PUBLIC VALUES AND INTEGRITY IN PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

Anne-Marie Reynaers

Paper presented at the EGPA conference

Study Group on Ethics and Integrity of Governance
Toulouse, September 8-10, 2010

DRAFT PAPER
PLEASE DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR

Anne-Marie Reynaers (PhD Candidate)

Research group Integrity of Governance
Department of Governance Studies
VU University Amsterdam
De Boelelaan 1081
1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands
E-mail: a.reynaers@fsw.vu.nl
Tel: 0031627092448

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1. INTRODUCTION

Once upon a time, many Western European governments organized human life through public
and private organizations. Public organizations took care of the public, common needs while
taking into account public values such as equity, accountability, legitimacy and democracy. Private
organizations, on the other hand, dealt with particular service and product delivery according to
private values as efficiency, profit making and professionalism. By the time governments faced
themselves with financial shortages; public organizations adopted private values and mechanisms
or collaborated with private organizations in order to overcome problems within the ineffective,
inefficient and rigid bureaucracies. Public service and product delivery was revived and, according
to some, even improved. Others, however, argued that public-private intermingling would result
in undesirable problems such as public value loss, an increased chance on integrity violations and
unethical behaviour by public servants. In order to overcome both the weaknesses of
bureaucracy and the market, a third norm in which public values, norms and ethics are preserved
while working more ‗businesslike‘ was created with public-private partnerships as its
organizational manifestation.

Scientists, following the normative and institutional reforms with great interest, never agreed
upon questions such as whether public-private intermingling is desirable; what actual effect
reforms have on public values and public integrity and what norm actually should initiate
institutional reforms. An academic debate with naive stereotypes about the public and private
sector, conflicting opinions, assumptions and research outcomes and a lack of empirical
knowledge, leaves us with questions rather than answers about the desirability of public-private
intermingling and triggers the need for a fundamental reflection on assumptions made;
terminology and language used; research questions still crucial to be answered; and
methodological implications. The aim of this literature review is to contrast and reflect upon
conflicting opinions, assumptions and research outcomes within academic literature considering
public-private intermingling. Special attention will be paid to the question how this debate should
be perceived within the context of public-private partnerships. Are partnerships indeed an
alternative governance structure, able to preserve public values and integrity while simultaneously
leaving room for private values and integrity? It seems arbitrary to formulate an answer on
conceptual grounds only and although theoretical concerns are alarming, empirical research on
this topic is surprisingly scarce. This paper therefore suggests what future research is needed in

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order to understand what public-private intermingling means in terms of public values and public
integrity within public-private partnerships.

2. FROM TPA TO PVM

2.1 THE PUBLIC PRIVATE DEVIDE

According to the traditional public administration philosophy (TPA), public service and product
delivery is organized through hierarchical bureaucracies that are characterized by rationality and
top-down control in accordance with public law. The concept of bureaucracy, with Woodrow
Wilson, Max Weber and Frederick Taylor as founding fathers, arose and flourished in many
Western countries from the end of the nineteenth century until the late seventies of the twentieth
century (Lynn 2001). Besides the famous politics-administration dichotomy, which marked the
boundary between intellectual, objective administration and normative politics and politicians,
bureaucracies (at least as an ideal type) also institutionalized the public-private dichotomy: public
organizations dealt with public service delivery according to public values and private
organizations, not interested, allowed or obliged to serve public needs, dealt with private interests
according to private values.

Academic interest on the public-private dichotomy resulted in an extensive body of literature

exploring the exact meaning and usefulness this conceptualization (e.g. Downs, 1967; Fayol,
1929; Harlow, 1980; Perry & Rainey, 1988; Rainey & Bozeman, 2000; Weintraub, 1997; Wilson,
1941). An assumption underlying this dichotomy is that the public and private spheres are
different and that both worlds can be separated by a clear line. Differences are often framed in
terms of value differences. In relation to public values, for example, the adjective ‗public‘ refers
to the sector from which these types of values originate or the forum they are connected with. In
general, ‗public‘ often refers to government, whereas ‗private‘ refers to business (Van der Wal,
2008: 24). Following this conceptualization, public organizations are stereotypically associated
with the public interest, equity, solidarity, stability, public law and democratic processes (e.g.
Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Reijniers, 1994) whereas private organizations are stereotypically
associated with entrepreneurship, efficiency, financial interest, competition, business risks, and
the realization of corporate goals (e.g. Reijniers, 1994; Rosenau, 2000: 218). In relation to the
moral identity of the public and private sector, Jacobs (1992) distinguishes a private commercial
moral syndrome and a public guardian moral syndrome and argues that organizations ―sink into
functional and moral quagmires … when they confuse their own appropriate moral system with

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the other‖ (Jacobs, 1992: xii). She therefore opts for a strict separation between public and
private organizations since both their values and morality are significantly different.

To get beyond the above described stereotypes, several scholars have tried to empirically map
and grasp the differences and similarities between public and private organizations (Perry &
Kraemer, 1983; Rainey, 1979; Smith & Perry, 1985). To do so, different categorizations have
been used. Rainey et al. (1976), for example, focus on ownership, funding, and control (see also
Coursey & Bozeman, 1990). Van der Wal (2008) includes organizational tasks and goals among
ownership and funding, referring to universally accessible, public, non-profit goods versus
private, for-profit, exclusively accessible goods (van der Wal, 2008: 26). Finally, Leeuw (1992) lists
goal complexity and work-related attitudes as variables on which public and private
organizational can differ. In general, the idea of a public-private dichotomy is contested and it is
often argued that differences between public and private organizations are not per se distributed
along a public-private dichotomy but rather along a public-private continuum (Bozeman, 1987;
Van der Wal, 2008; Van Montfort, 2008). In this respect, Bozeman (1987) introduces the concept
of publicness in which organizations are understood to be more or less public or private
(Bozeman, 1987: 5). Recent empirical research on value differences in the public and private
sector shows that, while public and private organizations have different values to some extent,
they also have certain values in common (Van der Wal, Huberts, Van den Heuvel & Kolthoff,
2006). Van der Wal and Huberts (2007: 4) therefore argue that, ―it seems arbitrary to attribute
specific values to specific sectors and specific organizations on conceptual or theoretical grounds
only.‖ In this respect De Bruijn & Dicke (2006: 720) stipulate that public values are not solely
owned or acted upon by public officials or public organizations: ―public values might be
protected by private actions‖. Note that in this statement ‗public value‘ implies a public interest
or goal. Finally, it is argued that values are not a priori public or private; rather, they become
public or private in a specific context (Noordegraaf & Teeuw, 2003).

Recently, there has been a revived interest in the public-private dichotomy within administrative
and organisational literature, varying from philosophical to more normative or empirical
contributions (see for example Jacbos 1992; Hodge and Greve 2007; Habermas 1996; Moore
2005; De Graaf and van der Wal 2008; Van Gestel et al. 2008; Weihe 2008; Van der Wal 2008;
Van der Wal et al. 2008). One explanation for the growing popularity of this field of research is
the relatively rapid growth of new public service delivery structures that introduce private values
and management principles into the public sector and the other way round.

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2.2 SECTOR BLURRING
The introduction of private values or private management techniques within public organisations
is a result of the introduction of a new norm in relation to the question how public service
delivery should be organized. This new norm is also known as New Public Management (NPM),
and refers to the wave of reforms that have contributed to the establishment of a more
entrepreneurial public sector in many western European countries (Hall, Holt & Purchase, 2003:
495; Hood, 1991, 1995; Kettl, 2005). One of the main features of the NPM philosophy is that
governments should ―steer‖ instead of ―row,‖ which suggests that governments should no longer
provide public services themselves since they are not best equipped to do so (e.g. Osborne &
Gaebler 1992; Barlow & Röber, 1996: 73). It is argued that public service and product delivery
can be organized more efficiently and effectively through the introduction of business practices
such as performance management and performance-related wages (Box, 1999; Hood, 1991, 1995;
Keen & Murphy, 1996; Noordegraaf & Abma, 2003; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004) and business
values such as competition, efficiency, profitability and personal gain without having negative
effects on values such as accountability or equity (Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow & Tinkler 2005:
467; Hall et al., 2003: 495; Pollitt, 1993: 2-3). This philosophy gained popularity in many Western
countries and, three decades after its appearance, the organization of public service and product
delivery has been changed substantially (Steenhuisen, 2009: 54). To illustrate this, under the guise
of ‗less government more market‘, Dutch former state monopolies have been liberalised,
privatised, outsourced or organized through pps. Thus, local and national public transport,
energy supply, gas delivery, telecommunication, postal services and social security have all been
privatised or liberalised by now; the implementation of reintegration policies and parts of social
protection have been outsourced, pps are constructed around infrastructure and area
development projects, including in the health-, and education sectors (Steenhuisen 2009;
Steenhuisen and Van Eeten 2008; Klijn and Van Twist 2007; De Bruijn and Dicke 2006).

The high level of ‗organizational manifestations‘ of the NPM ideology (Klijn and Teisman
2000:84) triggered, as described earlier, academic interest on the public-private dichotomy in
terms of public value safeguarding and public integrity (see for example Jørgensen and Bozeman
2002; De Bruijn and Dicke 2006; Hall 2000; Moore 2005; Kolthoff 2007; Frederickson 1999;
Ghere 1996; Maesschalck 2004). Following the assumption that public and private organizations
have different value systems and different ethical standards as described by Jabocs (1992), it is
often suggested that NPM has a negative effect on public servants‘ ethics, public sector ethics,
public integrity and public value safeguarding (Maesschalck 2004; Kolthoff 2007; Roberts &

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Breitenstein & Roberts; Ghere 1996). Several authors, propose a sharp division between both
sectors, their values, ethics and management styles (Gawthrop 1998; Wittmer 2000; Frederickson
1999, 2005). Frederickson (1997), for example, argues that the possibility of unethical and corrupt
behavior within public organizations could increase if they were managed like private
organizations. Bovens and Hemerijck (1996: 131) fear that managerial novelties will
―continuously result in questions about the integrity of government‖ since they ―do indeed
involve a hybrid mixture of incompatible moral values, as they introduce commercial precepts
into a guardian practice.‖ Similarly, Garofalo (2009: 19) states that ―the contemporary blurring of
the public-private distinction … presents profound ethical problems for both public and private
parties.‖ Finally, Johnston (2009: 13) even fears administrative evil due to value intermingling.
Both the assumptions on the relation between NPM and public values and NPM and public
integrity will be discussed in more detail below.

2.2.1 PUBLIC VALUES

Before taking a closer look at the public value discussion, it should be stipulated that it is hard to
define what public values exactly refer to since values are essentially-contested concepts that are
hard to define unambiguously (De Graaf 2003:21). Generally, values are associated with
perceptions about good and evil, moral beliefs, ethical standards, principles, guidelines, and
judgments (Van der Wal 2008:20). They play a role in decision-making processes and are defined
here as ―qualities and standards that have a certain weight in the choice of action‖ (Van der Wal
2008:11). Because of its ambiguous character, research on public values varies in definition, focus
and units of analysis which makes it hard to compare research outcomes (e.g. Beck Jørgensen and
Bozeman 2002; Van Gestel et al. 2008). To illustrate this, in some studies, public values are
defined as goals – the reliability and safety of public transport or energy services, for example
(Steenhuisen 2009; De Bruin en Dicke 2006; Weihe 2008:153). Here the concepts of ‗public
values‘ and ‗public interest‘ are used interchangeably. Public values sometimes imply procedural-
and process-related rules (Weihe 2008:153) and public values can also refer to moral concepts of
right and wrong (Van der Wal 2008:21). In relation to public-private intermingling and public
value safeguarding, a somewhat alarming discourse about governance problems within new
public service delivery structures can be distinguished. It is argued that public-private
intermingling might lead to a loss of public values such as accountability and democracy.
However, a second discourse nuances or rejects these claims. Both discourses will be discussed in
more detail below focusing on accountability and democracy.1

1 Due to limitations, only these two values are discussed.

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There is an extensive body of literature on public accountability in relation to recent reforms (e.g.
Acar & Robertson, 2004; Acar & Guo, 2009; Barberis, 1998; Behn, 2001; Bovens, 1998, 2005,
2007; Bovens, Schillemans, & ‗t Hart, 2008; Christensen & Lægreid, 2002; Day & Klein, 1987;
Deleon, 1998; Hodge & Coghill, 2007; Salamon, 2002; Schillemans & Bovens, 2008; Sterling,
2005; Stoker, 1998; Willems & Van Dooren, 2009). In administrative literature, accountability
often refers to a ‗simple system‘ with hierarchical control, elected officials, and ministerial
responsibility (Bovens et al., 2008: 2). It has been argued that public accountability is challenged
by the NPM philosophy resulting in accountability problems (e.g. Acar & Robertson, 2004;
Bloomfield, 2006; Drewry, 2000; Frederickson & Smith, 2003; Hodge & Greve, 2007; Kettl,
1996; Willems & Van Dooren, 2009; Peters & Pierre, 1998; Sterling, 2005; Agranoff & McGuire,
2001; Behn, 2001; Christensen & Lægreid, 2002; Ghere, 1996). Christensen and Lægreid (2002:
288), for example, state that the NPM philosophy ―argues for more business efficiency and
accountability for performance without paying much attention to political responsibility and
accountability for fairness.‖ Hodge and Coghill (2007: 697) state, ―privatization introduces
complexity and potential conflict between managerialist values and the strong concern with
public accountability found in many societies.‖ Collins & Butler (2002: 56), argue that NPM
diffuses political accountability because it increases the distance between political decision
making and the delivery of public services and goods. In this respect, Frederickson and Smith
(2003: 218) pose the question who is accountable for public service delivery when public and
private partners cooperate: ―If public officials have less power and responsibility, is it fair or even
possible to hold them accountable for public policy? If the answer is no, who or what should be
held accountable for public policy?‖

Democracy has also been discussed extensively in relation to the rise of new public service
delivery structures (e.g. Box, Marshall, Reed, 2001; Christensen & Lægreid, 2009; Christensen &
Lægreid, 2002; Collins & Butler, 2002; Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000; Kolthoff, Huberts, Van den
Heuvel, 2003; Mathur & Skelcher, 2007; McCabe & Vinzant, 1999; Skelcher, Smith, & Mathur,
2004; Terry, 1998). It often remains unclear what democracy exactly refers to. In literature on
value intermingling, democracy refers to several concepts such as political and administrative
control; the political-philosophical foundation of the democratic nation state; the changing role
of citizens as voters to citizens as customers; and citizen participation (e.g. Box et al., 2001;
Christensen & Lægreid, 2002; Hoogenboom & Muller, 2002; Osborne, 2000; Rosenau, 2000;
Sterling, 2005; Stoker, 1998). According to several authors, recent reforms have had a negative
effect on democracy. Deleon and Denhardt (2000), for example, argue that supporters of the

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reinvention movement reject democratic aspects of citizenship, civic engagement, and the public
interest. Skelcher et al. (2004: 4) argue that public-private intermingling presents a problem for
democratic governance since they ―do not accord with the doctrine of the primacy of politics.‖
Therefore, they embody a tension ―between effective democratic guidance and control to ensure
the public interest is served and effective program delivery to increase community welfare.‖
Rosenau suggests that public-private intermingling may achieve cost reduction at the price of
democracy (2000: 234). In this respect, Christensen and Lægreid (2002: 268) refer to a
―democratic deficit‖ which results from a ―dominance of economic norms and a subordination
… of many traditionally legitimate norms and values – like broader political concerns, sector-
political goals, professional expertise, different rights and rules, the interests of societal groups
and so on, making the conflicts and tensions between different considerations more evident.‖
Public private sector management approaches are not, according to Box et al. (2001: 609-613),
compatible with democracy and democratic values since that weaken the relationship between
individual citizens and society as a whole. Finally it is argued that rather than strengthening
citizens‘ role in the democratic order, recent reforms strengthen the position of managers and
administrators instead (Christensen & Lægreid, 2009: 22).

In contrast, to the above described concerns, the central story line of the second discourse
nuances or rejects the claim that value intermingling automatically leads to public value loss. In a
comparative case study between Denmark and the United States, Beck Jørgensen and Bozeman
(2002), for example, found that contracting sometimes forms a threat to public values but that it
does not necessarily require their sacrifice. In response to the idea that public organizations
perform better than private organizations in terms of accountability, democracy, and equity,
Rosenau (2000: 222) wonders where this assumption comes from, arguing that the safeguarding
of these concepts is never certain and that abuse is possible from both public and private
providers. The theoretical assumption that there is a positive causal relationship between public-
private intermingling and the detriment of traditional public values like accountability, democracy
therefore merits further discussion which will be illustrated below.

In relation to accountability, several scholars reject the claim that public-private intermingling
poses a serious threat to accountability (e.g. Savas, 2000). Börzel and Risse (2002: 13) even state
that privatization and contracting optimize accountability since collaboration with private
partners enables public organizations to overcome state failure. Barberis (1998: 460-461) argues
that recent reforms have given ministers greater control over their departments and that it even

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when NPM would disappear, an accountability gap would still remain. Criticizing the assumption
that accountability in not at stake within public organizations, Rosenau (2000: 227) claims that ―it
is difficult to argue that the public or private partner is more accountable or that partnering for
policy increases or decreases accountability.‖ Several scholars claim that the traditional concept of
accountability, as a hierarchical principle agent relation, is not a valid yardstick in the context of
new public service delivery structures (e.g. Barberis, 1998; Bovaird, 2004; Johnson, 1974; Rhodes,
1997; Weber, 1999). Weber (1999: 451), for example, asks what an effective accountability system
should look like ―in a world of decentralized governance, shared power, collaborative decision
processes, results-oriented management, and broad civic participation.‖ Likewise, Rhodes (1997:
21-22) argues that the traditional mechanisms of accountability were not designed to cope with
multi-organizational fragmented policy systems (see also Bovens et al. 2008: 2). In this respect
Deleon (1998: 555) opts for a accountability concept of a non-bureaucratic kind ―tailored as
much as possible to the types of decisions and structures being held to account.‖ In order to
establish a new normative comprehension of accountability in complex public service delivery
structures, Salamon (2002: 38) argues that ―we need to loosen up traditional notions of political
accountability, and develop more pluralistic conceptions.‖

In relation to democracy, proponents of public-private intermingling argue that NPM potentially

enhances citizens‘ freedom of choice in relation to public services. NPM therefore might
―broaden the options of people trying to influence the public authorities and participate in public
decision-making processes through market mechanisms and customer orientation‖ (Christensen
& Lægreid, 2002: 22). It is assumed that, unlike indirect representation of citizens through
democratic elections, consumer-like behavior enables citizens to directly respond and influence
the organization of public service delivery. Empirical research confirming this assumption is,
however, scarce (Christensen & Lægreid, 2009). According to Mathur and Skelcher (2007: 230),
the traditional understanding of democracy hides a much more complex reality, but nevertheless,
this literature reflects an implicit assumption that civic life proceeds in the context of a rationally
ordered, constitutional framework. Because this assumption is problematic in the context of
network governance, they claim that the quality-of-democracy approach provides a partial but
insufficient methodological strategy for researching what happens to the value of democracy in
network governance. As with accountability, pps proponents argue that the traditional
understanding of democracy is not applicable in the context of new public service delivery
structures (e.g. Mathur & Skelcher, 2007).

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What the overview of both discourses on public values teaches us is that not only do the endings
of the stories vary, but so do the main characters. Opponents of public-private cooperation,
foreseeing governance problems to occur within blurred organizational forms, see public values
as a priori and static. Scholars in this discourse treat public values as inherently important, thus
normatively. Since public-private intermingling always implies the influence of one‘s values over
another‘s, public values are in constant danger. And indeed, the few empirical studies within this
discourse confirm this bleaker prospect, signaling a call to safeguard public values. Any deviation
from traditional public administrative standards is believed to be problematic, and safeguarding
public values is thus, almost by definition, problematic. In the second discourse, with a less
pessimistic or even happy ending, the hero of the story (public values) plays a completely
different role. The hero continually changes character, which is not seen as an a priori problem.
Public values are understood to be context-dependent, socially-constructed concepts. The fact
that meaning is given to values through action, a deviation from the traditional standard, is not
seen as problematic. Instead of claiming that public values are at stake and should therefore be
safeguarded, proponents argue that a new environment enables new public delivery structures to
govern themselves reflectively, leaving room to integrate both value systems to some extent.

In relation to the ontological understanding of the construction of values, De Bruijn and Dicke
(2006) and Van Gestel et al. (2008) distinguish three perspectives, which to certain degrees
include or exclude contextual influences on value construction. Within the universal approach,
public values are universal, objective, and absolute. A given framework of public values are (or
should be) applicable to public organizations and form the background against which public
organizations function (Couture 1993:404). The stakeholders‘ approach considers values to be
neither objective nor absolute and universal. In contrast, it is believed that the construction and
content of values is subject-dependent because they come about through negotiation and
interaction between stakeholders. The exact meaning of a public value then depends on the
context in which it is used. Furthermore, it is argued that values can be more or less important or
represented, varying from case to case due to value trade-offs. From an institutional perspective,
the construction and content of public values is neither universal nor the result of a subjective
negotiation process. Institutional features like sector and organization culture are expected to
have an influence on the creation and content of values (De Bruijn and Dicke 2006:6). In sum,
the stakeholders‘ approach, in which the answer to what is valued totally depends on negotiation
processes between stakeholders, and the universalistic approach, in which a set of values is
context-independent, oppose each other. The institutional approach forms a bridge between the

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two extremes by integrating subjective negotiation processes within a pre-structured value
framework.

Several authors (e.g. De Graaf; 2003 Habermas 1996; De Bruijn and Dicke 2006) acknowledge
the social construction of values and emphasize its non-essential character. Habermas (1996:261),
for example, argues that values are just specially preferred and ―must be brought into a transitive
order with other values from case to case.‖ Since there is no rational standard for doing so, value
trade-offs are made in relation to customary standards and hierarchies (Habermas 1996: 259).
Similarly, De Bruijn and Dicke (2006), state that the fact ―that public values compete and always
require a trade-off … implies that the judgment about this trade-off tends to be subjective.
Different parties … may choose different trade-offs. This deprives the public value even more of
its absolute connotation.‖ Likewise, Bozeman (2007:36) argues that ―for any particular value, the
extent to which it is embraced … varies both across and within societies.‖ Also, Nelson et al.
(2001:652) argue: ―Keeping in mind that the context influences the set of values that is required is
a good antidote against the dogmatic application of beliefs.‖ In sum, the construction and
interpretation of values is context-dependent. Accountability, for example, is not equally
important in every case, nor does it mean the same thing in every case, and furthermore its
meaning could vary on whom you ask. Values, whether we call them public or private, have no a
priori meaning; rather, meaning is given to them within social contexts while people talk about
and act upon them – a strong argument for the second discourse.

2.2.2 INTEGRITY
The discussion about the desirability of public-private intermingling is not only framed in terms
of public values but also in terms of public integrity, or related concepts such as public service
ethics and public servants‘ ethics (e.g. Maesschalck 2004; Huberts 1998). It remains often unclear
what the exact differences between integrity and ethics is, and both terms are often used
interchangeably. Kolthoff (2007: 3), for example, defines integrity and ethical behavior as follows:
―Integrity or ethical behavior means much more than not being corrupt or fraudulent…integrity
is a quality or characteristic of individual of organizational behavior that denotes the quality of
acting in accordance with the moral values, standards, and rules accepted by the organization´s
members and society.‖ (Kolthoff 2007: 3). The strength of this definition lies in the fact that a
contextual approach leaves room for the existence of different interpretations of integrity (what is
ethical or integer in organization A doesn‘t have to be ethical or integer in organization B). Its
weakness however, triggers questions such as what happens if the created norm itself is not

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integer; what to do when there is no shared understanding about the norm within the
organization itself; what happens when the organizational norm is not in accordance with the
societal norms or when different interpretations of integrity are combined in new public service
delivery structures. The question then becomes: what should be the norm? In relation to public-
private intermingling it is possible, but not by definition necessary, that two different
understandings of integrity meet. Although it is plausible that this combination results in integrity
problems, we cannot state that problems will occurs since the private sector by definition is less
ethical than the public sector. As Caiden (1999: 21) describes ―governments and markets are not
rivals or competitors; they do different things in different ways‖. It follows that ethical standards
from private organizations are not unethical per se, but that they can be considered to be
unethical in a certain context with a different dominant norm.

In relation to NPM and integrity, it is often suggested that there exists a negative causal
relationship between NPM, or more specific organizational processes influenced by NPM, and
the decline of public integrity or public servants‘ ethics (Kolthoff 2007: 3; Maesschalck 2004) (e.g
Jacbos 1992; Denhardt 2002; Frederickson 1996). It is argued that NPM, increases the change on
integrity violations such as corruption, fraud and theft, the acceptance of gifts or discounts, waste
and abuse of organizational resources etc (Huberts 1998: 20-30). Bovens and Hemerijck (1996)
argue that exposing public managers to private sector values, and the implementation of private
techniques and tools might result in them losing their integrity. Frederickson (1999), fears for
government corruption and follows the somewhat naive argument that ―in democratic settings
government agencies and their officials in bureaucratic hierarchies are more ethical than self-
interested individuals or firms in competitive markets‖ (Frederickson 1999: 301), which obviously
does not need to be the case. More specific, Frederickson fears that co-operation between
government representatives(able to spend public money) and private money seekers (who might
seduce public representatives them to spend it in their favour) and the absence of democratic
regulatory instruments such as laws, rules and social conventions eventually lead to self-interested
action that does not serve the common, public need.

In contrast to the earlier described assumptions, Von Maravic and Reichard (2003: 121-122) state
that there is no direct simple link between recent reforms and unethical behaviour like
corruption. They argue that there is no empirical evidence suggesting that changes on corruption
are higher within new public service delivery structures than in traditional public organizations
(see also Lawton 1999: 65). Likewise Taylor (1999: 1) states that we should not assume the public

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sector to be more ethically aware that the private sector. According to Von Maravic and Reichard
(2003:121-122), the assumption of having a causal relationship between NPM as a cause and a
higher degree of corruption as an effect, is ―problematic, simplifying and dangerous...It is
analytically simplifying because the term NPM as such does not tell us much about actual reform
contents. Secondly, such an assumptions is blaming the reform for corruption and exonerating
morally the corrupt person. Thirdly, it does not explain why so many public servants stay honest
and loyal to their organization or go even further and blow the whistle.‖ Finally, several empirical
studies on the relation between NPM and integrity, show that employees that work in new public
delivery structures, do not consider recent reform to form a structural threat in terms of integrity
violations (Karré and In ‘t Veld, 2007: 200). Kolthoff (2007: 116) argues that a businesslike
approach might even increase the chances of success in relation to ethical issues. Overall,
literature on NPM and public values as well as on NPM and integrity, shows a highly fluctuated
pattern with conflicting assumptions and research outcomes. NPM is highly contested which
triggered the need and construction of a new perspective on public service delivery. The contours
of this new norm and its organizational manifestation in the form of public-private partnerships,
will be discussed below.

2.3 PUBLIC VALUE MANAGEMENT

Several scholars argue that the desire to fade away NPM, that formed a paradigmatic break with
the traditional notions of public administration (Hood 1999), by revaluing traditional notions of
public administration, should instead be replaced by a desire to balance between both extremes.
Instead of comparing values underlying Traditional Public Administration (TPA) with values
derived from New Public Management, a new narrative, which tries to establish a governance
framework for new public service delivery structures, marks the contours of a new perspective on
public and private co-operation: Public Value Management (PVM).

PVM, as described by Stoker (2006:41), bears the importance of specific public values in mind,
while at the same time, leaving room for managerial techniques and structures. According to
Stoker (2006), PVM ―marks a clear break with past understandings of the way that governmental
actors, both official and elected, should behave‖. PVM assumes that in order to create public
value (defined by politicians), involved actors, whether they are private or public, should share
ethical values and commitments to some extent‘ (Stoker 2006:49). Literature on public and
private value intermingling, often assumes that a trade-off between democracy and management
(or public and private values in general) must be made and that this leads to significant problems

13
from both a TPA as well as a NPM perspective (Stoker 2006:55; see also Deleon 1998:539).
Stoker (2006:56), however argues, that democracy and management can be partners rather than
enemies within the PVM paradigm: ‗politics and management go hand in hand‘. New public
service constructions should not try to safeguard conventions and institutions derived from TPA,
nor should they neglect political leadership and interference completely as NPM tries to do
(Stoker 2006:56). Similarly, Denhardt and Denhardt (2001), opt for a paradigmatic renewal
through the introduction of a New Public Service (NPS) perspective that forms a bridge between
TPA and NPM. With a different label but a similar message, also NPS ought to combine
governments‘ responsibility to safeguard democratic and social criteria through businesslike
practices. According to Denhardt and Denhardt (2001:399) ―we must take into account market
and economic criteria associated with the new public management and democratic and social
criteria associated with the new public service‖. In this respect, Denhardt and Denhardt
(2000:557) state that: ‗the NPS clearly seems most consistent with the basic foundations of
democracy in this country, and, therefore provides a framework within which other valuable
techniques and values, such as the best ideas of the old public administration or the new public
management, might be played out‘. Likewise, Salamon (2002) argues for a paradigmatic
management change moving from NPM and TPA to a New Governance perspective, which
shifts the focus of attention to the co-operation of partners in organizational networks such as
partnerships, combining public as well as private preferences.

2.3.1 PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

It is argued by several authors, that public-private partnerships form an alternative to the NPM
philosophy and that they enable governments to control their service delivery to a far greater
extent than when public services are privatized or outsourced (e.g. Bovaird 2004, Greve 2003:
63). Bovaird (2004: 206-207), for example, refers to the need for partnering as a reaction to
problematic privatization situations in which partners attempt to take advantage of each other.
According to Lowndes & Sullivan (2004: 52), pps seek to overcome the inefficiency of
bureaucracy and inequity of market solutions through cooperation among public, private, profit,
and nonprofit organizations. Skeptics however, argue that pps are nothing more than a language
tool, ―a replacement of the old general Thatcherite use of the word privatisation‖ (Hall & De la
Motte, 2003: 2, Savas 2002; Argyriades, 2001 in Wettenhall 2003).

Whatever position one takes within this debate, pps do indeed differ from privatization and
contracting on several variables. However, when considering the myriad definitions of pps, what

14
is most striking is the conceptual muddling between those concepts. (e.g. Carrol & Steane, 2000:
36; Hodge & Greve, 2007: 545; Hoogenboom & Muller, 2002: 10; Savas, 2000: 1). An often-used
definition of pps is ―cooperation of some sort of durability between public and private actors in
which they jointly develop products and services and share risks, costs and resources which are
connected with those products‖ (Van Ham & Koppenjan, 2001: 598). Although this definition
more or less clarifies what pps is, Weihe (2006) and Lonsdale (2007) argue that it is still too broad
since it could also include contracting and other forms of public private cooperation that should
be analytically distinguishable.

In short, privatization involves no direct relationship between public and private partners; private
organizations independently own and control public service delivery (Willems & Van Dooren,
2009: 4). In contracting and pps, public organizations work with private companies to deliver
public services or goods. The relation between public and private partners in contracting,
however, is not so much about joint decision making and production but rather involves a
(temporary) principal-agent relationship between a private company and a public partner, which
knows what it wants, how it has to be done, and who must execute it (Klijn & Teisman, 2000).
Unlike privatization, the public partner owns and controls the cooperation process, which is
clearly defined and can be divided into separate tasks and contracts. In contrast to contracting,
pps integrate different project aspects into a ―package deal‖ often funded by private partners
(Willems & Van Dooren, 2009: 4). There is, at least in theory, more interaction in pps and the
venture lasts longer than in contracting situations.

Partnership constructions are often reduced to two categories: (1) formal, well-defined, and
contractual and (2) less formal, less structured, interdependent, and cooperative (Sullivan and
Skelcher 2002; Hodge and Greve 2007). Koppenjan (2005:137-138) and Klijn and Tijsman (2003)
distinguish concession and alliance models. In concession partnerships, cooperation between
public and private partners is formally constructed through the sale of exploitation rights
(Edelenbos and Teisman 2008:616). Alliance partnerships assume joint action from both public
and private partners during the different project phases (Edelenbos and Teisman 2008:616). A
similar distinction is made by Klijn and Van Twist (2007:158) who distinguish contract
partnerships from partnership arrangements. Similarly, Lewis (2000:260) distinguishes active
partnerships, characterized by a process of ongoing negotiation, from dependent partnerships,
characterized by a formal ―blueprint character.‖ In the juridical dimension, Kouwenhoven
(1991:13) distinguishes narrow partnerships that become new public-private legal entities from

15
less formalized public-private forms of negotiation. When distinguishing concession from alliance
partnerships, it becomes rather unclear how pps are different from contracting because
concession, contract, dependent, and narrow partnerships all involve a contractual relationship.
Indeed, several authors wonder whether the concession model and its lookalikes are different
from contracting at all (e.g. Lonsdale 2007).

Partnering brings together two (or even more) organizations, that in theory have different
backgrounds. This institutional complexity requires action from both the public as well as the
private partner. Wettenhall (2003: 99) argues in this respect that: ―Such a partnership requires
strength in both sides, conscious recognition by each side of its distinctive values, and
resoluteness by each side to act in accordance with those values in working out the appropriate
mix‖. But although both public as well as private values might be at stake within a partnership,
administrative literature, however, mainly focuses on the public side, thereby isolating the private
partner as an important player. To illustrate this, Wettenhall (2003: 99) states that the public side
must be protected in the ‗public-private equation‘ and that managers should ensure that
―regardless of whether public sectors are big or small, issues of public policy and public interest
are not altogether submerged by the demands of the market‖. In this respect Roberts,
Breitenstein and Roberts (2002: 67) argue that private companies have a corporate responsibility
that constitutes the frame for private participation: ―pps raise important issues about national and
international social policy and the appropriate role of the private sector.‖ Not once do they
discuss how the public partner should behave, therewith ignoring the fact partners are mutual
dependent and assuming that the public partner by definition is acting with good intentions.
Other stereotypical assumptions about the private partners are described by Reich (2000: 618)
who states that there exists a lot of scepticism about the motives and behaviour of the private
partners entering a partnership: ―Private firms are assumed to be seeking future profits and
markets through partnerships; or to be seeking control over the agendas of international
organizations; or to be seeking tax deductions for financial reasons; or to be seeking new
products, subsidized by public funds, to be used for private sale and profits‖.

2.3.2 A NEW NORM FOR PARTNERING

The previous discussion triggered the creation of a new normative framework for partnership
constructions. In relation to the creation of such a new doctrine, Barberis (1998:461) argues: ‗(…)
if we prefer not to reshape present practice, then there remains one further possibility: formulate
a new doctrine which better fits and which provides an ‗anchor‘ for the modern realities. This

16
kind of reformulation cannot be done in a vacuum (…) any reconstruction of doctrine (…) must
take account of the broader constitutional context, including the movement for constitutional
change‘. Several scholars indeed created new normative frameworks that, at least in theory, fit
modern public service delivery practice better. These alternative standards proclaim to combine
values and goals of the public and private sector in a more adequate manner, taking into account
the broader constitutional context of the partnership allowing politicians or researchers to judge
and analyze the quality of governance within partnerships (see for example Bovaird 2004:211;
Robertson and Acar 1999:28; Denhardt and Denhardt 2000). In relation to accountability within
pps, Robertson and Acar (1995:5) argue that quality of accountability studies, so far only
concerned the single hierarchical agency and that ‗the existence of inter- organizational systems
and networks are not taken into consideration‘ (see also Acar et al. 2008). They therefore
introduce three alternative accountability standards that can be used in order to hold partners and
partnerships accountable. The first mechanism, community accountability, assumes that the
community, which is being served by the partnership, performs external control. Partnerships are
in this respect primarily accountable to the community it serves. According to Robertson and
Acar (1999:21), ‗(…) conceptualizing the community as the main focus of accountability
mechanisms for pps is both an effective managerial strategy and a desirable goal for addressing
community problems and enhancing democratic polity‘. Partner accountability forms a second
alternative approach. Besides being accountable to an external forum, partners should also be
accountable towards each other (Robertson and Acar 1999:23). Because partnerships create a
podium for ongoing interpretation and negotiation about problems, goals, and strategies between
the public the private partner, both should not impose their point of view but rather remain
flexible in order to ‗seek solutions to all parties‘ (Robertson and Acar 1999:24). Partners therefore
should address the clarification and or distribution of roles, responsibilities, risks, rewards, and
relationships among partners, through their accountability system. Partnerships should strive for
the development of a shared culture in which both partners share ‗a common normative
foundation to guide members‘ actions and decision‘ (Robertson and Acar 1999:26; see also Van
Montfort 2004:11). Finally, moral accountability (besides compliance with law, bureaucratic rules
and professional standards) concerns the ‗obligation to strive for a moral government in all their
decisions and actions‘ (Robertson and Acar 1999:26). Moral accountability forms a internalized
control mechanism, which reflects individual commitment ‗to serving the public good by
operating in an ethical and responsible manner‘ (Robertson and Acar 1999:26). Bovaird (2004)
presents an alternative framework for good governance within different kinds of partnership
constructions that not only entails a different understanding of accountability but also includes

17
other governance aspects such as transparency, accountability, ethical behavior, equity, and
sustainability, suitable. As table 1 shows, governance principles, do not only differ from values as
formulated within the context of traditional public administration; its understanding is
contextualized bearing in mind the different organizational structures of transactional and more
collaborative partnerships (Bovaird 2004:210-211). This normative framework, should be taken
into account while partnering and forms a new yardstick through which the quality of governance
within partnerships can be evaluated and judged (see also Denhardt and Denhardt 2000: 550).

Table 1 Partnerships from a governance perspective

Governance Transactional contractual Collaborative
Principles Relationships partnerships

Citizen engagement Consultation with citizens and other Participation of citizens and other
stakeholders stakeholders in decision-making

Transparency Limited to areas where stakeholders Open book working in respect

have a ‗need to know in order to of all partners (including user and
monitor the contract- and, even then, citizen representatives, where
limited by confines of ‗commercial appropriate) as a critical element
confidentiality‘ of building trust

Accountability The contractor must account to the
purchaser in the line with all
performance reporting procedures
agreed in the contract, particularly in
relation to budgetary and cost control
Partners must be prepared to account to
account to each other for their actions and
performance on all issues which arise –
and must be prepared to account to other
stakeholders for the overall performance
of the partnership

Ethical and honest Staff must act legally and within Accepted as core values in the working
behavior professional codes of conduct of the partnership- partners must actively
seek innovative ways of improving performance
against these principles

Equity (fair Staff must act within organizational
procedures and procedures, which must ensure
due process) consistent treatment of all individuals
within any group and must accord
priority to different groups as set out
in the contract
Accepted as core values in the working
of the partnership- partners must
continuously seek innovative ways of
improving performance against this
principle

Based on and adapted from Bovaird 2004:210-211.

Bovaird (2004:212), however, argues that these principles are by no means, fixed, objective and
context independent guidelines: ‗Just because these good governance principles could be
implemented in pps does not (…) mean that they should be. Indeed, there is an alternative school
of thought, which believes that there needs to be a careful adaptation of public governance
principles to ensure that they are appropriate to the complex and dynamic environments in which
they are to be applied. For example, in some countries (…) more emphasis might be placed on
transparency (…) while in other countries issues of social exclusion might be given major
emphasis‘. Since principles of good governance are no absolute norms, the way in and the extent
to which partnerships give or have to give meaning to these principles, depends from partnership
to partnership and may also vary from country to country, depending on the inter-subjective
understanding on governance principles. It may be acceptable to trade-off a certain degree of

18
accountability against creativity and innovation, which suggests that ‗good governance‘, is a
relative concept. Although the construction and interpretation of principles of good governance
is context dependent, Van Montfort (2004:32-33) demonstrates that there is some form of
agreement on the meaning of principles of good governance within national and international
literature.2 While evaluating or judging the quality of governance within partnership
constructions, Bovaird (2004:212-213) argues that the organizational and institutional context
always needs to be taken into account stating that: ‗(…) ‗good governance‘ is a relative concept,
which therefore cannot be assessed without an understanding of the context in which it is applied
— an understanding which is likely to be most highly developed by stakeholders embedded
within that context, rather than outsiders who might wish to make ‗good governance judgments‘
from afar‘.

3. DISCUSSION
The central question, underlying the normative and institutional reforms as described above
comes down to the following: what normative framework should be taken into account while
delivering public services and goods? Depending on once normative preference, judgements
about the desirability on public-private intermingling will almost by definition differ. Since there
is no universal understanding about what normative framework should underlie public service
delivery (TPA, NPM or PVM), it remains difficult for academics to make judgements about the
desirability of public-private intermingling without first taking a normative stance or following a
normative interpretation. In relation to public-private partnerships, it can be argued that it is even
more difficult to define a normative framework, since this framework is constructed by two
partners that have a different institutional background. If two different understanding about what
is important, what should be valued and what is ethical meet, then who is right and why? Before
answering the question whether partnerships are desirable in terms of public value safeguarding
and integrity, we thus first need to clarify through what normative lens we evaluate them and why
we choose for this perspective.

In this respect, Van Montfort (2004: 60) argues that it remains a difficult task to judge the quality
of governance of new public service delivery structures, such as partnerships, since the eventual
answer to the question whether partnerships are governed good or bad, can only be made by
those creating the standard. This implies that the ‗outsider (the scientist, a consultant) can only
describe the governance game by, describing what happens, how and to what extent partners act

2 For a more detailed discussion on good governance, see Van Montfort 2004 and Van Montfort 2008

19
upon these principles, and by addressing risks and side-effects. Judgments on how bad these risks
or side effects are, can only be made by the players themselves‘ (Van Montfort 2004: 60).
Following this interpretative interpretation, I argue that research on the desirability of public-
private intermingling within pps in terms of public values and integrity should focus on the emic
perspective of the partnership members. Interesting research questions then become 1) to what
extend partners experience value/ethical differences or similarities 2) whether the actual situation
in terms of ethics and public value safeguarding is perceived to be related to the institutional
background of both partners 3) how partners cope with values/ethical differences 4) whether
value/ethical differences are perceived to be problematic or not 5) how partnerships evaluate
their governance quality themselves 6) how meaning is given to values such as accountability and
democracy and ethical behaviour on paper and in practice etc...

Overall, the scarcity of empirical evidence, the contradicting normative and empirical research
findings, and the importance of partnerships as a governance tool in the 21st century call for
important new empirical studies that, before judging whether partnerships are good or bad in
terms of governance problems or prospects, describe how they empirically function. Additional
research that examines the relation between public-private intermingling and the quality of
governance within partnerships should not be limited to conducting a governance evaluation that
only looks at the public interest in terms of traditional public values, but should take the whole of
partnerships into consideration. Really knowing how partners jointly give meaning to ―their‖
values demands further empirical research. An explorative research approach, sensitive to locality
and context, would allow a description of cooperation in practice. It is plausible that public and
private partners use their own language, making it hard to collaborate and causing difficult value
trade-offs not wanted by any party, leading to governance problems. The possibility, however,
that partners reach a valuable compromise or strike a good balance between public and private
values is just as convincing. Contextual factors such as organizational structure, sector, and
partnership duration should be made explicit and taken into account while studying what is
valued, why, what it means for both partners, and how it relates to the governance discussions in
the literature. It is necessary to look at the formal aspects of a partnership (contracts,
agreements), but it is even more important to observe the informal processes in which partners
talk or act during different project phases to identify, describe, and evaluate issues related to value
intermingling and governance. Such research might unlock the ―black box of cooperation‖
(Weihe, 2008: 158).

20
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