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G.R. No. 162336. February 1, 2010.

* (DOSRI)

HILARIO P. SORIANO, vs. PEOPLE

Facts

The Office of Special Investigation (OSI) sent a letter to the (DOJ). Annexed therein are five
affidavits, which would serve as bases for filing criminal against the petitioner. Acting on the
letter-request the State Prosecutor Fonacier proceeded with the preliminary investigation and
filed two separate informations, One for estafa through falsification of commercial documents
and the other was for violation of Section 83 of RA 337, the so-called DOSRI loans. Petitioner
moved to quash these informations on two grounds: that the court had no jurisdiction over the
offense charged, and that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.

First, Petitioner argued that the letter transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ constituted the
complaint and was defective for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of the Rules,
such as the statement of address of petitioner and oath and subscription. Moreover, petitioner
argued that the officers of OSI, who were the signatories to the "letter-complaint," were not
authorized by the BSP Governor, much less by the Monetary Board, to file the complaint.

On the second ground, petitioner contended that the commission of estafa under paragraph 1(b)
of Article 315 of the RPC is inherently incompatible with the violation of DOSRI law. The
petitioner theorized that the characterization of possession is different in the two offenses. If
petitioner acquired the loan as DOSRI, he owned the loaned money and therefore, cannot
misappropriate or convert it as contemplated in the offense of estafa. Conversely, if petitioner
committed estafa, then he merely held the money in trust for someone else and therefore, did
not acquire a loan in violation of DOSRI rules.

RTC and CA ruled in favor of BSP.

Hence, this petition.

Issues

Whether a loan transaction within the ambit of the DOSRI law (violation of Section 83 of RA
337, as amended) could also be the subject of Estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised
Penal Code.

Held

Yes. the informations filed against petitioner do not negate each other.

The bank money (amounting to ₱8 million) which came to the possession of petitioner was
money held in trust or administration by him for the bank, in his fiduciary capacity as the
President of said bank. It is not accurate to say that petitioner became the owner of the ₱8
million because it was the proceeds of a loan. That would have been correct if the bank
knowingly extended the loan to petitioner himself. But no. The loan was supposed to be for
another person, a certain "Enrico Carlos"; petitioner, through falsification, made it appear that
said "Enrico Carlos" applied for the loan when in fact he ("Enrico Carlos") did not. Through such
fraudulent device, petitioner obtained the loan proceeds and converted the same. It cannot be
said that petitioner became the legal owner of the ₱8 million. Thus, petitioner remained the
bank’s fiduciary with respect to that money, which makes it capable of misappropriation or
conversion in his hands.

There can also be a charge for DOSRI violation in such a situation wherein the accused bank
officer did not secure a loan in his own name, but was alleged to have used the name of another
person in order to indirectly secure a loan from the bank.

The prohibition in Section 83 is broad enough to cover various modes of borrowing. It covers
loans by a bank director or officer (like herein petitioner) which are made either: (1) directly,
(2) indirectly, (3) for himself, (4) or as the representative or agent of others. It applies even if the
director or officer is a mere guarantor, indorser or surety for someone else's loan or is in any
manner an obligor for money borrowed from the bank or loaned by it. The covered transactions
are prohibited unless the approval, reportorial and ceiling requirements under Section 83 are
complied with. The prohibition is intended to protect the public, especially the depositors, from
the overborrowing of bank funds by bank officers, directors, stockholders and related interests,
as such overborrowing may lead to bank failures. It has been said that "banking institutions are
not created for the benefit of the directors [or officers]. While directors have great powers as
directors, they have no special privileges as individuals. They cannot use the assets of the bank
for their own benefit except as permitted by law. Stringent restrictions are placed about them so
that when acting both for the bank and for one of themselves at the same time, they must keep
within certain prescribed lines regarded by the legislature as essential to safety in the banking
business".

The foregoing information describes the manner of securing the loan as indirect; names
petitioner as the benefactor of the indirect loan; and states that the requirements of the law were
not complied with. It contains all the required elements for a violation of Section 83, even if
petitioner did not secure the loan in his own name.
G.R. No. 178429 October 23, 2009 (DOSRI)

JOSE C. GO, Petitioner, vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Respondent.

Facts

On August 20, 1999, an Information for violation of Section 83 of Republic Act No. 337 (RA 337)
or the General Banking Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1795, was filed against Go
before the RTC. Go claimed that the Information was defective, as the facts charged therein do
not constitute an offense. Go averred that based on the facts alleged in the Information, he was
being prosecuted for borrowing the deposits or funds of the Orient Bank and/or acting as a
guarantor, indorser or obligor for the bank’s loans to other persons. The use of the word
"and/or" meant that he was charged for being either a borrower or a guarantor, or for being both
a borrower and guarantor. Go claimed that the charge was not only vague, but also did not
constitute an offense. He posited that Section 83 of RA 337 penalized only directors and officers
of banking institutions who acted either as borrower or as guarantor, but not as both.

Go further pointed out that the Information failed to state that his alleged act of borrowing and/or
guarantying was not among the exceptions provided for in the law. According to Go, the second
paragraph of Section 83 allowed banks to extend credit accommodations to their directors,
officers, and stockholders, provided it is "limited to an amount equivalent to the respective
outstanding deposits and book value of the paid-in capital contribution in the bank." Extending
credit accommodations to bank directors, officers, and stockholders is not per se prohibited,
unless the amount exceeds the legal limit. Since the Information failed to state that the amount
he purportedly borrowed and/or guarantied was beyond the limit set by law, Go insisted that the
acts so charged did not constitute an offense.

The RTC granted Go’s motion to quash the Information. The CA annulled and set aside the
RTC’s orders and ordered the reinstatement of the criminal charge against Go.

Issues

Whether or not The failure to state that petitioner borrowed deposits and/or guaranteed loans
beyond an amount equivalent to the respective outstanding deposits and book value of the paid-
in capital contribution in the bank rendered the Information defective.

Held

No. Contrary to Go’s claims, the second paragraph of Section 83, RA 337 does not provide for
an exception to a violation of the first paragraph thereof, nor does it constitute as an element of
the offense charged. Section 83 of RA 337 actually imposes three restrictions: approval,
reportorial, and ceiling requirements.

The approval requirement (found in the first sentence of the first paragraph of the law) refers to
the written approval of the majority of the bank’s board of directors required before bank
directors and officers can in any manner be an obligor for money borrowed from or loaned by
the bank. Failure to secure the approval renders the bank director or officer concerned liable for
prosecution and, upon conviction, subjects him to the penalty provided in the third sentence of
first paragraph of Section 83.
The reportorial requirement, on the other hand, mandates that any such approval should be
entered upon the records of the corporation, and a copy of the entry be transmitted to the
appropriate supervising department. The reportorial requirement is addressed to the bank itself,
which, upon its failure to do so, subjects it to quo warranto proceedings under Section 87 of RA
337.

The ceiling requirement under the second paragraph of Section 83 regulates the amount of
credit accommodations that banks may extend to their directors or officers by limiting these to
an amount equivalent to the respective outstanding deposits and book value of the paid-in
capital contribution in the bank. Again, this is a requirement directed at the bank. In this light, a
prosecution for violation of the first paragraph of Section 83, such as the one involved here,
does not require an allegation that the loan exceeded the legal limit. Even if the loan involved
is below the legal limit, a written approval by the majority of the bank’s directors is still
required; otherwise, the bank director or officer who becomes an obligor of the bank is
liable. Compliance with the ceiling requirement does not dispense with the approval
requirement.

Evidently, the failure to observe the three requirements under Section 83 paves the way for the
prosecution of three different offenses, each with its own set of elements. A successful
indictment for failing to comply with the approval requirement will not necessitate proof that the
other two were likewise not observed.
G.R. No. 83139 April 12, 1989 (Redemption Price)

SY, vs.ca

Facs.

Carlos Coquinco executed in favor of private respondent State Investment House, Inc. (SIHI) a
real estate mortgage over a parcel of land in San Juan, Metro-Manila issued in his name, as
security for the payment of a loan in the amount of P1,000,000.00. For failure of Carlos
Coquinco to pay his outstanding balance of P1,126,220.56 computed as of October 19, 1982
the mortgaged property was extrajudicially foreclosed by SIHI and was sold at public auction on
for P760,000.00 to SIHI as the only bidder.

Petitoner acquired by virtue of a deed of assignment Carlos Coquinco's right of redemption for
and in consideration of P500,000.00. Before the expiration of the one-year redemption period,
petitioner offered to redeem the foreclosed property from SIHI by tendering to the latter two (2)
manager's checks issued by SOLIDBANK, one for P760,000.00 representing the purchase
price, and another for P91,200.00 representing interest at the rate of 1% per month for 12
months, totalling P851,200.00. SIHI rejected this offer.

Petitioner decided to redeem the foreclosed property directly from the Ex-Officio Regional
Sheriff of Rizal, who accepted from him the amount of P851,200.00 as redemption price and
P4,269.00 as percentage fee of collection, and issued to him the corresponding certificate of
redemption.

On March 30,1984, SIHI filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case on the ground of lack of cause of
action, alleging that the amount sought to be consigned was insufficient for purposes of
redemption pursuant to Section 78 of Rep. Act No. 337, otherwise known as the General
Banking Act.

RTC dismissed petitioner's complaint. CA affirmed

Issue

I. Whether Act No. 3135, as amended, in relation to Section 30, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court, or Section 78 of Rep. Act No. 337 (General Banking Act), as amended by P.D. No. 1828,
is the applicable law in determining the redemption price;

Held

Section 78 of Rep. Act No. 337 (General Banking Act), as amended by P.D. No. 1828, is the
applicable law in determining the redemption price

The Court finds that respondent appellate court committed no reversible error, having acted in
accordance with the law and jurisprudence.

Section 78 of the General Banking Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1828, states that:
... In the event of foreclosure, whether judicially or extra-judicially, of any
mortgage on real estate which is security for any loan granted before the
passage of this Act or under the provisions of this Act, the mortgagor or debtor
whose real property has been sold at public auction, judicially or extra-judicially,
for the full or partial payment of an obligation to any bank, banking or credit
institution, within the purview of this Act shall have the right, within one year after
the sale of the real estate as a result of the foreclosure of the respective
mortgage, to redeem the property by paying the amount fixed by the court in the
order of execution, or the amount due under the mortgage deed, as the case
may be, with interest thereon at the rate specified in the mortgage and all the
costs, and judicial and other expenses incurred by the bank or institution
concerned by reason of the execution and sale and as a result of the custody of
said property less the income received from the property. [Emphasis supplied].

It must be emphasized that the above section is applicable not only to "banks and banking
institutions," but also to "credit institutions such as sihi

Moreover, petitioner by virtue of the deed of assignment of Carlos Coquinco's right of


redemption must be deemed subrogated to the rights and obligations of his assignor, Had
Carlos Coquinco attempted to redeem the subject foreclosed property, he would have had to
pay "the amount due under the mortgage deed ... with interest thereon at the rate specified in
the mortgage and all costs ... and other expenses incurred . . . by reason of the execution (or
foreclosure] and sale and as a result of the custody of said property less the income received
from the property . . ." pursuant to Section 78 of the General Banking Act in order to effect a
valid redemption. Since petitioner merely stepped into the shoes of Carlos Coquinco his
assignor, petitioner should have tendered and paid the same amount in order to redeem the
property.

The General Banking Act partakes of the nature of an amendment to Act No. 3135 insofar as
the redemption price is concerned, when the mortgagee is a bank or banking or credit
institution, Section 6 of Act No. 3135 being, in this respect, inconsistent with Section 78 of the
General Banking Act. Although the foreclosure and sale of the subject property was done by
SIHI pursuant to Act No. 3135, as amended (whereby entities like SIHI are authorized to
extrajudicially foreclose and sell mortgaged properties only under a special power inserted in or
annexed to the real estate mortgage contract, and interested parties, like petitioner herein, are
given one year from the date of sale within which to redeem the foreclosed properties), Section
78 of the General Banking Act, as amended, provides the amount at which the subject property
is redeemable from SIHI, which is, in this case, the amount due under the mortgage deed, or
the outstanding obligation of Carlos Coquinco plus interest and expenses.

Thus, inasmuch as petitioner failed to tender and pay the required amount for the redemption of
the subject property pursuant to Section 78 of the General Banking Act, as amended, no valid
redemption was effected by him. Consequently, there was no legal obstacle to the consolidation
of title by SIHI.

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