Fernandez vs. Maravilla Case No. 2 G.R. No.

L-18799 March 31, 1964

Facts:

Maravilla sought the probate of his late wifeâs will. The siblings sought denial of probate on the ground
that it wasnât signed on each and every page by the decedent. They likewise prayed for the
appointment of their brother as special administrator in lieu of the husband to protect their interest and
also due to failure to file an inventory. The probate of the will in the meantime was denied and to this,
the husband appealed. Consequently, the brother was appointed as administrator. The husband filed a
petition for certiorari and for preliminary injunction, praying therein the annulment of the brother as co-
administrator and the prohibition of the probate court from proceeding in his removal as administrator.
The petitioners moved for the certification of the same to the SC as the amount involved exceeds the
jurisdiction of the CA. Nevertheless, the CA decided in favor of the husband.

Issue: Whether or not the ruling of the CA is correct.

Held:

Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be administered and liquidated in
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse is, not only that part of the conjugal estate
pertaining to the deceased spouse, but the entire conjugal estate. This Court has already held that even
if the deceased had left no debts, upon the dissolution of the marriage by the death of the husband or
wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated in the testate or
intestate proceedings of the deceased. In a number of cases where appeal was taken from an order of a
probate court disallowing a will, this Court, in effect, recognized that the amount or value involved or in
controversy therein is that of the entire estate. Not having appellate jurisdiction over the proceedings in
probate, considering that the amount involved therein is more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals
cannot also have original jurisdiction to grant the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by
respondent in the instant case, which are merely incidental thereto. Note also that the present
proceedings under review were for the annulment of the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-
administrator and to restrain the probate court from removing respondent as special administrator. It is
therefore, a contest for the administration of the estate and, consequently, the amount or value of the
assets of the whole estate is the value in controversy. It appearing that the value of the estate in dispute
is much more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals clearly had no original jurisdiction to issue the
writs in question.
The Incompetent Carmen Caniza v. Court of Appeals, Pedro and Leonora Estrada
G.R. No. 110427; February 24, 1997
Facts:
Carmen Caniza (94), a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the College of Chemistry
and Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was declared incompetent by judgment of the QC RTC
in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. She was so adjudged
because of her advanced age and physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and senile
dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her person and estate.
Cañiza was the owner of a house and lot. Her guardian Amparo commenced a suit to eject the spouses
Estrada from the said premises in the MTC of Quezon City. Complaint pertinently alleged that plaintiff
Cañiza was the absolute owner of the property in question, covered by TCT No. 27147; that out of
kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law to
temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; that Cañiza already had urgent need of the house on account
of her advanced age and failing health, "so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support,
maintenance and medical treatment;" that through her guardian, Cañiza had asked the Estradas verbally
and in writing to vacate the house but they had refused to do so; and that "by the defendants' act of
unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the possession of the house in question, they ** (were) enriching
themselves at the expense of the incompetent, because, while they ** (were) saving money by not
paying any rent for the house, the incompetent ** (was) losing much money as her house could not be
rented by others." Also alleged was that the complaint was "filed within one (1) year from the date of
first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990."
In their Answer, the defendants declared that they had been living in Cañiza's house since the 1960's;
that in consideration of their faithful service they had been considered by Cañiza as her own family, and
the latter had in fact executed a holographic will by which she "bequeathed".
Judgement was rendered by the MetroTC in favor of Cañiza but it was reversed on appeal by the Quezon
City RTC.
Cañiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the decision but failed in that attempt.
It ruled that (a) the proper remedy for Cañiza was indeed an accion publiciana in the RTC, not an accion
interdictal in the MetroTC, since the "defendants have not been in the subject premises as mere tenants
or occupants by tolerance, they have been there as a sort of adopted family of Carmen Cañiza," as
evidenced by what purports to be the holographic will of the plaintiff; and (b) while "said will, unless and
until it has passed probate by the proper court, could not be the basis of defendants' claim to the
property, ** it is indicative of intent and desire on the part of Carmen Cañiza that defendants are to
remain and are to continue in their occupancy and possession, so much so that Cañiza's supervening
incompetency cannot be said to have vested in her guardian the right or authority to drive the
defendants out. They conclude, on those postulates, that it is beyond the power of Cañiza's legal
guardian to oust them from the disputed premises.
Carmen Cañiza died, and her heirs -- the aforementioned guardian, Amparo Evangelista, and Ramon C.
Nevado, her niece and nephew, respectively -- were by this Court's leave, substituted for her.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Evangelista, as Cañiza's legal guardian had authority to bring said action; and
2. Whether or not Evangelista may continue to represent Cañiza after the latter's death.

Ruling:
1. The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Cañiza clearly denotes her intention that
they remain in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo
Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent with the ward's
will.
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or
revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed
thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838,id.).
An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not
inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient.
And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is apparent: she
needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising
from her extreme age.
Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the person and
the estate of her aunt, Carmen Cañiza. Her Letters of Guardianship clearly installed her as the "guardian
over the person and properties of the incompetent CARMEN CANIZA with full authority to take
possession of the property of said incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may be situated
and to perform all other acts necessary for the management of her properties.".
By that appointment, it became Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to her
physical and spiritual needs, to assure her well-being, with right to custody of her person in preference
to relatives and friends. It also became her right and duty to get possession of, and exercise control
over, Cañiza's property, both real and personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has no
right to possession or control of his property during her incompetency. That right to manage the ward's
estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof and recover it from anyone who retains it, and
bring and defend such actions as may be needful for this purpose.

2. As already stated, Carmen Cañiza passed away during the pendency of this appeal. The Estradas
thereupon moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Cañiza's death automatically terminated the
guardianship, Amaparo Evangelista lost all authority as her judicial guardian, and ceased to have
legal personality to represent her in the present appeal. The motion is without merit.
While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily
terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward, the rule affords no advantage to the
Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Cañiza, is one of the latter's only two (2) surviving
heirs, the other being Cañiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by Resolution of this
Court, they were in fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased.
"SEC. 18. Death of a party. — After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court
shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for
the deceased within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal
representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the
representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court
charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
Vancil vs Belmes
G.R. No. 132223, June 19 2001 [Guardianship]

FACTS: The RTC appointed Bonifacia Vancil, an American citizen, as legal and judicial guardian over the
persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent, the children of her deceased son Reeder. Helen Belmes, the
natural mother of the minor children, instituted a motion for removal of Guardianship and Appointment
of Vancil, asserting that she is the natural mother in custody of and exercising parental authority over
the subject minors. Trial court rejected Belmes'petition. The CA reversed the RTC order. Since Valerie
had reached the age of majority at the time the case reached the SC, the Court resolves to determine
who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian.

ISSUE: Whether Helen Belmes is the sole guardian of the minor Vincent.

RULING:
Belmes, being the natural mother of Vincent, has the preferential right to be his guardian. Art. 211 of
the FC states: "The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of
their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a
judicial order to the contrary. xxx."
Vancil, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death,
absence or unsuitability of Belmes. Considering that Belmes is still alive and has exercised continuously
parental authority over Vincent, Vancil has to prove Belmes'unsuitability. Assuming that Belmes is unfit
as a guardian of Vincent, still Vancil cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. She admitted in her petition
that an expatriate like her will find difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian. As the Court held in
Guerrero vs Teran, the courts should not appoint persons as guardians who are not within the
jurisdiction of the courts as they will find it difficult to protect the wards.
Sheker vs Estate of Alice Sheker

Civil Procedure – Certification of Non-Forum Shopping Not Required in a Contingent Money Claim

Alice Sheker died and her estate was left under the administration of Victoria Medina. Alice left a
holographic will which was admitted to probate by the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City. The trial court
issued an order for all creditors to file their claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, Alan
Joseph Sheker filed a contingent money claim in the amount of P206,250.00 representing the amount of
his commission as an agent for selling some properties for Alice; and another P275k as reimbursements
for expenses he incurred.

Medina moved for the dismissal of Alan Sheker’s claim alleging among others that the money claim filed
by Alan Sheker is void because the latter did not attach a certification of non-forum shopping thereto.

ISSUE: Whether or not the money claim filed by Alan Sheker is void.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that the certification of non-forum shopping is required only
for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. In the case at bar, the probate proceeding was initiated
NOT by Alan Sheker’s money claim but rather upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the Alice
Sheker’s will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of
testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated
to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they
would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.

A money claim in a probate proceeding is like a creditor’s motion for claims which is to be recognized
and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. And as a motion,
its office is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter arising in the
progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is
confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to
the main object of the action and is connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy.
Oropesa vs Oropesa GR No 184528 25 April 2012

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Decision rendered by the CA
affirming the Order of the RTC in a Special Proceedings which dismissed Nilo Oropesa’s, peitioner,
petition for guardianship over the properties of his father, respondent, Cirilo Oropesa.

Petitioner filed with the RTC of Parañaque City, a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be
appointed as guardians over the property of his father, respondent, Cirilo Oropesa.

In said petition, petitioner alleged that respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has
been sickly for over 10 years already having suffered a stroke, that his judgment and memory were
impaired and such has been evident after his hospitalization. That due to his age and medical condition,
he cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become easy prey for deceit and
exploitation by people around him, particularly his girlfriend, Ms. Luisa Agamata.

Respondent filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship filed by his (ever caring and loving) son.
During trial, petitioner presented his evidence which consists of his, his sister, and respondent’s former
nurse’s testimony.

After presenting evidence, petitioner rested his case but failed to file his written formal offer of
evidence.

Respondent, thereafter, filed his Omnibus Motion to declare that petitioner has waived the
presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and Evidence since they were not formally offered; To expunge the
documents of the petitioner from records; and to grant leave to the Oppositor to file Demurrer to Evid.
A subsequent Demurrer was filed and was granted.

MR was filed by petitioner and appealed the case to CA; failed, now to the SC.

Issue: Whether respondent is considered incompetent as per the Rules who should be placed under
guardianship?

Decision: No.The only medical document on record is the Report of Neuropsychological Screening. Said
report, was ambivalent at best, although had negative findings regarding memory lapses on the part of
respondent, it also contained finding that supported the view that respondent on the average was
indeed competent.
DINAH B. TONOG v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 122906
February 7, 2002

Facts:
- Dinah gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate child with Edgar V. Daguimol. The two
cohabited for a time and lived with Edgar's parents and sister.
- A year after Dinah left for US where she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care of
her father and grandparents.
- Edgar later filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin and the trial court granted the petition and
appointed Edgar as the legal guardian.
- Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgement and the court set aside the original judgement and
allowed Dinah to file her opposition to Edgar's petition. Edgar filed a motion for reconsideration but it
was denied and the court issued a resolution granting Dinah's motion for custody over Gardin.
- Edgar filed a petition for certiorari before the CA who modified their previous decision and granted
Edgar custody over Gardin.
- Dinah contends that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, as a matter of law. As
the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her as the mother of the
illegitimate minor.

Issue:
Is Dinah entitled to the custody of Gardin?

Ruling:
No. The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her
baby torn away from her. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for “compelling reasons” for the
good of the child.

A mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below seven years of age for “compelling
reasons.” Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable
illness. If older than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not
bound by that choice. The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the child’s preference
should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to the other
parent, or even to a third person.

Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, SC find that the appellate
court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile,
the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment
away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment.

Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly entertained
in the special proceedings before the trial court.
Joycelyn Pablo-Gualberto (petitioner) v. Cristiano Rafaelito Gualberto (respondent); and Cristiano
Rafaelito Gualberto (petitioner) v. Court of Appeal and Joycelyn D. Pablo-Gualberto (respondents)
Court:
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Date:
28 June 2005
CRC Provisions:
Article 3: Best interests of the child
Domestic Provisions:
Article 211 of the Family Code: The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over
their children. In the case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial
order to the contrary. A mother's authority is subordinated to the father's. In all controversies regarding
the custody of minors, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral
welfare of the child, taking into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the
contending parties.
Article 213 of the Family Code: No child under seven years of age shall be separated from his mother
unless the Court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
Case Summary:
Background:
The court consolidated and considered two appeals by former husband and wife Crisanto Rafaelito
Gualberto V and Joycelyn Pablo-Gualberto regarding their divorce and the custody of their child.
Crisanto had filed for divorce and custody of their child - Rafaello. Joycelyn failed to appear at the court
proceedings and the judge awarded custody to Cristiano after having considered evidence that Jocelyn
was having extramarital lesbian relations and that she did not care for and was witnessed slapping her
child. It was further held that her parental authority was subordinated to that of Crisanto under Article
211 of the Family Code. Jocelyn challenged this decision, which was reversed and she was granted
custody on the basis that, according to Article 213 of the Family Code, a minor child shall not be
separated from his mother unless a court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
At the next instance, the Court of Appeal annulled the second court order on procedural grounds and
returned custody to Crisanto until Jocelyn’s motion was decided on again. In the current case, both
parties petitioned the Supreme Court against the Court of Appeal's ruling.
Issue and resolution:
Custody of child after parental separation. Whether the Court of Appeal violated Article 213 of the
Family Code when it awarded custody of the child to Crisanto and was it Article 213 or Article 211 which
applied in this case. The Supreme Court held that in cases concerning minor children below the age of 7,
Article 213 of the Family Code takes priority as it is in the best interests of a young child to be cared for
by his mother unless 'compelling' reasons are presented for a court to order otherwise. As no such
reasons were presented or proved, custody was awarded to the mother.
Court reasoning:
The Supreme Court said that the general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be
separated from their mother finds its reason in the basic need of minor children for their mother’s
loving care and that this rule is recommended in order to avoid a tragedy where a mother has her baby
torn away from her. Any exception to this rule can only be made for ‘compelling reasons’ for the good of
the child, but such cases must indeed be rare.
Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to deprive
Joycelyn of custody. The mother’s immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her
of custody, but sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or
incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband
would render her unfit to have custody of her minor child.
It was held that in order to deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her
moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted her from
exercising proper parental care. It was, therefore, not enough for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn
was a lesbian, but he had to also demonstrate that she had carried on her purported relationship with a
person of the same sex in the presence of their son or under circumstances not conducive to the child’s
proper moral development. However, in the current case, there was no evidence that the son was
exposed to the mother’s alleged sexual proclivities or that his proper moral and psychological
development suffered as a result.
Excerpts citing CRC and other relevant human rights instruments:
The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that “in all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”
The principle of “best interest of the child” pervades Philippine cases involving adoption, guardianship,
support, personal status, minors in conflict with the law, and child custody. In these cases, it has long
been recognized that in choosing the parent to whom custody is given, the welfare of the minors should
always be the paramount consideration. Courts are mandated to take into account all relevant
circumstances that would have a bearing on the children’s well-being and development. Aside from the
material resources and the moral and social situations of each parent, other factors may also be
considered to ascertain which one has the capability to attend to the physical, educational, social and
moral welfare of the children. Among these factors are the previous care and devotion shown by each of
the parents; their religious background, moral uprightness, home environment and time availability; as
well as the children’s emotional and educational needs.
CRIN Comments:
CRIN believes this case in inconsistent with the CRC. Although the Court correctly refers to the best
interests principle, as required by the Convention, they only cite it as the basis for the presumption that
the mother should be awarded custody of a young child, rather than assess which parent’s custody
would best serve the interests of the child.
Citation:
G.R. No. 154994.