CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE FOR THE HUTTON INQUIRY

RECORD OF MEETINGS INVOLVING THE PRIME MINISTER ON

7 AND 8 JULY 2003

The following is a record of a series of running meetings on Monday 7 and

Tuesday 8 July. Most of the meetings were devoted to other subjects but this
note attempts to piece together the parts of the discussion relating to Mr
Gilligan's story and the appearance of an individual who had come forward
and might be his source . This compilation is therefore based on the
recollection of those at these meetings.

Monday, 7 July - 0900-1000

Present for at least part of the meeting: Foreign Secretary, David Omand, Kevin
Tebbit, John Scarlett, David Manning, Nigel Sheinwald, Alastair Campbell, Sally
Morgan, Tom Kelly, Godric Smith and Jonathan Powell .

The main purpose of the meeting was to discuss the Government's reaction to the
FAC report . There followed a brief discussion of whether the individual, Dr Kelly,
who had come forward was indeed Mr Gilligan's source. Kevin Tebbit said the
individual was an expert but not in the intelligence community and was not
centrally involved in the preparation of the dossier. Dr Kelly had denied that he
had mentioned Alastair Campbell to Mr Gilligan . Jack Straw remembered him
sitting next to him at an earlier FAC hearing . There was some questioning of
" whether we should already have given his name to the Chairman of the FAC.
Were we withholding information? But it was agreed that we needed to know
more before deciding what we should do next.

The Prime Minister asked what we knew of Dr Kelly's views on weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq. What would he say if he appeared before the ISC or the FAC?
Kevin Tebbit said that, while he supported the war and was certain that Saddam
Hussein had weapons ofmass destruction and that they had been concealed from
the inspectors, he might say some uncomfortable things about specific items on
which he had views. He undertook to find out more about his publicly expressed
views . He said we would have to face up to the fact that his identity was likely to
become public at some point soon, given the number of people he had talked to .
MOD was preparing contingency press lines just in case.

Kevin Tebbit reported that Dr Kelly had come forward of his own volition and as
far as MOD was concerned there was no question of any offence having been
committed under the OSA. The Foreign Secretary reminded the meeting of the

og e)lq locC~
 CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

employment rights Dr Kelly had. The Prime Minister made it clear, as he had over
the weekend, that the MOD should continue to handle the case following whatever
internal processes were normal . Kevin Tebbit and David Omand should be in the
lead at all times and nothing should be done with which they were not absolutely
content .

There was agreement that Dr Kelly's account needed to be subject to more forensic
examination and that the MOD should re-interview him. The meeting concluded
with Kevin Tebbit agreeing to call Dr Kelly back from a co):fcrence in
Lincolnshire to allow him to be re-interviewed .

Tuesday 8 July 0815- 0845

As part of the meeting to prepare for the PM's appearance before the Liaison
Committee involving Alastair Campbell, Clare Sumner, John Scarlett, David
Manning, Tom Kelly, Godric Smith, Sally Morgan, Catherine Rimmer and
Matthew Rycroft, there was discussion of what the PM should say if asked directly
whether a source had come forward. The PM was anxious not to be misleading, if a
statement was to be issued later in the day but he did not think it would be
appropriate to reveal that an individual had come forward at that stage. Godric
Smith checked with Kevin Tebbit's office what they thought the PM should say
and it was agreed that the PM should say, if asked, that we were taking the issue
seriously and looking at it in the normal way. (In the end the question was not put
to the PM at the Liaison Committee) .

Tuesdav 8 _July -1130-1200

Present: David Omand, David Manning, John Scarlett, Alastair Campbell, Tom
Kelly, Jonathan Powell (Kevin Tebbit in Portsmouth) .

David Omand reported back that he had heard from MOD that Dr Kelly's re-
interview had confirmed the earlier story from his first interview . There were
inconsistencies remaining, but it looked as if Dr Kelly was the main explanation
for Mr Gilligan's story, and that Mr Gilligan appeared to have heavily embellished
the conversation for the controversial parts of his story.

In discussion of what should be done with this information the following points
were made :

a. Government witnesses before the ISC would be in difficulty if, as was very
likely, they were asked whether they knew the identity of the source. David
Omand said he felt he would have to reply, if asked, that we did have someone
 CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

who had come forward. We could not attempt to cover up the fact . And he was
anxious that we could be accused of a cover-up if the FAC learned much later that
we had had this information now given that they had only just published a report
covering this very subject. We would be open to criticism for not revealing the
existence of a possible explanation for how the Gilligan story had been sourced.

b . it was relevant that the individual had come forward voluntarily and that there
was no expectation on his part of continued anonymity . That had been discussed
by MOD with him. He knew he might have to give evidence .

c. Dr Kelly's case was being handled by MOD according to their personnel

procedures . Whatever was decided would be put by MOD to Dr Kelly for his
agreement .

d. The field of WMD experts was a small one and Dr Kelly had indeed been asked
by one of his associates in RUSI whether he was the source, which had prompted
him to come forward. So we must assume that the media would soon speculate .
MOD had prepared draft press notices against the likelihood that Dr Kelly's name
might surface which had been received the previous night (and on which Godric,
Alastair and Jonathan had proposed amendments).

The meeting concluded that it was now firmly enough established that an
individual had come forward to admit to meeting Mr Gilligan, in circumstances
matching much ofwhat had been said, but with a materially different account of
what had been said to the journalist . That was highly relevant to the evidence now
being taken by the ISC on the dossier, as well as to the public debate following
publication of the FAC report . It was difficult to see how that fact could not be
communicated given its manifest relevance to the proceedings. The PM stressed
once again that the next steps should be decided by the MoD.

David Omand suggested that instead ofa press release, he write to the Chair of the
ISC to tell her that a MOD official had come forward and that we were prepared to
allow them to interview the individual if they thought fit. We could provide the
actual name of the possible source in confidence . The ISC took evidence in
private, so confidentiality could be maintained whilst the committee examined the
case. That would be the best way for Dr Kelly to put the record straight, initially
with the ISC and in due course with the public, whilst avoiding misleading the
public now should the BBC respond with information that made clear that it had
been another source on whom Mr Gilligan was relying, although his name was
bound to surface eventually . If we wrote to the FAC, instead of the ISC, that could
be taken as an invitation for them to summon Dr Kelly as they had done Mr
Gilligan . We could copy the letter to the FAC chairman and at the same time make
 CONFIDENTIAL

-4-

the letter to the ISC public, but not Dr Kelly's name, recognising that once the
FAC was made aware then the fact of there being a suspected source would
inevitably become known.

The meeting agreed that the ISC was the proper forum for further scrutiny of the
relevance of Dr Kelly's admission . The Prime Minister said that if, as he
suspected, the FAC insisted on knowing who the individual was and calling
Dr Kelly to give evidence, then we could not in conscience order him not to
appear, given the relevance of the information he had given us to the FAC's own
inquiry .

David Omand agreed to draft the letter as Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator .
He would make the ISC aware of the name of the source separately and in
confidence.

There was also a brief discussion of how we should make the name available to the
BBC and whether they should be informed in advance of the release of the letter to
the ISC . The idea was discussed of Mr Hoon writing to the Director General or the
Chairman of the Governors . After some discussion it was felt more appropriate to
write to the Chairman . It would be fair to Dr Kelly to give the BBC a chance to
clear his name but it would be unreasonable to expect the BBC to go further and
reveal the name of their source if it was not Dr Kelly .

The meeting ended with a commission to John Scarlett to draft a letter to the ISC
for David Omand, who was about to depart for Canada.

Tuesday 8 Julv -1330-1430

Present : John Scarlett, Alastair Campbell, Godric Smith, Tom Kelly, Jonathan
Powell . (Kevin Tebbit arrived from Portsmouth at the close of the meeting and
was briefed on the outcome) .

The meeting was convened to discuss the draft letter to the ISC. Word then
reached the meeting that the Clerk to the ISC had just told David Omand that the
chairman did not want to receive a letter if it was going to be made public, even if
the name were to remain known only to Government and the ISC . The ISC did not
want to be placed in the position of having a running commentary made on the
progress of their inquiry and it was up to the Committee to decide from whom they
wished to take evidence . The Chairman was however prepared to see a reference
to the ISC and that they might want to interview the individual at the end of a press
statement by the Government if the government chose to issue one . It was
therefore agreed to fall back on a press statement with a separate private letter from
 CONFIDENTIAL

-5-

David Omand to the Chair of the ISC, giving the name in confidence. It was also
confirmed that Geoff Hoon should write to the Chairman of the BBC Governors
offering to give them the name. There was some discussion about how the BBC
would react. The Prime Minister repeated that the MOD should remain in charge
and follow their normal procedures .

Kevin Tebbit returned from Portsmouth towards the end of the meeting. He and
the other officials withdrew to draft a suitable press release based on the MOD's
longer draft ofthe previous evening and the draft letter to the ISC. They produced
a draft statement which Kevin Tebbit took back to the MOD . Jonathan Powell
made it clear that the draft was only a proposal. The MOD was free to amend it in
any way they wanted and should only issue it if they were completely content.
Kevin Tebbit said he would discuss the draft with Ministers and check it with
Dr Kelly himself to ensure that he was content .