If on the face of the information, the judge finds no probable cause,
he may disregard the fiscal’s certification and require submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at the conclusion as to existence of probable cause.


167 SCRA 393

Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is the complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.


GR No. 143944; July 11, 2002

The baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security personnel. It was only after they
found “shabu” inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and
seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out without government intervention,
and hence, the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.

The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and does not discharge any governmental

17. LEDESMA vs. CA

GR No. 113216; September 5, 1997

In every case for libel, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious;
(c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable Petitioner's letter was written to seek
redress of proper grievance against the inaccurate distribution and payment of professional fees and against
unfair treatment in the Nuclear Medicine Department of the Philippine Heart Center Petitioner's letter was
written to seek redress of proper grievance against the inaccurate distribution and payment of professional
fees and against unfair treatment in the Nuclear Medicine Department of the Philippine Heart Center. It is a
qualified privileged communication under Article 354(1) of the Revised Penal Code Petitioner's letter was a
private communication made in the performance of a moral duty on her part. Her intention was not to inflict
an unjustifiable harm on the private complainant, but to present her grievance to her superior. The privileged
nature of her letter overcomes the presumption of malice. There is no malice when justifiable motive exists;
and in the absence of malice, there is no libel.


GR No. 81756; October 21, 1991
Section 3 – a search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause in connection with one specific offense
to be determined personally by the Judge after examination under oath.

19. PEOPLE vs. TEE

GR No. 140546-47; January 20, 2003

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant's contention that the description on the serach warrant which says “an
undetermined amount of marijuana,” was too general and hence makes the warrant void for vagueness.

HELD: It is not required that technical precision of description be required, particularly, where by the nature of
the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, since the requirement of a technical
description would mean that no warrant could issue.


132 SCRA 152; 1985

Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also
specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.

It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely
described and not particularized.

It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular
description of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description
were considered null and void for being too general.


GR No. 94902-06; April 21, 1999

After a careful study, the Court discerns no basis for disturbing the findings and conclusions arrived at by the
respondent Judge after examining the applicants and witnesses. Respondent judge had the singular
opportunity to assess their testimonies and to find out their personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
enough to create a probable cause.

In the absence of any showing that respondent judge was recreant of his duties in connection with the personal
examination he so conducted on the affiants before him, there is no basis for doubting the reliability and
correctness of his findings and impressions.
210 SCRA 97; GR No. L-95630; June 18, 1992

Although the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum, it does not follow that the subjects
may be seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary in the context of this case.
The Veroys moved to QC and left their house in Davao City to a caretaker

Capt. Obrero raided the house based on an information that rebel soldiers are allegedly hiding there.

Mrs. Veroy then gave permission to search the house with the condition that Major Macasaet, a long-time
family friend, must be there during the search.
Despite the qualified consent, the officers entered various rooms, including the children’s room, and
confiscated a .45 caliber gun and other effects, which were the basis of the charge of illegal possession of
firearms against them.

Petitioners alleged that while Capt. Obrero had permission to enter their house, it was merely for the purpose
of ascertaining the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The permission did not include the authority to
conduct a room to room search inside the house. The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal search,
violative of their constitutional rights. As such, they are inadmissible in evidence against them.

The rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally
and are therefore protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the
petitioners in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms.


219 SCRA 743; GR No. 89373; March 19, 1993

Sec 7, rule 126 rules of the court provides no search of a house, room or any other premise shall be made
except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the
latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. This
requirement is mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the search warrant. Violation of said rule is
in fact punishable under Article 130 of the Revised Penal Code.


GR Nos. 101216-18
GR No. 133254-55; April 19, 2001

26. UMIL vs. RAMOS

187 SCRA 311

The arrests were legal. Regarding the subversion cases, the arrests were legal since subversion is a form of a
continuing crime – together with rebellion, conspiracy or proposal to commit rebellion/subversion, and crimes
committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith. On the inciting to sedition case, the arrest was
legal since an information was filed prior to his arrest. Lastly, the arrests were not fishing expeditions but a
result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safe houses pinpointed by none other than members of the NPA.

The right to preliminary investigation should be exercised by the offender as soon as possible. Otherwise, it
would be considered as impliedly waived and the filing of information can proceed. This sort of irregularity is
not sufficient to set aside a valid judgment upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error.


GR No. 93239; March 18, 1991

The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure for the instance that
arrest without warrant is considered lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer when the officer sees the offense,
although at the distance, or hears the disturbance created thereby and proceed at once at the scene – the act
of surveillance


GR No. 95902; February 4, 1992

Buy bust – must be in flagrante delicto = requires that the suspected dealer must be caught red handed in the
act of selling marijuana or any prohibited drugs.


GR No. 180452; January 10, 2011

Consider the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of accused-appellants: (1) the
police officers received information from an operative about an ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police
officers, with the operative, proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they
observed the goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the six accused-
appellants loading transparent bags containing a white substance into a white L-300 van.

The arresting police officers had probable cause to suspect that accused-appellants were loading and
transporting contraband, more so when Hwan, upon being accosted, readily mentioned that they were loading
shabu and pointed to Tan as their leader. Thus, the arrest of accused-appellants––who were caught in flagrante
delicto of possessing, and in the act of loading into a white L-300 van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA 6425
is valid.

The Court also notes that accused-appellants are deemed to have waived their objections to their arrest for
not raising the issue before entering their plea.

Moreover, present in the instant case are all the elements of illegal possession of drugs: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized
by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug.

30. GO vs. CA
206 SCRA 138; GR No. 101837; February 11, 1992
31. PADILLA vs. CA
GR No. 121917; March 12, 1997

It must be stressed at this point that “presence” does not only require that the arresting person sees the
offense, but also when he “hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene.”

Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually
arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. We beg to disagree. That Manarang decided to seek the
aid of the policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting petitioner’s
arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent action
Manarang could have taken rather than collaring petitioner by himself, inasmuch as policemen are
unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a suspect (like herein petitioner) who
, in all probability, could have put up a degree of resistance which an untrained civilian may not be able to
contain without endangering his own life.

Besides, the policemen’s warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under paragraph (b) as he
had in fact just committed an offense.

Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay

Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest
must be made before the accused enters his plea. Petitioner’s belated challenge thereto aside from his failure
to quash the information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his evidence, placed him in estoppel
to assail the legality of his arrest. Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such irregularities
and defects.


GR No. 145176; March 30, 2004
396 SCRA 657; GR No. 136066-67; February 4, 2003

Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt
manifestation that accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime. “Reliable information” alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence
and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an
in flagrante delicto arrest.

With regard to the concept of “stop-and frisk”: mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop-and-frisk”.
A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant
the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-
fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the interest of safety and self-preservation
which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed
with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.

A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and
pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. It should also be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede
the arrest for this principle to apply. The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. To reiterate,
accused-appellant was first arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his
possession. The apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-appellant’s
business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The apprehending police officers
only introduced themselves when they already had custody of accused-appellant.

In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the “stop and frisk” principles is applicable to justify the
warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on accused-appellant.


395 SCRA 553; GR No. 138539-40; January 21, 2003

With the failure of the prosecution to establish the propriety of the search undertaken — during which the
incriminating evidence was allegedly recovered – it is held that the search was illegal. Without the badge of
legality, any evidence obtained therein becomes ipso facto inadmissible.
GR No. 123872; January 30, 1998

The SC ruled that the warrantless arrest is legal and so was the warrantless search. Sec 2 Art 3 of the
Constitution has its exception when it comes to warrantless searches, they are:
(1) customs searches;
(2) searches of moving vehicles,
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(4) consented searches;
(5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;
(6) “stop and frisk” measures have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.

In the case at bar, it should be noted that the information relayed by informant to the cops was that there
would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio in the “early morning” of
June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the policemen were not pressed for time, this would be beside the point
for, under these circumstances, the information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the
obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is an indication that the informant knew
the courier, the records do not reveal that he knew him by name.

On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a warrant, assuming that
they could readily have access to a judge or a court that was still open by the time they could make preparations
for applying therefor, and on which there is no evidence presented by the defense. In determining the
opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and
ambient circumstances should be considered, especially in rural areas.

A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with
authority to validly search and seize from the offender
(1) dangerous weapons, and
(2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.

36. ESPANO vs. CA

GR No. 120431; April 1, 1998
178 SCRA 362

The fact that the instant case involves an obscenity rap makes it no different from Burgos, a political case,
because speech is speech, whether political or "obscene". The authorities must apply for the issuance of the a
search warrant from the judge , if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in order. They must convince the court
that the materials sought to be seized are "obscene" and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive
enough to warrant State interference and action. The judge must determine WON the same are indeed
"obscene": the question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge's sound discretion. If
probable cause exists, a search warrant will issue.


217 SCRA 597; GR No. 96177; January 27, 1993


GR No. 132165; March 26, 2003

40. DE MAISIP vs. CA

193 SCRA 373
181 SCRA 623; GR No. 80508; January 30, 1990


GR No. 141176; May 27, 2004

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived expressly or
impliedly. BUT A WAIVER BY IMPLICATION CANNOT BE PRESUMED. There must be clear and convincing
evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right. There must be proof of the following:
a. that the right exists;
b. that the person involved had knowledge, either constructive or actual, of the existence of said right;
c. that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
d. Finally, the waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently in order that the said is to be


GR No. 119772-73; February 7, 1997


GR No. 148825; December 27, 2002

The search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 6235, “ Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain
among others the following condition printed thereon: “Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are
subject to search for , and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall
not be allowed to board the aircraft,” which shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and
the air carrier.


Valid Searches Without Warrants

The general rule is that a judicial warrant must first be duly obtained before search and seizure may be
conducted. The only allowable instances in which a search may be conducted without a warrant are:(1) search
incident to lawful arrest, (2) search pursuant to the plain view doctrine, (3) search of moving vehicles, (4)
searches incidental to violation of customs laws, (5) search with consent, and (6) a stop and frisk.
1. Search Incident to Lawful Arrest

Section 12 of Rule 1326 provides that a lawfully arrested person may be searched without a warrant for
dangerous weapons or anything else that may be used as evidence of the offense. Such incidental search is,
however, limited to the person of the arrestee at the time of the apprehension. The search cannot be extended
to or made in a place other than the place of the arrest.

2. The Plain View Doctrine

The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer is
in a position where he has a clear view of a particular area or has prior justification for an intrusion; (2) said
officer inadvertently comes across (or sees in plain view) a piece of incriminating evidence; and (3) it is
immediately apparent to such officer that the item he sees may be evidence of a crime or a contraband or is
otherwise subject to seizure.

3. Search of Moving Vehicles

The warrantless search of moving vehicles (including shipping vessels and aircraft) is justified
by practicability, viz.:

The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures construed as recognizing a necessary
difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search warrant may
readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it
is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

xxx xxx xxx

The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle xxx Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form in
immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling express trains, they furnish for successful
commission of crime a distinguishing means of silent approach and swift escape unknown in the history of the
world before their advent. The question of their police control and reasonable search on highways or other
public place is a serious question far deeper and broader than their use in so-called bootlegging or rum running,
which in itself is no small matter. While a possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but a vehicle
constructed for travel and transportation on highways. Their active use is not in homes or on private premises,
the privacy of which the law especially guards from search and seizure without process. The baffling extent to
which they are successfully utilized to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from those against morality,
chastity, and decency to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of common knowledge. Upon that
problem, a condition, and not a theory, confronts proper administration of our criminal laws. Whether search
of and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other public place without a search warrant is
unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial question in view of all the circumstances
under which it is made.

4. Customs Searches
Under the Tariff and Customs Code, searches, seizures and arrests may be made even without warrants,
for purposes of enforcing customs and tariff laws. Without mention of the need to priorly obtain a judicial
warrant, the Code specifically allows police authorities to enter, pass through or search any land, enclosure,
warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel
or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board[;]or stop and search and examine
any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced
into the Philippines contrary to law.

5. Search With Consent

Waiver of any objection to the unreasonableness or invalidity of a search is a recognized exception to the
rule against a warrantless search. The consent to the search, however, must be express, knowing and
voluntary. A search based merely on implied acquiescence is not valid, because such consent is not within the
purview of the constitutional guarantee, but only a passive conformity to the search given under intimidating
and coercive circumstances.
In People v. Lacerna, it was held that the otherwise prohibited intrusive search of appellants plastic bag
was validated by the express consent of appellant himself, who was observed to be urbanized in mannerism
and speech, and who moreover stated that he had nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong.

6. Stop and Frisk

The stop and frisk concept is of American origin, the most notable case thereon being Terry v. Ohio. The
idea is that a police officer may after properly introducing himself and making initial inquiries, approach and
restrain a person manifesting unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check, the latters outer clothing for
possibly concealed weapons. The strict manner in which this notion should be applied has been laid down as

xxx where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in the light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed
and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior, he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to
dispel his reasonable fear for his own and others safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others
in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him.

As in the warrantless arrest of a person reasonably suspected of having just committed a crime, mere
suspicious behavior would not call for a stop and frisk. There must be a genuine reason, in accordance with the
police officers experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has
weapons (or contraband) concealed about him.
A valid application of the doctrine was recognized in Posadas v. Court of Appeals and in Manalili v. Court
of Appeals. In Manalili, the law enforcers, who were members of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City
Police, observed during their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was walking in a wobbly manner
along the city cemetery which, according to police information, was a popular hangout of drug addicts. Based
on police experience, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of persons who were high on drugs. The
Court held that past experience and the surrounding circumstances gave the police sufficient reason to stop
the suspect and to investigate if he was really high on drugs. The marijuana that they found in the suspects
possession was held to be admissible in evidence.
Before I end, I must reiterate that the above exceptions to the general rule on the necessity of a judicial
warrant for any arrest, search and seizure must all be strictly construed. Foremost in our minds must still be
every persons prized and fundamental right to liberty and security, a right protected and guaranteed by our


Demurrer to evidence

Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution rests its

case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the
prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with
or without leave of court.

If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce
evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused
waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence
for the prosecution.

The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall

specifically state its grounds and shall be filed within a non-
extendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its
case. The prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from its

If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from
notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within a similar period from its receipt.

The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall
not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.



1. File a demurrer to evidence with leave or without leave of court

2. Adduce his evidence unless he waives the same

 It is a motion to dismiss the case filed by the defense after the prosecution rests on the ground of
insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution
 It has been said that a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court takes place of a demurrer, which
pleading raised questions of law as to sufficiency of the pleading apparent on the face thereof
 In the same manner as a demurrer, a motion to dismiss presents squarely before the court a question as
to the sufficiency of the facts alleged therein to constitute a cause of action


1. The court may dismiss the case on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the right to be heard
2. Upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court


 The court may dismiss the case on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the right to be heard



 The prosecution is given the chance to explain itself of circumstances that may have lead to its
failure to adduce enough evidence to support its case


 Within 5 days after the prosecution rests, the accused should file a motion for leave of court to file a
demurrer to evidence, stating in such motion his grounds for such
 The prosecution shall have 5 days within which to oppose the motion
 If the motion is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within 10 days from notice
of grant of leave of court
 The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within 10 days from its receipt of the demurrer


 The effect of its filing is that if the court grants the demurrer, the case will be dismissed
 If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may still adduce
evidence on his behalf

 If the court denies the demurrer to evidence which was filed without leave of court, the accused is
deemed to have waived his right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on basis of the
evidence of the prosecution
 This is because demurrer to evidence is not a matter of right but is discretionary on the court
 Permission of the court has to be obtained before it is filed, otherwise the accused loses certain



 No
 The general rule is that filing of a demurrer of evidence without
leave of court, which is subsequently denied, is a waiver of presentation of evidence
 Nonetheless, if the demurrer of evidence is filed before the
prosecution rests its case, there would be no waiver to present
evidence. As the prosecution hasn’t finished presenting its
evidence, there is still insufficiency of evidence.


 The accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court declares
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
 If the trial court issues an order or renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to evidence
of the accused and acquitting him but also on the civil liability of the accused to the private offended
party, said judgment on its civil case would be a nullity for violation of the rights of the accused to due


 As a general rule, there can be no appeal or certiorari on the

denial of the demurrer to evidence, since it is an interlocutory order which doesn’t pass judgment on
the merits of the case
 In such instance, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on
his behalf not only on the criminal aspect but also on the civil aspect of the case