Based on the Syllabus of Justice Yap

Revised Penal
Code – Book
Two
Title One to Title Four

G. Mata, CPA
11-18-2017
TITLE ONE – CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY & THE
LAW OF NATIONS
People vs Tulin
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 111709. August 30, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I.
LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, and JOHN
DOES, accused-appellants.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of the Court
for sometime. It was reassigned, together with other similar cases, to
undersigned ponente in pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001.
In the evening of March 2, 1991, M/T Tabangao, a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600
barrels of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with a total value of
P40,426,793,87. was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on, Second
Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded, with the
use of an aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco, older
brother of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including accused-
appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38
caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew and took complete control of
the vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew members to
paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front and rear portions
of the vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel. The vessel was
then painted with the name "Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The
crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio messages
to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the
vessel to the Philippine Coast Guard and secured the assistance of the Philippine Air
Force and the Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded
negative results. On March 9, 1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and
cruised around the area presumably to await another vessel which, however, failed
to arrive. The pirates were thus forced to return to the Philippines on March 14, 1991,
arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it remained at sea.
On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18
nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called "Navi Pride"
anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer
the vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong
supervised the crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving the cargo. The transfer, after an
interruption, with both vessels leaving the area, was completed on March 30,1991.
On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed the
transfer of cargo to "Navi Pride."
On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel
remained at sea. On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were released in three
batches with the stern warning not to report the incident to government authorities
for a period of two days or until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed. The
first batch was fetched from the shoreline by a newly painted passenger jeep driven
by accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio Changco, who brought them
to Imus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-on for fare of the crew in
proceeding to their respective homes. The second batch was fetched by accused-
appellant Changco at midnight of April 10, 1991 and were brought to different places
in Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew,
called the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation office to report the incident. The
crew members were brought to the Coast Guard Office for investigation. The incident
was also reported to the National Bureau of Investigation where the officers and
members of the crew executed sworn statements regarding the incident.
A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:
a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates were
present at U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. After three days of surveillance,
accused-appellant Tulin was arrested and brought to the NBI headquarters in Manila.
b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at Aguinaldo
Hi-way by NBI agents as the latter were pursuing the mastermind, who managed to
evade arrest.
c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at the
lobby of Alpha Hotel in Batangas City.
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On October 24 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of
Presidential Decree No. 532 (piracy in Philippine Waters) was filed against accused-
appellants, as follows:
The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA,
CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN HIONG, and nine (9)
other JOHN DOES of qualified piracy (Violation of P.D. No. 532), committed as follows:
That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991, both dates
inclusive, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, then manning a motor launch and armed
with high powered guns, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board
and seize while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with petroleum
products, together with the complement and crew members, employing violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, then direct the vessel to
proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded and thereafter returned to
the Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of the aforesaid law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)
This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila. Upon
arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereupon
ensued.
Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some
inconsistencies in their testimony as to where they were on March 1, 1991,
maintained the defense of denial, and disputed the charge, as well as the transfer of
any cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride." All of them claimed having their
own respective sources of livelihood. Their story is to the effect that on March 2,
1991, while they were conversing by the beach, a red speedboat with Captain
Edilberto Liboon and Second Mate Christian Torralba on board, approached the
seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from the three if they wanted to work in a vessel.
They were told that the work was light and that each worker was to be paid P3,000.00
a month with additional compensation if they worked beyond that period. They
agreed even though they had no sea-going experience. On board, they cooked,
cleaned the vessel, prepared coffee, and ran errands for the officers. They denied
having gone to Singapore, claiming that the vessel only went to Batangas. Upon arrival
thereat in the morning of March 21, 1991, they were paid P1,000.00 each as salary
for nineteen days of work, and were told that the balance would be remitted to their
addresses. There was neither receipt nor contracts of employment signed by the
parties.
Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that he was at
home sleeping on April 10, 1991. He testified that he is the younger brother of Emilio
Changco, Jr.
Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced evidence
that he studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining the "Certificate" as Chief Officer, and
later completed the course as a "Master" of a vessel, working as such for two years
on board a vessel. He was employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port
Captain. The company was engaged in the business of trading petroleum, including
shipoil, bunker lube oil, and petroleum to domestic and international markets. It
owned four vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."
On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio Changco and
his cohorts, Hiong's name was listed in the company's letter to the Mercantile Section
of the Maritime Department of the Singapore government as the radio telephone
operator on board the vessel "Ching Ma."
The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker,
who offered to sell to the former bunker oil for the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore
dollars. After the company paid over one-half of the aforesaid amount to Paul Gan,
the latter, together with Joseph Ng, Operations Superintendent of the firm,
proceeded to the high seas on board "Navi Pride" but failed to locate the contact
vessel.
The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991. Hiong, upon
his return on board the vessel "Ching Ma," was assigned to supervise a ship-to-ship
transfer of diesel oil off the port of Singapore, the contact vessel to be designated by
Paul Gan. Hiong was ordered to ascertain the quantity and quality of the oil and was
given the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore Dollars for the purchase. Hiong, together
with Paul Gan, and the surveyor William Yao, on board "Navi Pride" sailed toward a
vessel called "M/T Galilee". Hiong was told that "M/T Galilee" would be making the
transfer. Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was made by the port authorities
before departure, Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. was able to procure a port
clearance upon submission of General Declaration and crew list. Hiong, Paul Gan, and
the brokers were not in the crew list submitted and did not pass through the
immigration. The General Declaration falsely reflected that the vessel carried 11,900
tons.
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On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee". The brokers
then told the Captain of the vessel to ship-side with "M/T Galilee" and then transfer
of the oil transpired. Hiong and the surveyor William Yao met the Captain of "M/T
Galilee," called "Captain Bobby" (who later turned out to be Emilio Changco). Hiong
claimed that he did not ask for the full name of Changco nor did he ask for the latter's
personal card.
Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in the "Navi
Pride" and took samples of the cargo. The surveyor prepared the survey report which
"Captain Bobby" signed under the name "Roberto Castillo." Hiong then handed the
payment to Paul Gan and William Yao. Upon arrival at Singapore in the morning of
March 29, 1991, Hiong reported the quantity and quality of the cargo to the company.
Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil purchased by
the firm " from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride." The same procedure as in the first
transfer was observed. This time, Hiong was told that that there were food and drinks,
including beer, purchased by the company for the crew of "M/T Galilee. The transfer
took ten hours and was completed on March 30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid in full for
the transfer.
On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had four vessels
and wanted to offer its cargo to cargo operators. Hiong was asked to act as a broker
or ship agent for the sale of the cargo in Singapore. Hiong went to the Philippines to
discuss the matter with Emilio Changco, who laid out the details of the new transfer,
this time with "M/T Polaris" as contact vessel. Hiong was told that the vessel was
scheduled to arrive at the port of Batangas that weekend. After being billeted at Alpha
Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong checked in under the name "SONNY CSH." A
person by the name of "KEVIN OCAMPO," who later turned out to be Emilio Changco
himself, also checked in at Alpha Hotel. From accused-appellant Cecilio Changco,
Hiong found out that the vessel was not arriving. Hiong was thereafter arrested by
NBI agents.
After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants of the
crime charged. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby
rendered by this Court finding the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres
Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of the
crime of piracy in Philippine Waters defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree No.
532 and the accused Cheong San Hiong, as accomplice, to said crime. Under Section
3(a) of the said law, the penalty for the principals of said crime is mandatory death.
However, considering that, under the 1987 Constitution, the Court cannot impose
the death penalty, the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, ]r., and
Cecilio Changco are hereby each meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with
all the accessory penalties of the law. The accused Cheong San Hiong is hereby meted
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to Article 52 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Section 5 of PD 532. The accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola,
Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to return to the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation the "M/T Tabangao" or if the accused can no
longer return the same, the said accused are hereby ordered to remit, jointly and
severally, to said corporation the value thereof in the amount of P11,240,000.00
Philippine Currency, with interests thereon, at the rate of 6% per annum from March
2, 1991 until the said amount is paid in full. All the accused including Cheong San
Hiong are hereby ordered to return to the Caltex Philippines, Inc. the cargo of the
"M/T Tabangao", or if the accused can no longer return the said cargo to said
corporation, all the accused are hereby condemned to pay, jointly and severally, to
the Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value of said cargo in the amount of P40,426,793.87,
Philippine Currency plus interests until said amount is paid in full. After the accused
Cheong San Hiong has served his sentence, he shall be deported to Singapore.
All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at the National
Bureau of Investigation and the City Jail of Manila during the pendency of this case
provided that they agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and
regulations of the City Jail of Manila and the National Bureau of Investigation. With
costs against all the accused.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)
The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of accused-appellants
may be summarized as follows:
Roger P. Tulin Virgilio Loyola Andres C. Infante Jr., and Cecilio O. Changco
Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert that the trial
court erred in allowing them to adopt the proceedings taken during the time they
were being represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby depriving them
of their constitutional right to procedural due process.
In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered his
appearance as counsel for all of them. However, in the course of the proceedings, or
on February 11, 1992, the trial court discovered that Mr. Posadas was not a member
3
of the Philippine Bar. This was after Mr. Posadas had presented and examined seven
witnesses for the accused.
Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio, Changco uniformly
contend that during the custodial investigation, they were subjected to physical
violence; were forced to sign statements without being given the opportunity to read
the contents of the same; were denied assistance of counsel, and were not informed
of their rights, in violation of their constitutional rights,
Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that the
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of
qualified piracy. They allege that the pirates were outnumbered by the crew who
totaled 22 and who were not guarded at all times. The crew, so these accused-
appellants conclude, could have overpowered the alleged pirates.
Cheong San Hiong
In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect obliterated the
crime committed by him; (2) the trial court erred in declaring that the burden is
lodged on him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had no knowledge
that Emilio Changco and his cohorts attacked and seized the "M/T Tabangao" and/or
that the cargo of the vessel was stolen or the subject of theft or robbery or piracy; (3)
the trial court erred in finding him guilty as an accomplice to the crime of qualified
piracy under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Robbery
Law of 1974); (4) the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as an
accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside
of Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to
hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence; (5) the trial court erred in making factual
conclusions without evidence on record to prove the same and which in fact are
contrary to the evidence adduced during trial; (6) the trial court erred in convicting
him as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 when he was
charged as a principal by direct participation under said decree, thus violating his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.
Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-appellants do not
prove any participation on his part in the commission of the crime of qualified piracy.
He further argues that he had not in any way participated in the seajacking of "M/T
Tabangao" and in committing the crime of qualified piracy, and that he was not aware
that the vessel and its cargo were pirated.
As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the information
with qualified piracy as principal under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which
refers to Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues that he was convicted for
acts done outside Philippine waters or territory. For the State to have criminal
jurisdiction, the act must have been committed within its territory.
We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.
The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what are the legal
effects and implications of the fact that a non-lawyer represented accused-appellants
during the trial?; (2) what are the legal effects and implications of the absence of
counsel during the custodial investigation?; (3) did the trial court err in finding that
the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants
committed the crime of qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic Act No. 7659 obliterate the
crime committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5) can accused-appellant
Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was not charged as such and when the
acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside Philippine waters
and territory?
On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record) was
executed by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on February
11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced when they were
represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient representation
during the trial as covered by the due process clause shall only be valid if made with
the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-appellants, as
represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical manifestation that said
accused-appellants were apprised of the nature and legal consequences of the
subject manifestation, and that they voluntarily and intelligently executed the same.
They also affirmed the truthfulness of its contents when asked in open court (tsn,
February 11, 1992, pp. 7-59). It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be
present and to defend himself in person and by counsel at every stage of the
proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgment (Section 1, Rule 115,
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). This is hinged on the fact that a layman is not
versed on the technicalities of trial. However, it is also provided by law that "[r]ights
may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with right recognized by law."
(Article 6, Civil Code of the Philippines). Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds that
"[u]pon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it
sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the
4
assistance of counsel." By analogy , but without prejudice to the sanctions imposed
by law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply shown that the rights of accused-
appellants were sufficiently and properly protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas
Posadas. An examination of the record will show that he knew the technical rules of
procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient
representation during the trial, considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and
intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar.
Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid
waiver of rights has been made (People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs.
People, 166 SCRA 680 [1988]).
However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial investigation
may not be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate
the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as
well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices,
and their families.
Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U. S. 436 [1966]) which gave birth
to the so-called Miranda doctrine which is to the effect that prior to any questioning
during custodial investigation, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he gives may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.
The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The Constitution even adds the more
stringent requirement that the waiver must be in writing and made in the presence
of counsel.
Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions of
the accused-appellants make them invalid. In fact, the very basic reading of the
Miranda rights was not even shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of the
aforestated Section 12 sets forth the so-called "fruit from the poisonous tree
doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of
Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According to this rule, once the
primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary
or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is
based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used
to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all
evidence subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in
this case, the uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants, without a
valid waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible and whatever information is
derived therefrom shall be regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence against
them.
However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there is
sufficient evidence to convict accused-appellants with moral certainty. We agree with
the sound deduction of the trial court that indeed, Emilio Changco (Exhibits "U" and
"UU") and accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, .and Infante, Jr. did conspire and
confederate to commit the crime charged. In the words of then trial judge, now
Justice Romeo J. Callejo of the Court of Appeals -
...The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses, officers and
members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" no less, who identified and pointed to
the said Accused as among those who attacked and seized, the "M/T Tabangao" on
March 2, 1991, at about 6:30 o'clock in the afternoon, off Lubang Island, Mindoro,
with its cargo, and brought the said vessel, with its cargo, and the officers and crew
of the vessel, in the vicinity of Horsebough Lighthouse, about sixty-six nautical miles
off the shoreline of Singapore and sold its cargo to the Accused Cheong San Hiong
upon which the cargo was discharged from the "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride"
for the price of about $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on March 29, and 30, 1991...
xxx
xxx
xxx
The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" were on
board the vessel with the Accused and their cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to April
10, 1991 or for more than one (1) month. There can be no scintilla of doubt in the
5
mind of the Court that the officers and crew of the vessel could and did see and
identify the seajackers and their leader. In fact, immediately after the Accused were
taken into custody by the operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation,
Benjamin Suyo, Norberto Senosa, Christian Torralba and Isaias Wervas executed their
"Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit "B") and pointed to and identified the said Accused as some
of the pirates.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the three (3) Accused
admitted to the Court that they, in fact, boarded the said vessel in the evening of
March 2 1991 and remained on board when the vessel sailed to its, destination, which
turned out to be off the port of Singapore.
(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)
We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants' defense of denial
is not supported by any hard evidence but their bare testimony. Greater weight is
given to the categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses
than to the accused's plain denial of participation in the commission of the crime
(People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Instead, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola,
and Infante, Jr. narrated a patently desperate tale that they were hired by three
complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon, Second Mate Christian
Torralba, and their companion) while said accused-appellants were conversing with
one another along the seashore at Apkaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas, to work on
board the "M/T Tabangao" which was then anchored off-shore. And readily, said
accused-appellants agreed to work as cooks and handymen for an indefinite period
of time without even saying goodbye to their families, without even knowing their
destination or the details of their voyage, without the personal effects needed for a
long voyage at sea. Such evidence is incredible and clearly not in accord with human
experience. As pointed out by the trial court, it is incredible that Captain Liboon,
Second Mate Torralba, and their companion "had to leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock
in the evening and venture in a completely unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (5)
cooks or handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."
Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that on May 14
and 17, he was at his place of work and that on April 10, 1991, he was in his house in
Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is fundamentally and inherently
a weak defense, much more so when uncorroborated by other witnesses (People v.
Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997]) considering that it is easy to fabricate and concoct, and
difficult to disprove. Accused-appellant must adduce clear and convincing evidence
that, at about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was physically impossible for him to have
been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to do this, he was likewise
unable to prove that he was in his place of work on the dates aforestated.
It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is
accorded the highest respect, for trial courts have an untrammeled opportunity to
observe directly the demeanor of witnesses and, thus, to determine whether a
certain witness is telling the truth (People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).
We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator, one need
not participate in every detail of execution; he need not even take part in every act
or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution
of the conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there are times when conspirators are
assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another,
but in fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to achieve a common criminal
design.
We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused- appellants Tulin,
Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and others, were the ones assigned to attack and seize the
"M/T Tabangao" off Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco was
to fetch the master and the members of the crew from the shoreline of Calatagan,
Batangas after the transfer, and bring them to Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crew
and the officers of the vessel with money for their fare and food provisions on their
way home. These acts had to be well-coordinated. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco
need not be present at the time of the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" since he
performed his task in view of an objective common to all other accused- appellants.
Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to one another.
Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco is the younger brother of Emilio Changco (aka
Captain Bobby/Captain Roberto Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of Phil-Asia Shipping
Lines. Cecilio worked for his brother in said corporation. Their residences are
approximately six or seven kilometers away from each other. Their families are close.
Accused-appellant Tulin, on the other hand, has known Cecilio since their parents
were neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. Accused-appellant Loyola's
wife is a relative of the Changco brothers by affinity .Besides, Loyola and Emilio
Changco had both been accused in a seajacking case regarding "M/T Isla Luzon" and
6
its cargo of steel coils and plates off Cebu and Bohol in 1989. Emilio Changco (aka
Kevin Ocampo) was convicted of the crime while Loyola at that time remained at
large.
As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be convicted of
piracy in Philippine waters as defined and penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a],
respectively of Presidential Decree No. 532 because Republic Act No. 7659 (effective
January 1, 1994) which amended Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, has impliedly
superseded Presidential Decree No. 532. He reasons out that Presidential Decree No.
532 has been rendered "superfluous or duplicitous" because both Article 122 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 532 punish piracy
committed in Philippine waters. He maintains that in order to reconcile the two laws,
the word "any person" mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree No. 532
must be omitted such that Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply to offenders
who are members of the complement or to passengers of the vessel, whereas
Republic Act No. 7659 shall apply to offenders who are neither members of the
complement or passengers of the vessel, hence, excluding him from the coverage of
the law.
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:
Article 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. -The penalty of reclusion
temporal shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, shall attack or
seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize
the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings
of its complement or passengers.
(Underscoring supplied.)
Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 January 1, 1994), reads:
Article 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters. -
The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high
seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, being a member of its
complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel,
its equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or passengers.
(Underscoring ours)
On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides:
SEC. 2. Definition of Terms. - The following shall mean and be understood, as follows:
d. Piracy. -Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole
or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement
or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person. including a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters, shall be
considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as
hereinafter provided (underscoring supplied).
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment,
provided that piracy must be committed on the high seas by any person not a
member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by
Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to
include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand, under
Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy
embraces any person including "a passenger or member of the complement of said
vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement
or not, any person is covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy
under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws.
There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret
the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in
keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from
crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of
Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the
Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist
harmoniously as separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine
waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in
Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to
Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer
was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential
Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be
committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its
cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed
in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As
such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle
7
applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of
qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law, Presidential Decree No.
532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532
should be applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely to discourage
and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It
is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a
reprehensible crime against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).
However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's constitutional right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him on the ground
that he was convicted as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
532 even though he was charged as a principal by direct participation under Section
2 of said law?
The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing:
(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure of
"M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (b) that he induced Emilio Changco and his group in
the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; ( c) and that his act was
indispensable in the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo.
Nevertheless, the trial court found that accused-appellant Hiong's participation was
indisputably one which aided or abetted Emilio Changco and his band of pirates in
the disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532
which provides:
SEC. 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway
robbery brigandage. -Any person who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects
pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them information about the
movement of police or other peace officers of the government, or acquires or
receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or in any manner derives any
benefit therefrom; or any person who directly or indirectly abets the commission of
piracy or highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an accomplice of the
principal officers and be punished in accordance with Rules prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this Section
has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.
The ruling of the trial court is Within well-settle jurisprudence that if there is lack of
complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as
principal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any doubt as to the participation
of an individual in the commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of lesser
responsibility (People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People vs. Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA
792 [1983]; People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).
Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No 532 which presumes that any person who does any of the acts provided
in said section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. In the
case at bar, accused-appellant Hiong had failed to overcome the legal presumption
that he knowingly abetted or aided in the commission of piracy, received property
taken by such pirates and derived benefit therefrom.
The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in disposing of
the stolen cargo by personally directing its transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi
Pride". He profited therefrom by buying the hijacked cargo for Navi Marine Services,
Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 15-23). He even tested the quality and verified the
quantity of the petroleum products, connived with Navi Marine Services personnel in
falsifying the General Declarations and Crew List to ensure that the illegal transfer
went through, undetected by Singapore Port Authorities, and supplied the pirates
with food, beer, and other provisions for their maintenance while in port (tsn, June 3,
1992, pp. 133-134).
We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and Departure)
and Crew List was accomplished and utilized by accused-appellant Hiong and Navi
Marine Services personnel in the execution of their scheme to avert detection by
Singapore Port Authorities. Hence, had accused-appellant Hiong not falsified said
entries, the Singapore Port Authorities could have easily discovered the illegal
activities that took place and this would have resulted in his arrest and prosecution
in Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of the stolen cargo from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi
Pride" could not have been effected.
We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing in detail accused-
appellant Hiong's role in the disposition of the pirated goods summarized as follows:
that on March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain Biddy Santos boarded the "Navi Pride,"
one of the vessels of the Navi Marine, to rendezvous with the "M/T Galilee"; that the
firm submitted the crew list of the vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH", Record) to the port
authorities, excluding the name of Hiong; that the "General Declaration" (for
departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its voyage off port of Singapore (Exhibits "HH" and
"8-A CSH", Record) falsely stated that the vessel was scheduled to depart at 2200 (10
o'clock in the evening), that there were no passengers on board, and the purpose of
the voyage was for "cargo operation" and that the vessel was to unload and transfer
1,900 tons of cargo; that after the transfer of the fuel from "M/T Galilee" with' Emilio
8
Changco a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k. a. Roberto Castillo at the helm, the surveyor
prepared the "Quantity Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH, Record) stating that the cargo
transferred to the "Navi Pride" was 2,406 gross cubic meters; that although Hiong
was not the Master of the vessel, he affixed his signature on the "Certificate" above
the word "Master" (Exhibit "11-C-2 CSH", Record); that he then paid $150,000.00 but
did not require any receipt for the amount; that Emilio Changco also did not issue
one; and that in the requisite "General Declaration" upon its arrival at Singapore on
March 29, 1991, at 7 o'clock in the evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and "13-A CSH", Record), it
was made to falsely appear that the "Navi Pride" unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo on the
high seas during said voyage when in fact it acquired from the "M/T Galilee" 2,000
metric tons of diesel oil. The second transfer transpired with the same irregularities
as discussed above. It was likewise supervised by accused- appellant Cheong from his
end while Emilio Changco supervised the transfer from his end.
Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the orders of his
superiors and that he has no knowledge of the illegality of the source of the cargo.
First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny knowledge of the source
and nature of the cargo since he himself received the same from "M/T Tabangao".
Second, considering that he is a highly educated mariner, he should have avoided any
participation in the cargo transfer given the very suspicious circumstances under
which it was acquired. He failed to show a single piece of deed or bill of sale or even
a purchase order or any contract of sale for the purchase by the firm; he never
bothered to ask for and scrutinize the papers and documentation relative to the "M/T
Galilee"; he did not even verify the identity of Captain Robert Castillo whom he met
for the first time nor did he check the source of the cargo; he knew that the transfer
took place 66 nautical miles off Singapore in the dead of the night which a marine
vessel of his firm did not ordinarily do; it was also the first time Navi Marine transacted
with Paul Gan involving a large sum of money without any receipt issued therefor; he
was not even aware if Paul Gan was a Singaporean national and thus safe to deal with.
It should also be noted that the value of the cargo was P40,426,793.87 or roughly
more than US$l,000,000.00 (computed at P30.00 to $1, the exchange rate at that
time). Manifestly, the cargo was sold for less than one-half of its value. Accused-
appellant Hiong should have been aware of this irregularity. Nobody in his right mind
would go to far away Singapore, spend much time and money for transportation -
only to sell at the aforestated price if it were legitimate sale involved. This, in addition
to the act of falsifying records, clearly shows that accused-appellant Hiong was well
aware that the cargo that his firm was acquiring was purloined.
Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely following the
orders of his superiors." An individual is justified in performing an act in obedience to
an order issued by a superior if such order, is for some lawful purpose and that the
means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful (Reyes, Revised Penal
Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the alleged order of Hiong's superior Chua
Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent violation not only of Philippine, but of international law.
Such violation was committed on board a Philippine-operated vessel. Moreover, the
means used by Hiong in carrying out said order was equally unlawful. He misled port
and immigration authorities, falsified records, using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to
consummate said acts. During the trial, Hiong presented himself, and the trial court
was convinced, that he was an intelligent and articulate Port Captain. These
circumstances show that he must have realized the nature and the implications of the
order of Chua Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have refused to follow orders
to conclude the deal and to effect the transfer of the cargo to the Navi Pride. He did
not do so, for which reason, he must now suffer the consequences of his actions.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence
on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
People vs Catantan
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118075. September 5, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMILIANO CATANTAN y
TAYONG, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
EMILIANO CATANTAN and JOSE MACVEN URSAL alias "Bimbo" were charged with
violation of PD No. 532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law
of 1974 for having on 27 June 1993, while armed with a firearm and a bladed weapon,
acting in conspiracy with one another, by means of violence and intimidation, wilfully
and feloniously attacked, assaulted and inflicted physical injuries on Eugene Pilapil
and Juan Pilapil Jr. who were then fishing in the seawaters of Tabogon, Cebu, and
seized their fishing boat, to their damage and prejudice. [1]
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial, found both accused Emiliano Catantan y
Tayong and Jose Macven Ursal alias "Bimbo" guilty of the crime charged and
9
sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. [2] Of the duo only Emiliano Catantan
appealed.
In his appeal, accused Catantan contends that the trial court erred in convicting him
of piracy as the facts proved only constitute grave coercion defined in Art. 286 of the
Revised Penal Code and not piracy under PD No. 532.
The evidence for the prosecution is that at 3:00 o'clock in the morning of 27 June
1993, the Pilapil brothers Eugene, 21, and Juan Jr., 18, were fishing in the sea some 3
kilometers away from the shores of Tabogon, Cebu. Suddenly, another boat caught
up with them. One of them, later identified as the accused Emiliano Catantan,
boarded the pumpboat of the Pilapils and leveled his gun at Eugene. With his gun,
Catantan struck Eugene on the left cheekbone and ordered him and Juan Jr.
to "dapa." [3] Then Catantan told Ursal to follow him to the pumpboat of the
Pilapils. There they hogtied Eugene, forced him to lie down at the bottom of the boat,
covered him with a tarpaulin up to his neck, stepped on him and ordered Juan Jr. to
ferry them to Daan Tabogon. They left behind the other pumpboat which the accused
had earlier used together with its passengers one of whom was visibly tied.
Noting that they were already far out into the sea, Eugene reminded Catantan that
they were now off-course but Catantan told Eugene to keep quiet or he would be
killed. Later, the engine conked out and Juan Jr. was directed to row the boat. Eugene
asked to be set free so he could help but was not allowed; he was threatened with
bodily harm instead.
Meanwhile Juan Jr. managed to fix the engine, but as they went farther out into the
open sea the engine stalled again. This time Eugene was allowed to assist his
brother. Eugene's hands were set free but his legs were tied to the outrigger. At the
point of a tres cantos [4] held by Ursal, Eugene helped row the boat.
As they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another boat. Catantan asked whose
boat that was and the Pilapils told him that it was operated by a certain Juanito and
that its engine was new. Upon learning this, Catantan ordered the Pilapil brothers to
approach the boat cautioning them however not to move or say anything.
On the pretext that they were buying fish Catantan boarded the "new"
pumpboat. Once aboard he ordered the operator Juanito to take them to Mungaz,
another town of Cebu. When Juanito tried to beg-off by saying that he would still pull
up his net and harvest his catch, Catantan drew his revolver and said, "You choose
between the two, or I will kill you." [5] Juanito, obviously terrified, immediately obeyed
and Ursal hopped in from the other pumpboat and joined Catantan.
But, as Ursal was transferring to the "new" pumpboat, its outrigger caught the front
part of the pumpboat of the Pilapils so he kicked hard its prow; it broke.The jolt threw
Eugene into the sea and he landed on the water headlong. Juan Jr. then untied his
brother's legs and the two swam together clinging to their boat. Fortunately another
pumpboat passed by and towed them safely ashore.
Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any attack upon or seizure of any
vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the
personal belongings of the complement or passengers, irrespective of the value
thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things,
committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of
said vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be
considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided." And a vessel is construed
in Sec. 2, par. (b), of the same decree as "any vessel or watercraft used for transport
of passengers and cargo from one place to another through Philippine waters. It shall
include all kinds and types of vessels or boats used in fishing (underscoring supplied).
On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code is
committed by "any person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence,
prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do
something against his will, whether it be right or wrong."
Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be committed it is essential
that there be an attack on or seizure of a vessel. He claims that he and his companion
did not attack or seize the fishing boat of the Pilapil brothers by using force or
intimidation but merely boarded the boat, and it was only when they were already
on board that they used force to compel the Pilapils to take them to some other
place. Appellant also insists that he and Ursal had no intention of permanently taking
possession or depriving complainants of their boat. As a matter of fact, when they
saw another pumpboat they ordered the brothers right away to approach that boat
so they could leave the Pilapils behind in their boat. Accordingly, appellant claims, he
simply committed grave coercion and not piracy.
We do not agree. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave
coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely
within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were
compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of destination, such compulsion
was obviously part of the act of seizing their boat. The testimony of Eugene, one of
the victims, shows that the appellant actually seized the vessel through force and
intimidation. The direct testimony of Eugene is significant and enlightening -
10
Q: Now, while you and your younger brother were fishing at the seawaters of Eugene Pilapil testified, the accused suddenly approached them and boarded their
Tabogon at that time, was there anything unusual that happened? pumpboat and Catantan aimed his revolver at them as he ordered complaining
A: Yes. witness Eugene Pilapil to "dapa" or lie down with face downwards, and then struck
Q: Will you please tell the Court what that was? his face with a revolver, hitting the lower portion of his left eye, after which, Catantan
A: While we were fishing at Tabogon another pumpboat arrived and the passengers told his victims at gun point to take them to Daan Tabogon.
of that pumpboat boarded our pumpboat. The incident happened at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. The sudden appearance of
Q: Now, that pumpboat which you said approached you, how many were riding in another pumpboat with four passengers, all strangers to them, easily intimidated the
that pumpboat? Pilapil brothers that they were impelled to submit in complete surrender to the
A: Four. marauders. The moment Catantan jumped into the other pumpboat he had full
Q: When you said the passengers of that pumpboat boarded your pumpboat, how control of his victims. The sight of a drawn revolver in his hand drove them to
did they do that? submission. Hence the issuance of PD No. 532 designed to avert situations like the
A: They approached somewhat suddenly and came aboard case at bar and discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters. Thus we cite the
the pumpboat (underscoring supplied). succeeding "whereas" clauses of the decree -
Q: How many suddenly came aboard your pumpboat? Whereas, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are
A: Only one. still committing acts of depredations upon the persons and properties of innocent
Q: What did that person do when he came aboard your pumpboat? and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing
A: When he boarded our pumpboat he aimed his revolver at us (underscoring the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social
supplied). progress of the people;
Q: By the way, when he aimed his revolver to you, did he say anything to you? Whereas, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or highway
xxxx robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned
A: He said, "dapa," which means lie down (underscoring supplied). by the penal statutes of all countries; and,
COURT: Whereas, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from
Q: To whom did he aim that revolver? perpetrating such acts of depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders,
A: He aimed the revolver on me. with the end inview of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational
TRIAL PROS. ECHAVEZ: and community progress of the people.
Q: What else did he do? The Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose only means of livelihood is fishing in
A: Then he ordered his companion to come aboard the pumpboat. sea waters. They brave the natural elements and contend with the unknown forces
Q: What did he do with his revolver? of the sea to bring home a bountiful harvest. It is on these small fishermen that the
A: He struck my face with the revolver, hitting the lower portion of my left eye. townspeople depend for the daily bread. To impede their livelihood would be to
Q: Now, after you were struck with the revolver, what did these persons do? deprive them of their very subsistence, and the likes of the accused within the
A: We were ordered to take them to a certain place. purview of PD No. 532 are the obstacle to the "economic, social, educational and
Q: To what place did he order you to go? community progress of the people." Had it not been for the chance passing of another
A: To Daan Tabogon. [6] pumpboat, the fate of the Pilapil brothers, left alone helpless in a floundering,
To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of grave meandering outrigger with a broken prow and a conked-out engine in open sea, could
coercion would be to ignore the fact that a fishing vessel cruising in Philippine waters not be ascertained.
was seized by the accused by means of violence against or intimidation of persons. As
11
While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no intention of depriving the Pilapils
permanently of their boat, proof of which they left behind the brothers with their
boat, the truth is, Catantan and Ursal abandoned the Pilapils only because their
pumpboat broke down and it was necessary to transfer to another pumpboat that
would take them back to their lair. Unfortunately for the pirates their "new"
pumpboat ran out of gas so they were apprehended by the police soon after the
Pilapils reported the matter to the local authorities.
The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was not produced
in evidence cannot exculpate him from the crime. The fact remains, and we state it
again, that Catantan and his co-accused Ursal seized through force and intimidation
the pumpboat of the Pilapils while the latter were fishing in Philippine waters.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the conviction
of accused-appellant EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG for the crime of piracy
penalized under PD No. 532 and sentencing him accordingly to reclusion perpetua, is
AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
People vs Aranas
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 123101. November 22, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TITING ARANAS @
TINGARDS/RONNIE, ANGELO PARACUELES, JUAN VILLA @ JUANTOY, ELMER MANALILI,
ET AL. accused.
ELMER MANALILI, accused-appellant.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol,
7th Judicial Region, Branch 3, Tagbilaran City finding accused-appellant Elmer Manalili
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified piracy and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify certain individuals.
The Information indicting appellant reads:
That on or about the 15th day of December, 1992 in the seawaters of the municipality
of Ubay, Province of Bohol, Philippines, which is part of the Philippine waters and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain, and by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously seize by boarding a passenger sea vessel M/V J & N Princess, owned
by one Nelson Uy and under the complement of Gervacio Uy and Saturnino Gaudicos
with 19 officers and crew members and while on board said vessel, seized its radio
and subsequently demanded and divested them and its passengers cash in the
amount of P200,000.00, Philippine Currency and valuables and equipments worth
P350,000.00, Philippine currency or in the total amount of Five Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P550,000.00), Philippine Currency, and on the occasion of said
piracy, accused committed the crime of physical injuries on the person of Ernesto
Magalona, the quarter master; to the damage and prejudice of the offended parties
in the above stated total amount.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Art. 123 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by PD 532.[2]
Accused Titing Aranas alias Tingards, Angelo Paracueles, Juan Villa alias Juantoy,
Gaudencio Tolsidas and Rodrigo Salas remain at large. Hence, this case proceeded
only against appellant Elmer Manalili who was arrested on January 21, 1993 in Cebu
City.
When arraigned on August 23, 1993, appellant Manalili pleaded not guilty.[3]He also
waived his right to pre-trial. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented the following testimonial evidence:
Prosecution witness Gervacio Ong Uy, 62, operations manager of the cargo-
passenger vessel M/V J & N Princess, testified that at 9:40 in the evening of December
15, 1992, Tuesday, he boarded said vessel. The vessel plies the route between Ubay,
Bohol and Cebu (and vice-versa) every other day or every Sunday, Tuesday and
Thursday. It leaves the port of Ubay, Bohol at 10:00 o clock in the evening. About
twenty minutes after departure on said date, he went down to urinate at the lower
deck. After urinating, two persons were standing behind him; one was pointing a gun
at his back and the other was holding his collar. They ordered him to go upstairs to
the third or upper deck. Arriving there, they told him to open the radio room, and
they destroyed the radio. They also ordered that all lockers of the room be
opened. They told him that they were military men looking for firearms and shabu. He
opened all lockers except that of quartermaster Ernesto Magalona, who was not
around as he was hiding. The crew members looked for him, and when he appeared,
the pirates scolded and hit him with an armalite. He was about 3 meters away from
Magalona. Magalona opened his locker but the pirates were not able to find anything
12
inside. When the locker was opened, he saw that the left hand of one pirate had a
tattoo with the initials G.V.[4]
The pirates took from Gervacio Uy P30,500.00 in cash and his wristwatch worth
P1,500.00. From an inventory made by the purser, the pirates divested from the
passengers P200,000.00 in cash, and P300,000.00 worth of personal belongings
including radio and jewelry.[5]
After the robbery, the leader of the pirates told the quartermaster to stop the engine
of the vessel, then there was a gunshot, which was apparently a signal for the get-
away pumpboat. Before the pirates left, they told Uys group not to go back to Ubay,
but to proceed to Cebu, otherwise the boat would be strafed.Nevertheless, they
proceeded to Talibon, Bohol in order to report the incident to the police. They arrived
in Cebu at 5:00 o clock in the morning of December 16, 1992.[6]
Gervacio Uy declared that he identified the two persons who initially pointed a gun
at him through pictures. The one who pointed an armalite at him was about 56 in
height, regular in built, brown complexion, with straight hair and between 25 to 28
years old. The second man was older, about 42 years old, 53 or 54 in height, medium
built with brown complexion and black hair; he was carrying what looked like an uzi
gun. From pictures presented by the Central Intelligence Service (CIS) when he was
investigated, he identified the two as Titing Aranas and Paracueles, all at large. When
appellant Elmer Manalili was presented during the preliminary investigation before
the municipal judge of Ubay, he told Municipal Judge Napuli that his face was familiar
among the eight pirates. However, quartermaster Magalona and Boiser, a passenger,
identified him as one of the pirates.[7]
On cross-examination, Gervacio Uy said that out of the 20 pictures presented to him
for identification by the CIS, he only positively identified Titing Aranas and Angelo
Paracueles. He saw Elmer Manalili for the first time when he was presented before
Judge Napuli for investigation.[8]
Prosecution witness Ernesto Magalona, 39, quartermaster of M/V J & NPrincess since
1991 to the present, testified that on December 15, 1992, he was on board the said
vessel which left the port of Ubay, Bohol bound for Cebu at 10:00 o clock in the
evening. He was off-duty then. At the time of the robbery, he was on the second deck
of the boat. He was lying on his cot near the passage way leading to the upper deck
when someone shouted, Ayaw paglihok kay duna miy pangitaon nga shabu ug armas
nga uzi, meaning, Do not move, we are searching for shabu and uzi gun. Then he saw
their manager Gervacio Uy being escorted by two armed men. One was armed with
an armalite pointed at Uy. The other man was also armed because something was
bulging at his waist, but he did not see the kind of firearm he was carrying. He could
identify the two armed men who escorted Uy, because he was about three to four
meters away from them and the place was well illuminated with fluorescent lights. He
identified one of the said armed men by pointing to a person inside the court room
who, when asked his name, answered that he was Elmer Manalili. He declared that
the other man carried a long firearm. Describing the manner Uy was escorted, he said
that the man holding the armalite was also holding the collar of Uy and pushing him
while appellant followed. Uy and the two armed men eventually reached the third
deck where the armed men destroyed the radio. He came to know that the radio was
destroyed because the purser who came from the third deck looking for him told him
so. He tried to cover his face with his malong, but ultimately a pirate saw him and
struck him with his gun hitting his right ear so he was forced to stand up and go with
them to the third deck. When he was at the third or upper deck, Uy was on his way
down to the second deck escorted by appellant. Immediately after his locker was
opened, he was instructed to return to his cot and ordered to lie down.[9]
Magalona said that there were about eight (8) pirates. He could only remember and
identify the two armed men who escorted Gervacio Uy because the movements of
the pirates were so fast and coordinated. He could remember Elmer Manalili because
he was facing him and he saw him frontally. The pirates divested the passengers of
their belongings. His wallet containing P1,000.00 was taken.[10]
On cross-examination, Magalona stated that when the robbers announced a hold-up,
he was lying down. They were ordered to remain lying down, face down for less than
an hour. The robbers were in pairs stationed at the lower deck, second deck and third
deck while the other two made rounds of these decks.When the passengers were
divested of their belongings, operations manager Uy was at the third or upper deck
escorted by the two armed men, one of whom was the appellant. He was positive
that from the start, the two armed men escorted Uy from the comfort room at the
lower deck to the second deck and then the third or upper deck where the radio room
was located. They did not separate from Uy but always followed him, and he had a
good look at them when they passed by the second deck.[11]
After the incident, Magalona saw the appellant at the office of the chief of police in
Ubay, Bohol and then during the investigation at the office of the municipal judge. He
also saw the appellant from pictures of suspects shown to him at the office of the
chief of police.[12]
Prosecution witness SPO2 Alex Henson Reyes, a member of the Philippine National
Police (PNP), Ubay, Bohol, testified that on December 15, 1992 he was a passenger
13
of M/V J & N Princess bound for Cebu. He was asleep when the boat left the port of
Ubay, but was awakened by a gunfire. Then he saw a pirate aiming an armalite rifle,
and another one, about 16 years old, aiming his carbine rifle, at him. Another pirate
got his bag, and taken therefrom was his service revolver, a caliber .38 Smith and
Wesson, issued by the Chief of Police. The gun had twelve (12) rounds of
ammunition. After the incident, he went to the PNP in Bohol, and from pictures that
were shown to him, he identified the pirate who got his bag as Angelo Paracueles. He
did not see the appellant during the incident.[13]
Due to fright suffered at the time of the incident, SPO2 Reyes asked for moral
damages of P50,000.00, and actual damages of P50,000.00 for the loss of the gun,
and P288.00 for the 12 rounds of ammunition.[14]
Prosecution witness PO3 Saul Pino Cuyno,[15] a member of the PNP, Ubay, Bohol,
testified that in the evening of December 15, 1992, he was also a passenger of M/V J
& N Princess. The pirates took from him P80.00 in cash and his watch
worth P4,000.00 The armed men mentioned by SPO2 Reyes were the same men who
aimed their guns at him. From pictures that were shown to him after the incident, he
identified one of the armed men as Angelo Paracueles.[16]
On the other hand, appellant Elmer Manalili denied that he was involved in the piracy
committed on board M/V J & N Princess in the evening of December 15, 1992 in the
seawaters of Ubay, Bohol inasmuch as he was in his residence in Cebu City at that
time.
Defense witness Jeffrey Dadula Perandos, 26, single, third year high school,industrial
painter, testified that he knew appellant since they were neighbors at Cabantan St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City. Appellant started to live there when he was eight (8) years old
and stayed with his elder brother Junior Manalili. He does not know appellants father
because the latter died in Camotes Island before appellant transferred to Mabolo,
Cebu City. In 1989, appellant married Cherry Mae Elimino from Lutopan, Cebu. After
their marriage, they stayed in Lutopan for a while, and resided in Nivel, Lahug, Cebu
City in October or November 1992.[17]
Perandos said that he has been working as an industrial painter since he was 15 years
old. In December 1992, he was hired to paint the house of Mr. Chua in La Guardia,
Lahug, Cebu City. His companions were appellant, Reynaldo Cardona, Ernesto Dadula
and master painter Nicomedes Baguio who was the head of their group. They started
painting the house of Mr. Chua sometime during the first week of December, but he
did not finish painting the house because he transferred to another painting job at
Basak, Mandaue and stopped working with Mr. Chua about the end of January
1993.[18]
According to Perandos, when they started working at La Guardia, he and Reynaldo
Cardona slept at appellants house. On December 14, 1992, he, appellant and
Reynaldo Cardona started painting the house of Mr. Chua at 8:00 o clock in the
morning and stopped working at 5:00 o clock in the afternoon.Then they proceeded
to the house of appellant together with Reynaldo Cardona and ate supper there at
8:00 o clock in the evening. Appellants wife was not around because she was working
as an entertainer in a karaoke bar. Thereafter, they had a drinking spree, and then
slept in appellants house. The next day, December 15, 1992, they went to work at the
Chuas residence early in the morning and stopped working at 5:00 o clock in the
afternoon. They proceeded to appellants house and arrived there at 6:00 o clock in
the evening. Appellants wife was still around and they ate supper with her. She left
for work at 6:30 in the evening. Appellant was left to take care of their child. After
supper, he, Reynaldo Cardona and appellant were drinking until 10:00 o clock in the
evening.Appellant slept ahead of them at 11:00 o clock that night.[19]
Perandos stated that appellant was working continuously at the Chuas residence
from the first week of December until his arrest at about 7:00 o clock in the evening
of January 21, 1993. He knew of the arrest because appellant was arrested at the side
of his house. At that time, appellant went to his house in order for them to borrow
money from a close friend, money lender Cecilia Cupta.After the arrest, he visited
appellant at Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City and asked why he was
arrested. Appellant said he was only a suspect.[20]
On cross-examination, Perandos said that he was asked to testify by appellants wife,
Cherry Mae, and appellant himself in a letter handcarried by Cherry Mae. In said
letter, appellant also asked Reynaldo Cardona, his neighbor, to testify for
him. Appellants wife paid for his fare.[21]
Defense witness Reynaldo Cupta Cardona, 21, single, elementary graduate, painter,
and a resident of 55-B Cabantan Street, Barangay Mabolo, Cebu City, testified that
appellant resided in Nivel, Lahug, Cebu City. He knew appellant since they worked
together in painting the house of Alfonso Chua at La Guardia, Lahug, Cebu City. Aside
from appellant, his other companions were Jeffrey Perandos, Ernesto Dadula and
Nicolas Baguio. They started painting in December 1992 and finished the work in
February 1993. However, appellant was arrested on January 21, 1993 so only four of
them finished the painting job.[22]
14
Cardona stated that on December 14, 1992, he, appellant and Jeffrey Perandos
started painting the house of Mr. Chua at 7:00 o clock in the morning, and stopped
working at 5:00 o clock in the afternoon. Then they proceeded to the house of
appellant where they slept to save on fare. They ate supper at 6:00 o clock in the
evening together with appellants wife Cherry Mae, who did not work as it was her
day-off. Appellant went to bed at past 7:00 o clock in the evening, and slept with his
child. He and Cherry Mae talked about her work, while Jeffrey Perandos
listened. They all slept at 10:00 to 11:00 o clock that night. The following day,
December 15, 1992, they went to work at Mr. Chuas residence at 7:00 o clock in the
morning. They stopped working at 5:00 o clock in the afternoon, then proceeded to
appellants house. They ate supper at 6:00 o clock in the evening with Cherry Mae as
it was still her day-off. Appellant slept ahead because he had to make his child
sleep. They conversed with Cherry Mae after they cleaned the house, and slept at
past 10:00 o clock that night. The following day, December 16, 1992, he woke up
ahead and prepared his baon at 5:50 in the morning. Appellant and Jeffrey Perandos
woke up at the same time.Appellant played ball with his child. They left for work at
past 6:00 o clock in the morning, and started working at 7:00 o clock. His companions
were appellant, Jeffrey Perandos, Nicolas Baguio and Ernesto Dadula.[23]
On cross-examination, Cardona said that appellants wife requested him to testify in
this case, and gave him P70.00 for fare. On December 3, 1993, she gave him and
Jeffrey Perandos more than P200.00.[24]
On re-direct examination, Cardona clarified that while they were staying at appellants
house when they were then painting the house of Mr. Chua, they contributed money
for their food.[25]
Defense witness Cherry Mae Manalili declared that she was appellants wife.In
December 1992, her husband was a painter. She knew Jeffrey Perandos and Reynaldo
Cardona since the time they had a painting job together with her husband at the
Chuas residence in La Guardia, Lahug, Cebu City. At that time, her family consisting of
her husband and one-year-old child, was residing at Nivel, Lahug, Cebu City. They
rented a room and kitchen from one Nang Ason in the middle of November. She was
then working at the X-O Karaoke Bar. Her work was from 7:30 in the evening to 2:00
o clock in the morning. In June 1993, she transferred to Steves Karaoke Bar where
she is presently employed.[26]
Cherry Mae said that while working with her husband at the Chuas residence,
Perandos and Cardona lived with her family at Nivel, Lahug, Cebu City since December
7, 1992 to minimize travel expenses. They contributed money for their food.[27]
She stated that on December 14, 1992, Perandos and Cardona were still staying with
them. When she left for work at 7:30 in the evening, her husband was at home taking
care of their child. On December 15, 1992, she left for work at about 8:00 o clock in
the evening. Her husband, their son, Perandos and Cardona were left at home. She
arrived home at about 1:20 in the morning after their Christmas party. It was her
husband who opened the door of their house; their child, Perandos and Cardona were
still sleeping.[28]
According to Cherry Mae, Perandos and Cardona stayed in their house from
December 7, 1992 to January 21, 1993. They left when her husband was arrested. At
the time of his arrest, she was in Lutopan, Toledo City as she attended the burial of
her grandmother on January 20, 1993. It was Perandos who informed her that her
husband was arrested at 7:00 o clock in the evening of January 21, 1993 in Mabolo,
Cebu City. He was in Mabolo at that time because he wanted to borrow money.[29]
Appellant Elmer Manalili y Pogio, 24 years old, testified that he was a painter by
profession. He does not know the co-accused Titing Aranas, Angelo Paracueles, Juan
Villa, Gaudencio Tolsidas and Rodrigo Salas. He denied that in the evening of
December 15, 1992, he was at the wharf of Ubay, Bohol.[30]
He is married to Cherry Mae Elemino who is employed as a disco karaoke entertainer
in Cebu City. They got married in 1989, and then lived with his in-laws in Lutopan for
about a year in 1990 before transferring to Lahug, Cebu City.[31]
Appellant stated that in December 1992, they resided in Nivel, Lahug, Cebu City. In
the morning and afternoon of December 15, 1992, he was working as a painter in the
house of Mr. Chua in La Guardia, Lahug. In the evening, he was at home with his wife
and child, Reynaldo Cardona and Jeffrey Perandos. That night, his wife left after 7:00
o clock in the evening and attended a party given by her employer at the X-O Karaoke
Bar.[32]
He was arrested at 7:00 o clock in the evening of January 21, 1993, at Cabantan Street,
Mabolo, Cebu City by policemen without a warrant of arrest.He was in Mabolo to
borrow money from the spouses Cupta, who were neighbors of Jeffrey Perandos. At
that time, his wife was in Lutopan as she attended the burial of her
grandmother. After his arrest, he was brought to Camp Cabahug, Cebu City and then
brought to Bohol on January 24, 1993 and detained at Camp Dagohoy in Tagbilaran
City until September 10, 1993. He was later transferred to the Bohol Detention and
Rehabilitation Center.[33]
According to appellant, while he was in the municipal jail of Ubay, Bohol, about 30
people, whom he did not know, came to see him at his prison cell. Two of them were
15
prosecution witnesses Gervacio Uy and Ernesto Magalona. It was Magalona who
asked him, Who is Elmer Manalili? He answered that he was the one. There were four
inmates then inside the prison cell. Uy did not talk to him, but just took a good look
at him. Magalona pointed at him as one of the pirates and said mao mao, which
means, looked like one of the pirates.[34]
Appellant denied that he was in the vicinity of Ubay, Bohol in the evening of
December 15, 1992. He went to Bohol for the first time when he was brought to
Tagbilaran City after he was arrested by the police in Cebu City.[35]
Although prosecution witness Gervacio Uy testified that one of the pirates who
opened the locker of the quartermaster had a tattoo with the initials GV on his left
hand, the court found no such tatoo mark on appellants left hand.Moreover,
appellants height is 5 feet 7 and 1/2 inches.[36]
The trial court found that prosecution witnesses Gervacio Uy and Ernesto Magalona
identified appellant as one of the pirates. It held that the defense of alibi could not
prevail over said positive identification.[37] On September 2, 1994, the trial court
rendered judgment against appellant, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, this Court finds accused ELMER
MANALILI GUILTY of Qualified Piracy beyond reasonable doubt and hereby sentences
him to a penalty of imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Further, accused Elmer
Manalili is ordered to reimburse and pay complaining witnesses the following:
Complaining witness Gervacio Ong Uy:
1. P30,500.00 - representing cash taken from him by the pirates:
2. P1,500.00 - value of his Seiko watch;
3. P4,000.00 - value of his diamond ring;
4. P10,000.00 - representing actual, exemplary, and moral damages.
B. Complaining witness Ernesto Rodriguez Magalona:
1. P1,000.00 - representing cash taken from him together with his wallet;
2. P10,000.00 - representing cash taken from him togetherwith his wallet;
C. Complaining witness SPO2 Alex Henson Reyes:
1. P200.00 - cash taken from him together with his wallet;
2. P15,288.00 - value of the government issued firearm and live bullets taken by the
pirates;
3. P10,000.00 - representing actual, exemplary, and moral damages.
D. Complaining witness PO3 Saul Cuyno Pino:
1. P80.00 - representing cash taken from him together with his wallet;
2. P4,000.00 - value of his Seiko watch;
3. P10,000.00 - representing actual, exemplary, and moral damages.
But without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Without pronouncement as to Costs.
SO ORDERED.[38]
Appellant Elmer Manalili ascribes to the trial court the following errors:
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE TESTIMONIAL
EVIDENCES BOTH FOR THE PROSECUTION AND THE DEFENSE;
II. THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE
EVIDENCES FOR THE DEFENSE REGARDING THE IDENTITY OF ACCUSED ELMER
MANALILI, RESULTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.[39]
The appeal is meritorious.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in appreciating the testimonial evidence
of both the prosecution and defense which led to his conviction. He argues that the
prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he was one of the pirates
in this case.
We agree. A careful review of the records shows that about twenty minutes after the
vessel M/V J & N Princess left the port of Ubay, Bohol bound for Cebu on December
15, 1992, prosecution witness Gervacio Uy, the operations manager of the vessel,
urinated at the lower deck. After urinating, two persons were standing behind him;
one pointed a gun at his back, while the other held his collar. He was ordered to go
upstairs with them to the third or upper deck where the radio room was located, and
they then destroyed the radio.[40] When asked whether he could identify the two
armed men who initially pointed a gun at him, Uy replied in the affirmative, and stated
that he had identified them through pictures presented by the CIS as Titing Aranas
and Angelo Paracueles. This is reflected in the records thus:
FISCAL:
Q. You said that initially there were two persons after they pointed a gun at you, if
you can see these persons, can you still identify them?
A. Yes, I identified them thru the pictures.
Q. Could you describe to this Honorable Court the description of these two persons?
A. The one who pointed an armalite he was about 56 in height, regular in built, brown
complexion and his age is between 25 and 28 years old.
The second suspect is older, I think about 42 years old, 53 or 54 in height , medium
built, brown complexion.
Q. How about the hair?
A. The hair is straight.
16
Q. How about the second?
A. Black hair and he was carrying like an uzi gun.
Q. You said a while ago that you were showed pictures, where?
A. There were pictures presented by the CIS when I was investigated.
Q. And did you identify those pictures?
A. I positively identified two, one is Titing Aranas and the other Paracuellos, all at
large.[41]
On the other hand, prosecution witness Ernesto Magalona, quartermaster of the
same vessel, testified that while he was lying on his cot at the second deck near the
passage way to the upper deck, someone shouted, Do not move, we are searching
for shabu and uzi gun. Then he saw their manager, Gervacio Uy, being escorted by
two armed men. One was armed with an armalite pointed at Uy; the other was also
armed but he did not see the kind of firearm he was carrying at his waist. He could
identify the two armed men who escorted Uy because he was three to four meters
away from them and the place was well illuminated with fluorescent lights. He
identified one of the armed men as appellant. He said that the other man holding
the armalite was also holding the collar of Uy while pushing him, while appellant
followed fast. Uy and the two armed men eventually reached the third or upper deck
where the armed men destroyed the radio as reported to him by the purser who
came down looking for him from the upper deck.[42] Of the eight pirates, he could only
remember and identify the two armed men who escorted Uy, because their
movements were so fast and coordinated.[43] He stated that from the start the two
armed men, one of whom he identified as the appellant, escorted Uy from the
comfort room at the lower deck to the second deck and then proceeded to the third
or upper deck where the radio room was located. They did always followed Uy, and
he had a good look at them when they passed by the second deck.[44]
From the foregoing, prosecution witness Gervacio Uy identified the two armed men,
who initially pointed a gun at him in the comfort room at the lower deck, and who
ordered him to go with them to the radio room at the third or upper deck, as Titing
Aranas and Angelo Paracueles. On the other hand, prosecution witness Ernesto
Magalona who saw Gervacio Uy and the two armed men as they passed by the second
deck on their way to the third deck, identified one of those two armed men as
appellant Elmer Manalili.
Where eyewitnesses contradict themselves on a vital question, such as the identity
of the offender, the element of reasonable doubt is injected and cannot be lightly
disregarded.[45] The identity of the offender, like the crime itself must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.[46] In the case at bench, there is no positive identification
of the appellant inasmuch as prosecution eyewitnesses Uy and Magalona
contradicted themselves on the identity of the alleged offender.
Moreover, although prosecution witness Gervacio Uy stated that one of the pirates
who opened the locker of Ernesto Magalona had a tattoo on his left hand with the
initials GV, the trial court did not see any tattoo mark on the appellants left hand.[47]
Further, witness Uy declared that he saw appellant for the first time during the
investigation before the municipal judge of Ubay.[48] He told the municipal judge that
appellants face was familiar among the eight seajackers, but Magalona identified
appellant as one of the pirates.[49] Compared with the identification made by
Magalona, Uys statement that appellants face was familiar among the pirates is
characterized by uncertainty. His identification of appellant in the trial court based on
the aforementioned statement retained its doubtful tenor.
Significantly, the passenger named Boiser who allegedly identified the appellant as
one of the pirates before the municipal judge of Ubay was significantly not presented
as a witness by the prosecution. The records show thus:
FISCAL LIGASON:
I would like to made (sic) manifestation, Your Honor, that I did not present Ms. Alma
Casil and Melecio Boiser, they were listed, but after I confronted them that they did
not identify this accused, so that I did not present them, because there are others
who can identify.[50]
From the foregoing, it appears that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant was one of the eight men who committed qualified
piracy in the instant case.
Appellants defense of alibi is generally considered a weak defense.However, it
assumes importance when his identification as an alleged offender in the crime
charged is inconclusive or unreliable.[51] Appellant asserted that at the time of the
piracy in the seawaters of Ubay, Bohol, he was in his residence in Cebu City, and which
alibi was corroborated by Jeffrey Perandos, Reynaldo Cardona and his wife, Cherry
Mae Manalili. Although alibi can be fabricated, it is not always false and without
merit, and when coupled with the improbabilities and uncertainties of the
prosecution evidence, the defense of alibi deserves merit.[52]
Besides, the prosecution has the burden of proof in establishing the guilt of the
accused.[53] When the prosecution fails to discharge its burden, an accused need not
even offer evidence in his behalf.[54] In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the
offender or offenders must be established by proof beyond reasonable
17
doubt.[55] There must be moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind that it was accused-
appellant who committed the crime. Absent this required quantum of evidence
would mean exoneration for accused-appellant.[56] It is our view, therefore, and we
hold that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was
one of the pirates who committed the crime charged. Hence, the appellant must be
acquitted.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
appellant Elmer Manalili is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The Director of Prisons is hereby directed to cause the immediate release of appellant
unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform the Court
accordingly within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
SO ORDERED
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
RA 9372 – Human Security Act of 2007
Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Thirteenth Congress
Third Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the nineteenth day of February, two
thousand seven.
Republic Act No. 9372 March 6, 2007
AN ACT TO SECURE THE STATE AND PROTECT OUR PEOPLE FROM TERRORISM
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Short Title. - This Act shall henceforth be known as the "Human Security
Act of 2007."
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is declared a policy of the State to protect life, liberty,
and property from acts of terrorism, to condemn terrorism as inimical and dangerous
to the national security of the country and to the welfare of the people, and to make
terrorism a crime against the Filipino people, against humanity, and against the law
of nations.
In the implementation of the policy stated above, the State shall uphold the basic
rights and fundamental liberties of the people as enshrined in the Constitution.
The State recognizes that the fight against terrorism requires a comprehensive
approach, comprising political, economic, diplomatic, military, and legal means duly
taking into account the root causes of terrorism without acknowledging these as
justifications for terrorist and/or criminal activities. Such measures shall include
conflict management and post-conflict peace-building, addressing the roots of
conflict by building state capacity and promoting equitable economic development.
Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or diminution of
constitutionally recognized powers of the executive branch of the government. It is
to be understood, however that the exercise of the constitutionally recognized
powers of the executive department of the government shall not prejudice respect
for human rights which shall be absolute and protected at all times.
SEC. 3. Terrorism.- Any person who commits an act punishable under any of the
following provisions of the Revised Penal Code:
a. Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in the Philippine
Waters);
b. Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);
c. Article 134-a (Coup d' Etat), including acts committed by private persons;
d. Article 248 (Murder);
e. Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);
f. Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction), or under
1. Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);
2. Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control
Act of 1990);
3. Republic Act No. 5207, (Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of 1968);
4. Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law);
5. Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974);
and,
6. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal
and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of
Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives)
thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and
panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful demand shall be guilty of the crime of terrorism and shall suffer the penalty
of forty (40) years of imprisonment, without the benefit of parole as provided for
under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended.
18
SEC. 4. Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism. - Persons who conspire to commit the crime
of terrorism shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of the crime of terrorism as defined in Section 3 hereof and decide to
commit the same.
SEC. 5. Accomplice. - Any person who, not being a principal under Article 17 of the
Revised Penal Code or a conspirator as defined in Section 4 hereof, cooperates in the
execution of either the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism by
previous or simultaneous acts shall suffer the penalty of from seventeen (17) years,
four months one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 6. Accessory. - Any person who, having knowledge of the commission of the
crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, and without having
participated therein, either as principal or accomplice under Articles 17 and 18 of the
Revised Penal Code, takes part subsequent to its commission in any of the following
manner: (a) by profiting himself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of
the crime; (b) by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects, or
instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; (c) by harboring, concealing,
or assisting in the escape of the principal or conspirator of the crime, shall suffer the
penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
Notwithstanding the above paragraph, the penalties prescribed for accessories shall
not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants,
descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by
affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling
within the provisions of subparagraph (a).
SEC. 7. Surveillance of Suspects and Interception and Recording of Communications. -
The provisions of Republic Act No. 4200 (Anti-Wire Tapping Law) to the contrary
notwithstanding, a police or law enforcement official and the members of his team
may, upon a written order of the Court of Appeals, listen to, intercept and record,
with the use of any mode, form, kind or type of electronic or other surveillance
equipment or intercepting and tracking devices, or with the use of any other suitable
ways and means for that purpose, any communication, message, conversation,
discussion, or spoken or written words between members of a judicially declared and
outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons or of any person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism.
Provided, That surveillance, interception and recording of communications between
lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their sources and
confidential business correspondence shall not be authorized.
SEC. 8. Formal Application for Judicial Authorization. - The written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals to track down, tap, listen to, intercept,
and record communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or
written words of any person suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of
conspiracy to commit terrorism shall only be granted by the authorizing division of
the Court of Appeals upon an ex parte written application of a police or of a law
enforcement official who has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism
Council created in Section 53 of this Act to file such ex parte application, and upon
examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may
produce to establish: (a) that there is probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the said crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be
committed; (b) that there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that evidence, which is essential to the conviction of any
charged or suspected person for, or to the solution or prevention of, any such crimes,
will be obtained; and, (c) that there is no other effective means readily available for
acquiring such evidence.
SEC. 9. Classification and Contents of the Order of the Court. - The written order
granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals as well as its order, if any,
to extend or renew the same, the original application of the applicant, including his
application to extend or renew, if any, and the written authorizations of the Anti-
Terrorism Council shall be deemed and are hereby declared as classified information:
Provided, That the person being surveilled or whose communications, letters, papers,
messages, conversations, discussions, spoken or written words and effects have been
monitored, listened to, bugged or recorded by law enforcement authorities has the
right to be informed of the acts done by the law enforcement authorities in the
premises or to challenge, if he or she intends to do so, the legality of the interference
before the Court of Appeals which issued the written order. The written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall specify the following: (a) the identity,
such as name and address, if known, of the charged or suspected person whose
communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words
are to be tracked down, tapped, listened to, intercepted, and recorded and, in the
case of radio, electronic, or telephonic (whether wireless or otherwise)
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communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words,
the electronic transmission systems or the telephone numbers to be tracked down,
tapped, listened to, intercepted, and recorded and their locations or if the person
suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is not fully
known, such person shall be subject to continuous surveillance provided there is a
reasonable ground to do so; (b) the identity (name, address, and the police or law
enforcement organization) of the police or of the law enforcement official, including
the individual identity (names, addresses, and the police or law enforcement
organization) of the members of his team, judicially authorized to track down, tap,
listen to, intercept, and record the communications, messages, conversations,
discussions, or spoken or written words; (c) the offense or offenses committed, or
being committed, or sought to be prevented; and, (d) the length of time within which
the authorization shall be used or carried out.
SEC. 10. Effective Period of Judicial Authorization. - Any authorization granted by the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 9(d) of this Act, shall
only be effective for the length of time specified in the written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which shall not exceed a period of thirty
(30) days from the date of receipt of the written order of the authorizing division of
the Court of Appeals by the applicant police or law enforcement official.
The authorizing division of the Court of Appeals may extend or renew the said
authorization for another non-extendible period, which shall not exceed thirty (30)
days from the expiration of the original period: Provided, That the authorizing division
of the Court of Appeals is satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public
interest: and Provided, further, That the ex parte application for extension or renewal,
which must be filed by the original applicant, has been duly authorized in writing by
the Anti-Terrorism Council.
In case of death of the original applicant or in case he is physically disabled to file the
application for extension or renewal, the one next in rank to the original applicant
among the members of the team named in the original written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall file the application for extension or
renewal: Provided, That, without prejudice to the liability of the police or law
enforcement personnel under Section 20 hereof, the applicant police or law
enforcement official shall have thirty (30) days after the termination of the period
granted by the Court of Appeals as provided in the preceding paragraphs within which
to file the appropriate case before the Public Prosecutor's Office for any violation of
this Act.
If no case is filed within the thirty (30)-day period, the applicant police or law
enforcement official shall immediately notify the person subject of the surveillance,
interception and recording of the termination of the said surveillance, interception
and recording. The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment shall be imposed upon the applicant police or law enforcement official
who fails to notify the person subject of the surveillance, monitoring, interception
and recording as specified above.
SEC. 11. Custody of Intercepted and Recorded Communications. - All tapes, discs, and
recordings made pursuant to the authorization of the authorizing division of the Court
of Appeals, including all excerpts and summaries thereof as well as all written notes
or memoranda made in connection therewith, shall, within forty-eight (48) hours
after the expiration of the period fixed in the written order of the authorizing division
of the Court of Appeals or within forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration of any
extension or renewal granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, be
deposited with the authorizing Division of the Court of Appeals in a sealed envelope
or sealed package, as the case may be, and shall be accompanied by a joint affidavit
of the applicant police or law enforcement official and the members of his team.
In case of death of the applicant or in case he is physically disabled to execute the
required affidavit, the one next in rank to the applicant among the members of the
team named in the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals
shall execute with the members of the team that required affidavit.
It shall be unlawful for any person, police officer or any custodian of the tapes, discs
and recording, and their excerpts and summaries, written notes or memoranda to
copy in whatever form, to remove, delete, expunge, incinerate, shred or destroy in
any manner the items enumerated above in whole or in part under any pretext
whatsoever.
Any person who removes, deletes, expunges, incinerates, shreds or destroys the
items enumerated above shall suffer a penalty of not less than six years and one day
to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 12. Contents of Joint Affidavit. - The joint affidavit of the police or of the law
enforcement official and the individual members of his team shall state: (a) the
number of tapes, discs, and recordings that have been made, as well as the number
of excerpts and summaries thereof and the number of written notes and memoranda,
if any, made in connection therewith; (b) the dates and times covered by each of such
tapes, discs, and recordings; (c) the number of tapes, discs, and recordings, as well as
the number of excerpts and summaries thereof and the number of written notes and
20
memoranda made in connection therewith that have been included in the deposit;
and (d) the date of the original written authorization granted by the Anti-Terrorism
Council to the applicant to file the ex parte application to conduct the tracking down,
tapping, intercepting, and recording, as well as the date of any extension or renewal
of the original written authority granted by the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals.
The joint affidavit shall also certify under oath that no duplicates or copies of the
whole or any part of any of such tapes, discs, and recordings, and that no duplicates
or copies of the whole or any part of any of such excerpts, summaries, written notes,
and memoranda, have been made, or, if made, that all such duplicates and copies are
included in the sealed envelope or sealed package, as the case may be, deposited
with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals.
It shall be unlawful for any person, police or law enforcement official to omit or
exclude from the joint affidavit any item or portion thereof mentioned in this Section.
Any person, police or law enforcement officer who violates any of the acts prescribed
in the preceding paragraph shall suffer the penalty of not less than ten (10) years and
one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 13. Disposition of Deposited Material. -The sealed envelope or sealed package
and the contents thereof, which are deposited with the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals, shall be deemed and are hereby declared classified information,
and the sealed envelope or sealed package shall not be opened and its contents
(including the tapes, discs, and recordings and all the excerpts and summaries thereof
and the notes and memoranda made in connection therewith) shall not be divulged,
revealed, read, replayed, or used as evidence unless authorized by written order of
the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which written order shall be granted
only upon a written application of the Department of Justice filed before the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals and only upon a showing that the
Department of Justice has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism
Council to file the application with proper written notice the person whose
conversation, communication, message discussion or spoken or written words have
been the subject of surveillance, monitoring, recording and interception to open,
reveal, divulge, and use the contents of the sealed envelope or sealed package as
evidence.
Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to
notify in writing the persons subject of the surveillance as defined above shall suffer
the penalty of six years and one day to eight years of imprisonment.
SEC. 14. Application to Open Deposited Sealed Envelope or Sealed Package. - The
written application with notice to the party concerned to open the deposited sealed
envelope or sealed package shall clearly state the purpose or reason: (a) for opening
the sealed envelope or sealed package; (b) for revealing or disclosing its classified
contents; (c) for replaying, divulging, and or reading any of the listened to,
intercepted, and recorded communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or
spoken or written words (including any of the excerpts and summaries thereof and
any of the notes or memoranda made in connection therewith); [ and, (d) for using
any of said listened to, intercepted, and recorded communications, messages,
conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words (including any of the excerpts
and summaries thereof and any of the notes or memoranda made in connection
therewith) as evidence.
Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to
notify as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one day to eight years
of imprisonment.
SEC. 15. Evidentiary Value of Deposited Materials. - Any listened to, intercepted, and
recorded communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or
written words, or any part or parts thereof, or any information or fact contained
therein, including their existence, content, substance, purport, effect, or meaning,
which have been secured in violation of the pertinent provisions of this Act, shall
absolutely not be admissible and usable as evidence against anybody in any judicial,
quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or
hearing.
SEC. 16. Penalty for Unauthorized or Malicious Interceptions and/or Recordings. - Any
police or law enforcement personnel who, not being authorized to do so by the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, tracks down, taps, listens to, intercepts,
and records in whatever manner or form any communication, message, conversation,
discussion, or spoken or written word of a person charged with or suspected of the
crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of
an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12)
years of imprisonment.
In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other
offense, the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment and the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from
public office shall be imposed upon any police or law enforcement personnel who
maliciously obtained an authority from the Court of Appeals to track down, tap, listen
21
to, intercept, and record in whatever manner or form any communication, message,
conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words of a person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism: Provided, That
notwithstanding Section 13 of this Act, the party aggrieved by such authorization shall
be allowed access to the sealed envelope or sealed package and the contents thereof
as evidence for the prosecution of any police or law enforcement personnel who
maliciously procured said authorization.
SEC. 17. Proscription of Terrorist Organizations, Association, or Group of Persons. - Any
organization, association, or group of persons organized for the purpose of engaging
in terrorism, or which, although not organized for that purpose, actually uses the acts
to terrorize mentioned in this Act or to sow and create a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in order to coerce the government
to give in to an unlawful demand shall, upon application of the Department of Justice
before a competent Regional Trial Court, with due notice and opportunity to be heard
given to the organization, association, or group of persons concerned, be declared as
a terrorist and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons by the said
Regional Trial Court.
SEC. 18. Period of Detention Without Judicial Warrant of Arrest. - The provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to the contrary notwithstanding, any police or
law enforcement personnel, who, having been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-
Terrorism Council has taken custody of a person charged with or suspected of the
crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall, without
incurring any criminal liability for delay in the delivery of detained persons to the
proper judicial authorities, deliver said charged or suspected person to the proper
judicial authority within a period of three days counted from the moment the said
charged or suspected person has been apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken
into custody by the said police, or law enforcement personnel: Provided, That the
arrest of those suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism
must result from the surveillance under Section 7 and examination of bank deposits
under Section 27 of this Act.
The police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall, before detaining the
person suspected of the crime of terrorism, present him or her before any judge at
the latter's residence or office nearest the place where the arrest took place at any
time of the day or night. It shall be the duty of the judge, among other things, to
ascertain the identity of the police or law enforcement personnel and the person or
persons they have arrested and presented before him or her, to inquire of them the
reasons why they have arrested the person and determine by questioning and
personal observation whether or not the suspect has been subjected to any physical,
moral or psychological torture by whom and why. The judge shall then submit a
written report of what he/she had observed when the subject was brought before
him to the proper court that has jurisdiction over the case of the person thus arrested.
The judge shall forthwith submit his/her report within three calendar days from the
time the suspect was brought to his/her residence or office.
Immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime
of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, the police or law enforcement
personnel shall notify in writing the judge of the court nearest the place of
apprehension or arrest: Provided ,That where the arrest is made during Saturdays,
Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the written notice shall be served at the
residence of the judge nearest the place where the accused was arrested.
The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall
be imposed upon the police or law enforcement personnel who fails to notify and
judge as Provided in the preceding paragraph.
SEC. 19. Period of Detention in the Event of an Actual or Imminent Terrorist Attack. - In
the event of an actual or imminent terrorist attack, suspects may not be detained for
more than three days without the written approval of a municipal, city, provincial or
regional official of a Human Rights Commission or judge of the municipal, regional
trial court, the Sandiganbayan or a justice of the Court of Appeals nearest the place
of the arrest. If the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office
hours, the arresting police or law enforcement personnel shall bring the person thus
arrested to the residence of any of the officials mentioned above that is nearest the
place where the accused was arrested. The approval in writing of any of the said
officials shall be secured by the police or law enforcement personnel concerned
within five days after the date of the detention of the persons concerned: Provided,
however, That within three days after the detention the suspects, whose connection
with the terror attack or threat is not established, shall be released immediately.
SEC. 20. Penalty for Failure to Deliver Suspect to the Proper Judicial Authority within
Three Days. - The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment shall be imposed upon any police or law enforcement personnel who
has apprehended or arrested, detained and taken custody of a person charged with
or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism and fails to
deliver such charged or suspected person to the proper judicial authority within the
period of three days.
22
SEC. 21. Rights of a Person under Custodial Detention. - The moment a person charged
with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit
terrorism is apprehended or arrested and detained, he shall forthwith be informed,
by the arresting police or law enforcement officers or by the police or law
enforcement officers to whose custody the person concerned is brought, of his or her
right: (a) to be informed of the nature and cause of his arrest, to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel of his or her choice, the police or law
enforcement officers concerned shall immediately contact the free legal assistance
unit of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) or the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).
It shall be the duty of the free legal assistance unit of the IBP or the PAO thus
contacted to immediately visit the person(s) detained and provide him or her with
legal assistance. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of the counsel of choice; (b) informed of the cause or causes of his detention in the
presence of his legal counsel; (c) allowed to communicate freely with his legal counsel
and to confer with them at any time without restriction; (d) allowed to communicate
freely and privately without restrictions with the members of his family or with his
nearest relatives and to be visited by them; and, (e) allowed freely to avail of the
service of a physician or physicians of choice.
SEC. 22. Penalty for Violation of the Rights of a Detainee. - Any police or law
enforcement personnel, or any personnel of the police or other law enforcement
custodial unit that violates any of the aforesaid rights of a person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism
shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day
to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
Unless the police or law enforcement personnel who violated the rights of a detainee
or detainees as stated above is duly identified, the same penalty shall be imposed on
the police officer or hear or leader of the law enforcement unit having custody of the
detainee at the time the violation was done.
SEC. 23. Requirement for an Official Custodial Logbook and its Contents. - The police or
other law enforcement custodial unit in whose care and control the person charged
with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit
terrorism has been placed under custodial arrest and detention shall keep a securely
and orderly maintained official logbook, which is hereby declared as a public
document and opened to and made available for .the inspection and scrutiny of the
lawyer or lawyers of the person under custody or any member of his or her family or
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree or his or her
physician at any time of the day or night without any form of restriction. The logbook
shall contain a clear and concise record of: (a) the name, description, and address of
the detained person; (b) the date and exact time of his initial admission for custodial
arrest and detention; (c) the name and address of the physician or physicians who
examined him physically and medically; (d) the state of his health and physical
condition at the time of his initial admission for custodial detention; (e) the date and
time of each removal of the detained person from his cell for interrogation or for any
purpose; (f) the date and time of his return to his cell; (g) the name and address of
the physician or physicians who physically and medically examined him after each
interrogation; (h) a summary of the physical and medical findings on the detained
person after each of such interrogation; (i) the names and addresses of his family
members and nearest relatives, if any and if available; (j) the names and addresses of
persons, who visit the detained person; (k) the date and time of each of such visits;
(1) the date and time of each request of the detained person to communicate and
confer with his legal counsel or counsels; (m) the date and time of each visit, and date
and time of each departure of his legal counsel or counsels; and, (n) all other
important events bearing on and all relevant details regarding the treatment of the
detained person while under custodial arrest and detention.
The said police or law enforcement custodial unit shall upon demand of the
aforementioned lawyer or lawyers or members of the family or relatives within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the person under custody or his or
her physician issue a certified true copy of the entries of the logbook relative to the
concerned detained person without delay or restriction or requiring any fees
whatsoever including documentary stamp tax, notarial fees, and the like. This
certified true copy may be attested by the person who has custody of the logbook or
who allowed the party concerned to scrutinize it at the time the demand for the
certified true copy is made.
The police or other law enforcement custodial unit who fails to comply with the
preceding paragraph to keep an official logbook shall suffer the penalty of ten (10)
years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 24. No Torture or Coercion in Investigation and Interrogation. - No threat,
intimidation, or coercion, and no act which will inflict any form of physical pain or
torment, or mental, moral, or psychological pressure, on the detained person, which
shall vitiate his freewill, shall be employed in his investigation and interrogation for
the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; otherwise, the
23
evidence obtained from said detained person resulting from such threat,
intimidation, or coercion, or from such inflicted physical pain or torment, or mental,
moral, or psychological pressure, shall be, in its entirety, absolutely not admissible
and usable as evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative
investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.
SEC. 25. Penalty for Threat, Intimidation, Coercion, or Torture in the Investigation and
Interrogation of a Detained Person. - Any person or persons who use threat,
intimidation, or coercion, or who inflict physical pain or torment, or mental, moral, or
psychological pressure, which shall vitiate the free-will of a charged or suspected
person under investigation and interrogation for the crime of terrorism or the crime
of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the
penalty of twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment.
When death or serious permanent disability of said detained person occurs as a
consequence of the use of such threat, intimidation, or coercion, or as a consequence
of the infliction on him of such physical pain or torment, or as a consequence of the
infliction on him of such mental, moral, or psychological pressure, the penalty shall
be twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 26. Restriction on Travel. - In cases where evidence of guilt is not strong, and the
person charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is
entitled to bail and is granted the same, the court, upon application by the
prosecutor, shall limit the right of travel of the accused to within the municipality or
city where he resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of national security
and public safety, consistent with Article III, Section 6 of the Constitution. Travel
outside of said municipality or city, without the authorization of the court, shall be
deemed a violation of the terms and conditions of his bail, which shall then be
forfeited as provided under the Rules of Court.
He/she may also be placed under house arrest by order of the court at his or her usual
place of residence.
While under house arrest, he or she may not use telephones, cellphones, e-mails,
computers, the internet or other means of communications with people outside the
residence until otherwise ordered by the court.
The restrictions abovementioned shall be terminated upon the acquittal of the
accused or of the dismissal of the case filed against him or earlier upon the discretion
of the court on motion of the prosecutor or of the accused.
SEC. 27. Judicial Authorization Required to Examine Bank Deposits, Accounts, and
Records. - The provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 as amended, to the contrary
notwithstanding, the justices of the Court of Appeals designated as a special court to
handle anti-terrorism cases after satisfying themselves of the existence of probable
cause in a hearing called for that purpose that: (1) a person charged with or suspected
of the crime of terrorism or, conspiracy to commit terrorism, (2) of a judicially
declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; and
(3) of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association,
or group of persons, may authorize in writing any police or law enforcement officer
and the members of his/her team duly authorized in writing by the anti-terrorism
council to: (a) examine, or cause the examination of, the deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets and records in a bank or financial institution; and (b) gather or cause
the gathering of any relevant information about such deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets, and records from a bank or financial institution. The bank or
financial institution concerned, shall not refuse to allow such examination or to
provide the desired information, when so, ordered by and served with the written
order of the Court of Appeals.
SEC. 28. Application to Examine Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. - The written
order of the Court of Appeals authorizing the examination of bank deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets, and records: (1) of a person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) of any
judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of
persons, or (3) of any member of such organization, association, or group of persons
in a bank or financial institution, and the gathering of any relevant information about
the same from said bank or financial institution, shall only be granted by the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals upon an ex parte application to that effect
of a police or of a law enforcement official who has been duly authorized in writing
to file such ex parte application by the Anti-Terrorism Council created in Section 53
of this Act to file such ex parte application, and upon examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and, the witnesses he may produce to establish the facts
that will justify the need and urgency of examining and freezing the bank deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets, and records: (1) of the person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) of a
judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association or group of
persons; or (3) of any member of such organization, association, or group of persons.
SEC. 29. Classification and Contents of the Court Order Authorizing the Examination of
Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. - The written order granted by the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals as well as its order, if any, to extend or renew the
24
same, the original ex parte application of the applicant, including his ex parte
application to extend or renew, if any, and the written authorizations of the Anti-
Terrorism Council, shall be deemed and are hereby declared as classified information:
Provided, That the person whose bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets,
and records have been examined, frozen, sequestered and seized by law
enforcement authorities has the right to be informed of the acts done by the law
enforcement authorities in the premises or to challenge, if he or she intends to do so,
the legality of the interference. The written order of the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals designated to handle cases involving terrorism shall specify: (a) the
identify of the said: (1) person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
organization, association, or group of persons; and (3) member of such judicially
declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons, as the case
may be. whose deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records are to be
examined or the information to be gathered; (b) the identity of the bank or financial
Institution where such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records are
held and maintained; (c) the identity of the persons who will conduct the said
examination and the gathering of the desired information; and, (d) the length of time
the authorization shall be carried out.
SEC. 30. Effective Period of Court Authorization to Examine and Obtain Information on
Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. - The authorization issued or granted by the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals to examine or cause the examination of
and to freeze bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records, or to
gather information about the same, shall be effective for the length of time specified
in the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which shall
not exceed a period of thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of the written order
of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals by the applicant police or law
enforcement official.
The authorizing division of the Court of Appeals may extend or renew the said
authorization for another period, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days renewable
to another thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original period: Provided, That
the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals is satisfied that such extension or
renewal is in the public interest: and, Provided, further, That the application for
extension or renewal, which must be filed by the original applicant, has been duly
authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council.
In case of death of the original applicant or in case he is physically disabled to file the
application for extension or renewal, the one next in rank to the original applicant
among the members of the ream named in the original written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall file the application for extension or
renewal: Provided, That, without prejudice to the liability of the police or law
enforcement personnel under Section 19 hereof, the applicant police or law
enforcement official shall have thirty (30) days after the termination of the period
granted by the Court of Appeals as provided in the preceding paragraphs within which
to file the appropriate case before the Public Prosecutor's Office for any violation of
this Act.
If no case is filed within the thirty (30)-day period, the applicant police or law
enforcement official shall immediately notify in writing the person subject of the bank
examination and freezing of bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and
records. The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment shall be imposed upon the applicant police or law enforcement official
who fails to notify in writing the person subject of the bank examination and freezing
of bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records.
Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to
notify in writing as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one day to
eight years of imprisonment.
SEC. 31. Custody of Bank Data and Information Obtained after Examination of Deposits,
Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and Records. - All information, data, excerpts,
summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, and other documents
obtained from the examination of the bank deposits, placements, trust accounts,
assets and records of: (1) a person charged with or suspected of the crime of
terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially declared and
outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) a member of
any such organization, association, or group of persons shall, within forty-eight (48)
hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the written order of the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals or within forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration
of the extension or renewal granted by the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals, be deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals in a sealed
envelope or sealed package, as the case may be, and shall be accompanied by a joint
affidavit of the applicant police or law enforcement official and the persons who
actually conducted the examination of said bank deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets and records.
25
SEC. 32. Contents of Joint Affidavit. - The joint affidavit shall state: (a) the identifying
marks, numbers, or symbols of the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and
records examined; (b) the identity and address of the bank or financial institution
where such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records are held and
maintained; (c) the number of bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and
records discovered, examined, and frozen; (d) the outstanding balances of each of
such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets; (e) all information, data, excerpts,
summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, documents, records
examined and placed in the sealed envelope or sealed package deposited with the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals; (f) the date of the original written
authorization granted by the Anti-Terrorism Council to the applicant to file the ex
parte Application to conduct the examination of the said bank deposits, placements,
trust accounts, assets and records, as well as the date of any extension or renewal of
the original written authorization granted by the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals; and (g) that the items Enumerated were all that were found in the bank or
financial institution examined at the time of the completion of the examination.
The joint affidavit shall also certify under oath that no duplicates or copies of the
information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports,
and documents acquired from the examination of the bank deposits, placements,
trust accounts, assets and records have been made, or, if made, that all such
duplicates and copies are placed in the sealed envelope or sealed package deposited
with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals.
It shall be unlawful for any person, police officer or custodian of the bank data and
information obtained after examination of deposits, placements, trust accounts,
assets and records to copy, to remove, delete, expunge, incinerate, shred or destroy
in any manner the items enumerated above in whole or in part under any pretext
whatsoever,
Any person who copies, removes, deletes, expunges, incinerates, shreds or destroys
the items enumerated above shall suffer a penalty of not less than six years and one
day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 33. Disposition of Bank Materials. - The sealed envelope or sealed package and
the contents thereof, which are deposited with the authorizing division of the Court
of Appeals, shall be deemed and are hereby declared classified information and the
sealed envelope or sealed package shall not be opened and its contents shall not be
divulged, revealed, read, or used as evidence unless authorized in a written order of
the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which written order shall be granted
only upon a written application of the Department of Justice filed before the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals and only upon a showing that the
Department of Justice has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism
Council to file the application, with notice in writing to the party concerned not later
than three days before the scheduled opening, to open, reveal, divulge, and use the
contents of the sealed envelope or sealed package as evidence.
Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to
notify in writing as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one day to
eight years of imprisonment.
SEC. 34. Application to Open Deposited Bank Materials. - The written application, with
notice in writing to the party concerned not later than three days of the scheduled
opening, to open the sealed envelope or sealed package shall clearly state the
purpose and reason: (a) for opening the sealed envelope or sealed package; (b) for
revealing and disclosing its classified contents; and, (c) for using the classified
information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports,
and documents as evidence.
SEC. 35. Evidentiary Value of Deposited Bank Materials. - Any information, data,
excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, work sheets, reports, or documents
acquired from the examination of the bank deposits, placements, trust accounts,
assets and records of: (1) a person charged or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially declared and outlawed
terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) a member of such
organization, association, or group of persons, which have been secured in violation
of the provisions of this Act, shall absolutely not be admissible and usable as evidence
against anybody in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative
investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.
SEC. 36. Penalty for Unauthorized or Malicious Examination of a Bank or a Financial
Institution. - Any person, police or law enforcement personnel who examines the
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, or records in a bank or financial
institution of: (1) a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the
crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially declared and outlawed
terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) a member of such
organization, association, or group of persons, without being authorized to do so by
the Court of Appeals, shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten
(10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
26
In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other
offense, the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment shall be imposed upon any police or law enforcement personnel, who
maliciously obtained an authority from the Court of Appeals to examine the deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets, or records in a bank or financial institution of: (1)
a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism; (2) a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or
group of persons; or (3) a member of such organization, association, or group of
persons: Provided, That notwithstanding Section 33 of this Act, the party aggrieved
by such authorization shall upon motion duly filed be allowed access to the sealed
envelope or sealed package and the contents thereof as evidence for the prosecution
of any police or law enforcement personnel who maliciously procured said
authorization.
SEC. 37. Penalty of Bank Officials and Employees Defying a Court Authorization. - An
employee, official, or a member of the board of directors of a bank or financial
institution, who refuses to allow the examination of the deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets, and records of: (1) a person charged with or suspected of the crime
of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially declared
and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) a member of such
judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons in said
bank or financial institution, when duly served with the written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, shall be guilty of an offense and shall
suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 38. Penalty for False or Untruthful Statement or Misrepresentation of Material
Fact in Joint Affidavits. - Any false or untruthful statement or misrepresentation of
material fact in the joint affidavits required respectively in Section 12 and Section 32
of this Act shall constitute a criminal offense and the affiants shall suffer individually
the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 39. Seizure and Sequestration. - The deposits and their outstanding balances,
placements, trust accounts, assets, and records in any bank or financial institution,
moneys, businesses, transportation and communication equipment, supplies and
other implements, and property of whatever kind and nature belonging: (1) to any
person suspected of or charged before a competent Regional Trial Court for the crime
of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) to a judicially
declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) to a
member of such organization, association, or group of persons shall be seized,
sequestered, and frozen in order to prevent their use, transfer, or conveyance for
purposes that are inimical to the safety and security of the people or injurious to the
interest of the State.
The accused or a person suspected of may withdraw such sums as may be reasonably
needed by the monthly needs of his family including the services of his or her counsel
and his or her family's medical needs upon approval of the court. He or she may also
use any of his property that is under seizure or sequestration or frozen because of
his/her indictment as a terrorist upon permission of the court for any legitimate
reason.
Any person who unjustifiably refuses to follow the order of the proper division of the
Court of Appeals to allow the person accused of the crime of terrorism or of the crime
of conspiracy to commit terrorism to withdraw such sums from sequestered or frozen
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records as may be necessary for the
regular sustenance of his/her family or to use any of his/her property that has been
seized, sequestered or frozen for legitimate purposes while his/her case is pending
shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment.
SEC. 40. Nature of Seized. Sequestered and Frozen Bank Deposits, Placements, Trust
Accounts, Assets and Records. - The seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets and records belonging to a person suspected of or
charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be
deemed as property held in trust by the bank or financial institution for such person
and the government during the pendency of the investigation of the person
suspected of or during the pendency of the trial of the person charged with any of
the said crimes, as the case may be and their use or disposition while the case is
pending shall be subject to the approval of the court before which the case or cases
are pending.
SEC. 41. Disposition of the Seized, Sequestered and Frozen Bank Deposits, Placements,
Trust Accounts, Assets and Record. - If the person suspected of or charged with the
crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is found, after his investigation,
to be innocent by the investigating body, or is acquitted, after his arraignment or his
case is dismissed before his arraignment by a competent court, the seizure,
sequestration and freezing of his bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets
and records shall forthwith be deemed lifted by the investigating body or by the
competent court, as the case may be, and his bank deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets and records shall be deemed released from such seizure,
27
sequestration and freezing, and shall be restored to him without any delay by the
bank or financial institution concerned without any further action on his part. The
filing of any appeal on motion for reconsideration shall not state the release of said
funds from seizure, sequestration and freezing.
If the person charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism
is convicted by a final judgment of a competent trial court, his seized, sequestered
and frozen bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records shall be
automatically forfeited in favor of the government.
Upon his or her acquittal or the dismissal of the charges against him or her, the
amount of Five hundred thousand pesos (P500.000.00) a day for the period in which
his properties, assets or funds were seized shall be paid to him on the concept of
liquidated damages. The amount shall be taken from the appropriations of the police
or law enforcement agency that caused the filing of the enumerated charges against
him/her.
SEC. 42. Penalty for Unjustified Refusal to Restore or Delay in Restoring Seized,
Sequestered and Frozen Bank Deposits, Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and
Records. - Any person who unjustifiably refuses to restore or delays the restoration of
seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and
records of a person suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy
to commit terrorism after such suspected person has been found innocent by the
investigating body or after the case against such charged person has been dismissed
or after he is acquitted by a competent court shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years
and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 43. Penalty for the Loss, Misuse, Diversion or Dissipation of Seized, Sequestered
and Frozen Bank Deposits, Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and Records. - Any
person who is responsible for the loss, misuse, diversion, or dissipation of the whole
or any part of the seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets and records of a person suspected of or charged with the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years
and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 44. Infidelity in the Custody of Detained Persons. - Any public officer who has
direct custody of a detained person or under the provisions of this Act and who by his
deliberate act, misconduct, or inexcusable negligence causes or allows the escape of
such detained person shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of: (a)
twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment, if the detained
person has already been convicted and sentenced in a final judgment of a competent
court; and (b) six years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment, if the
detained person has not been convicted and sentenced in a final judgment of a
competent court.
SEC. 45. Immunity and Protection of Government Witnesses. - The provisions of
Republic Act No. 6981 (Witness Protection, Security and Benefits Act) to the contrary
notwithstanding, the immunity of government witnesses testifying under this Act
shall be governed by Sections 17 and 18 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court: Provided,
however, That said witnesses shall be entitled to benefits granted to witnesses under
said Republic Act No.6981.
SEC. 46. Penalty for Unauthorized Revelation of Classified Materials. - The penalty of
ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed
upon any person, police or law enforcement agent, judicial officer or civil servant
who, not being authorized by the Court of Appeals to do so, reveals in any manner or
form any classified information under this Act.
SEC. 47. Penalty for Furnishing False Evidence, Forged Document, or Spurious
Evidence. - The penalty of twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of
imprisonment shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly furnishes false
testimony, forged document or spurious evidence in any investigation or hearing
under this Act.
SEC. 48. Continuous Trial. - In cases of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism,
the judge shall set the continuous trial on a daily basis from Monday to Friday or other
short-term trial calendar so as to ensure speedy trial.
SEC. 49. Prosecution Under This Act Shall be a Bar to Another Prosecution under the
Revised Penal Code or any Special Penal Laws. - When a person has been prosecuted
under a provision of this Act, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused
had pleaded to the charge, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
shall be a bar to another prosecution for any offense or felony which is necessarily
included in the offense charged under this Act.
SEC. 50. Damages for Unproven Charge of Terrorism. - Upon acquittal, any person who
is accused of terrorism shall be entitled to the payment of damages in the amount of
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) for every day that he or she has been
detained or deprived of liberty or arrested without a warrant as a result of such an
accusation. The amount of damages shall be automatically charged against the
appropriations of the police agency or the Anti-Terrorism Council that brought or
sanctioned the filing of the charges against the accused. It shall also be released
28
within fifteen (15) days from the date of the acquittal of the accused. The award of
damages mentioned above shall be without prejudice to the right of the acquitted
accused to file criminal or administrative charges against those responsible for
charging him with the case of terrorism.
Any officer, employee, personnel, or person who delays the release or refuses to
release the amounts awarded to the individual acquitted of the crime of terrorism as
directed in the paragraph immediately preceding shall suffer the penalty of six
months of imprisonment.
If the deductions are less than the amounts due to the detained persons, the amount
needed to complete the compensation shall be taken from the current appropriations
for intelligence, emergency, social or other funds of the Office of the President.
In the event that the amount cannot be covered by the current budget of the police
or law enforcement agency concerned, the amount shall be automatically included in
the appropriations of the said agency for the coming year.
SEC. 51. Duty to Record and Report the Name and Address of the Informant. - The police
or law enforcement officers to whom the name or a suspect in the crime of terrorism
was first revealed shall record the real name and the specific address of the
informant.
The police or law enforcement officials concerned shall report the informant's name
and address to their superior officer who shall transmit the information to the
Congressional Oversight Committee or to the proper court within five days after the
suspect was placed under arrest or his properties were sequestered, seized or frozen.
The name and address of the informant shall be considered confidential and shall not
be unnecessarily revealed until after the proceedings against the suspect shall have
been terminated.
SEC. 52. Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. - The provisions of Book I of the
Revised Penal Code shall be applicable to this Act.
SEC. 53. Anti-Terrorism Council. - An Anti-Terrorism Council, hereinafter referred to,
for brevity, as the "Council," is hereby created. The members of the Council are: (1)
the Executive Secretary, who shall be its Chairperson; (2) the Secretary of Justice, who
shall be its Vice Chairperson; and (3) the Secretary of Foreign Affairs; (4) the Secretary
of National Defense; (5) the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government; (6) the
Secretary of Finance; and (7) the National Security Advisor, as its other members.
The Council shall implement this Act and assume the responsibility for the proper and
effective implementation of the anti-terrorism policy of the country. The Council shall
keep records of its proceedings and decisions. All records of the Council shall be
subject to such security classifications as the Council may, in its judgment and
discretion, decide to adopt to safeguard the safety of the people, the security of the
Republic, and the welfare of the nation.
The National Intelligence Coordinating Agency shall be the Secretariat of the Council.
The Council shall define the powers, duties, and functions of the National Intelligence
Coordinating Agency as Secretariat of the Council. The National Bureau of
Investigation, the Bureau of Immigration, the Office of Civil Defense, the Intelligence
Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Anti-Money Laundering Council,
the Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and the Philippine National Police
intelligence and investigative elements shall serve as support agencies for the
Council.
The Council shall formulate and adopt comprehensive, adequate, efficient, and
effective anti-terrorism plans, programs, and counter-measures to suppress and
eradicate terrorism in the country and to protect the people from acts of terrorism.
Nothing herein shall be interpreted to empower the Anti-Terrorism Council to
exercise any judicial or quasi-judicial power or authority.
SEC. 54. Functions of the Council. - In pursuit of its mandate in the previous Section,
the Council shall have the following functions with due regard for the rights of the
people as mandated by the Constitution and pertinent laws:
1. Formulate and adopt plans, programs and counter-measures against terrorists and
acts of terrorism in the country;
2. Coordinate all national efforts to suppress and eradicate acts of terrorism in the
country and mobilize the entire nation against terrorism prescribed in this Act;
3. Direct the speedy investigation and prosecution of all persons accused or detained
for the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism and other offenses
punishable under this Act, and monitor the progress of their cases;
4. Establish and maintain comprehensive data-base information system on terrorism,
terrorist activities, and counter-terrorism operations;
5. Freeze the funds property, bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and
records belonging to a person suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9160, otherwise known
as the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, as amended;
6. Grant monetary rewards and other incentives to informers who give vital
information leading to the apprehension, arrest, detention, prosecution, and
conviction of person or persons who are liable for the crime of terrorism or conspiracy
to commit terrorism;
29
7. Establish and maintain coordination with and the cooperation and assistance of
other nations in the struggle against international terrorism; and
8. Request the Supreme Court to designate specific divisions of the Court of Appeals
and Regional Trial Courts in Manila, Cebu City and Cagayan de Oro City, as the case
may be, to handle all cases involving the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism and all matters incident to said crimes. The Secretary of Justice shall assign
a team of prosecutors from: (a) Luzon to handle terrorism cases filed in the Regional
Trial Court in Manila; (b) from the Visayas to handle cases filed in Cebu City; and (c)
from Mindanao to handle cases filed in Cagayan de Oro City.
SEC. 55. Role of the Commission on Human Rights. - The Commission on Human Rights
shall give the highest priority to the investigation and prosecution of violations of civil
and political rights of persons in relation to the implementation of this Act; and for
this purpose, the Commission shall have the concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute
public officials, law enforcers, and other persons who may have violated the civil and
political rights of persons suspected of, or detained for the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism.
SEC. 56. Creation of a Grievance Committee. - There is hereby created a Grievance
Committee composed of the Ombudsman, as chair, and the Solicitor General, and an
undersecretary from the Department of Justice (DOJ), as members, to receive and
evaluate complaints against the actuations of the police and law enforcement officials
in the implementation of this Act. The Committee shall hold office in Manila. The
Committee shall have three subcommittees that will be respectively headed by the
Deputy Ombudsmen in Luzon, the Visayas and Mindanao. The subcommittees shall
respectively hold office at the Offices of Deputy Ombudsman. Three Assistant
Solicitors General designated by the Solicitor General, and the regional prosecutors
of the DOJ assigned to the regions where the Deputy Ombudsmen hold office shall
be members thereof. The three subcommittees shall assist the Grievance Committee
in receiving, investigating and evaluating complaints against the police and other law
enforcement officers in the implementation of this Act. If the evidence warrants it,
they may file the appropriate cases against the erring police and law enforcement
officers. Unless seasonably disowned or denounced by the complainants, decisions
or judgments in the said cases shall preclude the filing of other cases based on the
same cause or causes of action as those that were filed with the Grievance Committee
or its branches.
SEC. 57. Ban on Extraordinary Rendition. - No person suspected or convicted of the
crime of terrorism shall be subjected to extraordinary rendition to any country unless
his or her testimony is needed for terrorist related police investigations or judicial
trials in the said country and unless his or her human rights, including the right against
torture, and right to counsel, are officially assured by the requesting country and
transmitted accordingly and approved by the Department of Justice.
SEC. 58. Extra-Territorial Application of this Act. - Subject to the provision of an existing
treaty of which the Philippines is a signatory and to any contrary provision of any law
of preferential application, the provisions of this Act shall apply: (1) to individual
persons who commit any of the crimes defined and punished in this Act within the
terrestrial domain, interior waters, maritime zone, and airspace of the Philippines; (2)
to individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the
Philippines, commit, conspire or plot to commit any of the crimes defined and
punished in this Act inside the territorial limits of the Philippines; (3) to individual
persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines,
commit any of the said crimes on board Philippine ship or Philippine airship; (4) to
individual persons who commit any of said crimes within any embassy, consulate, or
diplomatic premises belonging to or occupied by the Philippine government in an
official capacity; (5) to individual persons who, although physically outside the
territorial limits of the Philippines, commit said crimes against Philippine citizens or
persons of Philippines descent, where their citizenship or ethnicity was a factor in the
commission of the crime; and (6) to individual persons who, although physically
outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit said crimes directly against the
Philippine government.
SEC. 59. Joint Oversight Committee. - There is hereby created a Joint Oversight
Committee to oversee the implementation of this Act. The Oversight Committee shall
be composed of five members each from the Senate and the House in addition to the
Chairs of the Committees of Public Order of both Houses who shall also Chair the
Oversight Committee in the order specified herein. The membership of the
Committee for every House shall at least have two opposition or minority members.
The Joint Oversight Committee shall have its own independent counsel. The Chair of
the Committee shall rotate every six months with the Senate chairing it for the first
six months and the House for the next six months. In every case, the ranking
opposition or minority member of the Committee shall be the Vice Chair. Upon the
expiration of one year after this Act is approved by the President, the Committee shall
review the Act particularly the provision that authorize the surveillance of suspects of
or persons charged with the crime of terrorism. To that end, the Committee shall
summon the police and law enforcement officers and the members of the Anti-
30
Terrorism Council and require them to answer questions from the members of
Congress and to submit a written report of the acts they have done in the
implementation of the law including the manner in which the persons suspected of
or charged with the crime of terrorism have been dealt with in their custody and from
the date when the movements of the latter were subjected to surveillance and his or
her correspondences, messages, conversations and the like were listened to or
subjected to monitoring, recording and tapping. Without prejudice to its submitting
other reports, the Committee shall render a semiannual report to both Houses of
Congress. The report may include where necessary a recommendation to reassess
the effects of globalization on terrorist activities on the people, provide a sunset
clause to or amend any portion of the Act or to repeal the Act in its entirety. The
courts dealing with anti-terrorism cases shall submit to Congress and the President a
report every six months of the status of anti-terrorism cases that have been filed with
them starting from the date this Act is implemented.
SEC. 60. Separability Clause. - If for any reason any part or provision of this Act is
declared unconstitutional or invalid, the other parts or provisions hereof which are
not affected thereby shall remain and continue to be in full force and effect.
SEC. 61. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules or regulations or
parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed,
amended, or modified accordingly.
SEC. 62. Special Effectivity Clause. - After the bill shall have been signed into law by
the President, the Act shall be published in three newspapers of national circulation;
three newspapers of local circulation, one each in llocos Norte, Baguio City and
Pampanga; three newspapers of local circulation, one each in Cebu, lloilo and
Tacloban; and three newspapers of local circulation, one each in Cagayan de Oro,
Davao and General Santos city.
The title of the Act and its provisions defining the acts of terrorism that are punished
shall be aired everyday at primetime for seven days, morning, noon and night over
three national television and radio networks; three radio and television networks, one
each in Cebu, Tacloban and lloilo; and in five radio and television networks, one each
in Lanao del Sur, Cagayan de Oro, Davao City, Cotabato City and Zamboanga City. The
publication in the newspapers of local circulation and the announcements over local
radio and television networks shall be done in the dominant language of the
community. After the publication required above shall have been done, the Act shall
take effect two months after the elections are held in May 2007. Thereafter, the
provisions of this Act shall be automatically suspended one month before and two
months as after the holding of any election.
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network vs. Anti-Terrorism Council
EN BANC
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
9372 (RA 9372), An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism,
otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007,[1] signed into law on March 6,
2007.
Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007,[2] petitioner Southern
Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a non-government organization, and Atty.
Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition on July 16, 2007docketed as G.R. No. 178552. On even date,
petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang
Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), and Center for Trade Union and Human Rights (CTUHR),
represented by their respective officers[3] who are also bringing the action in their
capacity as citizens, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No.
178554.
The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations Bagong Alyansang Makabayan
(BAYAN), General Alliance Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality,
Leadership and Action (GABRIELA), Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP),
Movement of Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL), Confederation for Unity,
Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees (COURAGE), Kalipunan ng
Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY), Solidarity of Cavite Workers (SCW), League of
Filipino Students (LFS), Anakbayan, Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya
(PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT), Migrante, Health Alliance for
Democracy (HEAD), and Agham, represented by their respective officers,[4] and joined
by concerned citizens and taxpayers Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Dr. Bienvenido Lumbera,
Renato Constantino, Jr., Sister Mary John Manansan, OSB, Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty.
Josefina Lichauco, Retired Col. Gerry Cunanan, Carlitos Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Carolina
Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Danilo Ramos, Emerenciana de Jesus, Rita Baua and
31
Rey Claro Casambre filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No.
178581.
On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member organizations Hustisya,
Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees Laban sa Detensyon at para sa
Amnestiya (SELDA), Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), and
Promotion of Church Peoples Response (PCPR), which were represented by their
respective officers[5] who are also bringing action on their own behalf, filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178890.
On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Counsels for the
Defense of Liberty (CODAL),[6] Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal, Sergio Osmea
III, and Wigberto E. Taada filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed
as G.R. No. 179157.
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST), other regional chapters
and organizations mostly based in the Southern Tagalog Region,[7] and
individuals[8] followed suit by filing on September 19, 2007a petition for certiorari and
prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179461 that replicates the allegations raised in the
BAYAN petition in G.R. No. 178581.
Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism
Council[9] composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson,
and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National
Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary
Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions,
except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of
Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar
Calderon.
The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise impleaded President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and the support agencies for the Anti-Terrorism Council like the
National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, National Bureau of Investigation, Bureau
of Immigration, Office of Civil Defense, Intelligence Service of the AFP, Anti-
Money Laundering Center, Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and the PNP
intelligence and investigative elements.
The petitions fail.
Petitioners resort to certiorari is improper
Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial
or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how
respondents acted without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail just the same.
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must
possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.[10]
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the most
essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.
Petitioners lack locus standi
32

Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.[11]
Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary[12]summarized the rule
on locus standi, thus:
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest
in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is
whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal
interest. It must show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but
also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite
way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to
which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show
that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected
communist fronts by the government, especially the military; whereas individual
petitioners invariably invoke the transcendental importance doctrine and their status
as citizens and taxpayers.
While Chavez v. PCGG[13] holds that transcendental public importance dispenses with
the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering
direct and personal injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation
belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional litigation. Compelling State
and societal interests in the proscription of harmful conduct, as will later be
elucidated, necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi.
Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.
KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR, petitioners in G.R. No.
178890, allege that they have been subjected to close security surveillance by state
security forces, their members followed by suspicious persons and vehicles with dark
windshields, and their offices monitored by men with military build. They likewise
claim that they have been branded as enemies of the [S]tate.[14]
Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
correctly points out that petitioners have yet to show any connection between the
purported surveillance and the implementation of RA 9372.
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan,
PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD and Agham, petitioner-organizations in G.R. No.
178581, would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents alleged action of
tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National Peoples Army (NPA). The tagging,
according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription without
following the procedure under the law.[15] The petition of BAYAN-ST, et al. in G.R. No.
179461 pleads the same allegations.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged tagging of petitioners.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the
matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining
what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can
33
be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of
general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a
reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court; or(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by
resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial matters coming to the
knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they
may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of
ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and
which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially
noticed, provided, they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood
that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every
person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of
particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common
knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is
dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no
constructive knowledge.[16] (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial
notice. Petitioners apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea.That no
specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three
years after its effectivity, belies any claim of imminenceof their perceived threat
emanating from the so-called tagging.
The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554, who
merely harp as well on their supposed link to the CPP and NPA. They fail to
particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result
in direct injury to their organization and members.
While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist organization, the
United States of America[17] (US) and the European Union[18] (EU) have both classified
the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as foreign terrorist organizations. The Court
takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice
Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU
classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations.[19] Such statement
notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the courts an application to declare the
CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA
9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in effect for three years now. From July 2007 up to
the present, petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities fully and freely
without any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or proscription under RA
9372.
Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution initiated by Party-list
Representatives Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro Casio, Rafael Mariano and Luzviminda
Ilagan,[20] urged the government to resume peace negotiations with the NDF by
removing the impediments thereto, one of which is the adoption of designation of
the CPP and NPA by the US and EU as foreign terrorist organizations. Considering the
policy statement of the Aquino Administration[21] of resuming peace talks with the
NDF, the government is not imminently disposed to ask for the judicial proscription
of the CPP-NPA consortium and its allied organizations.
More important, there are other parties not before the Court with direct and specific
interests in the questions being raised.[22] Of recent development is the filing of
the first case for proscription under Section 17[23] of RA 9372 by the Department of
Justice before the Basilan Regional Trial Court against the Abu
Sayyaf Group.[24] Petitioner-organizations do not in the least allege any link to the Abu
Sayyaf Group.
Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show the imminence of a prosecution
under RA 9372 by alluding to past rebellion charges against them.
In Ladlad v. Velasco,[25] the Court ordered the dismissal of rebellion charges filed in
2006 against then Party-List Representatives Crispin Beltran and Rafael Mariano of
Anakpawis, Liza Maza of GABRIELA, and Joel Virador, Teodoro Casio and Saturnino
Ocampo of Bayan Muna. Also named in the dismissed rebellion charges were
petitioners Rey Claro Casambre, Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Rita Baua,
Emerencia de Jesus and Danilo Ramos; and accused of being front organizations for
the Communist movement were petitioner-organizations KMU, BAYAN, GABRIELA,
PAMALAKAYA, KMP, KADAMAY, LFS and COURAGE.[26]
34
The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save the day for petitioners. For
one, those charges were filed in 2006, prior to the enactment of RA 9372, and
dismissed by this Court. For another, rebellion is defined and punished under the
Revised Penal Code. Prosecution for rebellion is not made more imminent by the
enactment of RA 9372, nor does the enactment thereof make it easier to charge a
person with rebellion, its elements not having been altered.
Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion charges bear no relation to
prospective charges under RA 9372. It cannot be overemphasized that three years
after the enactment of RA 9372, none of petitioners has been charged.
Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their claim of locus standi on their
sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. The IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA 9372
directing it to render assistance to those arrested or detained under the law.
The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not, however, suffice
to clothe the IBP or any of its members with standing.[27]The IBP failed to sufficiently
demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute revolts against its
constitutional rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed
to even a single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372.
Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have been the subject of
political surveillance, also lacks locus standi. Prescinding from the veracity, let alone
legal basis, of the claim of political surveillance, the Court finds that she has not shown
even the slightest threat of being charged under RA 9372. Similarly lacking in locus
standi are former Senator Wigberto Taada and Senator Sergio Osmea III, who cite
their being respectively a human rights advocate and an oppositor to the passage of
RA 9372. Outside these gratuitous statements, no concrete injury to them has been
pinpointed.
Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty. Soliman Santos
Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently state that the issues they raise are of
transcendental importance, which must be settled early and are of far-reaching
implications, without mention of any specific provision of RA 9372 under which they
have been charged, or may be charged. Mere invocation of human rights advocacy
has nowhere been held sufficient to clothe litigants with locus standi. Petitioners
must show an actual, or immediate danger of sustaining, direct injury as a result of
the laws enforcement. To rule otherwise would be to corrupt the settled doctrine
of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public.
Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners
as taxpayers and citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of
the spending or taxing power of Congress,[28] whereas citizen standing must rest on
direct and personal interest in the proceeding.[29]
RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from
Congress for its implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has
alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law.
It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a
public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest
is key.
Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or
controversy.
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.[30] (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,[31] the Court ruled that the power of
judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead
to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities.
35
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.[32]
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC[33]cannot be more
emphatic:
[C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest,
however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciabledefinite and
concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In
other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right,
on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other hand; that is, it must concern a real
and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and
substantial controversyadmitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in
nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, a petition to declare unconstitutional a law converting
the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City was held to be premature as
it was tacked on uncertain, contingent events.[34] Similarly, apetition that fails to
allege that an application for a license to operate a radio or television station has
been denied or granted by the authorities does not present a justiciable controversy,
and merely wheedles the Court to rule on a hypothetical problem.[35]
The Court dismissed the petition in Philippine Press Institute v. Commission on
Elections[36] for failure to cite any specific affirmative action of the Commission on
Elections to implement the assailed resolution. It refused, in Abbas v. Commission on
Elections,[37] to rule on the religious freedom claim of the therein petitioners based
merely on a perceived potential conflict between the provisions of the Muslim Code
and those of the national law, there being no actual controversy between real
litigants.
The list of cases denying claims resting on purely hypothetical or anticipatory grounds
goes on ad infinitum.
The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived
threat to any constitutional interest
suffices to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is
qualified by the requirement that there must be sufficient factsto enable the Court to
intelligently adjudicate the issues.[38]
Very recently, the US Supreme Court, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project,[39] allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal statute, challenged on
vagueness grounds, since plaintiffs faced a credible threat of prosecution and should
not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of
seeking relief.[40] The plaintiffs therein filed an action before a federal court to assail
the constitutionality of the material support statute, 18 U.S.C. 2339B (a)
(1),[41] proscribing the provision of material support to organizations declared by the
Secretary of State as foreign terrorist organizations. They claimed that
they intended to provide support for the humanitarian and political activities of two
such organizations.
Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an adjudication on the merits when an
anticipatory petition clearly shows that the challenged prohibition forbids the
conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as there would then be a justiciable
controversy.[42]
Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein petitioners have failed to show that
the challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally
protected conduct or activity that they seek to do. No demonstrable threat has been
established, much less a real and existing one.
Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic surveillance and supposedly being tagged
as communist fronts in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From
these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not
its function.[43]
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory
relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory
actions characterized by double contingency, where both the activity the petitioners
intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely
theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.[44]
36

The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the
present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility
is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be
abused.[45] Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may
step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.
A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain
rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition
of the crime of terrorism[46] under RA 9372 in that terms like widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace and coerce the government to give
in to an unlawful demand are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no
standard to measure the prohibited acts.
Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and
overbreadth find no application in the present case since these doctrines apply only
to free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these doctrines, it is imperative to
outline the schools of thought on whether the void-for-vagueness and overbreadth
doctrines are equally applicable grounds to assail a penal statute.
Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as slanting toward the idea of limiting
the application of the two doctrines to free speech cases. They particularly
cite Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan[47] and Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.[48]
The Court clarifies.
At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether the word intervene in Section
5[49] of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was intrinsically vague and
impermissibly broad. The Court stated that the overbreadth and the vagueness
doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases, and are not appropriate
for testing the validity of penal statutes.[50] It added that, at any rate, the challenged
provision, under which the therein petitioner was charged, is not vague.[51]
While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,[52]the Court
stated that a facial invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate, it nonetheless
proceeded to conduct a vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein subject
election offense[53] under the Voters Registration Act of 1996, with which the therein
petitioners were charged, is couched in precise language.[54]
The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the Separate Opinion[55] of Justice Vicente
V. Mendoza in the Estrada case, where the Court found the Anti-Plunder Law
(Republic Act No. 7080) clear and free from ambiguity respecting the definition of the
crime of plunder.
The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates these two doctrines to the
concept of a facial invalidation as opposed to an as-applied challenge. He basically
postulated that allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do not justify
a facial review of its validity. The pertinent portion of the Concurring Opinion of
Justice Mendoza, which was quoted at length in the main Estrada decision, reads:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is
that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct
could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm
to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed
by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived
grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad
statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is
allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws
37
against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take
chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free
speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S.
Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not
recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that "claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws
that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held
that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a
litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed
cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are
called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do
service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the
established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not
be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First
Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial
invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are
invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no
basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and
in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on
the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities
are constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made
without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. But, as the U.S.
Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring
correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever
an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of
the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above
all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of
detailed statutes, . . .ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory
for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as
"manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort,"
and is generally disfavored. In determining the constitutionality of a statute,
therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be
examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is
charged.[56] (Underscoring supplied.)
The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of
the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines as grounds for a facial or as-
appliedchallenge against a penal statute (under a claim of violation of due process of
law) or a speech regulation (under a claim of abridgement of the freedom of speech
and cognate rights).
To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate
on the same plane.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1)
it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.[57] The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a
38
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.[58]
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that
individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from
that behavior, even though some of it is protected.[59]
A facial challenge is likewise different from an as-applied challenge.
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extantfacts
affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law,
pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the
parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
activities.[60]
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle[61] in his concurring opinion that the
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not
applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge
against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert
the chilling effect on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times
be abridged.[62] As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal
statutes that generally bear an in terrorem effect in deterring socially harmful
conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly
considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading
the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.[63]
The Court reiterated that there are critical limitations by which a criminal statute may
be challenged and underscored that an on-its-face invalidation of penal statutes x x x
may not be allowed.[64]
[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case
may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious.
If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be
hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a
facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively
go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete
controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge
against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially,
force the court to consider third parties who are not before it. As I have said in my
opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test
will impair the States ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing
that can hinder an accused from defeating the States power to prosecute on a mere
showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad,
notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him.[65] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is
limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial
challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of
invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under
situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially
overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for
being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the
litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an
exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a
particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if
the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by
invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers
to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their
own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted
to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its
face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable
until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that
39
motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the
"chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous
enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech
or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on
the speech of those third parties.[66] (Emphasis in the original omitted; underscoring
supplied.)
In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least
two cases,[67] observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth
doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment,[68] and that claims of
facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their
terms, seek to regulate only spoken words.[69] In Virginia v. Hicks,[70] it was held that
rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that
is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly
broad statutes are justified by the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression.[71]
Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners,
alimited vagueness analysis of the definition of terrorism in RA 9372 is legally
impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them
While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not preclude the
operation of the vagueness test on the Anti-Plunder Law as applied to the therein
petitioner, finding, however, that there was no basis to review the law on its face and
in its entirety.[72] It stressed that statutes found vague as a matter of due
process typically are invalidated only 'as applied' to a particular defendant.[73]
American jurisprudence[74] instructs that vagueness challenges that do not involve
the First Amendment must be examined in light of the specific factsof the case at
hand and not with regard to the statute's facial validity.
For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has evaluated defendants claims that
criminal statutes are unconstitutionally vague, developing a doctrine hailed as among
the most important guarantees of liberty under law.[75]
In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process
clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at
least three cases,[76] the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an
ordinance penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of
illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the
vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the
petitioners in these three cases, similar to those in the
two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually charged with the therein assailed
penal statute, unlike in the present case.
There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial
analysis of its validity
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372,
the following elements may be culled: (1) the offender commits an act punishable
under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the
enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and
creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizesspeech,
petitioners contend that the element of unlawful demand in the definition of
terrorism[77] must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression
protected by the free speech clause.
The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not
speech.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a
predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying
phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government
to accede to an unlawful demand. Given the presence of the first element, any
attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative component of the
prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.
40

Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly
focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of
a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender like in declaring to
launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or
conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful transaction. An analogy in
one U.S. case[78] illustrated that the fact that the prohibition on discrimination in
hiring on the basis of race will require an employer to take down a sign reading White
Applicants Only hardly means that the law should be analyzed as one regulating
speech rather than conduct.
Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal
conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor the
essence of the whole act as conduct and not speech. This holds true a fortiori in the
present case where the expression figures only as an inevitable incident of making
the element of coercion perceptible.
[I]t is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in most instances
brought about through speaking or writing. But it has never been deemed an
abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely
because the conduct was, in part, initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of
language, either spoken, written, or printed. Such an expansive interpretation of the
constitutional guaranties of speech and press would make it practically impossible
ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of trade as well as many other
agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to society.[79] (italics and
underscoring supplied)
Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected conduct, because they
merely evidence a prohibited conduct.[80] Since speech is not involved here, the Court
cannot heed the call for a facial analysis.
IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities engaged in a vagueness analysis of
the therein subject penal statute as applied to the therein petitioners inasmuch as
they were actually charged with the pertinent crimes challenged on vagueness
grounds. The Court in said cases, however, found no basis to review the assailed penal
statute on its face and in its entirety.
In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme Court allowed the pre-enforcement
review of a criminal statute, challenged on vagueness grounds, since the therein
plaintiffs faced a credible threat of prosecution and should not be required to await
and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.
As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a
credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of
the assailed definition of terrorism is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds
litigants that judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes
future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an
extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
PD 532 – Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974
MALACAÑANG
MANILA
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 532
ANTI-PIRACY AND ANTI-HIGHWAY ROBBERY LAW OF 1974
WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are
still committing acts of depredations upon the persons and properties of innocent
and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby
distributing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic
and social progress of the people;
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or highway
robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned
by the penal statutes of all countries; and,
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from
perpetrating such acts of depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders,
with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational
and community progress of the people;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue
of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and pursuant to proclamation No.
1081, dated September 21, 1972 and No. 1104, dated January 17, 1973 and General
41
Order No. 1, dated September 22, 1972, do hereby order and decree as part of the
law of the land the following:
Section 1. Title. This Decree shall be known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974.
Section 2. Definition of Terms. The following terms shall mean and be understood, as
follows:
a. Philippine Waters. It shall refer to all bodies of water, such as but not limited to,
seas, gulfs, bays around, between and connecting each of the Islands of the Philippine
Archipelago, irrespective of its depth, breadth, length or dimension, and all other
waters belonging to the Philippines by historic or legal title, including territorial sea,
the sea-bed, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas over which the
Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.
b. Vessel. Any vessel or watercraft used for transport of passengers and cargo from
one place to another through Philippine Waters. It shall include all kinds and types of
vessels or boats used in fishing.
c. Philippine Highway. It shall refer to any road, street, passage, highway and bridges
or other parts thereof, or railway or railroad within thePhilippinesused by persons, or
vehicles, or locomotives or trains for the movement or circulation of persons or
transportation of goods, articles, or property or both.
d. Piracy. Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or
part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or
passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person, including a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be
considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as
hereinafter provided.
e. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. The seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or
other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the property of another by means of
violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things of other unlawful
means, committed by any person on any Philippine Highway.
Section 3. Penalties. Any person who commits piracy or highway robbery/brigandage
as herein defined, shall, upon conviction by competents court be punished by:
a. Piracy. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods shall
be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are committed as a result or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape, murder
or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or when the
offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves, or when the
seizure is accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of
death shall be imposed.
b. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum
period shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are committed during or
on the occasion of the commission of robbery or brigandage, the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed. If kidnapping for
ransom or extortion, or murder or homicide, or rape is committed as a result or on
the occasion thereof, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
Section 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway
robbery/brigandage. Any person who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects
pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them information about the
movement of police or other peace officers of the government, or acquires or
receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or in any manner derives any
benefit therefrom; or any person who directly or indirectly abets the commission of
piracy or highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an accomplice of the
principal offenders and be punished in accordance with the Rules prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this Section
has performed knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.
Section 5. Repealing Clause. Pertinent portions of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as
the Revised Penal Code; and all laws, decrees, or orders or instructions, or parts
thereof, insofar as they are inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
Section 6. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect upon approval.
Done in the City of Manila, this 8th day of August, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and seventy-four.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
RA 6235 – An Act Prohibiting Certain Acts Inimical to Civil Aviation
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to compel a change in the course or
destination of an aircraft of Philippine registry, or to seize or usurp the control
thereof, while it is in flight. An aircraft is in flight from the moment all its external
doors are closed following embarkation until any of such doors is opened for
disembarkation.
42
It shall likewise be unlawful for any person to compel an aircraft of foreign registry to
land in Philippine territory or to seize or usurp the control thereof while it is within
the said territory.
Section 2. Any person violating any provision of the foregoing section shall be
punished by an imprisonment of not less than twelve years but not more than twenty
years, or by a fine of not less than twenty thousand pesos but not more than forty
thousand pesos.
The penalty of imprisonment of fifteen years to death, or a fine of not less than
twenty-five thousand pesos but not more than fifty thousand pesos shall be imposed
upon any person committing such violation under any of the following circumstances:
1. Whenever he has fired upon the pilot, member of the crew or passenger of the
aircraft;
2. Whenever he has exploded or attempted to explode any bomb or explosive to
destroy the aircraft; or
3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, serious physical injuries
or rape.
Section 3. It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to ship, load or carry
in any passenger aircraft operating as a public utility within the Philippines, and
explosive, flammable, corrosive or poisonous substance or material.
Section 4. The shipping, loading or carrying of any substance or material mentioned
in the preceding section in any cargo aircraft operating as a public utility within the
Philippines shall be in accordance with regulations issued by the Civil Aeronautics
Administration.
Section 5. As used in this Act
(1) "Explosive" shall mean any substance, either solid or liquid, mixture or single
compound, which by chemical reaction liberates heat and gas at high speed and
causes tremendous pressure resulting in explosion. The term shall include but not
limited to dynamites, firecrackers, blasting caps, black powders, bursters,
percussions, cartridges and other explosive materials, except bullets for firearm.
(2) "Flammable" is any substance or material that is highly combustible and self-
igniting by chemical reaction and shall include but not limited to acrolein, allene,
aluminum dyethyl monochloride, and other aluminum compounds, ammonium
chlorate and other ammonium mixtures and other similar substances or materials.
(3) "Corrosive" is any substance or material, either liquid, solid or gaseous, which
through chemical reaction wears away, impairs or consumes any object. It shall
include but not limited to alkaline battery fluid packed with empty storage battery,
allyl chloroformate, allytrichlorosilane, ammonium dinitro-orthocresolate and other
similar materials and substances.
(4) "Poisonous" is any substance or materials, except medicinal drug, either liquid,
solid or gaseous, which through chemical reactions kills, injuries or impairs a living
organism or person, and shall include but not limited to allyl isothiocyanate,
ammunition (chemical, non-explosive but containing Class A, B or poison), aniline oil,
arsine, bromobenzyle cyanide, bromoacetone and other similar substances or
materials.
Section 6. Any violation of Section three hereof shall be punishable by an
imprisonment of at least five years but not more than ten years or by a fine of not
less than ten thousand pesos but not more than twenty thousand pesos: Provided,
That if the violation is committed by a juridical person, the penalty shall be imposed
upon the manager, representative, director, agent or employee who violated, or
caused, directed, cooperated or participated in the violation thereof: Provided,
further, That in case the violation is committed in the interest of a foreign corporation
legally doing business in the Philippines, the penalty shall be imposed upon its
resident agent, manager, representative or director responsible for such violation and
in addition thereto, the license of said corporation to do business in the Philippines
shall be revoked.
Any violation of Section four hereof shall be an offense punishable with the minimum
of the penalty provided in the next preceding paragraph.
43
Section 7. For any death or injury to persons or damage to property resulting from a
violation of Sections three and four hereof, the person responsible therefor may be
held liable in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Section 8. Aircraft companies which operate as public utilities or operators of aircraft
which are for hire are authorized to open and investigate suspicious packages and
cargoes in the presence of the owner or shipper, or his authorized representatives if
present; in order to help the authorities in the enforcement of the provisions of this
Act: Provided, That if the owner, shipper or his representative refuses to have the
same opened and inspected, the airline or air carrier is authorized to refuse the
loading thereof.
Section 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned
shall contain among others the following condition printed thereon: "Holder hereof
and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited
materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board
the aircraft," which shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and
the air carrier.
Section 10. The Civil Aeronautics Administration is hereby directed to promulgate
within one month after the approval of this Act such regulations as are provided in
Section four hereof and cause the publication of such rules and regulations in the
Official Gazette and in a newspaper of national circulation for at least once a week
for three consecutive weeks. Such regulations shall take effect fifteen days after
publication in the Official Gazette.
Section 11. This Act shall take effect after the publication mentioned in the preceding
section.
Approved: June 19, 1971
TITLE TWO – CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF
THE STATE
Martinez vs. People
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 198694 February 13, 2013
RAMON MARTINEZ y GOCO/RAMON GOCO y MARTINEZ @ MON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Centiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
are the June 30, 2011 Decision2 and September 20, 2011 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 32544 which affirmed the April 30, 2009 Decision4 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 2 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 08-358669
convicting petitioner Ramon Martinez y Goco/Ramon Goco y Martinez (Ramon) of
the crime of possession of dangerous drugs punished under Section 11(3) Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.’’
The Factual Antecedents
At around 9:15 in the evening of December 29, 2007, PO2 Roberto Soque (PO2
Soque), PO2 Alejandro Cepe(PO2 Cepe) and PO3Edilberto Zeta (PO3 Zeta), who
wereall assigned tothe Station Anti-Illegal Drugs (SAID) Section of the Malate Police
Station 9 (Police Station 9), conducted a routine foot patrol along Balingkit Street,
Malate, Manila. In the process, they heard a man shouting "Putanginamo!
Limangdaannabaito?" Forpurportedly violating Section 844 of the Revised Ordinance
of the City of Manila (Manila City Ordinance)which punishes breaches of the peace,
the man, later identified as Ramon,was apprehended and asked to empty his pockets.
In the course thereof, the police officers were able to recover from him a small
transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance suspected to
beshabu.PO2 Soque confiscated the sachet and brought Ramon to Police Station 9
where the former markedthe item with the latter’s initials, "RMG." There, Police
Superintendent Ferdinand RicafrenteQuirante(PSuptQuirante) prepared a request
for laboratory examination which, together with the specimen, was brought by PO2
Soque to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.
Forensic Chemist Police Senior Inspector Erickson Calabocal
(PSInspCalabocal)examinedthe specimen which contained 0.173 gram of white
44
crystalline substanceand found the same positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride (or shabu).
Consequently, Ramon was charged with possession of dangerous drugs under Section
11(3), Article II of RA 9165 throughan Information dated January 3, 2008 which states:
That on or about December 29, 2007, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, without being authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his
custody and control one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing ZERO
POINT ONE SEVEN THREE (0.173) gram of white crystalline substance containing
methylamphetamine hydrochloride known as SHABU, a dangerous drug.5
In defense, Ramon denied the charge and gave his version of the incident. He
narrated that on December 29, 2007, at around 4:00 in the afternoon, whilewalking
alongBalingkit Street to borrow a welding machine from one Paez Garcia, a man in
civilian clothing approached and asked him if he is Ramon Goco. Upon affirming his
identity, he was immediately handcuffed by the man who eventually introduced
himself as a police officer. Together, they boarded a tricycle (sidecar) wherethe said
officer asked him if he was carrying illegal drugs. Despite his denial, he was still
brought to a precinct to be detained. Thereafter, PO2 Soquepropositioned Ramon
and asked for ₱20,000.00 in exchange for his release.When Ramon’s
wife,AmaliaGoco, was unable to produce the ₱20,000.00 which PO2 Soquehad asked
for, he (Ramon) was brought to the Manila City Hall for inquest proceedings.
The RTC Ruling
In its April 30, 2009 Decision, the RTCconvicted Ramon of the crime of possession of
dangerous drugs as charged, finding all its elements tohave been established through
the testimonies of the prosecution’sdisinterested witnesses. In this relation,it
alsoupheld the legality of Ramon’s warrantless arrest, observing that Ramon was
disturbing the peace in violation of the Manila City Ordinance during the time of his
apprehension. Consequently, Ramon was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment oftwelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months as maximum and to pay a fine of ₱300,000.00. Aggrieved,
Ramon elevated his conviction to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its June 30, 2011 Decision,the CA denied Ramon’s appeal and thereby affirmedhis
conviction. Itupheld the factual findings of the RTC which found that the elements of
the crime of possession of dangerous drugs were extant, to wit: (1) that the accused
is in possession of a prohibited drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by
law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.6
Likewise, the CA sustained the validity of the body search made on Ramon as an
incident of alawful warrantless arrest for breach of the peace which he committed in
the presence of the police officers, notwithstanding its (the case for breach of the
peace)subsequent dismissal for failure to prosecute.
Moreover, the CAobserved that every link in the chain of custody of the prohibited
drug wassufficiently establishedfrom the time PO2Soque took the sameup to its
actual presentation in court.
Finally, it did not give credence to Ramon’s claim of extortion as his
asseverationsfailed to overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance of
the police officers’ official duties.
The Issue
The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the
Decision of the RTC convicting Ramon of the crime of possession of dangerous drugs.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
Enshrined in the fundamental law is a person’s right against unwarranted intrusions
by the government. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
(Constitution) states that:
Section 2.The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Accordingly, so as to ensure that the same sacrosanct right remains revered, effects
secured by government authoritiesin contraventionof the foregoingarerendered
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose, in any proceeding. In this regard, Section
3(2), Article III of the Constitution provides that:
2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section [referring to
Section 2] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Commonly known as the "exclusionary rule," the above-cited proscription is not,
however, an absolute and rigid one.7 As found in jurisprudence, the traditional
exceptions are customs searches,8 searches of moving vehicles,9seizure of evidence
45
in plain view,10 consented searches,11 "stop and frisk" measures12 andsearches
incidental to a lawful arrest.13 This last-mentioned exception is of particular
significance to this case and thus, necessitates further disquisition.
A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent search is one that is carried
out under the parameters of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court 14 which
requires that the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause to
arresta person caught in flagrante delicto. To be sure,the term probable cause has
been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief
that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.15Specifically
with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
by the person sought to be arrested.16 In this light, the determination of the existence
or absence of probable cause necessitates a re-examination of the factual incidents.
Records show that PO2 Soque arrested Ramon for allegedly violating Section 844 of
the Manila City Ordinance which provides as follows:
Sec. 844. – Breaches of the Peace. – No person shall make, and, countenance, or assist
in making any riot, affray, disorder, disturbance, or breach of the peace; or assault,
beat or use personal violence upon another without just cause in any public place; or
utter any slanderous, threatening or abusive language or expression or exhibit or
display any emblem, transparency, representation, motto, language, device,
instrument, or thing; or do any act, in any public place, meeting or procession, tending
to disturb the peace or excite a riot, or collect with other persons in a body or crowd
for any unlawful purpose; or disturbance or disquiet any congregation engaged in any
lawful assembly.1âwphi1
PENALTY: Imprisonment of not more than six (6) months and / or fine not more than
Two Hundred pesos (PHP 200.00)
As may be readily gleaned, the foregoing ordinancepenalizes the following acts: (1)
making, countenancing, or assisting in making any riot, affray, disorder, disturbance,
or breach of the peace; (2) assaulting, beating or using personal violence upon
another without just cause in any public place; (3) uttering any slanderous,
threatening or abusive language or expression or exhibiting or displaying any
emblem, transparency, representation, motto, language, device, instrument, or
thing; and (4) doing any act, in any public place, meeting or procession, tending to
disturb the peace or excite a riot, or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for
any unlawful purpose, or disturbance or disquiet any congregation engaged in any
lawful assembly. Evidently, the gravamen of these offenses is the disruption of
communal tranquillity. Thus, to justify a warrantless arrest based on the same, it must
be established that the apprehension was effected after a reasonable assessment by
the police officer that a public disturbance is being committed.
In this regard, PO2 Soque’s testimony detailed the surrounding circumstances leading
to Ramon’s warrantless warrant, viz:
DIRECT EXAMINATION:
ASST. CITY PROS. YAP:
Q: Tell the Court, what happened when you were there on patrol? PO2 Soque:
A: While we were on routinary patrol we heard a man shouting on top of his voice
telling "Putang ina mo! Limang daan na ba ito?" pointing to his right front pocket, sir.
Q: There was a shouting, where was this man shouting, where was the shouting came
from?
A: Along the street of Balingkit, sir.
Q: How far were you from this shouting, as you said?
A: About ten (10) meters, sir.
Q: Tell the Court what happened, what next follows?
A: We proceeded to the voice where it came from, then, we saw a man, sir.
Q: Who was that man?
A: Goco, sir.
Q: Who is this Goco in relation to this case?
A: Ramon Martinez Goco, sir.
Q: Who is this Goco in relation to this case?
A: He is the one that we apprehended, sir.
Q: What was he doing then when you said you responded immediately, when you
saw a man?
A: We saw him shouting on top of his voice, sir.
Q: That is why you came near him, the one who shouted?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So, what did you do, Mr. Witness, together with your other cooperatives?
A: We apprehended him for bringing [sic] the silence of the serenity of the place, sir.
Q: What time was that already at that time, the incident of shouting?
A: Past 9:00, sir.
Q: Who actually accosted Goco, the one who shouted?
A: Me, sir.
Q: Tell the Court, how many were there at that time present with Goco?
46
A: They scampered away when they saw the police were coming near the place, sir,
they scampered in different directions.
Q: Tell the Court what were Cepe and Zeta doing also when you approached the
accused?
A: They followed me, sir.
Q: So, tell the Court what happened when you approached accused therein Goco?
A: We apprehended Goco for violation for alarm scandal, sir.
x x x x17
CROSS EXAMINATION:
xxxx
ATTY. AMURAO:
Q: So, just like Leveriza, Balingkit is also thickly populated? PO2 Soque:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And there are many people outside their houses?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And I can imagine everybody there outside was talking also?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I was very noisy, everybody talking, altogether?
A: They were talking casually.
x x x x18
Clearly, a perusal of the foregoing testimony negates the presence of probable cause
when the police officers conducted their warrantless arrest of Ramon.
To elucidate, it cannot be said that the act of shouting in a thickly-populated place,
with many people conversing with each other on the street, would constitute any of
the acts punishable under Section 844 of the Manila City Ordinance as above-quoted.
Ramon was not making or assisting in any riot, affray, disorder, disturbance, or breach
of the peace; he was not assaulting, beating or using personal violence upon another;
and, the words he allegedly shouted – "Putanginamo! Limangdaannabaito?" –are not
slanderous, threatening or abusive, and thus, could not have tended to disturb the
peace or excite a riot considering that at the time of the incident, Balingkit Street was
still teeming with people and alive with activity.
Further, it bears stressing that no one present at the place of arrest ever complained
that Ramon’s shouting disturbed the public. On the contrary, a disinterested member
of the community (a certain Rosemarie Escobal) even testified that Ramon was
merely standing in front of the store of a certain MangRomy when a man in civilian
clothes, later identified as PO2 Soque, approached Ramon, immediately handcuffed
and took him away.19
In its totality, the Court observes that these facts and circumstances could not have
engendereda well-founded belief that any breach of the peace had been committed
by Ramon at the time that his warrantless arrest was effected. All told, noprobable
cause existedto justify Ramon’s warrantless arrest.
Indeed, while it is true that the legality of arrest depends upon the reasonable
discretion of the officer or functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the
decision to characterize the nature of the act or deed of the person for the urgent
purpose of suspending his liberty,20 this should not be exercised in a whimsical
manner, else a person’s liberty be subjected to ubiquitous abuse. Aslaw enforcers, it
is largely expectedof them to conduct a more circumspect assessment of the situation
at hand. The determination of probable cause is not a blanket-license to withhold
liberty or to conduct unwarranted fishing expeditions. It demarcates the line between
legitimate human conduct on the one hand, and ostensible criminal activity, on the
other. In this respect, it must be performedwisely and cautiously, applying the
exacting standards of a reasonably discreet and prudent man. Surely, as
constitutionally guaranteed rightslie at the fore, the duty to determine probable
cause should be clothed with utmost conscientiousness as well as impelled by a
higher sense of public accountability.
Consequently, as it cannot be said that Ramon was validly arrested the warantless
search that resulted from it was also illegal. Thus, the subject shabu purportedly
seized from Ramon is inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the
poisonous tree as mandated by the above discussed constitutional provision. In this
regard, considering that the confiscated shabuis the very corpus delicitof the crime
charged, Ramon's acquital should therefore come as a matter of course.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 30, 2011 Decision and September
20, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32544 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ramon Martinez y Goco/Ramon Goco y Martinez is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
Galvante vs Casimiro
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
47
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 162808 April 22, 2008
FELICIANO GALVANTE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law
Enforcement Offices, BIENVENIDO C. BLANCAFLOR, Director, DENNIS L. GARCIA, Graft
Investigation and Prosecution Officer, SPO4 RAMIL AVENIDO, PO1 EDDIE DEGRAN, PO1
VALENTINO RUFANO, and PO1 FEDERICO BALOLOT,respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed herein by Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court are the October 30, 2003 Resolution1 of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices - Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) which dismissed for lack of probable cause the criminal
complaint, docketed as OMB-P-C-02-0109-B, filed by Feliciano Galvante2 (petitioner)
against SPO4 Benjamin Conde, PO1 Ramil Avenido, PO1 Eddie Degran, PO1 Valentino
Rufano, and PO1 Federico Balolot (private respondents) for arbitrary detention, illegal
search and grave threats; and the January 20, 2004 Ombudsman Order3 which denied
his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are of record.
In the afternoon of May 14, 2001 at Sitio Cahi-an, Kapatungan, Trento, Agusan del
Sur, private respondents confiscated from petitioner one colt pistol super .38
automatic with serial no. 67973, one short magazine, and nine super .38 live
ammunitions.4 The confiscated materials were covered by an expired Memorandum
Receipt dated September 2, 1999.5
Consequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor filed against petitioner an
Information6 for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Relation to
Commission on Elections (Comelec) Resolution No. 3258, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 5047, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.
Pending resolution of Criminal Case No. 5047, petitioner filed against private
respondents an administrative case, docketed as Administrative Case No. IASOB-
020007 for Grave Misconduct, before the Internal Affairs Service (IAS), Region XIII,
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG);7 and a criminal case, docketed
as OMB-P-C-02-0109-B for Arbitrary Detention, Illegal Search and Grave Threats,
before the Ombudsman.8
In the June 21, 2001 Affidavit-Complaint he filed in both cases, petitioner narrated
how, on May 14, 2001, private respondents aimed their long firearms at him,
arbitrarily searched his vehicle and put him in detention, thus:
1. That sometime on May 14, 2001 I left my house at around 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon after having lunch for Sitio Cahi-an, Brgy. Kapatungan, Trento, Agusan del
Sur to meet retired police Percival Plaza and inquire about the retirement procedure
for policemen;
2. That upon arrival at the house of retired police Percival Plaza, together with
Lorenzo Sanoria, Delfin Ramirez and Pedro Ramas who asked for a ride from the
highway in going to Sitio Cahi-an, I immediately went down of the jeep but before I
could call Mr. Plaza, four policemen in uniform blocked my way;
3. That the four policemen were [private respondents] PO1 Romil Avenido PNP, PO1
Valentino Rufano, PNP both member of 142nd Company, Regional Mobile Group and
PO1 Eddie Degran PNP and PO1 Federico Balolot PNP members of 1403 Prov'l Mobile
Group, all of Bunawan Brook, Bunawan, Agusan del Sur; who all pointed their long
firearms ready to fire [at] me, having heard the sound of the release of the safety
lock;
4. That raising my arms, I heard [private respondent] PO1 Avenido saying, "ANG
IMONG PUSIL, IHATAG" which means "Give me your firearm," to which I answered,
"WALA MAN KO'Y PUSIL" translated as "I have no firearm," showing my waistline
when I raised my T-shirt;
5. That my other companions on the jeep also went down and raised their arms and
showed their waistline when the same policemen and a person in civilian attire
holding an armalite also pointed their firearms to them to which Mr. Percival Plaza
who came down from his house told them not to harass me as I am also a former
police officer but they did not heed Mr. Plaza's statements;
6. That while we were raising our arms [private respondent] SPO4 Benjamin Conde,
Jr. went near my owner type jeep and conducted a search. To which I asked them if
they have any search warrant;
7. That after a while they saw my super .38 pistol under the floormat of my jeep and
asked me of the MR of the firearm but due to fear that their long arms were still
pointed to us, I searched my wallet and gave the asked [sic] document;
8. That immediately the policemen left me and my companions without saying
anything bringing with them the firearm;
9. That at about 2:30 p.m., I left Mr. Percival's house and went to Trento Police Station
where I saw a person in civilian attire with a revolver tucked on his waist, to which I
48
asked the police officers including those who searched my jeep to apprehend him
also;
10. That nobody among the policemen at the station made a move to apprehend the
armed civilian person so I went to the office of Police Chief Rocacorba who
immediately called the armed civilian to his office and when already inside his office,
the disarming was done;
11. That after the disarming of the civilian I was put to jail with the said person by
Police Chief Rocacorba and was released only at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May
16, 2001 after posting a bailbond;
12. That I caused the execution of this document for the purpose of filing cases of
Illegal Search, Grave Misconduct and Abuse of Authority against SPO4 Benjamin
Conde, Jr., of Trento Police Station; PO1 Ramil Avenido, PO1 Velantino Rufano, PO1
Federico Balolot and PO1 Eddie Degran.9
Petitioner also submitted the Joint Affidavit10 of his witnesses, Lorenzo Sanoria and
Percival Plaza.
Private respondent Conde filed a Counter-Affidavit dated March 20, 2002, where he
interposed the following defenses:
First, he had nothing to do with the detention of petitioner as it was Chief of
Police/Officer-in-Charge Police Inspector Dioscoro Mehos Rocacorba who ordered
the detention. Petitioner himself admitted this fact in his own Complaint-
Affidavit;11 and
Second, he denies searching petitioner's vehicle,12 but admits that even though he
was not armed with a warrant, he searched the person of petitioner as the latter, in
plain view, was committing a violation of Comelec Resolutions No. 3258 and No. 3328
by carrying a firearm in his person.
Private respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot filed their Joint-Affidavit
dated March 25, 2002, which contradicts the statements of private respondent
Conde, viz:
1. that we executed a joint counter-affidavit dated August 28, 2001 where we stated
among other things, that "we saw Feleciano "Nani" Galvante armed with a
handgun/pistol tucked on his waist;"
2. that this statement is not accurate because the truth of the matter is that the said
handgun was taken by SPO4 BENJAMIN CONDE, JR., who was acting as our team
leader during the May 14, 2001 Elections, from the jeep of Mr. Galvante after
searching the same; and
3. that we noticed the aforementioned discrepancy in our affidavit dated August 28,
2001 after we have already affixed our signatures thereon.13
Consequently, petitioner filed an Affidavit of Desistance dated March 25, 2002 with
both the IAS and Ombudsman, absolving private respondents Avenido, Degran,
Rufano and Balolot, but maintaining that private respondent Conde alone be
prosecuted in both administrative and criminal cases.14
On July 17, 2002, the IAS issued a Decision in Administrative Case No. IASOB-020007,
finding all private respondents guilty of grave misconduct but penalized them with
suspension only. The IAS noted however that private respondents were merely being
"[enthusiastic] in the conduct of the arrest in line of duty." 15
Meanwhile, in Criminal Case No. 5047, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for
Preliminary Investigation and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of or Recall the
Warrant of Arrest.16 The RTC granted the same in an Order17 dated August 17, 2001.
Upon reinvestigation, Prosecutor II Eliseo Diaz, Jr. filed a "Reinvestigation with Motion
to Dismiss" dated November 22, 2001, recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case
No. 5047 on the ground that "the action of the policemen who conducted the
warrantless search in spite of the absence of any circumstances justifying the same
intruded into the privacy of the accused and the security of his property." 18 Officer-
in-Charge Prosecutor II Victoriano Pag-ong approved said recommendation.19
The RTC granted the prosecution's motion to dismiss in an Order20 dated January 16,
2003.
Apparently unaware of what transpired in Criminal Case No. 5047, Ombudsman
Investigation & Prosecution Officer Dennis L. Garcia issued in OMB-P-C-02-0109-B,
the October 30, 2003 Resolution, to wit:
After a careful evaluation, the undersigned prosecutor finds no probable cause for
any of the offenses charged against above-named respondents.
The allegations of the complainant failed to establish the factual basis of the
complaint, it appearing from the records that the incident stemmed from a valid
warrantless arrest. The subsequent execution of an affidavit of desistance by the
complainant rendered the complaint even more uncertain and subject to doubt,
especially so since it merely exculpated some but not all of the respondents. These
circumstances, coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of
duty, negates any criminal liability on the part of the respondents.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that the above-
captioned case be dismissed for lack of probable cause.21 (Emphasis supplied)
49
Upon the recommendation of Director Bienvenido C. Blancaflor, Deputy Ombudsman
for the Military Orlando C. Casimiro (Deputy Ombudsman) approved the October 30,
2003 Resolution.22
In his Motion for Reconsideration,23 petitioner called the attention of the
Ombudsman to the earlier IAS Decision, the Reinvestigation with Motion to Dismiss
of Prosecutor II Eliseo Diaz, Jr. and the RTC Order, all of which declared the
warrantless search conducted by private respondents illegal,24 which are
contradicted by the October 30, 2003 Ombudsman Resolution declaring the
warrantless search legal.
The Ombudsman denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground that
the latter offered "no new evidence or errors of law which would warrant the reversal
or modification"25 of its October 30, 2003 Resolution.
Petitioner filed the present petition, attributing to Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro,
Director Blancaflor and Prosecutor Garcia (public respondents) the following acts of
grave abuse of discretion:
I. Public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and/or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, in their
Resolution dated October 30, 2003, public respondents found that the incident upon
which petitioner's criminal complaint was based stemmed from a valid warrantless
arrest and dismissed petitioner's complaint despite the fact that:
A. Petitioner has clearly shown that the search conducted by the private respondents
was made without a valid warrant, nor does it fall under any of the instances of valid
warrantless searches.
B. Notwithstanding the absence of a valid warrant, petitioner was arrested and
detained by the private respondents.
II. Public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and/or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, in their Order
dated January 20, 2004, public respondents denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration in a capricious, whimsical, despotic and arbitrary manner. 26
In its Memorandum,27 the Office of the Solicitor General argued that public
respondents acted within the bounds of their discretion in dismissing OMB-P-C-02-
0109-B given that private respondents committed no crime in searching petitioner
and confiscating his firearm as the former were merely performing their duty of
enforcing the law against illegal possession of firearms and the Comelec ban against
the carrying of firearms outside of one's residence.
Private respondent Conde filed a Comment28 and a Memorandum for
himself.29 Private respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot filed their
separate Letter-Comment dated June 25, 2004.30
The petition lacks merit.
The Constitution vests in the Ombudsman the power to determine whether there
exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding
information with the appropriate courts.31 The Court respects the relative autonomy
of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute, and refrains from interfering when
the latter exercises such powers either directly or through the Deputy
Ombudsman,32 except when the same is shown to be tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.33
Grave abuse of discretion is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when judgment
rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim and
despotism.34 This does not obtain in the present case.
It is noted that the criminal complaint which petitioner filed with the Ombudsman
charges private respondents with warrantless search, arbitrary detention, and grave
threats.
The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense. The conduct of a
warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) or any other special law. What the RPC punishes are only two forms of
searches:
Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those
legally obtained. - In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the
commission of any other offense, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding P1,000.00
pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall procure a
search warrant without just cause, or, having legally procured the same, shall exceed
his authority or use unnecessary severity in executing the same.
Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. - The penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee
who, in cases where a search is proper, shall search the domicile, papers or other
belongings of any person, in the absence of the latter, any member of his family, or
in their default, without the presence of two witnesses residing in the same locality.
50
Petitioner did not allege any of the elements of the foregoing felonies in his Affidavit-
Complaint; rather, he accused private respondents of conducting a search on his
vehicle without being armed with a valid warrant. This situation, while lamentable, is
not covered by Articles 129 and 130 of the RPC.
The remedy of petitioner against the warrantless search conducted on his vehicle is
civil,35 under Article 32, in relation to Article 2219 36 (6) and (10) of the Civil Code,
which provides:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:
xxxx
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
xxxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.
and/or disciplinary and administrative, under Section 41 of Republic Act No. 6975.37
To avail of such remedies, petitioner may file against private respondents a complaint
for damages with the regular courts38 or an administrative case with the
PNP/DILG,39 as petitioner did in Administrative Case No. IASOB-020007, and not a
criminal action with the Ombudsman.
Public respondents' dismissal of the criminal complaint for illegal search which
petitioner filed with the Ombudsman against private respondents was therefore
proper, although the reasons public respondents cited for dismissing the complaint
are rather off the mark because they relied solely on the finding that the warrantless
search conducted by private respondents was valid and that the Affidavit of
Desistance which petitioner executed cast doubt on the veracity of his
complaint.40 Public respondents completely overlooked the fact that the criminal
complaint was not cognizable by the Ombudsman as illegal search is not a criminal
offense. Nevertheless, the result achieved is the same: the dismissal of a groundless
criminal complaint for illegal search which is not an offense under the RPC. Thus, the
Court need not resolve the issue of whether or not public respondents erred in their
finding on the validity of the search for that issue is completely hypothetical under
the circumstance.
The criminal complaint for abitrary detention was likewise properly dismissed by
public respondents. To sustain a criminal charge for arbitrary detention, it must be
shown that (a) the offender is a public officer or employee, (b) the offender detained
the complainant, and (c) the detention is without legal grounds.41 The second
element was not alleged by petitioner in his Affidavit-Complaint. As pointed out by
private respondent Conde in his Comment42 and Memorandum,43 petitioner himself
identified in his Affidavit-Complaint that it was Police Chief Rocacorba who caused his
detention. Nowhere in said affidavit did petitioner allege that private respondents
effected his detention, or were in any other way involved in it.44 There was, therefore,
no factual or legal basis to sustain the criminal charge for arbitrary detention against
private respondents.
Finally, on the criminal complaint for grave threats, the Solicitor General aptly pointed
out that the same is based merely on petitioner's bare allegation that private
respondents aimed their firearms at him.45 Such bare allegation stands no chance
against the well-entrenched rule applicable in this case, that public officers enjoy a
presumption of regularity in the performance of their official function.46 The IAS itself
observed that private respondents may have been carried away by their "enthusiasm
in the conduct of the arrest in line of duty." 47 Petitioner expressed the same view
when, in his Affidavit of Desistance, he accepted that private respondents may have
been merely following orders when they pointed their long firearms at him.
All said, public respondents did not act with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the criminal complaint against private respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.
People vs Flores
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 116488. May 31, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AARON FLORES @ RONITO,
SULPECIO SILPAO y ORTEGA @ SULPING and EDGAR VILLERAN y MAGBANUA, accused-
appellants.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
51
Sgt. Wennie Tampioc, Detachment Commander of the 7th Infantry Brigade detailed at
Barangay Tabu, Ilog, Negros Occidental, and three (3) members of the local Citizen
Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU) under his supervision, namely, Aaron
Flores alias Ronito, Sulpecio Silpao y Ortega alias Sulping and Edgar Villeran y
Magbanua, were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros
Occidental, Branch 61, with Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.The Information
charged as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of September, 1992, in the Municipality of Ilog, Province
of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, armed with high powered firearms conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, by means of force, violence and intimidation,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, kidnap, detain and keep
under guard one SAMSON SAYAM y GEPANAO from Km 117, Hda. Shangrella (sic),
Brgy. Tabu, of the above-named municipality, and bring the latter to their
detachment at Brgy. Tabu, under restraint and against his will, without proper
authority thereof, thereby depriving said victim of his civil liberty since then up to the
present.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
All the four accused pleaded Not Guilty when arraigned. Trial ensued and, based on
the testimonial evidence presented, the trial court found the following antecedent
facts to be undisputed.
On the night of September 29, 1992, the victim, Samson Sayam, was drinking beer at
the store owned by Terry Cabrillos located at Barangay Tabu, Ilog, Negros
Occidental. Sgt. Wennie Tampioc, Aaron Flores, Sulpecio Silpao and Edgar Villeran
were at the same store drinking beer. Sayam joined the four accused at their
table. Sometime later, all the accused and the victim left the store and walked
towards the direction of the military detachment headquarters. After the accused left
the store with Samson Sayam, witnesses heard a single gunshot followed by rapid
firing coming from the direction of the detachment headquarters.[2] That was the last
time Samson Sayam was seen, and despite diligent efforts of Sayams mother and
relatives, he has not been found.
It was the prosecutions contention that on that fateful evening, all four accused
hatched a conspiracy to kidnap the victim and thereafter detain him at the
detachment headquarters. They allegedly succeeded in their plot and, the
prosecution avers, to this day the accused have not released Samson Sayam. All the
accused, however, vehemently denied committing the acts charged.
The trial court held that the testimonial evidence failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the existence of a conspiracy among the four accused. More specifically, the
prosecution failed to show an apparent common design by and among the accused
to kidnap and detain Samson Sayam against his will. Thus, the trial court proceeded
to determine the individual liabilities of the four accused based on the degree of their
participation in the commission of the offense charged.
The trial court gave credence to the prosecutions evidence that Samson Sayam was
seen being forcibly dragged out of the store and pulled towards the direction of the
detachment headquarters by accused Aaron Flores, Sulpecio Silpao and Edgar
Villeran. Since Samson Sayam had not been seen nor heard from since then, the trial
court held that the three accused were responsible for the formers disappearance.
As regards Wennie Tampioc, the trial court found that he left the store ahead of the
three (3) co-accused and, thus, had nothing to do with the disappearance of Samson
Sayam. Notably, none of the prosecution witnesses specifically or categorically
mentioned Tampioc as among those who actively participated in bringing Samson
Sayam by force to their headquarters. Unlike his co-accused who are natives of the
place of the incident, Wennie Tampioc was newly assigned as Detachment
Commander and did not know Samson Sayam, such that no ill-motive was attributed
to him by the trial court. Likewise, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Nelson
Golez, on the one hand, and that of Carlos Manlangit, on the other hand, conflict as
to the kind of firearm allegedly carried by Tampioc. While Golez stated that he was
armed with an Armalite rifle,[3] Manlangit testified that Tampioc was armed with a
short firearm.[4]
More importantly, the trial court found that the identity of Sgt. Tampioc as one of the
perpetrators of the crime was doubtful, because notwithstanding the fact that Nelson
Golez knew Wennie Tampioc even before September 29, 1992,[5] the original
complaint filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Ilog Candoni, dated October
21, 1992, which was based on the affidavits of Golez and Carlito Manlingit, did not
mention Wennie Tampioc as one of the respondents. The said affidavits merely
mentioned an unidentified member of the 7th IB, Philippine Army, assigned at Brgy.
Tabu, detachment. At the time of the execution of the affidavits, the witnesses could
have known that Wennie Tampioc was a sergeant, and that he was the commander
of the detachment. Finally, the straightforward and emphatic manner in which
Wennie Tampioc testified inspired belief in the trial courts mind.[6]
On December 8, 1993, the trial court rendered the assailed judgment, the dispositive
portion of which states:
52
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Aaron Flores, Edgar
Villeran and Sulpecio Silpao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined and penalized in Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code and are each sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua; and there being no proof that Samson Sayam is dead, they are ordered to
pay him jointly and severally, or, in the alternative, his heirs the sum of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos as damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs of this suit.
The accused Wennie Tampioc is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.
The bail bonds of the said accused are ordered cancelled and the convicted accused
ordered confined pending appeal if they so file an appeal, in accordance with
Administrative Circular No. 2-92, dated January 20, 1992 of the Supreme Court.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Two (2) separate appeals were brought before us. Accused-appellant Sulpecio Silpao
raised the following errors:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT SULPECIO SILPAO
OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION, UNDER ARTICLE
267, REVISED PENAL CODE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAFGU SULPECIO
SILPAO, AS AMONG THOSE WHO FORCIBLY BROUGHT SAMSON SAYAM TO THEIR
HEADQUARTERS IN THE EVENING OF 29 SEPTEMBER 1992 AND RESPONSIBLE FOR
SAMSON SAYAMS DISAPPEARANCE.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAFGU SULPECIO
SILPAO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.
On the other hand, accused-appellants Aaron Flores and Edgar Villeran interposed a
joint appeal based on the sole error that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AARON FLORES AND
EDGAR VILLERAN GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL AND
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.
After a thorough review of the facts and evidence adduced before the trial court, we
find that accused-appellants should be acquitted of the offense charged against
them.
The crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention is defined and penalized under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The
elements of the offense are:
1. That the offender is a private individual.
2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of
his liberty.
3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal.
4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are
present:
(a) That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days;
(b) That it is committed simulating public authority;
(c) That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained or threats to kill him are made; or
(d) That the person kidnapped is a minor, female or public officer.[8]
Clearly, accused-appellants cannot be charged with or convicted of the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, since the first element of the said crime is
that the offender must be a private individual. In the case at bar, accused-appellants
were members of the local CAFGU at the time the alleged crime was committed.
The CAFGU was created pursuant to Executive Order No. 264 for the purpose of
complementing the operations of the regular force formations in a locality.[9] It was
composed of civilian volunteers who were tasked to maintain peace and order in their
localities, as well as to respond to threats to national security. As such, they were
provided with weapons, and given the authority to detain or order detention of
individuals.[10]
The Solicitor General recognizes the error of charging and convicting accused-
appellants of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention for the reason that the
appellants are not private individuals, but public officers. As such, the Solicitor
General submits that, under the facts alleged, accused-appellants can only be liable
for the crime of Arbitrary Detention, defined and penalized in Article 124 of the
Revised Penal Code. The prosecution maintains that inasmuch as all the other
elements of Arbitrary Detention were alleged in the criminal information filed against
the accused-appellants, they may still be convicted of said crime.
Arbitrary detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal
grounds, detains a person.[11] Since it is settled that accused-appellants are public
officers, the question that remains to be resolved is whether or not the evidence
adduced before the trial court proved that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily detained by
accused-appellants.
As far back as the case of U.S. v. Cabanag,[12] it was held that in the crime of illegal or
arbitrary detention, it is essential that there is actual confinement or restriction of
53
the person of the offended party. The deprivation of liberty must be proved,[13] just
as the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty must also be
established by indubitable proof.[14]1 In the more recent case of People v.
Fajardo,[15] this Court reiterated the ruling in U.S. v. Cabanag, i.e., there must be
uncontroverted proof of both intent to deprive the victim of his liberty, as well as
actual confinement or restriction.
Detention is defined as the actual confinement of a person in an enclosure, or in any
manner detaining and depriving him of his liberty.[16] A careful review of the records
of the instant case shows no evidence sufficient to prove that Samson Sayam was
detained arbitrarily by accused-appellants. While the prosecution witnesses testified
that accused-appellants were seen walking with Samson Sayam toward the direction
of the detachment headquarters, there is no shred of evidence that he was actually
confined there or anywhere else. The fact that Samson Sayam has not been seen or
heard from since he was last seen with accused-appellants does not prove that he
was detained and deprived of his liberty. The prosecution, however, argues that
Samson Sayam was deprived of his liberty when accused-appellants forced him to go
with them when they left the store of Jerry Cabrillos and brought him to the
detachment headquarters.
We assayed the testimonies of the prosecutions main witnesses, namely, Carlito
Manlangit and his son Jerry Manlangit. Carlito Manlangits testimony was offered to
prove that Samson Sayam was forcibly taken from the store and that the latter tried
his best to free himself from his abductors. And yet, all that Carlito testified to was
that he saw Samson Sayam crossing the street alone from the store of a certain
Moleng; that the four accused, who were armed, followed Sayam and asked for his
residence certificate; that the four accused apprehended Samson Sayam and brought
him to the detachment headquarters; and that he went home after he saw Samson
Sayam talking to the accused.[17]
It is readily apparent that Carlito Manlangits testimony failed to prove the stated
purpose thereof, i.e., that Samson Sayam was taken forcibly to the detachment
headquarters. To be sure, the witness did not state that Samson Sayam was pulled,
dragged, or coerced to go with accused-appellants. Neither did he say that Samson
Sayam was taken at gunpoint. There is also no relevant testimony to the effect that
Samson Sayam tried his best to free himself from the clutches of accused-
appellants. For if that were the truth, the reactions of Carlito Manlangit do not
conform to human experience. If he really witnessed Samson Sayam being
apprehended, forcibly taken, and trying to free himself, it cannot be logically
explained why Carlito Manlangit just went home,[18] instead of doing anything to help
Samson Sayam. He admitted that he did not immediately report the incident to the
authorities.[19] More telling is the absence of testimony to the effect that Samson
Sayam was being taken to the detachment headquarters against his will, that he was
protesting his apprehension, or that he was asking for help, considering that there
were other people within hearing and seeing distance. Most damaging is Carlito
Manlangits statement that he did not see Samson Sayam in the detachment
headquarters with any or all of the accused.[20] In fine, Carlito Manlangits testimony
failed to prove that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily detained or deprived of his liberty.
Jerry Manlangit, son of Carlito, also testified for the proseuction. According to him,
he and Samson Sayam went to Barangay Tabu to have a sack of palay milled on
September 29, 1992. At around six in the evening, while on their way home, they
passed by the store of Terry Cabrillos to buy kerosene. There, he saw the four accused
drinking beer. Samson Sayam told him to go home because he had to show his
residence certificate and barangay clearance to accused-appellant Aaron Flores. Jerry
Manlangit then proceeded to his residence in Hacienda Shangrila, located about half
a kilometer away from the center of Barangay Tabu. Later, he told his father that
Samson Sayam stayed behind and asked him to fetch Samson. He also testified that
he heard gunshots coming from the direction of the detachment headquarters.[21]
The testimony of Jerry Manlangit does not prove any of the elements of the crime of
arbitrary detention. Neither does it support nor corroborate the testimony of his
father, Carlito, for they dealt on a different set of facts. Jerry Manlangit did not see
any of accused-appellant apprehend or detain Samson Sayam. He did not even see if
accused-appellant Flores really inspected the residence certificate and barangay
clearance of Samson Sayam. The rest of his testimony comprised of hearsay
evidence,[22] which has no probative value.[23] In summary, Jerry Manlangits
testimony failed to establish that accused-appellants were guilty of arbitrary
detention.
The prosecution also presented the testimony of Nelson Golez, who identified the
four accused as the persons with Samson Sayam, drinking inside the store of Terry
Cabrillos. He also stated that following a heated argument, the accused and Samson
Sayam left the store and went towards the direction of the detachment
headquarters. He said that the accused were holding and pulling Samson Sayam
towards the road. Ten minutes later, Nelson Golez heard a single gunshot followed
by rapid firing.[24]
54
On cross-examination, however, Nelson Golez did not affirm his earlier statement
that the accused and Samson Sayam were engaged in a heated argument.Rather, he
said he did not hear them arguing as they were leaving the store. Although Nelson
Golez attested that Samson Sayam was protesting while the accused were dragging
him, he did not do anything to help Samson Sayam, who happened to be his cousin.[25]
Again, no conclusion of guilt can be inferred from Nelson Golezs testimony. First of
all, he was unsure of his assertion that there was an argument. The mere fact that
Samson Sayam was being dragged towards the road does not constitute arbitrary
detention. There is no showing that Samson Sayam was completely deprived of his
liberty such that he could not free himself from the grip of the accused, if he was
indeed being held against his will. The incident transpired in a public place, where
there were people milling about, many of whom were his friends. It is puzzling that
Samson Sayam did not cry out for help. Nobody bothered to report the incident, if
indeed it happened, to the barangay authorities. No one else came forward to
corroborate the testimony of Nelson Golez.
The testimony of Nelson Golez, by itself, lacks credibility. He wavered on material
points, even as the prosecution failed to substantiate by direct or corroborative
evidence the bare testimony of Nelson Golez.
It is basic and elemental that in criminal prosecutions, before the accused may be
convicted of a crime, his guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.Although the
findings of fact made by trial courts are generally not disturbed on appeal, if there are
substantial facts which were overlooked but which may alter the results of the case
in favor of the accused, such facts should be taken into account by the appellate
court.[26] And where it appears that the trial court erred in the appreciation of the
evidence on record or the lack of it, the factual findings of the trial court may be
reversed.[27]
After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case and weighing the testimonial
evidence on the scale of creditworthiness and materiality, this Court finds the
evidence of the prosecution grossly insufficient to sustain a conviction. Again, the fact
of detention, whether illegal or arbitrary, was not clearly established by credible
evidence. There was no showing that Samson Sayam was locked up, restrained of his
freedom, or prevented from communicating with anyone. Likewise, there was no
proof that there was actual intent on the part of accused-appellants to arbitrarily
deprive Samson Sayam of his liberty. It is necessary that there must be a purposeful
or knowing action by accused-appellants to restrain the victim by or with force,
because taking coupled with intent completes the crime of illegal or arbitrary
detention.[28]
The prosecution, however, maintains that the evidence, even though circumstantial,
sufficiently establishes the guilt of the accused-appellants. It cites the following
circumstances:
1. On September 29, 1992, at about 6:00 oclock in the evening, accused-appellants,
together with their companions Sergeant Tampioc and fellow CAFGU Sulpecio Silpao,
were seen with Samson at the store of Terry Cabrillos. Accused-appellants were
having a drinking spree. Later, they were seen engaged in a heated argument.
2. Thereafter, Samson was forcibly brought out of the store by accused-appellants by
holding and pulling him towards the road. From another angle, another prosecution
witness saw accused-appellants on the road arresting Samson.
3. Accused-appellants brought Samson towards the direction of the detachment of
Brgy. Tabu.
4. Ten (10) minutes later, a gunshot was heard coming from the direction of the
detachment followed by rapid firing.
5. After the incident, Samson was never seen again or heard from.[29]
As already discussed, the above-enumerated circumstances were not established by
clear and convincing evidence. And even if these acts were proven to be true, the
combination of all these circumstances would still not be able to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. To our mind, the totality of these circumstantial evidence
do not constitute an unbroken chain pointing to the fair and reasonable conclusion
that the accused-appellants are guilty of the crime charged.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the
circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused-appellants
are guilty, and inconsistent with the possibility that they are innocent.[30] Thus:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
a) There is more than one circumstance;
b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.[31]
The rule is clear that there must be at least two proven circumstances which in
complete sequence leads to no other logical conclusion than that of the guilt of the
accused.[32] It is admitted that Samson Sayam was seen drinking with accused-
appellants on that fateful night. However, the circumstances that there was a heated
55
argument among them, and that the accused-appellants held and pulled Samson
Sayam to the road and brought him towards the direction of the detachment
headquarters was not sufficiently proven by material or relevant testimony.
Moreover, the circumstance that gunshots were heard on that night have no
relevancy to the case. Even if it were, it cannot be concluded that the gunshots came
from the direction of the detachment headquarters. The witnesses who testified that
they heard the gunshots were at least half a kilometer away from the center of the
barangay, while the detachment headquarters itself was also some distance from the
barangay. At night, especially in the rural areas when all is quiet, loud sounds such as
gunshots reverberate and would seem to come from every direction. An ordinary
person a kilometer away cannot, with certainty, point to the exact location where the
gunshots would be coming from. That would otherwise be attributing expertise on
such matters to the prosecution witnesses.
That Samson Sayam was never seen or heard from again cannot be the basis for the
trial court to render judgment convicting the accused-appellants. In fact, it has no
bearing in this case because it is not one of the elements of the crime of arbitrary
detention. Consequently, only one relevant circumstance was proved, i.e., that
accused-appellants were the last persons seen with Samson Sayam. However, said
circumstance does not necessarily prove that they feloniously abducted him, then
arbitrarily detained him.[33]
Moreover, mere suspicion that the disappearance of Samson Sayam was a result of
accused-appellants alleged criminal acts and intentions is insufficient to convict
them. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the required quantum of evidence.[34] An
uncorroborated circumstantial evidence is certainly not sufficient for conviction when
the evidence itself is in serious doubt.[35] The prosecution was not able to prove a
possible motive why accused-appellants would arbitrarily detain Samson Sayam. In
sum, there is no unbroken chain of circumstances leading to the conclusion that
accused-appellants are guilty. Since the pieces of circumstantial evidence do not fulfill
the test of moral certainty that is sufficient to support a judgment or conviction, the
Court must acquit the accused.[36]
In the recent case of People v. Comesario,[37]3 we had occasion to rule that:
Accused-appellants conviction by the trial court hinged on circumstantial
evidence. To validly invoke circumstantial evidence, it must be shown that there is
more than one circumstance and the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain of
events that can lead reasonably to the conclusion pointing to the accused to the
exclusion of all others as the author of the crime. Logically, it is where the evidence is
purely circumstantial that there should be an even greater need than usual to apply
with vigor the rule that the prosecution cannot depend on the weakness of the
defense and that any conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of
guilt of the accused. Like a tapestry made of strands which create a pattern when
interwoven, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to
one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person.
Accused-appellants enjoy the presumption of innocence until the contrary is
proved. In the case at bar, the pieces of testimonial evidence relied on by the
prosecution and the trial court to support a conviction have failed to overcome the
constitutional precept of the presumed innocence of accused-appellants. Among
other grounds, not only is there a lot of room for reasonable doubt in regard to their
guilt, there is a virtual dearth of convincing evidence to prove that a crime had been
committed.
There is no need even to assess the evidence of the defense, for the prosecution
bears the onus to distinctly and indubitably prove that a crime had been committed
by accused-appellants.[38] It is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish its case
with that degree of proof which leads to no other conclusion but conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. The evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merits for it cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the defense.[39] Clearly, the prosecution in this case has failed to prove the guilt of
accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. In similar cases, this Court has often
and consistently ruled that it is better to acquit a guilty person than to convict an
innocent one.[40]
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants
are ACQUITTED. Unless being held or detained for some lawful reason, accused-
appellants are ORDERED RELEASED immediately. The Director of Prisons is
DIRECTED to inform this Court, within five (5) days from notice, of the date and time
when accused-appellants are released pursuant to this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Puno, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., on leave.
56
TITLE THREE- CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo, COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano, and the late
Senator Barbers.[8]
Chavez vs Gonzales
DECISION
3. On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul
PUNO, C.J.:
Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and
those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-
A. Precis
Wiretapping Act. These persons included Secretary Bunye and Atty. Paguia. He also
stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing
In this jurisdiction, it is established that freedom of the press is crucial and so
offense, subject to arrest by anybody who had personal knowledge if the crime was
inextricably woven into the right to free speech and free expression, that any attempt
committed or was being committed in their presence.[9]
to restrict it must be met with an examination so critical that only a danger that is
clear and present would be allowed to curtail it.
4. On June 9, 2005, in another press briefing, Secretary Gonzales ordered the
Indeed, we have not wavered in the duty to uphold this cherished freedom. We have
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to go after media organizations found to have
struck down laws and issuances meant to curtail this right, as in Adiong v.
caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape of an alleged
COMELEC,[1] Burgos v. Chief of Staff,[2] Social Weather Stations v.
wiretapped conversation involving the President about fixing votes in the 2004
COMELEC,[3] and Bayan v. Executive Secretary Ermita.[4] When on its face, it is clear
national elections. Gonzales said that he was going to start with Inq7.net, a joint
that a governmental act is nothing more than a naked means to prevent the free
venture between the Philippine Daily Inquirer and GMA7 television network, because
exercise of speech, it must be nullified.
by the very nature of the Internet medium, it was able to disseminate the contents
B. The Facts
of the tape more widely. He then expressed his intention of inviting the editors and
managers of Inq7.net and GMA7 to a probe, and supposedly declared, I [have] asked
1. The case originates from events that occurred a year after the 2004 national and
the NBI to conduct a tactical interrogation of all concerned. [10]
local elections. On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the
5. On June 11, 2005, the NTC issued this press release: [11]
opposition was planning to destabilize the administration by releasing an audiotape
NTC GIVES FAIR WARNING TO RADIO AND TELEVISION OWNERS/OPERATORS TO
of a mobile phone conversation allegedly between the President of the Philippines,
OBSERVE ANTI-WIRETAPPING LAW AND PERTINENT CIRCULARS ON PROGRAM
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections
STANDARDS
(COMELEC). The conversation was audiotaped allegedly through wire-
tapping.[5] Later, in a Malacaangpress briefing, Secretary Bunye produced two
xxx xxx xxx
versions of the tape, one supposedly the complete version, and the other, a spliced,
doctored or altered version, which would suggest that the President had instructed
Taking into consideration the countrys unusual situation, and in order not to
the COMELEC official to manipulate the election results in the Presidents favor. [6] It
unnecessarily aggravate the same, the NTC warns all radio stations and television
seems that Secretary Bunye admitted that the voice was that of President Arroyo, but
network owners/operators that the conditions of the authorization and permits
subsequently made a retraction. [7]
issued to them by Government like the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of
Authority explicitly provides that said companies shall not use [their] stations for the
2. On June 7, 2005, former counsel of deposed President Joseph Estrada, Atty. Alan
broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful misrepresentation. Relative
Paguia, subsequently released an alleged authentic tape recording of the
thereto, it has come to the attention of the [NTC] that certain personalities are in
wiretap. Included in the tapes were purported conversations of the President, the
possession of alleged taped conversations which they claim involve the President of
57
the Philippines and a Commissioner of the COMELEC regarding supposed violation of
election laws.
These personalities have admitted that the taped conversations are products of illegal
wiretapping operations.
Considering that these taped conversations have not been duly authenticated nor
could it be said at this time that the tapes contain an accurate or truthful
representation of what was recorded therein, it is the position of the [NTC] that the
continuous airing or broadcast of the said taped conversations by radio and television
stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of
the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority issued to these radio and
television stations. It has been subsequently established that the said tapes are false
and/or fraudulent after a prosecution or appropriate investigation, the concerned
radio and television companies are hereby warned that their broadcast/airing of such
false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be just cause for the
suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to
the said companies.
In addition to the above, the [NTC] reiterates the pertinent NTC circulars on program
standards to be observed by radio and television stations. NTC Memorandum Circular
111-12-85 explicitly states, among others, that all radio broadcasting and television
stations shall, during any broadcast or telecast, cut off from the air the speech, play,
act or scene or other matters being broadcast or telecast the tendency thereof is to
disseminate false information or such other willful misrepresentation, or to propose
and/or incite treason, rebellion or sedition. The foregoing directive had been
reiterated by NTC Memorandum Circular No. 22-89, which, in addition thereto,
prohibited radio, broadcasting and television stations from using their stations to
broadcast or telecast any speech, language or scene disseminating false information
or willful misrepresentation, or inciting, encouraging or assisting in subversive or
treasonable acts.
The [NTC] will not hesitate, after observing the requirements of due process, to apply
with full force the provisions of said Circulars and their accompanying sanctions on
erring radio and television stations and their owners/operators.
6. On June 14, 2005, NTC held a dialogue with the Board of Directors of
the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP). NTC allegedly assured the KBP
that the press release did not violate the constitutional freedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press, and the right to information. Accordingly, NTC and KBP
issued a Joint Press Statement which states, among others, that: [12]
NTC respects and will not hinder freedom of the press and the right to information
on matters of public concern. KBP & its members have always been committed to the
exercise of press freedom with high sense of responsibility and discerning judgment
of fairness and honesty.
NTC did not issue any MC [Memorandum Circular] or Order constituting a restraint of
press freedom or censorship. The NTC further denies and does not intend to limit or
restrict the interview of members of the opposition or free expression of views.
What is being asked by NTC is that the exercise of press freedom [be] done
responsibly.
KBP has program standards that KBP members will observe in the treatment of news
and public affairs programs. These include verification of sources, non-airing of
materials that would constitute inciting to sedition and/or rebellion.
The KBP Codes also require that no false statement or willful misrepresentation is
made in the treatment of news or commentaries.
The supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with sensitivity and handled
responsibly giving due consideration to the process being undertaken to verify and
validate the authenticity and actual content of the same.
C. The Petition
Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against
respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC, praying for the issuance of the writs
of certiorari and prohibition, as extraordinary legal remedies, to annul void
58
proceedings, and to prevent the unlawful, unconstitutional and oppressive exercise
of authority by the respondents.[13]
Alleging that the acts of respondents are violations of the freedom on expression and
of the press, and the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern,[14] petitioner specifically asked this Court:
[F]or [the] nullification of acts, issuances, and orders of respondents committed or
made since June 6, 2005 until the present that curtail the publics rights to freedom
of expression and of the press, and to information on matters of public concern
specifically in relation to information regarding the controversial taped conversion of
President Arroyo and for prohibition of the further commission of such acts, and
making of such issuances, and orders by respondents. [15]
Respondents[16] denied that the acts transgress the Constitution, and questioned
petitioners legal standing to file the petition. Among the arguments they raised as to
the validity of the fair warning issued by respondent NTC, is that broadcast media
enjoy lesser constitutional guarantees compared to print media, and the warning was
issued pursuant to the NTCs mandate to regulate the telecommunications
industry.[17] It was also stressed that most of the [television] and radio stations
continue, even to this date, to air the tapes, but of late within the parameters agreed
upon between the NTC and KBP. [18]
D. THE PROCEDURAL THRESHOLD: LEGAL STANDING
To be sure, the circumstances of this case make the constitutional challenge peculiar.
Petitioner, who is not a member of the broadcast media, prays that we strike down
the acts and statements made by respondents as violations of the right to free
speech, free expression and a free press. For another, the recipients of the press
statements have not come forwardneither intervening nor joining petitioner in this
action. Indeed, as a group, they issued a joint statement with respondent NTC that
does not complain about restraints on freedom of the press.
It would seem, then, that petitioner has not met the requisite legal standing, having
failed to allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
Court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. [19]
But as early as half a century ago, we have already held that where serious
constitutional questions are involved, the transcendental importance to the public of
these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside if
we must, technicalities of procedure. [20] Subsequently, this Court has repeatedly and
consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing
and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest,[21] in
keeping with the Court's duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or
not other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them.
Thus, in line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi when a case involves
an issue of overarching significance to our society,[22]we therefore brush aside
technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of this petition,[23] seeing as it
involves a challenge to the most exalted of all the civil rights, the freedom of
expression. The petition raises other issues like the extent of the right to information
of the public. It is fundamental, however, that we need not address all issues but only
the most decisive one which in the case at bar is whether the acts of the respondents
abridge freedom of speech and of the press.
But aside from the primordial issue of determining whether free speech and freedom
of the press have been infringed, the case at bar also gives this Court the opportunity:
(1) to distill the essence of freedom of speech and of the press now beclouded by the
vagaries of motherhood statements; (2) to clarify the types of speeches and their
differing restraints allowed by law; (3) to discuss the core concepts of prior restraint,
content-neutral and content-based regulations and their constitutional standard of
review; (4) to examine the historical difference in the treatment of restraints between
print and broadcast media and stress the standard of review governing both; and (5)
to call attention to the ongoing blurring of the lines of distinction between print and
broadcast media.
E. RE-EXAMINING THE LAW ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH,
OF EXPRESSION AND OF THE PRESS
59
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press,
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances.[24]
Freedom of expression has gained recognition as a fundamental principle of every
democratic government, and given a preferred right that stands on a higher level than
substantive economic freedom or other liberties. The cognate rights codified
by Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution, copied almost verbatim from the First
Amendment of the U.S. Bill of Rights,[25] were considered the necessary consequence
of republican institutions and the complement of free speech.[26] This preferred
status of free speech has also been codified at the international level, its recognition
now enshrined in international law as a customary norm that binds all nations.[27]
In the Philippines, the primacy and high esteem accorded freedom of expression is a
fundamental postulate of our constitutional system. [28] This right was elevated to
constitutional status in the 1935, the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions, reflecting our
own lesson of history, both political and legal, that freedom of speech is an
indispensable condition for nearly every other form of freedom.[29] Moreover, our
history shows that the struggle to protect the freedom of speech, expression and the
press was, at bottom, the struggle for the indispensable preconditions for the
exercise of other freedoms.[30] For it is only when the people have unbridled access
to information and the press that they will be capable of rendering enlightened
judgments. In the oft-quoted words of Thomas Jefferson, we cannot both be free and
ignorant.
E.1. ABSTRACTION OF FREE SPEECH
Surrounding the freedom of speech clause are various concepts that we have
adopted as part and parcel of our own Bill of Rights provision on this basic
freedom.[31] What is embraced under this provision was discussed exhaustively by the
Court in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, [32] in which it was held:
At the very least, free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to
discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship and
punishment. There is to be no previous restraint on the communication of views or
subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for
damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of
substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. [33]
Gonzales further explained that the vital need of a constitutional democracy for
freedom of expression is undeniable, whether as a means of assuring individual self-
fulfillment; of attaining the truth; of assuring participation by the people in social,
including political, decision-making; and of maintaining the balance between stability
and change.[34] As early as the 1920s, the trend as reflected in Philippine and
American decisions was to recognize the broadest scope and assure the widest
latitude for this constitutional guarantee. The trend represents a profound
commitment to the principle that debate on public issue should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open. [35]
Freedom of speech and of the press means something more than the right to approve
existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to official
measures, and to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter of public
consequence.[36] When atrophied, the right becomes meaningless.[37] The right
belongs as well -- if not more to those who question, who do not conform, who
differ.[38] The ideas that may be expressed under this freedom are confined not only
to those that are conventional or acceptable to the majority. To be truly meaningful,
freedom of speech and of the press should allow and even encourage the articulation
of the unorthodox view, though it be hostile to or derided by others; or though such
view induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are,
or even stirs people to anger.[39] To paraphrase Justice Holmes, it is freedom for the
thought that we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees with us. [40]
The scope of freedom of expression is so broad that it extends protection to nearly
all forms of communication. It protects speech, print and assembly regarding secular
as well as political causes, and is not confined to any particular field of human interest.
The protection covers myriad matters of public interest or concern embracing all
issues, about which information is needed or appropriate, so as to enable members
of society to cope with the exigencies of their period. The constitutional protection
assures the broadest possible exercise of free speech and free press for religious,
political, economic, scientific, news, or informational ends, inasmuch as the
Constitution's basic guarantee of freedom to advocate ideas is not confined to the
expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority.
60

The constitutional protection is not limited to the exposition of ideas. The protection
afforded free speech extends to speech or publications that are entertaining as well
as instructive or informative. Specifically, in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE)
v. Dans,[41] this Court stated that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are
entitled to the broad protection of the clause on freedom of speech and of
expression.
While all forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of freedom of
expression clause, the freedom of film, television and radio broadcasting is somewhat
lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspapers and other print media, as
will be subsequently discussed.
E.2. DIFFERENTIATION: THE LIMITS & RESTRAINTS OF FREE SPEECH
From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the
right to free speech and a free press is not susceptible of any limitation. But the
realities of life in a complex society preclude a literal interpretation of the provision
prohibiting the passage of a law that would abridge such freedom. For freedom of
expression is not an absolute, [42] nor is it an unbridled license that gives immunity for
every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this
freedom.
Thus, all speech are not treated the same. Some types of speech may be subjected to
some regulation by the State under its pervasive police power, in order that it may
not be injurious to the equal right of others or those of the community or
society.[43] The difference in treatment is expected because the relevant interests of
one type of speech, e.g., political speech, may vary from those of another, e.g.,
obscene speech. Distinctions have therefore been made in the treatment, analysis,
and evaluation of the permissible scope of restrictions on various categories of
speech. [44] We have ruled, for example, that in our jurisdiction slander or libel, lewd
and obscene speech, as well as fighting words are not entitled to constitutional
protection and may be penalized.[45]
Moreover, the techniques of reviewing alleged restrictions on speech (overbreadth,
vagueness, and so on) have been applied differently to each category, either
consciously or unconsciously. [46] A study of free speech jurisprudencewhether here
or abroadwill reveal that courts have developed different tests as to specific types or
categories of speech in concrete situations; i.e., subversive speech; obscene speech;
the speech of the broadcast media and of the traditional print media; libelous speech;
speech affecting associational rights; speech before hostile audiences; symbolic
speech; speech that affects the right to a fair trial; and speech associated with rights
of assembly and petition. [47]
Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or
a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which permits
limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established between the
speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the balancing of interests
tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance conflicting social values and
individual interests, and requires a conscious and detailed consideration of the
interplay of interests observable in a given situation of type of
situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on the premise that
speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that the speech will
likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule requires that the
evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high. [50]
As articulated in our jurisprudence, we have applied either the dangerous tendency
doctrine or clear and present danger test to resolve free speech challenges. More
recently, we have concluded that we have generally adhered to the clear and present
danger test. [51]
E.3. IN FOCUS: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
Much has been written on the philosophical basis of press freedom as part of the
larger right of free discussion and expression. Its practical importance, though, is
more easily grasped. It is the chief source of information on current affairs. It is the
most pervasive and perhaps most powerful vehicle of opinion on public questions. It
is the instrument by which citizens keep their government informed of their needs,
their aspirations and their grievances. It is the sharpest weapon in the fight to keep
government responsible and efficient. Without a vigilant press, the mistakes of every
administration would go uncorrected and its abuses unexposed. As Justice Malcolm
wrote in United States v. Bustos:[52]
61
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full
discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public
men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the
abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust
accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of clear conscience.
Its contribution to the public weal makes freedom of the press deserving of extra
protection. Indeed, the press benefits from certain ancillary rights. The productions
of writers are classified as intellectual and proprietary. Persons who interfere or
defeat the freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication are
liable for damages, be they private individuals or public officials.
E.4. ANATOMY OF RESTRICTIONS: PRIOR RESTRAINT, CONTENT-NEUTRAL AND
CONTENT-BASED REGULATIONS
Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period under the 1935 Constitution, has
recognized four aspects of freedom of the press. These are (1) freedom from prior
restraint; (2) freedom from punishment subsequent to publication; [53] (3) freedom of
access to information; [54]and (4) freedom of circulation.[55]
Considering that petitioner has argued that respondents press statement constitutes
a form of impermissible prior restraint, a closer scrutiny of this principle is in order,
as well as its sub-specie of content-based (as distinguished from content-neutral)
regulations.
At this point, it should be noted that respondents in this case deny that their acts
constitute prior restraints. This presents a unique tinge to the present challenge,
considering that the cases in our jurisdiction involving prior restrictions on speech
never had any issue of whether the governmental act or issuance actually constituted
prior restraint. Rather, the determinations were always about whether the restraint
was justified by the Constitution.
Be that as it may, the determination in every case of whether there is an
impermissible restraint on the freedom of speech has always been based on the
circumstances of each case, including the nature of the restraint. And in its application
in our jurisdiction, the parameters of this principle have been etched on a case-to-case
basis, always tested by scrutinizing the governmental issuance or act against the
circumstances in which they operate, and then determining the appropriate test with
which to evaluate.
Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms
of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination.[56] Freedom from
prior restraint is largely freedom from government censorship of publications,
whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of whether it is wielded by the
executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government. Thus, it precludes
governmental acts that required approval of a proposal to publish; licensing or
permits as prerequisites to publication including the payment of license taxes for the
privilege to publish; and even injunctions against publication. Even the closure of the
business and printing offices of certain newspapers, resulting in the discontinuation
of their printing and publication, are deemed as previous restraint or
censorship. [57] Any law or official that requires some form of permission to be had
before publication can be made, commits an infringement of the constitutional right,
and remedy can be had at the courts.
Given that deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is the hostility against all prior
restraints on speech, and any act that restrains speech is presumed invalid, [58] and
any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should
be greeted with furrowed brows, [59] it is important to stress not all prior restraints on
speech are invalid. Certain previous restraints may be permitted by the
Constitution, but determined only upon a careful evaluation of the challenged act as
against the appropriate test by which it should be measured against.
Hence, it is not enough to determine whether the challenged act constitutes some
form of restraint on freedom of speech. A distinction has to be made whether the
restraint is (1) a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents
of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well
defined standards;[60] or (2) a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the
restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. [61] The cast of
the restriction determines the test by which the challenged act is assayed with.
When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a
substantial governmental interest is required for its validity.[62] Because regulations
of this type are not designed to suppress any particular message, they are not subject
62
to the strictest form of judicial scrutiny but an intermediate approachsomewhere
between the mere rationality that is required of any other law and the compelling
interest standard applied to content-based restrictions.[63] The test is
called intermediate because the Court will not merely rubberstamp the validity of a
law but also require that the restrictions be narrowly-tailored to promote an
important or significant governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression of
expression. The intermediate approach has been formulated in this manner:
A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incident restriction on alleged [freedom of speech &
expression] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. [64]
On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the
press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and
invasive impact. Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present
danger rule will it pass constitutional muster,[65] with the government having the
burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.
Unless the government can overthrow this presumption, the content-based restraint
will be struck down.[66]
With respect to content-based restrictions, the government must also show the type
of harm the speech sought to be restrained would bring about especially the gravity
and the imminence of the threatened harm otherwise the prior restraint will be
invalid. Prior restraint on speech based on its content cannot be justified by
hypothetical fears, but only by showing a substantive and imminent evil that has
taken the life of a reality already on ground.[67] As formulated, the question in every
case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and
degree.[68]
The regulation which restricts the speech content must also serve an important or
substantial government interest, which is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression. [69]
Also, the incidental restriction on speech must be no greater than what is essential to
the furtherance of that interest. [70] A restriction that is so broad that it encompasses
more than what is required to satisfy the governmental interest will be
invalidated. [71] The regulation, therefore, must be reasonable and narrowly drawn to
fit the regulatory purpose, with the least restrictive means undertaken. [72]
Thus, when the prior restraint partakes of a content-neutral regulation, it is subjected
to an intermediate review. A content-based regulation,[73] however, bears a heavy
presumption of invalidity and is measured against the clear and present danger
rule. The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling reason,
and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague. [74]
Applying the foregoing, it is clear that the challenged acts in the case at bar need to
be subjected to the clear and present danger rule, as they are content-
based restrictions. The acts of respondents focused solely on but one objecta specific
content fixed as these were on the alleged taped conversations between the
President and a COMELEC official. Undoubtedly these did not merely provide
regulations as to the time, place or manner of the dissemination of speech or
expression.
E.5. Dichotomy of Free Press: Print v. Broadcast Media
Finally, comes respondents argument that the challenged act is valid on the ground
that broadcast media enjoys free speech rights that are lesser in scope to that of print
media. We next explore and test the validity of this argument, insofar as it has been
invoked to validate a content-based restriction on broadcast media.
The regimes presently in place for each type of media differ from one
other. Contrasted with the regime in respect of books, newspapers, magazines and
traditional printed matter, broadcasting, film and video have been subjected to
regulatory schemes.
The dichotomy between print and broadcast media traces its origins in the United
States. There, broadcast radio and television have been held to have limited First
Amendment protection,[75] and U.S. Courts have excluded broadcast media from the
application of the strict scrutiny standard that they would otherwise apply to content-
63
based restrictions.[76] According to U.S. Courts, the three major reasons why
broadcast media stands apart from print media are: (a) the scarcity of the frequencies
by which the medium operates [i.e., airwaves are physically limited while print
medium may be limitless]; [77] (b) its pervasiveness as a medium; and (c) its unique
accessibility to children.[78] Because cases involving broadcast media need not follow
precisely the same approach that [U.S. courts] have applied to other media, nor go so
far as to demand that such regulations serve compelling government
interests,[79] they are decided on whether the governmental restriction is narrowly
tailored to further a substantial governmental interest,[80] or the intermediate test.
As pointed out by respondents, Philippine jurisprudence has also echoed a
differentiation in treatment between broadcast and print media. Nevertheless, a
review of Philippine case law on broadcast media will show thatas we have deviated
with the American conception of the Bill of Rights[81] we likewise did not adopt en
masse the U.S. conception of free speech as it relates to broadcast media, particularly
as to which test would govern content-based prior restraints.
Our cases show two distinct features of this dichotomy. First, the difference in
treatment, in the main, is in the regulatory scheme applied to broadcast media that
is not imposed on traditional print media, and narrowly confined to unprotected
speech (e.g., obscenity, pornography, seditious and inciting speech), or is based on a
compelling government interest that also has constitutional protection, such as
national security or the electoral process.
Second, regardless of the regulatory schemes that broadcast media is subjected
to, the Court has consistently held that the clear and present danger test applies to
content-based restrictions on media, without making a distinction as to traditional
print or broadcast media.
The distinction between broadcast and traditional print media was first enunciated
in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) v. Dans,[82]wherein it was held that [a]ll
forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the
freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of
expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule[83]
Dans was a case filed to compel the reopening of a radio station which had been
summarily closed on grounds of national security. Although the issue had become
moot and academic because the owners were no longer interested to reopen, the
Court still proceeded to do an analysis of the case and made formulations to serve as
guidelines for all inferior courts and bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions.
Particularly, the Court made a detailed exposition as to what needs be considered in
cases involving broadcast media. Thus:[84]
xxx xxx xxx
(3) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad
protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on
freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule, that words
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has
a right to prevent, In his Constitution of the Philippines (2nd Edition, pp. 569-570)
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando cites at least nine of our decisions which apply the
test. More recently, the clear and present danger test was applied in J.B.L. Reyes in
behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition v. Bagatsing. (4) The clear and present danger test,
however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation
applicable to all utterances in all forums.
Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among
qualified users. A broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain
frequency without regard for government regulation or for the rights of others.
All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of
expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio
broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper
and print media.
The American Court in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica
Foundation (438 U.S. 726), confronted with a patently offensive and indecent regular
radio program, explained why radio broadcasting, more than other forms of
communications, receives the most limited protection from the free expression
clause. First, broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the
lives of all citizens, Material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not
only in public, but in the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely
accessible to children. Bookstores and motion picture theaters may be prohibited
64
from making certain material available to children, but the same selectivity cannot be
done in radio or television, where the listener or viewer is constantly tuning in and
out.
Similar considerations apply in the area of national security.
The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives
of all Filipinos. Newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan areas
and in the poblaciones of municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation.
Even here, there are low income masses who find the cost of books, newspapers, and
magazines beyond their humble means. Basic needs like food and shelter perforce
enjoy high priorities.
On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is also
becoming universal. Their message may be simultaneously received by a national or
regional audience of listeners including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be
within reach of a blaring radio or television set. The materials broadcast over the
airwaves reach every person of every age, persons of varying susceptibilities to
persuasion, persons of different I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons whose
reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech would be difficult to monitor or
predict. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers
of the printed work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate analyze,
and reject the utterance.
(5) The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular
circumstances of broadcast media into account. The supervision of radio stations-
whether by government or through self-regulation by the industry itself calls for
thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling.
The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the
listeners to violently overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to organize
a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread uprising. At the same time, the people
have a right to be informed. Radio and television would have little reason for
existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining
utterances. Since they are the most convenient and popular means of disseminating
varying views on public issues, they also deserve special protection.
(6) The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a
representative democracy. In the 1918 case of United States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731)
this Court was already stressing that.
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full
discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public
men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the
abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust
accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public
officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts.
Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted.
(7) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by
the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution. [Citations
omitted]
It is interesting to note that the Court in Dans adopted the arguments found in U.S.
jurisprudence to justify differentiation of treatment (i.e., the scarcity, pervasiveness
and accessibility to children), but only after categorically declaring that the test for
limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule,
for all forms of media, whether print or broadcast. Indeed, a close reading of the
above-quoted provisions would show that the differentiation that the Court
in Dans referred to was narrowly restricted to what is otherwise deemed as
unprotected speech (e.g., obscenity, national security, seditious and inciting speech),
or to validate a licensing or regulatory scheme necessary to allocate the limited
broadcast frequencies, which is absent in print media. Thus, when this Court declared
in Dans that the freedom given to broadcast media was somewhat lesser in scope
than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media, it was not as to what test
should be applied, but the context by which requirements of licensing, allocation of
airwaves, and application of norms to unprotected speech. [85]
In the same year that the Dans case was decided, it was reiterated in Gonzales v.
Katigbak,[86] that the test to determine free expression challenges was the clear and
present danger, again without distinguishing the media. [87] Katigbak, strictly
speaking, does not treat of broadcast media but motion pictures. Although the issue
involved obscenity standards as applied to movies,[88] the Court concluded its
decision with the following obiter dictum that a less liberal approach would be used
to resolve obscenity issues in television as opposed to motion pictures:
All that remains to be said is that the ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity
applicable to motion pictures. It is the consensus of this Court that where television
is concerned, a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike
motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every
home where there is a set. Children then will likely be among the avid viewers of the
65
programs therein shown..It cannot be denied though that the State as parens
patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.
More recently, in resolving a case involving the conduct of exit polls and
dissemination of the results by a broadcast company, we reiterated that the clear and
present danger rule is the test we unquestionably adhere to issues that involve
freedoms of speech and of the press.[89]
This is not to suggest, however, that the clear and present danger rule has been applied
to all cases that involve the broadcast media.The rule applies to all media, including
broadcast, but only when the challenged act is a content-based regulation that
infringes on free speech, expression and the press. Indeed, in Osmena v.
COMELEC,[90] which also involved broadcast media, the Court refused to apply the
clear and present danger rule to a COMELEC regulation of time and manner of
advertising of political advertisements because the challenged restriction was
content-neutral.[91] And in a case involving due process and equal protection issues,
the Court in Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v.
COMELEC[92] treated a restriction imposed on a broadcast media as a reasonable
condition for the grant of the medias franchise, without going into which test would
apply.
That broadcast media is subject to a regulatory regime absent in print media is
observed also in other jurisdictions, where the statutory regimes in place over
broadcast media include elements of licensing, regulation by administrative bodies,
and censorship. As explained by a British author:
The reasons behind treating broadcast and films differently from the print media
differ in a number of respects, but have a common historical basis. The stricter
system of controls seems to have been adopted in answer to the view that owing to
their particular impact on audiences, films, videos and broadcasting require a system
of prior restraints, whereas it is now accepted that books and other printed media do
not. These media are viewed as beneficial to the public in a number of respects, but
are also seen as possible sources of harm.[93]
Parenthetically, these justifications are now the subject of debate. Historically, the
scarcity of frequencies was thought to provide a rationale. However, cable and
satellite television have enormously increased the number of actual and potential
channels. Digital technology will further increase the number of channels available.
But still, the argument persists that broadcasting is the most influential means of
communication, since it comes into the home, and so much time is spent watching
television. Since it has a unique impact on people and affects children in a way that
the print media normally does not, that regulation is said to be necessary in order to
preserve pluralism. It has been argued further that a significant main threat to free
expressionin terms of diversitycomes not from government, but from private
corporate bodies. These developments show a need for a reexamination of the
traditional notions of the scope and extent of broadcast media regulation. [94]
The emergence of digital technology -- which has led to the convergence of
broadcasting, telecommunications and the computer industry -- has likewise led to
the question of whether the regulatory model for broadcasting will continue to be
appropriate in the converged environment.[95] Internet, for example, remains largely
unregulated, yet the Internet and the broadcast media share similarities, [96] and the
rationales used to support broadcast regulation apply equally to the
Internet.[97] Thus, it has been argued that courts, legislative bodies and the
government agencies regulating media must agree to regulate both, regulate neither
or develop a new regulatory framework and rationale to justify the differential
treatment. [98]
F. The Case At Bar
Having settled the applicable standard to content-based restrictions on broadcast
media, let us go to its application to the case at bar. To
recapitulate, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech
or of the press based on content is given the strictest
scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies
equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.
This outlines the procedural map to follow in cases like the one at bar as it spells out
the following: (a) the test; (b) the presumption; (c) the burden of proof; (d) the party
to discharge the burden; and (e) the quantum of evidence necessary. On the basis of
the records of the case at bar, respondents who have the burden to show that these
acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press failed to hurdle the clear and
66
present danger test. It appears that the great evil which government wants to
prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping
law. The records of the case at bar, however, are confused and confusing, and
respondents evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger
test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of
the voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is
also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions, one supposed
to be a complete version and the other, an altered version. Thirdly, the evidence of
the respondents on the whos and the hows of the wiretapping act is ambivalent,
especially considering the tapes different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers,
the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the
invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even
arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.
We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of
freedom of speech and of the press. Our laws are of different kinds and doubtless,
some of them provide norms of conduct which even if violated have only an adverse
effect on a persons private comfort but does not endanger national security. There
are laws of great significance but their violation, by itself and without more, cannot
support suppression of free speech and free press. In fine, violation of law is just a
factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be
weighed in adjudging whether to restrain freedom of speech and of the press.
The totality of the injurious effects of the violation to private and public interest must
be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by the Constitution and by
related international covenants protecting freedom of speech and of the press. In
calling for a careful and calibrated measurement of the circumference of all these
factors to determine compliance with the clear and present danger test, the Court
should not be misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law. By all
means, violations of law should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed
their own evil consequence. But to repeat, the need to prevent their violation cannot
per se trump the exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred right whose
breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer
proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to
uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared
violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the
State.
This is not all the faultline in the stance of the respondents. We slide to the issue of
whether the mere press statements of the Secretary of Justice and of the NTC in
question constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the
Constitution. In resolving this issue, we hold that it is not decisive that the press
statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal
orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents
while in the exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales
made his statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as
the regulatory body of media. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on
behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior
restraint. The concept of an act does not limit itself to acts already converted to a
formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an
official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior
restraint. The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they
constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and
press.
There is enough evidence of chilling effect of the complained acts on
record. The warnings given to media came from no less the NTC, a regulatory agency
that can cancel the Certificate of Authority of the radio and broadcast media. They
also came from the Secretary of Justice, the alter ego of the Executive, who wields
the awesome power to prosecute those perceived to be violating the laws of the
land. After the warnings, the KBP inexplicably joined the NTC in issuing an ambivalent
Joint Press Statement. After the warnings, petitioner Chavez was left alone to fight
this battle for freedom of speech and of the press. This silence on the sidelines on the
part of some media practitioners is too deafening to be the subject of
misinterpretation.
The constitutional imperative for us to strike down unconstitutional acts should
always be exercised with care and in light of the distinct facts of each case. For there
are no hard and fast rules when it comes to slippery constitutional questions, and the
limits and construct of relative freedoms are never set in stone. Issues revolving on
their construct must be decided on a case to case basis, always based on the peculiar
shapes and shadows of each case. But in cases where the challenged acts are patent
invasions of a constitutionally protected right, we should be swift in striking them
67
down as nullities per se. A blow too soon struck for freedom is preferred than a blow
too late.
In VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The writs of certiorari and prohibition
are hereby issued, nullifying the official statements made by respondents on June 8,
and 11, 2005 warning the media on airing the alleged wiretapped conversation
between the President and other personalities, for constituting unconstitutional prior
restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press
SO ORDERED.
Fortun vs Macapagal-Arroyo
EN BANC
PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN G.R. No. 190293
and ALBERT LEE G. ANGELES, vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, as
Commander-in-Chief and President of the Republic of the Philippines, EDUARDO
ERMITA, Executive Secretary, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), or any of their
units, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), or any of their units, JOHN DOES and JANE
DOES acting under their direction and control,
Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
These cases concern the constitutionality of a presidential proclamation of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus in 2009 in a province
in Mindanao which were withdrawn after just eight days.
The Facts and the Case
The essential background facts are not in dispute. On November 23, 2009 heavily
armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried
under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in Maguindanao. In response
to this carnage, on November 24 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation
1946, declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat,
and CotabatoCity to prevent and suppress similar lawless violence in Central
Mindanao.
Believing that she needed greater authority to put order in Maguindanao and secure
it from large groups of persons that have taken up arms against the constituted
authorities in the province, on December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in that province except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front.
Two days later or on December 6, 2009 President Arroyo submitted her report to
Congress in accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which
required her, within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, to submit to that body a report in person
or in writing of her action.
In her report, President Arroyo said that she acted based on her finding that lawless
men have taken up arms in Maguindanao and risen against the government. The
President described the scope of the uprising, the nature, quantity, and quality of the
rebels weaponry, the movement of their heavily armed units in strategic positions,
the closure of the Maguindanao Provincial Capitol, Ampatuan Municipal Hall, Datu
Unsay Municipal Hall, and 14 other municipal halls, and the use of armored vehicles,
tanks, and patrol cars with unauthorized PNP/Police markings.
On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened pursuant to Section 18,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to review the validity of the Presidents action. But,
two days later or on December 12 before Congress could act, the President issued
Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
Petitioners Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun and the other petitioners in G.R. 190293, 190294,
190301,190302, 190307, 190356, and 190380 brought the present actions to
challenge the constitutionality of President Arroyos Proclamation 1959 affecting
68
Maguindanao. But, given the prompt lifting of that proclamation before Congress
could review it and before any serious question affecting the rights and liberties of
Maguindanaos inhabitants could arise, the Court deems any review of its
constitutionality the equivalent of beating a dead horse.
Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of the government dictate that
the Court should be cautious in entertaining actions that assail the constitutionality
of the acts of the Executive or the Legislative department. The issue of
constitutionality, said the Court in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of
2010,[1] must be the very issue of the case, that the resolution of such issue is
unavoidable.
The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable for two
reasons:
One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress could
fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the same. The
pertinent provisions of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution state:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place
the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President,
the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for
a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist
and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need
of a call.
xxxx
Although the above vests in the President the power to proclaim martial law or
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, he shares such power with the
Congress. Thus:
1. The Presidents proclamation or suspension is temporary, good for only 60 days;
2. He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or suspension, report his action in
person or in writing to Congress;
3. Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly convene within 24 hours of
the proclamation or suspension for the purpose of reviewing its validity; and
4. The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or affirm the Presidents proclamation or
suspension, allow their limited effectivity to lapse, or extend the same if Congress
deems warranted.
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in
tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a
sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the
suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of
the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have.
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power
to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a
proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review
powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its
express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme
Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the Presidents
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a
69
political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the
hands of the Court.
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of
Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the
petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review. The
lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.[2]
Two. Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have
not been meaningfully implemented. The military did not take over the operation and
control of local government units in Maguindanao. The President did not issue any
law or decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by
Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported. Those who were
arrested during the period were either released or promptly charged in court.Indeed,
no petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court respecting arrests made
in those eight days. The point is that the President intended by her action to address
an uprising in a relatively small and sparsely populated province. In her judgment, the
rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined and
amply armed government presence.
In Lansang v. Garcia,[3] the Court received evidence in executive session to determine
if President Marcos suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in 1971
had sufficient factual basis. In Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,[4] while the Court took judicial
notice of the factual bases for President Marcos proclamation of martial law in 1972,
it still held hearings on the petitions for habeas corpus to determine the
constitutionality of the arrest and detention of the petitioners. Here, however, the
Court has not bothered to examine the evidence upon which President Arroyo acted
in issuing Proclamation 1959, precisely because it felt no need to, the proclamation
having been withdrawn within a few days of its issuance.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio points out in his dissenting opinion the finding of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City that no probable cause exist that the
accused before it committed rebellion in Maguindanao since the prosecution failed
to establish the elements of the crime.But the Court cannot use such finding as basis
for striking down the Presidents proclamation and suspension. For, firstly, the Court
did not delegate and could not delegate to the RTC of Quezon City its power to
determine the factual basis for the presidential proclamation and
suspension. Secondly, there is no showing that the RTC of Quezon City passed upon
the same evidence that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces,
had in her possession when she issued the proclamation and suspension.
The Court does not resolve purely academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest,
however intellectually challenging these are.[5] This is especially true, said the Court
in Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of
Education,[6] where the issues reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes
into play regard for the courts duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless
avoidance becomes evasion. The Courts duty is to steer clear of declaring
unconstitutional the acts of the Executive or the Legislative department, given the
assumption that it carefully studied those acts and found them consistent with the
fundamental law before taking them. To doubt is to sustain.[7]
Notably, under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the Court has only 30
days from the filing of an appropriate proceeding to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. Thus
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. (Emphasis supplied)
More than two years have passed since petitioners filed the present actions to annul
Proclamation 1959. When the Court did not decide it then, it actually opted for a
default as was its duty, the question having become moot and academic.
Justice Carpio of course points out that should the Court regard the powers of the
President and Congress respecting the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as sequential or joint, it would be
impossible for the Court to exercise its power of review within the 30 days given it.
70
But those 30 days, fixed by the Constitution, should be enough for the Court to fulfill SO ORDERED.
its duty without pre-empting congressional action. Section 18, Article VII, requires the
President to report his actions to Congress, in person or in writing, within 48 hours of RA 10591 – An Act Providing for a Comprehensive Law on Firearms and
such proclamation or suspension. In turn, the Congress is required to convene Ammunitions and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof
without need of a call within 24 hours following the Presidents proclamation or
Republic of the Philippines
suspension. Clearly, the Constitution calls for quick action on the part of the
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES
Congress. Whatever form that action takes, therefore, should give the Court
Metro Manila
sufficient time to fulfill its own mandate to review the factual basis of the
Fifteenth Congress
proclamation or suspension within 30 days of its issuance.
Third Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-third day of July, two
If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting the
thousand twelve.
proclamation or suspension within the short time expected of it, then the Court can
REPUBLIC ACT No. 10591
step in, hear the petitions challenging the Presidents action, and ascertain if it has a
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE LAW ON FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION
factual basis. If the Court finds none, then it can annul the proclamation or the
AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF
suspension. But what if the 30 days given it by the Constitution proves
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
inadequate? Justice Carpio himself offers the answer in his dissent: that 30-day
Congress assembled:
period does not operate to divest this Court of its jurisdiction over the case. The
ARTICLE I
settled rule is that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost until the case has been
TITLE, DECLARATION OF POLICY AND DEFINITION OF TERMS
terminated.
Section 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the "Comprehensive Firearms and
Ammunition Regulation Act".
The problem in this case is that the President aborted the proclamation of martial law
Section 2. Declaration of State Policy. – It is the policy of the State to maintain peace
and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao in
and order and protect the people against violence. The State also recognizes the right
just eight days. In a real sense, the proclamation and the suspension never took
of its qualified citizens to self-defense through, when it is the reasonable means to
off. The Congress itself adjourned without touching the matter, it having become
repel the unlawful aggression under the circumstances, the use of firearms. Towards
moot and academic.
this end, the State shall provide for a comprehensive law regulating the ownership,
possession, carrying, manufacture, dealing in and importation of firearms,
Of course, the Court has in exceptional cases passed upon issues that ordinarily would
ammunition, or parts thereof, in order to provide legal support to law enforcement
have been regarded as moot. But the present cases do not present sufficient basis for
agencies in their campaign against crime, stop the proliferation of illegal firearms or
the exercise of the power of judicial review. The proclamation of martial law and the
weapons and the illegal manufacture of firearms or weapons, ammunition and parts
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in this case, unlike similar
thereof.
Presidential acts in the late 60s and early 70s, appear more like saber-rattling than an
Section 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act:
actual deployment and arbitrary use of political power.
(a) Accessories refer to parts of a firearm which may enhance or increase the
operational efficiency or accuracy of a firearm but will not constitute any of the major
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions on the ground that the
or minor internal parts thereof such as, hut not limited to, laser scope, telescopic sight
same have become moot and academic.
and sound suppressor or silencer.

71
(b) Ammunition refers to a complete unfixed unit consisting of a bullet, gunpowder,
cartridge case and primer or loaded shell for use in any firearm.
(c) Antique firearm refers to any: (1) firearm which was manufactured at least
seventy-five (75) years prior to the current date but not including replicas; (2) firearm
which is certified by the National Museum of the Philippines to be curio or relic of
museum interest; and (3) any other firearm which derives a substantial part of its
monetary value from the fact that it is novel, rare, bizarre or because of its association
with some historical figure, period or event.
(d) Arms smuggling refers to the import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery,
movement or transfer of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, from
or across the territory of one country to that of another country which has not been
authorized in accordance with domestic law in either or both country/countries.
(e) Authority to import refers to a document issued by the Chief of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) authorizing the importation of firearms, or their parts,
ammunition and other components.
(f) Authorized dealer refers to any person, legal entity, corporation, partnership or
business entity duly licensed by the Firearms and Explosive Office (FEO) of the PNP to
engage in the business of buying and selling ammunition, firearms or parte thereof,
at wholesale or retail basis.
(g) Authorized importer refers to any person, legal entity, corporation, partnership or
business duly licensed by the FEO of the PNP to engage in the business of importing
ammunition and firearms, or parts thereof into the territory of the Republic of the
Philippines for purposes of sale or distribution under the provisions of this Act.
(h) Authorized manufacturer refers to any person, legal entity, corporation, or
partnership duly licensed by the FEO of the PNP to engage in the business of
manufacturing firearms, and ammunition or parts thereof for purposes of sale or
distribution.1âwphi1
(i) Confiscated firearm refers to a firearm that is taken into custody by the PNP,
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA),
and all other law enforcement agencies by reason of their mandate and must be
necessarily reported or turned over to the PEO of the PNP.
(j) Demilitarized firearm refers to a firearm deliberately made incapable of
performing its main purpose of firing a projectile.
(k) Duty detail order refers to a document issued by the juridical entity or employer
wherein the details of the disposition of firearm is spelled-out, thus indicating the
name of the employee, the firearm information, the specific duration and location of
posting or assignment and the authorized bonded firearm custodian for the juridical
entity to whom such firearm is turned over after the lapse of the order.
(l) Firearm refers to any handheld or portable weapon, whether a small arm or light
weapon, that expels or is designed to expel a bullet, shot, slug, missile or any
projectile, which is discharged by means of expansive force of gases from burning
gunpowder or other form of combustion or any similar instrument or implement. For
purposes of this Act, the barrel, frame or receiver is considered a firearm.
(m) Firearms Information Management System (FIMS) refers to the compilation of all
data and information on firearms ownership and disposition for record purposes.
(n) Forfeited firearm refers to a firearm that is subject to forfeiture by reason of court
order as accessory penalty or for the disposition by the FEO of the PNP of firearms
considered as abandoned, surrendered, confiscated or revoked in compliance with
existing rules and regulations.
(o) Gun club refers to an organization duly registered with and accredited in good
standing by the FEO of the PNP which is established for the purpose of propagating
responsible and safe gun ownership, proper appreciation and use of firearms by its
members, for the purpose of sports and shooting competition, self-defense and
collection purposes.
(p) Gunsmith refers to any person, legal entity, corporation, partnership or business
duly licensed by the FEO of the PNP to engage in the business of repairing firearms
and other weapons or constructing or assembling firearms and weapons from
finished or manufactured parts thereof on a per order basis and not in commercial
quantities or of making minor parts for the purpose of repairing or assembling said
firearms or weapons.
(q) Imitation firearm refers to a replica of a firearm, or other device that is so
substantially similar in coloration and overall appearance to an existing firearm as to
lead a reasonable person to believe that such imitation firearm is a real firearm.
(r) Licensed citizen refers to any Filipino who complies with the qualifications set forth
in this Act and duly issued with a license to possess or to carry firearms outside of the
residence in accordance with this Act.
(s) Licensed, juridical entity refers to corporations, organizations, businesses including
security agencies and local government units (LGUs) which are licensed to own and
possess firearms in accordance with this Act.
(t) Light weapons are: Class-A Light weapons which refer to self-loading pistols, rifles
and carbines, submachine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns not exceeding
caliber 7.62MM which have fully automatic mode; and Class-B Light weapons which
72
refer to weapons designed for use by two (2) or more persons serving as a crew, or
rifles and machine guns exceeding caliber 7.62MM such as heavy machine guns,
handheld underbarrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns,
portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and
rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of a
caliber of less than 100MM.
(u) Long certificate of registration refers to licenses issued to government agencies or
offices or government-owned or -controlled corporations for firearms to be used by
their officials and employees who are qualified to possess firearms as provider in this
Act, excluding security guards.
(v) Loose firearm refers to an unregistered firearm, an obliterated or altered firearm,
firearm which has been lost or stolen, illegally manufactured firearms, registered
firearms in the possession of an individual other than the licensee and those with
revoked licenses in accordance with the rules and regulations.
(w) Major part or components of a firearm refers to the barrel, slide, frame, receiver,
cylinder or the bolt assembly. The term also includes any part or kit designed and
intended for use in converting a semi-automatic burst to a full automatic firearm.
(x) Minor parts of a firearm refers to the parts of the firearm other than the major
parts which are necessary to effect and complete the action of expelling a projectile
by way of combustion, except those classified as accessories.
(y) Permit to carry firearm outside of residence refers to a written authority issued to
a licensed citizen by the Chief of the PNP which entitles such person to carry his/her
registered or lawfully issued firearm outside of the residence for the duration and
purpose specified in the authority.
(z) Permit to transport firearm refers to a written authority issued to a licensed citizen
or entity by the Chief of the PNP or by a PNP Regional Director which entitles such
person or entity to transport a particular firearm from and to a specific location within
the duration and purpose in the authority.
(aa) Residence refers to the place or places of abode of the licensed citizen as
indicated in his/her license.
(bb) Shooting range refers to a facility established for the purpose of firearms training
and skills development, firearm testing, as well as for sports and competition shooting
either for the exclusive use of its members or open to the general public, duly
registered with and accredited in good standing by the FEO of the PNP.
(cc) Short certificate of registration refers to a certificate issued by the FEO of the PNP
for a government official or employee who was issued by his/her employer
department, agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation a firearm
covered by the long certificate of registration.
(dd) Small arms refer to firearms intended to be or primarily designed for individual
use or that which is generally considered to mean a weapon intended to be fired from
the hand or shoulder, which are not capable of fully automatic bursts of discharge,
such as:
(1) Handgun which is a firearm intended to be fired from the hand, which includes:
(i) A pistol which is a hand-operated firearm having a chamber integral with or
permanently aligned with the bore which may be self-loading; and
(ii) Revolver which is a hand-operated firearm with a revolving cylinder containing
chambers for individual cartridges.
(2) Rifle which is a shoulder firearm or designed to be fired from the shoulder that
can discharge a bullet through a rifled barrel by different actions of loading, which
may be classified as lever, bolt, or self-loading; and
(3) Shotgun which is a weapon designed, made and intended to fire a number of ball
shots or a single projectile through a smooth bore by the action or energy from
burning gunpowder.
(ee) Sports shooting competition refers to a defensive, precision or practical sport
shooting competition duly authorized by the FEO of the PNP.
(ff) Tampered, obliterated or altered firearm refers to any firearm whose serial
number or other identification or ballistics characteristics have been intentionally
tampered with, obliterated or altered without authority or in order to conceal its
source, identity or ownership.
(gg) Thermal weapon sight refers to a battery operated, uncooled thermal imaging
device which amplifies available thermal signatures so that the viewed scene
becomes clear to the operator which is used to locate and engage targets during
daylight and from low light to total darkness and operates in adverse conditions such
as light rain, light snow, and dry smoke or in conjunction with other optical and red
dot sights.
ARTICLE II
OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF FIREARMS
Section 4. Standards and Requisites for Issuance of and Obtaining a License to Own
and Possess Firearms. – In order to qualify and acquire a license to own and possess
a firearm or firearms and ammunition, the applicant must be a Filipino citizen, at least
twenty-one (21) years old and has gainful work, occupation or business or has filed
73
an Income Tax Return (ITR) for the preceding year as proof of income, profession,
business or occupation.
In addition, the applicant shall submit the following certification issued by
appropriate authorities attesting the following:
(a) The applicant has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude;
(b) The applicant has passed the psychiatric test administered by a PNP-accredited
psychologist or psychiatrist;
(c) The applicant has passed the drug test conducted by an accredited and authorized
drug testing laboratory or clinic;
(d) The applicant has passed a gun safety seminar which is administered by the PNP
or a registered and authorized gun club;
(e) The applicant has filed in writing the application to possess a registered firearm
which shall state the personal circumstances of the applicant;
(f) The applicant must present a police clearance from the city or municipality police
office; and
(g) The applicant has not been convicted or is currently an accused in a pending
criminal case before any court of law for a crime that is punishable with a penalty of
more than two (2) years.
For purposes of this Act, an acquittal or permanent dismissal of a criminal case before
the courts of law shall qualify the accused thereof to qualify and acquire a license.
The applicant shall pay the reasonable licensing fees as may be provided in the
implementing rules and regulations of this Act.
An applicant who intends to possess a firearm owned by a juridical entity shall submit
his/her duty detail order to the FEO of the PNP.
Section 5. Ownership of Firearms and Ammunition by a Juridical Entity. – A juridical
person maintaining its own security force may be issued a regular license to own and
possess firearms and ammunition under the following conditions:
(a) It must be Filipino-owned and duly registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC);
(b) It is current, operational and a continuing concern;
(c) It has completed and submitted all its reportorial requirements to the SEC; and
(d) It has paid all its income taxes for the year, as duly certified by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue.
The application shall be made in the name of the juridical person represented by its
President or any of its officers mentioned below as duly authorized in a board
resolution to that effect: Provided, That the officer applying for the juridical entity,
shall possess all the qualifications required of a citizen applying for a license to
possess firearms.
Other corporate officers eligible to represent the juridical person are: the vice
president, treasurer, and board secretary.
Security agencies and LGUs shall be included in this category of licensed holders but
shall be subject to additional requirements as may be required by the Chief of the
PNP.
Section 6. Ownership of Firearms by the National Government. – All firearms owned
by the National Government shall be registered with the FEO of the PNP in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines. Such registration shall be exempt from all duties
and taxes that may otherwise be levied on other authorized owners of firearms. For
reason of national security, firearms of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
Coast Guard and other law enforcement agencies shall only be reported to the FEO
of the PNP.
Section 7. Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence or Place of Business. – A permit
to carry firearms outside of residence shall be issued by the Chief of the PNP or
his/her duly authorized representative to any qualified person whose life is under
actual threat or his/her life is in imminent danger due to the nature of his/her
profession, occupation or business.
It shall be the burden of the applicant to prove that his/her life is under actual threat
by submitting a threat assessment certificate from the PNP.
For purposes of this Act, the following professionals are considered to be in imminent
danger due to the nature of their profession, occupation or business:
(a) Members of the Philippine Bar;
(b) Certified Public Accountants;
(c) Accredited Media Practitioners;
(d) Cashiers, Bank Tellers;
(e) Priests, Ministers, Rabbi, Imams;
(f) Physicians and Nurses;
(g) Engineers; and
(h) Businessmen, who by the nature of their business or undertaking, are exposed to
high risk of being targets of criminal elements.
ARTICLE III
REGISTRATION AND LICENSING
74
Section 8. Authority to Issue License. – The Chief of the PNP, through the FEO of the
PNP, shall issue licenses to qualified individuals and to cause the registration of
firearms.
Section 9. Licenses Issued to Individuals. – Subject to the requirements set forth in this
Act and payment of required fees to be determined by the Chief of the PNP, a
qualified individual may be issued the appropriate license under the following
categories;
Type 1 license – allows a citizen to own and possess a maximum of two (2) registered
firearms;
Type 2 license – allows a citizen to own and possess a maximum of five (5) registered
firearms;
Type 3 license – allows a citizen to own and possess a maximum of ten (10) registered
firearms;
Type 4 license – allows a citizen to own and possess a maximum of fifteen (15)
registered firearms; and
Type 5 license – allows a citizen, who is a certified gun collector, to own and possess
more than fifteen (15) registered firearms.
For Types 1 to 5 licenses, a vault or a container secured by lock and key or other
security measures for the safekeeping of firearms shall be required.
For Types 3 to 5 licenses, the citizen must comply with the inspection and bond
requirements.
Section 10. Firearms That May Be Registered. – Only small arms may be registered by
licensed citizens or licensed juridical entities for ownership, possession and concealed
carry. A light weapon shall be lawfully acquired or possessed exclusively by the AFP,
the PNP and other law enforcement agencies authorized by the President in the
performance of their duties: Provided, That private individuals who already have
licenses to possess Class-A light weapons upon the effectivity of this Act shall not be
deprived of the privilege to continue possessing the same and renewing the licenses
therefor, for the sole reason that these firearms are Class "A" light weapons, and shall
be required to comply with other applicable provisions of this Act.
Section 11. Registration of Firearms. – The licensed citizen or licensed juridical entity
shall register his/her/its firearms so purchased with the FEO of the PNP in accordance
with the type of license such licensed citizen or licensed juridical entity possesses. A
certificate of registration of the firearm shall be issued upon payment of reasonable
fees.
For purposes of this Act, registration refers to the application, approval, record-
keeping and monitoring of firearms with the FEO of the PNP in accordance with the
type of license issued to any person under Section 9 of this Act.
Section 12. License to Possess Ammunition Necessarily Included. – The licenses
granted to qualified citizens or juridical entities as provided in Section 9 of this Act
shall include the license to possess ammunition with a maximum of fifty (50) rounds
for each registered firearm: Provided; That the FEO of the PNP may allow more
ammunition to be possessed by licensed sports shooters.
Section 13. Issuance of License to Manufacture or Deal In Firearms and Ammunition. –
Any person desiring to manufacture or deal in firearms, parts of firearms or
ammunition thereof, or instruments and implements used or intended to be used in
the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms or ammunition, shall make an
application to:
(a) The Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) in
the case of an application for a license to manufacture; and
(b) The Chief of the PNP in the case of a license to deal in firearms and firearms parts,
ammunition and gun repair.
The applicant shall state the amount of capitalization for manufacture or cost of the
purchase and sale of said articles intended to be transacted by such applicant; and
the types of firms, ammunition or implements which the applicant intends to
manufacture or purchase and sell under the license applied for; and such additional
information as may be especially requested by the Secretary of the DILG or the Chief
of the PNP.
The Secretary of the DILG or the Chief of the PNP may approve or disapprove such
application based on the prescribed guidelines. In the case of approval, the Secretary
of the DILG or the Chief of the PNP shall indicate the amount of the bond to be
executed by the applicant before the issuance of the license and the period of time
by which said license shall be effective, unless sooner revoked by their authority.
Upon approval of the license to manufacture or otherwise deal in firearms by the
Secretary of the DILG or the Chief of the PNP as the case may be, the same shall be
transmitted to the FEO of the PNP which shall issue the license in accordance with
the approved terms and conditions, upon the execution and delivery by the applicant
of the required bond conditioned upon the faithful compliance on the part of the
licensee to the laws and regulations relative to the business licensed.
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Section 14. Scope of License to Manufacture Firearms and Ammunition. – The scope
of the License to Manufacture firearms and ammunition shall also include the
following:
(a) The authority to manufacture and assemble firearms, ammunition, spare parts
and accessories, ammunition components, and reloading of ammunitions, within
sites, areas, and factories stated therein. The Secretary of the DILG shall approve such
license;
(b) The license to deal in or sell all the items covered by the License to Manufacture,
such as parts, firearms or ammunition and components;
(c) The authority to subcontract the manufacturing of parts and accessories necessary
for the firearms which the manufacturer is licensed to manufacture: Provided, That
the subcontractor of major parts or major components is also licensed to
manufacture firearms and ammunition; and
(d) The authority to import machinery, equipment, and firearm parts and ammunition
components for the manufacture thereof. Firearm parts and ammunition
components to be imported shall, however, be limited to those authorized to be
manufactured as reflected in the approved License to Manufacture. The Import
Permit shall be under the administration of the PNP.
A licensed manufacturer of ammunition is also entitled to import various reference
firearms needed to test the ammunition manufactured under the License to
Manufacture. A licensed manufacturer of firearms, on the other hand, is entitled to
import various firearms for reference, test and evaluation for manufacture of similar,
types of firearms covered by the License to Manufacture.
An export permit shall, however, be necessary to export manufactured parts or
finished products of firearms and ammunition. The Export Permit of firearms and
ammunition shall be under the administration of the PNP.
Section 15. Registration of Locally Manufactured and Imported Firearms. – Local
manufacturers and importers of firearms and major parts thereof shall register the
same as follows:
(a) For locally manufactured firearms and major parts thereof, the initial registration
shall be done at the manufacturing facility: Provided, That firearms intended for
export shall no longer be subjected to ballistic identification procedures; and
(b) For imported firearms and major parts thereof, the registration shall be done upon
arrival at the FEO of the PNP storage facility.
Section 16. License and Scope of License to Deal. – The License to Deal authorizes the
purchase, sale and general business in handling firearms and ammunition, major and
minor parts of firearms, accessories, spare parts, components, and reloading
machines, which shall be issued by the Chief of the PNP.
Section 17. License and Scope of License for Gunsmiths. – The license for gunsmiths
shall allow the grantee to repair registered firearms. The license shall include
customization of firearms from finished or manufactured parts thereof on per order
basis and not in commercial quantities and making the minor parts thereof, i.e. pins,
triggers, trigger bows, sights and the like only for the purpose of repairing the
registered firearm. The license for gunsmiths shall be issued by the Chief of the PNP.
Section 18. Firearms for Use in Sports and Competitions. – A qualified individual shall
apply for a permit to transport his/her registered firearm/s from his/her residence to
the firing range/s and competition sites as may be warranted.
Section 19. Renewal of Licenses and Registration. – All types of licenses to possess a
firearm shall be renewed every two (2) years. Failure to renew the license on or
before the date of its expiration shall cause the revocation of the license and of the
registration of the firearm/s under said licensee.
The registration of the firearm shall be renewed every four (4) years. Failure to renew
the registration of the firearm on or before the date of expiration shall cause the
revocation of the license of the firearm. The said firearm shall be confiscated or
forfeited in favor of the government after due process.
The failure to renew a license or registration within the periods stated above on two
(2) occasions shall cause the holder of the firearm to be perpetually disqualified from
applying for any firearm license. The application for the renewal of the license or
registration may be submitted to the FEO of the PNP, within six (6) months before the
date of the expiration of such license or registration.
Section 20. Inspection and Inventory. – The Chief of the PNP or his/her authorized
representative shall require the submission of reports, inspect or examine the
inventory and records of a licensed manufacturer, dealer or importer of firearms and
ammunition during reasonable hours.
ARTICLE IV
ACQUISITION, DEPOSIT OF FIREARMS, ABANDONED, DEMILITARIZED AND ANTIQUE
FIREARMS
Section 21. Acquisition or Purchase and Sale of Firearms and Ammunition. – Firearms
and ammunition may only be acquired or purchased from authorized dealers,
importers or local manufacturers and may be transferred or sold only from a licensed
citizen or licensed juridical entity to another licensed citizen or licensed juridical
entity: Provided, That, during election periods, the sale and registration of firearms
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and ammunition and the issuance of the corresponding licenses to citizens shall be
allowed on the condition that the transport or delivery thereof shall strictly comply
with the issuances, resolutions, rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commission on Elections.
Section 22. Deposit of Firearms by Persons Arriving From Abroad. – A person arriving
in the Philippines who is legally in possession of any firearm or ammunition in his/her
country of origin and who has declared the existence of the firearm upon
embarkation and disembarkation but whose firearm is not registered in the
Philippines in accordance with this Act shall deposit the same upon written receipt
with the Collector of Customs for delivery to the FEO of the PNP for safekeeping, or
for the issuance of a permit to transport if the person is a competitor in a sports
shooting competition. If the importation of the same is allowed and the party in
question desires to obtain a domestic firearm license, the same should be undertaken
in accordance with the provisions of this Act. If no license is desired or leave to import
is not granted, the firearm or ammunition in question shall remain in the custody of
the FEO of the PNP until otherwise disposed of in-accordance with law.
Section 23. Return of Firearms to Owner upon Departure from the Philippines. – Upon
the departure from the Philippines of any person whose firearm or ammunition is in
the custody of the FEO of the PNP, the same shall, upon timely request, be delivered
to the person through the Collector of Customs. In the case of a participant in a local
sports shooting competition, the firearm must be presented to the Collector of
Customs before the same is allowed to be loaded on board the carrier on which the
person is to board.
Section 24. Safekeeping of Firearms and Ammunition. – Any licensee may deposit a
registered firearm to the FEO of the PNP, or any Police Regional Office for
safekeeping. Reasonable fees for storage shall be imposed.
Section 25. Abandoned Firearms and Ammunition. – Any firearm or ammunition
deposited in the custody of the FEO of the PNP pursuant to the provisions of this Act,
shall be deemed to have been abandoned by the owner or his/her authorized
representative if he/she failed to reclaim the same within five (5) years or failed to
advise the FEO of the PNP of the disposition to be made thereof. Thereafter, the FEO
of the PNP may dispose of the same after compliance with established procedures.
Section 26. Death or Disability of Licensee. – Upon the death or legal disability of the
holder of a firearm license, it shall be the duty of his/her next of kin, nearest relative,
legal representative, or other person who shall knowingly come into possession of
such firearm or ammunition, to deliver the same to the FEO of the PNP or Police
Regional Office, and such firearm or ammunition shall be retained by the police
custodian pending the issuance of a license and its registration in accordance, with
this Act. The failure to deliver the firearm or ammunition within six (6) months after
the death or legal disability of the licensee shall render the possessor liable for illegal
possession of the firearm.
Section 27. Antique Firearm. – Any person who possesses an antique firearm shall
register the same and secure a collector’s license from the FEO of the PNP. Proper
storage of antique firearm shall be strictly imposed. Noncompliance of this provision
shall be considered as illegal possession of the firearm as penalized in this Act.
ARTICLE V
PENAL PROVISIONS
Section 28. Unlawful Acquisition, or Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. – The
unlawful acquisition, possession of firearms and ammunition shall be penalized as
follows:
(a) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a small arm;
(b) The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if three
(3) or more small arms or Class-A light weapons are unlawfully acquired or possessed
by any person;
(c) The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a Class-A light weapon;
(d) The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall,
unlawfully acquire or possess a Class-B light weapon;
(e) The penalty of one (1) degree higher than that provided in paragraphs (a) to (c) in
this section shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully possess any
firearm under any or combination of the following conditions:
(1) Loaded with ammunition or inserted with a loaded magazine;
(2) Fitted or mounted with laser or any gadget used to guide the shooter to hit the
target such as thermal weapon sight (TWS) and the like;
(3) Fitted or mounted with sniper scopes, firearm muffler or firearm silencer;
(4) Accompanied with an extra barrel; and
(5) Converted to be capable of firing full automatic bursts.
(f) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a major part of a small arm;
(g) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess ammunition for a small arm or Class-
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A light weapon. If the violation of this paragraph is committed by the same person
charged with the unlawful acquisition or possession of a small arm, the former
violation shall be absorbed by the latter;
(h) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a major part of a Class-A light weapon;
(i) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess ammunition for a Class-A light
weapon. If the violation of this paragraph is committed by the same person charged
with the unlawful acquisition or possession of a Class-A light weapon, the former
violation shall be absorbed by the latter;
(j) The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a major part of a Class-B light weapon;
and
(k) The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess ammunition for a Class-B light
weapon. If the violation of this paragraph is committed by the same person charged
with the unlawful acquisition or possession of a Class-B light weapon, the former
violation shall be absorbed by the latter.
Section 29. Use of Loose Firearm in the Commission of a Crime. – The use of a loose
firearm, when inherent in the commission of a crime punishable under the Revised
Penal Code or other special laws, shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance: Provided, That if the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm
is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty which is lower than that prescribed
in the preceding section for illegal possession of firearm, the penalty for illegal
possession of firearm shall be imposed in lieu of the penalty for the crime
charged: Provided, further, That if the crime committed with the use of a loose
firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty which is equal to that
imposed under the preceding section for illegal possession of firearms, the penalty
of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed in addition to the penalty for
the crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code or other special laws of which
he/she is found guilty.
If the violation of this Act is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the
crime of rebellion of insurrection, or attempted coup d’ etat, such violation shall be
absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, or attempted coup
d’ etat.
If the crime is committed by the person without using the loose firearm, the violation
of this Act shall be considered as a distinct and separate offense.
Section 30. Liability of Juridical Person. – The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
to prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon the owner, president,
manager, director or other responsible officer of/any public or private firm, company,
corporation or entity who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned
by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons
found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding section, or willfully or
knowingly allow any of them to use unregistered firearm or firearms without any legal
authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their employment.
Section 31. Absence of Permit to Carry Outside of Residence. – The penalty of prision
correccional and a fine of Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) shall be imposed upon
any person who is licensed to own a firearm but who shall carry the registered firearm
outside his/her residence without any legal authority therefor.
Section 32. Unlawful Manufacture, Importation, Sale or Disposition of Firearms or
Ammunition or Parts Thereof, Machinery, Tool or Instrument Used or Intended to be
Used in the Manufacture of Firearms, Ammunition or Parts Thereof. – The penalty
of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully engage in the manufacture, importation, sale or disposition of a
firearm or ammunition, or a major part of a firearm or ammunition, or machinery,
tool or instrument used or intended to be used by the same person in the
manufacture of a firearm, ammunition, or a major part thereof.
The possession of any machinery, tool or instrument used directly in the manufacture
of firearms, ammunition, or major parts thereof by any person whose business,
employment or activity does not lawfully deal with the possession of such article, shall
be prima facie evidence that such article is intended to be used in the unlawful or
illegal manufacture of firearms, ammunition or parts thereof.
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period to prision mayor in its medium
period shall be imposed upon any laborer, worker or employee of a licensed firearms
dealer who shall unlawfully take, sell or otherwise dispose of parts of firearms or
ammunition which the company manufactures and sells, and other materials used by
the company in the manufacture or sale of firearms or ammunition. The buyer or
possessor of such stolen part or material, who is aware that such part or material was
stolen, shall suffer the same penalty as the laborer, worker or employee.
If the violation or offense is committed by a corporation, partnership, association or
other juridical entity, the penalty provided for in this section shall be imposed upon
78
the directors, officers, employees or other officials or persons therein who knowingly
and willingly participated in the unlawful act.
Section 33. Arms Smuggling. – The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon any person who shall engage or participate in arms smuggling as defined in this
Act.
Section 34. Tampering, Obliteration or Alteration of Firearms Identification. – The
penalty of prision correccional to prision mayor in its minimum period shall be
imposed upon any person who shall tamper, obliterate or alter without authority the
barrel, slide, frame, receiver, cylinder, or bolt assembly, including the name of the
maker, model, or serial number of any firearm, or who shall replace without authority
the barrel, slide, frame, receiver, cylinder, or bolt assembly, including its individual or
peculiar identifying characteristics essential in forensic examination of a firearm or
light weapon.
The PNP shall place this information, including its individual or peculiar identifying
characteristics into the database of integrated firearms identification system of the
PNP Crime Laboratory for future use and identification of a particular firearm.
Section 35. Use of an Imitation Firearm. – An imitation firearm used in the commission
of a crime shall be considered a real firearm as defined in this Act and the person who
committed the crime shall be punished in accordance with this Act: Provided, That
injuries caused on the occasion of the conduct of competitions, sports, games, or any
recreation activities involving imitation firearms shall not be punishable under this
Act.
Section 36. In Custodia Legis. – During the pendency of any case filed in violation of
this Act, seized firearm, ammunition, or parts thereof, machinery, tools or
instruments shall remain in the custody of the court. If the court decides that it has
no adequate means to safely keep the same, the court shall issue an order to turn
over to the PNP Crime Laboratory such firearm, ammunition, or parts thereof,
machinery, tools or instruments in its custody during the pendency of the case and
to produce the same to the court when so ordered. No bond shall be admitted for
the release of the firearm, ammunition or parts thereof, machinery, tool or
instrument. Any violation of this paragraph shall be punishable by prision mayor in its
minimum period to prision mayor in its medium period.
Section 37. Confiscation and Forfeiture. – The imposition of penalty for any violation
of this Act shall carry with it the accessory penalty of confiscation and forfeiture of
the firearm, ammunition, or parts thereof, machinery, tool or instrument in favor of
the government which shall be disposed of in accordance with law.
Section 38. Liability for Planting Evidence. – The penalty of prision mayor in its
maximum period shall be imposed upon any person who shall willfully and maliciously
insert; place, and/or attach, directly or indirectly, through any overt or covert act, any
firearm, or ammunition, or parts thereof in the person, house, effects, or in the
immediate vicinity of an innocent individual for the purpose of implicating or
incriminating the person, or imputing the commission of any violation of the
provisions of this Act to said individual. If the person found guilty under this paragraph
is a public officer or employee, such person shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Section 39. Grounds for Revocation, Cancellation or Suspension of License or Permit. –
The Chief of the PNP or his/her authorized representative may revoke, cancel or
suspend a license or permit on the following grounds:
(a) Commission of a crime or offense involving the firearm, ammunition, of major
parts thereof;
(b) Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or any offense where the penalty
carries an imprisonment of more than six (6) years;
(c) Loss of the firearm, ammunition, or any parts thereof through negligence;
(d) Carrying of the firearm, ammunition, or major parts thereof outside of residence
or workplace without, the proper permit to carry the same;
(e) Carrying of the firearm, ammunition, or major parts thereof in prohibited places;
(f) Dismissal for cause from the service in case of government official and employee;
(g) Commission of any of the acts penalized under Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise
known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002″;
(h) Submission of falsified documents or misrepresentation in the application to
obtain a license or permit;
(i) Noncompliance of reportorial requirements; and
(j) By virtue of a court order.
Section 40. Failure to Notify Lost or Stolen Firearm or Light Weapon. – A fine of Ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00) shall be imposed upon any licensed firearm holder who
fails to report to the FEO of the PNP that the subject firearm has been lost or stolen
within a period of thirty (30) days from the date of discovery.
Likewise, a fine of Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person
holding a valid firearm license who changes residence or office address other than
that indicated in the license card and fails within a period of thirty (30) days from said
transfer to notify the FEO of the PNP of such change of address.
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Section 41. Illegal Transfer/Registration of Firearms. – It shall be unlawful to transfer Section 45. Repealing Clause. – This Act repeals Sections 1, 2, 5 and 7 of Presidential
possession of any firearm to any person who has not yet obtained or secured the Decree No. 1866, as amended, and Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8294 and all other
necessary license or permit thereof. laws, executive orders, letters of instruction, issuances, circulars, administrative
The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any person who shall orders, rules or regulations that are inconsistent herewith.
violate the provision of the preceding paragraph. In addition, he/she shall be Section 46. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act or any part hereof is held
disqualified to apply for a license to possess other firearms and all his/her existing invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder of the law or the provision not otherwise
firearms licenses whether for purposes of commerce or possession, shall be revoked. affected shall remain valid and subsisting.
If government-issued firearms, ammunition or major parts of firearms or light Section 47. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days from its
weapons are unlawfully disposed, sold or transferred by any law enforcement agent publication in a newspaper of nationwide circulation.
or public officer to private individuals, the penalty of reclusion temporal shall be Approved,
imposed.
Any public officer or employee or any person who shall facilitate the registration of a RA 8294 – Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession,
firearm through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation or submission of falsified Manufacture Dealing in Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms,
documents shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional.
Ammunition or Explosives
ARTICLE VI
Republic of the Philippines
FINAL PROVISIONS
Congress of the Philippines
Section 42. Firearms Repository. – The FEO of the PNP shall be the sole repository of
Metro Manila
all firearms records to include imported and locally manufactured firearms and
ammunition. Within one (1) year upon approval of this Act, all military and law
Tenth Congress
enforcement agencies, government agencies, LGUs and government-owned or -
controlled corporations shall submit an inventory of all their firearms and
Republic Act No. 8294 June 6, 1997
ammunition to the PNP.
Section 43. Final Amnesty. – Persons in possession of unregistered firearms and
AN ACT AMENDING THE PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1866, AS
holders of expired license or unregistered firearms shall register and renew the same
AMENDED, ENTITLED "CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION,
through the Final General Amnesty within six (6) months from the promulgation of
MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION OF FIREARMS,
the implementing rules and regulations of this Act. During the interim period of six
AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF
(6) months, no person applying for license shall be charged of any delinquent
FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR
payment accruing to the firearm subject for registration. The PNP shall conduct an
CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF, AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES."
intensive nationwide campaign to ensure that the general public is properly informed
of the provisions of this Act.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Section 44. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – Within one hundred twenty (120)
Congress assembled:
days from the effectivity of this Act, the Chief of the PNP, after public hearings and
consultation with concerned sectors of society shall formulate the necessary rules
Section 1. Sec. 1 Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further
and regulations for the effective implementation of this Act to be published in at least
amended to read as follows:
two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

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"Sec. 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of firearms
or ammunition or instruments used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
firearms or ammunition. – The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon
any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess
any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of
similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used
or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided,
That no other crime was committed.
"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand
pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm
which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter
such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered
powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms
with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided,
however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.
"If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use
of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
"If the violation of this Sec. is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with
the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat, such
violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion, or insurrection,
sedition, or attempted coup d'etat.
"The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or
other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity,
who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm,
company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of
violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow
any of them to use unlicensed firearms or firearms without any legal authority to be
carried outside of their residence in the course of their employment.
"The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any
licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor."
Section 2. Sec. 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 3. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of
explosives. – The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal and a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) shall be imposed
upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, assemble, deal in, acquire,
dispose or possess hand grenade(s), rifle grenade(s), and other explosives, including
but not limited to 'pillbox,' 'molotov cocktail bombs,' 'fire bombs,' or other incendiary
devices capable of producing destructive effect on contiguous objects or causing
injury or death to any person.
"When a person commits any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code or
special laws with the use of the aforementioned explosives, detonation agents or
incendiary devices, which results in the death of any person or persons, the use of
such explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devices shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.
"If the violation of this Sec. is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with
the crime of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat, such violation
shall be absorbed as an element of the crimes of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or
attempted coup d'etat.
"The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or
other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity,
who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the explosives owned by such firm,
company, corporation or entity, to be used by any person or persons found guilty of
violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs."
Section 3. Sec. 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 5. Tampering of firearm's serial number. – The penalty of prision correccional
shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully tamper, change, deface or
erase the serial number of any firearm."
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Section 4. Sec. 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 6. Repacking or altering the composition of lawfully manufactured explosives. –
The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully repack, alter or modify the composition of any lawfully manufactured
explosives."
Section 5. Coverage of the Term Unlicensed Firearm. – The term unlicensed firearm
shall include:
1) firearms with expired license; or
2) unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the commission of the crime.
Section 6. Rules and regulations. – The Department of Justice and the Department of
the Interior and Local Government shall jointly issue, within ninety (90) days after the
approval of this Act, the necessary rules and regulations pertaining to the
administrative aspect of the provisions hereof, furnishing the Committee on Public
Order and Security and the Committee on Justice and Human Rights of both Houses
of Congress copies of such rules and regulations within thirty (30) days from the
promulgation hereof.
Section 7. Separability clause. – If, for any reason, any Sec. or provision of this Act is
declared to be unconstitutional or invalid, the other Sec.s or provisions thereof which
are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.
Section 8. Repealing clause. – All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations or parts
thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or
modified accordingly.
Section 9. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its
publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: June 6, 1997.
PD 90 – Unlawful Rumor Mongering and Spreading False Information
MALACAÑANG
Manila
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 90 January 6, 1973
DECLARING UNLAWFUL RUMOR-MONGERING AND SPREADING FALSE INFORMATION
WHEREAS, a primordial objective of Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21,
1972 is the early restoration of peace, order and tranquility throughout the country;
WHEREAS, one of the most insidious means of disrupting such peace, order and
tranquility is the utterance, publication, distribution, circulation and spread of
rumors, false news or information and gossip that cause divisive effects among the
people, discredit of or distrust for the duly constituted authorities and/or that
undermine the stability of the government and the objectives of the New Society and,
therefore, inimical to the best interests of the State;
WHEREAS, to attain the aforesaid primordial objective of Proclamation No. 1081, it is
imperative that such acts be curbed and penalized;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, in my capacity as Commander-in-Chief
of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081
dated September 21, 1972, do hereby order and decree that any person who shall
offer, publish, distribute, circulate and spread rumors, false news and information
and gossip, or cause the publication, distribution, circulation or spreading of the
same, which cause or tend to cause panic, divisive effects among the people, discredit
of or distrust for the duly constituted authorities, undermine the stability of the
Government and the objectives of the New Society, endanger the public order, or
cause damage to the interest or credit of the State shall, upon conviction, be punished
by prision correccional. In case the offender is a government official or employee, the
accessory penalty of absolute perpetual disqualification from holding any public
office shall be imposed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and seventy-three.
TITLE FOUR – CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
People vs Go
82
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 191015 August 6, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE C. GO, AIDA C. DELA ROSA, and FELECITAS D. NECOMEDES,** Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The power of courts to grant demurrer in criminal cases should be exercised with
great caution, because not only the rights of the accused - but those of the offended
party and the public interest as well - are involved. Once granted, the accused is
acquitted and the offended party may be left with no recourse. Thus, in the resolution
of demurrers, judges must act with utmost circumspection and must engage in
intelligent deliberation and reflection, drawing on their experience, the law and
jurisprudence, and delicately evaluating the evidence on hand.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the September 30, 2009
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 101823, entitled "People of
the Philippines, Petitioner, versus Hon. Concepcion Alarcon-Vergara et al.,
Respondents," as well as its January 22, 2010 Resolution3 denying reconsideration of
the assailed judgment.
Factual Antecedents
The following facts appear from the account of the CA:
On October 14, 1998, the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)
issued Resolution No. 1427 ordering the closure of the Orient Commercial Banking
Corporation (OCBC) and placing such bank under the receivership of the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). PDIC, as the statutory receiver of OCBC,
effectively took charge of OCBC’s assets and liabilities in accordance withits mandate
under Section 30 of Republic Act 7653.
xxxx
While all the aforementioned events were transpiring, PDIC began collecting on
OCBC’s past due loans receivable by sending demand letters to its borrowers for the
immediate settlement oftheir outstanding loans. Allegedly among these borrowers of
OCBC are Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. which appeared to have obtained
a loanof [P]10 Million each. A representative of Timmy’s, Inc. denied being granted
any loan by OCBC and insisted that the signatures on the loan documents were
falsified. A representative of Asia Textile Mills, Inc. denied having applied, much less
being granted, a loan by OCBC.
The PDIC conducted an investigation and allegedly came out with a finding that the
loans purportedly in the names of Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. were
released in the form of manager’schecks in the name of Philippine Recycler’s and Zeta
International, Inc. These manager’s checks were then allegedly deposited to the
savings account of the private respondent Jose C. Go with OCBC and, thereafter, were
automatically transferred to his current account in order to fund personal checks
issued by him earlier.
On September 24, 1999, PDIC filed a complaint4 for two (2) counts of Estafa thru
Falsification of CommercialDocuments in the Office of the City Prosecutor of the City
of Manila against the private respondents in relation to the purported loans of
Timmy’s, Inc.and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. On November 22, 2000, after finding probable
cause, the Office of the City Prosecutor of the City of Manila filed
Informations5 against the private respondents which were docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 in the RTC in Manila.
Upon being subjected to arraignment by the RTC in Manila, the private respondents
pleaded not guilty to the criminal cases filed against them. A pretrial was conducted.
Thereafter, trial of the cases ensued and the prosecution presented its evidence.
After the presentation of all of the prosecution’s evidence, the private respondents
filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence and a Motion for Voluntary
Inhibition. The presiding judge granted the private respondents’ Motion for Voluntary
Inhibition and ordered the case to be re-raffled to another branch. The case was
subsequently re-raffled to the branch of the respondent RTC judge.6
In an Order dated December 19, 2006, the respondent RTC judge granted the private
respondents’ Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence. On January 17, 2007,
the private respondents filed their Demurrer to Evidence7praying for the dismissal of
the criminal cases instituted against them due to the failure of the prosecution to
establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On July 2, 2007, an Order8 was promulgated by the respondent RTC judge finding the
private respondents’ Demurrer to Evidence to be meritorious, dismissing the Criminal
Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 and acquitting all of the accused in these cases.
On July20, 2007, the private prosecutor in Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-
187319 moved for a reconsideration of the July 2, 2007 Order but the same was
denied by the respondent RTC judge in an Order9 dated October 19, 2007.10
83
Surprisingly, and considering thathundreds of millions of Orient Commercial Banking
Corporation (OCBC) depositors’ money appear to have been lost – which must have
contributed to the bank’s being placed under receivership, no motion for
reconsideration of the July 2, 2007 Order granting respondents’ demurrer to
evidence was filed by the handling public prosecutor, Manila Prosecutor Marlo B.
Campanilla (Campanilla). Only complainant Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation
(PDIC) filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and the same lacked Campanilla’s approval
and/or conformé; the copy of the Motion for Reconsideration filed with the
RTC11 does not bear Campanilla’s approval/conformé; instead,it indicates thathe was
merely furnished with a copy of the motion by registered mail.12 Thus, while the
prosecution’s copy of PDIC’sMotion for Reconsideration 13 bore Campanilla’s
subsequent approval and conformity, that which was actually filed by PDIC with the
RTC on July 30, 2007 did not contain the public prosecutor’s written approval and/or
conformity.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On January 4, 2008, the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed anoriginal Petition for Certiorari14 with the CA assailing the July 2, 2007
Order of the trial court. Itclaimed that the Order was issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lackor excess of jurisdiction; that it was issued with partiality;
that the prosecution was deprived of its day in court; and that the trial court
disregarded the evidence presented, which undoubtedly showed that respondents
committed the crime of estafa through falsification ofcommercial documents.
On September 30, 2009, the CA issued the assailed Decision with the following
decretal portion: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the petition filed in
this case is hereby DENIED and the assailed Orders of the respondent RTC judge are
AFFIRMED and deemed final and executory.
SO ORDERED.15
Notably, in dismissing the Petition, the appellate court held that the assailed July 2,
2007 Order of the trial court became final since the prosecution failed to move for
the reconsideration thereof, and thus double jeopardy attached. The CA declared
thus –
More important than the fact that double jeopardy already attaches is the fact that
the July 2, 2007 Order of the trial court has already attained finality. This Order was
received by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila on July 3, 2007 and by the
Private Prosecutor on July 5, 2007. While the Private Prosecutor filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the said Order, the Public Prosecutor did not seek for the
reconsideration thereof. It is the Public Prosecutor who has the authority to file a
Motion for Reconsideration of the said order and the Solicitor General who can file a
petition for certiorari with respect to the criminal aspect of the cases. The failure of
the Public Prosecutor to file a Motion for Reconsideration on or before July 18, 2007
and the failure of the Solicitor General to file a Petition for Certiorarion or before
September 1, 2007 made the order of the trial court final.
As pointed out by the respondents, the Supreme Court ruled categorically on this
matter in the case of Mobilia Products, Inc. vs. Umezawa (452 SCRA 736), as follows:
"In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private
complainant or the offended party is limited to the civil liabilityarising therefrom.
Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a
reconsideration of the order of dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken, whenever
legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is concerned and may be made
only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal, by the State only, through
the OSG. The private complainant or offended party may not undertake such motion
for reconsideration or appeal on the criminal aspect ofthe case. However, the
offended party or private complainant may file a motion for reconsideration of such
dismissal or acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the civil aspect thereof
is concerned. In so doing, the private complainant or offended party need not secure
the conformity of the public prosecutor. If the court denies his motion for
reconsideration, the private complainant or offended party may appeal or file a
petition for certiorarior mandamus, if grave abuse amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction is shown and the aggrieved party has no right of appeal or given an
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."16
In addition, the CA ruled that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the demurrer, or that it was
denied its day in court; that on the contrary, the prosecution was afforded every
opportunity to present its evidence, yet it failed to prove that respondents committed
the crime charged.
The CA further held that the prosecution failed to present a witness who could testify,
based on personal knowledge, that the loan documents were falsified by the
respondents; that the prosecution should not have relied on "letters and unverified
ledgers," and it "should have trailed the money from the beginning to the end;"17 that
while the documentary evidenceshowed that the signatures in the loan documents
were falsified, it has not been shown who falsified them. It added that since only two
of the alleged 13 manager’s checks were being questioned, there arose reasonable
84
doubt as to whether estafa was committed, as to these two checks; instead, there is
an "inescapable possibility that an honest mistake was made in the preparation of the
two questioned manager’s checks since these checks were made out to the names of
different payees and not in the names of the alleged applicants of the loans."18 The
appellate court added –
x x x Finally, the petitioner failed to present evidence on where the money went after
they were deposited to the checking account of the private respondent Jose C. Go.
There is only a vague reference that the money was used to fund the personal checks
earlier issued by x x x Go. The petitioner should have gone further and identified who
were the recipients of these personal checks and if these personal checks were
negotiated and honored. With all the resources of the public prosecutor’s office, the
petitioner should have done a better job of prosecuting the cases filed against the
private respondents. It isa shame that all the efforts of the government will go for
naught due to the negligence of the public prosecutors in tying up the chain of
evidence in a criminal case.19
As a final point, the CA held that if errors were made inthe appreciation of evidence,
these are mere errors of judgment – and not errors of jurisdiction – which may no
longer be reviewed lest respondents be placed in double jeopardy.
The OSG moved for reconsideration, but in the assailed January 22, 2010 Resolution,
the CA stood its ground. Hence, the instant Petition was instituted.
Issues
In the Petition, it is alleged that –
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT –
(a) NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT RTC JUDGE
IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE;
(b) THE ORDER OF ACQUITTAL HAS ALREADY ATTAINED FINALITY WHEN IT WAS NOT
CHALLENGED IN A TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE MANNER; AND
(c) THE LOWER COURT MERELY COMMITTED ERRORS OF JUDGMENT AND NOT OF
JURISDICTION.20
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner argues that the public prosecutor actually filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the assailed July 2,2007 Order of the trial court granting
respondents’ demurrer – that is, by "joining"the private prosecutor PDIC in the
latter’s July 20, 2007 Motion for Reconsideration. Nonetheless,it admitted that while
it joined PDIC in the latter’s July 20, 2007 Motion for Reconsideration, it had only until
July 18, 2007 within which to seek reconsideration since it received the order on July
3, 2007, while the private prosecutor received a copy of the Order only on July 5,
2007; it pleads thatthe two-day delay in filing the motion should not prejudice the
interests of the State and the People.
Petitioner assumes further that, since it was belated in its filing of the required
Motion for Reconsideration, it may have been tardy as well in the filing of the Petition
for Certiorariwith the CA, or CA-G.R. SP No. 101823. Still, it begs the Court to excuse
its mistake in the nameof public interest and substantial justice, and in order to
maintain stability in the banking industry given that the case involved embezzlement
of large sums ofdepositors’ money in OCBC.
Petitioner goes on to argue that the CAerred in affirming the trial court’s finding that
demurrer was proper. It claims that it was able to prove the offense charged, and it
has shown that respondents were responsible therefor.
In its Reply,21 petitioner claims thatthe July 2, 2007 Order of the trial court granting
respondents’ demurrer was null and void to begin with, and thus it could not have
attained finality. It adds thatcontrary to respondents’ submission, the private
prosecutor’s Motion for Reconsideration contained the public prosecutor’s written
conformity, and that while it may be saidthat the public prosecutor’s motion was two
days late, still the trial court took cognizance thereof and passed upon its merits; by
so doing, the trial court thus validatedthe public prosecutor’s action of adopting the
private prosecutor’sMotion for Reconsideration as his own. This being the case, it
should therefore besaid that the prosecution’s resultant Petition for Certiorariwith
the CA on January 4, 2008 was timely filed within the required 60-day period, counted
from November 5, 2007,or the date the public prosecutor received the trial court’s
October 19, 2007 Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner submits further that a Petition for Certiorariwas the only available remedy
against the assailed Orders of the trial court, since the granting of a demurrer in
criminal cases is tantamount to an acquittal and is thus immediately final and
executory. It adds that the denial of its right to due process is apparent since the trial
court’s grant of respondents’ demurrer was purely capricious and done with evident
partiality, despite the prosecution having adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt
that they committed estafa through falsification of commercial documents. Petitioner
thus prays that the assailed CA dispositions be reversed and that Criminal Case Nos.
00-187318 and 00-187319 be reinstated for further proceedings.
Respondents’ Arguments
Praying that the Petition be denied, respondents Jose C. Go (Go), Aida C. Dela Rosa
(Dela Rosa), and Felecitas D. Necomedes (Nicomedes) – the accused in Criminal Case
85
Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 – argue in their Comment22 that the trial court’s grant
of their demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal; any subsequent prosecution
for the same offense would thus violate their constitutional right against double
jeopardy. They add thatsince the public prosecutor failed to timely move for the
reconsideration of the trial court’s July 2, 2007 Order, it could not have validly filed
an original Petition for Certiorariwith the CA. Nor can it be said that the prosecution
and the private prosecutor jointly filed the latter’s July 20, 2007 Motion for
Reconsideration with the trial court because the public prosecutor’s copy of
PDIC’smotion was merely sent through registered mail. Therefore if it were true that
the public prosecutor gave his approval or conformity to the motion, he did so only
afterreceiving his copy of the motion through the mail, and not at the time the private
prosecutor actually filed its Motion for Reconsideration with the trial court.
Next, respondents submit that petitioner was not deprived of its day in court; the
grant of their demurrer to evidence is based on a fair and judicious determination of
the facts and evidence bythe trial court, leading it to conclude that the prosecution
failed to meet the quantum of proof required to sustain a finding of guilt on the part
of respondents. They argue thatthere is no evidence to show that OCBC released loan
proceeds to the alleged borrowers, Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc., and that
these loan proceeds were then deposited in the account of respondent Go. Since no
loans were granted to the two borrowers, then there is nothing for Go to
misappropriate. With respect to the two manager’s checks issued to Philippine
Recycler’s Inc. and Zeta International, respondents contend that these may not
beconsidered to be the loan proceeds pertaining to Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile
Mills, Inc.’s loan application because these checks were not in the name of the alleged
borrowers Timmy’s, Inc.and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. as payees. Besides, these two
checks were never negotiated with OCBC, either for encashmentor deposit, since
they did not bear the respective indorsements or signatures and account numbers of
the payees; thus, they could not be considered to havebeen negotiated nor deposited
with Go’s account with OCBC.
Next, respondents argue that the cash deposit slip used to deposit the alleged loan
proceeds in Go’s OCBC account is questionable, since under banking procedure, a
cash deposit slip may not be used to deposit checks. Moreover, it has not been shown
who prepared the said cash deposit slip. Respondents further question the validity
and authenticity of the other documentary evidence presented, such as the
Subsidiary Ledger, Cash Proof,23 Schedule of Returned Checks and Other Cash Items
(RTCOCI), etc.
Finally, respondents claim that not all the elementsof the crime of estafa under Article
315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code have been established; specifically, it has not
been shown that Goreceived the alleged loan proceeds, and that a demand was made
upon him for the return thereof.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 for estafa through falsification of
commercial documents against the respondents are based on the theory that in 1997,
fictitious loans in favor of two entities – Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. –
were approved, after which two manager’s checks representing the supposed
proceeds of these fictitious loans were issued but made payable to two different
entities – Philippine Recycler’sInc. and ZetaInternational – without any documents
issued by the supposed borrowers Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. assigning
the supposedloan proceeds tothe two payees. Thereafter, these two manager’s
checks – together with several others totaling ₱120,819,475.00 24 – were encashed,
and then deposited in the OCBC Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0 of Go. Then,
several automatic transfer deposits were made from Go’s savings account to his
OCBC Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0 which were then used to fund Go’s
previously dishonored personal checks.
The testimonial and documentary evidenceof the prosecution indicate that OCBC, a
commercial bank, was ordered closed by the BSP sometime in October 1998. PDIC
was designated as OCBC receiver, and it took over the bank’s affairs, assets and
liabilities, records, and collected the bank’s receivables.
During efforts to collect OCBC’s pastdue loan receivables, PDIC as receiver sent
demand letters to the bank’s debtor-borrowers on record, including Timmy’s, Inc. and
Asia Textile Mills, Inc. which appeared to have obtained unsecured loans of ₱10
million each, and which apparently remained unpaid. In response to the demand
letters, Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. denied having obtained loans from
OCBC. Timmy’s, Inc., through its designated representative, claimed that while it is
true that it applied for an OCBC loan, it no longer pursued the application after it was
granted a loan by another bank. When the OCBC loan documents were presented to
Timmy’s, Inc.’s officers, it was discovered that the signatures therein of the corporate
officers were forgeries. In their defense and to clarify matters, Timmy’s, Inc.’s
corporate officers executed affidavits and furnished official documents such as their
passports and the corporation’s Articles of Incorporation containing their
respectivesignatures to show PDIC that their purported signatures in the OCBC loan
86
documents were forgeries. After its investigation into the matter, PDIC came to the
conclusion that the signatures on the Timmy’s, Inc. loan documents were indeed
falsified.25
On the other hand, in a written reply26 to PDIC’s demand letter, Asia Textile Mills, Inc.
vehemently denied thatit applied for a loan with OCBC. On this basis, PDIC concluded
that the AsiaTextile Mills, Inc.loan was likewise bogus. Moreover, PDIC discovered
other bogus loans in OCBC.
Through the falsified loan documents, the OCBC Loan Committee – composed of Go,
who was likewise OCBCPresident, respondent Dela Rosa (OCBC Senior Vice President,
or SVP, and Chief Operating Officer, or COO), Arnulfo Aurellano and Richard Hsu –
approved a ₱10 million unsecured loan purportedly in favor of Timmy’s, Inc. After
deducting finance charges, advance interest and taxes, DelaRosa certified a net loan
proceeds amounting to ₱9,985,075.00 covered by Manager’s Check No.
000000334727 dated February 5, 1997.28 The face of the check bears the notation
"Loan proceeds of CL-484," the alpha numeric code ("CL-484")of which refers to the
purported loan of Timmy’s, Inc.29 However, the payee thereof was not the purported
borrower, Timmy’s, Inc., but a certain "Zeta International". Likewise, on even date,
Manager’s Check No. 000000334030 for ₱9,985,075.00 was issued, and on its face is
indicated "Loan proceeds of CL-477", which alpha numeric code ("CL-477") refers to
the purported loan of AsiaTextile Mills, Inc.31 Manager’s Check No. 0000003340 was
made payable not to Asia Textile Mills, Inc., but to "Phil. Recyclers Inc."
On the same day that the subject manager’s checks were issued, or on February 5,
1997, it appears that the two checks – together with other manager’s checks totaling
₱120,819,475.00– were encashed; on the face ofthe checks, the word "PAID" was
stamped, and at the dorsal portion thereof there were machine validations showing
thatManager’s Check No. 0000003347 was presented at 6:16 p.m., while Manager’s
Check No. 0000003340 was presented at 6:18 p.m.32
After presentment and encashment, the amount of ₱120,819,475.00 – which among
others included the ₱9,985,075.00 proceeds of the purported Timmy’s, Inc. loan and
the ₱9,985,075.00 proceeds of the supposed Asia Textile Mills, Inc. loan – was
deposited in Go’s OCBC Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0 at OCBC Recto Branch,
apparently on instructions of respondent Dela Rosa.33 The deposit is covered by OCBC
Cash Deposit Slip34 dated February 5, 1997, with the corresponding machine
validation thereon indicating that the deposit was made at 6:19 p.m.35 The funds
were credited to Go’s savings account.36
It appears that previously, or on February 4, 1997, seven OCBC checks issued by Go
from his personal OCBC Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0 totaling
₱145,488,274.48 were dishonored for insufficiency of funds.37 After Manager’s Check
Nos. 0000003340 and 0000003347, along with several other manager’s checks, were
encashed and the proceeds thereof deposited in Go’s OCBC Savings Account No.
00810-00108-0 withautomatic transferfeature to his OCBC Current Account No. 008-
00-000015-0, funds were automatically transferred from the said savings account to
the current account, which atthe time contained only a total amountof
₱26,332,303.69. Go’sOCBC Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0 was credited with
₱120,819,475.00, and thereafter the account registered a balance of
₱147,151,778.69. The seven previously dishonored personal checks were
thenpresented for clearing, and were subsequently cleared that sameday, or on
February 5, 1997.38 Apparently, they were partly funded by the
₱120,819,475.00manager’s check deposits – which include Manager’s Check Nos.
0000003340 and 0000003347.
During the examination and inquiry into OCBC’s operations, oron January 28, 1998,
Go issued and sent a letter39 to the BSP, through Maria Dolores Yuviengco, Director
of the Departmentof Commercial Banks, specifically requesting that the BSP refrain
from sending any communication to Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc., among
others. He manifested that he was "willing to assume the viability and full payment"of
the accounts under investigation and examination, including the Timmy’s, Inc. and
AsiaTextile Mills, Inc. accounts.
Demurrer to the evidence40 is "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the
effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law,
whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring
challenges the sufficiencyof the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in
passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required
to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. x x x Sufficient evidence for purposes of
frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in character, weight or amount as will
legally justify the judicial or official action demanded according to the circumstances.
To be considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the commission
of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation therein by the
accused."41 Thus, when the accused files a demurrer, the court must evaluate
whether the prosecution evidence is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.42
87
"The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the
trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave
abuse of such discretion."43 As to effect, "the grant of a demurrer to evidence
amounts to an acquittal and cannot be appealed because it would place the accused
in double jeopardy. The order is reviewable only by certiorariif it was issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack or excess of jurisdiction."44 When grave
abuse of discretion is present, an order granting a demurrer becomes null and void.
As a general rule, an order granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence amounts to
an acquittal. There are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant thereof would
not violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. For instance, this
Court ruled that when there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s
demurrer to evidence,its judgment is considered void, as this Court ruled in People v.
Laguio, Jr.:
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial
courts granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special
civil action of certiorariunder Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being
considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of
dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action
via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated.
In the instant case, having affirmed the CA finding grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court when it granted the accused’s demurrer to evidence, we deem
its consequent order of acquittal void.45
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as "that capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. ‘The abuse of discretion must
be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.’ The party questioning the acquittal of an accused should be able toclearly
establish that the trial court blatantly abused its discretion such that it was deprived
of its authority to dispense justice."46
In the exercise of the Court’s "superintending control over inferior courts, we are to
be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case ‘as the ends of justice may
require.’ So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial
wrong or to do substantial justice."47
Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, the Court declaresthat the CA grossly
erred in affirming the trial court’s July 2, 2007 Order granting the respondent’s
demurrer, which Order was patently null and void for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion and manifest irregularity, thus causing substantial injury to the
banking industry and public interest.1avvphi1 The Court finds that the prosecution
has presented competent evidence to sustain the indictment for the crime of estafa
through falsification of commercial documents, and that respondents appear to be
the perpetrators thereof. In evaluating the evidence, the trial court effectively failed
and/or refused to weigh the prosecution’s evidence against the respondents, which
it was duty-bound to do as a trier of facts; considering that the case involved
hundreds of millions of pesos of OCBC depositors’ money – not to mention that the
banking industry is impressed with public interest, the trial court should have
conducted itself with circumspection and engaged in intelligent reflection in resolving
the issues.
The elements of estafa through abuse ofconfidence under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code48 are: "(a) that money,goods or other personal property is
received by the offender in trust oron commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (b)
that there be misappropriation orconversion of such money or property by the
offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) there is demand by the
offended party to the offender."49
Obviously, a bank takes its depositors’ money as a loan, under an obligation to return
the same; thus, the term "demand deposit."
The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the
Civil Code on simpleloan. Article 1980 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "x x x
savingsx x x deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by
the provisions concerning simple loan." There is a debtor-creditor relationship
between the bank and its depositor. The bank is the debtor and the depositor is the
creditor. The depositor lends the bank money and the bank agrees to pay the
depositor on demand. x x x50
Moreover, the banking laws impose high standards on banks in view of the fiduciary
nature of banking."This fiduciary relationship means that the bank’s obligation to
observe ‘high standards ofintegrity and performance’ is deemed written into every
deposit agreement between a bank and its depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking
88
requires banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a
family."51
In Soriano v. People,52 it was held that the President of a bank is a fiduciary with
respect to the bank’s funds, and he holds the same in trust or for administration for
the bank’s benefit. From this, it may beinferred that when such bank president makes
it appear through falsification that an individual or entity applied for a loan when in
fact such individual or entity did not, and the bank president obtains the loan
proceeds and converts the same, estafa is committed.
Next, regarding misappropriation, the evidence tends to extablish that Manager’s
Check Nos.0000003340 and 0000003347 were encashed, using the bank’s funds
which clearly belonged to OCBC’s depositors, and then deposited in Go’s OCBC
Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0 at OCBC Recto Branch – although he was not the
named payee therein. Next, the money was automatically transferred to Go’s OCBC
Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0 and used to fund his seven previously-issued
personal checks totaling ₱145,488,274.48, which checks were dishonored the day
before. Simply put, the evidence strongly indicates that Go converted OCBC funds to
his own personal use and benefit. "The words ‘convert’ and ‘misappropriate’ connote
an act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own, or of
devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate
for one’s own use includes not only conversion to one’s personal advantage, but also
every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right. x x x In proving the
element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of misappropriation
arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the items
to be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.Thus, the
merepresumption of misappropriation or conversion is enough to conclude thata
probable cause exists for the indictment x x x."53
As to the third element of estafa, there is no question that as a consequence of the
misappropriation of OCBC’s funds, the bank and its depositors have been prejudiced;
the bank has been placed under receivership, and the depositors’ money is no longer
under their unimpeded disposal.
Finally, on the matter of demand, while it has not been shown that the bank
demanded the return of the funds, it has nevertheless been held that "[d]emand is
not an element of the felony or a condition precedent tothe filing of a criminal
complaint for estafa. Indeed, the accusedmay be convicted ofthe felony under Article
315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code if the prosecution proved
misappropriation or conversion by the accused of the money or property subject of
the Information. In a prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary where there is
evidence of misappropriation or conversion."54 Thus, strictly speaking, demand is not
an element of the offense of estafa through abuse of confidence; even a verbal query
satisfies the requirement.55 Indeed, in several past rulings of the Court, demand was
not even included as anelement of the crime of estafa through abuse of confidence,
orunder paragraph 1(b).56
On the other hand, the elements of the crime of falsification of commercial document
under Art. 17257 are: "(1) that the offender is a private individual; (2) that the offender
committed any of the acts of falsification; and (3) that the act of falsification is
committed ina commercial document."58 As to estafa through falsification of public,
official or commercial documents, it has been held that –
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of
committing Estafa, because before the falsified document is actually utilized to
defraud another, the crime of Falsification has already been consummated, damage
or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public,
official or commercial document. In other words, the crime of falsification has already
existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or commercial document
todefraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission of Estafa,
not by the falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification of the public,
official or commercial document is only a necessary means to commit the estafa.59
Simulating OCBC loan documents – such as loan applications, credit approval
memorandums, and the resultant promissory notes and other credit documents – by
causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when
they did not in fact so participate, and by counterfeiting or imitating their handwriting
or signatures constitute falsification of commercial and public documents.
As to the respondents’ respective participation in the commission of the crime, suffice
it to state that as the beneficiary of the proceeds, Go is presumed to be the author of
the falsification. The fact that previously, his personal checks totaling
₱145,488,274.48 were dishonored, and the day after, the amount of
₱120,819,475.00 was immediately credited to his account, which included funds
from the encashment of Manager’s Check Nos. 0000003340 and 0000003347 or the
loan proceeds of the supposed Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. accounts,
bolsters this view. "[W]henever someone has in his possession falsified documents
[which he used to] his advantage and benefit, the presumption that he authored it
arises."60
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x x x This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so
closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven
to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the
forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery.
In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a
forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger.
Certainly, the channeling of the subjectpayments via false remittances to his savings
account, his subsequent withdrawals of said amount as well as his unexplained flight
at the height of the bank’s inquiry into the matter more than sufficiently establish x x
x involvement in the falsification.61
Likewise, Dela Rosa’s involvement inthe scheme has been satisfactorily shown. As
OCBC SVP and COO and member of the OCBC Loan Committee, she approved the
purported Timmy’s, Inc.loan, and she certified and signed the February 2, 1997 OCBC
Disclosure Statement and other documents.62 She likewise gave specific instructions
to deposit the proceeds of Manager’s Check Nos. 0000003340 and 0000003347,
among others, in Go’s OCBC Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0 at OCBC Recto
Branch.63 Finally, she was a signatory to the two checks.64
On the other hand, respondent Nicomedes as OCBC Senior Manager for Corporate
Accounts – Account Management Group, among others prepared the Credit Approval
Memorandum and recommended the approval of the loans.65
In granting the demurrer, the trial court – in its assailed July 2, 2007 Order –
concluded that based on the evidence adduced, the respondents could not have
falsified the loan documents pertaining toTimmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc.
since the individuals who assert that their handwriting and signatures were forged
were not presented incourt to testify on such claim; that the prosecution witnesses –
Honorio E. Franco, Jr. (Franco) of PDIC, the designated Assisting Deputy Liquidator of
OCBC, and Virginia Rowella Famirin (Famirin), Cashier of OCBC Recto Branch – were
not present when the loan documents were executed and signed, and thus have no
personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the alleged falsification; and
as high-ranking officers of OCBC, respondents could not be expected to have
prepared the saiddocuments. The evidence, however, suggests otherwise; it shows
that respondents had a direct hand in the falsification and creation of fictitious loans.
The loan documents were even signed by them. By disregarding what is evident in
the record, the trial court committed substantial wrong that frustrates the ends of
justice and adversely affects the public interest. The trial court’s act was so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law.
An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of
discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
personal hostility. x x x66
On the charge of estafa, the trial court declared that since the payees of Manager’s
Check Nos. 0000003340 and 0000003347 were not Asia Textile Mills, Inc. and
Timmy’s, Inc., respectively, but other entities– Phil. Recyclers Inc. and Zeta
International, and there are no documents drawn by the borrowers assigning the loan
proceeds to these two entities, then it cannot besaid that there were loan proceeds
released to these borrowers. The trial court added that it is doubtful that the two
manager’s checks were presented and negotiated for deposit in Go’s savings account,
since theydo not contain the required indorsements of the borrowers, the signatures
of the tellers and individuals/payees who received the checks and the proceeds
thereof, and the respective account numbers of the respondents; and the checks
were presented beyond banking hours. The trial court likewise held that the fact that
a cash deposit slip – and not a check deposit slip – was used to allegedly deposit the
checks raised doubts as to the truth of the allegation that the manager’s checks were
deposited and credited to Go’s savings account.
The CA echoed the trial court’s observations, adding that the evidence consisted of
mere "letters and unverifiedledgers" which were thus insufficient; that there was an
"inescapable possibility that an honest mistake was made" in the preparation and
issuance of Manager’s CheckNos. 0000003340 and 0000003347, since these two
checks are claimed to be just a few of several checks – numbering thirteen in all – the
rest of which werenever questioned by the receiver PDIC. The appellate court added
that the prosecution should have presented further evidence as to where the money
went after being deposited inGo’s savings and current accounts, identifying thus the
recipients of Go’spersonal checks.
What the trial and appellate courts disregarded, however, is that the OCBC funds
ended up in the personal bank accountsof respondent Go, and were used to fund his
personal checks, even as he was not entitled thereto. These, if not rebutted, are
indicative ofestafa, as may be seen from the afore-cited Sorianocase.
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The bank money (amounting to ₱8million) which came to the possession of petitioner
was money held in trust or administration by him for the bank, in his fiduciary capacity
as the President of said bank. It is not accurate to say that petitioner became the
owner of the ₱8 million because it was the proceeds of a loan. That would have been
correct if the bank knowingly extended the loan to petitioner himself. But that is not
the case here. According to the information for estafa, the loan was supposed to be
for another person, a certain "Enrico Carlos"; petitioner, through falsification, made
it appear that said "Enrico Carlos" applied for the loan when infact he ("Enrico Carlos")
did not. Through such fraudulent device, petitioner obtained the loan proceeds and
converted the same. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that petitioner
became the legal owner of the ₱8 million. Thus, petitioner remained the bank’s
fiduciary with respect to that money, which makes it capable of misappropriation or
conversion in his hands.67
Thus, it is irrelevant that the proceeds of the supposed loans were made payable to
entities other than the alleged borrowers.1âwphi1 Besides, the manager’s checks
themselves indicate that they were the proceeds of the purported Timmy’s, Inc.’s and
Asia Textile Mills, Inc.’s loans, through the alpha numeric codes specifically assigned
to them that are printed on the face of the checks; the connection between the
checks and the purported loans is thus established. In the same vein, the CA’s
supposition that there is an "inescapable possibility that an honest mistake was made
inthe preparation of the two questioned manager’s checks" is absurd; even so, the
bottom line is that they were encashed using bank funds, and the proceeds thereof
were deposited in Go’s bank savings and current accounts and used to fund his
personal checks.
Furthermore, as correctly pointed outby petitioner, it issuperfluous to require that
the recipients of Go’s personal checks be identified. For purposes of proving the
crime, it has been shown that Goconverted bank funds to his own personal use when
they were deposited in his accounts and his personal checks were cleared and the
funds were debited from his account.1âwphi1 This suffices. Likewise, the Court
agrees that the prosecution’s reliance on the supposed loan documents, subsidiary
ledgers, deposit slip, cash proof, RTCOCI and other documents was proper. They are
both public and private documents which may be received in evidence; notably,
petitioner’s documentary evidence was admitted in full by the trial court.68 With
respect to evidence consisting of private documents, the presumption remains that
"therecording of private transactions has been fair and regular, and that the ordinary
course of business has been followed."69
Go’s January 28, 1998 letter to the BSP stating that he was "willing to assume the
viabilityand full payment" of the accounts under examination – which included the
Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. accounts, among others – is an offer of
compromise, and thus an implied admission of guilt under Rule 130, Section 27 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence.70
In addition, appellant’s act of pleading for his sister-in-law’s forgiveness may be
considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise, which in turn can be received
as an implied admission ofguilt under Section 27, Rule 130 x x x.71
As a result of the Court’s declaration of nullity of the assailed Orders of the trial court,
any dissection of the truly questionable actions of Prosecutor Campanilla – which
should merit appropriate disciplinary action for they reveal a patent ignorance of
procedure, if not indolence or a deliberate intention to bungle his own case –
becomes unnecessary. It is conceded that the lack of Campanilla’s approval and/or
conforméto PDIC’s Motion for Reconsideration should have rendered the trial court’s
assailed Ordersfinal and executory were it not for the fact that they were inherently
null and void; Campanilla’s irresponsible actions almost cost the People its day in
court and their right to exact justice and retribution, not to mention that they could
have caused immeasurable damage to the banking industry. Just the same, "[a] void
judgment or order has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose.
In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Such judgment or order may be resisted in
any action or proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not even necessary to take any
steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or final order; it may simply be
ignored."72 More appropriately, the following must be cited:
x x x Clearly, the assailed Order of Judge Santiago was issued in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. A void order is no order at all. It cannot
confer any right or be the source of any relief. This Court is not merely a court of law;
it is likewise a court of justice.
To rule otherwise would leave the private respondent without any recourse to rectify
the public injustice brought about by the trial court's Order, leaving her with only the
standing to file administrative charges for ignorance of the law against the judge and
the prosecutor. A party cannot be left without recourse to address a substantive issue
in law.73
Finally, it must be borne in mind that "[t]he granting of a demurrer to evidence should
x x x be exercised with caution, taking into consideration not only the rights of the
accused, but also the right of the private offended party to be vindicated of the
wrongdoing done against him, for if it is granted, the accused is acquitted and the
91
private complainant is generally left with no more remedy. In such instances,
although the decision of the court may be wrong, the accused can invoke his right
against double jeopardy. Thus, judges are reminded to be more diligent and
circumspect in the performance of their duties as members of the Bench xx x." 74
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The September 30, 2009 Decision and January
22, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The July 2,
2007 and October 19, 2007 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49 in
Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 are declared null and void, and the said
cases are ordered REINSTATED for the continuation of proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Shu vs Dee
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182573 April 23, 2014
RAY SHU, Petitioner,
vs.
JAIME DEE, ENRIQUETO MAGPANTAY, RAMON MIRANDA, LARRY MACILLAN, AND
EDWIN SO,Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the Rule 45 petit10n for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Ray Shu
(petitioner) seeking the reversal of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
June 19, 2007 and its resolution dated April 4, 2008. These assailed CA rulings
annulled the resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause for
falsification against the respondents.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
The petitioner is the President of the 3A Apparel Corporation. He filed a complaint
before the National Bureau of Investigation (NB!) charging the respondents of
falsification of two deeds of real estate mortgage submitted to the Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Company (A4etrobank). Both deeds of real estate mortgage were allegedly
signed by the petitioner, one in his own name while the other was on behalf of 3A
Apparel Corporation.
According to the petitioner, the respondents were employees of Metrobank.
Respondents Jaime T. Dee and Edwin So signed the two deeds of real estate mortgage
as witnesses; respondents Ramon S. Miranda and Enriqueto I. Magpantay notarized
the deeds of real estate mortgage signed by the petitioner in his own behalf and for
the corporation, respectively. The signature of respondent Larry Macillan, on the
other hand, appeared in the deeds of real estate mortgage which he submitted to the
Office of the Registrar of Deeds for San Juan, Metro Manila.2 Based on these deeds,
Metrobank foreclosed the two properties securing the 3A Apparel Corporation’s
loan.3
After investigation, the NBI filed a complaint with the City Prosecutor of Makati (city
prosecutor) charging the respondents of the crime of forgery and falsification of
public documents. The NBI supported the complaint with the Questioned Documents
Report No. 746-1098 (questioned documents report) issued by its Questioned
Documents Division. The questioned documents report states that the signatures of
the petitioner which appear on the questioned deeds are not the same as the
standard sample signatures he submitted to the NBI.4
The respondents argued in their counter-affidavits that they were denied their right
to due process during the NBI investigation because the agency never required them
and Metrobank to submit the standard sample signatures of the petitioner for
comparison.5 The findings contained in the questioned documents report only
covered the sample signatures unilaterally submitted by the petitioner as compared
with the signatures appearing on the two deeds of real estate mortgage. An
examination of the signatures of the petitioner which appear in several documents in
Metrobank’s possession revealed that his signatures in the questioned deeds are
genuine.6 The respondents also argued that the examination of the documents was
conducted without the original copies of the questioned deeds of real estate
mortgage.
The Ruling of the City Prosecutor
In a resolution dated June 25, 1999, the city prosecutor found no probable cause
against the respondents and, consequently, dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
The city prosecutor ruled that the questioned documents report is not conclusive
evidence that the respondents committed the crime charged. It only proves that the
sample signatures which were submitted solely by the petitioner are different from
the signatures appearing on the questioned deeds. The pieces of evidence presented
before the city prosecutor, which were not made available to the NBI and which the
petitioner does not dispute prove that the same person executed the questioned
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deeds.7 The city prosecutor found that the similarities in the sample signatures
submitted by the respondents and the signatures on the two deeds of real estate
mortgage are so striking that even a layman could see that they were written by one
and the same person.
Furthermore, the documents appended to the respondents’ counter-affidavit show
that the petitioner availed of the credit line and benefited from its proceeds.
Sufficient consideration also supported the execution of the two deeds of
mortgage.8 The city prosecutor also concluded that the petitioner used his passport
when he executed the questioned deeds before the respondents-notaries public
Magpantay and Miranda, without informing these notaries that the passport had
already been cancelled. This finding presumed the regularity of the performance of
duty of a notary public.9
The petitioner appealed the city prosecutor’ resolution to the Secretary of Justice.10
The Ruling of the Secretary of Justice
The Secretary of Justice reversed the city prosecutor’s findings. She ruled that the city
prosecutor failed to consider the evidentiary value of the findings of the NBI
questioned documents experts. This NBI finding is entitled to full faith and credit in
the absence of proof of irregularity in the performance of the experts’ duties.11
According to the Secretary, the expert evidence, the disclaimer of the petitioner that
he did not sign any promissory note, the lack of proof of receipt of the proceeds of
the loan, all tended to prove that he did not execute the subject deeds. The
complainant’s evidence is more credible and suffices to establish probable cause for
falsification, as against the respondents’ questionable and flawed supporting
documents.12
In addition, the finding of the city prosecutor that the petitioner’s ‘credit line’ with
Metrobank is sufficient consideration for the execution of the questioned deeds, even
if not palpably erroneous, is still gratuitous and conjectural.13
The Secretary of Justice denied the respondents’ motion for reconsideration
prompting them to file a petition for certiorari with the CA. The respondents alleged
that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolution.14
The ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA granted the petition and annulled the assailed resolution of the Secretary of
Justice.15
According to the CA, the respondents were denied their right to due process in the
proceedings before the NBI and the Secretary of Justice.16
In the proceedings before the NBI, the respondents were not furnished a copy of the
complaint and were not likewise required to file their answer or to present
countervailing evidence. All the evidence at the NBI level were solely provided by the
petitioner.17
In the proceedings before the Secretary of Justice, the respondents were not
furnished with the petition for review that the petitioner filed. They were not even
required to file their answer nor to comment.18
The CA also found that the persons who had been directly and personally involved in
the investigation of the case, like the NBI investigating agent and the city prosecutor,
were convinced that the evidence were not sufficient for purposes of filing charges
against the respondents. The recommendation for the filing of the complaint came
from the NBI chiefs and the Secretary of Justice who did not personally investigate
the case.19
The CA affirmed the findings of the city prosecutor as he had the opportunity to
examine the documents submitted by the parties, including the respondents’
evidence which the NBI did not consider. The CA denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration;20 hence, the present petition.
The Petitioner’s Position
The petitioner assigned the following errors:
First, the CA sweepingly relied on the respondents’ allegation that they had been
denied due process in the proceedings before the Secretary of Justice despite their
active participation in the proceedings through the filing of a motion for
reconsideration.21
Second, the CA erred in giving credence to the findings of the investigating NBI agent
and the city prosecutor. The Secretary of Justice is the ultimate authority who decides
which of the conflicting theories of the complainant and the respondents should be
given weight.22
Third, an NBI expert’s examination of certain contested documents at the request of
a private litigant does not necessarily nullify the examination made. Its purpose is to
assist the court exercising jurisdiction over the case in the performance of its duty to
correctly settle the issue related to the documents.23
The Respondents’ Position
In the respondents’ Comment and Memorandum, they reiterated their argument
that they were prevented from participating in the proceedings before the NBI and
the Secretary of Justice, resulting in the denial of their right to due
process.24 Moreover, the questioned documents report issued by the NBI was one-
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sided, thus, casting doubt on its veracity and reliability; thus, it deserves no weight
and credence.25 The Secretary of Justice erred in giving more weight to the
questioned documents report and the petitioner’s self-serving denials.26
In addition, the respondents argued that there was no evidence pointing to them as
the perpetrators of the forgery, if indeed there had been any. The expert opinion,
disclaimer of the petitioner and the alleged lack of proof of receipt of the proceeds
of the loan could only support a finding that the petitioner did not execute the
questioned deeds or obtain loans from the bank. Too, there was no evidence that the
respondents would gain pecuniary benefits from the commission of the crime. 27
The Court’s ruling
We find the petition meritorious.
The respondents were not denied their right to due process
We find no merit in the respondent’s claim that they were denied due process when
they were not informed by the Secretary of Justice of the pendency of the petitioner’s
appeal.
The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. What the law
prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but its absolute absence and lack of
opportunity to be heard. Sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process
exists when a party is given a chance to be heard through his motion for
reconsideration.28
In the present case, we do not find it disputed that the respondents filed with the
Secretary of Justice a motion for reconsideration of her resolution. Therefore, any
initial defect in due process, if any, was cured by the remedy the respondents availed
of.
On the respondents’ allegation that they were denied due process during the NBI
investigation, we stress that the functions of this agency are merely investigatory and
informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of
granting any relief to any party. It cannot even determine probable cause. The NBI is
an investigative agency whose findings are merely recommendatory. It undertakes
investigation of crimes upon its own initiative or as public welfare may require in
accordance with its mandate. It also renders assistance when requested in the
investigation or detection of crimes in order to prosecute the persons responsible. 29
Since the NBI’s findings were merely recommendatory, we find that no denial of the
respondents’ due process right could have taken place; the NBI’s findings were still
subject to the prosecutor’s and the Secretary of Justice’s actions for purposes of
finding the existence of probable cause.
We find it significant that the specimen signatures in the possession of Metrobank
were submitted by the respondents for the consideration of the city prosecutor and
eventually of the Secretary of Justice during the preliminary investigation
proceedings. Thus, these officers had the opportunity to examine these signatures.
The respondents were not likewise denied their right to due process when the NBI
issued the questioned documents report. We note that this report merely stated that
the signatures appearing on the two deeds and in the petitioner’s submitted sample
signatures were not written by one and the same person. 30 Notably, there was no
categorical finding in the questioned documents report that the respondents falsified
the documents. This report, too, was procured during the conduct of the NBI’s
investigation at the petitioner’s request for assistance in the investigation of the
alleged crime of falsification. The report is inconclusive and does not prevent the
respondents from securing a separate documents examination by handwriting
experts based on their own evidence. On its own, the NBI’s questioned documents
report does not directly point to the respondents’ involvement in the crime charged.
Its significance is that, taken together with the other pieces of evidence submitted by
the parties during the preliminary investigation, these evidence could be sufficient
for purposes of finding probable cause – the action that the Secretary of Justice
undertook in the present case.
The Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion
Probable cause pertains to facts and circumstances sufficient to support a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty
thereof.31
It is well-settled that in order to arrive at a finding of probable cause, the elements of
the crime charged should be present. In determining these elements for purposes of
preliminary investigation, only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against
the respondent are required, not absolute certainty. Thus, probable cause implies
mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less
than evidence that would justify a conviction.32
The elements of falsification of public documents are as follows: (1) the offender is a
private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his
official position; (2) he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article
171 of the RPC; and (3) the falsification was committed in a public, official or
commercial document.33
94
In light of the discussion above, we rule that the findings of the Secretary of Justice
are more in accord with the duty to determine the existence of probable cause than
the findings of the city prosecutor.
Contrary to the respondents’ assertions, the Secretary of Justice did not just merely
give credence to the questioned documents report and the petitioner’s self-serving
allegations.1âwphi1 The Secretary of Justice made a holistic review of the parties’
submitted pieces of evidence in ruling that "the expert evidence, the disclaimer of
the petitioner that he did not sign any promissory note, the lack of proof of receipt of
the proceeds of the loan, all tend to prove that he did not execute the subject deeds.
Also, the finding in the assailed resolution that the ‘credit line’ of the petitioner with
Metrobank is sufficient consideration for him to have executed the deeds is
gratuitous and conjectural."
From the evidence submitted by the parties, the petitioner offered sufficient
evidence showing that falsification might have been committed and that the
respondents might have been responsible therefor. The NBI’s questioned documents
report states that the questioned deeds of mortgage and the sample signatures
submitted by the petitioner were not written by one and the same person. It was also
shown that the respondents Dee, So, Magpantay and Miranda signed and
participated in the execution of the two deeds of real estate mortgage and the
respondent Macillan signed and submitted these documents to the Office of the
Registrar of Deeds for San Juan, Metro Manila. The petitioner also submitted
evidence that the passport used in notarizing the documents was a cancelled
passport. Furthermore, as the Secretary of Justice found, the respondents did not
show that the petitioner received the proceeds of the loan.
The findings of the city prosecutor are not proper in a preliminary investigation but
should be threshed out in a full-blown trial
In contrast, the city prosecutor negated the questioned documents report issued by
the NBI. He concluded that the documents submitted by the respondents showed
that even a layman could see the striking similarities of the alleged signatures of the
petitioner in the questioned deeds and in the documents submitted by the
respondents. He also concluded that the petitioner misrepresented to the
respondents-notaries public Miranda and Magpantay that the passport used in
notarizing the questioned deeds was not yet cancelled.
In arriving at these conclusions, the city prosecutor already delved into the merits of
the respondents’ defense. This is contrary to the well-settled rule that the validity and
merits of a party’s defense and accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and
evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary
investigation level.34 The allegations adduced by the prosecution will be put to test in
a full-blown trial in which evidence shall be analyzed, weighed, given credence or
disproved.35 The preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence.36 Simply put, in determining probable
cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the rules
of evidence that, as a rule, is outside his technical knowledge.37
That the findings of the city prosecutor should be ventilated in a full-blown trial is
highlighted by the reality that the authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be
determined solely upon its general characteristics, or its similarities or dissimilarities
with the genuine signature.38 The duty to determine the authenticity of a signature
rests on the judge who must conduct an independent examination of the signature
itself in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. Thus, Section
22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make
a comparison of the disputed handwriting "with writings admitted or treated as
genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine."39
Read in this light, the respondents' defense that there are striking similarities in the
specimen signatures they submitted and those of the questioned deeds is a matter
of evidence whose consideration is proper only in a full-blown trial. In that proper
forum, the respondents can present evidence to prove their defense and controvert
the questioned documents report; they can raise as issue the alleged irregularities in
the conduct of the examination.
The Secretary of Justice has the power to review the findings of the city prosecutor
We also find that the CA erred in ruling that the city prosecutor's findings should be
given more weight than the findings of the Secretary of Justice.
The determination of probable cause is essentially an executive function, lodged in
the first place on the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation. The
prosecutor's ruling is reviewable by the Secretary who, as the final determinative
authority on the matter, has the power to reverse, modify or affirm the prosecutor's
determination.40
It is well-settled that the findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to
interference by the courts, save only when he acts with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; when he grossly misapprehends facts;
when he acts in a manner so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
95
duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law; or when he acts outside
the contemplation of law.41
Contrary to the findings of the CA, we find that the Secretary of Justice did not gravely
abuse the exercise of her discretion in reversing the findings of the city prosecutor.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated June 19, 2007 and its resolution dated April 4, 2008.
SO ORDERED.
Zafra vs People
consolidated decision rendered on February 17, 2004 by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Cases Nos. 4634 to Nos. 4651,
inclusive,2 finding Manolito Gil Z. Zafra, a Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) assigned in Revenue District 3 in San Fernando, La Union
guilty of 18 counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public
documents.3
Antecedents
The CA summarized the factual antecedents as follows:

Republic of the Philippines Appellant was the only Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
SUPREME COURT (BIR), Revenue District 3, in San Fernando, La Union from 1993-1995. Among his
Manila duties was toreceive tax payments for which BIR Form 25.24 or the revenue official
receipts (ROR) were issued. The original of the ROR was then given to the taxpayer
FIRST DIVISION while a copy thereof was retained by the collection officer.

G.R. No. 176317 July 23, 2014 Every month, appellant submitted BIR Form 12.31 of the Monthly Report of
Collections (MRC) indicating the numbers of the issued RORs, date of collection,
MANOLITO GIL Z. ZAFRA, Petitioner, name of taxpayer,the amount collectedand the kind of tax paid. The original copy of
vs. the MRC with the attached triplicate copy of the issued RORs was submitted to the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Regional Office of the Commission on Audit (COA).

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In convicting an accused of the complex crime of malversation of public fund!:
through falsification of a public document, the courts shall impose the penalty for
the graver felony in the maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code, plus fine in the amount of the funds malversed or the total value of the
property embezzled. In addition, the courts shall order the accused to return to the
Government the funds malversed, or the value of the property embezzled.
The Assessment Division of the BIR Regional Office, likewise, kept a copy of the
duplicate original of the Certificate Authorizing Registration (CAR) relating to the
real property transactions, which contained, among other data, the number of the
issued ROR, its date, name of payor, and the amount the capital gains tax and
documentary stamp tax paid.
On 06 July 1995, an audit team composed of Revenue Officers Helen D. Rosario,
Maria Lourdes G.Morada, Marina B. Magluyan and Norma Duran, all from the
central office of the BIR, was tasked to audit the cash and non-cash accountabilities
of the appellant.

The Case
This appeal by petition for review on certiorari is taken from the judgment
promulgated on August 16, 2006,1whereby the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Among the documents reviewed by the audit team were the CARs furnished by the
Assessment Division ofthe BIR; triplicate copies of the RORs attached to the MRCs
submitted by appellant to COA; and appellant’s MRCs provided by the Finance
Division of the BIR. The audit team likewise requested and was given copies of the
96
RORs issued to the San Fernando, La Union branch of the Philippine National Bank
(PNB). A comparison of the entries in said documents revealed that the data
pertaining to 18 RORs with the same serial number, i.e., (a) 1513716, (b) 1513717,
(c) 1513718, (d) 1513719, (e) 1529758, (f) 2016733, (g) 2018017, (h) 2018310, (i)
2023438, (j) 2023837, (k) 2617653, (l) 2617821, (m) 2627973, (n) 3095194, (o)
3096955, (p) 3097386, (q) 3503336, (r) 4534412, vary with respect to the name of
the taxpayer, the kind of tax paid, the amount of tax and the date of payment. Of
particular concern to the audit team were the lesser amounts of taxes reported in
appellant’s MRCs and the attached RORs compared to the amount reflected in the
CARs and PNB’s RORs.
The CARs showed that documentary stamp tax and capital gains tax for ROR Nos.
1513716, 1513717, 1513718, 1513719, 2018017, and 2023438 totalled
Php114,887.78, while the MRCs and COA’s copies of the RORs submitted by
appellant, the sum of the taxes collected was only Php227.00, or a difference of
Php114,660.78. ROR Nos. 2018017 and 2023438, mentioned in CAR as duly issued
to taxpayers and for which taxes were paid, were reported in the MRC as cancelled
receipts.
Likewise, PNB’s RORs bearing Serial Nos. 1529758, 2016733, 2018310, 2023837,
2617653. 2617821, 2627973, 3095194, 3096955, 3097386, 3503336, and 4534412,
show that it paid the total sum of Php500,606.15, as documentary stamp tax. Yet,
appellant’s MRCs yielded only the total sum of Php1,115.00, for the same RORs, or a
difference of Php499,491.15.
The subject 18 RORs were the accountability of appellant as shown in his Monthly
Reports of Accountability (MRA) or BIR Form 16 (A). The MRA contains, among
others, the serial numbers of blank RORs received by the collection agent from the
BOR as well as those issued by him for a certain month.
In sum, although the RORs bear the same serial numbers, the total amount
reflected in the CARs and PNB’s 12 copies of RORs is Ph₱615,493.93, while only
Php1,342.00 was reported as tax collections in the RORs’ triplicate copies
submittedby appellant to COA and in his MRCs, or a discrepancy of Php614,151.93,
Thus, the audit team sent to appellant a demand letter requiring him to restitute
the total amount of Php614,151.93. Appellant ignored the letter, thus, prompting
the institution of the 18 cases for malversation of public funds through falsification
of public document against him."4
On his part, the petitioner tendered the following version, to wit:
Appellant denied that he committed the crimes charged. He averred that as
Revenue Collection Officer of San Fernando, La Union, he never accepted payments
from taxpayers nor issued the corresponding RORs. It was his subordinates, Andrew
Aberin and Rebecca Supsupin, who collected the taxes and issued the
corresponding RORs. To substantiate his claim, he presented Manuel Meris, who
testified that when he paid capital gains tax, at the district office of BIR in Sam
Fernando, La Union, it was a female BIR employee who received the payment and
issued Receipt No. 2023438. Likewise, Arturo Suyat, messenger of PNB from 1979 to
1994, testified that when he made the payments to the same BIR office, it was not
appellant who received the payments nor issued the corresponding receipts but
another unidentified BIR employee."5
Decision of the RTC
On February 17, 2004, the RTC rendered its consolidated decision convicting the
petitioner of 18 counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public
documents,6 decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused GUILTY of the crime with which he is
charged in:
1) Criminal Case No. 4634 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 14 years,
8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual
special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱19,775.00;
2) Criminal Case No. 4635 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccionalas minimum
up to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayoras maximum; to suffer perpetual
special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱4,869.00;
3) Criminal Case No. 4636 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 14 years,
8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual
special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱13,260.90;
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4) Criminal Case No. 4637 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 14 years,
8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual
special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱17,419.00;
5) Criminal Case No. 4638 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 10 years
and 1 day of prision mayoras maximum; to suffer perpetual special
disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱11,309.20;
6) Criminal Case No. 4639 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 10 years
and 1 day of prision mayoras maximum; to suffer perpetual special
disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱9,736.86;
7) Criminal Case No. 4640 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years,
4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual
special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱39,050.00;
8) Criminal Case No. 4641 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer
perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱38,878.55;
9) Criminal Case No. 4642and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum; to suffer
perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱20,286.88;
10) Criminal Case No. 4643 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer
perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱42,573.97;
11) Criminal Case No. 4644 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17
And to pay costs.
years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer
perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱40,598.40;
12) Criminal Case No. 4645 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer
perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱42,140.45;
13) Criminal Case No. 4646 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer
perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱47,902.60;
14) Criminal Case No. 4647 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 10 years and 1 one day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer
perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱52,740.66;
15) Criminal Case No. 4648 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer
perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine ₱75,489.76;
16) Criminal Case No. 4649 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer
perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱54,948.47;
17) Criminal Case No. 4650 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer
perpetual special disqualification; and to pay fine of ₱45,330.18; 18)
Criminal Case No. 4651and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer
perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱37,842.05;
98
SO ORDERED.
Judgment of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner asserted that the RTC had erred as follows:
I. x x x IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC
FUNDS THRU FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS BASED ON THE
PRESUMPTION THAT HE WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS
OFFICIAL DUTIES.
II. x x x IN TAKING IT AGAINST THE ACCUSED THE FAILURE TO FILE AND
PROSECUTE PERSONS WHO COULD HAVE POSSIBLY COMMITTED THE
CRIMES CHARGED.
III. x x x IN FINDING THAT ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED ARE PRESENTED IN THIS CASE.
IV. x x x WHEN IT DID NOT DECIDE TO ACQUIT THE ACCUSED BASED ON
REASONABLE DOUBT.7
On August 16, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed judgment affirming the
conviction of the petitioner and the penalties imposed by the RTC,8 observing that
he had committed falsification through his submission of copies of falsified MRCs
and had tampered revenue receipts to the BIR and COA;9 that he was presumed to
be the forger by virtue of his being in the possession of such public
documents;10 and that he had certified to the MRAs and had actually issued the
tampered receipts.11
Anent the malversation, the CA opined:
All the elements of malversation obtain in the present case. Appellant was the
Revenue Collection Agent of the BIR. As such, through designated collection clerks,
hecollected taxes and issued the corresponding receipts for tax payments made by
taxpayers. He was accountable for the proper and authorized use and application of
the blank RORs issued by the BIR District Office, not the least for the tax payments
received in the performance of his duties. The unexplained shortage in his
remittances of the taxes collected as reflected in the CARs and PNB’s receipts, even
in the absence of direct proof of misappropriation, made him liable for
malversation. The audit team’s demand letter to appellant, which he failed to rebut,
raised a prima facie presumption that he put to his personal use the missing funds.12
The CA explained that even if it were to subscribe to the petitioner’s insistence that
it had been his assistants, not him, who had collected the taxes and issued the
RORs, he was nonetheless liable,13 because his duty as an accountable officer had
been to strictly supervise his assistants;14 and that by failing to strictly supervise
them he was responsible for the shortage resulting from the non-remittance of the
actual amounts collected.15
After the CA denied his motion for reconsideration by its resolution16 promulgated
on January 11, 2007, the petitioner appeals via petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
The petitioner claims that the CA erred:
I. x x x IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NEGLIGENT YET HE WAS
CONVICTED OF THE CRIME OF MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS
THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC [DOCUMENTS].
II. x x x IN APPLYING THE RULE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN A
COMPLEX CRIME OF MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS THROUGH
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS.
III. x x x IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE.17
The petitioner contends that the RTC and the CA erroneously convicted him of
several counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public
documents on the basis of the finding that he had been negligent in the
performance of his duties as Revenue District Officer;18 that the acts imputed to him
did not constitute negligence; and that he could not be convicted of intentional
malversation and malversation through negligence at the same time. 19
Ruling
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We DENY the petition for review for its lack of merit.
The RTC stated in its decision convicting the petitioner, viz:
The particular pages of the Monthly Reports from which witness Magluyan based
her examination to determine the discrepancies in the Official Receipts listed by the
accused therein, bore only the typewritten name of the accused without any
signature. However, prosecution witness Rebecca Rillorta showed that those
individual pages were part of a number of pages of a report submitted for a
particular month, and she showed that the last pages of the related reports were
duly signed by the accused. Witness Rillorta brought to the Court the original pages
of the questioned monthly reports and demonstrated to the Court the sequence of
the pagination and the last pages ofthe monthly reports bearing the signature of
accused Zafra x x x. By these the prosecution demonstrated that the individual
pages of the Monthly Collection Report which listed receipts for lesser amounts
were part of official reports regularly submitted by the accused in his capacity as
Collection Agent of the BIR in San Fernando City, La Union. While counsel for
accused called attention to the absence of accused (sic) signatures on Exhibit "A",
accused did not deny the monthly report[s] and the exhibits as he chose to remain
silent.
In addition, Maria Domagas, State Auditor of the BIR showed Monthly Report of
Accountabilities (Exhibit "D") which the accused, as Collection Officer submits on the
first week of the following month for a particular month. The testimony of Maria
Domagas establishes that the questionable receipts were within the series of
receipts accountability of accused for a particular month. x x x. The testimony of
State Auditor Domagas established the link of accused accountable receipts, with
the receipts numbers reported in his Monthly Collection Report as well as to the
receipts issued to the taxpayers. Thereby prosecution showed that while the
receipts issued to the taxpayer were not signed by the accused, these receipts were
his accountable forms. Such that the use thereof is presumed to be sourced from
him. Even the defense witness admitted that the receipts emanated from the office
of the accused.
Notably, there is a big disparity between the amount covered by BIR Form No. 25.24
issued to the taxpayer, and the amount for the same receipt number appearing in
the Monthly Collection Reports indicating the falsification resorted to by the
accused in the official reports he filed, thereby remitting less than what was
collected from taxpayers concerned, resulting tothe loss of revenue for the
government as unearthed by the auditors."20 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The findings of fact of the RTC were affirmed by the CA. Hence, the petitioner was
correctly convicted of the crimes charged because such findings of fact by the trial
court, being affirmed by the CA as the intermediate reviewing tribunal, are now
binding and conclusive on the Court. Accordingly, we conclude that the Prosecution
sufficiently established that the petitioner had beenthe forger of the falsified and
tampered public documents, and that the falsifications of the public documents had
been necessary to committhe malversations of the collected taxes.
Anent the petitioner’s defense that it was his subordinates who had dealt with the
taxpayers and who had issued the falsified and tampered receipts, the RTC fittingly
ruminated:
x x x If this Court were to believethat the criminal act imputed to the accused were
done by the employees blamed by the accused, the presumption of negligence by
the accused with respect to his duties as such would attach; and under this
presumption, accused would still not avoid liability for the government loss.21 (Italics
supplied)
The petitioner relies on this passage of the RTC’s ruling to buttress his contention
that he should be found guilty of malversation through negligence. His reliance is
grossly misplaced, however, because the RTC did not thereby pronounce that he
had beenmerely negligent. The passage was nothing but a brief forensic discourse
on the legal consequence if his defense were favorably considered, and was notthe
basis for finding him guilty. To attach any undue significance to such discourse is to
divert attention away from the firmness of the finding of guilt. It cannot be denied,
indeed, that the RTC did not give any weight to his position.
Initially, the CA’s disquisition regarding malversation through negligence had the
same tenor as that of the RTC’s,22and later on even went to the extent of opining
that the petitioner ought to be held guilty of malversation through negligence.23 But
such opinion on the part of the CA would not overturn his several convictions for
the intentional felonies of malversation of public funds through falsification of
public documents. As can be seen, both lower courts unanimously concluded that
the State’s evidence established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for malversation
of public funds through falsification of public documents. Their unanimity rested on
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findings of fact that are nowbinding on the Court after he did not bring to our
attention any fact or circumstance that either lower court had not properly
appreciated and considered and which, if so considered, could alter the outcome in
his favor. At any rate, even if it were assumed that the findings by the CA warranted
his being guilty only of malversation through negligence, the Court would not be
barred from holding him liable for the intentional crime of malversation of public
funds through falsification of public documents because his appealing the
convictions kept the door ajar for an increase in his liability. It is axiomatic that by
appealing he waived the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, leaving
him open to being convicted of whatever crimes the Court would ultimately
conclude from the records to have been actually committed by him within the
terms of the allegations in the informations under which he had been arraigned.
Yet, we see an obvious need to correct the penalties imposed on the petitioner. He
was duly convicted of 18 counts of malversation of public funds through falsification
of public documents, all complex crimes. Pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code,24 the penalty for each count is that prescribed on the more serious offense, to
be imposed in its maximum period. Falsification of a public document by a public
officer is penalized with prision mayor and a fine not to exceed ₱5,000.00. 25 Prision
mayor has a duration of six years and one day to 12 years of imprisonment.26 In
contrast, the penalty for malversation ranges from prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods to reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua depending on the amount misappropriated, and a fine equal to
the amount of the funds malversed or to the total value of the property embezzled,
to wit:
Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation.
— Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for
public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate
or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person
to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be
guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall
suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods,
if the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not
exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayorin its minimum and medium periods, if the
amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six
thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayorin its maximum period to reclusion
temporalin its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six
thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos. 4. The penalty of
reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved is morethan twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two
thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be
reclusion temporalin its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or
equal tothe total value of the property embezzled. x x x x
To determine the maximum periods of the penalties tobe imposed on the
petitioner, therefore, we must be guided by the following rules, namely: (1) the
penalties provided under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code constitute degrees;
and (2) considering that the penalties provided under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Codeare not composed of three periods, the time included in the penalty
prescribed should be divided into three equal portions, which each portion forming
one period, pursuant to Article 65 of the Revised Penal Code.27
Accordingly, the penalties prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
should be divided into three periods, with the maximum period being the penalty
properly imposable on each count, except in any instance where the penalty for
falsification would be greater than such penalties for malversation. The tabulation
of the periods of the penalties prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code follows, to wit:
TABLE 1
Amount Penalty Duration Minimum Periods Maximum
Misappropriated prescribed Medium
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Not exceeding Prision 2 years, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years, More than Reclusion 17 years, 17 years, 18 years, Reclusion
₱200.00 correccional 4 months 4 months 6 months 9 months ₱22,000.00 temporal in 4 months 4 months 8 months perpetua
in its and 1 day and 1 day and and 11 its and 1 day and 1 day and 1 day
medium to 6 years to 3 years, 21 days to days maximum to to 18 to 20
and 6 months 4 years, to 6 years. period to reclusion years years
maximum and 20 9 months reclusion perpetua and
periods days and 10 perpetua 8 months
days

More than ₱200 Prision 6 years 6 years 7 years, 8 years, Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence is
pesos but not mayorin its and and 4 months 8 months imposed on the offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum term.28 The
exceeding minimum 1 day to 1 day to and 1 day and 1 day maximum term is the penalty under the Revised Penal Code properly imposed after
₱6,000.00 and 10 7 years to 8 years to 10 considering any attending circumstance; while the minimum term is within the
medium years and and 8 years range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Codefor
periods 4 months Months the offense committed.

More than Prision 10 years 10 years 11 years, 13 years, The Indeterminate Sentence Lawwas applicable here, save for the counts for which
₱6,000.00 but mayor in its and 1 day and 1 day 6 months 1 month the imposable penalty was reclusion perpetua. Considering that each count was a
less than maximum to 14 to 11 and 21 and 11 complex crime without any modifying circumstances, the maximum term of the
₱12,000.00 period to years years, days to days penalty for each count is the maximum period as shown in Table 1, supra, except for
reclusion and 6 months 13 years, to 14 the count dealt with in Criminal Case No. 4635 involving the misappropriated
temporal in 8 months and 20 1 month years amount of ₱4,869.00, for which the corresponding penalty for malversation as
its days and and stated in Table 1 was prision mayorin its minimum and medium periods. However,
minimum 10 days 8 months because such penalty for malversation was lower than the penalty of prision mayor
period imposable on falsification of a public document under Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code, it is the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period that was
More than Reclusion 14 years, 14 years, 16 years,
applicable.
₱12,000.00 temporal in 8 months 8 months 5 months
but less than its medium and 1 day and 1 day and 11
and to 20 to 16 days to On other hand, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence for each count should
maximum years years, 18 years, come from the penalty next lower than that prescribed under Article 217 of the
periods. 5 months 2 months Revised Penal Code, except in Criminal Case No. 4635 where the penalty next lower
and 10 and is prision correccional in its full range, to wit:
days 20 days
TABLE 2
18 years,
2 months<
and 21 days Penalty prescribed Penalty next Range of minimum term
to 20 years/td> under Art. 217 lower in degree

102
sion Arresto mayor in 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and To illustrate, the count involving the largest amount misappropriated by the
reccionalin its maximum 4 months accused totaling ₱75,489.76 merited the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium and period to prision maximum period to reclusion perpetua, and a fine of ₱75,489.76. Obviously, the
ximum periods correccional in penalty is that prescribed for malversation of public funds, the more serious
its minimum offense.
period
In its consolidated decision of February 17, 2004, the RTC erred in pegging the
sion mayor in its Prision 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years maximum terms within the minimum periods of the penalties prescribed under
nimum and correccional in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
dium its medium and
iod maximum It committed another error by fixing indeterminate sentences on some counts
periods despite the maximum of the imposable penalties being reclusion perpetua. There is
even one completely incorrect indeterminate sentence. And, as earlier noted, the
sion mayor in its Prision mayor in 6 years and 1 day to 10 years
penalty for falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code was applicable
ximum period its minimum and
in Criminal Case No. 4635 involving ₱4,869.00 due to its being the higher penalty.
medium periods
lusion
mporal in The Court now tabulates the corrected indeterminate sentences, to wit:
minimum
iod TABLE 3

lusion Prision mayor in 10 years and 1 day to 14 years and

Amount Indeterminate sentence
mporal in its maximum 8 months
misappropriated
medium and period to Minimum term Maximum term
ximum periods. reclusion
temporal in its ₱19,775.00 10 years and 1 day of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days
minimum period prision mayor of reclusion temporal

lusion Not applicable in the present case since the proper imposable penalty to be imposed₱4,869.00 2 years of prision 10 years and 1 day to 12 years of
mporal in upon the accused in already reclusion correccional prision mayor29
maximum perpetua
iod to ₱13,260.90 10 years and 1 day prision 18 years, 2 months and 21 days
lusion perpetua mayor of reclusion temporal

nalty prescribed Penalty next Range of minimum term ₱17,419.00 10 years and 1 day prision 18 years, 2 months and 21 days
der Art. 171 lower in degree mayor of reclusion temporal

sion mayor Prision 6 months and 1 day to 6 years ₱11,390.00 6 years and 1 day of prision 13 years, 1 month and 11 days of
correccional mayor prision mayor

103
 ₱9,736.86 6 years and 1 day of prision 13 years, 1 month and 11 days of It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express
mayor prision mayor mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Courtto have the judgment, if it
was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the
₱39,050.00 - Reclusion perpetua acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances
which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense,
₱38,878.55 - Reclusion perpetua whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty
imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his
₱20,286.88 10 years and 1 day prision 18 years, 2 months and 21 days
wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if
mayor of reclusion temporal
there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has
₱42,573.97 - Reclusion perpetua been reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to actas we now do lest the
Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas
₱40,598.40 - Reclusion perpetua did not themselves seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance
to this action because the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the
₱42,140.45 - Reclusion perpetua authority but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice.
₱47,902.60 - Reclusion perpetua
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that
₱52,740.66 - Reclusion perpetua the parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts.
Their judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine
₱75,489.76 - Reclusion perpetua the rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full
determination of such rights and obligations would they betrue to the judicial office
₱54,984.47 - Reclusion perpetua of administering justice and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious
₱45,330.18 - Reclusion perpetua in their rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe
the legal penalties, which is what the Constitution and the law require and expect
₱37,842.05 - Reclusion perpetua them to do. Their prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual
for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil
One more omission by the CA and the RTC concerned a matter of law. This refers to liability ex delictoof the accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims
their failure to decree in favor of the Government the return of the amounts who are always entitled to them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless
criminally misappropriated by the accused. That he was already sentenced to pay the enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions has been reserved or
the fine in each count was an element of the penalties imposed under the Revised waived.31
Penal Code, and was not the same thing as finding him civilly liable for restitution,
which the RTC and the CA should have included in the judgment. Indeed, as the
In addition, the amounts to be returned to the Government as civil liability of the
Court emphasized in Bacolod v. People,30 it was "imperative that the courts
accused in each count shall earn interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the
prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused, and determine the civil
finality of this decision until full payment by the accused.1âwphi1
liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation of the
action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery," explaining the reason for
doing so in the following manner: WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 16, 2006 by
the Court of Appeals subject to the modification of the penalties imposed as stated
in this decision.

104
ACCORDINGLY, the dispositive portion of the consolidated decision rendered on
February 17, 2004 by the Regional Trial Court is hereby AMENDED to read as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused GUILTY of the crime with which he is
charged in:
1) Criminal Case No. 4634 and sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty from 10 years and one day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 18 years, two months and 21 days of
reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱19,775.00;
2) Criminal Case No. 4635 and sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty from two years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum;
and to pay a fine of ₱5,000.00;
3) Criminal Case No. 4636 and sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty from 10 years and one day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 18 years, two months and 21 days of
reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱13,260.90;
4) Criminal Case No. 4637 and sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty from 10 years and one day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 18 years, two months and 21 days of
reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱17,419.00;
5) Criminal Case No. 4638and sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penaltyfrom 10 years and one day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 13 years, one month and 11 days of
reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱11,309.20;
6) Criminal Case No. 4639 and sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty from 10 years and one day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 13 years, one month and 11 days of
reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱9,736.86;
7) Criminal Case No. 4640 and sentences him to suffer reclusion
perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱39,050.00;
8) Criminal Case No. 4641 and sentences him to suffer reclusion
perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱38,878.55;
9) Criminal Case No. 4642 and sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty from 10 years and one day of prision
mayor, as m inimum, to 18 years, two months and 21 days of
reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱20,286.88;
10) Criminal Case No. 4643 and sentences him to suffer reclusion
perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱42,573.97;
11) Criminal Case No. 4644 and sentences him to suffer reclusion
perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱40,598.40;
12) Criminal Case No. 4645 and sentences him to suffer reclusion
perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱42,140.45;
13) Criminal Case No. 4646 and sentences him to suffer reclusion
perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱47 ,902.60;
14) Criminal Case No. 4647 and sentences him to suffer reclusion
perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱52, 7 40.66;
15) Criminal Case No. 4648 and sentences him to suffer reclusion
perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱75,489. 76;
16) Criminal Case No. 4649 and sentences him to suffer reclusion
perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱54,948.47;
17) Criminal Case No. 4650 and sentences him to suffer reclusion
perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱45,330.18;
18) Criminal Case No. 4651 and sentences him to suffer reclusion
perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱37,842.05;
105
In addition, the accused shall pay to the Government the total amount of
₱614,268.73, plus interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this
decision until full payment, by way of his civil liability.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
OCA vs Hernandez
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. P-13-3130 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3668-P], September 22, 2014
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner, v. MAY F. HERNANDEZ, CLERK III,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 199, LAS PIÑAS CITY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERALTA, J.:
For Resolution is the administrative complaint against respondent May F. Hernandez,
Clerk III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 199, Las Piñas City, charging her with dishonesty.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an anonymous letter reporting
the conduct of respondent May F. Hernandez, Clerk III, Branch 199, Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. The letter sender alleged that respondent would arrive
late for work, but to make it appear that she arrived on time, she would insert her
name right above or almost on the same line as the series of “X” marks in the court's
attendance logbook, which is the dividing line between the list of names of people
who arrived on time and those who were already tardy. Respondent had allegedly
been doing this for more than a year and her actuations had started to affect the
morale of other employees.1cralawlawlibrary
The OCA then referred the matter to Executive Judge Elizabeth Yu-Guray of the RTC
of Las Piñas City for discreet investigation and report. In a Report dated January 24,
2011, Executive Judge Guray stated that she issued a Resolution reprimanding
respondent.2 The OCA, finding the Executive Judge's action to be insufficient, directed
Executive Judge Guray to conduct a more thorough investigation.
Thus, in a Report dated March 22, 2011, Executive Judge Guray held that evidence on
record shows that respondent Hernandez may be held liable for dishonesty. Executive
Judge Guray recounted that in the past, her office had also received an anonymous
letter about respondent's conduct and referred the matter to Presiding Judge Joselito
DJ Vibandor of Branch 199, RTC of Las Piñas City, the branch where respondent
rendered service. Respondent then submitted a letter-explanation dated November
17, 2010 to Judge Vibandor, wherein she begged for the indulgence of the court,
explaining that she was then heavily stressed due to her marriage annulment and
burdened with serious health issues at that time. 3cralawlawlibrary
The OCA then sent a 1st Indorsement dated July 7, 2011, directing respondent to
comment on the Report of Executive Judge Guray finding her liable for
dishonesty.4cralawlawlibrary
Respondent submitted her Comment dated July 25, 2011 and therein, she readily
admitted her wrongdoing, stating that she had actually been tardy for the months of
September and October 2010.5She also attached the previously mentioned letter
dated November 17, 2010 to the Presiding Judge.
Thereafter, the OCA proceeded to determine whether respondent was liable for the
charge of dishonesty, and issued the present Administrative Matter for Agenda. An
examination of the records and applicable rules would reveal that the OCA correctly
observed, thus:
No less than respondent Hernandez herself admitted tampering with her entries in
the court's attendance logbook by inserting her name barely above or almost inside
the “X” bar that separates those who arrived on time from those who arrived late.
The falsified entries were carried over to respondent Hernandez's Daily Time Record
(DTR), thus making said DTRs a product of forgery as well.
The actuations of respondent Hernandez amount to a violation of OCA Circular No.
2-2003 (dated 9 January 2003) which in part reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the submission of Certificates of Service and Daily Time Records (DTRs)/Bundy
Cards by Judges and court personnel, the following guidelines shall be
observed:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. After the end of each month, every official and employee of each court shall
accomplish the Daily Time Record (Civil Service Form No. 48)/Bundy Card, indicating
therein truth fully and accurately the time of arrival in and departure from the office x
106
x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxxx
Under Section 46, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, promulgated on 19 November 2011, falsification of official document such
as an employee's DTR is classified as a grave offense that is punishable by dismissal
from the service. As such, it carries the penalty of dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in government service. 6chanrobleslaw
Based on the foregoing, the OCA recommended that respondent be found guilty of
dishonesty and meted the penalty of suspension for a period of six months without
pay, effective immediately, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely by the Court. 7cralawlawlibrary
The Court agrees with the evaluation of the OCA that respondent is guilty of
dishonesty. Respondent readily admitted that she tampered with the court's
attendance logbook by inserting her name above the series of “X” marks to make it
appear that she was not tardy. In Rufon v. Genita,8 the Court categorically
pronounced that
Falsification of time records constitutes dishonesty. Dishonesty has been defined as
“the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity;
lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.”9chanrobleslaw
Such conduct of making it appear that she always reported for work on time
although, in fact, she was often tardy, is deplorable and falls way below the
standard set for employees of the Judiciary.
Section 46, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
promulgated on November 18, 2011, states that falsification of official document,
such as an employee's Daily Time Record (DTR), is a grave offense that is punishable
by dismissal from the service. Under the circumstances, however, the Court does
not believe that such extreme penalty should be imposed on respondent. Section
48, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides
that the disciplining authority may consider mitigating circumstances in imposing
the proper penalty.
In previous cases, the Court accorded some measure of compassion to erring
employees. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Magbanua,10 the Court found
Process Server Magbanua guilty of dishonesty for making false and inaccurate
entries in his DTR and yet only imposed a fine equivalent to one month salary. The
Court ratiocinated that the law is concerned for the working man, and respondent's
unemployment would bring untold hardships and sorrows on his dependents. In
addition, the Court regarded as mitigating circumstance, the fact that Magbanua
had been an employee of the court since 1985. Also, in Leave Division, Office of
Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator v. Gutierrez III,11 the Court
only imposed the penalty of a P5,000.00 fine for therein respondent's falsification of
his DTR, since he readily admitted his wrongdoing and it was the very first time that
an administrative case was filed against him in the five years that he had been in
government service.
There are also reasons to exercise leniency in this case. Respondent readily
admitted her offense, explaining that she had been going through some very
difficult marital problems at the time, and even became ill with bronchopneumonia,
for which she was taking medication that caused lethargy.12Respondent likewise
showed remorse for her wrongdoing, assuring the Court that she would work with
“utmost commitment to punctuality.”13 Such circumstances are sufficient for the
Court to impose a lower penalty on respondent. However, the penalty to be
imposed on her should be heavier than those meted on respondents in the above-
mentioned cases since, by her own admission, she falsified her DTR for the entire
two months of September and October 2010.
WHEREFORE, May F. Hernandez, Clerk III, Branch 199, Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas
City, is found GUILTY of DISHONESTY, and is meted the penalty of SUSPENSION for
six (6) months without pay, effective immediately, with a STERN WARNING that the
commission of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
107
Pagaduan vs CSC
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 206379 November 19, 2014
CECILIA PAGADUAN, Petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION* and REMA MARTIN SALVADOR, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Subject of this disposition is the petition for revievv' on certiorori filed under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court which seeks to review, reverse and set aside the August 31, 2012
Amended Decision1 and the February 20, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 120208, involving a complaint for falsification and
misrepresentation.
Initially, the Court denied the petition in its July 10, 2013 Resolution3 for failure of the
petitioner to show any reversible error in the challenged amended decision as to
warrant the exercise of the Court's discretionary appellate jurisdiction. (Rollo, p. 101.)
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, and on October 23, 2013, the Court
granted the said motion and set aside the July 10, 2013 Resolution. In the same
October 23, 2013 resolution, the Court reinstated the petitionand required the
respondents to file their comments thereon. On January 23, 2014, the private
respondentfiled her Comment. On February 7, 2014, the petitioner filed her Reply to
Comment. (Rollo, p. 110)
The Facts:
On May 14, 1992, petitioner Cecilia Pagaduan (Pagaduan) filed a notarized complaint
with the Civil Service Commission-Regional Office No. 2 (CSC-RO II)in Tuguegarao City,
Cagayan, against respondent Rema Martin Salvador (Salvador), newly appointed
Municipal Budget Officer at that time, charging her with the administrative offenses
of falsification and misrepresentation. Pagaduan alleged that Salvador did not actually
possess the necessary budgeting experience required by her position; and that
although she indicated in her Personal Data Sheet (PDS)that she performed book
keeping and accounting functions for Veteran's Woodworks, Inc. (VWI) from August
1, 1990 to February 15, 1992,she was never in fact employed by the said
entity.4 Salvador on the other hand, claimed that she had been employed by Alfonso
Tuzon (Tuzon), whom the Board of Directors of VWI had granted full management,
direct supervision and control of VWI's logging operations. She explained that her
namedid not appear in the employees' payroll because Tuzon's office was
independent from VWI's original staff.5
Subsequently, on October 19, 1994, Pagaduan filed with the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 4, Tuguegarao City(MTCC), a criminal charge against Salvador for
falsification of public documents under Article 172 in relation to Article 171(4) of the
Revised Penal Code in making false statements in her PDS, which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 15482.
On May 22, 2000, a decision6 on the administrative complaint was rendered by the
CSC-RO II, holding Salvador liable only for Simple Misconduct and imposing the
penalty ofone (1) month suspension, after ruling that her act was a mere error of
judgment.
Unsatisfied, Pagaduan filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however,
denied. She then appealedto the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which found the
appeal to be without merit, ruling that she had no standing to file the appeal as she
was not the party aggrieved by the CSC-RO II decision. The CSC also approved
Salvador's qualification as Municipal Budget Officer because her experience in VWI
was a "related field."7
Pagaduan ceased her pursuit and did not move for a reconsideration or appeal. Thus,
on January 21, 2002, the CSC-RO II issued the order, stating that its May 22, 2000
decision had attained finality. Salvador then served the penalty of one (1) month
suspension.8
Later, on October 22, 2008, the MTCC rendered a decision9 in Criminal Case No.
15842, finding Salvador guilty of falsification of public documents. Salvador did not
appeal and then applied for probation. Her application was granted and she was
placed under probation for a period of one (1) year.
Thereafter, Pagaduan filed a second administrative complaint against Salvador, this
time for the offense of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Salvador
submitted the required counter affidavit, raising the defenses of res judicata, forum
shopping, and double jeopardy on account of the finality of the decision in the first
administrative complaint for falsification. After finding a prima faciecase in the second
administrative complaint, Salvador was formally charged. To answer the charges
against her, she adopted her defenses inher counter-affidavit and submitted
documents to support her cause.
108
On January 12, 2010, the CSC-RO II rendered a decision,10 finding Salvador guilty of
the administrative offense of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude because
of her conviction for falsification before the MTCC, and imposing the penalty of
dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, REMA MARTIN SALVADOR is hereby declared
guilty of CONVICTION OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE and is meted the
penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE WITH ALL ITS ACCESSORY PENALTIES.11
Aggrieved, Salvador moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. Salvador
appealed to the CSC, which rendered a decision12 on March 1, 2011 reversing and
setting asidethe decision of the CSC-RO II and exonerating her of the charge. She was
sternly warned to be more cautious and prudent in accomplishing public documents.
The CSC ruled that the criminal offense of falsification of public document did not per
se involve moral turpitude, following the Court's pronouncement in Dela Torre vs.
COMELEC,13 citing Zari vs. Flores.14 The CSC stated that since the liability of Salvador
in the first administrative complaint was lowered to Simple Misconduct, the crime
ascribed to her could not be said to have been attended with inherent baseness or
vileness or depravity.15 The dispositive portion of the March 1, 2011 CSC Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review (appeal) filed by Rema Martin Salvador is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated January 12, 2010 issued by Civil Service
Commission Regional Office (CSCRO) No. II finding her guilty of Conviction of a Crime
Involving Moral Turpitude and meting upon her the penalty of dismissal from the
government service with all its accessory penalties is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Thus, appellant Rema Martin Salvador is EXONERATED of the charge of
Conviction of Crime Involving Moral Turpitude levelled against her. She is STERNLY
WARNED to be more cautious and prudent in accomplishing public documents.16
Pagaduan moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied on June 1, 2011.
Hence, an appeal was made to the CA which ruled that following precedents, a
conviction for falsification of public document constituted the offense of conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude.17 The gravity of Salvador's falsification was
highlighted by her commission of the same in her PDS, which was no ordinary
contract.18 Thus, on February 28, 2012 the CA disposed in this wise: WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Decision of the Commission dated 1 March 2011 and its
Resolution promulgated 3 June 2011 affirming the same are hereby REVERSEDand
SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Decision ofthe Civil Service Commission Regional Office
No. 2 of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, dated 12 January 2010, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.19
Salvador then filed a motion for reconsideration of the February 28, 2012 CA
Decision.20 On August 31, 2012, in a turn-around, the CA granted her motion and
issued the assailed Amended Decision,21 reversingand setting asideits previous
decision and reinstated the March 1, 2011 CSC decision. It agreed with the findings
ofthe CSC that the act of falsification committed by Salvador did not involve moral
turpitude as it was a mere error of judgment on her part. The dispositive portion of
the Amended Decision reads:
WHEREFORE,premises considered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is
GRANTED, such that Our Decision dated 28 February 2012 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDEand in view thereof, the Decision and Resolution of public respondent Civil
Service Commission dated 01 March 2011 and 01 June 2011 respectively, are
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.22
Hence, this petition.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN
IT FINALLY EXONERATED RESPONDENT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGE OF
CONVICTION OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE BY FINDING THE
FALSIFICATION COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN HER PERSONAL DATA SHEET AS
ONLY A SIMPLE MISCONDUCT WHICH DOES NOT AMOUNT TO MORAL TURPITUDE.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND AUTHORITY AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
IN NOT APPLYING IN THE INSTANT CASE THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN THE CASE OF
TEVES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN WHICH SPECIFICALLY CATEGORIZED THE CRIME OF
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT FOR WHICH RESPONDENT WAS CONVICTED
AS A CRIME WHICH INVOLVES MORAL TURPITUDE.
III. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE
OF ITS AUTHORITY AND DISCRETION IN NOT AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE CSC-
ROII WHICH DISMISSED FROM THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE PRIVATE RESPONDENT OF
THE OFFENSE OF CONVICTION OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.23
In this case, the substantive issue for resolution is whether or not Salvador was
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. On the other hand, the procedural
issues of res judicataand forum shopping were raised by the respondent.
The Ruling of the Court
109
As previously recited, this petition arose from the second administrative complaint
filed by Pagaduan against Salvador. The first administrative complaint was for the
offenses of falsification and misrepresentation, where the CSC-RO II found her to be
liable for simple misconduct only. The CSC decision affirming the said CSC-RO II
decision became final and executory, and Salvador served the penalty of one (1)
month suspension.
Meanwhile, the October 22, 2008, MTCC decision24 in the criminal case filed by
Pagaduan against Salvador, finding the latter guilty of the crime of falsification of
public document, attained finality as Salvador did not appeal. By reason of the said
conviction, Pagaduan filed the second administrative complaint for the offense of
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Before discussing the substantial aspect of the case, the issues on the procedural
aspect shall first be addressed.
In her Comment,25 Salvador invoked res judicataand forum shopping in arguing that
the second administrative case was already barred by the prior administrative case
against her. It was her contention that both cases involved the same parties, the same
facts and issues, although with different causes of action.26
The principle of res judicatais applicable either by way of "bar by prior judgment" or
by "conclusiveness of judgment." Here, Salvador's defense was res judicataby
conclusiveness of judgment. In Borra v. Court of Appeals,27the Court stated that:
Stated differently, conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or
question has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a
former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction.The fact or question settled by final
judgment or order binds the parties to that action (and persons in privity with them
or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind them while the judgment or
order remains standing and unreversed by proper authority on a timely motion or
petition; the conclusively-settled fact or question cannot again be litigated in any
future or other action between the same parties or their privies and successors-in-
interest, in the same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the
same or for a different cause of action. Thus, only the identities of parties and issues
are required for the operation of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.
[Emphasis supplied]
Contrary to Salvador's contention,however, there appears to be no identity of issues
and facts in the two administrative cases.1âwphi1 The first case involved facts
necessary to resolve the issue of whether or not Salvador falsified her PDS. The
second one involved facts necessary to resolve the issue of whether or not Salvador
was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Falsification was the main issue
in the first case, while it was no longer an issue in the second case. The only fact to
consider in the second administrative complaint is the fact ofconviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. It must be borne in mind that both administrative
complaints were based on different grounds. The grounds were separate and distinct
from each other and entailed different sets of facts.
Corollarily, Pagaduan cannot be liable for forum shopping. The established rule is that
for forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transactions, same
essential facts and circumstances, and must raise identical causes of actions, subject
matter, and issues.28 It exists where the elements of litis pendentiaare present,
namely: (a) there is identity of parties, or at least such parties representing the same
interests in both actions; (b) there is identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same set of facts; and (c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicatain the
other.29 Since no res judicata exists, no forum shopping either exists in this case.
Now on the substantial issue, Pagaduan avers that Salvador was convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude - a sufficient ground for dismissal from government service.
On the other hand, Salvador argues that the falsification she committed did not
involve moral turpitude. In resolving the issue of whether Salvador was convicted of
a crime involving moral turpitude, the existence of only two elements is necessary:
(1) the conviction of a crime, which conviction has attained finality; and (2) the crime
for which the accused was convicted involves moral turpitude. There is no dispute as
to the first element, leaving Us to determine the presence of the other.
Moral turpitude has been defined aseverything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals; anact of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,30 contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.31 Not every criminal
act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that the Court has to
determine as to what crime involves moral turpitude.32 Salvador was convicted of
falsification of public document. The MTCC found that she made an untruthful
statement in a narration of facts and perverted the truth with a wrongful
intent.33 While Salvador invoked good faith as a defense, the MTCC was not
convinced, stating that good faith could not be made to depend solely on the self-
serving statement of the accused. It must be supportedby other independent
110
evidence.34 To the MTCC, Salvador miserably failed to clearly show the presence of
good faith. More specifically, the trial court stated:
She alleged that she honestlybelieved she was employed with VWI because Alfonso
Tuzon is the operations manager of VWI. Second, she was responsible in the
preparation of the payroll sheets of VWI.
However, the following circumstances negate the existence of good faith:
1. Accused was not included in the list of employees of VWI as shown in Exhibits "G",
"G-1", "G-2", "G-3", and "G-4," "J" and its sub-markings and "K" and its sub-markings;
2. Accused was not in the payroll of VWI as shown in Exhibit "L";
3. Accused received her salary from Rodolfo Quiambao and not from VWI;
4. Rodolfo Quiambao, who is not a VWI employee, issued directives to the accused;
5. Accused never went to the VWI office at Magapit, Lallo, Cagayan;
6. Accused never had any VWI identification card;
7. Accused had no contract of employment with VWI; and finally,
8. Rodolfo Quiambao worked personally with Alfonso Tuzon and not with VWI.
These circumstances were known to the accused. Despite knowledge of these facts,
accused stated in her PDS that she was employed with VWI, thus, she perverted the
truth. Said act constitutes malice on her part negating her claim of good
faith.35 [Emphasis supplied] Granting arguendothat Salvador had no criminal intent to
injure a third person, the same is immaterial as such intent is not an essential element
of the crime of falsification of public document. It is jurisprudentially settled that in
the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officers or private
persons, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to
injure a third person for the reason that, in contradistinction to private
documents,the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faithand the
destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. In falsification of public
documents, therefore, the controlling consideration is the public character of a
document; and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the
intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial.36
Salvador did not appeal from the said judgment and, instead, filed an application for
probation which was granted.1âwphi1 It has been held that an application for
probation is an admission of guilt.37 Logically then, when Salvador applied for
probation, she admitted the making of an untruthful statement in her PDS. In
Lumancas v. Intas,38 the Court held that "the accomplishment of the Personal Data
Sheet being a requirement under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations in
connection with employment in the government, the making of an untruthful
statement therein was, therefore, intimately connected with such
employment."39 The filing of a PDS is required in connection with the promotion to a
higher position and contenders for promotion have the legal obligation to disclose
the truth. Otherwise, enhancing their qualifications by means of false statements will
prejudice other qualified aspirants to the same position.40
As early as 1961, in the case of De Jesus-Paras vs. Vailoces,41 the Court disbarred a
lawyer on the ground of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, after having
found that the said lawyer was convicted of the crime of falsification of public
documents. Similarly, in In Re - Attorney Jose Avanceña,42 the said lawyer was
disbarred from the practice of law due to a conviction by final judgment of a crime
involving moral turpitude after being convicted of the crime of falsification of public
documents. Lastly, in RE: SC Decision dated May 20, 2008 in G.R. No. 161455 under
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court v. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin,43 the Court reiterated
that the crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty and
good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude.44
Following the Court's disposition in the aforecited cases, the CSC and the CA therefore
erred in reaching a conclusion to the contrary, especially that Salvador's conviction
for such crime already attained finality. Both tribunals were of the view that Salvador
merely committed a mere error of judgment and, thus, no moral turpitude was
involved. Their position was based on the finding previously made by the CSC-RO II in
the first administrative complaint. That could not a valid basis because, as earlier
pointed out, the second case was separate and distinct from the first one.
Although the CSC itself recognized that it was for the Court to determine what crime
involved moral turpitude, it ruled that Salvador's commission of the crime of
falsification of public document did not involve moral turpitude. Both the CSC and the
CA strayed away from the settled jurisprudence on the matter. It will beabsurd to
insist that Salvador committed a mere error of judgment when the very basis of the
second administrative charge against her was a final judgment of conviction where
the trial court found otherwise.
Considering that the principal act punished in the crime of falsification of public
document is the violation of the public faithand the destruction of truth as therein
solemnly proclaimed, the elements of the administrative offense of conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude clearly exist in this case. The Court does not have to
look beyond what is simply apparent from the surrounding circumstances.
Finally, Salvador argues that her conviction and eventual discharge from probation
presents another administrative case to be filed against her because to do so would
111
defeat the purpose of the Probation Law45 which was to erase the effect of conviction In Re: Decision (05/20/2008) in GR 161455 vs Atty. Pactolin
and to restore civil rights that were lost or suspended. Suffice it to state that
probation does not erase the effects and fact of conviction, but merely suspends the EN BANC
penalty imposed. While indeed the purpose of the Probation Law is to save valuable
human material, it must not be forgotten that unlike pardon, probation does not
obliterate the crime for which the person under probation has been convicted. The RE: SC DECISION DATED A.C. No. 7940
reform and rehabilitation of the probationer cannotjustify his retention in the MAY 20, 2008 IN G.R. NO. 161455
government service.46 Furthermore, probation only affects the criminal liability of the UNDER RULE 139-B OF THE
accused, and not his administrative liabilities, if any. The Court once ruled in the case RULES OF COURT
of Samalio vs. Court of Appeals47 that: vs.
Finally, even if dismissal had been one of the accessory penalties of the principal ATTY. RODOLFO D. PACTOLIN,
penalty imposed upon petitioner in the criminal case, and even if the administrative Respondent. Promulgated:
case had been decided earlier than the criminal case, still the imposition of the
penalty of dismissal could not have been suspended by the grant of probation.As April 24, 2012
petitioner himself contends, the criminal action is separate and distinct from the x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
administrative case. And, if only for that reason, so is administrative liability separate
and distinct from penal liability. Hence, probation affects only the criminal aspect of DECISION
the case, not its administrative dimension.48 [Emphases supplied]
All told, if there is no compelling reason to deviate from what has already been PER CURIAM:
established, settled principles and jurisprudence should be respected. To do
otherwise would only create confusion and instability in our jurisprudence.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that a PDS is a public Document 49 required This case resolves the question of whether or not the conviction of a lawyer for a
of a government employee and official by the CSC. It is the repository of all crime involving moral turpitude constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment from
information about any government employee or official regarding his personal the practice of law under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
background, qualification, and eligibility. Government employees are tasked under
the Civil Service rules to properly and completely accomplish their PDS, 50 in The Facts and the Case
accordance with the constitutional principle that public office is a public trust, thereby
enjoining all public officers and employees to serve with the highest degree or In May 1996, Elmer Abastillas, the playing coach of the Ozamis City volleyball team,
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.51 Only those who can live up to such wrote Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes of OzamisCity, requesting financial assistance for
exacting standard deserve the honor of continuing in public service. 52 WHEREFORE, his team. Mayor Fuentes approved the request and sent Abastillas letter to the City
the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the August 31, 2012 Amended Decision 53 and Treasurer for processing. Mayor Fuentes also designated Mario R. Ferraren, a city
the February 20, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 120208 council member, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the city while Mayor Fuentes was
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The February 28, 2012 Decision of the Court of away. Abastillas eventually got the P10,000.00 assistance for his volleyball team.
Appeals is UPHELD and REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED. Meanwhile, respondent lawyer, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, then
a Sangguniang Panlalawigan member of Misamis Occidental, got a photocopy of
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Abastillas letter and, using it, filed on June 24, 1996 a complaint with the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao against Ferraren for alleged illegal disbursement
of P10,000.00 in public funds. Atty. Pactolin attached to the complaint a copy of what
he claimed was a falsified letter of Abastillas, which showed that it was Ferraren, not
Mayor Fuentes, who approved the disbursement.
Aggrieved, Ferraren filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 25665 a complaint
against Atty. Pactolin for falsification of public document.[1] On November 12, 2003
the Sandiganbayan found Atty. Pactolin guilty of falsification under Article 172 and
sentenced him to the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 2 years and 4 months
of prision correccional as minimum to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days
of prision correccional as maximum, to suffer all the accessory penalties
of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency.
Atty. Pactolin appealed to this Court but on May 20, 2008 it affirmed his
conviction.[2] Since the Court treated the matter as an administrative complaint
against him as well under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, it referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for appropriate action.
Because complainant Ferraren neither appeared nor submitted any pleading during
the administrative proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, on
October 9, 2010 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XIX-2010-632,
adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioners Report and
Recommendation that the case against Atty. Pactolin be dismissed for insufficiency
of evidence.
The Issue Presented
The only issue presented in this case is whether or not Atty. Pactolin should be
disbarred after conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification.
The Courts Ruling
In his pleadings before the Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Pactolin reiterated the
defenses he raised before the Sandiganbayan and this Court in the falsification
case. He claims that the Court glossed over the facts, that its decision and referral to
the IBP was factually infirmed[3] and contained factual exaggerations and patently
erroneous observation,[4] and was too adventurous.[5]
To recapitulate, this Court upheld the finding of the Sandiganbayan that the copy of
Abastillas letter which Atty. Pactolin attached to his complaint was spurious. Given
the clear absence of a satisfactory explanation regarding his possession and use of
the falsified Abastillas letter, this Court held that the Sandiganbayan did not err in
concluding that it was Atty. Pactolin who falsified the letter. This Court relied on the
settled rule that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession
of and who used a forged document is the forger and therefore guilty of
falsification.[6]
This Courts decision in said falsification case had long become final and
executory. In In Re: Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo,[7] the Court held that in disbarment
cases, it is no longer called upon to review the judgment of conviction which has
become final. The review of the conviction no longer rests upon this Court.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or
suspended on the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct
in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to
a case without authority so to do.
This Court has ruled that the crime of falsification of public document is contrary to
justice, honesty, and good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude.[8] Moral
turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted
and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary
to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.[9]
Having said that, what penalty should be imposed then on Atty. Pactolin?
113
As a rule, this Court exercises the power to disbar with great caution. Being the most
severe form of disciplinary sanction, it is imposed only for the most imperative
reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character
of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.[10] Yet this Court has
also consistently pronounced that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for
conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.[11]
Here, Atty. Pactolins disbarment is warranted. The Sandiganbayan has confirmed that
although his culpability for falsification has been indubitably established, he has not
yet served his sentence. His conduct only exacerbates his offense and shows that he
falls short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal
profession.[12]
This Court once again reminds all lawyers that they, of all classes and professions, are
most sacredly bound to uphold the law.[13] The privilege to practice law is bestowed
only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally
important, morally. As such, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially
in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity
in a manner beyond reproach.[14]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin is hereby DISBARRED and his
name REMOVED from the Rolls of Attorney. Let a copy of this decision be attached to
his personal records and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts
in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Casimiro vs Rigor
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 206661 December 10, 2014
HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, in his capacity as Acting Ombudsman, Office of the
Ombudsman; HON. ROGELIO L. SINGSON, in his capacity as Department of Public
Works and Highways Secretary, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSEFINO N. RIGOR, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed by petitioners Orlando C. Casimiro, as Acting Ombudsman, and Rogelio L.
Singson, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH), assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 4, 2012 and
its Resolution2 dated March 27, 2013 in CA-G.R. SP 120708. The CA nullified and set
aside the Order3of the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), dated July 18, 2011, and
reinstated its Order4 dated April 29, 2011, both in OMB-C-A-05-0123-C.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Sometime in 2005, the General Investigation Bureau-A of the OMB (GIB-A-OMB)
conducted a lifestyle check on respondent Josefino N. Rigor, then the Regional
Director of the DPWH-National Capital Region (DPWHNCR). Thereafter, the GIB-A-
OMB filed a complaint against Rigor charging him criminally and administratively
before the OMB for alleged unexplained wealth and violation of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 30195 and R.A. 1379.6 Said complaint was mainly based on certain irregularities
on Rigor’s Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALNs), allegedly failing to
declare therein several properties, business interests, and financial connections. Its
administrative aspect asserted that Rigor committed Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct,
and Falsification of Official Documents.
The complaint alleged that Rigor failed to declare in his 1999 SALN the following:
1) Fourteen (14) parcels of land located in Barrio Maluid, Victoria, Tarlac, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 223271 to 223284, which were all issued by
the Registry of Deeds for Tarlac province on August 21, 1989 in the name of Josefino
Rigor, married to Abigail S. Rigor;
2) Seven (7) parcels of land located in San Roque and San Rafael, Tarlac City covered
by a single title, TCT No. T-240955 issued by the Registry of Deeds for Tarlac Province
on September 6, 1991 in the name of Josefino Rigor, married to Abigail S. Rigor;
3) A parcel of land located in San Roque and San Rafael, Tarlac City covered by TCT
No. T-240956;
4) A two-storey commercial/residential building at 1722 G. Tuazon St., Sampaloc,
Manila covered by TCT No. 229634 issued by the Registry of Deeds for Manila and
114
was purchased from Jose N. Reyes for Nine Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱950,000.00) on July 18, 1996;
5) A Toyota Rav 4 Sports Utility Vehicle (SUV) with License Plate No. XPT-816
registered under Land Transportation Office (LTO) MV File No. 1336-115201 and sold
by Toyota Shaw, Inc. on December 18, 1999 to Anastacia Corpuz Rigor, Rigor’s wife;
6) A Dodge Ram Road Trek 1995 model with license number UBA-898 registered
under the name of Rigor’s wife, Anastacia C. Rigor. The same was sold by Anastacia
only on May 16, 2003 to George Mamonluk for ₱1,050,000.00;
7) Business interest in Jetri Construction Corporation which was incorporated in
November 1989 under Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Reg. No. 171720
with an authorized capital stock of ₱8,000,000.00 which was primarily incorporated
for construction business, in defiance ofa possible conflict of interest with Rigor, being
a ranking DPWH official. Rigor’s wife, as one of the incorporators, has the biggest
number of shares worth ₱600,000.00; she made payment of ₱150,000.00 worth of
capital stocks and was the elected Treasurer of the Corporation; and
8) Business interest in Disneyland Bus Line, Inc. which was registered on March 30,
1994, primarily intended to operate as a transportation business with an authorized
capital stock of ₱10,000,000.00. Of the ₱2,500,000.00 subscribed capital stocks, Rigor
subscribed to ₱1,125,000.00 while his wife subscribed to ₱750,000.00. Both amounts
of subscribed shares were wholly paid up.
In 2000, Rigor allegedly failed to declare the following in his SALN:
1) Fourteen (14) parcels of land located in Barrio Maluid, Victoria, Tarlac, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 223271 to 223284;
2) Seven (7) parcels of land locatedin San Roque and San Rafael, Tarlac City covered
by a single title, TCT No. T-240955;
3) A parcel of land located in San Roque and San Rafael, Tarlac City under TCT No.
132066 issued by the Registry of Deeds for Tarlac Province on September 7, 1976 in
the name of Josefino Rigor; and
4) A parcel of land located in San Roque and San Rafael, Tarlac City covered by TCT
No. T-240956.
Lastly, he failed to include in his 2001 and 2002 SALNs the following properties,
business interests,and financial connections:
1) Four (4) parcels of land in San Sebastian Village, Tarlac City covered by TCT Nos.
356610, 356611, 356612, and 356613, all in Rigor’s name and purchased from Allan
M. Manalang;
2) The two-storey commercial/residential building at1722 G. Tuazon St., Sampaloc,
Manila covered by TCT No. 229634;
3) The Toyota Rav 4 Sports Utility Vehicle (SUV) with License Plate No. XPT-816;
4) The Dodge Ram Road Trek 1995 model with license number UBA-898;
5) Business interest in Jetri Construction Corporation;
6) Business interest in Disneyland Bus Line, Inc.;
7) Business interest in Kontrata Construction and Development Corporation;
8) A parcel of land situated in Barrio Tibag, Tarlac City covered by TCT No. 249517 in
the name of Rigor’s son; and
9) Six (6) lots situated in San Sebastian Village, Tarlac City covered by TCT Nos.
330183, 327448, 326965, 326966, 326964, and 325284.
On July 28, 2006, the OMB issued a Decision finding Rigor guilty of Dishonesty, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
FOREGOING CONSIDERED, pursuant to Section 52 (A-1) Rule IV of the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases (CSC Resolution No. 991936), dated August 31, 1999,
respondent JOSEFINO NACPIL RIGOR, Regional Director, DPWH-NCR, 2nd St., Port
Area, Manila, is hereby found guilty of DISHONESTY and is meted the corresponding
penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE, including all its accessory penalties of
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual
disqualification for reemployment in the government service and without prejudice
to criminal prosecution.
Pursuant to the Memorandum Circular No. 01 dated April 11, 2006 issued by the
Office of the Ombudsman, the Honorable HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR., Secretary,
Department of Public Works and Highways, is hereby directed to immediately
implement this Decision, with the request to inform this Office of the action taken
thereon and promptly submit to this Office a Compliance Report thereof.
SO ORDERED.7
Subsequently, Rigor moved for a reconsideration, which the OMB granted on April
29, 2011. It thus ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration of the
respondent is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated September 23, 2010, finding
respondent JOSEFINO NACPIL RIGOR guilty of the administrative offense is hereby
MODIFIED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, respondent is adjudged GUILTY of Simple
Negligence and is hereby fined the amount of One Thousand Pesos, with a warning
that repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more strictly.
115
The Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways is hereby directed to
implement this Decision within Ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.8
The DPWH Secretary then filed, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), an
Omnibus Motion (for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Motion for Reconsideration),
praying for its intervention in the case to be allowed. The DPWH argued that there
existed strong and compelling reasons for the reversal of the April 29,2011 OMB
Order. On June 7, 2011, the OMB directed Rigor to filehis Comment on said Motion.
On July 18, 2011, the OMB issued an Order with a decretal portion that states:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 May 2011 is
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Order dated 29 April 2011 finding JOSEFINO N. RIGOR
guiltyof Simple Negligence and imposing upon him the penalty of Fine in the amount
of One Thousand Pesos (Ph₱1,000.00) is hereby SET ASIDE.
JOSEFINO N. RIGOR, Regional Director, DPWH-National Capital Region, is hereby
found GUILTY of Serious Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Documents. The
penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE is accordingly imposed against him
pursuant to Section 52-A, Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, as amended, with the accessory penalties of cancellation of
eligibility, forfeiture of all benefits, except leave credits, and the perpetual
disqualification for reemployment in the Government service.
This Order is immediately executory pursuant to Ombudsman Memorandum Circular
No. 01, Series of 2006, in relation to paragraph 1, Section 27 of R.A. 6770, and Section
7, Rule III, Administrative Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as amended, and in accordance with the ruling of the Supreme Court
in Ombudsman vs. Joel Samaniego. Accordingly, let a copy of this Order be furnished
to the Honorable Secretary Rogelio L. Singson, Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH), for the implementation thereof against JOSEFINO N. RIGOR.
SO ORDERED.9
Aggrieved, Rigor brought the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, attributing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the OMB. On July 4, 2012, the appellate court
sustained Rigor and rendered the herein assailed decision. Thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the challenged Order dated 18 July 2011 of
the Office of the Ombudsman is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
Order dated 29 April 2011 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.10
Thereafter, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed but the same was denied for lack
of merit. Hence, the OMB and the DPWH filed the instant Petition for Review. It
asserts that the CA gravely erred in giving due course to Rigor’s petition despite using
the remedy of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, instead of Rule 63,
of the Rules of Court. They likewise maintain that the DPWH could still intervene
before the OMB and question the April 29, 2011 OMB Order which found Rigor guilty
of mere Simple Negligence and reduced the penalty to a fine of only ₱1,000.00. They
aver that there is sufficient evidence to hold respondent administratively liable for
Serious Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Documents.
Petitioners present the following arguments:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT A PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION IS AN IMPROPER REMEDY TO ASSAIL RESPONDENT’S
DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DPWH CAN NO
LONGER INTERVENE BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND ASSAIL THE
APRIL 29, 2011 ORDER FINDING RESPONDENT ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE ONLY FOR
SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DPWH CAN NO
LONGER INTERVENE BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, DESPITE THE
PRESENCE OF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO HOLD RESPONDENT ADMINISTRATIVELY
LIABLE FOR SERIOUS DISHONESTY AND FALSIFICATION OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. 11
There is merit in the petition.
The Court shall first delve on the procedural issues of the case. The OMB contends
that the CA should have dismissed Rigor’s Petition for Certiorari for being an improper
remedy. Appeals from decisions in administrative disciplinary cases of the OMB
should be taken to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court. Rule 43 prescribes the manner of appeal from quasi-judicial agencies, such as
the OMB, and was formulated precisely to provide for a uniform rule of appellate
procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. Rigor, in support of his petition for certiorari,
argues that there was no other plain, speedy, and adequate legal remedy available to
him. But it is settled that certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie, as appeal under Rule 43
is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The remedies of appeal and
certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.12 And even if the
116
special civil action of certiorari were to be allowed, Rigor still failed to show that the
OMB committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the intervention of
the DPWH.
Under Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the OMB is authorized to
promulgate its own rules of procedure. As such, it likewise holds the power to amend
or modify saidrules as the interest of justice may require.13The emerging trend of
jurisprudence is more inclined to the liberal and flexible application of procedural
rules. Nonetheless, rules of procedure still exist to ensure the orderly, just, and
speedy dispensation of cases;to this end, inflexibility or liberality must be weighed.
Thus, the relaxation or suspension of procedural rules or the exemption of a case
from their operation is warranted only by compelling reasons or when the purpose
of justice requires it.14
Here, the records clearly show compelling and justifiable reasons for the OMB to
allow the Omnibus Motion of the DPWH and, consequently, hold Rigor
administratively liable. Rigor alleges that the business interests in the Jetri
Construction Corporation, the two-storey building in Sampaloc, Manila, the Toyota
RAV 4 SUV, and the Dodge Ram Road Trek were all separate properties of his second
wife, Anastacia, that was why he never included the same in his SALNs. Section 8 of
R.A. No. 6713,15 however, requires him to declare under oath eventhe assets,
liabilities, and financial interests of his spouse, thus:
Section 8. Statements and Disclosure.- Public officials and employees have an
obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of, and the public has
the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business
interests including those of their spouses and of unmarried children under eighteen
(18) years of age living in their households. (A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities
and Financial Disclosure. - All public officials and employees, except those who serve
in an honorary capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers, shall file under
oath their Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure of Business
Interests and Financial Connections and those of their spouses and unmarried
children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households.
The two documents shall contain information on the following:
(a) real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed value and current fair
market value;
(b) personal property and acquisition cost;
(c) all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and
the like; (d) liabilities, and;
(e) all business interests and financial connections.
x x x16
Dishonesty, as juridically understood, implies the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or
defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty or probity in principle;
lack of fairness and straight forwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. It
is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt on one’s ability to perform duties with the
integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee. The requirement
of filing a SALN is enshrined in the Constitution to promote transparency in the civil
service and serves as a deterrent against government officials bent on enriching
themselves through unlawful means. By mandate of law, every government official
or employee must make a complete disclosure of his assets, liabilities and net worth
in order to avoid any issue regarding questionable accumulation of wealth. The
importance of requiring the submission of a complete, truthful, and sworn SALN as a
measure to defeat corruption in the bureaucracy cannot be gainsaid. Full disclosure
of wealth in the SALN is necessary to particularly minimize, if not altogether eradicate,
the opportunities for official corruption, and maintain a standard of honesty in the
public service. Through the SALN, the public can monitor movement in the fortune of
a public official; it serves as a valid check and balance mechanism to verify undisclosed
properties and wealth. The failure to file a truthful SALN reasonably puts in doubts
the integrity of the officer and normally amounts to dishonesty.17
In the case at bar, Rigor deliberately and wilfully omitted his wife’s business interests
in the Jetri Corporation, the two-storey building in Sampaloc, the Toyota RAV 4, and
the Dodge Ram Road Trek in his SALNs for 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002, despite being
required by law to do so. Anent his wife’s alleged business interests in Disneyland Bus
Line, Inc., and Kontrata Construction & Development Corporation, his belief that he
was no longer under obligation to declare the same as they had already become dead
corporations, deserves scant merit. He and Anastacia had paid-up capital stocks in
the bus line amounting to₱1,125,000.00 and ₱750,000.00, respectively, and
₱100,000.00 and ₱330,000.00 in the construction firm, respectively. Since the bus
line was incorporated in 1994 and the construction firm in 1995, Rigor should have
nonetheless declared in his SALNs their interests therein, until the time the
corporations have been dissolved. While said corporations may be considered as
dead corporations, dissolution and liquidation are still necessary. Also, Rigor’s SALN
for 1999 has two (2) versions. Though it appears that both SALNs contain the same
property values and liabilities, his networth in the SALN which he submitted to OMB-
Luzon is substantially higher than that in the SALN submitted to DPWH-Region 1, on
117
account of the declared accumulated depreciation in the amount of ₱5,898,181.00.
True, no liability can be attributed to him for submitting two (2) different SALNs for a
calendar year, as his real purpose behind it cannot be ascertained with accuracy, but
such act still manifests Rigor’s predilection to misrepresent a fact. Since there are two
(2) versions of a SALN which appear to have been subscribed on the same date before
the same administering officer, it cannot, therefore, be determined which of these
two versions represents his real networth.
Rigor, moreover, alleged that he had no obligation to declare the fourteen (14)
parcels of land in Victoria, Tarlac because these properties were actually owned by
Riya corp Piggery Form Incorporated, a family corporation which his parents
owned.He was merely authorized to mortgage these properties and was never the
owner of the same prior to the subsequent transfer to Metrobank, the present
owner. However, the annotations on the Memorandum of Encumbrances of the titles
showed that said properties were the subject of a Deed of Sale in favor of the
Associated Bank way back in 1987. The ownership over these properties was also
consolidated in the name of said bank in the same year and new TCTs were
consequently issued. Thus, in all likelihood, the owner of the properties prior to Rigor
was Associated Bank and not Riyacorp, and the latter could not have possibly
authorized Rigor to mortgage the properties. This proves that Rigor was, in fact, the
owner of the lots and not merely Riyacorp’s authorized mortgagor. As such, he was
under obligation to declare the same from 1989 to 2000, before the consolidation of
ownership in favor of Metrobank in 2001.
Lastly, as to the twenty-nine (29)copies of his SALNs from 1972 to 1998, he knew that
the Administrative Division did not have file copies of his SALNs because of the fire
that gutted the DPWH Legal Office where its employees’ SALNs were kept. Instead of
admitting and informing the Administrative Division of DPWH-Region 1 that copies of
his old SALNs were no longer available, here constituted them and made it appear
that said reconstituted SALNs were the very same documents which he executed
from 1972 to 1998. He even put the blame on the fact-finding investigators of the
OMB for maliciously forcing him to reproduce his SALNs by virtue of a subpoena. He
could not, however, justify his misrepresentation by this assertion as the one who
was actually directed by the subpoena to reproduce the SALNs was the Chief of the
Administrative Division, DPWH-Region 1. In addition, Rigor’s SALNs do not have
markings or stamps of receipt as proof of filing and give an impression that these had
all been accomplished on a single occasion. These facts indubitably show that Rigor
should likewise be held liable for Falsification of Official Documents.
Falsification of an official document such as the SALN is considered a grave offense.
It amounts to dishonesty.1awp++i1 Both falsification and dishonesty are grave
offenses punishable by dismissal from the service, even for the first offense, with
forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave benefits, and perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in government service. The act of falsifying an
official document is in itself grave because of its possible deleterious effects on
government service. At the same time, it is also an act of dishonesty, which violates
fundamental principles of public accountability and integrity. Under Civil Service
regulations, falsification of an official document and dishonesty are distinct offenses,
but both may be committed in one act, as in this case. The constitutionalization of
public accountability shows the kind of standards of public officers that are woven
into the fabric of our legal system. To reiterate, public office is a public trust, which
embodies a set of standards such as responsibility, integrity and efficiency.
Unfortunately, reality may sometimes depart from these standards, but our society
has consciously embedded them in our laws so that they may be demanded and
enforced as legal principles, and the Court is mandated to apply these principles to
bridge actual reality to the norms envisioned for our public service.18
Administrative proceedings are governed by the "substantial evidence rule," meaning
a finding of guilt in an administrative case may and would issue if supported by
substantial evidence that the respondent has committed the acts stated in the
complaint. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. Its
absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence, direct or
circumstantial, on record. Here, the pieces of evidence met the quantum of evidence
required in administrative cases to justify Rigor's dismissal from service.19 Not only
did he fail to declare in his SALN the separate properties of his wife, as required by
law, he likewise failed to satisfactorily explain the other glaring irregularities involved
with his SALNs. These facts certainly constitute sufficient and relevant evidence which
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to sustain a finding of guilt against Rigor
for Serious Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Documents, for which the penalty
of Dismissal from Service is imposed pursuant to Section 52, Rule IV of the Revised
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, as amended.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated July 4, 2012 and its Resolution dated March 27, 2013 in CA-
G.R. SP 120708 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Order of the Office of the
118
Ombudsman dated July 18, 2011 in OMB-C-A-05-0123-C finding Josefino N. Rigor importation and exportation. Specifically, Chua was tasked to process trust receipts,
guilty of Serious Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Documents, and ordering his accept trust receipt payments and issue the corresponding receipts for these
Dismissal from Service, is hereby REINSTATED. payments.[4]
SO ORDERED.
In response to a complaint of a bank client regarding the non- application of his
Chua vs People payments, an internal audit was conducted. In the course of the audit, twenty-nine
Republic of the Philippines (29) fictitious payments backed by equally bogus foreign remittances were
Supreme Court discovered. The audit led to a finding that these remittances were not supported by
Manila the necessary authenticated advice from the foreign bank concerned. Two of these
remittances were with instructions to credit specified amounts to Savings Account
THIRD DIVISION No. 1000-209312 which turned out to be under Chuas name.

RICHARD CHUA, 1. Inward Foreign Remittance Advice of Credit dated 29 October 1984 in the amount
Petitioner, of ₱16,729.96:
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Kindly credit & advi[s]e immediately SA# 1000-209312 of R. CHUA representing
Respondent. proceeds of remittance by order of Amado Roque under TT ref. BKT/1752/25 dated
X ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------X 10-26-84.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to annul and set aside the
February 21, 2008 Decision[1] and June 2, 2008 Resolution[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 29051, modifying the October 6, 2004 Decision[3] of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 132, Makati City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 21499
entitled People of the Philippines v. Richard Chua, for Estafa thru Falsification of
Commercial Document.
The Facts:
In 1982, Allied Banking Corporation (the bank) hired Richard Chua as a general clerk
in its International Banking Division which processed the opening of domestic and
international letters of credit, domestic and international remittances as well as
2.Inward Foreign Remittance Advice of Credit dated 6 August 1984 in the amount
of ₱16,024.70:
Please credit & advi[s]e immediately SA# 1000-209312 of R. Chua representing
proceeds of remittance from San Francisco by order of Linda Castro for US$899.75 @
17.822 less charges.[5]
Meanwhile, the accounts payable or the excess payments made by two clients of the
Bank, ATL Plastic Manufacturing Industries and Unidex Garments, were used to cover
up the discrepancy created as a result of the crediting of the foregoing amounts to
Chuas account. It was made to appear that the said amounts were refunded to the
same clients although they were not. Debit Tickets were even accomplished to justify
the act of crediting the subject amounts to Chuas account. Afterwards, when the
same had been credited to his account, Chua withdrew them on different dates.[6]
119
On December 17, 1985, Chua was charged with Estafa through Falsification of
Commercial Documents before the RTC. The Information reads:
That on or about May 18, 1984 and October 24, 1984 and for sometime prior to and
subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means
of deceit and false pretenses executed prior to or simultaneous with the commission
of the fraud, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Allied
Banking Corporation in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, as General
Clerk of the said complainant and taking advantage of his position as such, received
from clients of the bank, Unidex Garments and ATL Plastics Manufacturing Industries,
the respective sums of P16,024.70 and P16,729.96 for the purpose of applying the
same to the payment of the excess indebtedness of said clients with the complainant
bank but the accused instead made it appear that said amounts were to be credited
to the current account of the client by executing an advice of credit which the said
accused, however, did not forward to the Cash Department of the complainant and,
instead, he prepared a fictitious inward foreign remittance advice of credit by falsely
making it appear therein that there existed dollar remittances of a certain Linda
Castro and Amado Roque in the U.S. dollar equivalent of said amounts which the
accused credited to his personal account with the bank; and the accused, once in
possession of said funds, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
appropriate and convert the same to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage
and prejudice of the complainant, Allied Banking Corporation, in the total amount
of P32,754.66.[7]
Records show that the case was ordered archived on March 31, 1986 when Chua
evaded arrest after the courts issuance of an arrest warrant. He was finally arrested
on September 10, 1999, after 13 years, but was released on bail the following day.
When arraigned, Chua entered a plea of not guilty.[8]
For his defense, Chua denied that he prepared the subject Debit Tickets. He insisted
on their regularity as these were duly signed and approved by two of his immediate
supervisors. Chua likewise denied having prepared the Advice of Credit documents
that covered the questioned foreign remittances. He pointed out that these
documents were likewise approved for final processing by his supervisors. Finally, he
denied having prepared the withdrawal slips, much more, the cash withdrawals
corresponding to the subject amounts.[9]
In the assailed decision dated October 6, 2004, the RTC found Chua guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa through falsification of commercial
documents and was sentenced accordingly.[10]
On appeal, the CA modified the RTCs judgment of conviction by holding Chua liable
for falsification of commercial documents only. The CA reasoned out that Chua, being
a mere general clerk of the bank, did not acquire both material and juridical
possession of the subject amounts. He was likened to a bank teller whose possession
over the money received by him is possession by the bank itself.[11] Be that as it may,
the CA, still under the same indictment/information and pursuant to this Courts ruling
in Gonzaludo v. People,[12] held Chua liable for falsification of commercial
documents as defined in Articles 172 and 171 of the Revised Penal Code.[13]
The CA wrote:
In the case at bench, the prosecution was able to prove that the subject Inward
Foreign Remittance Advices of Credit which were used to transfer the excess
payments made by ATL Plastic Manufacturing Industries and Unidex Garments to the
appellants account in the guise of remittances, were fictitious since there were really
no Linda Castro or Amado Roque who sent the same. It adduced two documents, i.e.,
the Advices of Credit and the Debit Tickets, which were merely used to cover up the
fictitious remittances. It is true that there is no direct proof that appellant was the
author of the falsification. However, since he benefited from the fictitious
transactions in question, the inevitable conclusion is that he falsified them. It is an
established rule that when it is proved that a person has in his possession a falsified
document and makes use of the same, the presumption or inference is justified that
such person is the forger. On this score, the prosecution convincingly demonstrated
that appellant withdrew the subject amounts on different dates.[14]
Chuas defense of forgery failed to impress the CA. As it was his burden to establish
his defense, it was not enough for him to submit just any specimen of his signature.
The NBI requested him to submit additional documents containing his signatures for
the years 1983 and 1984 but he failed to meet its requirements. Thus, the CA gave
120
no value to his defense. The dispositive portion of its February 21, 2008 Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 6 October 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati
City, Branch 132, is MODIFIED. Appellant RICHARD CHUA is hereby ACQUITTED of the
complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents. However,
he is adjudged GUILTY of the crime of Falsification of Commercial Documents and is
SENTENCED to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 4 months and 1 day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as maximum.
Likewise, he is ORDERED to PAY a fine of P5,000.00.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Chua sought partial reconsideration but his motion was denied by the CA on June 2,
2008. Still not satisfied, Chua now comes to this Court raising the following
ISSUES:
I appellant is a mere general clerk of Allied Bank. As part of his duties, he received
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding the petitioner guilty of
the crime of Falsification of Commercial Documents considering that it has
categorically ADMITTED that there is no direct proof that petitioner was the author of
the falsification in the case at bar.
II
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not applying the paramount
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the petitioner in view of its explicit
admission that there is no direct proof that the petitioner was the author of the
falsification.[16]
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
Chua claims that the CAs statement, It is true that there is no direct proof that
appellant was the author of the falsification,[17] absolves him from criminal liability
even for the lesser offense of falsification of commercial documents. According to
Chua, the CA was merely speculating when it held that he was the author of the
falsified commercial documents because he allegedly benefited from them. He
further argues that the prosecution failed to show other facts and circumstances from
which it may be reasonably and logically inferred that he committed the crime of
falsification.[18]
Chua is obviously clutching at straws when he argues that the CAs judgment of
conviction was based merely on speculation. He apparently misread the CA decision.
First of all, the CA never abandoned or set aside the factual findings of the RTC when
it ordered the modification of the judgment of conviction. The modification was
merely on the RTCs conclusion as to the crime actually committed. In its appealed
decision, the CA pointed out that an essential element in the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of commercial documentswas lacking, thus:
Evidently, in the case at bench, appellant did not acquire juridical possession over the
subject payments which were made by two of Allied Banks clients, i.e., Unidex
Garments and ATL Plastic Manufacturing Industries. It must be borne in mind that
payments from clients. His position therefor may be likened to the position of a bank
teller whose possession over the money received by him is possession by the bank
itself.[19]
The CA never disturbed, categorically or otherwise, the RTCs factual findings with
regard to (a) the discovery of fictitious payments purportedly from equally fictitious
foreign remittances; (b) the fictitious debit or refund to the banks clients although in
truth there were none as indicated in the banks History of Daily Transactions, and was
instead credited to the account of Chua; (c) authenticity of his signature in the
withdrawal slips as testified to by the banks signature verifier; (d) his denial that he
ever knew the two persons named above who allegedly remitted the subject amount
to him; (e) his own admission on cross examination that the subject amounts were
indeed credited to his savings account with the bank; and (f) his admission that after
the subject incident with the bank, he filed a notice of leave and never came back.[20]
121
The absence of a direct proof that Chua was the author of the falsification is of no
moment for the rule remains that whenever someone has in his possession falsified
documents and uttered or used the same for his advantage and benefit, the
presumption that he authored it arises.
X x x. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so
closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven
to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the
forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery.
In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a
forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger.[21]
Certainly, the channeling of the subject payments via false remittances to his savings
account, his subsequent withdrawals of said amount as well as his unexplained flight
at the height of the banks inquiry into the matter more than sufficiently establish
Chuas involvement in the falsification.
The evidentiary bases of the RTC were the very same bases relied upon by the CA
when it instead found Chua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of
commercial documents. The facts are the same. The elements of the crime as found
in paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC, are: 1) the offender is a private individual or a
public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; 2) the
offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171; and 3)
the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document.[22]
Applying this to the present case, all three elements are undeniably present (i) Chua
is a private individual; (ii) he used fictitious inward foreign remittance advice of credit
to cause the funneling or transfer of the two named bank clients payments into his
own account,[23]squarely falling under paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code[24]; and (iii) the falsification was committed in two commercial documents,
namely, inward foreign remittance advice of credit and the debit tickets.[25] Without
doubt, his subsequent conviction to a lesser crime was not unfounded.
A conviction coming from the heels of an acquittal in a complex or a more serious
crime is nothing new. The CA was merely following the Courts lead in the case
of Gonzaludo v. People,[26] where it was held:
The lack of criminal liability for estafa, however, will not necessarily absolve petitioner
from criminal liability arising from the charge of falsification of public document under
the same Information charging the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public document. It is settled doctrine that
When a complex crime has been charged in an information and the evidence fails to
support the charge on one of the component offenses, can defendant still be
separately convicted of the other offense? The question has long been answered in
the affirmative. In United States v. Lahoylahoy and Madanlog,[27] the Court has ruled
to be legally feasible the conviction of an accused on one of the offenses included in
a complex crime charged, when properly established, despite the failure of evidence
to hold the accused of the other charge.[28](previous citations omitted)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The February 21, 2008 Decision and June 2, 2008
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29051 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Delos Reyes vda. Del Prado vs People
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
122
 NORMA DELOS REYES VDA. G.R. No. 186030
DEL PRADO, EULOGIA R. The Factual Antecedents
DEL PRADO, NORMITA R. Present:
DEL PRADO and RODELIA This petition stems from an Information for falsification under Article 172, in relation
R. DEL PRADO, CARPIO, J., to Article 171(4), of the Revised Penal Code filed against herein petitioners Norma
Petitioners, Chairperson, Delos Reyes Vda. Del Prado (Norma), Normita Del Prado (Normita), Eulogia Del Prado
BRION, (Eulogia) and Rodelia[3] Del Prado (Rodelia) with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
PEREZ, Lingayen, Pangasinan, allegedly committed as follows:
-versus- SERENO, and
REYES, JJ. That on or about the 19th day of July, 1991, in the [M]unicipality of Lingayen,
[P]rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Promulgated: Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, one another, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously falsified,
Respondent. March 21, 2012 execute[d] and cause[d] the preparation of the DEED OF SUCCESSION, by stating and
making it appear in said document that they were the only heirs of the late Rafael del
Prado, when in truth and in fact, all the accused well knew, that Ma. Corazon Del
Prado-Lim is also an heir who is entitled to inherit from the late Rafael Del Prado, and
all the accused deliberately used the DEED OF SUCCESSION to claim ownership and
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x possession of the land mentioned in the DEED OF SUCCESSION to the exclusion of the
complainant Ma. Corazon Del Prado-Lim to her damage and prejudice.
DECISION
Contrary to Art. 172 in relation to Art. 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[4]
REYES, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
which seeks to assail and set aside the following issuances of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in the case docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 31225 and entitled Norma Delos Reyes
Vda. Del Prado, Eulogia R. Del Prado, Normita R. Del Prado and Rodelia R. Del Prado
v. People of the Philippines":
1) the Decision[1] dated September 15, 2008 affirming with modification the
decision and order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, Lingayen, Pangasinan
in Criminal Case No. L-8015; and
2) the Resolution[2] dated January 6, 2009 denying the motion for reconsideration
of the Decision of September 15, 2008.
Upon arraignment, the accused therein entered their plea of not guilty. After pre-trial
conference, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution claimed that Ma. Corazon Del Prado-Lim (Corazon), private
complainant in the criminal case, was the daughter of the late Rafael Del Prado
(Rafael) by his marriage to Daisy Cragin (Daisy). After Daisy died in 1956, the late
Rafael married Norma with whom he had five children, namely: Rafael, Jr., Antonio,
Eulogia, Normita and Rodelia.
The late Rafael died on July 12, 1978. On October 29, 1979, Corazon, as a daughter
of the late Rafael, and Norma, as the late Rafaels surviving spouse and representative
of their five minor children, executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the Estate
123
of Rafael Del Prado to cover the distribution of several properties owned by the late
Rafael, including the parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
P-22848, measuring 17,624 square meters, more or less, and situated at Libsong,
Lingayen, Pangasinan.
Per agreement of the heirs, Corazon was to get a 3,000-square meter portion of the
land covered by OCT No. P-22848. This right of Corazon was also affirmed in the Deed
of Exchange dated October 15, 1982 and Confirmation of Subdivision which she
executed with Norma.
Corazon, however, later discovered that her right over the subject parcel of land was
never registered by Norma, contrary to the latters undertaking. The petitioners
instead executed on July 19, 1991 a Deed of Succession wherein they, together with
Rafael, Jr. and Antonio, partitioned and adjudicated unto themselves the property
covered by OCT No. P-22848, to the exclusion of Corazon. The deed was notarized by
Loreto L. Fernando (Loreto), and provides in part:
WHEREAS, on the 12[th] day of July 1978, RAFAEL DEL PRADO[,] SR., died intestate in
the City of Dagupan, leaving certain parcel of land, and more particularly described
and bounded to wit:
ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. P-22848
A certain parcel of land (Lot No. 5518, Cad-373-D) Lingayen Cadastre, situated in
Poblacion, Lingayen, Pangasinan, Island of Luzon.Bounded on the NE., by Lots Nos.
5522, 5515; and 6287; on the SE., by Lots Nos. 5516, 5517, 55 and Road; on the SW.,
by Road, and Lots Nos. 5521, 5510, and 5520; and on the NW., by Road; x x x
containing an area of SEVENTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR (17,624)
Square Meters, more or less. Covered by Psd-307996 (LRC), consisting of two lots. Lot
No. 5510-A and Lot 5518-B.
WHEREAS, the parties hereto are the only heirs of the decedent, the first name, is the
surviving spouse and the rest are the children of the decedent;
xxx
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the premises and invoking the
provisions of Rule 74, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, the parties hereto do by these
presents, agree to divide and partition the entire estate above[-]described and
accordingly adjudicate, as they do hereby adjudicate the same among themselves,
herein below specified to wit:
x x x[5]
By virtue of the said Deed of Succession, OCT No. P-22848 was cancelled and several
new titles were issued under the names of Corazons co-heirs. When Corazon
discovered this, she filed a criminal complaint against now petitioners Norma,
Eulogia, Normita and Rodelia.Antonio and Rafael, Jr. had both died before the filing
of said complaint.
Among the witnesses presented during the trial was Loreto, who confirmed that upon
the request of Norma and Antonio, he prepared and notarized the deed of
succession. He claimed that the petitioners appeared and signed the document
before him.
For their defense, the petitioners denied having signed the Deed of Succession, or
having appeared before notary public Loreto. They also claimed that Corazon was not
a daughter, but a niece, of the late Rafael. Norma claimed that she only later knew
that a deed of succession was prepared by her son Antonio, although she admitted
having executed a deed of real estate mortgage in favor of mortgagee Prudential Bank
over portions of the subject parcel of land already covered by the new titles.
The Ruling of the MTC
The MTC rejected for being unsubstantiated the petitioners denial of any
participation in the execution of the deed of succession, further noting that they
benefited from the property after its transfer in their names. Thus, on August 9, 2006,
the court rendered its decision[6]finding petitioners Norma, Eulogia, Normita and
Rodelia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, sentencing them to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor as
124
minimum to two years and four months and one day of prision correccional as
maximum. They were also ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 each, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of non-payment of fine.
Considering the minority of Rodelia at the time of the commission of the crime, she
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four months of arresto mayor, plus payment
of fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment.
All the petitioners were ordered to indemnify Corazon in the amount of P10,000.00
as attorneys fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
Unsatisfied with the MTCs ruling, the petitioners filed a motion for new trial on the
grounds of alleged gross error of law, irregularities during the trial, and new and
material evidence. To prove that they did not intend to exclude Corazon from the
estate of the late Rafael, the petitioners cited their recognition of Corazons right to
the estate in the deed of extra-judicial partition, confirmation of subdivision, deed of
exchange, joint affidavit and petition for guardianship of minors Rafael, Jr., Eulogia,
Antonio and Normita, which they had earlier executed.[7] Again, the petitioners
denied having signed the deed of succession, and instead insisted that their
signatures in the deed were forged.
The motion was denied by the MTC via a resolution[8] dated December 21, 2006,
prompting the filing of an appeal with the RTC.
The Ruling of the RTC
On August 10, 2007, the RTC rendered its decision[9] affirming the MTCs decision, with
modification in that the case against Rodelia was dismissed in view of her minority at
the time of the commission of the crime. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Municipal Trial
Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan dated August 9, 2006 is hereby AFFIRMED, but
modified as to accused Rodelia R. Del Prado as the case against her is hereby
DISMISSED on account of her minority at the time of the commission of the offense.
SO ORDERED.[10]
A motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit by the RTC via its
resolution[11] dated October 31, 2007. Hence, Norma, Eulogia and Normita filed a
petition for review with the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
On September 15, 2008, the CA rendered its decision[12] dismissing the petition and
affirming the RTCs ruling, with modification as to the imposable penalty under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The appealed Decision
dated August 10, 2007 and Order dated October 31, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 38, Pangasinan, in Crim. Case No. L-8015
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellants Norma delos Reyes Vda. Del
Prado, Eulogia R. Del Prado and Normita R. Del Prado are hereby sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[13]
The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the CA in its
resolution[14] dated January 6, 2009. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners appealed from
the decision and resolution of the CA to this Court, through a petition for review
on certiorari[15]under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Present Petition
The petitioners present the following assignment of errors to support their petition:
A. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
COMPLAINANT MA. CORAZON DEL PRADO-LIM WAS EXCLUDED AS AN HEIR OF THE
LATE RAFAEL DEL PRADO.
125

B. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING
THE FACT THAT IN SEVERAL DOCUMENTS/INSTRUMENTS EXECUTED BY THE
PETITIONERS WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF COMPLAINANT MS. CORAZON DEL
PRADO-LIM, SHE WAS SPECIFICALLY NAMED AS AN HEIR WITH CORRESPONDING
SHARES/INHERITANCE IN THE ESTATE OF THE LATE RAFAEL DEL PRADO.
C. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE THE GOOD FAITH OF THE PETITIONERS WHICH NEGATES THE
COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE OF FALSIFICATION ON THEIR PART.
D. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
PETITIONERS WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE OF THE PETITIONERS NOT HAVING BEEN OVERCOME BY THE
PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE.
E. WITH DUE RESPECT [THE LOWER COURT ERRED] IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
CASE IS PURELY CIVIL ONE[,] NOT CRIMINAL.[16]
To support their assigned errors, the petitioners invoke the existence and contents of
the several documents which they had presented before the MTC, including the deed
of extrajudicial partition of the estate of Rafael Del Prado dated October 29, 1979,
confirmation of subdivision, deed of exchange and petition in the guardianship
proceedings for the minor Del Prado children filed by Norma, in which documents
they claim to have indicated and confirmed that Corazon is also an heir of the late
Rafael. Given these documents, the petitioners insist that they cannot be charged
with falsification for having excluded Corazon as an heir of their decedent.
In sum, the issue for this Courts resolution is whether or not the CA erred in affirming
the petitioners conviction for falsification, notwithstanding the said petitioners
defense that they never intended to exclude private complainant Corazon from the
estate of the late Rafael.
This Courts Ruling
The petition is bound to fail.
Only questions of law may be raised in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
First, the questions being raised by the petitioners refer to factual matters that are
not proper subjects of a petition for review under Rule 45. Settled is the rule that in
a petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised. It is not this
Courts function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence already considered in the
proceedings below, our jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that
may have been committed by the lower court. The resolution of factual issues is the
function of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with
respect. A question of law which we may pass upon must not involve an examination
of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants.[17] This is clear under
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal
by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts,
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for
review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which
must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies
by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its
pendency. (Emphasis supplied)
The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact is settled. There is a
question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts. Such a question does not involve an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. On the other hand, there
is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged
facts or when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence,
considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific
126
surrounding circumstances, their relation to one another and to the whole, and the
probabilities of the situation.[18]
Contrary to these rules, the petitioners ask us to review the lower courts factual
finding on Carmens exclusion in the subject deed of succession, to reconsider its
contents and those of the other documentary evidence which they have submitted
with the court a quo, all of which involve questions of fact rather than questions of
law. In their assignment of errors, petitioners even fully question the factual basis for
the courts finding of their guilt. However, as we have explained in Medina v. Asistio,
Jr.:[19]
Petitioners allegation that the Court of Appeals grossly disregarded their Exhibits A,
B, C, D and E, in effect, asks us to re-examine all the [evidence] already presented and
evaluated as well as the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals. Thus, in Sotto
v. Teves (86 SCRA 154 [1978]), [w]e held that the appreciation of evidence is within
the domain of the Court of Appeals because its findings of fact are not reviewable by
this Court (Manlapaz v. CA, 147 SCRA 236 [1987]; Knecht v. CA, 158 SCRA 80 [1988]
and a long line of cases).
It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over
again. Our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been
committed by the lower court. (Nicolas[,] et al., v. CA, 154 SCRA 635 [1987]; Tiongco
v. de la Merced, 58 SCRA 89 [1974]).
There are recognized exceptions to this rule on questions of law as subjects of
petitions for review, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures, (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible, (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion, (4) when
the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts, (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting, (6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case,
or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee,
(7) when the CAs findings are contrary to those by the trial court, (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based, (9) when the acts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent, (10) when the findings of fact
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
on record, or (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.[20] After a consideration of the petitioners arguments, this Court holds
that the present appeal does not fall under any of these exceptions.
There can be no good faith on the part of the petitioners since they knew of the
untruthful character of statements contained in their deed of succession.
Even granting that the present petition may be admitted, we find no cogent reason
to reverse the CA decision appealed from, considering that the elements of the crime
of falsification under Art. 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Art. 172
thereof, were duly proved during the proceedings below. Said elements are as
follows:
(a) The offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration
of facts;
(b) The offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated
by him; and
(c) The facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false.[21]
These elements are based on the provisions of Art. 172, in relation to Art. 171, par. 4,
of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastical minister.
The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos shall be imposed
upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official
position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
xxx
4. Making untruthful statements in narration of facts;
xxx
127

Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. The penalty
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more
than P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in
the next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or
any other kind of commercial document; and
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such
damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in the next preceding article.
xxx
The material document claimed to be falsified in this case is the Deed of Succession
dated July 19, 1991, the presentation of which before the Register of Deeds and other
government agencies allowed the cancellation of OCT No. P-22848, and the issuance
of several new titles in its stead. The first and third elements were committed by the
inclusion in the subject deed of the clause that states, (w)hereas, the parties hereto
are the only heirs of the decedent, the first name, is the surviving spouse and the rest
are the children of the decedent.[22] The untruthfulness of said statement is clear from
the several other documents upon which, ironically, the petitioners anchor their
defense, such as the deed of extrajudicial partition dated October 29, 1979, the
parties confirmation of subdivision, deed of exchange and Normas petition for
guardianship of her then minor children. Specifically mentioned in these documents
is the fact that Corazon is also a daughter, thus an heir, of the late Rafael.
The obligation of the petitioners to speak only the truth in their deed of succession is
clear, taking into account the very nature of the document falsified. The deed, which
was transformed into a public document upon acknowledgement before a notary
public, required only truthful statements from the petitioners. It was a legal
requirement to effect the cancellation of the original certificate of title and the
issuance of new titles by the Register of Deeds. The false statement made in the deed
greatly affected the indefeasibility normally accorded to titles over properties
brought under the coverage of land registration, to the injury of Corazon who was
deprived of her right as a landowner, and the clear prejudice of third persons who
would rely on the land titles issued on the basis of the deed.
We cannot subscribe to the petitioners claim of good faith because several
documents prove that they knew of the untruthful character of their statement in the
deed of succession. The petitioners alleged good faith is disputed by their prior
confirmation and recognition of Corazons right as an heir, because despite knowledge
of said fact, they included in the deed a statement to the contrary. The wrongful
intent to injure Corazon is clear from their execution of the deed, showing a desire to
appropriate only unto themselves the subject parcel of land.Corazon was unduly
deprived of what was due her not only under the provisions of the law on succession,
but also under contracts that she had previously executed with the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is
hereby DENIED. The Decision dated September 15, 2008 and Resolution dated
January 6, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31225 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
People vs Estrada
EN BANC
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
- versus -
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
and THE HONORABLE SPECIAL DIVISION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
128
 DECISION
Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest that the
BRION, J.: Sandiganbayan issued.

The People of the Philippines (the People) filed this Petition for Review On January 11, 2005, we ordered the creation of a Special Division in the
on Certiorari[1] to seek the reversal of the Sandiganbayans Joint Resolution dated July Sandiganbayan to try, hear, and decide the charges of plunder and related cases
12, 2004, granting respondent Joseph Ejercito Estradas (Estrada) demurrer to (illegal use of alias and perjury) against respondent Estrada.[3]
evidence in Crim. Case No. 26565.[2]
At the trial, the People presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove
THE FACTS the allegations of the Informations for plunder, illegal use of alias, and perjury. The
Peoples evidence for the illegal alias charge, as summarized by the Sandiganbayan,
On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder (docketed as Crim. Case No. 26558) was consisted of:
filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among other accused. A
separate Information for illegal use of alias, docketed as Crim. Case No. 26565, was A. The testimonies of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) officers
likewise filed against Estrada. The Amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 Clarissa G. Ocampo (Ocampo) and Atty. Manuel Curato (Curato) who commonly
reads: declared that on February 4, 2000, Estrada opened a numbered trust account (Trust
Account C-163) with PCIB and signed as Jose Velarde in the account opening
That on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the documents; both Ocampo and Curato also testified that Aprodicio Lacquian and
City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the Fernando Chua were present on that occasion;
above-named accused, being then President of the Republic of the Philippines,
without having been duly authorized, judicially or administratively, taking advantage B. (1) The testimony of PCIB-Greenhills Branch Manager Teresa Barcelan, who
of his position and committing the offense in relation to office, i.e., in order to declared that a certain Baby Ortaliza (Ortaliza) transacted several times with her; that
CONCEAL THE ill-gotten wealth HE ACQUIRED during his tenure and his true identity Ortaliza deposited several checks in PCIB Savings Account No. 0160-62502-5 under
as THE President of the Republic of the Philippines, did then and there, willfully, the account name Jose Velarde on the following dates (as evidenced by deposit
unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS JOSE VELARDE IN SEVERAL receipts duly marked in evidence):
TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias Jose Velarde which IS neither his a. 20 October 1999 (Exh. MMMMM)
registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable b. 8 November 1999 (Exh. LLLLL)
PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities. c. 22 November 1999 (Exh. NNNNN)
d. 24 November 1999 (Exh. OOOOO)
CONTRARY TO LAW. e. 25 November 1999 (Exh. PPPPP)
f. 20 December 1999 (Exh. QQQQQ)
g. 21 December 1999 (Exh. RRRRR)
Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26558 were subsequently consolidated for joint trial. Still h. 29 December 1999 (Exh. SSSSS)
another Information, this time for perjury and docketed as Crim. Case No. 26905, was i. 4 January 2000 (Exh. TTTTT)
filed with the Sandiganbayan against Estrada. This was later consolidated, too, with j. 10 May 2000 (Exh. UUUUU)
Crim. Cases No. 26558 and 26565. k. 6 June 2000 (Exh. VVVVV)
129
l. 25 July 2000 (Exh. WWWWW)
(2) Documents duly identified by witnesses showing that Lucena Ortaliza was
employed in the Office of the Vice President and, later on, in the Office of the
President when Estrada occupied these positions and when deposits were made to
the Jose Velarde Savings Account No. 0160-62502-5.
The People filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits in the consolidated cases, which the
Sandiganbayan admitted into evidence in a Resolution dated October 13, 2003.[4] The
accused separately moved to reconsider the Sandiganbayan Resolution;[5] the People,
on the other hand, filed its Consolidated Comment/Opposition to the motions.[6] The
Sandiganbayan denied the motions in its Resolution dated November 17, 2003.[7]
After the People rested in all three cases, the defense moved to be allowed to file a
demurrer to evidence in these cases.[8] In its Joint Resolution dated March 10,
2004,[9] the Sandiganbayan only granted the defense leave to file demurrers in Crim.
Case Nos. 26565 (illegal use of alias) and 26905 (perjury).
Estrada filed separate Demurrers to Evidence for Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and
26905.[10] His demurrer to evidence for Crim. Case No. 26565 (illegal use of alias) was
anchored on the following grounds[11]:
1. Of the thirty-five (35) witnesses presented by the prosecution, only two (2)
witnesses, Ms. Clarissa Ocampo and Atty. Manuel Curato, testified that on one
occasion (4 February 2000), they saw movant use the name Jose Velarde;
2. The use of numbered accounts and the like was legal and was prohibited only in
late 2001 as can be gleaned from Bangko Sentral Circular No. 302, series of 2001,
dated 11 October 2001;
3. There is no proof of public and habitual use of alias as the documents offered
by the prosecution are banking documents which, by their nature, are confidential
and cannot be revealed without following proper procedures; and
4. The use of alias is absorbed in plunder.
The People opposed the demurrers through a Consolidated Opposition that
presented the following arguments:[12]
1. That the use of fictitious names in bank transaction was not expressly
prohibited until BSP No. 302 is of no moment considering that as early as
Commonwealth Act No. 142, the use of alias was already prohibited. Movant is being
prosecuted for violation of C.A. No. 142 and not BSP Circular No. 302;
2. Movants reliance on Ursua vs. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]) is
misplaced;
3. Assuming arguendo that C.A. No. 142, as amended, requires publication of the
alias and the habitual use thereof, the prosecution has presented more than sufficient
evidence in this regard to convict movant for illegal use of alias; and
4. Contrary to the submission of movant, the instant case of illegal use of alias is
not absorbed in plunder.
Estrada replied to the Consolidated Opposition through a Consolidated Reply
Opposition.
THE ASSAILED SANDIGANBAYANS RULING
The Sandiganbayan issued on July 12, 2004 the Resolution now assailed in this
petition. The salient points of the assailed resolution are:
First the coverage of Estradas indictment. The Sandiganbayan found that the only
relevant evidence for the indictment are those relating to what is described in the
Information i.e., the testimonies and documents on the opening of Trust Account C-
163 on February 4, 2000. The Sandiganbayan reasoned out that the use of the
disjunctive or between on or about 04 February 2000 and sometime prior or
subsequent thereto means that the act/s allegedly committed on February 4, 2000
130
could have actually taken place prior to or subsequent thereto; the use of the
conjunctive was simply the prosecutions procedural tool to guard against any
variance between the date stated in the Information and that proved during the trial
in a situation in which time was not a material ingredient of the offense; it does not
mean and cannot be read as a roving commission that includes acts and/or
events separate and distinct from those that took place on the single date on or about
04 February 2000 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto. The Sandiganbayan ruled
that the use of the disjunctive or prevented it from interpreting the Information any
other way.
Second the Peoples failure to present evidence that proved Estradas commission of
the offense. The Sandiganbayan found that the People failed to present evidence that
Estrada committed the crime punished under Commonwealth Act No. 142, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6085 (CA 142), as interpreted by the Supreme
Court in Ursua v. Court of Appeals.[13] It ruled that there is an illegal use of alias within
the context of CA 142 only if the use of the alias is public and habitual. In Estradas
case, the Sandiganbayan noted, the application of the principles was not as simple
because of the complications resulting from the nature of the transaction involved
the alias was used in connection with the opening of a numbered trust account made
during the effectivity of R.A. No. 1405, as amended,[14] and prior to the enactment of
Republic R.A. No. 9160.[15]
Estrada did not publicly use the alias Jose Velarde:
a. Estradas use of the alias Jose Velarde in his dealings with Dichavez and
Ortaliza after February 4, 2000 is not relevant in light of the conclusion that the acts
imputed to Estrada under the Information were the act/s committed on February 4,
2000 only. Additionally, the phrase, Estrada did represent himself as Jose Velarde in
several transactions, standing alone, violates Estradas right to be informed of the
nature and the cause of the accusation, because it is very general and vague. This
phrase is qualified and explained by the succeeding phrase and use and employ the
said alias Jose Velarde which is neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal
name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate
entities. Thus, Estradas representations before persons other than those mentioned
in the Information are immaterial; Ortaliza and Dichavez do not fall within the
Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities specified in the
Information. Estradas representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez are not therefore
covered by the indictment.
b. The Sandiganbayan rejected the application of the principle in the law of
libel that mere communication to a third person is publicity; it reasoned out that that
the definition of publicity is not limited to the way it is defined under the law on libel;
additionally, the application of the libel law definition is onerous to the accused and
is precluded by the ruling in Ursua that CA No. 142, as a penal statute, should be
construed strictly against the State and favorably for the accused. It ruled that the
definition under the law on libel, even if it applies, considers a communication to a
third person covered by the privileged communication rule to be non-
actionable. Estradas use of the alias in front of Ocampo and Curato is one such
privileged communication under R.A. No. 1405, as amended. The Sandiganbayan
said:
Movants act of signing Jose Velarde in bank documents being absolutely confidential,
the witnessing thereof by bank officers who were likewise sworn to secrecy by the
same law cannot be considered as public as to fall within the ambit of CA 142 as
amended. On account of the absolute confidentiality of the transaction, it cannot be
said that movant intended to be known by this name in addition to his real
name.Confidentiality and secrecy negate publicity. Ursua instructs:
Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person
in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by
this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the
prohibition in C.A. No. 142 as amended.
c. The Sandiganbayan further found that the intention not to be publicly
known by the name Jose Velarde is shown by the nature of a numbered account a
perfectly valid banking transaction at the time Trust Account C-163 was opened. The
opening, too, of a numbered trust account, the Sandiganbayan further ruled, did not
impose on Estrada the obligation to disclose his real identity the obligation R.A. No.
6713 imposes is to file under oath a statement of assets and liabilities.[16] Reading CA
No. 142, R.A. No. 1405 and R.A. No. 6713 together, Estrada had the absolute
obligation to disclose his assets including the amount of his bank deposits, but he was
under no obligation at all to disclose the other particulars of the bank account (such
as the name he used to open it).
131
Third the effect of the enactment of R.A. No. 9160.[17] The Sandiganbayan said that
the absolute prohibition in R.A. No. 9160 against the use of anonymous accounts,
accounts under fictitious names, and all other similar accounts, is a legislative
acknowledgment that a gaping hole previously existed in our laws that allowed
depositors to hide their true identities. The Sandiganbayan noted that the prohibition
was lifted from Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Circular No. 251 dated July 7,
2000 another confirmation that the opening of a numbered trust account was
perfectly legal when it was opened on February 4, 2000.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the provisions of CA No. 142, as interpreted
in Ursua, must necessarily be harmonized with the provisions of R.A. No.1405 and
R.A. No. 9160 under the principle that every statute should be construed in a way
that will harmonize it with existing laws. A reasonable scrutiny, the Sandiganbayan
said, of all these laws in relation to the present case, led it to conclude that the use
of an alias within the context of a bank transaction (specifically, the opening of a
numbered account made before bank officers) is protected by the secrecy provisions
of R.A. No. 1405, and is thus outside the coverage of CA No. 142 until the passage
into law of R.A. No. 9160.
THE PETITION
The People filed this petition raising the following issues:
1. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing
Crim. Case No. 26565 and in holding that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his
alias Jose Velarde was not public despite the presence of Messrs. Aprodicio Laquian
and Fernando Chua on 4 February 2000;
2. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing
Crim. Case No. 26565 and in holding that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his
alias Jose Velarde was allowable under banking rules, despite the clear prohibition
under Commonwealth Act No. 142;
3. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing
Crim. Case No. 26565 and in applying R.A. No. 1405 as an exception to the illegal use
of alias punishable under Commonwealth Act No. 142;
4. Whether the alleged harmonization and application made by the court a quo of
R.A. No.1405 and Commonwealth Act No. 142 were proper;
5. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in limiting the
coverage of the amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 to the use of the alias
Jose Velarde by respondent Joseph Estrada on February 4, 2000;
6. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in departing
from its earlier final finding on the non-applicability of Ursua v. Court of Appeals and
forcing its application to the instant case.
THE COURTS RULING
The petition has no merit.
The Law on Illegal Use of Alias and the Ursua Ruling
Sections 1 and 2 of CA No. 142, as amended, read:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other
entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a
normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with
which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which
he was baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered
in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been
authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been
registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year
from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry
of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two
surnames.
132
Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in
proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of
name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than
one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and family
name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's name,
if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real
name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for
the use of alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded
in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other
than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper
local civil registry.
How this law is violated has been answered by the Ursua definition of an alias a name
or names used by a person or intended to be used by
him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real
name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name
authorized by a competent authority. There must be, in the words of Ursua, a sign or
indication that the user intends to be known by this name (the alias) in addition to his
real name from that day forth [for the use of alias to] fall within the prohibition
contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.[18]
Ursua further relates the historical background and rationale that led to the
enactment of CA No. 142, as follows:
The enactment of C.A. No. 142 was made primarily to curb the common practice
among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created
tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the
crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully
maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a
thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name,
unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in
the civil register.[19]
Following the doctrine of stare decisis,[20] we are guided by the Ursua ruling on how
the crime punished under CA No. 142 may be committed. Close adherence to this
ruling, in other words, is unavoidable in the application of and the determination of
criminal liability under CA No. 142.
Among the many grounds the People invokes to avoid the application of
the Ursua ruling proceeds from Estradas position in the government; at the time of
the commission of the offense, he was the President of the Republic who is required
by law to disclose his true name. We do not find this argument sufficient to justify a
distinction between a man on the street, on one hand, and the President of the
Republic, on the other, for purposes of applying CA No. 142. In the first place, the law
does not make any distinction, expressly or impliedly, that would justify a differential
treatment. CA No. 142 as applied to Estrada, in fact allows him to use his cinema or
screen name of Joseph Estrada, which name he has used even when he was already
the President of the Philippines. Even the petitioner has acquiesced to the use of the
screen name of the accused, as shown by the title of the present petition. Additionally,
any distinction we make based on the Peoples claim unduly prejudices Estrada; this
is proscribed by the Ursua dictum that CA No. 142, as a penal statute, should be
construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused.[21] The mode of
violating CA No. 142 is therefore the same whoever the accused may be.
The People also calls our attention to an earlier Sandiganbayan ruling (Resolution
dated February 6, 2002) denying Estradas motion to quash the Information. This
earlier Resolution effectively rejected the application of Ursua under the following
tenor:
The use of the term alias in the Amended Information in itself serves to bring this case
outside the ambit of the ruling in the case of Ursua v. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147
[1996]), on which the accused heavily relies in his motion to quash. The term alias
means otherwise known as (Webster Third New International Dictionary, 1993 ed., p.
53). The charge of using an alias logically implies that another name has been used
publicly and habitually. Otherwise, he will not be known by such name. In any case,
the amended information adverts to several transactions and signing of documents
with the Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities where the above-
mentioned alias was allegedly employed by the accused.
The facts alleged in the information are distinctly different from facts established in
the Ursua case where another name was used by the accused in a single instance
133
without any sign or indication that that [sic] he intended to be known from that day
by this name in addition to his real name.[22]
The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
applying Ursua notwithstanding this earlier final ruling on its non-applicability a
ruling that binds the parties in the present case. The People thus claims that the
Sandiganbayan erred to the point of gravely abusing its discretion when it resurrected
the application of Ursua, resulting in the reversal of its earlier final ruling.
We find no merit in this argument for two reasons. First, the cited Sandiganbayan
resolution is a mere interlocutory order a ruling denying a motion to quash[23] that
cannot be given the attributes of finality and immutability that are generally accorded
to judgments or orders that finally dispose of the whole, of or particular matters in, a
case.[24] The Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order because its
effects would only be provisional in character, and would still require the issuing court
to undertake substantial proceedings in order to put the controversy to rest.[25] It is
basic remedial law that an interlocutory order is always under the control of the court
and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before
final judgment.[26] Perez v. Court of Appeals,[27] albeit a civil case, instructively teaches
that an interlocutory order carries no res adjudicata effects. Says Perez:
The Decision in CA-G.R. No. 10415 having resolved only an interlocutory matter, the
principle of res judicata cannot be applied in this case. There can be no res
judicata where the previous order in question was not an order or judgment
determinative of an issue of fact pending before the court but was only an interlocutory
order because it required the parties to perform certain acts for final adjudication. In
this case, the lifting of the restraining order paved the way for the possession of the
fishpond on the part of petitioners and/or their representatives pending the
resolution of the main action for injunction. In other words, the main issue of whether
or not private respondent may be considered a sublessee or a transferee of the lease
entitled to possess the fishpond under the circumstances of the case had yet to be
resolved when the restraining order was lifted.[28]
Second, in the earlier motion to quash, the Sandiganbayan solely looked at the
allegations of the Information to determine the sufficiency of these allegations and
did not consider any evidence aliunde. This is far different from the present demurrer
to evidence where the Sandiganbayan had a fuller view of the prosecutions case, and
was faced with the issue of whether the prosecutions evidence was sufficient to prove
the allegations of the Information. Under these differing views, the Sandiganbayan
may arrive at a different conclusion on the application of Ursua, the leading case in
the application of CA 142, and the change in ruling is not per se indicative of grave
abuse of discretion. That there is no error of law is strengthened by our consideration
of the Sandiganbayan ruling on the application of Ursua.
In an exercise of caution given Ursuas jurisprudential binding effect, the People also
argues in its petition that Estradas case is different from Ursuas for the following
reasons: (1) respondent Estrada used and intended to continually use the alias Jose
Velarde in addition to the name Joseph Estrada; (2) Estradas use of the alias was not
isolated or limited to a single transaction; and (3) the use of the alias Jose Velarde was
designed to cause and did cause confusion and fraud in business transactions which
the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent. The People also argues that
the evidence it presented more than satisfied the requirements of CA No. 142, as
amended, and Ursua, as it was also shown or established that Estradas use of the alias
was public.
In light of our above conclusions and based on the parties expressed positions, we
shall now examine within the Ursua framework the assailed Sandiganbayan
Resolution granting the demurrer to evidence. The prosecution has the burden of
proof to show that the evidence it presented with the Sandiganbayan satisfied
the Ursua requirements, particularly on the matter of publicity and habituality in the
use of an alias.
What is the coverage of the indictment?
The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely erred and abused its discretion in
limiting the coverage of the amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 to Estradas
use of the alias Jose Velarde on February 4, 2000. It posits that there was a main
transaction one that took place on February 4, 2000 but there were other
transactions covered by the phrase prior to or subsequent thereto; the Information
specifically referred to several transactions with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other
corporate entities. To the People, the restrictive finding that the phrase prior to or
subsequent thereto is absorbed by the phrase on or about 04 February 2000
134
drastically amends the succeeding main allegations on the constitutive criminal acts
by removing the plurality of both the transactions involved and the documents signed
with various entities; there is the undeniable essential relationship between the
allegations of the multiplicity of transactions, on one hand, and the additional
antecedent of prior to or subsequent thereto, on the other. It argues that the
Sandiganbayan reduced the phrase prior to or subsequent thereto into a useless
appendage, providing Estrada with a convenient and totally unwarranted escape
route.
The People further argues that the allegation of time is the least exacting in satisfying
the constitutional requirement that the accused has to be informed of the accusation
against him. Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that an
allegation of the approximate date of the commission of the offense will suffice, while
Section 11 of the same Rule provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint
or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a
material ingredient of the crime. This liberality allegedly shaped the time-tested rule
that when the time given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, the
time of the commission of the offense does not need to be proven as alleged, and
that the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was
committed at any time within the period of the statute of limitations and before the
commencement of the action (citing People v. Bugayong [299 SCRA 528, 537] that in
turn cited US v. Smith [3 Phil. 20, 22]). Since allegations of date of the commission of
an offense are liberally interpreted, the People posits that the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion in disregarding the additional clause prior to or subsequent
thereto; under the liberality principle, the allegations of the acts constitutive of the
offense finally determine the sufficiency of the allegations of time. The People thus
claims that no surprise could have taken place that would prevent Estrada from
properly defending himself; the information fully notified him that he was being
accused of using the alias Jose Velarde in more than just one instance.
We see no merit in these arguments.
At its core, the issue is constitutional in nature the right of Estrada to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.Under the provisions of the Rules
of Court implementing this constitutional right, a complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by
the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense in the
name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense;
and the place where the offense was committed.[29] As to the cause of accusation, the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute, but in terms sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know the offense charged and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances, and for the court to pronounce judgment.[30] The date of
the commission of the offense need not be precisely stated in the complaint or
information except when the precise date is a material ingredient of the offense. The
offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the
actual date of its commission.[31]
The information must at all times embody the essential elements of the crime charged
by setting forth the facts and circumstances that bear on the culpability and liability
of the accused so that he can properly prepare for and undertake his defense.[32] In
short, the allegations in the complaint or information, as written, must fully inform or
acquaint the accused the primary reader of and the party directly affected by the
complaint or information of the charge/s laid.
The heretofore cited Information states that on or about 04 February 2000, or
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [did] willfully, unlawfully
and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS JOSE VELARDE IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND
use and employ the SAID alias Jose Velarde which IS neither his registered name at birth
nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other
corporate entities.
We fully agree with the disputed Sandiganbayans reading of the Information, as this
was how the accused might have similarly read and understood the allegations in the
Information and, on this basis, prepared his defense. Broken down into its
component parts, the allegation of time in the Information plainly states
that (1) ON February 4, 2000; (2) OR before February 4, 2000; (3) OR sometime prior
or subsequent to February 4, 2000, in the City of Manila, Estrada represented himself
as Jose Velarde in several transactions in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank
and/or other corporate entities.
135

Under this analysis, the several transactions involving the signing of documents with
Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities all had their reference to February
4, 2000; they were all made on or about or prior or subsequent to that date, thus
plainly implying that all these transactions took place only on February 4, 2000 or on
another single date sometime before or after February 4, 2000. To be sure, the
Information could have simply said on or about February 4, 2000 to capture all the
alternative approximate dates, so that the phrase sometime prior or subsequent
thereto would effectively be a surplusage that has no meaning separately from the
on or about already expressed. This consequent uselessness of the prior or subsequent
thereto phrase cannot be denied, but it is a direct and necessary consequence of the
use of the OR between the two phrases and the THERETO that referred back
to February 4, 2000 in the second phrase. Of course, the reading would have been
very different (and would have been clearly in accord with the Peoples present
interpretation) had the Information simply used AND instead of OR to separate the
phrases; the intent to refer to various transactions occurring on various dates and
occasions all proximate to February 4, 2000 could not be disputed. Unfortunately for
the People, the imprecision in the use of OR is the reality the case has to live with. To
act contrary to this reality would violate Estradas right to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation against him; the multiple transactions on several separate
days that the People claims would result in surprise and denial of an opportunity to
prepare for Estrada, who has a right to rely on the single day mentioned in the
Information.
Separately from the constitutional dimension of the allegation of time in the
Information, another issue that the allegation of time and our above conclusion raise
relates to what act or acts, constituting a violation of the offense charged, were
actually alleged in the Information.
The conclusion we arrived at necessarily impacts on the Peoples case, as it deals a
fatal blow on the Peoples claim that Estrada habitually used the Jose Velarde
alias. For, to our mind, the repeated use of an alias within a single day cannot be
deemed habitual, as it does not amount to a customary practice or use. This reason
alone dictates the dismissal of the petition under CA No. 142 and the terms of Ursua.
The issues of publicity, numbered accounts, and
the application of CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405,
and R.A. No. 9160.
We shall jointly discuss these interrelated issues.
The People claims that even on the assumption that Ocampo and Curato are bank
officers sworn to secrecy under the law, the presence of two other persons who are
not bank officers Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua when Estradas signed the
bank documents as Jose Velarde amounted to a public use of an alias that violates CA
No. 142.
On the issue of numbered accounts, the People argues that to premise the validity of
Estradas prosecution for violation of CA No. 142 on a mere banking practice is gravely
erroneous, improper, and constitutes grave abuse of discretion; no banking law
provision allowing the use of aliases in the opening of bank accounts existed; at most,
it was allowed by mere convention or industry practice, but not by a statute enacted
by the legislature. Additionally, that Estradas prosecution was supposedly based on
BSP Circular No. 302 dated October 11, 2001 is wrong and misleading, as Estrada
stands charged with violation of CA No. 142, penalized since 1936, and not with a
violation of a mere BSP Circular. That the use of alias in bank transactions prior to BSP
Circular No. 302 is allowed is inconsequential because as early as CA No. 142, the use
of an alias (except for certain purposes which do not include banking) was already
prohibited. Nothing in CA No. 142 exempted the use of aliases in banking
transactions, since the law did not distinguish or limit its application; it was therefore
grave error for the Sandiganbayan to have done so. Lastly on this point, bank
regulations being mere issuances cannot amend, modify or prevail over the effective,
subsisting and enforceable provision of CA No. 142.
On the issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 1405 and its relationship with CA No. 142,
that since nothing in CA No. 142 excuses the use of an alias, the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that R.A. No. 1405 is an exception to CA
No. 142s coverage.Harmonization of laws, the People posits, is allowed only if the
laws intended to be harmonized refer to the same subject matter, or are at least
related with one another. The three laws which the Sandiganbayan tried to
harmonize are not remotely related to one another; they each deal with a different
subject matter, prohibits a different act, governs a different conduct, and covers a
different class of persons,[33] and there was no need to force their application to one
136
another. Harmonization of laws, the People adds, presupposes the existence of
conflict or incongruence between or among the provisions of various laws, a situation
not obtaining in the present case.
The People posits, too, that R.A. No. 1405 does not apply to trust transactions, such
as Trust Account No. C-163, as it applies only to traditional deposits (simple loans). A
trust account, according to the People, may not be considered a deposit because it
does not create the juridical relation of creditor and debtor; trust and deposit
operations are treated separately and are different in legal contemplation; trust
operation is separate and distinct from banking and requires a grant of separate
authority, and trust funds are not covered by deposit insurance under the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation law (R.A. No. 3591, as amended).
The People further argues that the Sandiganbayans conclusion that the transaction
or communication was privileged in nature was erroneous a congruent interpretation
of CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 shows that a person who signs in a public or private
transaction a name or alias, other than his original name or the alias he is authorized
to use, shall be held liable for violation of CA No. 142, while the bank employees are
bound by the confidentiality of bank transactions except in the circumstances
enumerated in R.A. No. 1405. At most, the People argues, the prohibition in R.A. No.
1405 covers bank employees and officers only, and not Estrada; the law does not
prohibit Estrada from disclosing and making public his use of an alias to other people,
including Ocampo and Curato, as he did when he made a public exhibit and use of the
alias before Messrs. Lacquian and Chua.
Finally, the People argues that the Sandiganbayan ruling that the use of an alias
before bank officers does not violate CA No. 142 effectively encourages the
commission of wrongdoing and the concealment of ill-gotten wealth under
pseudonyms; it sustains an anomalous and prejudicial policy that uses the law to
silence bank officials and employees from reporting the commission of crimes. The
People contends that the law R.A. No. 1405 was not intended by the Legislature to be
used as a subterfuge or camouflage for the commission of crimes and cannot be so
interpreted; the law can only be interpreted, understood and applied so that right
and justice would prevail.
We see no merit in these arguments.
We agree, albeit for a different reason, with the Sandiganbayan position that the rule
in the law of libel that mere communication to a third person is publicity does not
apply to violations of CA No. 142. Our close reading of Ursua particularly, the
requirement that there be intention by the user to be culpable and the historical
reasons we cited above tells us that the required publicity in the use of alias is more
than mere communication to a third person; the use of the alias, to be considered
public, must be made openly, or in an open manner or place, or to cause it to become
generally known. In order to be held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of
the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under
that other name. In other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest.
To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde
and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be
publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua
were not part of the public who had no access to Estradas privacy and to the
confidential matters that transpired in Malacaan where he sat as President; Lacquian
was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest
confidence, while Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office and ties of
friendship to keep and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada
could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public
consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the room at
that time. The same holds true for Estradas alleged representations with Ortaliza and
Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of
Estradas representations to these people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with
no iota of intention of publicity.
The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment rests, affords Estrada a
reasonable expectation of privacy, as the alleged criminal act related to the opening
of a trust account a transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers absolutely confidential
in nature.[34] We previously rejected, in Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan,[35] the Peoples
nitpicking argument on the alleged dichotomy between bank deposits and trust
transactions, when we said:
The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the term deposits, as used in
R.A. 1405, by the mere fact that they do not entail a creditor-debtor relationship
137
between the trustor and the bank, does not lie. An examination of the law shows that
the term deposits used therein is to be understood broadly and not limited only to
accounts which give rise to a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and
the bank.
The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1:
SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to give
encouragement to the people to deposit their money in banking institutions and to
discourage private hoarding so that the same may be properly utilized by banks in
authorized loans to assist in the economic development of the
country. (Underscoring supplied)
If the money deposited under an account may be used by bank for authorized loans
to third persons, then such account, regardless of whether it creates a creditor-
debtor relationship between the depositor and the bank, falls under the category of
accounts which the law precisely seeks to protect for the purpose of boosting the
economic development of the country.
Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust Agreement
between petitioner and Urban Bank provides that the trust account covers deposit,
placement or investment of funds by Urban Bank for and in behalf of petitioner. The
money deposited under Trust Account No. 858, was, therefore, intended not merely
to remain with the bank but to be invested by it elsewhere. To hold that this type of
account is not protected by R.A. 1405 would encourage private hoarding of funds that
could otherwise be invested by bank in other ventures, contrary to the policy behind
the law.
Section 2 of the same law in fact even more clearly shows that the term deposits was
intended to be understood broadly:
SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with bank or banking institutions in the
Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the
Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered
as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked
into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written
permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in
cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The phrase of whatever nature proscribes any restrictive interpretation
of deposits. Moreover, it is clear from the immediately quoted provision that,
generally, the law applies not only to money which is deposited but also to those
which are invested. This further shows that the law was not intended to apply only
to deposits in the strict sense of the word. Otherwise, there would have been no need
to add the phrase or invested.
Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account No. 858.[36]
We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of
Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily protected or recognized zones of privacy.[37] Given
the private nature of Estradas act of signing the documents as Jose Velarde related
to the opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim that there was already
a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. We need not
even consider here the impact of the obligations imposed by R.A. No.1405 on the
bank officers; what is essentially significant is the privacy situation that is necessarily
implied in these kinds of transactions. This statutorily guaranteed privacy and secrecy
effectively negate a conclusion that the transaction was done publicly or with the
intent to use the alias publicly.
The enactment of R.A. No.9160, on the other hand, is a significant development only
because it clearly manifests that prior to its enactment, numbered accounts or
anonymous accounts were permitted banking transactions, whether they be allowed
by law or by a mere banking regulation. To be sure, an indictment against Estrada
using this relatively recent law cannot be maintained without violating the
constitutional
prohibition on the enactment and use of ex post facto laws.[38]
138
We hasten to add that this holistic application and interpretation of these various
laws is not an attempt to harmonize these laws. A finding of commission of the
offense punished under CA No. 142 must necessarily rest on the evidence of the
requisites for culpability, as amplified in Ursua. The application of R.A. No. 1405 is
significant only because Estradas use of the alias was pursuant to a transaction that
the law considers private or, at the very least, where the law guarantees a reasonable
expectation of privacy to the parties to the transactions; it is at this point that R.A.
No. 1405 tangentially interfaces with an indictment under CA 142. In this light, there
is no actual frontal clash between CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 that requires
harmonization. Each operates within its own sphere, but must necessarily be read
together when these spheres interface with one another. Finally, R.A. No. 9160, as a
law of recent vintage in relation to the indictment against Estrada, cannot be a source
or an influencing factor in his indictment.
In finding the absence of the requisite publicity, we simply looked at the totality of
the circumstances obtaining in Estradas use of the alias Jose Velarde vis--
vis the Ursua requisites. We do not decide here whether Estradas use of an alias
when he occupied the highest executive position in the land was valid and legal; we
simply determined, as the Sandiganbayan did, whether he may be made liable for the
offense charged based on the evidence the People presented. As with any other
accused, his guilt must be based on the evidence and proof beyond reasonable doubt
that a finding of criminal liability requires. If the People fails to discharge this burden,
as they did fail in this case, the rule of law requires that we so declare. We do so now
in this review and accordingly find no reversible error of law in the assailed
Sandiganbayan ruling.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Acuna vs Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 144692. January 31, 2005]
CELSA P. ACUA, petitioner, vs. DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON, PEDRO PASCUA and
RONNIE TURLA, (Angeles City National Trade School), respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari[1] of the Resolution dated 4 April 2000 and the Order
dated 19 June 2000 of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The 4 April 2000 Resolution
dismissed for lack of probable cause the complaint for perjury of petitioner Celsa P.
Acua against respondents Pedro Pascua and Ronnie Turla. The 19 June 2000 Order
denied the motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioner Celsa P. Acua (petitioner) is a former teacher of the Angeles City National
Trade School (ACNTS) in Angeles City, Pampanga. Respondent Pedro Pascua
(respondent Pascua) was ACNTS Officer-In-Charge while respondent Ronnie Turla
(respondent Turla) was a member of its faculty.[2]
On 13 July 1998, a certain Erlinda Yabut (Yabut), another ACNTS teacher, together
with other school personnel, requested a dialogue with respondent Pascua on some
unspecified matter. Respondent Pascua agreed to the request and the meeting took
place on 16 July 1998. Respondent Turla attended the meeting upon respondent
Pascuas directive. Petitioner, whom Yabut apparently invited, also attended the
meeting.
As an offshoot to an incident during the 16 July 1998 meeting, petitioner charged
respondent Pascua with misconduct (OMB-ADM-1-99-0387) and with violation of
Article 131[3] of the Revised Penal Code (OMB 1-99-903) before the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman).[4] In his sworn counter-affidavit in OMB-ADM-1-99-
0387, respondent Pascua alleged, among others, that: (1) OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 is a
rehash and a duplication with a slight deviation of fact of an administrative case
pending with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) which
petitioner and Yabut earlier filed against him and (2) Yabut had no authority to invite
to the 16 July 1998 meeting a non-employee of ACNTS like petitioner considering that
he (respondent Pascua) was the one who called the meeting.[5] Respondent Pascua
also submitted a sworn statement of respondent Turla confirming that respondent
Pascua and not Yabut called the 16 July 1998 meeting.[6]
The Ombudsman dismissed OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 and OMB 1-99-0903.
Contending that private respondents perjured themselves in their sworn statements
in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387, petitioner charged private respondents with perjury (OMB
1-99-2467) before the office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon (public
respondent). Petitioner alleged that private respondents were liable for perjury
because: (1) the complaint she and Yabut filed against respondent Pascua before the
139
Civil Service Commission, later endorsed to the DECS, was not the same as her
complaint in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 and (2) it was Yabut and not respondent Pascua
who called the 16 July 1998 meeting.[7]
Private respondents denied the charge against them and sought the dismissal of the
complaint.[8]
The Ruling of the Public Respondent
Public respondent dismissed petitioners complaint in his 4 April 2000
Resolution,[9] thus:
Upon careful evaluation of the case record, we find no evidence to indict respondents
for perjury.
xxxx
It could not be established by the evidence on record that it was Erlinda Yabut who
called the meeting on July 16, 1998 and invited complainant. Annex B-1 xxx of the
complaint is the letter of Erlinda Yabut to Dr. Pedro Pascua, dated July 13, 1998, which
shows that Ms. Yabut was requesting respondent to have a dialogue (sic). The letter
states:
We, the undersigned would like to request your good office to allow us to have a
dialogue on Thursday, July 1[6], to once and for all ventilate our
complaints/observations and also listen to the rebuttal of the other side.
It is the desire of everybody who attended the meeting last time that whatever is the
outcome of this confrontation will be the basis of the next appropriate step.
We would like to request the incoming Administrator or somebody from the DECS to
act as moderator.
Pursuant to such circumstance, respondent Pascua stated, among others, in his
counter-affidavit in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 that:
5. Be that as it may, I vehemently deny the charge that I prevented Complainant Celsa
Acu[]a from testifying against Mrs. Amelia Yambao on July 16, 1998 the truth of the
matter being that there was no hearing or investigation conducted or called by the
undersigned on said date but a dialogue among the teachers of Angeles City National
Trade School which I previously headed. Mrs. Acu[]a at that time was not a teacher
to attend the said dialogue, thus I stated openly on said occasion that I will not start
the meeting if there are outsiders, and Mr. ROGELIO GUTIERREZ asked herein
Complainant to step out of the room so we could start the dialogue, xxx;
6. I also deny the charge that she was invited by Mrs. Erlinda Yabut, co-complainant
of hers in the DECS Administrative case, because I was the one who called for that
dialogue and not Mrs. Yabut, thus I never gave any authority to anyone to invite any
person who was not a member of the school faculty or an employee thereof.
Clearly, the letter of Ms. Yabut and the aforequoted counter-affidavit of respondent
Pascua belie the commission of perjury since there was no deliberate assertion of
falsehood on a material matter.
Respondent Ronnie Turla could not likewise be indicted for the crime charged. Since
it was respondent Pascua who called him to that meeting, it would be truthful of him
to state that way. There was also no willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood on
the part of respondent Ronnie Turla.[10]
Petitioner sought reconsideration but public respondent denied her motion in the 19
June 2000 Order.
Hence, petitioner filed this petition. Petitioner contends that public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing her complaint for lack of probable
cause.[11]
Public respondent, in his Comment, maintains that he did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing petitioners complaint in OMB 1-99-2467.[12]
In their Comment, private respondents claim that petitioner filed this petition out of
time. Hence, this petition should be dismissed outright. On the merits, private
respondents submit that public respondent correctly dismissed the perjury charge
against them.[13]
In her Reply, petitioner counters that she timely filed her petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 65).[14]
The Issues
The petition raises these issues:
1. Whether petitioner filed the petition on time; and
2. Whether public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the complaint in OMB 1-99-2467 for lack of probable cause.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition, while filed on time, has no merit.
The Petition was Filed on Time
Private respondents contend that petitioner filed this petition beyond the ten-day
period provided in Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770.[15]Section 27 states in part:
Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. xxxx
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition
for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
140
directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
The contention has no merit. Section 27 is no longer in force because this Court
in Fabian v. Desierto[16] declared it unconstitutional for expanding the Courts
jurisdiction without its consent in violation of Article VI, Section 30 of the
Constitution. Furthermore, Section 27 relates only to appeals from rulings of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It does not apply to appeals from
the Ombudsmans rulings in criminal cases such as the present case.[17]
The remedy of an aggrieved party in criminal complaints before the Ombudsman is
to file with this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Thus, we held in Tirol, Jr.
v. Del Rosario:[18]
The Ombudsman Act specifically deals with the remedy of an aggrieved party from
orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases. As we ruled in Fabian, the aggrieved party [in administrative cases] is given the
right to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Such right of appeal is not granted to parties
aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, like finding
probable cause to indict accused persons.
However, an aggrieved party is not without recourse where the finding of the
Ombudsman xxx is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack [or]
excess of jurisdiction. An aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner precisely availed of such remedy when she filed this petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 alleging that public respondent gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing her complaint against private respondents. Under Section 4
of Rule 65, as amended, petitioner had 60 days from her receipt of the 19 June 2000
Order within which to file this petition. Petitioner received a copy of the 19 June 2000
Order on 13 July 2000. Thus, petitioner had until 11 September 2000 within which to
file this petition. Petitioner did so on 11 August 2000. Hence, petitioner filed this
petition on time.
The Public Respondent did not Gravely Abuse
His Discretion in Dismissing OMB 1-99-2467
We reiterate this Courts policy of non-interference with the Ombudsmans exercise of
his constitutionally mandated prosecutory powers.[19] We explained the reason for
such policy in Ocampo, IV v. Ombudsman:[20]
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers
granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as
well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by
innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted
by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much
the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be
compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting
attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint
by a private complainant.
The Court, in the present case, finds no reason to deviate from this long-standing
policy.
Petitioner contends that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing her complaint for perjury for lack of probable cause. The contention is
untenable. Probable cause, as used in preliminary investigations, is defined as the
existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable
mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.[21] The elements of
perjury under Article 183[22] of the Revised Penal Code are:
(a) that the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a
material matter; (b) that the statement or affidavit was made before a competent
officer, authorized to receive and administer oath; (c) that in that statement or
affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and, (d)
that the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made
for a legal purpose.[23](Emphasis supplied)
Public respondent correctly ruled that the first and third elements are absent here in
that private respondents statements in their counter-affidavits in OMB-ADM-1-99-
0387 were not material to that case nor do they constitute willful and deliberate
assertion of falsehood.
On the Element of Materiality
In prosecutions for perjury, a matter is material if it is the main fact which was the
subject of the inquiry, or any circumstance which tends to prove that fact xxx. [24] To
hold private respondents liable, there must be evidence that their assailed
statements in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 were the subject of inquiry in that case.
Petitioner has presented no such evidence. The records are hardly helpful, as
petitioner did not furnish the Court a copy of her complaint in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387.
What is before the Court is a portion of respondent Pascuas counter-affidavit in that
case as quoted by public respondent in his 4 April 2000 Resolution. Admittedly, some
inference is possible from this quoted material, namely, that the basis of petitioners
141
complaint in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 is that respondent Pascua prevented her from WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. The Resolution dated 4 April 2000 and the
taking part in the 16 July 1998 meeting. However, it would be improper for the Court Order dated 19 June 2000 of respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon are
to rely on such inference because the element of materiality must be established by AFFIRMED.
evidence and not left to inference.[25] SO ORDERED.
At any rate, petitioners complaint for perjury will still not prosper because respondent Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Pascuas statement that OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 is significantly the same as petitioners
and Yabuts administrative complaint against respondent Pascua before the DECS is Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. vs Gomez
immaterial to the inferred issue.
On the Element of Deliberate Assertion SECOND DIVISION
of Falsehood COCA-COLA BOTTLERS, PHILS., INC. G.R. No. 154491
The third element of perjury requires that the accused willfully and deliberately assert (CCBPI), Naga Plant,
a falsehood. Good faith or lack of malice is a valid defense.[26] Here, the Court finds Petitioner,
that respondent Pascuas statement in his counter-affidavit in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 Promulgated:
that he called the 16 July 1998 meeting does not constitute a deliberate assertion of - versus -
falsehood. While it was Yabut and some unidentified ACNTS personnel who QUINTIN J. GOMEZ, a.k.a. KITGOMEZ November 14, 2008
requested a dialogue with respondent Pascua, it was respondent Pascuas consent to and DANILO E. GALICIA, a.k.a.
their request which led to the holding of the meeting. Thus, respondent Pascuas DANNY GALICIA,
statement in question is not false much less malicious. It is a good faith interpretation Respondents.
of events leading to the holding of the meeting. x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Regarding respondent Pascuas allegation in his counter-affidavit in OMB-ADM-1-99-
0387 that petitioners complaint was a mere rehash and duplication with a slight DECISION
deviation of fact of the DECS administrative case petitioner and Yabut filed against
respondent Pascua, petitioner has not shown why this is false. Petitioner again did BRION, J.:
not furnish the Court a copy of her and Yabuts complaint with the DECS.
Respondent Turlas statement in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 that respondent Pascua called Is the hoarding of a competitors product containers punishable as unfair competition
the 16 July 1998 meeting was a mere reiteration of what respondent Pascua told him. under the Intellectual Property Code (IP Code, Republic Act No. 8293) that would
Consequently, it was correct for public respondent to hold that since respondent entitle the aggrieved party to a search warrant against the hoarder? This is the issue
Turla merely repeated what he heard from respondent Pascua, he could not be held we grapple with in this petition for review on certiorari involving two rival
liable for making a false and malicious statement. multinational softdrink giants; petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., Inc. (Coca-Cola)
There is grave abuse of discretion where power is exercised in arbitrary or despotic accuses Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. (Pepsi), represented by the respondents, of
manner by reason of passion or hostility. The abuse must be so patent and gross as hoarding empty Coke bottles in bad faith to discredit its business and to sabotage its
to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty or operation in Bicolandia.
to act at all in contemplation of law.[27] No such conduct can be imputed on public
respondent. Public respondent disposed of petitioners complaint consistent with BACKGROUND
applicable law.
The facts, as culled from the records, are summarized below.
142
On July 2, 2001, Coca-Cola applied for a search warrant against Pepsi for hoarding
Coke empty bottles in Pepsis yard in Concepcion Grande, Naga City, an act allegedly
penalized as unfair competition under the IP Code. Coca-Cola claimed that the bottles
must be confiscated to preclude their illegal use, destruction or concealment by the
respondents.[1] In support of the application, Coca-Cola submitted the sworn
statements of three witnesses: Naga plant representative Arnel John Ponce said he
was informed that one of their plant security guards had gained access into the Pepsi
compound and had seen empty Coke bottles; acting plant security officer Ylano A.
Regaspi said he investigated reports that Pepsi was hoarding large quantities of Coke
bottles by requesting their security guard to enter the Pepsi plant and he was
informed by the security guard that Pepsi hoarded several Coke bottles; security
guard Edwin Lirio stated that he entered Pepsis yard on July 2, 2001 at 4 p.m. and saw
empty Coke bottles inside Pepsi shells or cases.[2]
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Executive Judge Julian C. Ocampo of Naga City, after
taking the joint deposition of the witnesses, issued Search Warrant No. 2001-01[3] to
seize 2,500 Litro and 3,000 eight and 12 ounces empty Coke bottles at Pepsis Naga
yard for violation of Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code.[4] The local police seized and
brought to the MTCs custody 2,464 Litro and 4,036 eight and 12 ounces empty Coke
bottles, 205 Pepsi shells for Litro, and 168 Pepsi shells for smaller (eight and 12
ounces) empty Coke bottles, and later filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Naga a complaint against two Pepsi officers for violation of Section 168.3 (c) in
relation to Section 170 of the IP Code.[5] The named respondents, also the
respondents in this petition, were Pepsi regional sales manager Danilo E.
Galicia (Galicia)and its Naga general manager Quintin J. Gomez, Jr. (Gomez).
In their counter-affidavits, Galicia and Gomez claimed that the bottles came from
various Pepsi retailers and wholesalers who included them in their return to make up
for shortages of empty Pepsi bottles; they had no way of ascertaining beforehand the
return of empty Coke bottles as they simply received what had been delivered; the
presence of the bottles in their yard was not intentional nor deliberate; Ponce and
Regaspis statements are hearsay as they had no personal knowledge of the alleged
crime; there is no mention in the IP Code of the crime of possession of empty bottles;
and that the ambiguity of the law, which has a penal nature, must be construed
strictly against the State and liberally in their favor. Pepsi security guards Eduardo E.
Miral and Rene Acebuche executed a joint affidavit stating that per their logbook,
Lirio did not visit or enter the plant premises in the afternoon of July 2, 2001.
The respondents also filed motions for the return of their shells and to quash the
search warrant. They contended that no probable cause existed to justify the
issuance of the search warrant; the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and
their Naga plant was in urgent need of the shells.
Coca-Cola opposed the motions as the shells were part of the evidence of the crime,
arguing that Pepsi used the shells in hoarding the bottles. It insisted that the issuance
of warrant was based on probable cause for unfair competition under the IP Code,
and that the respondents violated R.A. 623, the law regulating the use of stamped or
marked bottles, boxes, and other similar containers.
THE MTC RULINGS
On September 19, 2001, the MTC issued the first assailed order[6] denying the twin
motions. It explained there was an exhaustive examination of the applicant and its
witnesses through searching questions and that the Pepsi shells are prima
facie evidence that the bottles were placed there by the respondents.
In their motion for reconsideration, the respondents argued for the quashal of the
warrant as the MTC did not conduct a probing and exhaustive examination; the
applicant and its witnesses had no personal knowledge of facts surrounding the
hoarding; the court failed to order the return of the borrowed shells; there was no
crime involved; the warrant was issued based on hearsay evidence; and the seizure
of the shells was illegal because they were not included in the warrant.
On November 14, 2001, the MTC denied the motion for reconsideration in the second
assailed order,[7] explaining that the issue of whether there was unfair competition
can only be resolved during trial.
The respondents responded by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City on the
ground that the subject search warrant was issued without probable cause and that
the empty shells were neither mentioned in the warrant nor the objects of the
perceived crime.
143

THE RTC RULINGS
On May 8, 2002, the RTC voided the warrant for lack of probable cause and the non-
commission of the crime of unfair competition, even as it implied that other laws may
have been violated by the respondents. The RTC, though, found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the issuing MTC judge.[8] Thus,
Accordingly, as prayed for, Search Warrant No. 2001-02 issued by the Honorable
Judge Julian C. Ocampo III on July 2, 2001 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Orders
issued by the Pairing Judge of Br. 1, MTCC of Naga City dated September 19,
2001 and November 14, 2001 are also declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The City
Prosecutor of Naga City and SPO1 Ernesto Paredes are directed to return to the
Petitioner the properties seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 2001-02. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[9]
In a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied on July 12, 2002, the
petitioner stressed that the decision of the RTC was contradictory because it absolved
Judge Ocampo of grave abuse of discretion in issuing the search warrant, but at the
same time nullified the issued warrant. The MTC should have dismissed the petition
when it found out that Judge Ocampo did not commit any grave abuse of discretion.
Bypassing the Court of Appeals, the petitioner asks us through this petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to reverse the decision of the
RTC. Essentially, the petition raises questions against the RTCs nullification of the
warrant when it found no grave abuse of discretion committed by the issuing judge.
THE PETITION and
THE PARTIES POSITIONS
In its petition, the petitioner insists the RTC should have dismissed the respondents
petition for certiorari because it found no grave abuse of discretion by the MTC in
issuing the search warrant. The petitioner further argues that the IP Code was
enacted into law to remedy various forms of unfair competition accompanying
globalization as well as to replace the inutile provision of unfair competition under
Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. Section 168.3(c) of the IP Code does not limit
the scope of protection on the particular acts enumerated as it expands the meaning
of unfair competition to include other acts contrary to good faith of a nature
calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of another. The inherent
element of unfair competition is fraud or deceit, and that hoarding of large quantities
of a competitors empty bottles is necessarily characterized by bad faith. It claims that
its Bicol bottling operation was prejudiced by the respondents hoarding and
destruction of its empty bottles.
The petitioner also argues that the quashal of the search warrant was improper
because it complied with all the essential requisites of a valid warrant. The empty
bottles were concealed in Pepsi shells to prevent discovery while they were
systematically being destroyed to hamper the petitioners bottling operation and to
undermine the capability of its bottling operations in Bicol.
The respondents counter-argue that although Judge Ocampo conducted his own
examination, he gravely erred and abused his discretion when he ignored the rule on
the need of sufficient evidence to establish probable cause; satisfactory and
convincing evidence is essential to hold them guilty of unfair competition; the
hoarding of empty Coke bottles did not cause actual or probable deception and
confusion on the part of the general public; the alleged criminal acts do not show
conduct aimed at deceiving the public; there was no attempt to use the empty bottles
or pass them off as the respondents goods.
The respondents also argue that the IP Code does not criminalize bottle hoarding, as
the acts penalized must always involve fraud and deceit. The hoarding does not make
them liable for unfair competition as there was no deception or fraud on the end-
users.
THE ISSUE
Based on the parties positions, the basic issue submitted to us for resolution is
whether the Naga MTC was correct in issuing Search Warrant No. 2001-01 for the
seizure of the empty Coke bottles from Pepsis yard for probable violation of Section
168.3 (c) of the IP Code. This basic issue involves two sub-issues, namely, the
substantive issue of whether the application for search warrant effectively charged
an offense, i.e., a violation of Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code; and the procedural
144
issue of whether the MTC observed the procedures required by the Rules of Court in
the issuance of search warrants.
OUR RULING
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.
We clarify at the outset that while we agree with the RTC decision, our agreement is
more in the result than in the reasons that supported it. The decision is correct in
nullifying the search warrant because it was issued on an invalid substantive basis the
acts imputed on the respondents do not violate Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code. For
this reason, we deny the present petition.
The issuance of a search warrant[10] against a personal property[11] is governed by Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Court whose relevant sections state:
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing
and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together
with the affidavits submitted.
Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. If the judge is satisfied of the
existence of facts upon which the application is based or that there is probable cause
to believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in
the form prescribed by these Rules. [Emphasis supplied]
To paraphrase this rule, a search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause
in connection with a specific offense alleged in an application based on the personal
knowledge of the applicant and his or her witnesses. This is the substantive
requirement in the issuance of a search warrant. Procedurally, the determination of
probable cause is a personal task of the judge before whom the application for search
warrant is filed, as he has to examine under oath or affirmation the applicant and his
or her witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers in writing and under
oath. The warrant, if issued, must particularly describe the place to be searched and
the things to be seized.
We paraphrase these requirements to stress that they have substantive and
procedural aspects. Apparently, the RTC recognized this dual nature of the
requirements and, hence, treated them separately; it approved of the way the MTC
handled the procedural aspects of the issuance of the search warrant but found its
action on the substantive aspect wanting. It therefore resolved to nullify the warrant,
without however expressly declaring that the MTC gravely abused its discretion when
it issued the warrant applied for. The RTCs error, however, is in the form rather than
the substance of the decision as the nullification of the issued warrant for the reason
the RTC gave was equivalent to the declaration that grave abuse of discretion was
committed. In fact, we so rule as the discussions below will show.
Jurisprudence teaches us that probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a
search warrant, is such reasons supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant
a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are
legally just and proper.Probable cause requires facts and circumstances that would
lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be
searched.[12] Implicit in this statement is the recognition that an underlying offense
must, in the first place, exist. In other words, the acts alleged, taken together, must
constitute an offense and that these acts are imputable to an offender in relation with
whom a search warrant is applied for.
In the context of the present case, the question is whether the act charged alleged to
be hoarding of empty Coke bottles constitutes an offense under Section 168.3 (c) of
the IP Code. Section 168 in its entirety states:
SECTION 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulation and Remedies.
168.1. A person who has identified in the mind of the public the goods he
manufactures or deals in, his business or services from those of others, whether or
145
not a registered mark is employed, has a property right in the goodwill of the said
goods, business or services so identified, which will be protected in the same manner
as other property rights.
168.2. Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good
faith by which he shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals,
or his business, or services for those of the one having established such goodwill, or
who shall commit any acts calculated to produce said result, shall be guilty of unfair
competition, and shall be subject to an action therefor.
168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against
unfair competition, the following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition:
(a) Any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance of
goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the
wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the devices or words
thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance, which would be likely to
influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer
or dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the
goods with such appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another of his
legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor
engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose;
(b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any other means
calculated to induce the false belief that such person is offering the services of
another who has identified such services in the mind of the public; or
(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or who shall
commit any other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the
goods, business or services of another.
168.4. The remedies provided by Sections 156, 157 and 161 shall apply mutatis
mutandis. (Sec. 29, R.A. No. 166a)
The petitioner theorizes that the above section does not limit the scope of protection
on the particular acts enumerated as it expands the meaning of unfair competition to
include other acts contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the goods,
business or services of another. Allegedly, the respondents hoarding of Coca Cola
empty bottles is one such act.
We do not agree with the petitioners expansive interpretation of Section 168.3 (c).
Unfair competition, previously defined in Philippine jurisprudence in relation with
R.A. No. 166 and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code, is now covered by
Section 168 of the IP Code as this Code has expressly repealed R.A. No. 165 and R.A.
No. 166, and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code.
Articles 168.1 and 168.2, as quoted above, provide the concept and general rule on
the definition of unfair competition. The law does not thereby cover every unfair act
committed in the course of business; it covers only acts characterized by deception or
any other means contrary to good faith in the passing off of goods and services as
those of another who has established goodwill in relation with these goods or
services, or any other act calculated to produce the same result.
What unfair competition is, is further particularized under Section 168.3 when it
provides specifics of what unfair competition is without in any way limiting the scope
of protection against unfair competition. Part of these particulars is provided under
Section 168.3(c) which provides the general catch-all phrase that the petitioner
cites. Under this phrase, a person shall be guilty of unfair competition who shall
commit any other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the
goods, business or services of another.
From jurisprudence, unfair competition has been defined as the passing off (or
palming off) or attempting to pass off upon the public the goods or business of one
person as the goods or business of another with the end and probable effect of
deceiving the public. It formulated the true test of unfair competition: whether the
acts of defendant are such as are calculated to deceive the ordinary buyer making his
purchases under the ordinary conditions which prevail in the particular trade to which
the controversy relates.[13] One of the essential requisites in an action to restrain
unfair competition is proof of fraud; the intent to deceive must be shown before the
right to recover can exist.[14] The advent of the IP Code has not significantly changed
these rulings as they are fully in accord with what Section 168 of the Code in its
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entirety provides. Deception, passing off and fraud upon the public are still the key
elements that must be present for unfair competition to exist.
The act alleged to violate the petitioners rights under Section 168.3 (c) is hoarding
which we gather to be the collection of the petitioners empty bottles so that they can
be withdrawn from circulation and thus impede the circulation of the petitioners
bottled products.This, according to the petitioner, is an act contrary to good faith a
conclusion that, if true, is indeed an unfair act on the part of the respondents. The
critical question, however, is not the intrinsic unfairness of the act of hoarding; what
is critical for purposes of Section 168.3 (c) is to determine if the hoarding, as charged,
is of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of the petitioner.
We hold that it is not. Hoarding as defined by the petitioner is not even an act within
the contemplation of the IP Code.
The petitioners cited basis is a provision of the IP Code, a set of rules that refer to a
very specific subject intellectual property. Aside from the IP Codes actual substantive
contents (which relate specifically to patents, licensing, trademarks, trade names,
service marks, copyrights, and the protection and infringement of the intellectual
properties that these protective measures embody), the coverage and intent of the
Code is expressly reflected in its Declaration of State Policy which states:
Section 2. Declaration of State Policy. The State recognizes that an
effective intellectual and industrial property system is vital to the development of
domestic and creative activity, facilitates transfer of technology, attracts foreign
investments, and ensures market access for our products. It shall protect and secure
the exclusive rights of scientists, inventors, artists and other gifted citizens to their
intellectual property and creations, particularly when beneficial to the people, for
such periods as provided in this Act.
The use of intellectual property bears a social function. To this end, the State shall
promote the diffusion of knowledge and information for the promotion of national
development and progress and the common good.
It is also the policy of the State to streamline administrative procedures of registering
patents, trademarks and copyright, to liberalize the registration on the transfer of
technology, and to enhance the enforcement of intellectual property rights in
the Philippines. (n)
Intellectual property rights have furthermore been defined under Section 4 of the
Code to consist of: a) Copyright and Related Rights; b) Trademarks and Service Marks;
c) Geographic Indications; d) IndustrialDesigns; e) Patents; f) Layout-Designs
(Topographies) of Integrated Circuits; and g)Protection of Undisclosed Information.
Given the IP Codes specific focus, a first test that should be made when a question
arises on whether a matter is covered by the Code is to ask if it refers to an intellectual
property as defined in the Code. If it does not, then coverage by the Code may be
negated.
A second test, if a disputed matter does not expressly refer to an intellectual property
right as defined above, is whether it falls under the general unfair competition
concept and definition under Sections 168.1 and 168.2 of the Code. The question
then is whether there is deception or any other similar act in passing off of goods or
services to be those of another who enjoys established goodwill.
Separately from these tests is the application of the principles of statutory
construction giving particular attention, not so much to the focus of the IP Code
generally, but to the terms of Section 168 in particular. Under the principle of noscitur
a sociis, when a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and
specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is
associated.[15]
As basis for this interpretative analysis, we note that Section 168.1 speaks of a person
who has earned goodwill with respect to his goods and services and who is entitled
to protection under the Code, with or without a registered mark. Section 168.2, as
previously discussed, refers to the general definition of unfair competition. Section
168.3, on the other hand, refers to the specific instances of unfair competition,
with Section 168.1 referring to the sale of goods given the appearance of the goods
of another; Section 168.2, to the inducement of belief that his or her goods or services
are that of another who has earned goodwill; while the disputed Section 168.3 being
a catch all clause whose coverage the parties now dispute.
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Under all the above approaches, we conclude that the hoarding - as defined and
charged by the petitioner does not fall within the coverage of the IP Code and of
Section 168 in particular. It does not relate to any patent, trademark, trade name or
service mark that the respondents have invaded, intruded into or used without
proper authority from the petitioner. Nor are the respondents alleged to be
fraudulently passing off their products or services as those of the petitioner. The
respondents are not also alleged to be undertaking any representation or
misrepresentation that would confuse or tend to confuse the goods of the petitioner
with those of the respondents, or vice versa. What in fact the petitioner alleges is an
act foreign to the Code, to the concepts it embodies and to the acts it regulates; as
alleged, hoarding inflicts unfairness by seeking to limit the oppositions sales by
depriving it of the bottles it can use for these sales.
In this light, hoarding for purposes of destruction is closer to what another law - R.A.
No. 623 covers, to wit:
SECTION 1. Persons engaged or licensed to engage in the manufacture, bottling or
selling of soda water, mineral or aerated waters, cider, milk, cream, or other lawful
beverages in bottles, boxes, casks, kegs, or barrels, and other similar containers, with
their names or the names of their principals or products, or other marks of ownership
stamped or marked thereon, may register with the Philippine Patent Office a
description of the names or are used by them, under the same conditions, rules, and
regulations, made applicable by law or regulation to the issuance of trademarks.
SECTION 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, without the written consent of the
manufacturer, bottler or seller who has successfully registered the marks of
ownership in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section, to fill such
bottles, boxes, kegs, barrels, or other similar containers so marked or stamped, for the
purpose of sale, or to sell, dispose of, buy, or traffic in, or wantonly destroy the same,
whether filled or not, or to use the same for drinking vessels or glasses or for any other
purpose than that registered by the manufacturer, bottler or seller. Any violation of this
section shall be punished by a fine or not more than one hundred pesos or
imprisonment of not more than thirty days or both.
As its coverage is defined under Section 1, the Act appears to be a measure that may
overlap or be affected by the provisions of Part II of the IP Code on The Law on
Trademarks, Service Marks and Trade Names. What is certain is that the IP Code has
not expressly repealed this Act. The Act appears, too, to have specific reference to a
special type of registrants the manufacturers, bottlers or sellers of soda water,
mineral or aerated waters, cider, milk, cream, or other lawful beverages in bottles,
boxes, casks, kegs, or barrels, and other similar containers who are given special
protection with respect to the containers they use. In this sense, it is in fact a law of
specific coverage and application, compared with the general terms and application
of the IP Code. Thus, under its Section 2, it speaks specifically of unlawful use of
containers and even of the unlawfulness of their wanton destruction a matter that
escapes the IP Codes generalities unless linked with the concepts of deception and
passing off as discussed above.
Unfortunately, the Act is not the law in issue in the present case and one that the
parties did not consider at all in the search warrant application. The petitioner in fact
could not have cited it in its search warrant application since the one specific offense
that the law allows and which the petitioner used was Section 168.3 (c). If it serves
any purpose at all in our discussions, it is to show that the underlying factual situation
of the present case is in fact covered by another law, not by the IP Code that the
petitioner cites. Viewed in this light, the lack of probable cause to support the
disputed search warrant at once becomes apparent.
Where, as in this case, the imputed acts do not violate the cited offense, the ruling of
this Court penned by Mr. Justice Bellosillo is particularly instructive:
In the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court requires a finding of probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the
judge after examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. Hence, since there is no crime to speak of, the search warrant does not even
begin to fulfill these stringent requirements and is therefore defective on its face. The
nullity of the warrant renders moot and academic the other issues raised in
petitioners Motion to Quash and Motion for Reconsideration. Since the assailed
search warrant is null and void, all property seized by virtue thereof should be
returned to petitioners in accordance with established jurisprudence.[16]
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Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the RTC correctly ruled that the petitioners
search warrant should properly be quashed for the petitioners failure to show that
the acts imputed to the respondents do not violate the cited offense. There could not
have been any probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant because
no crime in the first place was effectively charged. This conclusion renders
unnecessary any further discussion on whether the search warrant application
properly alleged that the imputed act of holding Coke empties was in fact a hoarding
in bad faith aimed to prejudice the petitioners operations, or whether the MTC duly
complied with the procedural requirements for the issuance of a search warrant
under Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. Accordingly, we confirm
that Search Warrant No. 2001-01, issued by the Municipal Trial Court, Branch
1, Naga City, is NULL and VOID. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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