Republic of the Philippines information charging petitioner with bigamy was filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City on August 9, 1990.5 This case was docketed as
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 126746 November 29, 2000
ARTHUR TE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the
Decision of the Court of Appeals Tenth Division, dated 31 August 1994 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 239711 and CA-G.R. SP No. 261782 and the Resolution
dated October 18, 1996 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in
civil rites on September 14, 1988. They did not live together after the
marriage although they would meet each other regularly. Not long after
private respondent gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner stopped
visiting her.3
On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting,
petitioner contracted a second marriage with a certain Julieta Santella
(Santella).4
On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime in
June 1990, when she learned about petitioner’s marriage to Santella, an
Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409.6
Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an
action for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent on the ground
that he was forced to marry her. He alleged that private respondent
concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage and
that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations.7
On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative case against petitioner and
Santella for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses on the
ground that they committed acts of immorality by living together and
subsequently marrying each other despite their knowledge that at the time of
their marriage, petitioner was already married to private respondent. With
respect to petitioner, private respondent added that he committed an act of
falsification by stating in his marriage contract with Santella that he was still
single.8
After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy,
petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court and motion to
inhibit the trial court judge for showing antagonism and animosity towards
petitioner’s counsel during the hearings of said case.
The trial court denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence in an Order dated
November 28, 1990 which stated that the same could not be granted
because the prosecution had sufficiently established a prima facie case
against the accused.9 The RTC also denied petitioner’s motion to inhibit for
lack of legal basis.10
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge, Judge Cezar C.
Peralejo, for (1) exhibiting antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s
counsel; (2) violating the requirements of due process by denying
petitioner’s [motion for reconsideration and] demurrer to evidence even
before the filing of the same; (3) disregarding and failing to comply with the
appropriate guidelines for judges promulgated by the Supreme Court; and
(4) ruling that in a criminal case only "prima facie evidence" is sufficient for Neither did the appellate court find grave abuse of discretion on the part of
conviction of an accused. This case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. the Board’s Order denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings in the
23971.11 administrative case on the ground of prejudicial question. Respondent court
held that no prejudicial question existed since the action sought to be
suspended is administrative in nature, and the other action involved is a civil
case.17
Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC
Board), where the administrative case for the revocation of his engineering
license was pending, a motion to suspend the proceedings therein in view of
the pendency of the civil case for annulment of his marriage to private Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
respondent and criminal case for bigamy in Branches 106 and 98, Court of Appeals but the same was denied.18
respectively of the RTC of Quezon City.12 When the Board denied the said
motion in its Order dated July 16, 1991,13 petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals another petition for certiorari, contending that the Board gravely Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues:
abused its discretion in: (1) failing to hold that the resolution of the
annulment case is prejudicial to the outcome of the administrative case
pending before it; (2) not holding that the continuation of proceedings in the
administrative case could render nugatory petitioner’s right against self- I
incrimination in this criminal case for bigamy against him; and (3) making an
overly-sweeping interpretation that Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations
Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals does not allow the PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN REFUSING
suspension of the administrative proceeding before the PRC Board despite TO SUSPEND THE LEGAL [CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE]
the pendency of criminal and/or administrative proceedings against the PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE FOR
same respondent involving the same set of facts in other courts or tribunals. DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
This petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 26178.14

II
The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they arose from the
same set of facts.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND

COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, rendered the DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE.
assailed decision in the consolidated petitions. The appellate court upheld
the RTC’s denial of the motion to inhibit due to petitioner’s failure to show
any concrete evidence that the trial court judge exhibited partiality and had
prejudged the case. It also ruled that the denial of petitioner’s motion to III
suspend the proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in accord
with law.15 The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the RTC’s denial of the
demurrer to evidence filed by petitioner for his failure to set forth persuasive
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN NOT
grounds to support the same, considering that the prosecution was able to
HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE A QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED
adduce evidence showing the existence of the elements of bigamy.16
HIMSELF.19

The petition has no merit.
While the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of
petitioner’s marriage to private respondent has rendered the issue of the
propriety of suspending both the criminal case for bigamy before the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 98 and the administrative case for revocation of
petitioner’s engineering license before the PRC Board moot and academic,
the Court shall discuss the issue of prejudicial question to emphasize the
guarding and controlling precepts and rules.20
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines
the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal
action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related
to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in
the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.21 The rationale
behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.22
The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil
case for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent
did not pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal
case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to
private respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s
innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is
required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.23 Petitioner’s
argument that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be
resolved first in the civil case before the criminal proceedings could continue,
because a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would
necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable. The ruling in
People vs. Mendoza24 and People vs. Aragon25 cited by petitioner that no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is
void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found in Article 40
of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of petitioner’s
marriage to private respondent in September 1988. Said article states that
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes
of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or
voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding.26 In Landicho vs. Relova,27 we held that:
Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and
only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and
so long as there is no such declaration the presumption of marriage
exists.28
It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for
annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent did not give rise to
a prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in
the criminal case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged commission of
the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid and subsisting.
Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the
suspension of the administrative proceedings before the PRC Board. As
discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a
criminal case. We have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question
where one case is administrative and the other is civil.29
Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the
Regulation and Practice of Professionals of the PRC Board expressly
provides that the administrative proceedings before it shall not be
suspended notwithstanding the existence of a criminal and/or civil case
against the respondent involving the same facts as the administrative case:
The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an
administrative case in another judicial body against an examinee or
registered professional involving the same facts as in the administrative case
filed or to be filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the
proceeding of the latter case. The Board shall proceed independently with
the investigation of the case and shall render therein its decision without case against him, the trial court was already making a pronouncement that
awaiting for the final decision of the courts or quasi-judicial body. he is liable for the offense charged. As correctly held by the Court of
Appeals, the order of the RTC denying the demurrer was not an adjudication
on the merits but merely an evaluation of the sufficiency of the prosecution’s
evidence to determine whether or not a full-blown trial would be necessary to
It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint
resolve the case.35 The RTC’s observation that there was a prima facie
before the PRC Board are not confined to the issue of the alleged bigamous
case against petitioner only meant that the prosecution had presented
marriage contracted by petitioner and Santella. Petitioner is also charged
sufficient evidence to sustain its proposition that petitioner had committed
with immoral conduct for continued failure to perform his obligations as
the offense of bigamy, and unless petitioner presents evidence to rebut the
husband to private respondent and as father to their child, and for cohabiting
same, such would be the conclusion.36 Said declaration by the RTC should
with Santella without the benefit of marriage.30 The existence of these other
not be construed as a pronouncement of petitioner’s guilt. It was precisely
charges justified the continuation of the proceedings before the PRC Board.
because of such finding that the trial court denied the demurrer, in order that
petitioner may present evidence in his defense and allow said court to
resolve the case based on the evidence adduced by both parties.
Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial
court’s denial of his demurrer to evidence in the criminal case for bigamy,
arguing that the prosecution failed to establish the existence of both the first
Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo in
and second marriages beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner claims that the
Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409 should have been granted since said judge
original copy of marriage contract between him and private respondent was
exhibited partiality and bias against him in several instances. First, when
not presented, the signatures therein were not properly identified and there
petitioner manifested that he would file a motion for reconsideration of the
was no showing that the requisites of a valid marriage were complied with.
denial of his motion to suspend the proceedings in said case, the judge said
He alleges further that the original copy of the marriage contract between
such motion was dilatory and would be denied even though the motion for
him and Santella was not presented, that no proof that he signed said
reconsideration had not yet been filed. Second, when petitioner’s counsel
contract was adduced, and that there was no witness presented to show that
manifested that he had just recovered from an accident and was not
a second marriage ceremony participated in by him ever took place.31
physically fit for trial, the judge commented that counsel was merely trying to
delay the case and required said counsel to produce a medical certificate to
support his statement. Third, when petitioner manifested that he was going
We are not persuaded. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to file a demurrer to evidence, the judge characterized the same as dilatory
to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not and declared that he would deny the same. According to petitioner, the
be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion.32 In this judge’s hostile attitude towards petitioner’s counsel as shown in the
case, the Court of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the foregoing instances justified the grant of his motion to inhibit.
part of the trial court, which based its denial of the demurrer on two grounds:
first, the prosecution established a prima facie case for bigamy against the
petitioner; and second, petitioner’s allegations in the demurrer were
We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner
insufficient to justify the grant of the same. It has been held that the
against Judge Peralejo did not conclusively show that the latter was biased
appellate court will not review in a special civil action for certiorari the
and had prejudged the case.37 In People of the Philippines vs. Court of
prosecution’s evidence and decide in advance that such evidence has or
Appeals,38 this Court held that while bias and prejudice have been
has not yet established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.33
recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of a judge under
In view of the trial court’s finding that a prima facie case against petitioner
Section 1, Rule 137, the rudimentary rule is that the mere suspicion that a
exists, his proper recourse is to adduce evidence in his defense.34
judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing
evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality.39

The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioner’s misimpression that

by denying his demurrer to evidence in view of the existence of a prima facie
Furthermore, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
are not among those expressly mentioned in Section 1, Rule 137 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the decision to inhibit himself lay within the sound
discretion of Judge Peralejo. Said provision of law states:
SO ORDERED.

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in

any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir,
legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within
the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has
been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he
has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them
and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in the case, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned
above.

Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and
deciding the case.

This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in
denying petitioner’s motion to inhibit. The test for determining the propriety of
the denial of said motion is whether petitioner was deprived a fair and
impartial trial.40 The instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly exhibited
antagonism and partiality against petitioner and/or his counsel did not
deprive him of a fair and impartial trial. As discussed earlier, the denial by
the judge of petitioner’s motion to suspend the criminal proceeding and the
demurrer to evidence are in accord with law and jurisprudence. Neither was
there anything unreasonable in the requirement that petitioner’s counsel
submit a medical certificate to support his claim that he suffered an accident
which rendered him unprepared for trial. Such requirement was evidently
imposed upon petitioner’s counsel to ensure that the resolution of the case
was not hampered by unnecessary and unjustified delays, in keeping with
the judge’s duty to disposing of the court’s business promptly.41

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009
VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR, Petitioner,
vs.
REY C. ALCAZAR, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision1 dated
24 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, affirming
the Decision dated 9 June 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos
City, Branch 85, in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, which dismissed petitioner
Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar’s Complaint for the annulment of her
marriage to respondent Rey C. Alcazar.
The Complaint,2 docketed as Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, was filed by
petitioner before the RTC on 22 August 2002. Petitioner alleged in her
Complaint that she was married to respondent on 11 October 2000 by Rev.
Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at the latter’s residence. After their
wedding, petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of respondent’s parents. Thereafter, the
newlyweds went back to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner at
the latter’s abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On
23 October 2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture shop. While working in
Riyadh, respondent did not communicate with petitioner by phone or by
letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times but respondent never
answered. About a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-
teacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to come home to the
Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was not advised by
respondent of his arrival.
Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in
the Philippines, the latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad
Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to his
parents’ house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that
respondent was in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioner went to see her
brother-in-law in Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was not
aware of respondent’s whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, where she was informed that respondent had been
living with his parents since his arrival in March 2002.
Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines,
he never contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was
physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her, providing
sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5,
Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There was
also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent.
Per the Sheriff’s Return3 dated 3 October 2002, a summons, together with a
copy of petitioner’s Complaint, was served upon respondent on 30
September 2002.4
On 18 November 2002, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion5 to direct
the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation of the case pursuant to
Article 48 of the Family Code.
As respondent did not file an Answer, the RTC issued on 27 November 2002
an Order6 directing the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation to
ensure that no collusion existed between the parties; to submit a report
thereon; and to appear in all stages of the proceedings to see to it that
evidence was not fabricated or suppressed.
On 4 March 2003, Public Prosecutrix Veronica A.V. de Guzman (De psychologically incapacitated to properly assume and comply [with] essential
Guzman) submitted her Report manifesting that she had conducted an roles (sic) of obligations as a married man.
investigation of the case of petitioner and respondent in January 2003, but
respondent never participated therein. Public Prosecutrix De Guzman also
noted that no collusion took place between the parties, and measures were
The pattern of behaviors displayed by the respondent satisfies the diagnostic
taken to prevent suppression of evidence between them. She then
criteria of a disorder clinically classified as Narcissistic Personality Disorder,
recommended that a full-blown trial be conducted to determine whether
a condition deemed to be grave, severe, long lasting in proportion and
petitioner’s Complaint was meritorious or not.
incurable by any treatment.

Pre-trial was held and terminated on 20 May 2003.

People suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder are known to have a
pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), need for admiration,
and lack of empathy, beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety
On 21 May 2003, the RTC received the Notice of Appearance of the Solicitor of contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the following:
General.

1. has a grandiose of self-importance (e.g. exaggerates achievements and

Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. talents, expect to be recognized as superior without commensurate
achievements)

During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita Cabacungan

(Cabacungan), and clinical psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag) as 2. is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance,
witnesses. beauty or ideal love

Petitioner first took the witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in 3. believes that he or she is "special" and unique and can only be
her Complaint. Cabacungan corroborated petitioner’s testimony. understood by, or should associate with, other special or high status people
(institutions)

Petitioner’s third witness, Tayag, presented the following psychological

evaluation of petitioner and respondent: 4. requires excessive admiration

After meticulous scrutiny and careful analysis of the collected data, petitioner 5. has sense of entitlement, i.e., unreasonable expectations of especially
is found to be free from any underlying personality aberration neither (sic) of favorable treatment or automatic compliance with his or her expectations
any serious psychopathological traits, which may possibly impede her
normal functioning (sic) of marriage. On the other hand, the undersigned
arrived to (sic) a firm opinion that the sudden breakdown of marital life
6. is interpersonally exploitative, i.e., takes advantage of others to achieve
between petitioner and respondent was clearly due to the diagnosed
his or her own ends
personality disorder that the respondent is harboring, making him
7. lacks empathy: is unwilling to recognize or identify with the feelings and lon[g]er exist between them. With due consideration of the above-mentioned
needs of others findings, the undersigned recommends, the declaration of nullity of marriage
between petitioner and respondent.8

8. is often envious of others or believes that others are envious of him or her
On 18 February 2004, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence. Public
Prosecutrix Myrna S. Lagrosa (Lagrosa), who replaced Public Prosecutrix
De Guzman, interposed no objection to the admission of petitioner’s
9. shows arrogant, haughty behavior or attitudes.
evidence and manifested that she would no longer present evidence for the
State.

The root cause of respondent’s personality disorder can be attributed to his

early childhood years with predisposing psychosocial factors that
On 9 June 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying petitioner’s
influence[d] his development. It was recounted that respondent is the first
Complaint for annulment of her marriage to respondent, holding in
child of his mother’s second family. Obviously, unhealthy familial
substance that:
constellation composed his immediate environment in his growing up years.
Respondent had undergone a severe longing for attention from his father
who had been unfaithful to them and had died early in life, that he was left
alone to fend for the family needs. More so that they were coping against In the case at bar, the Court finds that the acts of the respondent in not
poverty, his caregivers failed to validate his needs, wishes or responses and communicating with petitioner and not living with the latter the moment he
overlooked the love and attention he yearned which led to develop a returned home from Saudi Arabia despite their marriage do (sic) not lead to
pathological need for self-object to help him maintain a cohesive sense of a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no
self-such so great that everything other people offer is "consumed." Hence, showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of their
he is unable to develop relationship with other (sic) beyond this need. There marriage or that these are incurable.
is no capacity for empathy sharing, or loving others.

That being the case, the Court resolves to deny the instant petition.
The psychological incapacity of the respondent is characterized by juridical
antecedence as it already existed long before he entered into marriage.
Since it already started early in life, it is deeply engrained within his system
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Annulment of Marriage
and becomes a[n] integral part of his personality structure, thereby rendering
is hereby DENIED.9
such to be permanent and incurable.7

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 but it was denied by the RTC
Tayag concluded in the end that:
in an Order11 dated 19 August 2004.

As such, their marriage is already beyond repair, considering the fact that it
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as
has long been (sic) ceased to exist and have their different life priorities.
CA-G.R. CV No. 84471. In a Decision12 dated 24 May 2006, the Court of
Reconciliation between them is regarded to be (sic). The essential
Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision dated 9 June 2004. The Court of
obligations of love, trust, respect, fidelity, authentic cohabitation as husband
Appeals ruled that the RTC did not err in finding that petitioner failed to
and wife, mutual help and support, and commitment, did not and will no
prove respondent’s psychological incapacity. Other than petitioner’s bare
allegations, no other evidence was presented to prove respondent’s
personality disorder that made him completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state. Citing Republic v. Court of
Appeals,13 the appellate court ruled that the evidence should be able to
establish that at least one of the spouses was mentally or physically ill to
such an extent that said person could not have known the marital obligations
to be assumed; or knowing the marital obligations, could not have validly
assumed the same. At most, respondent’s abandonment of petitioner could
be a ground for legal separation under Article 5 of the Family Code.1avvphi1
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals
in a Resolution14 dated 28 August 2008.
Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT, AS DEFINED BY THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE,
RESPONDENT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO PERFORM
THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATONS.15
At the outset, it must be noted that the Complaint originally filed by petitioner
before the RTC was for annulment of marriage based on Article 45,
paragraph 5 of the Family Code, which reads:
ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes,
existing at the time of the marriage:
xxxx
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage
with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; x
x x.
Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate.16
Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the
spouses to perform the complete act of sexual intercourse.17 Non-
consummation of a marriage may be on the part of the husband or of the
wife and may be caused by a physical or structural defect in the anatomy of
one of the parties or it may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears
arising in whole or in part from psychophysical conditions. It may be caused
by psychogenic causes, where such mental block or disturbance has the
result of making the spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage
act.18
No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that respondent
was in any way physically incapable to consummate his marriage with
petitioner. Petitioner even admitted during her cross-examination that she
and respondent had sexual intercourse after their wedding and before
respondent left for abroad. There obviously being no physical incapacity on
respondent’s part, then, there is no ground for annulling petitioner’s marriage
to respondent. Petitioner’s Complaint was, therefore, rightfully dismissed.
One curious thing, though, caught this Court’s attention. As can be gleaned
from the evidence presented by petitioner and the observations of the RTC
and the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner was actually seeking the
declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent based on the latter’s
psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner attributes the filing of the erroneous Complaint before the RTC to
her former counsel’s mistake or gross ignorance.19 But even said reason
cannot save petitioner’s Complaint from dismissal. It is settled in this
jurisdiction that the client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of the counsel
in the realm of procedural technique.20 Although this rule is not a hard and
fast one and admits of exceptions, such as where the mistake of counsel is
so gross, palpable and inexcusable as to result in the violation of his client’s
substantive rights,21 petitioner failed to convince us that such exceptional
circumstances exist herein.
Assuming for the sake of argument that we can treat the Complaint as one
for declaration of nullity based on Article 36 of the Family Code, we will still
dismiss the Complaint for lack of merit, consistent with the evidence
presented by petitioner during the trial.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court declared that "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend
all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.23
The Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, in Republic v.
Court of Appeals,24 to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be a) medically or
clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by
experts and d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence,
a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less
ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.
Being accordingly guided by the aforequoted pronouncements in Republic v.
Court of Appeals, we scrutinized the totality of evidence presented by
petitioner and found that the same was not enough to sustain a finding that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioner’s evidence, particularly her and her mother’s testimonies, merely
established that respondent left petitioner soon after their wedding to work in
Saudi Arabia; that when respondent returned to the Philippines a year and a
half later, he directly went to live with his parents in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, and not with petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that respondent also
did not contact petitioner at all since leaving for abroad. These testimonies
though do not give us much insight into respondent’s psychological state.
Tayag’s psychological report leaves much to be desired and hardly helps
petitioner’s cause. It must be noted that Tayag was not able to personally
examine respondent. Respondent did not appear for examination despite
Tayag’s invitation.25 Tayag, in evaluating respondent’s psychological state,
had to rely on information provided by petitioner. Hence, we expect Tayag to
have been more prudent and thorough in her evaluation of respondent’s
psychological condition, since her source of information, namely, petitioner,
was hardly impartial.
Tayag concluded in her report that respondent was suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder, traceable to the latter’s experiences during
his childhood. Yet, the report is totally bereft of the basis for the said
conclusion. Tayag did not particularly describe the "pattern of behavior" that
showed that respondent indeed had a Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
Tayag likewise failed to explain how such a personality disorder made
respondent psychologically incapacitated to perform his obligations as a
husband. We emphasize that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to
prove that respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that
such psychological disorder renders him "truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage."26 Psychological incapacity must be more than
just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations.
In this instance, we have been allowed, through the evidence adduced, to
peek into petitioner’s marital life and, as a result, we perceive a simple case
of a married couple being apart too long, becoming strangers to each other,
with the husband falling out of love and distancing or detaching himself as
much as possible from his wife.
To be tired and give up on one’s situation and on one’s spouse are not
necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be
so labeled. When these happen, the remedy for some is to cut the marital
knot to allow the parties to go their separate ways. This simple remedy,
however, is not available to us under our laws. Ours is a limited remedy that
addresses only a very specific situation – a relationship where no marriage
could have validly been concluded because the parties; or where one of
them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing when
the marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of marital life
and, thus, could not have validly entered into a marriage.271avvphi1
An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. As we stated in
Marcos v. Marcos28]:
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. x x x.

Resultantly, we have held in the past that mere "irreconcilable differences"
and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitute psychological
incapacity.29
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The 24 May 2006 Decision and 28
August 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471,
which affirmed the 9 June 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos City, Branch 85, dismissing petitioner Veronica Cabacungan
Alcazar’s Complaint in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, are AFFIRMED. No
costs.

As a last-ditch effort to have her marriage to respondent declared null,

petitioner pleads abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent. In a SO ORDERED.
Manifestation and Motion30 dated 21 August 2007 filed before us, petitioner
claims that she was informed by one Jacinto Fordonez, who is residing in
the same barangay as respondent in Occidental Mindoro, that respondent is
living-in with another woman named "Sally."

Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological

incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Again, petitioner
must be able to establish that respondent’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation
of a disordered personality, which makes him completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.31

It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of
marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its
mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.32
Presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio.33 In the case at bar, petitioner failed to
persuade us that respondent’s failure to communicate with petitioner since
leaving for Saudi Arabia to work, and to live with petitioner after returning to
the country, are grave psychological maladies that are keeping him from
knowing and/or complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

We are not downplaying petitioner’s frustration and misery in finding herself

shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably,
there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide
the specific answers to every individual problem.34

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4904 February 5, 1909
ROSALIA MARTINEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ANGEL TAN, defendant-appellee.
Domingo Franco, for appellant.
Doroteo Karagdag, for appellee.
WILLARD, J.:
The only question in this case is whether or not the plaintiff and the
defendant were married on the 25th day of September, 1907, before the
justice of the peace, Jose Ballori, in the town of Palompon in the Province of
Leyte.
There was received in evidence at the trial what is called an expediente de
matrimonio civil. It is written in Spanish and consists, first, of a petition
directed to the justice of the peace, dated on the 25th of September, 1907,
signed by the plaintiff and the defendant, in which they state that they have
mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage before the justice of the
peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the marriage. Following this is a
document dated on the same day, signed by the justice of the peace, by the
plaintiff, by the defendant, and by Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori. It
states the presentation of the petition above mentioned; that the persons
who signed it where actually present in the office of the justice on the same
day named; that they ratified under oath the contents of the petition, and that
they insisted in what they had there asked for. It also stated that being
required to produce witnesses of the marriage, the presented Zacarias
Esmero as a witness for the husband and Pacita Ballori as a witness for the
wife. Following this is a certificate of marriage signed by the justice of the
peace and the witnesses Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, dated the 25th
day of September, 1907, in which it is stated that the plaintiff and the
defendant were legally married by the justice of the peace in the presence of
the witnesses on that day.
The court below decided the case in favor of the defendant, holding that the
parties were legally married on the day named. The evidence in support of
that decision is: First. The document itself, which the plaintiff admits that she
signed. Second. The evidence of the defendant, who testifies that he and
said plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace at the time named,
together with the witness Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, and that they
all signed the document above mentioned. Third. The evidence of Zacarias
Esmero, one of the above-named witnesses, who testifies that the plaintiff,
the defendant, and Pacita Ballori appeared before the justice at the time
named and did sign the document referred to. Fourth. The evidence of
Pacita Ballori, who testified to the same effect. Fifth. The evidence of Jose
Santiago, the bailiff of the court of the justice of the peace, who testified that
the plaintiff, the defendant, the two witnesses above-named, and the justice
of the peace were all present in the office of the justice of the peace at the
time mentioned.
The only direct evidence in favor of the plaintiff is her own testimony that she
never appeared before the justice of the peace and never was married to the
defendant. She admits that she signed the document in question, but says
that she signed it in her own home, without reading it, and at the request of
the defendant, who told her that it was a paper authorizing him to ask the
consent of her parents to the marriage.
There is some indirect evidence which the plaintiff claims supports her case,
but which we think, when properly considered, is not entitled to much weight.
The plaintiff at the time was visiting, in the town of Palompon, her married
brother and was there for about two weeks. The wife of her brother, Rosario
Bayot, testified that the plaintiff never left the house except in her company.
But she admitted on cross-examination that she herself went to school every
morning and that on one occasion the plaintiff had gone to church
unaccompanied. The testimony of this witness loses its force when the
testimony of Pacita Ballori is considered. She says that at the request of the
defendant on the day named, about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, she went to
the store of a Chinese named Veles; that there she met the plaintiff and her
mother; that she asked the mother of the plaintiff to allow the plaintiff to
accompany her, the witness, to her own house for the purpose of examining Do what you may deem convenient, as I don't know what to do.
some dress patterns; that the mother gave her consent and the two rights
left the store, but instead of going to the house of the witness they went
directly to the office of the justice of the peace where the ceremony took Should I be able to go to-morrow to Merida, I shall do so, because I can not
place; that after the ceremony had taken place, one came advising them that remain here.
the mother was approaching, and that they thereupon hurriedly left the office
of the justice and went to the house of Pacita Ballori, where the mother later
found them.
Yours, ROSAL.

The other testimony of the plaintiff relating to certain statements made by the
justice of the peace, who died after the ceremony was performed and before Letter No. 6, which bears no date, but which undoubtedly was written on the
the trial, and certain statements made by Pacita Ballori, is not sufficient to morning of the 25th of September, is as follows:
overcome the positive testimony of the witnesses for the defendant.

Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.

The other testimony of Pacita Ballori is severely criticized by counsel for the
appellant in his brief. It appears that during her first examination she was
seized with an hysterical attack and practically collapsed at the trial. Her ANGEL: It is impossible for me to go to the house of Veles this morning
examination was adjourned to a future day and was completed in her house because my sister in law will not let me go there; if it suits you, I believe that
where she was sick in bed. It is claimed by counsel that her collapse was this afternoon, about 5 or 6 o'clock, is the best hour.
due to the fact that she recognized that she testified falsely in stating the
office of the justice of the peace was at the time in the municipal building,
when, in fact, it was in a private house. We do not think that the record
justifies the claim of the appellant. The statement as to the location of the Arrange everything, as I shall go there only for the purpose of signing, and
office of the justice of the peace was afterwards corrected by the witness have Pacita wait for me at the Chinese store, because I don't like to go
and we are satisfied that she told the facts substantially as they occurred. without Pacita.

There is, moreover, in the case written evidence which satisfies us that the The house must be one belonging to prudent people, and no one should
plaintiff was not telling the truth when she said she did not appear before the know anything about it.
justice of the peace. This evidence consists of eight letters, which the
defendant claims were all written by the plaintiff. The plaintiff admits that she
wrote letters numbered 2 and 9. The authenticity of the others was proven.
Yours, ROSAL.
No. 9 is as follows:

It will be noticed that this corroborates completely the testimony of Pacita

ANGEL: Up to this time I did not see my father; but I know that he is very
Ballori as to her meeting the plaintiff in the afternoon at the store of the
angry and if he be informed that we have been married civilly, I am sure that
Chinese, Veles. Letter No. 7 is also undated, but was evidently written after
he will turn me out of the house.
the marriage before the justice of the peace. It is as follows:
Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.
ANGEL: If you want to speak to my mother, who is also yours, come here by
and by, at about 9 or 10, when you see that the tide is high because my
brother will have to go to the boat for the purpose of loading lumber.
Don't tell her that we have been civilly married, but tell her at first that you
are willing to celebrate the marriage at this time, because I don't like her to
know to-day that we have been at the court-house, inasmuch as she told me
this morning that she heard that we would go to the court, and that we must
not cause her to be ashamed, and that if I insist on being married I must do it
right.
Tell her also that you have asked me to carry you.
I send you herewith the letter of your brother, in order that you may do what
he wishes.
Yours, ROSAL.
Letter No. 8 was also evidently written after the marriage and is in part as
follows:
Sr. D. ANGEL TAN.
ANGEL: I believe it is better for you to go to Ormoc on Sunday of the
steamer Rosa, for the purpose of asking my father's permission for our
marriage, and in case he fails to give it, then we shall do what we deem
proper, and, if he does not wish us to marry without his permission, you must
request his consent.
Tell me who said that my sister in law knows that we are civilly married; my
brother ill treatment is a matter of no importance, as every thing may be
carried out, with patience.
It was proven at the trial that the defendant did go to Ormoc on the steamer
Rosa as indicated in this letter, and that the plaintiff was on the same boat.
The plaintiff testified, however, that she had no communication with the
defendant during the voyage. The plaintiff and the defendant never lived
together as husband and wife, and upon her arrival in Ormoc, after
consulting with her family, she went to Cebu and commenced this action,
which was brought for the purpose of procuring the cancellation of the
certificate of marriage and for damages. The evidence strongly
preponderates in favor of the decision of the court below to the effect that
the plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace at the time named.
It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the
peace, even admitting all that the witnesses for the defendant testified to, did
not constitute a legal marriage. General orders, No. 68, section 6, is as
follows:
No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties
must declare in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that
they take each other as husband and wife.
Zacarias Esmero, one of the witnesses, testified that upon the occasion in
question the justice of the peace said nothing until after the document was
signed and then addressing himself to the plaintiff and the defendant said,
"You are married." The petition signed the plaintiff and defendant contained
a positive statement that they had mutually agreed to be married and they
asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage. The document
signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the justice of the peace, stated
that they ratified under oath, before the justice, the contents of the petition
and that witnesses of the marriage were produced. A mortgage took place
as shown by the certificate of the justice of the peace, signed by both
contracting parties, which certificates gives rise to the presumption that the
officer authorized the marriage in due form, the parties before the justice of
the peace declaring that they took each other as husband and wife, unless
the contrary is proved, such presumption being corroborated in this case by
the admission of the woman to the effect that she had contracted the
marriage certified to in the document signed by her, which admission can
only mean the parties mutually agreed to unite in marriage when they
appeared and signed the said document which so states before the justice of
the peace who authorized the same. It was proven that both the plaintiff and
the defendant were able to read and write the Spanish language, and that
they knew the contents of the document which they signed; and under the
circumstances in this particular case were satisfied, and so hold, that what
took place before the justice of the peace on this occasion amounted to a
legal marriage.

The defendant's original answer was a general denial of the allegations

contained in the complaint. Among these allegations was a statement that
the parties had obtain previously the consent of the plaintiff's parents. The
defendant was afterwards allowed to amend his answer so that it was a
denial of the allegations of the complaint except that relating to the condition
in regard to the consent of the parents. The plaintiff objected to the
allowance of this amendment. After the trial had commenced the defendant
was again allowed to amend his answer so that it should be an admission of
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the complaint, except that part which related to the
consent of the parents. It will be seen that this second amendment
destroyed completely the first amendment and the defendants lawyer stated
that what he intended to allege in his first amendment, but by reason of the
haste with which the first amendment was drawn he had unintentionally
made it exactly the opposite of what he had intended to state. After
argument the court allowed the second amendment. We are satisfied that in
this allowance there was no abuse of discretion and we do not see how the
plaintiff was in any way prejudiced. She proceeded with the trial of the case
without asking for a continuance.

The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the complaint is
affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu,
Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather
SUPREME COURT silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
Manila

FIRST DIVISION (1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in
asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father,
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;
BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR.,
petitioners,
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with
vs.
defendant is null and void ab initio;
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the
second marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's death. 1

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage after his death?
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to
declare null and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death,
applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage.
of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question
resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or of law.
on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an
affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11,
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing
Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification
a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident.
failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the
After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading
the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for
which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3
lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the
However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal
validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's
and reinstated the petition for review. 4
successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons
who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the
Family Code. The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their
validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage
void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The
requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of
its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of
which the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an
"inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall
be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers
marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law
considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein
a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article
76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing
the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity
attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from
legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the
peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of
gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to
preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent
Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they
executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority,
and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue
that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of
the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period
or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year
continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their
being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or
intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as
husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year
period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and
wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to
validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation
period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage,
should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day
of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5
years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties
were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the
law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those
who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed.
The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the
law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every
single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-
conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no
exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances
clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license
is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be
united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any
impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil
registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the
local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons
under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil
registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil
registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars
thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely
prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during
the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the
exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or
annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the
contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs
are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The
law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be
said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least
five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage
was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started
living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains
that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid
under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage
contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started
cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each
other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the
filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by
either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void
ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a
petition to declare their father's marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20
cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the
trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at
anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains
to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a
suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until
otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is
considered as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the
source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free
cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable
marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while
a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages
can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after
death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if
the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense
for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any
proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no
legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the
alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint
contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as
provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53
and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing
voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children
conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father
extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The
conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was
a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that
their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and
the death of either extinguished nothing.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt
does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights
or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be
absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for
the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the SO ORDERED.
marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a
void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the
parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being
good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding
in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in
any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the
death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the
facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-
existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be
collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime
of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code
expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment
to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action or
defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29
Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or
the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is

necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.1âwphi1 For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or
a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as
it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to
any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other
than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.