TRANSCRIPT

Programme(s) BBC2 Newsnight

Date & time Wednesday, 4th June 2003
Subject l interviewee Dossier-Susan Watts
Prepared by: Pauline Hume
Contact numbers : 020 7276 1080 - Pager 07659 137 572 - 24hrs, every day

Jeremy Paxman, Presenter: Our Science Editor, Susan Watts, reports .

Susan Watts, Science Editor : The row over intelligence information and
how coalition governments used it in the build-up to war reverberated
around the capitals today. A senior Australian intelligence officer, who
resigned over his country's involvement m the war with Iraq, kept up the
barrage of highly damaging assertions .
Andrew Wilkie, Former Senior Analyst, Australian Office of National
Assessments : I feel that all 3 governments - m Washington, in London, in
Canberra - in a11 cases were dishonest when selling the Iraq problem to
their people and trying to persuade them to go to the war. Yes ., they were
dishonest . Some people would call that lying.
Ray McGovern, Former CIA Analyst : I sympathise with your
professional intelligence experts because I know a lot of them and I know
the degree of care and professionalism they bring to the task. And to see
them watch their product be prostituted really to higher purpose is
something that is almost, there's nothing more painful for an intelligence
professional to watch .
SW: The questions for any inquiry are piling up . First, how sound was the
govemment's assertion that Saddam could launch banned weapons at 45
minutes notice? The issue dominated today's debate . Tony Blair flatly
denied that the 45 minute claim had unsettled the intelligence services .
Tony Blair : The claim that, the claim about 45 minutes provoked disquiet
amongst the intelligence community who disagreed with its inclusion in the
dossier. Again this is something I have discussed again with the Chairman
of the Joint Intelligence Committee . That allegation also is completely and
totally untrue.
SW : But a source we've spoken to, a senior official intimately involved
with the process of pulling together the original weapons dossier in which
the claim was made, told us that he and others felt considerable discomfort
over it .
Actor's Voice: I was uneasy with it. My problem was 1 could give other
explanations, which I've indicated to you, but it was the time to erect

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something like a scud missile or it's the time to fill a multi-barrelled rocket
launcher, all sorts of reasons why 45 minutes might well be important.
SW : In other words he's saying that Saddam might have rocket hardware
that takes 45 minutes to assemble but not necessarily the weapons of mass
destruction to which Tony Blair referred in his weapons dossier when he
said of Saddam : "The document discloses that his military planning allows
for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use
them ." The Prime Minister appeared to want to shift the focus of the
argument, moving away from how the 45 minute claim was used to who
put it in the weapons dossier.
TB : The judgment about the so-called 45 minutes was a judgment made
by the Joint Intelligence Committee and by them alone .
SW: Our source was not disputing that the 45 minute assessment was
included in the dossier by the intelligence services, although he did say he
felt that to have been a mistake. His point was that the emphasis placed on
that element of the intelligence in the foreword to the dossier went too far.
He felt this emphasis turned a possible capability into an imminent threat
and a critical part of the government's case for war. Our source cannot be
described as a rogue element . On the contrary, he is exceptionally well-
placed to judge the prevailing mood as the dossier of September last year
was put together .
RM : It's fair to describe these hoaxes and rogue elements only if you are
part of a government that has a lot of defensiveness and a lot of need to
dismiss such allegations as being untrue. You are not a rogue element if
you have a devotion towards the truth that transcends this or that
regulation .
SW : The government denied today that the 45 minute claim originated
from an Iraqi defector whose credibility some might doubt but instead from
a reliable source trusted over many years . Nevertheless its inclusion was
unusual since a minister has conceded the information came from a single
source.
AW : l don't think it should have been included at all . One of the worrying
things about this whole Iraq mess is the way the intelligence process has
been allowed to break down . Intelligence officers would never rely on a
single report as evidence of such an important point .
SW : So is the intelligence information itself sound? Tony Blair was also
asked about the conclusion by nuclear inspectors that forged documents
were behind claims included in the same September dossier that Saddam
was trying to obtain uranium from Niger for a revived nuclear programme .
The Prime Minister said he was not able to say if this was accurate or not.
 RM : What I would suggest is that Mr Blair needs to talk with Secretary
Powell and find out why it is that Secretary Powell has conceded that that
was a forgery.
SW : Can we rely on the govetrnment's dossiers? It's not as if the British
government's record is clean when it comes to embellishment . A
Cambridge academic uncovered that a second dossier published in January
shared 10 of its 19 pages with an article written by a lecturer in Middle East
studies m California . But where the original talked of the Iraqi Intelligence
Service aiding opposition groups in hostile regimes, the British document
translated that to supporting terrorist organisations in hostile regimes .
AA' There was no doubt that Iraq was pursuing some sort of WMD
:
programme . That's what all the intelligence agencies were assessing and I
agreed with it at the time . The issue here is one of degree, the fact that m
all 3 countries the intelligence agencies were coming up with reasonably
measured assessments but in a11 3 countries it was the governments that
were taking those measured assessments and exaggerating them to quite a
substantial degree .
SW : The Prime Minister said the real hunt for weapons begins today with
the Iraq Survey Group . The question now is can this team, which includes
former inspectors, succeed where the coalition forces have so far failed?
Jeremy Paxman: Well we'rejoined now by the Deputy Leader ofthe House
ofCommons Ben Bradshaw and by Menzies Campbell ofthe Liberal
Democrats. In the light ofanother security source talking to us about their
disquiet would you like to apologisefor the comments about rogue elements
in the security services?
Ben Bradshaw (Deputy Leader of the House of Commons): No you say
another, we don't know whether this is a different one or the same one and
Susan Watts did extremely . . .
JP : It is a different one.
BB : Well Susan Watts was extremely careful in her report not even to say
that this person was a member of the security services, I listened very
carefully to what she said . But even taking the . . .
JP: I can tell you it's, it is a member ofthe security services intimately
involved.
BB : . . . even, even taking, well it would have been helpful if you'd say that
in your report. Even if 1 accept that do you give more credence to a
potentially disgruntled single member of the security service, services or to
the Joint Intelligence Committee which contains on, as its membership all
the senior managers of all the security services who have said absolutely
categorically time and time again that all of the accusations that have been
levelled against the Government in the last week are wrong?

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JP: The accusation is, is not so much that there is necessarily oryou can
come to it, the one or two things that are questioned but by and large it's
not to do with specific allegations it's to do with the prominence given to
certain allegations and the way in which allegations are used. For example
the point about thefortyfive minutes.
BB : The Prime Minister made quite clear in the House of Commons at
Prime Minister's Question Time today that the work of that report was by
the Joint Intelligence Committee there was no embellishment, there was no
pressure, there was no doctoring by any politician or any one at Downing
Street . This is work that has been approved and this has been repeated time
and time again by the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee since
these allegations surfaced . They have been rebuffed . . .
JP : Well in that case) ~ou have nothing to fearfrom a public inquiry .
BB: . . . and they have been totally not substantiated . . .
JP: (indistinct) to fear.
BB: I don't think we have got anything to fear from any inquiry . . .
JP : In that case why are you so against it?
BB: . . . well we're having, we're having two inquiries, two parliamentary
inquiries and I do find it astonishing that someone like Menzies Campbell
who is your other guest tonight . . .
JP: He hasn't even spoken yet.
BB: . . . 1 know but he, but he, he, he was behind the motion today that
called for a judicial inquiry run by a judge. Menzies is some one who like
me shares a, a, a care for the integrity of Parliament and I find it amazing
that Menzies does not have enough confidence in his fellow members,
Liberal Democrats, distinguished Liberal Democrats who are on the
Intelligence Committee to do a good job . . .
JP: All right you . . .
BB : . . . as they did in the (indistinct) inquiry which was highly critical of
the intelligence services .
JP: . . . you've got your retaliation in, you've got your retaliation in, in, in
first but perhaps we could allow Menzies Campbell to explain to us why
there (indistinct) there are going to be two inquiries why have they accepted
it?
Menzies Campbell (Liberal Democrat, Foreign Affairs) : Well it's not
my confidence that matters it's the confidence of the public over a million
of whom came onto the streets of London to express their anxiety about the
idea of conflict with Iraq. And it seems to me that if we're going to satisfy
the public interest here then we don't need an inquiry which reports to the

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Prime Minister or to the House of Commons we need one which is, in
which the public will have confidence. Now what a judge brings to these
matters is total impartiality . Now I don't for a moment challenge the
independence of members of the intelligence security committee indeed I
went out of my way in my speech today to say precisely that. They're all
men and women of considerable character and considerable experience .
But for once in our lives in the House of Commons we ought to ask
ourselves how does this look outside and the point is that an independent
inquiry, independent of the House of Commons would be much more
credible in the minds of the public .
JP : You seethe difficulty is you've gotform on this. We know that you 1
won't say necessarily distort but you rewrite assessments in order to make
them suit your political purpose
BB : Now wait a minute Jeremy there is a crucial difference between and,
and Susan also made this absolutely clear, between a so called dodgy
dossier and a, the allegations that have been made for the last week largely
by the BBC that the Government deliberately put pressure on the security
services to put stuff in the report that was the main reason for us going to
war against (indistinct) . It wasn't the main reason, the main reason was that
Saddam Hussein, a fascist dictator was in material breach of seventeen
mandatory United Nations' resolutions on his weapons programme .
Menzies accepts he has these weapons, the whole international community
accepted he had these weapons . . .
JP : You don't think you've got a credibility problem?
BB : I don' think and l think when, when you see what comes out of both
these inquiries you, you, you will realise this is being, this is being
motivated by those people who were against the military action from the
beginning and who have been proved wrong in all their predictions
including I'm afraid to say Menzies of whom 1 have the highest respect,
Menzies your party . . .
MC: Well, well me, me think he doth protest too much if I may say so
because . . .
BB : . . . your party said that this would be a quagmire . . .
119C : Never, never . . .
BB: . . . the Arab street would rise up, it would stop the Middle East peace
process . Today we're celebrating . . .
MC : . . . well, well I .1 . . .
BB : . . . a major break through in the Middle East peace process thanks in
no small part (indistinct) Saddam Hussein .
MC : Well I call upon, l call upon you to specify the occasions on which
any one of these charges, any one of these charges . . .
BB : I've heard members of your party say exactly those things.
MC : . . . are able to be substantiated. The whole point about the
Government's position was this. That weapons of mass destruction were
right at the centre of its strategy because there were Security Council
resolutions which it said that Saddam Hussein had not implemented . It
went beyond that, it said that he processed weapons of mass destruction
which were capable of being used within forty five minutes of the order to
use them . What it said was there is an acute threat, an acute threat to the
region and indeed to British forces . Government Ministers were saying
look we've got soldiers in Cyprus . . .
JP : In Cyprus yes.
N1C : . . . they would fall within the range of a scud missile which might
have a chemical or a biological war head . The Government went out of its
way to say that this was so acute that Hans Blix and UNMOVIC the
inspectorate could not be allowed the few months that Bans Blix said were
necessary in order that he could complete his inspections . Now on that
basis if the forty five minute factor is suspicious in any way whatsoever it
has a very substantial effect in undermining the Government's position .
That's why this issue is of such importance .
BB : But Menzies the idea that this whole conflict comes down to the forty
five minute factor is preposterous . . .
MC : Well it . . .
BB : . . . you know exactly what it came down to, it was a fact that this was a
regime that was in material breach of seventeen mandatory resolutions on
weapons of mass destruction . . .
JP: You, you set out to demonstrate an imminent threat . ..
BB: . . . imminent threat and . ..
JP : . . . that was thepoint, that was what swung people in behind you.
BB : I am confident that when these inquiries report and when the people
who are now on the ground in Iraq only just beginning their work . . .
JP : Are you . . .
BB : . . . of looking into the weapons programme report that that view will
be vindicated .
JP: And it will also . . .
BB : And everything else it says (indistinct) vindicated .
JP : . . . it will also demonstrate will it that this country was trying to take
uranium from Lajere, an allegation which is apparently based upon
fraudulent documents according to the IEA?
BB : Well you say that . . .
JP : Well no, no Dr El-Baradei says that, told the Security Council that.
BB : That is, that is, I'm not going to pre judge what our own Joint
Intelligence Committee will say on that and you can't expect me to do that
on the programme . . .
MC : (indistinct) Colin Powell (indistinct) using that illustration . . .
BB : Sorry Menzies we're not prepared to do that yet.
P9C : It. it was, it was essentially, it was essentially blown out of the water
(indistinct) by El-Baradei who said the documents are false and it
subsequently emerged that one of the signatories, purported signatories was
a minister who hadn't been in office for seven years.
BB : The problem here . . .
JP: But if Colin Powell can, can make a judgment about it, he's wrong
(indistinct) is he?
BB : The problem here Jeremy is that those people who said this would be a
disaster from the beginning have been proved wrong on every count
(indistinct) . . .
JP: That's not the, that's not the argument (indistinct) why you're sticking
to this discredited allegation.
BB : I'm not sticking to a discredited allegation I'm simply pointing out
that the people who are making the running on this were people who
opposed this conflict from the start, who have been proved wrong on every
count. I mean you're not even leading your programme tonight, which I
think is a scandal, on the historic break through in the Middle East peace
process . . .
JP: Right.
BB : . . . you know and this is something . this is something . . .
JP : You'vejust, (indistinct) you'vejust written yourselfout of the script
both ofyou, we are going to go immediately .. .
BB : Very good .
JP: . . . to the very optimistic noises coming out ofthe Middle East today.
End