11/7/2017

11/7/2017
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Writing a project is one of the most significant academic challenges I have ever faced.
Though this project has been presented by me but there are many people who remained in
veil, who gave their all support and helped me to complete this project.

First of all I am very grateful to my Subject Teacher Ms. Sital without the kind support of
whom and help the completion of project was a herculean task for me.

I am very thankful to the Librarian who provided me several books on this topic. I
acknowledge my friends who gave their valuable and meticulous advice which was very
useful and could not be ignored in writing the project. I also owe special thanks to my parents
for their selfless help which was very useful in preparing the project.
 TABLE OF CONTENT

A. Literal Rule of Interpretation………………………………………….5

B. Retrospective and Prospective operation of statute

OBJECTIVES ...............................................................................................................................9

CONCEPT OF RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION OF STATUTES…………………………………10

TEST FOR DETERMINING ‘RETROSPECTIVITY’………………………………………………………………………..10

EXISTING RIGHTS USUALLY NOT AFFECTED…………………………………………………………………………12

APPLICABILITY OF THE RULE TO SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS…………………………………………………………12

PRESUMPTION AGAINST RETROSPECTIVITY ..........................................................................13

EXCEPTION .......................................................................................................................... 14

WHERE TWO INTERPRETATIONS ARE POSSIBLE .....................................................................15

EFFECT MUST BE GIVEN TO LANGUAGE IRRESPECTIVE OF CONSEQUENCES ....................15

HOW FAR PRIOR STATE OF LAW RELEVANT ........................................................................13

CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................................16

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................19
 Table of Cases
Cases

A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak AIR 1984 SC 718. .....................................................................7

D Kalia Murthy v. Five qori thaikkal Wakf AIR 2007 SC 365. ........................................19
Jay Mahakali Rolly Mills v. Union of India AIR 2007 SC 425 ..........................................19
Khubi Singh Yadava v Dist Judge, Allahabad 1980 (ALL) lj 233. .......................................13
Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay AIR 1953 SC 325. .....................................................6
Nemi Chand vs. State of Rajasthan (1977) Raj LW 430. ...................................................11
Rajagopalachari v. State of Madras AIR 1964 SC 1172 ......................................................6
Ramavatar v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer AIR 1961 SC 1325. ............................................6
Sangam Spinners v. Regional Prov. Fund Commission AIR 2008 SC 365. ......................18
Shah Bhojraj Mills v Subhas Chandra AIR 1961 SC 1596................................................11
State of Bombay v Vishnu Ram Chandra AIR 1961 SC 307 .............................................12
State of Maharashtra V. Shyam K. Patel AIR 2007 SC 425. .............................................17
Suresh Nanda v. Central Bureau of Investigation AIR 2008 SC 2088. ...............................7
Union of India v. Braj Nandan Singh AIR 2005 SC 4403 ....................................................7
 Literal or Grammatical Interpretation
Introduction

There are certain general principles of interpretation which have been applied by the Courts
from time to time. The first principle of interpretation is the literal or grammatical
interpretation which means that the words of an enactment are to be given their ordinary
meaning, and if such meaning is clear and unambiguous, effect should be given to a provision
of a statute whatever may be the consequences. The basis of the principle is that the object of
all interpretations being to know what the legislature intended, whatever was the intention of
the legislature has been expressed by it through words which are to be interpreted according
to the rules of the grammar. This has been called the safest rule because the legislature’s
intention can be deduced only from the language through which it has expressed itself. If the
language of the statute is plain, the only duty of the court is to give effect to it and the court
has no business to look into the consequences of such interpretation.

The court is under an obligation to expound the law as it exists and leave the
remedy to the legislature if harsh conclusions result from such expositions. Similarly, the
court should give technical meaning to a technical word. The word of a statute are first
understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are
construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to absurdity or unless
there is something in the context or in the object of a statute to suggest the contrary. The
epithets ‘natural’, ‘ordinary’, ‘literal’, ‘grammatical’, and ‘popular’ are employed most
interchangeably, but their indiscriminate use leads to some confusion, and probably, the term
‘primary’ is preferable to any of them, if it be remembered that the primary meaning of a
word varies with its setting or context and with the subject- matter to which it is applied; for
reference to the abstract meaning of words, if there be any such thing, is of little value in
interpreting statutes. The cardinal rule for the construction of Act of Parliament is that they
should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Act themselves.

Cases

In Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay1, the appellant, a citizen of India, on arrival at an

airport did not declare that he had brought gold with him. Gold, found in his possession
during search in violation of government notification, was confiscated under Section 167 (8),
Sea Custom Act, 1878. He was charged under Section 8, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act,
1947 also. The appellant pleaded that his trial under the Act of 1947 was violative of Article
20 (2) of the Constitution relating to the double jeopardy as he was already punished for his
act by way of confiscation of his gold. It was held by the Supreme court that the Sea Custom
Authority is not a court or judicial tribunal and the adjudging of confiscation or the
increased rate of duty of penalty under the Sea Customs Act was not a prosecution.
Consequently, his trial under the Act of 1947 was valid.

1
AIR 1953 SC 325.
In Ramavatar v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer2, the question before the court was whether
sale of betel leaves was subject to sales tax. The appellant contended that no such tax could
be levied as betel leaves were vegetables on the sale of which no tax could be imposed.
Under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 as amended by Act 16 of 1948.
For this, the appellant relied on the dictionary meaning of vegetable which says that a
vegetable is that which is pertaining to comprised or consisting of, or derived, or obtained
from plants or their parts. The Supreme court, while rejecting the contention, held that the
betel leaves could not be given the dictionary, technical or botanical meaning when the
ordinary and the natural meaning is clear and unambiguous. Being a word of everyday use it
must be understood in its popular sense by which the people are conversant with it as also the
meaning which the statute dealing would attribute to it. Its sale is therefore liable to sales tax.

In Rajagopalachari v. State of Madras3, the Supreme Court held that a tax on receipt of
pension is not a tax on employment under Entry of List II in the Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution and hence, it is not within the legislative competence of the State but is within
the legislative competence of the Union under the head tax on income in Entry of List I.

Given by Salmond

Interpretation

Grammatical Logical
Interpration Interpretation

Rules that were given in the theory were-

a) Statutes are to be construed in consonance of object of the legislation.

b) It should be construed in a manner to carry out the legislative intention.
c) Court cannot add/ delete/ substitute words or supply to deficiencies of the statute.
d) No provision to be interpreted in isolation
e) Interpretation by which a statute is turned by nullity should be discarded.
f) Statute cannot be given retrospective effect unless provided.

It is held by majority of the bench of the Supreme court in Additional Commissioner of Sales
Tax v. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association, that if the language if a statutory
provisio is ambigious and capable of two constructions, that construction must be adopted

2
AIR 1961 SC 1325.
3
AIR 1964 SC 1172.
which will give meaning and effect to the other provisons of the enactment rather than which
will give one.

In A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak4, the Supreme Court held that the Court should read a
provision as it is and cannot rewrite it to suit its convenience, nor does any cannon of
construction permit the court to read the section in such a manner as to render it to some
extent otiose. Section 8 (1) of the Criminal law Amendment Act (46 of 1952) says that the
special judge shall take cognizance of an offence and shall not take it on commitment of the
accused. The legislature provided for both the positive and the negative. It positively
conferred power on special judge to take cognizance and it negatively removed any concept
of commitment. It is not possible, therefore, to read Section (1) as canvasses on behalf of the
appellant, that cognizance can only be taken upon a police report.

In Union of India v. Braj Nandan Singh5, the Supreme Court observed that the object of
interpretation of statutes is to ascertain the intention of the legislature enacting it. Court
cannot read anything into statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous.

In Suresh Nanda v. Central Bureau of Investigation6, the Supreme Court ruled that while
the police may have the powers to seize the passport under Section 102 (1) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, it does not have the power to impound the same. Impounding of a
passport can only be done by the passport authority under Section 10 (3) of the Passport Act,
1967. Even the Court cannot impound a passport. Though Section 104, Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 states that the Court may, if it thinks fit, impound any document or thing
produced before it, this provision will only enable the court o impound any document or
thing other than a passport. This is because impounding a passport is provided for in Section
10 (3) of the Passport Act, 1967 which is a special law while the Code of Criminal Procedure.
1973 is a general law. It is well established that the special law prevails over the general law.

There is a difference between seizing and impounding a document. A seizure is made at a

particular moment when a person or a authority takes into his possession some property
which was earlier not in his possession. Thus, seizure is done at a particular moment of time.
However, if after seizing of a property or document

Moreover it was held that Technical words re to be understood in technical sense only. ( ex-
award, complaint).

Abandonment of the Rule of Literal interpretation

a) Where the words are of doubtful meaning and do not convey what was intended by
the legislator.
b) When the language suffers from ambiguity and alternative construction are possible
then interpretation which is in tune with the intention of legislative will be followed.
c) When the results derived from literal interpretation are unjust/ unreasonable /
uncertain.
d) If the law is turned to nullity or futility when literally construed.

4
AIR 1984 SC 718.
5
AIR 2005 SC 4403.
6
AIR 2008 SC 2088.
e) But if the language is clear, certain then abandonment of literal construction is not
permissible on the ground of hardship or inconvenience.

In Navjot Singh Sidhu v. State of Punjub, the Court observed that the court has to
interpret a statute as it stands and not on the considerations which may be perceived to be
morally more correct and ethical.
 Retrospective and Prospective Operation of Statutes
OBJECTIVE
The objective of this project is to analyze the retrospective operation of statutes through
various case laws and to understand the current position of laws with respect the same.

INTRODUCTION
Any kind of statute operates in two ways, i.e., a prospective operations where a statute seeks
to govern current activities and a retrospective operation where a statute seeks to operate on
past events and activities. Though retrospective operation is not favoured in law rather there
is a presumption against retrospective operation of statutes. Acts, enactments and
administrative rules will not be construed to have retrospective effect unless their language
requires this result7.

The use of the term ‘retrospective operation’ of statutes is at times bleary & obscure. In a
wider sense it would be right enough to say that statute has retrospective operation when it
purports to operate over those facts or events which took place before the provision come in
to force. It is sometimes used in a divergent sense when vested rights are sought to be
affected. Also, it is at times loosely used in context of certain functions of law which the law
maker deems it necessary to introduce in existing laws for the purpose of setting certain
matters rightly or avoiding certain mischief which might be possible for change in law; and
this is done by penning down that certain facts or things which did not exist.2 In this project
we have discussed concept of retrospective operation of statutes, general principles relating to
retrospective operation of statutes and retrospectively of other statutes with special reference
to various statutes with the help of recent case laws and with reference to some basic rules
enunciated by prominent authors on the construction of statutes.

7
A.B.Kafaltiya, Interpretation of Statutes (Universal Law Publishing, 2008), pp.216
 CONCEPT OF RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION OF STATUTES
Retrospective operation is an inaccurate term and somewhat ambiguous. Since it is very
cloudy it is open to interpretations. Literal meaning of the word ‘retrospective’ is to ‘look
backward’; contemplating what is past; having reference to a state of things existing before
the Act in question. Thus a ‘retrospective law’ would be a law which goes back into the past,
contemplates over it, affects acts or facts occurring, or right occurring before it came into
force. The best instances of retrospective laws are those, in which the date of commencement
is earlier than enactment, or which validates some invalid law; otherwise, every statute
affects rights which would have been in existence but for the statute.

In the case of Nemi Chand vs. State of Rajasthan8, the court said that a statute does not
become a retrospective one because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time
antecedent to its passing. All what it means is that save in cases where the law creates a new
offence or increases a penalty, a legislature is not prevented from enacting an ex post facto
law but if any such law takes away or impairs any vested right acquired under an existing
law, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to
transactions on considerations already past, it must so provide in express terms or such
should be a necessary implication from the language ‘employed’.

TEST FOR DETERMINING ‘RETROSPECTIVITY’

The question whether a statute operates retrospectively or not is one of legislative intent.
Unless it is provided in the statute expressly or impliedly, retrospective operation is generally
presumed to be unjust and oppressive. If however, the terms of statute do not of themselves
make the intention of legislature certain or clear, the statute will be presumed to operate
prospectively7. There are occasions when a law may be held to be retrospective; however,
retrospection of the statute is not to be presumed, for the presumption is in favour of the
prospective operation of law. Conclusively, court will consider following factor if the
retrospective operation is not expressly given in the statute:

They will look into the general scope and purview of the statute. The remedy sought to be
applied. The former state of law. What, it was that the legislature contemplated. The courts
also, while considering the question of the retrospective operation of statute, considers the
nature of the right affected. Where there is no vested right, an amendment will be considered
8
Nemi Chand v State of Rajasthan, (1977) Raj LW 430.
as prospective so as not to affect the vested right. If the right is merely procedural then
normally there is no vested right. In case of Shah Bhojraj Mills v Subhas Chandra9, it was
also ruled by the Supreme Court that the statute may be prospective in some parts and
retrospective in other parts.

Generally remedial or curative statutes are always regarded as prospective, but declaratory
statutes are considered as retrospective. Those statutes that only relates to matters of
procedure or of evidence, are prima facie prospective and retrospective operation not to be
given to them unless, by express words or necessary implications it appears that this was the
intention of the legislature.

In State of Bombay v Vishnu Ram Chandra10, dealing with the question as to how an
enactment may be construed as retrospective, the Supreme Court states that the question has
to be decided in accordance with the following principles:

 Penal Statutes are always prospective, but can also interpreted retrospectively; of
there is a clear intendment that they are to be applied to past events.
 Statutes, which create new punishments, but authorize some actions based on past
conducts, if expressed in language showing retrospective operation, would be
applied retrospectively.
 Acts designed to protect the public against acts of harmful character may be
construed retrospectively if the language admits such an interpretation, even though it
may equally have prospective meaning.
 Statute which takes away or impairs vested rights under existing laws is presumed not
to have retrospective operation.

Thus, the principles that have to be applied for interpretation of statutory provisions are well
settled.

 The first of these is that statutory provisions creating substantive rights or taking away
substantive rights are ordinarily perspectives, they are retrospective only if by express
words or by necessary implication, the legislatures has made them retrospective13;
and the retrospective operation will be limited only to the extent to which it has been
so made by express words, or necessary implications

9
Shah Bhojraj Mills v Subhas Chandra, AIR 1961 (SC) 1596.
10
State of Bombay v Vishnu Ram Chandra, AIR 1961 (SC) 307.
  The second rule is that the intention of the legislature has always to be gathered from
the words used by it, giving to the words their plain, normal and grammatical
meaning.

 The third rule is that if any legislation, the general object of which is to benefit a
particular class of persons, any provision is ambiguous so that it is capable of two
meaning, one which would preserve the benefit and another, which would take it
away, the meaning which preserves the benefit should be adopted.

 The fourth rule is that if strict grammatical interpretation gives rise to an absurdity or
inconsistency, such interpretation should be discarded and an interpretation which
gives effect to the purpose of legislature may reasonably be considered to have had,
will be put on the words, if necessary, and even by modification of the language used.
 The fifth rule is that where a statute is not clear as to whether it has retrospective
effect and can be interpreted either way on this point, the court should not give it
retrospective effect. Except where necessary, a statute should not be read
retrospectively. Pending actions are not affected by new statute, unless the latter are
expressly made applicable to the former.

EXISTING RIGHTS USUALLY NOT AFFECTED

A retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or

obligation otherwise than as regards matter of procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided

without doing violence to the language of the enactment. A statute which impairs vested

rights or the legality of past transactions or the obligations of contract should not prima facie

be held to be retrospective. Every statute which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired

under existing laws, creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, attaches a new disability

in respect of transactions already past, must be presumed to be intended not to have

retrospective effect. It is well settled that a statute is not to be construed to operate

retrospectively so as to take away a vested right, unless that intention is made manifest by

language so plain and unmistakable that there is no possibility of any choice of meaning.

APPLICABILITY OF THE RULE TO SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS

When the law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights if the parties are decided
according to law, as it existed when the action was begun, unless the new statute shows a
clear intention to vary such rights. In the case of Khubi Singh Yadava v Dist Judge,
Allahabad11, no vacancy in the accommodation was created on account of transfer of the
tenant, according to the law in force prior to the commencement of the amending act of 1976.
The amending act did not indicate that any retrospective operation was to be given to sub-s
(3A) of S-12 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)
Act 1972, therefore, it was held that no vacancy was created by the transfer which took place
before the amending Act came into force. The question of prospectivity and retrospectivity
might arise in pending suits, suits which were pending on the date when the amendment Act
came into force, to contend that the amending provision would never be applicable even in
future to a sitting tenant would not be a tenable contention.

Whether a person has a right to recover property is a question of substantive law.

An enactment conferring substantive rights cannot be given a retrospective unless the

legislature has made an explicit and express provision to that effect therein or such a
consequence inevitably follows by necessary intendment.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST RETROSPECTIVITY

As a general rule, every statute is deemed to be prospective, unless by express provision or
necessary implication is to have a prospective effect. Whether a statute is to have
retrospective effect depends upon its interpretation having regard to well-settled rules of
construction. A statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation and no further
retrospective effect should be given to the provisions of a statute then is expressly provided
therein. Retrospection is not to be presumed; but many statutes have been regarded as
retrospective without declaring so. The statute would operate retrospectively when the intent
that it should so operate clearly appears from a consideration of the Act as a whole, or from
the terms thereof, which unqualifiedly gave the statute a retrospective operation or
imperatively require such a consideration, or negate the idea that is to apply only to future
cases. Retrtospectivity is liable to be determined on few grounds;

The words used must expressly provide, or clearly imply retrospective operation. The
retrospectivity must be reasonable and not excessive or harsh otherwise it runs the risk of
being struck down as unconstitutional. Where the legislation is introduced to overcome a
judicial decision, the power cannot be used to subvert the decision without removing the
statutory basis of the decision.

11
Khubi Singh v Dist Judge Allahabad, 1980 (All) LJ 233.
 EXCEPTION
Sometimes a statute, although not intended to be retrospective, will, as a matter of fact, have
a retrospective operation. For instance, if two persons enter into a contract, and afterwards a
statute is passed, engrafts an enactment upon an existing contract, and thus operates so as to
produce a result which something quite different from the original intention of the contracting
parties, such a statute has, as a matter of fact, a retrospective operation. It is a familiar rule
that no statute is construed to be of retrospective operation unless the terms of the statute
expressly state that it is retrospective or such a construction arises by necessary implication.
The rule is based on the presumption that the legislature does not intend what is unjust or that
transactions which have already vested title to property should be reopened or thrown into
doubt.

It is well recognised that the canon against retrospective interpretation does not apply to a
statute dealing with an adjective law, i.e., procedure, and we think that a statute abolishing
old legal fictions is so nearly akin to a procedural statute that the canon can have little if any,
application.

WHERE TWO INTERPRETATIONS ARE POSSIBLE

If an enactment is expressed in language, which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it
ought to be construed as prospective only. Even in construing a section which is to a certain
extent retrospective the maxim must be borne in mind as applicable whenever the line is
reached at which words of the section cease to be plain. The question as to whether a statute
should have a prospective and retrospective as well can only arise only when the words of the
statute are capable of giving the enactment both prospective and retrospective effect. The
question can never arise if the words of the statute make it clear that it should have
prospective effect only. Even admittedly retrospective legislation is limited by the clearness
of its retrospectivity; and, also, rights that have passed from

the original contractual or relational character into rights measured by judicial determination
are prima facie, outside retrospection, which usually applies to rights not yet so determined.
EFFECT MUST BE GIVEN TO LANGUAGE IRRESPECTIVE CONSEQUENCES

If the meaning of words used indicates an intention that the Act is to have retrospective

operation, then, no matter, what the consequences this operation must be given to the

provisions. No doubt whenever the intention is clear that the Act shall have retrospective

operation, it must unquestionably be so construed even if the consequences may appear

unjust and hard. If there are words in the enactment which either expressly or by necessary

intendment (eg from the object of the statute) imply that the statute is to be given

retrospective operation even in respect of substantive rights or pending actions, the courts

have no other alternative than to give such operation to the statutes even though the

consequence may appear to be unjust or hard. In determining whether any provisions of an

Act was intended to be retrospective or not, the consequences of holding that it is not

retrospective must be looked at.

HOW FAR PRIOR STATE OF LAW RELEVANT

When the question for consideration is whether a statute is retrospective so as to affect
existing rights, it is impossible to determine the question without considering the prior state
of the law. The courts have sometimes taken into consideration the state of law which was
there at the time when the Amendment act was passed. In fact, we must look at the general
scope and purview of the statute, and at the remedy sought to be applied, and consider what
the former state of law was and also what was that the legislature contemplated. But laws
made justly and for the benefit of individuals and the community as a whole, as in this case,
may relate to a time antecedent to their commencement.
 CONCLUSION
Every other statutes leaving those which are merely declaratory or which relate only to
procedural laws or in which evidence are prima facie prospective and retrospective operation
should not be given to a statute so as to affect, alter or destroy an existing right or create a
new liability or obligation unless the effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the
language of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable
of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only. Where the language of
statutes is susceptible of both interpretation then prospective interpretation must be preferred
which provide for moderate & harmonious position.

Commencement of Statute (When does statute commence)

Prospective statutes

They have only Future effect. They don’t effect past transactions

Retrospective statutes

Will have effect on past cases also.

Fiscal Statutes

They are presumed to be prospective in nature.

Penal Statutes

They are presumed to be prospective in nature. In case, punishment increases- newer law. But
in case punishment decreases then it will be older law.

Remedial Statutes

Statutes providing new remedies for enforcement of existing rights will be retrospective in
nature.

If the date of commencement is provided in the bill then it will commence on that particular
date only. But if not, it will operate from the date on which it takes assent of the President.

Statute dealing with substantive rights

They are presumed to be prospective in nature.

Case- State of Maharashtra V. Shyam K. Patel12

Statute dealing with procedure-

12
AIR 2007 SC 425.
It will have retrospective effect. It will not be prejudicially to any party. So, it will affect the
pending cases.

Case- Sukhdev v. State of Haryana13

Apex court held that retrospective effect to procedural in criminal statutes is only to be given
if after strict construction, the legislature intent to give it a retrospective effect is beyond any
kind of ambiguity.

Statute dealing Succession

They are presumed to be prospective in nature.

Statute regulating Transfer and Contracts

They are presumed to be prospective unless otherwise provided.

Statutes prescribing Limitation –

Prospective but there are certain provisions in limitation act which creates rights-
Prescription, adverse possession. Rules of equity/ easement so let it be undisturbed. This is
also known as balance of convenience.

New law will lessen the period- in period who possesses the property and not person having
adverse possession. Thus it will be prospective. (Substantive right of recovering)

Limitation law- Procedural

If limitation period provided by earlier law is reduced by a later act, matter will be governed
by earlier law only i.e. it will be presumed to have prospective operation.

And if right to sue subsists under previous law, but stands extinguished as per the later act
matter will be governed by earlier act i.e. retrospective operation.

Generally it has retrospective operation.

Case- Sangam Spinners v. Regional Prov. Fund Commission14

Court observed that it is a ordinal principle of construction that every statute is prime facie
prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective
operation.

Absence of saving clause in a new enactment preserving rights and liabilities under repealed
law is neither deceptive nor material to the question that a statute will have prospective
operation.

13
AIR 2013 SC 258.
14
AIR 2008 SC 365.
In terms of Sec 6 © of General clauses Act, 1897 unless a different intention appears, lenpee
shall not affect any right, liability, privilege incurred under the statute which has been
repealed.

Case- Jay Mahakali Rolly Mills v. Union of India15

Court described what is meant by incourt retrospective. Court observed that retrospective
means living backward contemplatey what is past having reference to a statute or existing
before that statute in question.

It means a statute which creates new obligation or consideration or destroys vested rights

Case- D Kalia Murthy v. Five qori thaikkal Wakf16

Court observed that no statute should be construed to be retrospective unless, the language
requires to. Exception to this rule is procedural enactment, whenever there is an exception to
an exception (Limitation). Where right of suit is already barred under relevant limitation law
and a vested right has accrued to another before the coming into operation of the new law,
new provision cannot revive the right or take away vested rights.

15
AIR 2007 SC 425.
16
AIR 2007 SC 365.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS
 T.Bhattacharyya, The Interpretation of Statutes, (Allahabad Law Agency
Publication, 4th edn, 2001).

 Rao and Dhanda, N S Bindra’s Interpretation of Statutes (Lexis Nexis Publication,

10th edn, 2012).

 D.N. Mathur, Introduction to Interpretation of Statutes, (Wadhwa publication, 2nd

edn, 2005).

WEBSITES
 http://corporatelawsupdates.blogspot.in/2010/08/retrospective-operation-of statutes.html
 http://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/article/prospective-vs-retrospective-517-1.html
 http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/19039/Principles+of+Retrospective+Operation+of+Law
+and+Ultra+Vires
 http://www.taxindiaonline.com/RC2/inside2.php3?filename=bnews_detail.php3&newsid
=981
 http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/ubclr29&div=9&collection=
journals&set_as_cursor=3&men_tab=srchresults&terms=retros
pective%7Claw&type=matchall