1) LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK vs. ASSO.
OF LDB EMPLOYEES and GARCIA (B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or
FACTS: From a submission agreement of the LDB and the Association of Luzon Development
Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue:
Whether or not the company has violated the CBA provision and the MOA on promotion.
At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers.
Atty. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE’s Position Paper ; LDB,
on the other hand, failed to submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary
Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995 no Position Paper had been filed by
LDB. Without LDB’s Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision disposing
as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to the CBA provision nor
the MOA on promotion.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same.
ISSUE: WON a voluntary arbiter’s decision is appealable to the CA and not the SC
HELD: the Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals.
YES. The jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators
is quite limited compared to the original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the appellate
jurisdiction of the NLRC for that matter. The “(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor
Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission …” Hence, while there is
an express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is silent
with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator.
Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is, more often than
not, elevated to the SC itself on a petition for certiorari, in effect equating the voluntary
arbitrator with the NLRC or the CA. In the view of the Court, this is illogical and imposes an
unnecessary burden upon it.
In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 8 on the settled premise that the judgments
of courts and awards of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite time, this
Court ruled that the awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of parties; hence,
their decisions have the same legal effect as judgments of a court. In Oceanic Bic Division
(FFW), et al. v. Romero, et al., this Court ruled that “a voluntary arbitrator by the nature of
her functions acts in a quasi-judicial capacity.” Under these rulings, it follows that the
voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-
judicial agency but independent of, and apart from, the NLRC since his decisions are not
appealable to the latter.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that the Court of
Appeals shall exercise:
awards of RTC s and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions,
including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees Compensation
Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the
Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel of voluntary arbitrators may
not strictly be considered as a quasi-judicial agency, board or commission, still both he and
the panel are comprehended within the concept of a “quasi-judicial instrumentality.”
An “instrumentality” is anything used as a means or agency. Thus, the terms governmental
“agency” or “instrumentality” are synonymous in the sense that either of them is a means
by which a government acts, or by which a certain government act or function is performed.
The word “instrumentality,” with respect to a state, contemplates an authority to which the
state delegates governmental power for the performance of a state function. An individual
person, like an administrator or executor, is a judicial instrumentality in the settling of an
estate, in the same manner that a sub-agent appointed by a bankruptcy court is an
instrumentality of the court, and a trustee in bankruptcy of a defunct corporation is an
instrumentality of the state.
The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power
delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore,
within the contemplation of the term “instrumentality” in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129.
The fact that his functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him
within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as
contemplated therein.
It will be noted that, although the Employees Compensation Commission is also provided for
in the Labor Code, Circular No. 1-91, which is the forerunner of the present Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95, laid down the procedure for the appealability of its
decisions to the CA under the foregoing rationalization, and this was later adopted by
Republic Act No. 7902 in amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. A fortiori, the decision or award of the
voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the CA, in line
with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the
quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein.
In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 876, also
known as the Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special proceeding of which the court
specified in the contract or submission, or if none be specified, the RTC for the province or
city in which one of the parties resides or is doing business, or in which the arbitration is held,
shall have jurisdiction.
In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that of the RTC.
Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that award or decision, the CA must be deemed
to have concurrent jurisdiction with the SC. As a matter of policy, this Court shall henceforth
remand to the Court of Appeals petitions of this nature for proper disposition.
 NOTES:
1. In labor law context, arbitration is the reference of a labor dispute to an impartial third
person for determination on the basis of evidence and arguments presented by such parties
who have bound themselves to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final and binding.
Arbitration may be classified, on the basis of the obligation on which it is based, as either
compulsory or voluntary.
Compulsory arbitration is a system whereby the parties to a dispute are compelled by the
government to forego their right to strike and are compelled to accept the resolution of their
dispute through arbitration by a third party. 1 The essence of arbitration remains since a
resolution of a dispute is arrived at by resort to a disinterested third party whose decision is
final and binding on the parties, but in compulsory arbitration, such a third party is normally
appointed by the government.
Under voluntary arbitration, on the other hand, referral of a dispute by the parties is made,
pursuant to a voluntary arbitration clause in their collective agreement, to an impartial third
person for a final and binding resolution. 2 Ideally, arbitration awards are supposed to be
complied with by both parties without delay, such that once an award has been rendered by
an arbitrator, nothing is left to be done by both parties but to comply with the same. After
all, they are presumed to have freely chosen arbitration as the mode of settlement for that
particular dispute. Pursuant thereto, they have chosen a mutually acceptable arbitrator who
shall hear and decide their case. Above all, they have mutually agreed to de bound by said
arbitrator’s decision.
2. Article 261 of the Labor Code accordingly provides for exclusive original jurisdiction of such
voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators over
(1) the interpretation or implementation of the CBA and
(2) the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.
Article 262 authorizes them, but only upon agreement of the parties, to exercise jurisdiction
over other labor disputes.
On the other hand, a labor arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor Code has jurisdiction over
the following enumerated cases:
. . . (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the
submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of
stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-
agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving
wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the
employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving
the legality of strikes and lockouts;
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity
benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations, including those of
persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.
2) IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY vs. CA and MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORPORATION
G.R. No. 102976 October 25, 1995
FACTS: Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created by P.D. No. 272 in order, generally, to
develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. The list of powers and
functions of the ISA included the following: xx
Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. – The authority shall have the following powers and functions:
xx
(j) to initiate expropriation of land required for basic iron and steel facilities for subsequent
resale and/or lease to the companies involved if it is shown that such use of the State’s power
is necessary to implement the construction of capacity which is needed for the attainment
of the objectives of the Authority; xx
The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National
Development Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National
Government, embarked on an expansion program embracing, among other things, the
construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. Pursuant to the expansion program of
the NSC, Proc. No. 2239 was issued by the President of the Philippines withdrawing from sale
or settlement a large tract of public located in Iligan City, and reserving that land for the use
and immediate occupancy of NSC.
Since certain portions of the public land subject matter Proclamation No. 2239 were occupied
by a non-operational chemical fertilizer plant and related facilities owned by Maria Cristina
Fertilizer Corporation (“MCFC”), Letter of Instruction (LOI), No. 1277, was issued directing
the NSC to “negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for
the compensation of MCFC’s present occupancy rights on the subject land.” LOI No. 1277
also directed that should NSC and private respondent MCFC fail to reach an agreement within
a period of sixty (60) days from the date of LOI No. 1277, petitioner ISA was to exercise its
power of eminent domain under P.D. No. 272 and to initiate expropriation proceedings in
respect of occupancy rights of private respondent MCFC relating to the subject public land
as well as the plant itself and related facilities and to cede the same to the NSC.
Negotiations between NSC and private respondent MCFC did fail. Accordingly ISA
commenced eminent domain proceedings against MCFC in the RTC of Iligan City, praying that
it be placed in possession of the property involved upon depositing in court representing ten
percent (10%) of the declared market values of that property.
A writ of possession was issued by the trial court in favor of ISA. ISA in turn placed NSC in
possession and control of the land occupied by MCFC’s fertilizer plant installation.
The case proceeded to trial. While the trial was ongoing, however, the statutory existence of
petitioner ISA expired. MCFC then filed a motion to dismiss, contending that no valid
judgment could be rendered against ISA which had ceased to be a juridical person. Petitioner
ISA filed its opposition to this motion.
The trial court granted MCFC’s motion to dismiss and did dismiss the case. The dismissal was
anchored on the provision of the Rules of Court stating that “only natural or juridical persons
or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil case.”
Petitioner ISA moved for reconsideration which the trial court denied.
ISA went on appeal to the CA, which affirmed the order of dismissal of the trial court. At the
same time, however, the Court of Appeals held that it was premature for the trial court to
have ruled that the expropriation suit was not for a public purpose, considering that the
parties had not yet rested their respective cases.
Hence this Petition for Review.
ISSUE: WON the RP is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA’s term.
HELD: The Decision of the CA to the extent that it affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing
the expropriation proceedings, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the case is
REMANDED to the court a quo which shall allow the substitution of the RPfor petitioner ISA
YES
Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules of Court specifies who may be parties to a civil action:
Sec. 1. Who May Be Parties. – Only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law
may be parties in a civil action.
Examination of the statute which created petitioner ISA shows that ISA falls under category
(b) above. P.D. No. 272, as already noted, contains express authorization to ISA to commence
expropriation proceedings like those here involved. It should also be noted that the enabling
statute of ISA expressly authorized it to enter into certain kinds of contracts “for and in behalf
of the Government” in the following terms: xx
(i) to negotiate, and when necessary, to enter into contracts for and in behalf of the
government, for the bulk purchase of materials, supplies or services for any sectors in the
industry, and to maintain inventories of such materials in order to insure a continuous and
adequate supply thereof and thereby reduce operating costs of such sector; xxx
Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributes normally associated with
juridical personality. There is, however, no provision in P.D. No. 272 recognizing ISA as
possessing general or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of
the Government.
We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the RP. The Republic
itself is a body corporate and juridical person vested with the full panoply of powers and
attributes which are compendiously described as “legal personality.” The relevant definitions
are found in the Administrative Code of 1987:
Sec. 2. General Terms Defined. – Unless the specific words of the text, or the context as a
whole, or a particular statute, require a different meaning:
(1) Government of the RPrefers to the corporate governmental entity through which the
functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the
contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is
made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the
provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government.
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government, including
a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled
corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within
the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed
with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations.
xxx xxx xxx
When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and
functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are re-assumed
by, the RP, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other disposition
thereof such as, e.g., devolution or transmission of such powers, duties, functions, etc. to
some other identified successor agency or instrumentality of the RP.
When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry must be
looked for, in the first instance, in the charter of that agency and, by way of supplementation,
in the provisions of the Corporation Code.
Since, in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic,
its powers, duties, functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into
GRP and hence assumed once again by the Republic, no special statutory provision having
been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the
Republic.
The principal or the real party in interest is thus the RP and not the NSC, even though the
latter may be an ultimate user of the properties involved should the condemnation suit be
eventually successful.
From the foregoing premises, it follows that the RP is entitled to be substituted in the
expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having
expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISA’s statutory term did not by itself require
or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.
In E.B. Marcha, the Court also stressed that to require the Republic to commence all over
again another proceeding, as the trial court and CA had required, was to generate
unwarranted delay and create needless repetition of proceedings:
NOTES:
1. Since, as we have held above, the powers and functions of ISA have reverted to the RP
upon the termination of the statutory term of ISA, the question should be addressed whether
fresh legislative authority is necessary before the RP may continue the expropriation
proceedings initiated by its own delegate or agent.
While the power of eminent domain is, in principle, vested primarily in the legislative
department of the government, we believe and so hold that no new legislative act is
necessary should the Republic decide, upon being substituted for ISA, in fact to continue to
prosecute the expropriation proceedings. For the legislative authority, a long time ago,
enacted a continuing or standing delegation of authority to the President of the Philippines
to exercise, or cause the exercise of, the power of eminent domain on behalf of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The 1917 Revised Administrative Code, which
was in effect at the time of the commencement of the present expropriation proceedings
before the Iligan RTC , provided that:
Sec. 64. Particular powers and duties of the President of the Philippines. – In addition to his
general supervisory authority, the President of the Philippines shall have such other specific
powers and duties as are expressly conferred or imposed on him by law, and also, in
particular, the powers and duties set forth in this Chapter.
Among such special powers and duties shall be: xx
(h) To determine when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise the right of eminent
domain in behalf of the Government of the Philippines; and to direct the Secretary of Justice,
where such act is deemed advisable, to cause the condemnation proceedings to be begun in
the court having proper jurisdiction. xx
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 currently in force has substantially reproduced the
foregoing provision in the following terms:
Sec. 12. Power of eminent domain. – The President shall determine when it is necessary or
advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the National
Government, and direct the Solicitor General, whenever he deems the action advisable, to
institute expopriation proceedings in the proper court. (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, the President, exercising the power duly delegated under both the 1917
and 1987 Revised Administrative Codes in effect made a determination that it was necessary
and advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the Government of
the Republic and accordingly directed the SG to proceed with the suit. 17
2. It is argued by private respondent MCFC that, because Congress after becoming once more
the depository of primary legislative power, had not enacted a statute extending the term of
ISA, such non-enactment must be deemed a manifestation of a legislative design to
discontinue or abort the present expropriation suit. We find this argument much too
speculative; it rests too much upon simple silence on the part of Congress and casually
disregards the existence of Section 12 of the 1987 Administrative Code already quoted
above.
3. Other contentions are made by private respondent MCFC, such as, that the constitutional
requirement of “public use” or “public purpose” is not present in the instant case, and that
the indispensable element of just compensation is also absent. We agree with the Court of
Appeals in this connection that these contentions, which were adopted and set out by the
RTC in its order of dismissal, are premature and are appropriately addressed in the
proceedings before the trial court. Those proceedings have yet to produce a decision on the
merits, since trial was still on going at the time the RTC precipitously dismissed the
expropriation proceedings. Moreover, as a pragmatic matter, the Republic is, by such
substitution as party-plaintiff, accorded an opportunity to determine whether or not, or to
what extent, the proceedings should be continued in view of all the subsequent
developments in the iron and steel sector of the country including, though not limited to, the
partial privatization of the NSC
3) PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, INC. (PLDT)
vs.
CITY OF DAVAO and ADELAIDA B. BARCELONA, in her capacity as City Treasurer of Davao
GR. No. 143867
March 25, 2003
____________________________
TAX EXEMPTIONS vs. TAX EXCLUSION; “IN LIEU OF ALL TAXES” PROVISION
Facts: PLDT paid a franchise tax equal to three percent (3%) of its gross receipts. The franchise
tax was paid “in lieu of all taxes on this franchise or earnings thereof” pursuant to RA 7082.
The exemption from “all taxes on this franchise or earnings thereof” was subsequently
withdrawn by RA 7160 (LGC), which at the same time gave local government units the power
to tax businesses enjoying a franchise on the basis of income received or earned by them
within their territorial jurisdiction. The LGC took effect on January 1, 1992.
The City of Davao enacted Ordinance No. 519, Series of 1992, which in pertinent part
provides: Notwithstanding any exemption granted by law or other special laws, there is
hereby imposed a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise, a rate of seventy-five percent (75%)
of one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar year based on
the income receipts realized within the territorial jurisdiction of Davao City.
Subsequently, Congress granted in favor of Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation
(Globe) and Smart Information Technologies, Inc. (Smart) franchises which contained “in leiu
of all taxes” provisos.
In 1995, it enacted RA 7925, or the Public Telecommunication Policy of the Philippines, Sec.
23 of which provides that any advantage, favor, privilege, exemption, or immunity granted
under existing franchises, or may hereafter be granted, shall ipso facto become part of
previously granted telecommunications franchises and shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the grantees of such franchises. The law took effect on March 16, 1995.
In January 1999, when PLDT applied for a mayor’s permit to operate its Davao Metro
exchange, it was required to pay the local franchise tax which then had amounted to
P3,681,985.72. PLDT challenged the power of the city government to collect the local
franchise tax and demanded a refund of what had been paid as a local franchise tax for the
year 1997 and for the first to the third quarters of 1998.
Issue: Whether or not by virtue of RA 7925, Sec. 23, PLDT is again entitled to the exemption
from payment of the local franchise tax in view of the grant of tax exemption to Globe and
Smart.
Held: Petitioner contends that because their existing franchises contain “in lieu of all taxes”
clauses, the same grant of tax exemption must be deemed to have become ipso facto part of
its previously granted telecommunications franchise. But the rule is that tax exemptions
should be granted only by a clear and unequivocal provision of law “expressed in a language
too plain to be mistaken” and assuming for the nonce that the charters of Globe and of Smart
grant tax exemptions, then this runabout way of granting tax exemption to PLDT is not a
direct, “clear and unequivocal” way of communicating the legislative intent.
Nor does the term “exemption” in Sec. 23 of RA 7925 mean tax exemption. The term refers
to exemption from regulations and requirements imposed by the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC). For instance, RA 7925, Sec. 17 provides: The
Commission shall exempt any specific telecommunications service from its rate or tariff
regulations if the service has sufficient competition to ensure fair and reasonable rates of
tariffs. Another exemption granted by the law in line with its policy of deregulation is the
exemption from the requirement of securing permits from the NTC every time a
telecommunications company imports equipment.
Tax exemptions should be granted only by clear and unequivocal provision of law on the basis
of language too plain to be mistaken.
4) SOLID HOMES V. TERESITA PAYAWAL
On August 31, 1982 Teresita Payawal filed a complaint against Solid Homes Inc., before the
Regional Trial Court alleging that they contracted to sell her subdivision lot in Marikina on
June 9, 1975. Subsequently Solid Homes Inc. executed a deed of sale but failed to deliver the
corresponding certificate title despite of repeated demands by Payawal because defendant
had mortgaged the property in bad faith to a financing company.
Thereafter, Solid Homes Inc moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court
had no jurisdiction this being rested in the National Housing Authority under PD no. 597. The
motion was denied, hence, the petition to reverse said decision of the Court of Appeals in
sustaining the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court was submitted by Solid Homes Inc. to
the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over cases involving claims, refund and
any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the project
owner,developer,dealer,broker or salesman?
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the applicable law is PD No. 957. The National Housing
Authority has the jurisdiction.
As amended by PD No 1344 entitled “Empowering the National Housing Authority to issue
writs of execution in the enforcement of its decisions under Presidential Decree No 957”
Section 1 provides, in the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and
business and in addition to its powers provided for in PD No 957 that the National Housing
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
a) unsound real estate business practices, b) claims involving refund and any other claims
filed by subdivision lot owners or condo unit buyers against project owner, developer, dealer,
broker, or salesman and, c) cases involving specific performance of contractual statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
The challenged decision of the respondent court was reversed and the decision of RTC is Set
Aside without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate complaint before the HLURB.
5) CHRISTIAN GENERAL ASSEMBLY INC.v.IGNACIO
G.R. No. 164789 | August 27, 2009
CGA entered into a Contract to Sell a subdivision lot with the respondents – the registered
owners and developers of a housing subdivision, Villa Priscilla. The price was payable in
instalments at an extended period of 5 years. CGA religiously paid the monthly installments
until it was discovered that the title covering the subject property was actually part of two
consolidated lots that the respondents had acquired from his former tenantbeneficiaries
whose subject property had been placed under PD 27’s Operation Land Transfer. According
to CGA, Imperial applied for the retention of five hectares of her land under Republic Act No.
6657, which the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) granted. CGA filed a complaint against
the respondents before the RTC; and claimed that the respondents fraudulently concealed
the fact that the subject property was part of a property under litigation. CGA sought for the
rescission of contract. Ignacio filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the case and claimed that the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the HLURB since it involved the sale of a subdivision lot. CGA opposed the motion to dismiss,
claiming that the action is for rescission of contract, not specific performance, and is not
among the actions within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.
ISSUE: Which of the two – the regular court or the HLURB – has exclusive jurisdiction ove
CGA’s action for rescission and damages.
HELD: The Court affirmed the decision of the CA in finding that HLURB has exclusive
jurisdiction over CGA’s action for rescission and damages. Based on the allegations, the main
thrust of the CGA complaint is clear — to compel the respondents to
refund the payments already made for the subject property because the respondents were
selling a property that they apparently did not own. Since the respondents cannot comply
with their obligations under the contract, i.e., to deliver the property free from all liens and
encumbrances, CGA is entitled to rescind the contract and get a refund of the payments
already made. The cause of action falls under the actions contemplated
by Paragraph (b), Section 1 of PD No. 1344, which reads:
SEC. 1.In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
xxx xxx xxx
B.Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; The surge in the real
estate business in the country brought with it an increasing number of cases between
subdivision owners/developers and lot buyers on the issue of the extent of the HLURB’s
exclusive jurisdiction.
The provisions of PD 957 were intended to encompass all questions regardin subdivisions
and condominiums. The intention was aimed at providing for an appropriate government
agency, the HLURB, to which all parties aggrieved in th implementation of provisions and the
enforcement of contractual rights with respect to said category of real estate may take
recourse. The business of developing subdivisions and corporations being imbued with public
interest and welfare, any question arising from the exercise of that prerogative should be
brought to the HLURB which has the technical knowhow on the matter. In the exercise of its
powers, the HLURB must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights
of private parties under such contracts. This ancillary power is no longer a uniquely judicial
function, exercisable only by the regular courts. Regardless of whether the rescission of
contract is based on Article 1191 or 1381 of the Civil Code, the fact remains that what CG
principally wants is a refund of all payments it already made to the respondents. This intent,
amply articulated in its complaint, places its action within the ambit of the HLURB's exclusive
jurisdiction and outside the reach of the regular courts. Accordingly, CGA has to file its
complaint before the HLURB, the body with the proper jurisdiction.
6) Dadubo v. CSC, G.R. No. 106498, June 28, 1993 Facts: Dadubo and Cidro of the DBP
Borongan branch bank were administratively charged with conduct prejudicial to best
interest of the service, based on allegations on the unposted withdrawal of P60,000 from the
savings accounts of the Tiu’s. DBP found Dadubo guilty of dishonesty for embezzlement
of bank funds. She was penalized with dismissal and fined an amount equal to 1 month basic
salary. However, Civil Service Commission reversed the DBP findings and reduced
Dadubo€™s penalty to suspension for 6 months. DBP moved for reconsideration and CSC
affirmed the earlier findings as to Dadubo’s guilt. Dadubo brought the present case to SC
on certiorari, claiming that CSC failed to comply w/ constitutional requirement to state
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which the decision is based.
Issue: Whether or not there is violation of the administrative due process
Held: Compliance with the constitutional requirement to state clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which a decision is based on applies only to courts of justice and not to
administrative bodies like the Civil Service Commission. In any event, there was an earlier
statement of the facts and the law involved in the decision rendered by the MSPB dated
February 28, 1990, which affirmed DBP's decision to dismiss the petitioner. In both decisions,
the facts and the law on which they were based were clearly and distinctly stated.
7) Lianga Bay Logging, Co., Inc. v. Enage, G.R. No. L-30637, July 16, 1987
Facts: The parties are both forest concessionaries whose licensed areas are adjacent to each
other. Since the concessions of petitioner and respondent are adjacent to each other, they
have a common boundary. Reports of encroachment by both parties on each other’s
concessions triggered a survey to establish the common boundary of the respective
concession areas and was held that the claim of Ago Timber Corporation runs counter to the
intentions of the Office granting the Timber License Agreement to Lianga Bay Logging. Ago
Timber appealed to Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and set aside the
appealed decision of the Director of Forestry and ruled in favor of Ago. Lianga Bay Logging
elevated the case to office of President and ruling of Agriculture and Natural Resources was
affirmed. On Motion for Recon, decision was reversed and reinstated decision of Director of
Forestry. A civil action was instituted by Ago Timber to determine the correct boundary line
of license timber areas. TRO was set in place. Lianga brought the case to SC on certiorari.
Issue: WON respondent court has jurisdiction over the administrative case
Held: Respondent Judge erred in taking cognizance of the complaint filed by respondent Ago,
asking for the determination anew of the correct boundary line of its licensed timber area,
for the same issue had already been determined by the Director of Forestry, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the President, administrative officials
under whose jurisdictions the matter properly belongs. Section 1816 of the Revised
Administrative Code vests in the Bureau of Forestry, the jurisdiction and authority over the
demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, reforestation, occupancy, and use of
all public forests and forest reserves and over the granting of licenses for game and fish, and
for the taking of forest products, including stone and earth therefrom. The Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, as department head, may repeal or modify the decision
of the Director of Forestry when advisable in the public interests, whose decision is in turn
appealable to the Office of the President. For the respondent court to consider and weigh
again the evidence already presented and passed upon by said officials would be to allow it
to substitute its judgment for that of said officials who are in a better position to consider
and weigh the same in the light of the authority specifically vested in them by law. it is a well-
settled doctrine that the courts of justice will generally not interfere with purely
administrative matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies
and their expertise unless there is a clear showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such
that their action may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.