EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS

HONASAN VS PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS OF DEPT OF JUSTICE

FACTS:

August 4, 2003: CIDG-PNP/P Director Edguardo Matillano filed an affidavit-complaint with the
Department of Justice (DOJ) which contains the following in part:

o July 27, 2003: crime of coup d’ etat was committed by military personnel who occupied
Oakwood and Senator Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan, II

o On or about 11 p.m. June 4,2003: A meeting was held and presided by Senator Honasan in a
house located in San Juan, Metro Manila

o Early morning of July 27, 2003: Capt. Gerardo Gambala, in behalf of the military rebels occupying
Oakwood, made a public statement aired on national television, stating their withdrawal of support to
the chain of command of the AFP and the Government of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Willing
to risk their lives to achieve the National Recovery Agenda (NRA) of Senator Honasan which they
believe is the only program that would solve the ills of society.

· Sworn statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil stated that:

o June 4, 2003 about 11 pm: Senator Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan arrived with Capt. Turinga to hold
the NRP meeting where they concluded the use of force, violence and armed struggle to achieve the
vision of NRP where a junta will be constituted which will run the new government. They had a blood
compact and that he only participated due to the threat made by Senator Honasan when he said
“Kung kaya nating pumatay sa ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating pumatay sa mga kasamahang
magtataksil.”

o July 27, 2003: He saw on TV that Lieutenant Antonio Trillanes, Captain Gerardo Gambala, Captain
Alejano and some others who were present during the NRP meeting he attended, having a press
conference about their occupation of the Oakwood Hotel. He saw that the letter "I" on the arm
bands and the banner is the same letter "I" in the banner is the same as their blood compact wound.

· August 27, 2003: Senator Honasan appeared with counsel at the DOJ to file a a Motion for
Clarification questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case since the imputed acts were committed in
relation to his public office by a group of public officials with Salary Grade 31 which should be
handled by the Office of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan

· Senator Honasan then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
against the DOJ Panel and its members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano and Ombudsman
Simeon V. Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in issuing the
aforequoted Order of September 10, 2003 directing him to file his respective counter-affidavits and
controverting evidence on the ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation

ISSUE:
WON respondent Department of Justice Panel of Investigators has jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation over the charge of coup d'etat against petitioner;

HELD:

Petitioner claims that it is the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the jurisdiction to conduct the
preliminary investigation under paragraph (1), Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which
confers upon the Office of the Ombudsman the power to investigate on its own, or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. Petitioner rationalizes that the 1987
Administrative Code and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 cannot prevail over the Constitution, pursuant
to Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not
be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and
the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary
to the laws or the Constitution.

and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito.2

The Court is not convinced. Paragraph (1) of Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, viz:

SEC. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:

1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.

does not exclude other government agencies tasked by law to investigate and prosecute cases
involving public officials. If it were the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, they would
have expressly declared the exclusive conferment of the power to the Ombudsman. Instead,
paragraph (8) of the same Section 13 of the Constitution provides:
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or
duties as may be provided by law.

Accordingly, Congress enacted R.A. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989." Section
15 thereof provides:

Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in
the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency
of the government, the investigation of such cases.

…. (Emphasis supplied)

Pursuant to the authority given to the Ombudsman by the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of
1989 to lay down its own rules and procedure, the Office of the Ombudsman promulgated
Administrative Order No. 8, dated November 8, 1990, entitled, Clarifying and Modifying Certain Rules
of Procedure of the Ombudsman, to wit:

A complaint filed in or taken cognizance of by the Office of the Ombudsman charging any public
officer or employee including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, with an act or
omission alleged to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient is an Ombudsman case. Such a complaint
may be the subject of criminal or administrative proceedings, or both.

For purposes of investigation and prosecution, Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses may be
subdivided into two classes, to wit: (1) those cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling
under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The difference between the two, aside from the category
of the courts wherein they are filed, is on the authority to investigate as distinguished from the
authority to prosecute, such cases.

The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman case may be
exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or
City Prosecutor or their assistance, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman
prosecutors.

The prosecution of cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the direct exclusive control
and supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman. In cases cognizable by the regular Courts, the
control and supervision by the Office of the Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman cases in the sense
defined above. The law recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the
Ombudsman and other investigative agencies of the government in the prosecution of cases
cognizable by regular courts. (Emphasis supplied)

It is noteworthy that as early as 1990, the Ombudsman had properly differentiated the authority to
investigate cases from the authority to prosecute cases. It is on this note that the Court will first dwell
on the nature or extent of the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate cases. Whence, focus is
directed to the second sentence of paragraph (1), Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act which
specifically provides that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from
any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.

That the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is
not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government such as
the provincial, city and state prosecutors has long been settled in several decisions of the Court.

Gatbonton vs NLRC

Facts:

Petitioner Renato S. Gatbonton is an associate professor of respondent Mapua Institute of

Technology (MIT), Faculty of Civil Engineering. Some time in November 1998, a civil engineering
student of respondent MIT filed a letter-complaint against petitioner for unfair/unjust grading system,
sexual harassment and conduct unbecoming of an academician. Pending investigation of the
complaint, respondent MIT, through its Committee on Decorum and Investigation placed petitioner
under a 30-day preventive suspension effective January 11, 1999. The committee believed that
petitioners continued stay during the investigation affects his performance as a faculty member, as
well as the students learning; and that the suspension will allow petitioner to prepare himself for the
investigation and will prevent his influences to other members of the community.[3]

Thus, petitioner filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal suspension, damages and attorneys fees,[4]
docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 01-00388-99.

Petitioner questioned the validity of the administrative proceedings with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila in a petition for certiorari but the case was terminated on May 21, 1999 when the parties
entered into a compromise agreement wherein respondent MIT agreed to publish in the school organ
the rules and regulations implementing Republic Act No. 7877 (R.A. No. 7877) or the Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act; disregard the previous administrative proceedings and conduct anew an
investigation on the charges against petitioner. Petitioner agreed to recognize the validity of the
published rules

and regulations, as well as the authority of respondent to investigate, hear and decide the
administrative case against him.[5]
On June 18, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Wherefore, premises considered, the thirty day preventive suspension of complainant is hereby
declared to be illegal. Accordingly, respondents are directed to pay his wages during the period of his
preventive suspension.

The rest of complainants claims are dismissed.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Both respondents and petitioner filed their appeal from the Labor Arbiters Decision, with petitioner
questioning the dismissal of his claim for damages. In a Decision dated September 30, 1999, the NLRC
granted respondents appeal and set aside the Labor Arbiters decision. His motion for reconsideration
having been denied by the NLRC on December 13, 1999, petitioner filed a special civil action for
certiorari with the CA.

On November 10, 2000, the CA promulgated the assailed decision affirming the NLRC decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and
ORDERED DISMISSED, and the challenged decision and order of public respondent NLRC AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied in its Resolution dated January 16,
2001.

Issue:

won there is legal basis for preventive dismissal.

Won there is basis for damages

Held:
A. It must be noted however, that respondent published said rules and regulations only on February
23, 1999. In Taada vs. Tuvera,[13] it was ruled that:

all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity is fixed by
the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel
of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules
or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform
the public of the contents of the laws. (Emphasis supplied)

The Mapua Rules is one of those issuances that should be published for its effectivity, since its
purpose is to enforce and implement R.A. No. 7877, which is a law of general application.[14] In fact,
the Mapua Rules itself explicitly required publication of the rules for its effectivity, as provided in
Section 3, Rule IV (Administrative Provisions), which states that [T]hese Rules and Regulations to
implement the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 shall take effect fifteen (15) days after publication
by the Committee. Thus, at the time of the imposition of petitioners preventive suspension on
January 11, 1999, the Mapua Rules were not yet legally effective, and therefore the suspension had
no legal basis.

B. With regard to petitioners claim for damages, the Court finds the same to be without basis. While
petitioners preventive suspension may have been unjustified, this does not automatically mean that
he is entitled to moral or other damages. In Cocoland Development Corp. vs. NLRC,[17] the Court
ruled:

In Primero vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court held that " an award (of moral damages)
cannot be justified solely upon the premise (otherwise sufficient for redress under the Labor Code)
that the employer fired his employee without just cause or due process. Additional facts must be
pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of moral damages under the Civil Code, these being, to
repeat, that the act of dismissal was attended by bad faith or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or
done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy; and of course, that social
humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc., resulted therefrom." This was reiterated in Garcia
vs. NLRC, where the Court added that exemplary damages may be awarded only if the dismissal was
shown to have been effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.
This the private respondent failed to do. Because no evidence was adduced to show that petitioner
company acted in bad faith or in a wanton or fraudulent manner in dismissing the private respondent,
the labor arbiter did not award any moral and exemplary damages in his decision. Respondent NLRC
therefore had no factual or legal basis to award such damages in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction.

The records of this case are bereft of any evidence showing that respondent MIT acted in bad faith or
in a wanton or fraudulent manner in preventively suspending petitioner, thus, the Labor Arbiter was
correct in not awarding any damages in favor of petitioner.

Marcos vs judge pamintuan

Facts:

From the records, it appears that on November 15, 2006, Marcos filed a complaint-affidavit charging
Judge Pamintuan with Gross Ignorance of the Law for reversing motu proprio the final and executory
order of then Acting Presiding Judge Antonio Reyes (Judge Reyes) dated May 30, 1996 (and modified
in the September 2, 1996 order), in Civil Case No. 3383-R, entitled "Albert D. Umali, in his capacity as
the exclusive administrator and as President of the Treasure Hunters Association of the Philippines v.
Jose D. Roxas, et al."

Judge Reyes dismissed Civil Case No. 3383-R in an order, dated May 30, 1996, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises and further, for failure to comply with Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated April 1, 1994 on forum shopping, the petition is DISMISSED.

It is further ORDERED that the Buddha statuette in the custody of this Court be immediately
RELEASED to the children of the late Rogelio Roxas, namely, Henry Roxas and Gervic Roxas and to
decedent’s brother, Jose Roxas, IN TRUST FOR the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas.

SO ORDERED.

The parties filed their separate motions for reconsideration of the said order but both motions were
denied by the RTC for lack of merit in its June 24, 1996 Order.

On June 25, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own motion for reconsideration
which was also denied in a court order dated September 2, 1996.
Ten (10) years later, in an order dated May 9, 2006, Judge Pamintuan set the case for hearing on June
29, 2006 purportedly to formally and finally release the Golden Buddha to its rightful owner. Marcos
was one of the subpoenaed parties, being a person with interest in the case.

On August 15, 2006, Judge Pamintuan issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in accordance with the final and executory Order of this Court dated September 2, 1996,
the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica is awarded to the estate of Rogelio Roxas. However, the
Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica shall be under custodia legis until the final settlement of the
estate of the late Rogelio Roxas, or upon the appointment of his estate’s administrator.

This Court further rules that the Golden Buddha in its custody is a fake one, or a mere replica of the
original Golden Buddha which has a detachable head, which has been missing since 1971 up to the
present, or for a period of thirty five (35) years by now, and has been in unlawful possession of
persons who do not have title over it, nor any right at all to possess this original Golden Buddha.

Marcos averred that the act of Judge Pamintuan in reversing a final and executory order constituted
gross ignorance of the law. In her complaint, citing A.M. No. 93-7-696-0, she argued that final and
executory judgments of lower courts were not reviewable even by the Supreme Court. Judge
Pamintuan reversed a final and executory order not upon the instance of any of the parties in Civil
Case No. 3383-R but motu proprio. He even failed to indicate where he obtained the information that
the Golden Buddha sitting in his sala was a "mere replica." Marcos claimed that his order was in
conflict with Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that a judgment or final
order shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it (his order) is based xxx."

In his Comment, Judge Pamintuan argued that Marcos could have just filed a pleading manifesting
lack of interest or moving for the recall of the subpoena, but she did not. In fact, her counsel, Atty.
Robert Sison, entered his appearance and actually appeared in court. With her appearance through
counsel, she subjected herself to the jurisdiction of the court. She should have filed a motion for
reconsideration of the August 15, 2006 Order instead of filing an administrative complaint. As she did
not, Judge Pamintuan opined that her lost judicial remedies could not be substituted with the filing of
this case.

Marcos, in her Reply-Affidavit, stated that she was not a party in Civil Case No. 3383-R, hence, she
could not file a motion for reconsideration. She cited Section 1 of Rule 37 which provides that only
the aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration within the period for taking an appeal.

In its Report, dated June 29, 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that
Judge Pamintuan be dismissed from the service with the additional penalty of forfeiture of all his
retirement benefits and disqualification from re-employment in the government service, including
government owned or controlled corporations, for Gross Ignorance of the Law and for "violation of
Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct." The OCA pointed out that:
As held, execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law. A judgment, if left
unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. Bearing this in mind,
respondent issued the questioned Order dated August 15, 2006, the pertinent text of which reads:

Despite said Order which was issued almost ten (10) years ago, the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas
has not taken possession of the Buddha Statuette or the Buddha replica from the Court, thus, this
incumbent Presiding Judge, seeing the necessity of finally disposing of the Buddha Statuette physically,
and finding out the present statue of the late Rogelio Roxas, ordered the hearing on June 29, 2006.
(Italics supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, in accordance with the final and executory Order of this Court dated September 2, 1996,
the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica is awarded to the estate of Rogelio Roxas. However, the
Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica shall be under custodia legis until the final settlement of the
estate of the late Rogelio Roxas, or upon the appointment of his estate’s administrator.

Clearly, the questioned Order conforms to the directive of the Court in its previous Order dated May
30, 1996, which provides:

It is further ORDERED that the Buddha Statuette in custody of this Court be immediately RELEASED to
the children of the late Rogelio Roxas, namely, Henry Roxas and Gervic Roxas and to the decedent’s
brother, Jose Roxas, IN TRUST FOR the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas.

And modified in an Order dated September 2, 1996, which reads:

"WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Solicitor General is DENIED. The Order of
this Court on May 30, 1996 remains insofar as the Buddha statuette is awarded to the state of the late
Rogelio Roxas and is at the same time MODIFIED in the sense that the Buddha statuette shall be
under the custodia legis until the final settlement of the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas or upon the
appointment of his estate’s administrator."

xxx xxx xxx

A normal course of proceedings would have been that respondent Judge waits for the proper party to
go to court to ask for the release of the Buddha statuette. x x x.

However, respondent was being overzealous when he ruled that the Golden Buddha in its custody is a
"fake one, or a mere replica." Notwithstanding that the same may be his’ and the litigants’ opinion
during the hearing of June 29, 2006. (sic) He should have borne in mind that there were no issues nor
controversies left for consideration in Civil Case No. 3383-R. It must be noted that the Order dated
May 30, 1996 (and modified on September 2, 1996) has become final and executory. Hence, issues
have been settled and the matter laid to rest. As repeatedly ruled by this Court, a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law. Should
judgment of lower courts – which may normally be subject to review by higher tribunals – become
final and executory before, or without exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they too become
inviolable, impervious to modification. They may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in any way modified
directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by Supreme Court, much less by any other official,
branch or department of government.

It is inexcusable for respondent Judge to have overlooked such an elementary legal principle."

Upon recommendation of the OCA, the Court, in its July 31, 2007 Resolution, preventively suspended
Judge Pamintuan pending resolution of this administrative case to stop him from committing further
damage to the judiciary. Judge Pamintuan moved for reconsideration and eventually filed a Motion
for Early Resolution of Motion for Reconsideration and to Submit the Case for Decision.

The matter was referred again to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation. In its
Memorandum dated November 22, 2007, the OCA recommended that "the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by respondent be GRANTED and that the Order of Preventive Suspension dated
July 31, 2007, be LIFTED." Thus, in its December 11, 2007 Resolution, the Court granted the Motion
for Reconsideration filed by Judge Pamintuan and lifted the Order of Preventive Suspension effective
immediately.

Judge Pamintuan then sent a letter requesting for his backpay and benefits covering the period of his
preventive suspension from August to December 13, 2007. In its June 3, 2008 Resolution, following
the recommendation of the OCA, the Court denied said request for being premature and for lack of
merit.

Now, the Court resolves the complaint against Judge Pamintuan.

Issue:

Won the judge is guilty of ignorance of the law

Held:

As of this time, there is another administrative case yet to be resolved against Judge Pamintuan filed
by one Peter Cosalan for gross ignorance of the law.[8] Although, this is not pertinent in the
resolution of this case, it is clear from the other undisputed records that Judge Pamintuan has failed
to meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. He has shown himself unworthy of
the judicial robe and place of honor reserved for guardians of justice. As held in the case of Malabed v.
Asis:[9]

Respondent Judge must bear in mind that membership in the judiciary circumscribes ones personal
conduct and imposes upon him certain restrictions, the faithful observance of which is the price one
has to pay for holding such a distinguished position. x x x His conduct must be able to withstand the
most searching public scrutiny, for the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are
essential to the preservation of the peoples faith in the judicial system lest public confidence in the
judiciary would be eroded by the incompetent, irresponsible and negligent conduct of judges.

The Court has held time and again that a judge is expected to demonstrate more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. It is essential that he be familiar with basic legal
principles and be aware of well-settled doctrines.[10]

As fittingly stated in the case of Borromeo v. Mariano,[11] Our conception of good judges has been,
and is, of men who has a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance
with law. Thus, this Court has had the occasion to hold that:

When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a
principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the
position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in
bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judges dismissal is in order.
After all, faith in the administration of justice exists only if every party-litigant is assured that
occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.[12]

In this case, the Court finds Judge Pamintuan accountable for gross ignorance of the law. He could
have simply been suspended and fined, but the Court cannot take his previous infractions lightly. His
violations are serious in character. Having been previously warned and punished for various
infractions, Judge Pamintuan now deserves the ultimate administrative penalty − dismissal from
service.

People vs Quiachon

Facts:

On the night of May 12, 2001, Rowel saw his father on top of his sister Rowena and they were
covered by a blanket or “kumot.” His father’s buttocks were moving up and down, and Rowel could
hear Rowena crying. He could not do anything, however, because he was afraid of their father.
Rowel remained in the room but the following morning, he, forthwith, told his mother’s sister
Carmelita Mateo, whom he called Ate Lita, about what he had witnessed. Together, Carmelita and
Rowel went to the police to report what had transpired. During the police investigation, Rowel
executed a sworn statement in Tagalog and signed it using the surname Mateo.[2]
Rowena, through sign language, testified that her father had sexual intercourse with her and even
touched her breasts against her will. She was

only eight years old at the time. She cried when she was asked if she was hurt by what appellant did
to her. She consistently declared that she does not love her father and wants him to be punished for
what he did to her.[3]

Dr. Miriam Sta. Romana Guialani of the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital Health
Services testified that she received a letter request from the PNP Crime Laboratory to conduct an
examination on Rowena. While she was about to proceed with the forensic interview, she noticed
that Rowena was deaf and mute, hence, could not verbally communicate her ordeal. Dr. Guialani
proceeded to conduct a physical examination and, based thereon, she submitted her medico-legal
report.

Dr. Guialani, as indicated in her report, found that Rowena had a “contusion hematoma” on her left
cheek, which was compatible with her claim that she was slapped by her father. Rowena also had
an “ecchymosis” or “kissmark” at the antero-lateral border of her left breast as well as ano-genital
injuries suggestive of chronic penetrating trauma.

Dr. Guialani explained that although the external genitalia did not show any sign of sexual abuse,
when it was opened up, the following were discovered: “markedly hyperemic urethra and
peri-hymenal area with fossa navicularis and markedly hyperemic perineum, markedly hyperemic
urethra layer up to the peri-hymenal margin up to the posterior hymenal notch with attenuation.”
Further, the labia was “very red all throughout, with hymenal notch with attenuation, a pale navicular
fossa and a very red perineum.”[4] All these, according to Dr. Guialani, were compatible with the
recent chronic penetrating trauma and recent injury which could have happened a day before the
examination. She pointed out that the hymenal attenuation sustained by Rowena was almost in the
6 o’clock notch.[5]

For its part, the defense presented the lone testimony of appellant Roberto Quiachon.

He testified that, on May 13, 2001, he was invited to the barangay hall by their barangay chairman.
He did not know then the reason for the invitation. At the barangay hall, he was surprised to see the
two sisters of his deceased live-in partner and his two children. He was shocked to learn that his
daughter Rowena had accused him of raping her. Thereafter, he was taken to the Karangalan Police
Station. He suffered hypertension and was brought to the hospital. When he recovered, he was
taken to the Pasig City Police Station and, thereafter, to jail.

Appellant claimed that Rowena is not deaf but only has a minor speech handicap. He denied raping
Rowena and alleged that Virginia Moraleda and Carmelita Mateo, both sisters of his deceased
common-law wife, held a grudge against him because he abandoned his family and was not able to
support them. His common-law wife died of cancer and her relatives were allegedly all interested in
his house and other properties. The said house was being leased and they were the ones getting the
rental income. Further, the nephew of his deceased partner was sending financial support of
US$100 a month for his child.

According to appellant, even before the death of his common-law wife, his son Rowel was already
hostile to him because he was closer to his daughters. He disclaimed any knowledge of any reason
why his children, Rowel and Rowena, accused him of a very serious offense.[6]

After consideration of the respective evidence of the prosecution and defense, the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 159, rendered its Decision[7] dated September 9, 2003, finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape defined and penalized under Articles
266-A and B[8] of the Revised Penal Code.

Issue:

Won the imposition of death penalty is proper

Held:

in view of the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346[27] on June 24, 2006 prohibiting the
imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be meted on appellant is reclusion perpetua in
accordance with Section 2 thereof which reads:

SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of
the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.

The aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this case pursuant to the principle in
criminal law, favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to
accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied under Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code, which provides as follows:

Retroactive effect of penal laws. – Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62
of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws, a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.[28]

However, appellant is not eligible for parole because Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 provides that
“persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced
to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall not be eligible for parole.”

With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court, following prevailing jurisprudence,[29]
correctly awarded the following amounts: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity which is awarded if the crime
is qualified by circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty; P75,000.00 as moral
damages because the victim is assumed to have suffered moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an
award of moral damages even without proof thereof, and; P25,000.00 as exemplary damages in light
of the presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.

Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant because of the prohibition in R.A.
No. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is still proper because, following the ratiocination in
People v. Victor,[30] the said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty
but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended
the commission of the offense. The Court declared that the award of P75,000.00 shows “not only a
reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time
but also the expression of the displeasure of the court of the incidence of heinous crimes against
chastity.”

Notwithstanding the abolition of the death penalty under R.A. No. 9364, the Court has resolved, as it
hereby resolves, to maintain the award of P75,000.00 for rape committed or effectively qualified by
any of the circumstances under which the death penalty would have been imposed prior to R.A. No.
9346.

JARILLO VS PEOPLE

FACTS:

That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo, being previously
united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with
Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered on January 12, 1999.

Contrary to law.

On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter, trial proceeded.
The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.

On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony
solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1, H-2,
O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated November 17, 2000).

On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church wedding
ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN dated November
17, 2000). Out of the marital union, appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29,
1975 (Exhs. F, R, R-1).

Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos
Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on November 26,
1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1, pp. 15-18, TSN dated November 22, 2000).

On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a church wedding in
Manila (Exh. E).

In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of marriage
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City x x
x.

xxxx

Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their marriage.

On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which
states:

WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby finds accused Victoria Soriano Jarillo
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.

Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of
prision correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum.
This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such as the nullity of accused’s
bigamous marriage to Uy and its effect on their children and their property. This aspect is being
determined by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 99-93582.

Costs against the accused.

The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in that assailed Order dated 2
August 2001.3

For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null and
void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the
celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a
valid marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo
as far back as 1978.

On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated July 21, 2003,
the CA held that petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos
Uy because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by
the court. This being so, the presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the
time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioner’s
contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy had notice of
her previous marriage as far back as 1978.

In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated March 28, 2003,
declaring petitioner’s 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of
Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her
motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal
of her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July 8, 2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals,4 denied reconsideration and ruled that "[t]he subsequent declaration of nullity of her first
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the celebration of
the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, the said marriage is not
without legal consequences, among which is incurring criminal liability for bigamy."

ISSUE:

HELD:

Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978; hence,
prescription began to run from that time. Note that the party who raises a fact as a matter of defense
has the burden of proving it. The defendant or accused is obliged to produce evidence in support of
its defense; otherwise, failing to establish the same, it remains self-serving.[12] Thus, for petitioners
defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her to adduce evidence that as early as the
year 1978, Uy already obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.

A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failed to present
sufficient evidence to support her allegation. Petitioners testimony that her own mother told Uy in
1978 that she (petitioner) is already married to Alocillo does not inspire belief, as it is totally
unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The trial court correctly observed that:

x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother the person who allegedly actually told Uy about
her previous marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the confirmatory testimony of her
mother, the attribution of the latter of any act which she allegedly did is hearsay.[13]

As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,[14] the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should
be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the
authorities or their [agents], as opposed to being counted from the date of registration of the
bigamous marriage.[15] Since petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the period of prescription
began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore, ineffectual.

Ferrer vs spouses diaz

Facts:

Petitioner Atty. Ferrer claimed in his original Complaint[6] that on May 7, 1999, the Diazes, as
represented by their daughter Comandante, through a Special Power of Attorney (SPA),[7] obtained
from him a loan of P1,118,228.00. The loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract[8] by
way of second mortgage over Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-6604[9] and a Promissory
Note[10] payable within six months or up to November 7, 1999. Comandante also issued to petitioner
postdated checks to secure payment of said loan.

Petitioner further claimed that prior to this or on May 29, 1998, Comandante, for a valuable
consideration of P600,000.00, which amount formed part of the abovementioned secured loan,
executed in his favor an instrument entitled Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real
Property (Still Undivided),

On the basis of said waiver, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim[12] which he caused to
be annotated at the back of TCT No. RT-6604 on May 26, 1999.

The Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by Comandante were
dishonored upon presentment. Despite repeated demands, said respondents still failed and refused
to settle the loan. Thus, petitioner filed on September 29, 1999 a Complaint[13] for Collection of Sum
of Money Secured by Real Estate Mortgage Contract against the Diazes and Comandante docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-99-38876 and raffled to Branch 224 of RTC, Quezon City.
Petitioner twice amended his complaint. First, by including as an alternative relief the Judicial
Foreclosure of Mortgage[14] and, second, by impleading as additional defendants the Pangans as the
mortgaged property covered by TCT No. RT-6604 was already transferred under their names in TCT
No. N-209049. Petitioner prayed in his second amended complaint that all the respondents be
ordered to jointly and solidarily pay him the sum of P1,118,228.00, exclusive of interests, and/or for
the judicial foreclosure of the property pursuant to the Real Estate Mortgage Contract.

In her Answer15 to petitioner’s original complaint, Comandante alleged that petitioner and his wife
were her fellow members in the Couples for Christ Movement. Sometime in 1998, she sought the
help of petitioner with regard to the mortgage with a bank of her parents’ lot located at No. 6, Rd. 20,
Project 8, Quezon City and covered by TCT No. RT-6604. She also sought financial accommodations
from the couple on several occasions which totaled ₱500,000.00. Comandante, however, claimed that
these loans were secured by chattel mortgages over her taxi units in addition to several postdated
checks she issued in favor of petitioner.

As she could not practically comply with her obligation, petitioner and his wife, presented to
Comandante sometime in May 1998 a document denominated as Waiver of Hereditary Rights and
Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) pertaining to a waiver of her hereditary share over her
parents’ abovementioned property. Purportedly, the execution of said waiver was to secure
Comandante’s loan with the couple which at that time had already ballooned to ₱600,000.00 due to
interests.

A year later, the couple again required Comandante to sign the following documents: (1) a Real Estate
Mortgage Contract over her parents’ property; and, (2) an undated Promissory Note, both
corresponding to the amount of ₱1,118,228.00, which petitioner claimed to be the total amount of
Comandante’s monetary obligation to him exclusive of charges and interests. Comandante alleged
that she reminded petitioner that she was not the registered owner of the subject property and that
although her parents granted her SPA, same only pertains to her authority to mortgage the property
to banks and other financial institutions and not to individuals. Petitioner nonetheless assured
Comandante that the SPA was also applicable to their transaction. As Comandante was still hesitant,
petitioner and his wife threatened to foreclose the former’s taxi units and present the postdated
checks she issued to the bank for payment. For fear of losing her taxi units which were the only
source of her livelihood, Comandante was thus constrained to sign the mortgage agreement as well
as the promissory note. Petitioner, however, did not furnish her with copies of said documents on the
pretext that they still have to be notarized, but, as can be gleaned from the records, the documents
were never notarized. Moreover, Comandante claimed that the SPA alluded to by petitioner in his
complaint was not the same SPA under which she thought she derived the authority to execute the
mortgage contract.

Comandante likewise alleged that on September 29, 1999 at 10:00 o‘ clock in the morning, she
executed an Affidavit of Repudiation/Revocation of Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over A
(Still Undivided) Real Property,16 which she caused to be annotated on the title of the subject
property with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on the same day. Interestingly, petitioner filed his
complaint later that day too.
By way of special and affirmative defenses, Comandante asserted in her Answer to the amended
complaint17 that said complaint states no cause of action against her because the Real Estate
Mortgage Contract and the waiver referred to by petitioner in his complaint were not duly, knowingly
and validly executed by her; that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property
(Still Undivided) is a useless document as its execution is prohibited by Article 1347 of the Civil
Code,18 hence, it cannot be the source of any right or obligation in petitioner’s favor; that the Real
Estate Mortgage was of doubtful validity as she executed the same without valid authority from her
parents; and, that the prayer for collection and/or judicial foreclosure was irregular as petitioner
cannot seek said remedies at the same time.

Apart from executing the affidavit of repudiation, Comandante also filed on October 4, 1999 a
Petition for Cancellation of Adverse Claim (P.E. 2468) Under The Memorandum of Encumbrances of
TCT No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-1888719 docketed as LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) and raffled to Branch
220 of RTC, Quezon City. Petitioner who was impleaded as respondent therein moved for the
consolidation of said case20 with Civil Case No. Q-99-38876. On June 24, 2000, Branch 220 of RTC,
Quezon City ordered the consolidation of LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) with Civil Case No. Q-99-38876.
Accordingly, the records of the former case was forwarded to Branch 224.

For their part, the Diazes asserted that petitioner has no cause of action against them. They claimed
that they do not even know petitioner and that they did not execute any SPA in favor of Comandante
authorizing her to mortgage for the second time the subject property. They also contested the due
execution of the SPA as it was neither authenticated before the Philippine Consulate in the United
States nor notarized before a notary public in the State of New York where the Diazes have been
residing for 16 years. They claimed that they do not owe petitioner anything. The Diazes also pointed
out that the complaint merely refers to Comandante’s personal obligation to petitioner with which
they had nothing to do. They thus prayed that the complaint against them be dismissed.21

At the Pangans’ end, they alleged that they acquired the subject property by purchase in good faith
and for a consideration of ₱3,000,000.00 on November 11, 1999 from the Diazes through the latter’s
daughter Comandante who was clothed with SPA acknowledged before the Consul of New York. The
Pangans immediately took actual possession of the property without anyone complaining or
protesting. Soon thereafter, they were issued TCT No. N-209049 in lieu of TCT No. RT-6604 which was
cancelled. 22

However, on December 21, 1999, they were surprised upon being informed by petitioner that the
subject land had been mortgaged to him by the Diazes. Upon inquiry from Comandante, the latter
readily admitted that she has a personal loan with petitioner for which the mortgage of the property
in petitioner’s favor was executed. She admitted, though, that her parents were not aware of such
mortgage and that they did not authorize her to enter into such contract. Comandante also informed
the Pangans that the signatures of her parents appearing on the SPA are fictitious and that it was
petitioner who prepared such document.

As affirmative defense, the Pangans asserted that the annotation of petitioner’s adverse claim on TCT
No. RT-6604 cannot impair their rights as new owners of the subject property. They claimed that the
Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) upon which
petitioner’s adverse claim is anchored cannot be the source of any right or interest over the property
considering that it is null and void under paragraph 2 of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.

Moreover, the Pangans asserted that the Real Estate Mortgage Contract cannot bind them nor in any
way impair their ownership of subject property because it was not registered before the Register of
Deeds.23

All the respondents interposed their respective counterclaims and prayed for moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees in varying amounts.

After the parties have submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, the Diazes filed on March 29, 2001 a
Motion for Summary Judgment24 alleging that: first, since the documents alluded to by petitioner in
his complaint were defective, he was not entitled to any legal right or relief; and, second, it was clear
from the pleadings that it is Comandante who has an outstanding obligation with petitioner which the
latter never denied. With these, the Diazes believed that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact against them and, hence, they were entitled to summary judgment.

On May 7, 2001, petitioner also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment,25 claiming that his suit against
the respondents is meritorious and well-founded and that same is documented and supported by law
and jurisprudence. He averred that his adverse claim annotated at the back of TCT No. RT-6604, which
was carried over in TCT No. 209049 under the names of the Pangans, is not merely anchored on the
Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by
Comandante, but also on the Real Estate Mortgage likewise executed by her in representation of her
parents and in favor of petitioner. Petitioner insisted that said adverse claim is not frivolous and
invalid and is registrable under Section 70 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. In fact, the Registrar
of Deeds of Quezon City had already determined the sufficiency and/or validity of such registration by
annotating said claim, and this, respondents failed to question. Petitioner further averred that even
before the sale and transfer to the Pangans of the subject property, the latter were already aware of
the existence of his adverse claim. In view of these, petitioner prayed that his Motion for Summary
Judgment be granted.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

After the filing of the parties’ respective Oppositions to the said motions for summary judgment, the
trial court, in an Order dated May 31, 2001,26 deemed both motions for summary judgment
submitted for resolution. Quoting substantially petitioner’s allegations in his Motion for Summary
Judgment, it thereafter rendered on June 14, 2001 a Summary Judgment27 in favor of petitioner, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and
against defendants by:
a) ORDERING all defendants jointly and solidarily to pay plaintiff the sum of ONE MILLION ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT PESOS (₱1,118,228.00) which is
blood money of plaintiff;

b) ORDERING the Honorable Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City that the rights and interest of the
plaintiff over subject property be annotated at the back of T.C.T. No. N-209049;

c) SENTENCING all defendants to pay plaintiff’s expenses of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000.00) and
to pay the costs of suit.

IT IS SO ORDERED.28

The Pangans, the Diazes, and Comandante appealed to the CA.29 The Pangans faulted the trial court
in holding them jointly and severally liable with the Diazes and Comandante for the satisfaction of the
latter’s personal obligation to petitioner in the total amount of ₱1,118,228.00. The Diazes and
Comandante, on the other hand, imputed error upon the trial court in rendering summary judgment
in favor of petitioner. They averred that assuming the summary judgment was proper, the trial court
should not have considered the Real Estate Mortgage Contract and the Promissory Note as they were
defective, as well as petitioner’s frivolous and non-registrable adverse claim.

In its Decision30 dated December 12, 2003, the CA declared Comandante’s waiver of hereditary rights
null and void. However, it found the Real Estate Mortgage executed by Comandante on behalf of her
parents as binding between the parties thereto.

As regards the Pangans, the CA ruled that the mortgage contract was not binding upon them as they
were purchasers in good faith and for value. The property was free from the mortgage encumbrance
of petitioner when they acquired it as they only came to know of the adverse claim through
petitioner’s phone call which came right after the former’s acquisition of the property. The CA further
ruled that as Comandante’s waiver of hereditary rights and interests upon which petitioner’s adverse
claim was based is a nullity, it could not be a source of any right in his favor. Hence, the Pangans were
not bound to take notice of such claim and are thus not liable to petitioner.

Noticeably, the appellate court did not rule on the propriety of the issuance of the Summary
Judgment as raised by the Diazes and Comandante. In the ultimate, the CA merely modified the
assailed Summary Judgment of the trial court by excluding the Pangans among those solidarily liable
to petitioner, in effect affirming in all other respects the assailed summary judgment, viz:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 224 in Civil Case No. Q-99-38876 is hereby MODIFIED, as follows:

1. Ordering defendants-appellants Comandante and Spouses Diaz to jointly and severally pay plaintiff
the sum of Php 1,118, 228.00; and
2. Ordering defendants-appellants Comandante and Spouses Diaz to jointly and severally pay plaintiff
the amount of Php10,000.00 plus cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.31

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration32 having been denied by the CA in its Resolution33 dated
September 10, 2004, he now comes to us through this petition for review on certiorari insisting that
the Pangans should, together with the other respondents, be held solidarily liable to him for the
amount of ₱1,118,228.00.

Issue:

Held:

The Diazes and Comandante then enumerate the genuine issues in the case which they claim should
have precluded the trial court from issuing a summary judgment in petitioners favor. First, the
execution of the SPA in favor of Comandante referred to by petitioner in his complaint was never
admitted by the Diazes. They assert that as such fact is disputed, trial should have been conducted to
determine the truth of the matter, same being a genuine issue. Despite this, the trial court merely
took the word of the plaintiff and assumed that said document was indeed executed by them. Second,
although Comandante acknowledges that she has a personal obligation with petitioner, she
nevertheless, did not admit that it was in the amount of P1,118,228.00. Instead, she claims only the
amount of P500,000.00 or P600,000.00 (if inclusive of interest) as her obligation. Moreover, the
Diazes deny borrowing any money from petitioner and neither did the Pangans owe him a single
centavo. Thus, the true amount of the obligation due the petitioner and how each of the respondents
are responsible for such amount are genuine issues which need formal presentation of evidence.
Lastly, they aver that the trial court ignored factual and material issues such as the lack of probative
value of Comandantes waiver of hereditary rights as well as of the SPA; the fact that Comandante
signed the mortgage contract and promissory note in her personal capacity; and, that all such
documents were prepared by petitioner who acted as a lawyer and the creditor of Comandante at the
same time.

Rule 35 of the Rules of Court provides for summary judgment, the pertinent provisions of which are
the following:

Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has
been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in
his favor upon all or any part thereof.
 Section 2. Summary Judgment for the defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim
or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting
affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.

Section 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before
the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or
admissions at least three (3) days before the hearing. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions on file, show
that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

As can be deduced from the above provisions, summary judgment is a procedural devise resorted to
in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays. When the pleadings on file show that
there are no genuine issues of facts to be tried, the Rules of Court allows a party to obtain immediate
relief by way of summary judgment. That is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to
decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts. Conversely, where the pleadings
tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. A genuine issue is such fact which requires
the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.[41]

Here, we find the existence of genuine issues which removes the case from the coverage of summary
judgment. The variance in the allegations of the parties in their pleadings is evident.

Petitioner anchors his complaint for sum of money and/or judicial foreclosure on the alleged real
estate mortgage over the subject property allegedly entered into by Comandante in behalf of her
parents to secure payment of a loan amounting to P1,118,228.00. To support this claim, petitioner
attached to his complaint (1) the SPA alleged to have been executed by the Diazes; (2) the Real Estate
Mortgage Contract pertaining to the amount of P1,118,228.00; and, (3) a Promissory Note.

Comandante, in her Answer to petitioners Amended Complaint, assailed the validity and due
execution of the abovementioned documents. She asserted that the same were not duly, knowingly
and validly executed by her and that it was petitioner who prepared all of them. Also, although she
admitted owing petitioner, same was not an absolute admission as she limited herself to an obligation
amounting only to P600,000.00 inclusive of charges and interests. She likewise claimed that such
obligation is her personal obligation and not of her parents.

The Diazes, for their part, also denied that they executed the SPA authorizing their daughter to
mortgage their property to petitioner as well as having any obligation to the latter.

Clearly, there are genuine issues in this case which require the presentation of evidence. For one, it is
necessary to ascertain in a full blown trial the validity and due execution of the SPA, the Real Estate
Mortgage and the Promissory Notes because the determination of the following equally significant
questions depends on them, to wit: (1) Are the Diazes obligated to petitioner or is the obligation a
purely personal obligation of Comandante? and, (2) Is the sum of P1,118,228.00 as shown in the Real
Estate Mortgage and the Promissory Note, the amount which is really due the petitioner?
To stress, trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when
there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are
disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.[

California clothing vs Quinones

Facts:

On July 25, 2001, respondent Shirley G. Quiñones, a Reservation Ticketing Agent of Cebu Pacific Air in
Lapu Lapu City, went inside the Guess USA Boutique at the second floor of Robinson’s Department
Store (Robinson’s) in Cebu City. She fitted four items: two jeans, a blouse and a shorts, then decided
to purchase the black jeans worth ₱2,098.00.4 Respondent allegedly paid to the cashier evidenced by
a receipt5 issued by the store.6

While she was walking through the skywalk connecting Robinson’s and Mercury Drug Store (Mercury)
where she was heading next, a Guess employee approached and informed her that she failed to pay
the item she got. She, however, insisted that she paid and showed the employee the receipt issued in
her favor.7 She then suggested that they talk about it at the Cebu Pacific Office located at the
basement of the mall. She first went to Mercury then met the Guess employees as agreed upon.8

When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees allegedly subjected her to
humiliation in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific and repeatedly demanded payment for the black
jeans.9 They supposedly even searched her wallet to check how much money she had, followed by
another argument. Respondent, thereafter, went home.10

On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to the Director of Cebu Pacific Air
narrating the incident, but the latter refused to receive it as it did not concern the office and the same
took place while respondent was off duty.11 Another letter was allegedly prepared and was supposed
to be sent to the Cebu Pacific Office in Robinson’s, but the latter again refused to receive it.12
Respondent also claimed that the Human Resource Department (HRD) of Robinson’s was furnished
said letter and the latter in fact conducted an investigation for purposes of canceling respondent’s
Robinson’s credit card. Respondent further claimed that she was not given a copy of said damaging
letter.13 With the above experience, respondent claimed to have suffered physical anxiety, sleepless
nights, mental anguish, fright, serious apprehension, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social
humiliation.14 She thus filed the Complaint for Damages15 before the RTC against petitioners
California Clothing, Inc. (California Clothing), Excelsis Villagonzalo (Villagonzalo), Imelda Hawayon
(Hawayon) and Ybañez. She demanded the payment of moral, nominal, and exemplary damages, plus
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.16

In their Answer,17 petitioners and the other defendants admitted the issuance of the receipt of
payment. They claimed, however, that instead of the cashier (Hawayon) issuing the official receipt, it
was the invoicer (Villagonzalo) who did it manually. They explained that there was miscommunication
between the employees at that time because prior to the issuance of the receipt, Villagonzalo asked
Hawayon " Ok na ?," and the latter replied " Ok na ," which the former believed to mean that the item
has already been paid.18 Realizing the mistake, Villagonzalo rushed outside to look for respondent
and when he saw the latter, he invited her to go back to the shop to make clarifications as to whether
or not payment was indeed made. Instead, however, of going back to the shop, respondent suggested
that they meet at the Cebu Pacific Office. Villagonzalo, Hawayon and Ybañez thus went to the agreed
venue where they talked to respondent.19 They pointed out that it appeared in their conversation
that respondent could not recall whom she gave the payment.20 They emphasized that they were
gentle and polite in talking to respondent and it was the latter who was arrogant in answering their
questions.21 As counterclaim, petitioners and the other defendants sought the payment of moral and
exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.22

On June 20, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing both the complaint and counterclaim of the
parties. From the evidence presented, the trial court concluded that the petitioners and the other
defendants believed in good faith that respondent failed to make payment. Considering that no
motive to fabricate a lie could be attributed to the Guess employees, the court held that when they
demanded payment from respondent, they merely exercised a right under the honest belief that no
payment was made. The RTC likewise did not find it damaging for respondent when the confrontation
took place in front of Cebu Pacific clients, because it was respondent herself who put herself in that
situation by choosing the venue for discussion. As to the letter sent to Cebu Pacific Air, the trial court
also did not take it against the Guess employees, because they merely asked for assistance and not to
embarrass or humiliate respondent. In other words, the RTC found no evidence to prove bad faith on
the part of the Guess employees to warrant the award of damages.23

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision

Issue:

Held:

In this case, petitioners claimed that there was a miscommunication between the cashier and the
invoicer leading to the erroneous issuance of the receipt to respondent. When they realized the
mistake, they made a cash count and discovered that the amount which is equivalent to the price of
the black jeans was missing. They, thus, concluded that it was respondent who failed to make such
payment. It was, therefore, within their right to verify from respondent whether she indeed paid or
not and collect from her if she did not. However, the question now is whether such right was
exercised in good faith or they went overboard giving respondent a cause of action against them.

Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise
of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acted in bad faith, with intent
to prejudice another.34 Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the
individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and
unscrupulous advantage of another.35 Malice or bad faith, on the other hand, implies a conscious and
intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.36
Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking respondent whether she paid or not. The
Guess employees were able to talk to respondent at the Cebu Pacific Office. The confrontation started
well, but it eventually turned sour when voices were raised by both parties. As aptly held by both the
RTC and the CA, such was the natural consequence of two parties with conflicting views insisting on
their respective beliefs. Considering, however, that respondent was in possession of the item
purchased from the shop, together with the official receipt of payment issued by petitioners, the
latter cannot insist that no such payment was made on the basis of a mere speculation. Their claim
should have been proven by substantial evidence in the proper forum.

It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went overboard and tried to force
respondent to pay the amount they were demanding. In the guise of asking for assistance, petitioners
even sent a demand letter to respondent’s employer not only informing it of the incident but
obviously imputing bad acts on the part of respondent.

Petitioners claimed that after receiving the receipt of payment and the item purchased, respondent
"was noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store." They also accused respondent that she was not
completely being honest when she was asked about the circumstances of payment, thus:

x x x After receiving the OR and the item, Ms. Gutierrez was noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store. x x x

When I asked her about to whom she gave the money, she gave out a blank expression and told me,
"I can’t remember." Then I asked her how much money she gave, she answered, "₱2,100; 2 pcs 1,000
and 1 pc 100 bill." Then I told her that that would (sic) impossible since we have no such
denomination in our cash fund at that moment. Finally, I asked her if how much change and if she
received change from the cashier, she then answered, "I don’t remember." After asking these simple
questions, I am very certain that she is not completely being honest about this. In fact, we invited her
to come to our boutique to clear these matters but she vehemently refused saying that she’s in a
hurry and very busy.37

Clearly, these statements are outrightly accusatory. Petitioners accused respondent that not only did
she fail to pay for the jeans she purchased but that she deliberately took the same without paying for
it and later hurriedly left the shop to evade payment. These accusations were made despite the
issuance of the receipt of payment and the release of the item purchased. There was, likewise, no
showing that respondent had the intention to evade payment. Contrary to petitioners’ claim,
respondent was not in a rush in leaving the shop or the mall. This is evidenced by the fact that the
Guess employees did not have a hard time looking for her when they realized the supposed
non-payment.

It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter to respondent’s employer,
petitioners intended not only to ask for assistance in collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish
respondent’s reputation in the eyes of her employer. To malign respondent without substantial
evidence and despite the latter’s possession of enough evidence in her favor, is clearly impermissible.
A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise, he opens
himself to liability.38
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must
not be excessive or unduly harsh.39 In this case, petitioners obviously abused their rights.

Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20 and 2 of the Civil
Code which read:40

Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals or good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

ARDIENTE VS SPOUSES PASTORFIDE

Facts:

[Herein petitioner] Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr. Roberto S. Ardiente are owners of a
housing unit at Emily Homes, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City with a lot area of one hundred fifty-three
(153) square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 69905.

On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (Exh. "B", pp. 470-473,
Records) selling, transferring and conveying in favor of [respondent] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide all their
rights and interests in the housing unit at Emily Homes in consideration of ₱70,000.00. The
Memorandum of Agreement carries a stipulation:

"4. That the water and power bill of the subject property shall be for the account of the Second Party
(Ma. Theresa Pastorfide) effective June 1, 1994." (Records, p. 47)

vis-a-vis Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's assumption of the payment of the mortgage loan secured by Joyce
Ardiente from the National Home Mortgage (Records, Exh. "A", pp. 468-469)

For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water connection in the name of Joyce Ardiente was never
questioned nor perturbed (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, pp. 7-8) until on March 12, 1999, without notice,
the water connection of Ma. Theresa was cut off. Proceeding to the office of the Cagayan de Oro
Water District (COWD) to complain, a certain Mrs. Madjos told Ma. Theresa that she was delinquent
for three (3) months corresponding to the months of December 1998, January 1999, and February
1999. Ma. Theresa argued that the due date of her payment was March 18, 1999 yet (T.S.N., October
31, 2000, pp. 11-12). Mrs. Madjos later told her that it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the
water line was cut off (T.S.N., February 5, 2001, p. 31).
On March 15, 1999, Ma. Theresa paid the delinquent bills (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, p. 12). On the
same date, through her lawyer, Ma. Theresa wrote a letter to the COWD to explain who authorized
the cutting of the water line (Records, p. 160).

On March 18, 1999, COWD, through the general manager, [respondent] Gaspar Gonzalez, Jr.,
answered the letter dated March 15, 1999 and reiterated that it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente
that the water line was cut off (Records, p. 161).

Aggrieved, on April 14, 1999, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide [and her husband] filed [a] complaint for
damages [against petitioner, COWD and its manager Gaspar Gonzalez] (Records, pp. 2-6).

In the meantime, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's water line was only restored and reconnected when the
[trial] court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on December 14, 1999 (Records, p.
237).4

After trial, the RTC rendered judgment holding as follows:

xxxx

In the exercise of their rights and performance of their duties, defendants did not act with justice,
gave plaintiffs their due and observe honesty and good faith. Before disconnecting the water supply,
defendants COWD and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales did not even send a disconnection notice to plaintiffs as
testified to by Engr. Bienvenido Batar, in-charge of the Commercial Department of defendant COWD.
There was one though, but only three (3) days after the actual disconnection on March 12, 1999. The
due date for payment was yet on March 15. Clearly, they did not act with justice. Neither did they
observe honesty.

They should not have been swayed by the prodding of Joyce V. Ardiente. They should have
investigated first as to the present ownership of the house. For doing the act because Ardiente told
them, they were negligent. Defendant Joyce Ardiente should have requested before the cutting off of
the water supply, plaintiffs to pay. While she attempted to tell plaintiffs but she did not have the
patience of seeing them. She knew that it was plaintiffs who had been using the water four (4) years
ago and not hers. She should have been very careful. x x x5

The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants [Ardiente,

COWD and Gonzalez] to pay jointly and severally plaintiffs, the following sums:

(a) ₱200,000.00 for moral damages;

(b) 200,000.00 for exemplary damages; and

(c) 50,000.00 for attorney's fee.

The cross-claim of Cagayan de Oro Water District and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales is hereby dismissed. The
Court is not swayed that the cutting off of the water supply of plaintiffs was because they were
influenced by defendant Joyce Ardiente. They were negligent too for which they should be liable.

SO ORDERED.6

Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed an appeal with the CA.

On August 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision disposing as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the
awarded damages is reduced to ₱100,000.00 each for moral and exemplary damages, while
attorney's fees is lowered to ₱25,000.00. Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.7

The CA ruled, with respect to petitioner, that she has a "legal duty to honor the possession and use of
water line by Ma. Theresa Pastorfide pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement" and "that when
[petitioner] applied for its disconnection, she acted in bad faith causing prejudice and [injury to] Ma.
Theresa Pastorfide."8

As to COWD and Gonzalez, the CA held that they "failed to give a notice of disconnection and
derelicted in reconnecting the water line despite payment of the unpaid bills by the [respondent
spouses Pastorfide]."9

Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration, but these were
denied by the CA in its Resolution dated December 17, 2003.

COWD and Gonzalez filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court, which was docketed as
G.R. No. 161802. However, based on technical grounds and on the finding that the CA did not commit
any reversible error in its assailed Decision, the petition was denied via a Resolution10 issued by this
Court on March 24, 2004. COWD and Gonzalez filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was
denied with finality through this Court's Resolution11 dated June 28, 2004.
Issue:

Held:

The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

In this regard, the Court's ruling in Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation17 is
instructive, to wit:

xxxx

This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise of one’s rights as well as
in the performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe
honesty and good faith.

In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it was elucidated that while Article
19 "lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of
social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under
either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper." The Court said:

One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic
principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which
merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain
fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain
of good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct [that] should
run as golden threads through society, to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is
the sway and dominance of justice." (Id.) Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in
Article 19 x x x.

xxxx

This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets
certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights, but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone
his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation
on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be
observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does
not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down
a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it
does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20
or Article 21 would be proper.

Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same." It speaks of the general sanctions of all
other provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised
in a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.
Thus, if the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under either
Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.

The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages
under Article 20 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. x x
x18

To recapitulate, petitioner's acts which violated the abovementioned provisions of law is her
unjustifiable act of having the respondent spouses' water supply disconnected, coupled with her
failure to warn or at least notify respondent spouses of such intention. On the part of COWD and
Gonzalez, it is their failure to give prior notice of the impending disconnection and their subsequent
neglect to reconnect respondent spouses' water supply despite the latter's settlement of their
delinquent account.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of both the
RTC and the CA that petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez are solidarily liable.

Nikko hotel Manila Garden vs Reyes

Facts:

Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name
"Amay Bisaya," alleged that at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he was
having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko,5 he was spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta
Filart, who then approached him.6 Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at the hotel’s
penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.7 Mr. Reyes
asked if she could vouch for him for which she replied: "of course."8 Mr. Reyes then went up with the
party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits which was the latter’s present for the celebrant.9 At the
penthouse, they first had their picture taken with the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the
party of Dr. Filart.10 After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at
the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by petitioner
herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof.11 In a loud
voice and within the presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet
table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party ("huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na
lang").12 Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart.13 Dr. Filart, who was within
hearing distance, however, completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation.14 Not
long after, while he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman
approached and asked him to step out of the hotel.15 Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of
the party by the policeman.16 Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual
damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
attorney’s fees.17

Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under the
ignominious circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was the Hotel’s Executive
Secretary for the past twenty (20) years.18 One of her functions included organizing the birthday
party of the hotel’s former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka.19 The year 1994 was no different. For Mr.
Tsuruoka’s party, Ms. Lim generated an exclusive guest list and extended invitations accordingly.20
The guest list was limited to approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruoka’s closest friends and some hotel
employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited.21 At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr.
Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink.22 Mindful of Mr. Tsuruoka’s wishes to keep the party
intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller, the "captain waiter," to inquire as to the presence of
Mr. Reyes who was not invited.23 Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group of Dr.
Filart.24 As Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation with another guest and as Ms. Lim did not want to
interrupt, she inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr.
Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.25 Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the
party as he was not invited.26 Mr. Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms.
Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to leave.27 When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr.
Reyes conversing with a Captain Batung whom she later approached.28 Believing that Captain Batung
and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim requested from him the same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for
Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited.29 Still, Mr. Reyes lingered.
When Ms. Lim spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as there
were no other guests in the immediate vicinity.30 However, as Mr. Reyes was already helping himself
to the food, she decided to wait.31 When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim
approached him and said: "alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo
ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo."32 She then
turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he
began screaming and making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food on her.33 1awphi1.nét

Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court, also gave her version of
the story to the effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party.34 According to her, it was Mr.
Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise
going to take the elevator, not to the penthouse but to Altitude 49.35 When they reached the
penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not properly dressed and was not
invited.36 All the while, she thought that Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later saw him at the
bar talking to Col. Batung.37 Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes shouting.38 She
ignored Mr. Reyes.39 She was embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to think that she invited
him.40

After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,41 giving more credence to the
testimony of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court
likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was
uninvited:

Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the birthday
celebrant. He assumed the risk of being asked to leave for attending a party to which he was not
invited by the host. Damages are pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of
some duty or the violation of some right. Thus, no recovery can be had against defendants Nikko
Hotel and Ruby Lim because he himself was at fault (Garciano v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He
knew that it was not the party of defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to join her and took
responsibility for his attendance at the party. His action against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim
must therefore fail.42

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more commanding of
belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud voice within hearing
distance of several guests:

In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that he should not finish his food and
to leave the place within the hearing distance of other guests is an act which is contrary to morals,
good customs . . ., for which appellees should compensate the appellant for the damage suffered by
the latter as a consequence therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The liability arises from the acts which
are in themselves legal or not prohibited, but contrary to morals or good customs. Conversely, even in
the exercise of a formal right, [one] cannot with impunity intentionally cause damage to another in a
manner contrary to morals or good customs.43

The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching several people to
inquire into the presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled for as she
should have approached Dr. Filart first and both of them should have talked to Mr. Reyes in private:

Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been done by appellee Lim was to
approach appellee Mrs. Filart and together they should have told appellant Reyes in private that the
latter should leave the party as the celebrant only wanted close friends around. It is necessary that
Mrs. Filart be the one to approach appellant because it was she who invited appellant in that occasion.
Were it not for Mrs. Filart’s invitation, appellant could not have suffered such humiliation. For that,
appellee Filart is equally liable.

...

The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of
consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such
dignity. Under Article 20 of the Civil Code, every person who violates this duty becomes liable for
damages, especially if said acts were attended by malice or bad faith. Bad faith does not simply
connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity
and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty to some motive or interest or ill-will that
partakes of the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., 309 SCRA 603).44
Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr. Violeta Filart the
solidary obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000); (2) moral damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and
(3) attorney’s fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000).45 On motion for reconsideration,
the Court of Appeals affirmed its earlier decision as the argument raised in the motion had "been
amply discussed and passed upon in the decision sought to be reconsidered."

Issue:

whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay Bisaya," to leave the
party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles 19
and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko,
as her employer, is solidarily liable with her.

Held:

Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they
cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave
(and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a "gate-crasher."

The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury"47 )
refers to self-inflicted injury48 or to the consent to injury49 which precludes the recovery of damages
by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in
doing so.50 As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the case
at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party,
petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him
fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.

Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a.
"Amay Bisaya," to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby
becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so
liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable with her.

In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him
to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms.
Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues
to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and
is indeed incredible.
 It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not presented any
witness to back his story up. All his witnesses – Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva -
proved only that it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the party.57

Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited,
cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily,
neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its
employee.58

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,59 is not
a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.1awphi1.nét

Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed
for which the wrongdoer must be responsible."60 The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance
of one’s duties.61 These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith.62 Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to
injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad
faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.63 When Article 19 is violated, an action
for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising
from a violation of law64 which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to
ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states:

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act
which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3)
it is done with intent to injure.66

A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,67 and that is, the act complained of must be
intentional.68

As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven
by animosity against him. These two people did not know each other personally before the evening of
13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lim’s alleged
abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being "single at 44 years old," had a "very strong
bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel
with foreign businessmen."69 The lameness of this argument need not be belabored. Suffice it to say
that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to
recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.

Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and
humane under the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate
court’s declaration that Ms. Lim’s act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying
from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action "predicated upon mere
rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but
respect of such dignity."70 Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s act of by-passing
Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs. Filart’s
companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.71 If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of
bad judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.

Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be
made answerable for exemplary damages72 especially for the reason stated by the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held –

Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the latter’s lowly station in
life.l^vvphi1.net This has to be limited somewhere. In a democracy, such a limit must be established.
Social equality is not sought by the legal provisions under consideration, but due regard for decency
and propriety (Code Commission, pp. 33-34). And by way of example or correction for public good
and to avert further commission of such acts, exemplary damages should be imposed upon
appellees.73

The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs counter with the very facts of the
case and the evidence on hand.l^vvphi1.net It is not disputed that at the time of the incident in
question, Mr. Reyes was "an actor of long standing; a co-host of a radio program over DZRH; a Board
Member of the Music Singer Composer (MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda Papin; a showbiz
Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch; and 1992 official candidate of the KBL Party for Governor of
Bohol; and an awardee of a number of humanitarian organizations of the Philippines."74 During his
direct examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed that he had income75 and nowhere did he say
otherwise. On the other hand, the records are bereft of any information as to the social and economic
standing of petitioner Ruby Lim. Consequently, the conclusion reached by the appellate court cannot
withstand scrutiny as it is without basis.

All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might
have suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety
and good faith, must be his to bear alone.

Spouses Hing vs Choachuy

Facts:
On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Mandaue City a Complaint5 for Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case
MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan
Choachuy.

Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B) covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu;6 that
respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and
1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners;7 that respondents constructed an auto-repair shop
building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed a case against
petitioners for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil
Case No. MAN-5125;8 that in that case, Aldo claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence
without a valid permit and that the said construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is
adjacent to petitioners’ property;9 that the court, in that case, denied Aldo’s application for
preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its allegations;10 that, in order to get evidence to
support the said case, respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on the building of
Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras facing petitioners’ property;11 that
respondents, through their employees and without the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of
petitioners’ on-going construction;12 and that the acts of respondents violate petitioners’ right to
privacy.13 Thus, petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the video surveillance
cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.14

In their Answer with Counterclaim,15 respondents claimed that they did not install the video
surveillance cameras,16 nor did they order their employees to take pictures of petitioners’
construction.17 They also clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders.18

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order19 granting the application for a TRO. The dispositive
portion of the said Order reads:

WHEREFORE, the application for a Temporary Restraining Order or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is
granted. Upon the filing and approval of a bond by petitioners, which the Court sets at ₱50,000.00, let
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction issue against the respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan
Choachuy. They are hereby directed to immediately remove the revolving camera that they installed
at the left side of their building overlooking the side of petitioners’ lot and to transfer and operate it
elsewhere at the back where petitioners’ property can no longer be viewed within a distance of about
2-3 meters from the left corner of Aldo Servitec, facing the road.

IT IS SO ORDERED.20

Respondents moved for a reconsideration21 but the RTC denied the same in its Order22 dated
February 6, 2006.23 Thus:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Issue a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction in consonance with the Order dated 18 October 2005.

IT IS SO ORDERED.24

Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari25 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with application for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision26 granting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled that
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion because petitioners failed
to show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive writ.27 The CA explained that the right to
privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated since the property subject
of the controversy is not used as a residence.28 The CA alsosaid that since respondents are not the
owners of the building, they could not have installed video surveillance cameras.29 They are mere
stockholders of Aldo, which has a separate juridical personality.30 Thus, they are not the proper
parties.31 The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING the
petition filed in this case. The assailed orders dated October 18, 2005 and February 6, 2006 issued by
the respondent judge are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.32

Issue:

Held:

The Petition is meritorious.

The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.

The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution44 and in our laws. It is defined as "the right to be
free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in
such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities."45 It is the right of an
individual "to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the
public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned."46 Simply put, the right to privacy
is "the right to be let alone."47

The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects them against the State’s abuse
of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their houses. No
one, not even the State, except "in case of overriding social need and then only under the stringent
procedural safeguards," can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.48

The right to privacy under Article 26(1)

of the Civil Code covers business offices

where the public are excluded

therefrom and only certain individuals

are allowed to enter.

Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individual’s right to privacy and provides
a legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals. It states:

Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense,
shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;

xxxx

This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied
or even restricted by others. It includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into
the residence of another without the consent of the latter."49 The phrase "prying into the privacy of
another’s residence," however, does not mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy. As
elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:

Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of another’s residence." This does not mean,
however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also "similar acts." A
business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such
individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. x x x50 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his
house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny
them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence," therefore, covers places,
locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is
recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore,
erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.

The "reasonable expectation of

privacy" test is used to determine

whether there is a violation of the right

to privacy.

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy and whether the expectation has been violated.51 In Ople v. Torres,52 we enunciated that
"the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by
his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that
society recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or
extend an individual’s "reasonable expectation of privacy."53 Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s
expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual
circumstances surrounding the case.54

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection
and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places where
there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy
would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of
another’s residence or business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a
crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction, ruled that:

After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary restraining order.
The operation by respondents of a revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their building,
violated the right of privacy of petitioners, who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The camera does
not only focus on respondents’ property or the roof of the factory at the back (Aldo Development and
Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a good portion of the land of petitioners.

Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why petitioner Hing was so unyielding in
asserting that the revolving camera was set up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going construction in
his property. The monitor showed only a portion of the roof of the factory of Aldo. If the purpose of
respondents in setting up a camera at the back is to secure the building and factory premises, then
the camera should revolve only towards their properties at the back. Respondents’ camera cannot be
made to extend the view to petitioners’ lot. To allow the respondents to do that over the objection of
the petitioners would violate the right of petitioners as property owners. "The owner of a thing
cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person."55

The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in their
property, whether they use it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of video
surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners’ property or covering a significant portion thereof,
without their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the issuance of a
preliminary injunction was justified. We need not belabor that the issuance of a preliminary
injunction is discretionary on the part of the court taking cognizance of the case and should not be
interfered with, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the court.56 Here, there is no
indication of any grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred in finding that petitioners are not
entitled to an injunctive writ.

ZUZUARREGUI VS HON.VILLAROSA

FACTS:

Sometime in August 2000, Rosemary Torres Ty-Rasekhi (Rosemary), the sister of petitioners late
father Alexander Torres Ty, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of
her mother, Bella Torres (Bella), before the RTC of Pasig City.[5] Petitioner initially opposed[6]
Rosemarys petition, but they eventually reached an amicable settlement and entered into a
compromise agreement which they submitted to the RTC for approval.[7] In a Decision[8] dated
November 19, 2002, the RTC approved the compromise agreement.

Subsequently, two (2) of Rosemarys alleged siblings, Peter Torres Ty (Peter) and Catherine Torres
Ty-Chavez (Catherine), filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition to Annul Judgment Approving
Compromise Agreement, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87222.[9] Peter and Catherine claimed that they
are also biological children of the late Bella, and are entitled to participate in the settlement of the
latters estate. Later, private respondent Fannie Torres-Ty (Fannie), who likewise claimed to be a
biological child of the late Bella and therefore also entitled to inherit from her, filed a
petition-in-intervention in the action for annulment of judgment.[10]

Peter, Catherine, and Fannie alleged that upon the death of Bella, they held a number of discussions
pertaining to the settlement of the latters estate. Rosemary, their elder sister, promised to take care
of the processing of papers so that the estate may be divided among them in the manner provided by
law. However, in subsequent discussions, Rosemary made known to them her intention to get a
disproportionately larger share of the estate, but they did not agree. No agreement was reached and
as far as they know, no progress was made towards the settlement of Bellas estate. They were not
aware that Rosemary had filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and that a
judgment by compromise agreement was rendered by the RTC of Pasig City. Rosemary had falsely
averred that aside from herself, petitioner, who was her niece, was the only other heir of Bella. In
petitioners opposition, it was likewise averred that petitioner and Rosemary were the only heirs of
Bella. The subsequent compromise agreement contained similar averments, and it was not disclosed
that Peter, Catherine, and Fannie were also Bellas heirs. It was only sometime in June 2004 that they
came to know of the decision by compromise agreement of the Pasig City RTC.

Petitioner and Rosemary filed their answers[11] to the petition for annulment of judgment and the
petition-in-intervention. They raised similar defenses. They denied that Peter, Catherine, and Fannie
were heirs of Bella for, as far as they knew, the three (3) were literally purchased from third persons
who represented to Bella and the latters common-law husband, Alejandro Ty, that they were
abandoned children. Bella and Alejandro took pity on the three (3) and brought them up as their own.
This was known within the family circle, but was not disclosed to Peter, Catherine, and Fannie in order
to protect them from the stigma of knowing they were unwanted children. However, Alejandro and
Bella did not legally adopt them; hence, they were never conferred the rights of legitimate children.

While the action for annulment of judgment was pending before the Court of Appeals, Fannie filed a
complaint[12] for falsification and perjury against petitioner and Rosemary. Fannie alleged that
petitioner and Rosemary falsely and maliciously stated in the pertinent pleadings filed before the RTC
of Pasig City that the late Bella had only two (2) heirs, namely the two (2) of them. Petitioner and
Rosemary forthwith filed a joint motion to suspend the preliminary investigation on the ground of a
pending prejudicial question before the Court of Appeals.[13] They argued that the issue of whether
Peter, Catherine, and Fannie are related to Bella and therefore legal heirs of the latter was pending
before the Court of Appeals. The investigating prosecutor denied the joint motion and found probable
cause against petitioner and Rosemary for two (2) counts each of falsification of public documents.[14]
The prosecutor held that the issue before the Court of Appeals is the validity of the compromise
agreement which is not determinative of the criminal case which involves the liability of petitioner
and Rosemary for falsification, allegedly for willfully making the false statements in the opposition to
the petition for letters of administration and in the subsequent compromise agreement filed before
the RTC of Pasig City.

On December 20, 2005, three (3) informations[15] against petitioner and Rosemary were thus filed
with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 61.

Petitioner filed a petition for review[16] with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and a motion to defer
proceedings[17] before the MeTC on the ground of the pending appeal before the DOJ. Also,
petitioner and Rosemary filed with the MeTC separate motions to suspend proceedings on the
ground of prejudicial question.[18] However, petitioners appeal was dismissed by the DOJ,[19] while
her motions before the MeTC were denied by the said court.[20] The MeTC agreed with the
prosecutor that the issue before the Court of Appeals in the action for annulment of judgment is the
validity of the compromise agreement while the criminal case involves their liability for falsification of
public documents. The MeTC also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.[21]

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition[22] with the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 66. In an Order[23] dated November 16, 2006, the RTC denied the petition on the ground that
there was no prejudicial question; hence, the MeTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings. The RTC held that there was no prejudicial
question as the quantum of evidence in the civil action for annulment of judgment differs from the
quantum of evidence required in the criminal action for falsification of public documents. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration[24] was also denied by the RTC in its Order[25] dated March 9, 2007.

Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals
assailing the RTCs orders. In its August 23, 2007 Resolution,[26] the appellate court dismissed the
petition on the ground that the certification of non-forum shopping was signed only by petitioners
counsel and not by petitioner herself. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied in the
July 14, 2008 Resolution[27] of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

HELD:

On the second assignment of error that the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioners prayer for a
writ of certiorari and prohibition, we likewise find for petitioner.

Under Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, a criminal action may be
suspended upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action, to wit:

SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of

the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in
the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the
criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same
criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend a criminal action, it must appear not only that said
civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.[42] The rationale behind the principle of
prejudicial question is to avoid two (2) conflicting decisions.

Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the
criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be
present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said
question must be lodged in another tribunal.[43]

If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the
accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity that the civil case be
determined first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial
question.[44] Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according
to law, proceed independently of each other.[45]

As stated, the determination of whether the proceedings may be suspended on the basis of a
prejudicial question rests on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the civil case are
so related with the issues raised in the criminal case such that the resolution of the issues in the civil
case would also determine the judgment in the criminal case.

A perusal of the allegations in the petition to annul judgment shows that CA-G.R. SP No. 87222
pending before the Court of Appeals is principally for the determination of the validity of the
compromise agreement which did not include Peter, Catherine, and Fannie as heirs of Bella. Peter,
Catherine, and Fannie presented evidence to prove that they are also biological children of Bella and
Alejandro. On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos. 343812 to 343814 before the MeTC involve the
determination of whether petitioner committed falsification of public documents in executing
pleadings containing untruthful statements that she and Rosemary were the only legal heirs of Bella.

It is evident that the result of the civil case will determine the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in
the criminal cases for falsification of public documents. The criminal cases arose out of the claim of
Peter, Catherine, and Fannie that they are also the legal heirs of Bella. If it is finally adjudged in the
civil case that they are not biological children of the late Bella and consequently not entitled to a
share in her estate as heirs, there is no more basis to proceed with the criminal cases against
petitioner who could not have committed falsification in her pleadings filed before the RTC of Pasig
City, the truth of her statements regarding the filiation of Peter, Catherine and Fannie having been
judicially settled.

PIMENTEL VS PIMENTEL

FACTS:

On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for
frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No.
Q-04-130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC
Quezon City).

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria
Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under
Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC
Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since
the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of
Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC
Quezon City.

The Decision of the Trial Court

The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005[3] holding that the pendency of the case
before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case
before it. The RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries
sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioners
marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground] of
the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order,[5] the RTC Quezon City
denied the motion.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August
2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled
that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the
commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of
execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the
other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals
ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would
be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts
constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled
that all that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of
the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.

Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals decision.

ISSUE:
HELD:

The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In
this case, the Information[7] for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC
Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC
Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner
was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005.[8] Respondents petition[9] in Civil
Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil
case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the
requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the
civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.

Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question

in Criminal Case for Parricide

Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the
suspension of the criminal action.

There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there
exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may
proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.[10] A prejudicial question is defined as:

x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said
case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based
but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined.[11]

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide,[12]
which punishes any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.[13] The relationship between the
offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder[14] or homicide.[15]
However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the
criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue
in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have
killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of petitioners will.[16] At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner
and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in
Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the
time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.

We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals[17] that the judicial declaration
of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x. First, the
issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of
prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that [t]here is x x x a recognition
written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences.[18] In fact, the Court declared in that case that a declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the
States penal laws are concerned.[19]

TOMLIN II VS ATTY. MOYA II

FACTS:

On December 1, 2003, Quirino Tomlin II filed a complaint1 before the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Salvador N. Moya II for allegedly reneging on
his monetary obligations and for having issued bouncing checks; thereby violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility2 and Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22.3

Complainant averred that respondent borrowed from him P600,000.00 partially covered by seven
postdated checks. However, when complainant tried to encash them on their respective due dates,
the checks were all dishonored by the drawee bank

Complainant made several demands, the last being a formal letter4 sent on September 25, 2002;5
however, respondent still failed and refused to pay his debt without justifiable reason. Consequently,
complainant instituted a case for seven counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against the respondent
before the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.6 In addition, he filed the instant case for
respondent’s disbarment.

On December 1, 2003, respondent was directed to file his answer but instead he filed several motions
for extension of time to file a responsive pleading7 and a motion to dismiss complaint.8
Respondent alleged that the case should be dismissed outright for violation of the rule on non-forum
shopping. He argued that complainant did not inform the IBP about the cases he filed for violations of
B.P. Blg. 22 against respondent pending before the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.9
Respondent argued that the filing of the administrative case despite the pendency of the criminal
cases is a form of harassment which should not be allowed.

On April 28, 2004, the Commission on Bar Discipline denied10 the motion to dismiss for being a
prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 3 of its Rules of Procedure. Respondent’s motion for
reconsideration11 was likewise denied on June 16, 2004.12

Thereafter, respondent filed several motions for extension of time to file an answer.13 His last motion
for extension was however denied for lack of merit. Consequently, the Commission on Bar Discipline
declared him in default.14

Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation with motion to terminate proceedings on the ground of
prescription15 and omnibus motion to recall the default order.16

On January 3, 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline required the parties to submit their respective
verified position papers after which the case shall be considered submitted for resolution.17

Only the complainant submitted his position paper.18

In the Report and Recommendation dated March 31, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner noted
that respondent failed to file an answer and/or position paper despite several requests for extension,
in disregard of the orders of the IBP. Moreover, it was observed that the pending criminal action
against respondent does not pose a prejudicial question to the resolution of the issues in the present
administrative case. Hence, it was recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for one year.

On October 22, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report of the
Investigating Commissioner, but modified the penalty of suspension from the practice of law from
one year to two years.

ISSUE:

HELD:

In the present case, respondent admitted his monetary obligations to the complainant but offered no
justifiable reason for his continued refusal to pay. Complainant made several demands, both verbal
and written, but respondent just ignored them and even made himself scarce. Although he
acknowledged his financial obligations to the complainant, respondent never offered nor made
arrangements to pay his debt. On the contrary, he refused to recognize any wrongdoing nor shown
remorse for issuing worthless checks, an act constituting gross misconduct.22 Respondent must be
reminded that it is his duty as a lawyer to faithfully perform at all times his duties to society, to the
bar, to the courts and to his clients. As part of his duties, he must promptly pay his financial
obligations.23

The contention that complainant violated the rule against forum shopping with the filing of this
administrative complaint is bereft of merit. There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an
adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in
another24 or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on
the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.25 Forum shopping
applies only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings.26 Moreover, Criminal
Case Nos. 6-367-03 to 6-373-03 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 refer to the respondent’s act of making or
drawing and issuance of worthless checks; while the present administrative case seeks to discipline
respondent as a lawyer for his dishonest act of failing to pay his debt in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.lavvph!1.net

Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative cases against lawyers belong
to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of criminal cases.
The burden of proof in a criminal case is guilt beyond reasonable doubt while in an administrative
case, only preponderance of evidence is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a
prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative
proceedings.27

Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a
complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless from
applying the rules on admission to and continuing membership in the legal profession during the
whole period that the criminal case is pending final disposition when the objectives of the two
proceedings are vastly disparate.28

Finally, we note that respondent failed to file his answer and verified position paper despite several
opportunities given him by the IBP, that is, from the time he received on December 20, 200329 the
Order30 of the IBP requiring him to file an answer until March 31, 2005 when the Investigating
Commissioner submitted the Report and Recommendation. Instead, he filed several motions for
extension of time, motion to dismiss the complaint, motion for reconsideration, manifestation with
motion to terminate proceedings, and omnibus motion to recall the default order. Until the end,
respondent offered no plausible explanation for his failure to pay his debts. Instead, he kept on
insisting, on plainly unmeritorious grounds, the dismissal of the complaint. Verily, respondent’s failure
to comply with the orders of the IBP without justifiable reason manifests his disrespect of judicial
authorities.31 Respondent should be reminded that the IBP has disciplinary authority over him by
virtue of his membership therein.32

In view of the foregoing, we find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years as
recommended by the IBP commensurate under the circumstances.
GELUZ VS CA

FACTS:

Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 — through her
aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally
married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she
had herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became
pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be
inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years
later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and
the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez
streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a
two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was
at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did
not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.

ISSUE:

HELD:

The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06
upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This we
believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a
person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the
system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en
consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho
Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and obligations.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the
one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the
unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to
its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the
same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on
that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no
answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under
Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by
imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later
with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the
child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.

The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery can
not had for the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs.
Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages
must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights
of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help,
support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the
illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of
distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ.
Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art.
2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any
basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous
abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned
with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the
majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the
second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the
suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the
causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the
third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal
cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the
doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees,
an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.

The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:

It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the abortion
which his wife has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be highminded rather than
mercenary; and that his primary concern would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged
of an unworthy member rather than turn his wife's indiscretion to personal profit, and with that idea
in mind to press either the administrative or the criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead of
abandoning them in favor of a civil action for damages of which not only he, but also his wife, would
be the beneficiaries.

It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without
medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too
severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But
the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the
circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.

CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORP VS ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR

FACTS:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel)

and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of
Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a
claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent,
pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union

The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos wife, Marife V. Hortillano,
had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy.[5]
According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during labor
due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.[6]

Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for
bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance.[7]

Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillanos claims for bereavement and
other death benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Despite the
series of conferences held, the parties still failed to settle their dispute,[8] prompting the Union to file
a Notice to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR).[9] In a Submission
Agreement dated 9 October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary
arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death
benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2

and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.[10] The parties mutually chose Atty. Montao, an Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.[11]

When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the dispute, the parties
proceeded to submit their respective Position Papers, [12] Replies,[13] and Rejoinders[14] to Atty.
Montao.

The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits
pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of
the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have
acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death
benefits. The Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer
Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar situations as
Hortillano were able to receive death benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.

The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee of Mayer Steel,
whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to the delivery. Dugan
was able to receive paternity leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under the CBA
between his union and Mayer Steel.[15] Dugans child was only 24 weeks in the womb and died before
labor, as opposed to Hortillanos child who was already 37-38 weeks in the womb and only died during
labor.
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in the same
compound as Continental Steel; and the representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed
the CBA with their respective employees unions were the same as the representatives of Continental
Steel who signed the existing CBA with the Union.

Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in labor
legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for the
laborer.

On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not
contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are
two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate
dependent, none of which existed in Hortillanos case. Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and
42[16] of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn
child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of
thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not
a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired
juridical personality. A fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it
never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be supported.

Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since neither
of the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof were
deemed automatically accepted by both parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child
included in the definition of dependent, as used in the CBA the death of whom would have qualified
the parent-employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits bound the Union to the legally
accepted definition of the latter term.

Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its sister companies,
MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and incompetent evidence,
given the separate and distinct personalities of the companies. Neither could the Union sustain its
claim that the grant of bereavement leave and other death benefits to the parent-employee for the
loss of an unborn child constituted company practice.

On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montao, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a
Resolution[17] ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.

Atty. Montao identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:

This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave with pay by the
covered employees as provided under Article X, Section 2 of the parties CBA, three (3) indispensable
elements must be present: (1) there is death; (2) such death must be of employees dependent; and (3)
such dependent must be legitimate.
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident insurance as provided under
Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be
present: (a) there is death; (b) such death must be of employees dependent; (c) such dependent must
be legitimate; and (d) proper legal document to be presented.[18]

Atty. Montao found that there was no dispute that the death of an employees legitimate dependent
occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was
conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained
himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the
fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died during the labor or delivery. There was also no
question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married, making their dependent, unborn child,
legitimate.

In the end, Atty. Montao decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING [herein petitioner

Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred
Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00), representing his bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven
Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00) representing death benefits, or a total amount of
P16,489.00

The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of merit.

All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein dispositions.

Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari,[19]
under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.

Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montao erred in granting Hortillanos claims for bereavement
leave with pay and other death benefits because no death of an employees dependent had occurred.
The death of a fetus, at whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA
since what was contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal person, and not that of a fetus,
which did not acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel pointed out that its contention was
bolstered by the fact that the term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate dependent. It
asserted that the status of a child could only be determined upon said childs birth, otherwise, no such
appellation can be had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillanos entitlement to
bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA were lacking.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaos Resolution
dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court interpreted death to mean as follows:
[Herein petitioner Continental Steels] exposition on the legal sense in which the term death is used in
the CBA fails to impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which the
grant of bereavement leave and death benefits thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no
arguing with [Continental Steel] that the acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is
conditioned on being born alive upon delivery, it does not follow that such event of premature
delivery of a fetus could never be contemplated as a death as to be covered by the CBA provision,
undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom the dead fetus
stands in a legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical significance to
the term death of a legitimate dependent as condition for granting bereavement leave and death
benefits under the CBA. Following [Continental Steels] theory, there can be no experience of death to
speak of. The Court, however, does not share this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with
anything less than loss of human life, especially for the expectant parents. In this light, bereavement
leave and death benefits are meant to assuage the employee and the latters immediate family,
extend to them solace and support, rather than an act conferring legal status or personality upon the
unborn child. [Continental Steels] insistence that the certificate of fetal death is for statistical
purposes only sadly misses this crucial point.[20]

Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S.
Montao is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].[21]

In a Resolution[22] dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration[23]
of Continental Steel.

Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is clear and
unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be applied. Only one with juridical
personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical personality.

ISSUE:

HELD:

The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of
death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born,
and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is
extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on
natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the
general provisions on civil personality, which reads:

Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every
natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal
effect, is acquired and may be lost.

We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity and
capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us whether the unborn child
acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or
assumed by the childs parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the
instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latters death.

Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover,
while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not
explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die.

And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.[24] Life is not synonymous with civil
personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside
the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception,[25] that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already
has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself
defines, a dependent is one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself
without the power or aid of someone else. Under said general definition,[26] even an unborn child is
a dependent of its parents. Hortillanos child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life
without depending upon its mother, Hortillanos wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the
CBA provisions in question that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married
employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a
qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired
civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood
in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mothers womb.

The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent childs status in relation to his/her parents. In
Angeles v. Maglaya,[27] we have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz:

A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the
element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article
164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: Children conceived or born during
the marriage of the parents are legitimate. (Emphasis ours.)
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,[28] we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:

The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the
Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally
adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born
outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis
ours.)

It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that
Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage,
hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception.

Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element entitling him
to death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death certificate of his
unborn child.

Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under the
CBA, Hortillanos claims for the same should have been granted by Continental Steel.

We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give
aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a
loved one. It cannot be said that the parents grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their
unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any
less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.

Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits
should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is
specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting
labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor.[29] In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions
should be interpreted in favor of labor.