MANIAGO VS. CA G.R. NO. 104392; FEB.

20, 1992 (253 SCRA 647)

Topic:
Art. 31. (NCC) When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter.
In relation to: (RULE 111, SEC. 1, RULES OF COURT)
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
Facts:
Petitioner Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in transporting employees of
the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio City proper to its plant site at the Export Processing
Authority in Loakan, Baguio City. On January 7, 1990, one of his buses figured in a vehicular accident
with a passenger jeepney owned by private respondent Boado along Loakan Road, Baguio City. As a
result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and
multiple physical injuries was filed on March 2, 1990 against petitioners driver, Herminio Andaya
with RTC Branch III, docketed as Criminal Case No. 7514-R. A month later, on April 19, 1990, a civil
case for damages was filed by the same respondent Boado against petitioner himself, docketed as
Civil Case No. 2050-R, was assigned to Branch IV of the same court. Petitioner moved for the
suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case
against his driver and because no reservation of the right to bring it (civil case) separately had been
made in the criminal case. But the lower court denied petitioner’s motion on the ground that
pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed independently of the criminal action. CA upheld
in which it allowed a civil action for damages to be filed independently of the criminal action even
though no reservation to file the same has been made. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON despite the absence of such reservation, private respondent may nonetheless bring an action
for damages against petitioner under the following provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Held:
No. The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required by
Rule 111, § 1, otherwise it should be dismissed. To begin with, §1 quite clearly requires that a
reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability,
otherwise they will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case.
xxx
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party (a)waives the civil action, (b) reserves the right to
institute it separately or (c) institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
xxx
On the basis of Rule 111, §§1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civil liability is, as a general rule,
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, except only (1) when such action arising from the same
act or omission, which is the subject of the criminal action, is waived;(2) the right to bring it
separately is reserved or (3) such action has been instituted prior to the criminal action. Even if an
action has not been reserved or it was brought before the institution of the criminal case, the
acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal is based on a finding
that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code.
ADDENDUM:
There is a practical reason for requiring that the right to bring an independent civil action under the
Civil Code separately must be reserved. It is to avoid the filing of more than one action for the same
act or omission against the same party.
In the present case, the criminal action was filed against the employee, bus driver. Had the driver
been convicted and found insolvent, his employer would have been held subsidiarily liable for
damages. But if the right to bring a separate civil action (whether arising from the crime or from
quasi-delict) is reserved, there would be no possibility that the employer would be held liable
because in such a case there would be no pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused. In
such a case the institution of a separate and independent civil action under the Civil Code would not
result in the employee being held liable for the same act or omission. The rule requiring reservation
in the end serves to implement the prohibition against double recovery for the same act or omission.
As held in Barredo v. Garcia, the injured party must choose which of the available causes of action
for damages he will bring. If he fails to reserve the filing of a separate civil action he will be deemed
to have elected to recover damages from the bus driver on the basis of the crime. In such a case his
cause of action against the employer will be limited to the recovery of the latter’s subsidiary liability
under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
Nor does it matter that the action is against the employer to enforce his vicarious liability under Art.
2180 of the Civil Code. Though not an accused in the criminal case, the employer is very much a
party, as long as the right to bring or institute a separate action (whether arising from crime or from
quasi delict) is not reserved. The ruling that a decision convicting the employee is binding and
conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to its civil liability but also with regard to its
amount because the liability of an employer cannot be separated but follows that of his employee27
is true not only with respect to the civil liability arising from crime but also with respect to the civil
liability under the Civil Code. Since whatever is recoverable against the employer is ultimately
recoverable by him from the employee, the policy against double recovery requires that only one
action be maintained for the same act or omission whether the action is brought against the
employee or against his employer. Thus in Dulay v. Court of Appeals2 this Court held that an
employer may be sued under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code and that the right to bring the action did
not have to be reserved because, having instituted before the criminal case against the employee,
the filing of the civil action against the employer constituted an express reservation of the right to
institute its separately.

Rule 111 – Prosecution of Civil Actions a) Sec. 1 Institution of Criminal and Civil Action
2. Yakult Philippines, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 91856 October 5, 1990 Gancayco, J.
Facts: In 1982, five-year old Roy Camaso, while standing on the sidewalk of M. de la Fuente Street,
Sampaloc, Manila, was sideswiped by motorcycle owned by Yakult Philippines and driven by its
employee, Larry Salvado. The latter was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to
slight physical injuries in an information that was filed with the then City Court of Manila. In 1984, a
complaint for damages was filed by Roy Camaso represented by his father, David Camaso, against
Yakult and Salvado in RTC Manila. A decision was rendered in the civil case ordering defendants
Yakult and Salvado to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff sums for actual expenses for medical
services and hospital bills, attorney’s fees and the costs of the suit.
Issue: whether or not a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed prosper even if there
was no reservation to file a separate civil action
Held: Yes. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.
xxx
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. The civil action for the recovery of civil liability is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. It
is also provided that the reservation of the right to institute the separate civil action shall be made
before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. In this case, the offended party
has not waived the civil action, nor reserved the right to institute it separately. Neither has the
offended party instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action. However, the civil action in this
case was filed in court before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution in the criminal
action of which the judge presiding on the criminal case was duly informed, so that in the disposition
of the criminal action no damages was awarded.
Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without previous reservation in the criminal
case, nevertheless since it was instituted before the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal
action, and the judge handling the criminal case was informed thereof, then the actual filing of the
civil action is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation that
should be made by the offended party before the prosecution presents its evidence.

General v. Claravall GR No. 96724 March 22, 1991

FACTS: Benneth Thelmo filed a complaint of libel against Honesto General before the Office of the
Public Prosecutor of Rizal. Thelmo alleged that he had suffered worth 100 million of damages.
Eventually, the case was filed before the RTC. However, the information did not contain any
allegation respecting the 100 million worth of damages due to Thelmo. General raised the issue
of non-payment of the docket fees corresponding to the claim of damages contained in Thelmo's
sworn complaint before the fiscal, as a bar to Thelmo's pursuing his civil action therefor.
CASE:—RTC overruled the objection of General —Motion to for reconsideration and Motion for
suspension by General was likewise denied by the RTC. General cited cases to support his
argument that that payment of docket fees should be paid first before the trial court acquired
jurisdiction. One of the cited cases: Manchester v. CA Laid down the doctrine, that a specific
amounts of claims of damages must be alleged both in the body and the prayer of the complaint,
and the filing fees corresponding thereto paid at the time of the filing of the complaint; that if these
requisites were not fulfilled, jurisdiction could not be acquired by the trial court; and that
amendment of the complaint could not "thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court.”
ISSUE: 1) W/N the filing fees for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense should first be
paid in order that said civil action may be deemed to have been impliedly instituted with the criminal
and prosecuted in due course. 2) W/N Manchester doctrine applicable in the case at bar.
HELD:
1) NO. The rule set forth in Rule 111 of Rules of Court of 1964 was amended in 1985 Rules of Court.
Section1, Rule 111, Rules of Court 1964 “xxx When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability
against the accused by way of actual, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing
fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall first be paid to the Clerk of Court of the
court where the criminal case is filed. Xxx”
Section 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court 1985 “xxx When the offended party seeks to enforce civil
liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing
fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except
in an award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof
in court for trial.”
Under the 1985 Rules, the filing fees for the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal had to
be paid first to the Clerk of the court where the criminal action was commenced, without regard to
whether the claim for such damages was set out in the information or not. Under the 1988 Rules,
however, it is only when "the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or
information (that) the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing
thereof in court for trial." In any other case—i.e., when the amount of damages other than actual is
NOT alleged in the complaint or information—the filing fees for the civil action "to enforce civil
liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages . . . shall
(merely) constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual damages."
2) Manchester doctrine is only applicable when the amount of damages is ALLEGED in the complaint
or information.— Manchester doctrine, requiring payment of filing fees at the time of the
commencement of an action applicable to impliedly instituted civil actions under Section 1, Rule 111
only when "the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information
when a civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal in accordance with Section 1,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court—because the offended party has NOT waived the civil action, or
reserved the right to institute it separately, or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action—
the rule is as follows:
1)when "the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information" filed
in court, then "the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing
thereof in court for trial;"
2)in any other case, however—i.e., when the amount of damages is not so alleged in the complaint
or information filed in court, the corresponding filing fees need not be paid and shall simply
"constitute a first lien on the judgment, except in an award for actual damages.
WHEREFORE, there being no error in the challenged Orders of the respondent Court dated March
28, 1990 and May 17, 1990, these appearing on the contrary to be in accord with the law and the
facts, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition, with costs against the petitioner.

MACCAY VS NOBELA G.R. No. 145823. March 31, 2005

FACTS
Adelaida Potenciano and Oscar Maccay had a good relationship with Spouses Prudencio and Serlina
Nobela after the former sold Maccay’s land to the latter. In purchasing the land, Potenciano and the
wife Nobela went to a lawyer and executed a Deed of Sale prepared and notarized. Nobela paid Php
300,000 to the couple and in turn, she was given the Deed of Sale, the tax declaration, the tax receipt
and other documents. Prudencio Nobela suffered a stroke and he was brought to the Polymedic
Hospital. Potenciano confided that her real name and that the owners of the hospital are her parents
and that there is no need to worry on the hospital bill. However, when it was time for the payment
of the same, Potenciano’s payment with her dollars and yens were not accepted by the hospital. The
foreign exchange dealer refused to change the money saying that those were fake. Serlina Nobela
then had to look for the payment on her own. At that time, the trust and confidence on the Maccay
couple by the Nobelas was beginning to slip off. Potenciano later invited Serlina to engage in the
buy and sell of appliances which she claimed were brought by her nephew from Japan. To Serlinas
dismay, she was only brought to a store in the pier where she had to pay for the appliances herself.
She had receipts from De Lara Merchandising (Exhs. 15 to 15-C) showing her payments. The last
receipt is dated July 29, 1990. Serlina brought the appliances home. Naturally, when Potenciano saw
Serlina selling the appliances herself, her pretensions having been exposed, the relationship began
to sour. Before the last purchase of appliance, without the knowledge of the accused couple,
Potenciano executed an Affidavit of Loss, relating that on her way to Antipolo, the stainless steel
jeep broke down but when she returned with a mechanic, the jeep was gone. Serlina was beginning
to doubt Potenciano and heard that the latter was trying to sell their jeep. She inquired at the NBI
and was told that Potenciano had a string of cases against her. Potenciano went to the Eastern Police
District Headquarters and executed an affidavitcomplaint against the accused spouses relating that
she was fooled by Prudencio and Serlina Nobela. She related how the accused spouses cheated her
by stealing TCT No. 473584 and her appliances. Her affidavit related how she was prayed over and
mesmerized by Serlina. In the meantime, Prudencio and Serlina, who had not been able to register
the sale to them because of the ailment of Prudencio asked a real estate agent, Anita de la Vega, to
help them in the registration of Deed of Sale. They knew de la Vega as she used to frequent a real
estate agent living in their place. When they were told that for the P300,000.00 consideration, they
would need around P20,000.00 to include capital gains taxes, she gave P21,000.00. The mother of
de la Vega was supposed to know many people in the Register of Deeds. The new title was delivered
on August 10, 1990 to Serlina. She had to give an additional 2,000.00 to de la Vega for other
expenses. Prudencio and Serlina Nobela were surprised to receive an invitation from Col. Nestor E.
Cruz on August 17, 1990, to go to his office regarding the complaint of Potenciano for Estafa and
Theft. When they went to Col. Cruz nothing happened but they were shocked to receive a subpoena
from the Fiscals Office. Maccay was not there and Prudencio was quite sick. Serlina went to the
Register of Deeds of Marikina to find out why they were accused and she was astonished to discover
as the Deed of Sale registered by de la Vega under the name of Linda Cruz. She also found the
payments of the capital gains tax as only P1,000.00 plus. Then she realized the reason for the alleged
falsification charge of Potenciano alias Angelita
Barba and Oscar Maccay. The deed of sale given to them for P300,000.00 which they paid the
Maccays was not the one registered but one which obviously was forged by de la Vega and her
mother Juanita Magcaling in order to make more money from the registration transaction. They
filed a complaint against de la Vega and Juanita Magcaling which is still pending in court at Judge
Alfredo Flores sala. RTC acquitted respondent spouses and found petitioners swindled the spouses.
The trial court declared that petitioner Maccay filed the Estafa charge against respondent spouses
to turn the tables on respondent spouses, the victims of the swindling. The trial court ordered
petitioners to pay respondent spouses P390,000 as damages. CA upheld the decision.
ISSUES
1. Whether the trial court may rule on the civil liability of complainant in a criminal case where the
civil action was not reserved or filed separately;
2. Whether a witness, who is not a party to the case, may be held liable for damages.
HELD
1. A court trying a criminal case cannot award damages in favor of the accused. The task of the trial
court is limited to determining the guilt of the accused and if proper, to determine his civil liability.
A criminal case is not the proper proceedings to determine the private complainants’ civil liability, if
any.
The trial court erred in ordering complainant petitioner Maccay and prosecution witness
Potenciano, as part of the judgment in the criminal case, to reimburse the P300,000 and pay
damages to the accused respondent spouses. The appellate court erred in affirming the trial courts
award of damages by justifying it as a counterclaim. Nothing in the records shows that respondent
spouses filed or attempted to file a counterclaim.
The 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure prohibit counterclaims in criminal cases. Section 1 of Rule 111
provides: SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.
(a) x x x
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal
case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action.
That paragraph addresses the problem on the absence of clear-cut rules governing the prosecution
of impliedly instituted civil action and the necessary consequences and implications thereof. In the
present case, the civil liability of petitioners for swindling respondent spouses and for maliciously
filing a baseless suit must be litigated in a separate proceeding.
2. The trial court also erred in holding prosecution witness petitioner Potenciano, together with
petitioner Maccay, liable for damages to respondent spouses. A judgment cannot bind persons who
are not parties to the action. A decision of a court cannot operate to divest the rights of a person
who is not a party in the case. It does not however prejudice the filing by respondent of a claim for
damages against petitioners.

Rodriguez v (RTC Judge) Ponferrada - CrimPro

DOCTRINE:
1. While the single act of issuing a bouncing check may give rise to two distinct criminal offenses —
estafa and violation of BP22 — the same involves only once civil liability for the offended party since
he sustained only a single injury.
2. Nothing in the Rules signifies that the necessary inclusion of a civil action in a criminal case for
violation of the Bouncing Checks Law precludes the institution in an estafa case of the corresponding
civil action, even if both offenses relate to the issuance of the same check
3. While ordinarily no filing fees were charged for actual damages in criminal action, the rule on the
necessary inclusion of a civil action with the payment of filing fees based on the face value of the
check involved was laid down to prevent the practice of creditors of using the threat of a criminal
prosecution to collect on their credit free of charge
FACTS:
1. Rodriguez was charged with Estafa and violation of BP22 (bouncing checks law) 2. City Prosecutor
Rossana S. Morales-Montojo of Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office found PROBABLE CAUSE to charge
Rodriguez with ESTAFA under Article 315 paragraph 2(d) as amended by PD 818 and for Violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 3. Violation of BP22 was filed in MTC of QC - docket fees were accordingly
paid by private complainant 4. ESTAFA was filed with RTC of QC 5. During the hearing, Judge
Ponferrada noted the Formal Entry of Appearance of Atty. Felix R. Solomon as PRIVATE prosecutor
(in order to pursue Civil Liability against Rodriguez), but this was opposed by Rodriguez. 6.
Rodriguez’s Contention: that the private prosecutor is barred from appearing before this Court as
his appearance is limited to the civil aspect which must be presented and asserted in B.P. 22 cases
pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (and not in the Regional Trial Court
where his ESTAFA case is being tried) 7. RTC held: civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is deemed instituted, unless the offended party (1) waives the civil action,
(2) reserves the right to institute it separately, or (3) institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action. Considering that the offended party had paid the corresponding filing fee for the estafa cases
prior to the filing of the BP 22 cases with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), the RTC allowed the
private prosecutor to appear and intervene in the proceedings. (Did not go thru CA)
ISSUES: Whether or not a Private Prosecutor can be allowed to intervene and participate in the
proceedings of the above-entitled Estafa cases for the purpose of prosecuting the attached civil
liability arising from the issuance of the checks involved which is also subject matter of the pending
B.P. 22 cases. HELD: Petiton has NO MERIT. Civil Action in BP 22 Case Not a Bar to Civil Action in
Estafa Case
RATIO: 1. Settled is the rule that the single act of issuing a bouncing check may give rise to two
distinct criminal offenses: estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22). The Rules of
Court allow the offended party to intervene via a private prosecutor in each of these two penal
proceedings. However, the recovery of the single civil liability arising from the single act of issuing
a bouncing check in either criminal case bars the recovery of the same civil liability in the other
criminal action. While the law allows two simultaneous civil remedies for the offended party, it
authorizes recovery in only one. In short, while two crimes arise from a single set of facts, only one
civil liability attaches to it.
2. [Memory AID: SWoRN) An offended party may intervene in the prosecution of a crime, except in
the following instances: (1) when, from the nature of the crime and the law defining and punishing
it, no civil liability arises in favor of a private offended party; and
(2) when, from the nature of the offense, the offended parties are entitled to civil indemnity, but (a)
they waive the right to institute a civil action, (b) expressly reserve the right to do so or (c) the suit
has already been instituted. In any of these instances, the private complainant’s interest in the case
disappears and criminal prosecution becomes the sole function of the public prosecutor. None of
these exceptions apply to the instant case. Hence, the private prosecutor cannot be barred from
intervening in the estafa suit.
3. The traditional theory is that when a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1)
the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he had violated; and
(2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was
actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission…While an act or
omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because
it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily
see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to
repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. In other words, criminal
liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or
injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is
evidently the foundation of the civil action
4. Thus, the possible single civil liability arising from the act of issuing a bouncing check can be the
subject of both civil actions deemed instituted with the estafa case and the BP 22 violation
prosecution. In the crimes of both estafa and violation of BP 22, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
expressly allows, even automatically in the present case, the institution of a civil action without need
of election by the offended party. As both remedies are simultaneously available to this party, there
can be no forum shopping.
5. Hence, this Court cannot agree with what petitioner ultimately espouses. At the present stage,
no judgment on the civil liability has been rendered in either criminal case. There is as yet no call
for the offended party to elect remedies and, after choosing one of them, be considered barred from
others available to her.
6. Doctrine of Election of Remedies: the purpose of the doctrine of election of remedies is not to
prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double redress for a single wrong. It is regarded as
an application of the law of estoppel, upon the theory that a party cannot, in the assertion of his
right occupy inconsistent positions which form the basis of his respective remedies. However, when
a certain state of facts under the law entitles a party to alternative remedies, both founded upon
the identical state of facts, these remedies are not considered inconsistent remedies. In such case,
the invocation of one remedy is not an election which will bar the other, unless the suit upon the
remedy first invoked shall reach the stage of final adjudication or unless by the invocation of the
remedy first sought to be enforced, the plaintiff shall have gained an advantage thereby or caused
detriment or change of situation to the other. It must be pointed out that ordinarily, election of
remedies is not made until the judicial proceedings has gone to judgment on the merits.
7. In the case at bar, the institution of the civil actions with the estafa cases and the inclusion of
another set of civil actions with the BP 22 cases are not exactly repugnant or inconsistent with each
other. Nothing in the Rules signifies that the necessary inclusion of a civil action in a criminal case
for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law precludes the institution in an estafa case of the
corresponding civil action, even if both offenses relate to the issuance of the same check.

EDUARDO COJUANGCO, JR. and GRETCHEN OPPENCOJUANGCO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, GEORGE F. SISON and LUIS R. MAURICIO, respondents.
FACTS: In the 14 June 1972 issue of the GRAPHIC, a weekly magazine of general circulation in the
Philippines, under the column Social Climbing by one "Conde de Makati," later identified as George
F. Sison, the following item appeared:
ONCE UPON A time a beautiful Blue Lady (GOC) used to frequent the office of the Honorable Sir.
Because of her well-known beauty and charm, the frequency of her visits did not pass unnoticed by
our Lady of the House by Pasig. An investigation by her battery of personal "spies" revealed the
beautiful Blue Lady was "following up" her threemillion-peso to from one of our leading
government-lending institutions. "Ang mahal naman ng hanyang ...! exclaimed our Lady of the
House. Aba, floating rate yata tayo ngayon. Even my friend Marquessa de Culi-Culi has upped her
price by 50 percent, "kasi ang mahal na bilihin ngayon, kahit bulak at alkohol."
Claiming that the publication alludes to petitioners-spouses and that it is false, malicious and
constitutes a vicious attack on petitioner-wife's virtue, honor and character as it imputes her not
only the corrupt and immoral act of "following up" a alleged loan, but also the commission of corrupt
and immortal acts of adultery and/or prostitution, petitioners filed on 11 July 1972 with the then
Court of First Instnce (now Regional Trial Court) of Quezon City a civil action for Damages based on
Libel against the Graphic Publishing Co., Inc., as owner; J. Antoni Araneta, as publisher; Luis R.
Mauricio, as general manager and editor; and Conde de Makati, as writer, of the GRAPHIC magazine.
On 29 December 1972, the City Fiscal of Quezon City filed with the above court a criminal case for
libel against defendants Sison, Mauricio and Araneta.
On 7 March 1973, after issues in Civil Case No. Q-16725 joined and the accused in Criminal Case No.
Q-2713 arraigned, petitioners filed therein separate motions to consolidate the criminal case with
the civil case in Branch XVI alleging that the evidence to be presented in both would be the same
much valuable time and effort of the court as well as that of the parties would be saved by such
consolidation; and, moreover Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides, inter
alia, that in libel the civil action shall be filed in the same court where the criminal action
is filed and vice-versa, provided, however, that the court where the criminal action or civil action for
damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts.
Only defendants Mauricio and Araneta, now private respondents, filed their opposition to the
motions. They claim that petitioners, having filed a separate civil action, have no legal standing to
intervene in the criminal case; there is no provision in the Rules of Court authorizing the
consolidation of the criminal case with the separate civil action; the rule contemplate the
consolidation of the hearing of two (2) or more cases pending before the same judge, and not when
the cases are before different courts or different branches of the same court.
Trial court allowed the consolidation. Defendants filed an MR which was denied. They appealed to
CA which set aside the trial court’s order.
ISSUE: May a criminal case for libel and an independent civil action for damages arising therefrom,
filed pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, be consolidated for joint trial?
RULING:
Yes. Under Section 3 of Rule 111 which was subsequently amended, and is now Section 2 thereof, it
is clear that the Civil action for recovery of damages arising from a crime, or ex delicto, may filed
separately from the criminal case either before the institution of the latter, which may be done
without reservation, after such institution, provided, however, that a reservation that effect has
been made. If in the meantime the criminal action is instituted, the civil action which has been
reserve cannot be commenced until final judgment has been render in the former. This restriction
does not, however, apply to the cases provided for in Section 3. Thus, in the case provided for in
Articles 32, 33 (as in the instant case), 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil action may be filed
even at the institution of the criminal case, provided that prior proper reservation had been made.
Subsection (a) of Section 2 refers to civil cases filed before the institution of the criminal cases. Since
it makes reference to first paragraph of Section 1, and the latter necessarily include the cases under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code expressly recognized in the second paragraph thereof
which reads:
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of
the accused.
It follows without saying that an independent civil action for the recovery of civil liability, authorized
under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of the Civil Code, filed before the institution of the criminal case,
may be consolidated with the latter, subject to the condition that no final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal case. If this is permitted, there is neither rhyme nor reason why, given the
existence of the condition, an independent civil action under any of the said Articles, but filed after
the institution of the criminal case, may not be consolidated with the latter. This second scenario is
equally and logically addressed by the reasoning behind the provision for the first situation.
Furthermore, Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court authorizes consolidation of actions involving
common questions of law or fact pending before the court. The purpose or object of consolidation
is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression or abuse, prevent delay, clear congested
dockets, simplify the work of the trial court, and save unnecessary costs or expense; in short, the
attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties litigants.
It is self-evident that Civil Case No. Q-16725 and Criminal Case No. Q-2713 involve common or
Identical questions of fact and law, and that they would even have the same witnesses. These
considerations alone justify the exercise by the court of its discretion to consolidate the cases for
joint hearing to attain the salutary purpose of consolidation.
There is yet a further consideration why in the instant case consolidation of Civil Case No. Q-16725
and Criminal Case No. Q-2713 should be allowed. What is involved is the crime of libel. As correctly
stated by petitioners, per the third paragraph of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
the criminal case for libel and the civil action for damages arising therefrom must be filed in the
same court.
If the court referred to is a multi-sala court, it may happen, as in this case, that the criminal and civil
actions are raffled or assigned to different salas. In this situation, consolidation one with another
earlier filed would not only be practical and economical — it would subserve the very purpose of
the law Consolidation of cases assigned to different branches of a court had earlier been recognized.
In Raymundo, et al. vs. Felipe, et al., We held: [A]lthough consolidation of several cases involving the
same parties and subject matter is a matter addressed to the discretion of the trial court, joint
hearing becomes a matter of duty if two or more cases are tried before the same judge, or even if
filed with the different branches of the same court of first instance, provided one of such case has
not been partially tried.

ANAMER SALAZAR VS. PEOPLE AND J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORP. G.R. No. 151931
September 23, 2003
Facts:
On June 11, 1997, an Information for estafa was filed against herein petitioner Anamer D. Salazar
and co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City. Based on the
evidence of the prosecution, petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice from J.Y.
Brothers Marketing Corporation. As payment, the petitioner gave the private complainant Check
No. 067481 drawn against the Prudential Bank, Legazpi City Branchb in the amount of P214,000.
Jerson Yao. representative of JY Brothers, accepted the check upon the petitioners assurance that it
was a good check. The cavans of rice were picked up. On the next day, upon presentment, the check
was dishonored because it was drawn under a closed account. The petitioner was informed of such
dishonor, to which she responsded by replacing the said check with another check No. 365704
drawn against the Solid Bank, Legazpi Branch. However, it was returned since it was drawn against
uncollected deposits. The petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court alleging that
she could not be guilty of the crime as charged for the following reasons: (a) she was merely an
indorser of the check issued by Nena Timario, and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) on estafa penalizes
only the issuer of the check and not the indorser thereof; (b) there is no sufficient evidence to prove
that the petitioner conspired with the issuer of the check, Nena Jaucian Timario, in order to defraud
the private complainant; (c) after the first check was dishonored, the petitioner replaced it with a
second one. The first transaction had therefore been effectively novated by the issuance of the
second check. Unfortunately, her personal check was dishonored not for insufficiency of funds, but
because it was drawn against uncollected deposit which means that the account had sufficient funds
but was still restricted because the deposit, usually a check, had not yet been cleared. The
prosecution filed an opposition to the petitioners demurrer to evidence. On November 19, 2001,
the trial court rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime charged but ordering her to
remit to the private complainant the amount of the check as payment for her purchase. The trial
court further ruled that as a mere indorser of the check, the petitioners breach of the warranty that
the check was a good one is not synonymous with the fraudulent act of falsely pretending to possess
credit under Article 315(2)(d). The petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration on the civil
aspect of the decision with a plea that he be allowed to present evidence pursuant to Rule 33 of the
Rules of Court, to which the court denied the motion. The petitioner therefore assailed the orders
of the trial court claiming that after her demurrer to evidence was granted by the trial court, she
was denied due process as she was not given the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she
was not civilly liable to the private respondent. The petitioner invokes the Rule 33 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure contending that before being adjudged liable to the private offended party, she
should have been first accorded the procedural relief granted in Rule 33.
Issue: Whether or not the acquittal of the accused in the crime charged would acquit her from civil
liability.
Ruling:
The court granted the petition. It ruled that the last paragraph of Sec. 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court provides that the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action. Moreover, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding
in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist. The prosecution, thus, need to present its evidence not only to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt but also to prove the civil liability of the accused to the
offended party. When the prosecution has rested its case, the accused shall have been given the
chance to adduce its evidence not only on the criminal but also on the civil aspect of the case. At the
conclusion of the trial, the trial court should have rendered judgment based on the evidence
presented during the criminal aspect of the case and also on the civil aspect thereof as regards the
civil liability of the accused.
Citing Aante vs Savelana, Jr., the Court stressed that Section 14 (1) and (2) of Article III of the 1987
Constitution which are elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system are
mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in
the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a "law which
hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial".
Therefore, Salazar should have been given by the trial court the chance to present her evidence as
regards the civil aspect of the case.
Manantan v CA Jan 29, 2001 J. Quisumbing
FACTS - June 1, 1983, an info was filed charging Manantan with reckless imprudence resulting to
damage to property (sideswiped a jeepney owned by Charles Codamon) and death (Ruben Nicolas,
passenger of the jeep) which happened at Daang Maharlika - It was alleged in the evidence
presented by the prosecution that Manantan was intoxicated, after going on a drinking spree just
before the accident happened; where the car driven by Manantan, going at a speed of 40kph (80-
90 according to Charles Cudamon) tried to overtake a tricycle, but instead hit an oncoming jeepney
- The defense alleged the same except that Manantan did not drink prior to the accident - RTC found
Manantan not guilty - On appeal, Nicolas spouses prayed that the decision be modified and that
appellee be ordered to pay indemnity and damages - CA ruled in favor of the Nicolas Spouses - CA
noted that at the time of the accident, Manantan was intoxicated, due to his having consumed all in
all, a total of at least twelve (12) bottles of beer between 9 a.m. and 11 p.m - This act of driving while
intoxicated was a clear violation of Section 53 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (R.A. No.
4136)[7] and pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code,[8] a statutory presumption of negligence
existed - Petitioner filed an MR but was denied
ISSUE and RULING
WON acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further inquiry by the CA as his reckless imprudence
NO. There was no second jeopardy as the subject of the appeal is only the civil aspect of the criminal
case (they only filed for appeal on the indemnity and damages). For double jeopardy to exist, the
following elements must be established: (a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same
offense as the first.
WON CA erred in finding that petitioner’s acquittal did not extinguish his civil liability
NO. The acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence, petitioners civil liability was not
extinguished by his discharge.
Two kinds of acquittal: 1. acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of (Rule 111 ROC) a. Person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of
any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission 2. acquittal based
on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused (Article 29 NCC) a. If the guilt of the accused has
not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only The decision of the trial courts was based on the second kind of
acquittal. The trial courts declaration that did not discount the possibility that the accused was really
negligent.
WON CA committed a reversible error in failing to apply the Manchester Doctrine
NO.
Manchester Doctrine: the Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the
prescribed docket fees
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure (applicable during the pendency of the case) states
however that where the civil action is impliedly instituted together with the criminal action, the
actual damages claimed by the offended parties, as in this case, are not included in the computation
of the filing fees
BONITE v ZOSA 162 SCRA 180 PADILLA; June 20, 1988
NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the order of the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental, Br. III. Zosa, J.
FACTS - September 24, 1968, 2 PM – Bonite, a caminero of the Bureau of Public Highways was killed
when he was hit by a truck driven by Abamonga. A complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide was filed by the surviving heirs of Bonite but Abamonga was acquitted because of
insufficient evidence. - In the course of the trial, the petitioners actively participated in the
proceedings through their lawyer, private prosecutor Atty. Dulalas. - December 28, 1970 – The
Bonite heirs filed an action for recovery of damages against Abamonga based on the same act but
the court dismissed the complaint for damages because the Court believes that the Bonite heirs did
not reserve the right to do so.
ISSUE
WON an independent civil action for damages, under Article 29 of the Civil Code, is deemed barred
by petitioners' failure in the criminal action to make a reservation to file a separate civil action and
by their active participation in the prosecution of such criminal action.
HELD YES Ratio When the accused in a criminal case is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may
still be instituted against him, and only a preponderance of evidence is required to hold the accused
liable. The civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal of the accused, where the acquittal is based
on reasonable doubt (based on Article 29 of the Civil Code). Reasoning - In the criminal case against
Abamonga, the accused was acquitted because there was insufficient evidence to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, the Bonite heirs have the right to file an independent civil action
for damages despite the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case. - Aside from basing their action
for damages in Article 29 of the Civil Code, the petitioners may also rely on Article 2176 which
provides that acquittal of the accused from a charge of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable
doubt or not, is not a bar to a subsequent civil action for recovery of civil liability, arising not from
criminal negligence, but from a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. - It has been held that Article 2176 of
the Civil Code, in referring to "fault or negligence" covers acts "not punishable by law" as well as acts
that may be criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. A separate civil
action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and
found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed to recover damages on
both scores. - Article 29 of the Civil Code does not state that the right to file an independent civil
action for damages (under said article) can be availed of only in offenses not arising from a tortious
act. The only requisite for the exercise of the right to file a civil action for damages is that the accused
must have been acquitted in the criminal action based on reasonable doubt. - The respondent’s
argument that the applicable provision is Article 33 is devoid of merit because of the
abovementioned argument. In addition, Article 33 assumes defamation, fraud, or physical injuries
were intentionally committed. - In the case at bar, Rule 111 of the former Rules of Criminal
Procedure (i.e., that a reservation be made in the criminal case of the right to institute an
independent civil action) is not applicable because Article 29 does not require it. - The requirement
in Section 2 of Rule 111 of the former Rules on Criminal Procedure, that there be a reservation in
the criminal case of the right to institute an independent civil action, has been declared as not in
accordance with law. It is regarded as an unauthorized amendment to the substantive law, in this
case the Civil Code. In fact, the reservation of the right to file an independent civil action has been
deleted from Section 2, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, in consonance with
the decisions of this Court declaring such requirement of a reservation as ineffective. - The active
participation of the Bonite heirs does not act as a bar from pursuing a civil action for damages
because the civil action based on criminal liability and a civil action under Article 29 are two separate
and independent actions. Dispositive WHEREFORE, the orders of the respondent court are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is entered reinstating the complaint in the civil case
directing said court to proceed with the trial of the case. Costs against private respondent. SEPARATE
OPINION

Philippine Rabbit vs. People G.R. No. 147703 April 14, 2004 Topic: Subsidiary liability of employers
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts
Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to
triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment and to pay damages. The court further ruled that in the event of the insolvency of
accused, petitioner shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment
against accused had become final and executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. The CA ruled that the institution of a
criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once
determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the employer’s subsidiary civil
liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.
Issue: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-
employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.
Held No. It is well-established in our jurisdiction that the appellate court may, upon motion or motu
proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. This rule is based on the
rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they abscond.
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal
prosecution. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted
in a criminal action; that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability
of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the
basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or
delict per se, but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact,
even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains,
and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal
action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking,
they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although in substance
and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary
liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latter’s lawyers, as in
the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the
accused.
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Under Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in
the event of the latter’s insolvency. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court
need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer. In the absence of any collusion
between the accused-employee and the offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind the
person who is subsidiarily liable. In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction
surpasses mere civil liability.
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend,
nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. By the same token, to allow them
to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latter’s consent would also
result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment. The decision convicting an
employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the
former’s civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be
separated from that of the employee.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of
the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by
reason of his flight, then the former’s subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately
enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly
contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.

Bermudez v. Judge Amuerfina Melencio Herrera (**casedigestph) BERMUDEZ V MELENCIO-

HERRERA G.R. No. L-32055 February 26, 1988
Facts: A cargo truck, driven by Domingo Pontino and owned by Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, bumped a
jeep on which Rogelio, a six-year old son of plaintiffs-appellants, was riding. The boy sustained
injuries which caused his death. As a result, Criminal Case No. 92944 for Homicide through Reckless
Imprudence was filed against Domingo Pontino. Plaintiffs-appellants filed on July 27, 1969 in the
said criminal case “A Reservation to File Separate Civil Action.” On July 28, 1969, the plaintiffs-
appellants filed a civil case for damages against Domingo Pontino y Tacorda and Cordova Ng Sun
Kwan. Finding that the plaintiffs instituted the action “on the assumption that defendant Pontino’s
negligence in the accident of May 10, 1969 constituted aquasidelict,” the trial court stated that
plaintiffs had already elected to treat the accident as a “crime” by reserving in the criminal case their
right to file a separate civil action. That being so, the trial court decided to order the dismissal of the
complaint against defendant Cordova Ng Sun Kwan and to suspend the hearing of the case against
Domingo Pontino until after the criminal case for Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence is finally
terminated.
Issue: Whether or not the present action is based on quasi-delict under the Civil Code and therefore
could proceed independently of the criminal case for homicide thru reckless imprudence.
Ruling: In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Article100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action
for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold
the employer solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee, subject to the employer’s
defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family.
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-delict. The
fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did
not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi¬delict. The appellant precisely made
a reservation to file an independent civil action. In fact, even without such a reservation, the Court
allowed the injured party in the criminal case which resulted in the acquittal of the accused to
recover damages based on quasi-delict. It does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable
is also free from civil liability. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be
established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action
for damages (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the
accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist.

BORDADOR v s . BRIGIDA D. . BRIGIDA D. LUZ, ERNESTO M. LUZ and NARCISO DEGANOS LUZ,
ERNESTO M. LUZ and NARCISO DEGANOS, r e s p o n d e n t s .
SYNOPSIS SYNOPSIS
Petitioners were engaged in the business of purchase and sale of jewelry while respondent Brigida
Luz was their regular customer. On several occasions, respondent Narciso Deganos, brother of
Brigida, received several pieces of gold and jewelry from petitioners amounting to P382,816.00. The
receipts stated that some of them were received for a certain Evelyn Aquino and the rest were
received for Brigida Luz. Deganos was supposed to sell the items at a profit and thereafter remit the
proceeds and return the unsold items to petitioners. However, Deganos remitted only the sum of
P53,207.00. He neither paid the balance of the sales proceeds, nor did he return any unsold item to
petitioners. Hence, petitioners instituted an action for recovery of sum of money against Deganos
and Luz claiming that Deganos acted as agent to Brigida Luz when the former received the subject
items in her behalf. And because Deganos failed to pay for the same, Brigida, as principal, and her
spouse are solidarily liable with him therefor. Brigida denied that she had anything to do with the
transactions between petitioners and Deganos. She claimed that she never authorized Deganos to
receive any item of jewelry in her behalf and neither did she actually receive any of the articles in
question. In the absence of consent to the acts of the supposed agent or authority therefor, no
agency whatsoever was created. Hence, the supposed principal cannot be held liable; only Deganos
was liable to the petitioners for the amount and damages claimed. Petitioners attempt to foist
liability on the respondent spouses Luz through the supposed agency relation with Deganos is
groundless and ill- advised
SYLLABUS SYLLABUS
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION; SEPARATE ACTION FOR
DAMAGES MAY BE INSTITUTED. — Article 33 of the Civil Code provides that in cases involving alleged
fraudulent acts, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action
may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. It is worth noting that this civil case
was instituted four years before the criminal case for estafa was filed and that although there was a
move to consolidate both cases, the same was denied by the trial court. Consequently, it was the
duty of the two branches of the Regional Trial Court concerned to independently proceed with the
civil and criminal cases. It will also be observed that a final judgment rendered in a civil action
absolving the defendant from civil liability is no bar to a criminal action. It is clear therefore, that this
civil case may proceed independently of the criminal case especially because while both cases are
based on the same facts, the quantum of proof required for holding the parties liable therein differ.
Thus, it is improvident of petitioners to claim that the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
in the present case would be preemptive of the outcome of the criminal case. Their fancied fear of
possible conflict between the disposition of this civil case and the outcome of the pending criminal
case is illusory.
DECISION
REGALADO REGALADO, J p: In this appeal by certiorari, petitioners assail the judgment of the Court
of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 49175 affirming the adjudication of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan which found private respondent Narciso Deganos liable to petitioners for actual damages,
but absolved respondent spouses Brigida D. Luz and Ernesto M. Luz of liability. Petitioners likewise
belabor the subsequent resolution of the Court of Appeals which denied their motion for
reconsideration of its challenged decision. cdtai Petitioners were engaged in the business of
purchase and sale of jewelry and respondent Brigida D. Luz, also known as Aida D. Luz, was their
regular customer. On several occasions during the period from April 27, 1987 to September 4, 1987,
respondent Narciso Deganos, the brother of Brigida D. Luz, received several pieces of gold and
jewelry from petitioners amounting to P382,816.00. 1 1 These items and their prices were indicated
in seventeen receipts covering the same. Eleven of the receipts stated that they were received for a
certain Evelyn Aquino, a niece of Deganos, and the remaining six indicated that they were received
for Brigida D. Luz. 2 2 Deganos was supposed to sell the items at a profit and thereafter remit the
proceeds and return the unsold items to petitioners. Deganos remitted only the sum of P53,207.00.
He neither paid the balance of the sales proceeds, nor did he return any unsold item to petitioners.
By January 1990, the total of his unpaid account to petitioners, including interest, reached the sum
of P725,463.98. 3 3 Petitioners eventually filed a complaint in the b a r a n g a y court against Deganos
to recover said amount. In the b a r a n g a y proceedings, Brigida D. Luz, who was not impleaded in
the case, appeared as a witness for Deganos and ultimately, she and her husband, together with
Deganos, signed a compromise agreement with petitioners. In that compromise agreement,
Deganos obligated himself to pay petitioners, on installment basis, the balance of his account plus
interest thereon. However, he failed to comply with his aforestated undertakings. On June 25, 1990,
petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 412-M-90 in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan against
Deganos and Brigida D. Luz for recovery of a sum of money and damages, with an application for
preliminary attachment. 4 4 Ernesto Luz was impleaded therein as the spouse of Brigida. Four years
later, or on March 29, 1994, Deganos and Brigida D. Luz were charged with estafa 5 5 in the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 785-M-94. That criminal
case appears to be still pending in said trial court. During the trial of the civil case, petitioners claimed
that Deganos acted as the agent of Brigida D. Luz when he received the subject items of jewelry and,
because he failed to pay for the same, Brigida, as principal, and her spouse are solidarily liable with
him therefor.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
On the other hand, while Deganos admitted that he had an unpaid obligation to petitioners, he
claimed that the same was only in the sum of P382,816.00 and not P725,463.98. He further asserted
that it was he alone who was involved in the transaction with the petitioners; that he neither acted
as agent for nor was he authorized to act as an agent by Brigida D. Luz, notwithstanding the fact that
six of the receipts indicated that the items were received by him for the latter. He further claimed
that he never delivered any of the items he received from petitioners to Brigida. Brigida, on her part,
denied that she had anything to do with the transactions between petitioners and Deganos. She
claimed that she never authorized Deganos to receive any item of jewelry in her behalf and, for that
matter, neither did she actually receive any of the articles in question. After trial, the court below
found that only Deganos was liable to petitioners for the amount and damages claimed. It held that
while Brigida D. Luz did have transactions with petitioners in the past, the items involved were
already paid for and all that Brigida owed petitioners was the sum of P21,483.00 representing
interest on the principal account which she had previously paid for. 6 6 The trial court also found
that it was petitioner Lydia Bordador who indicated in the receipts that the items were received by
Deganos for Evelyn Aquino and Brigida D. Luz. 7 7 Said court was "persuaded that Brigida D. Luz was
behind Deganos," but because there was no memorandum to this effect, the agreement between
the parties was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. 8 8 Absent the required memorandum
or any written document connecting the respondent Luz spouses with the subject receipts, or
authorizing Deganos to act on their behalf, the alleged agreement between petitioners and Brigida
D. Luz was unenforceable. Deganos was ordered to pay petitioners the amount of P725,463.98, plus
legal interest thereon from June 25, 1990, and attorney's fees. Brigida D. Luz was ordered to pay
P21,483.00 representing the interest on her own personal loan. She and her co-defendant spouse
were absolved from any other or further liability. 9 9 As stated at the outset, petitioners appealed
the judgment of the court a q u o to the Court of Appeals which affirmed said judgment. 10 10 The
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was subsequently dismissed, 11 11 hence the present
recourse to this Court. The primary issue in the instant petition is whether or not herein respondent
spouses are liable to petitioners for the latter's claim for money and damages in the sum of
P725,463.98, plus interests and attorney's fees, despite the fact that the evidence does not show
that they signed any of the subject receipts or authorized Deganos to receive the items of jewelry
on their behalf. Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in adopting the findings of the
court a q u o that respondent spouses are not liable to them, as said conclusion of the trial court is
contradicted by the finding of fact of the appellate court that "(Deganos) acted as agent of his sister
(Brigida Luz)." 12 12 In support of this contention, petitioners quoted several letters sent to them
by Brigida D. Luz wherein the latter acknowledged her obligation to petitioners and requested for
more time to fulfill the same. They likewise aver that Brigida testified in the trial court that Deganos
took some gold articles from petitioners and delivered the same to her. Both the Court of Appeals
and the trial court, however, found as a fact that the
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aforementioned letters concerned the previous obligations of Brigida to petitioners, and had
nothing to do with the money sought to be recovered in the instant case. Such concurrent factual
findings are entitled to great weight, hence, petitioners cannot plausibly claim in this appellate
review that the letters were in the nature of acknowledgments by Brigida that she was the principal
of Deganos in the subject transactions. On the other hand, with regard to the testimony of Brigida
admitting delivery of the gold to her, there is no showing whatsoever that her statement referred
to the items which are the subject matter of this case. It cannot, therefore, be validly said that she
admitted her liability regarding the same. Petitioners insist that Deganos was the agent of Brigida D.
Luz as the latter clothed him with apparent authority as her agent and held him out to the public as
such, hence Brigida can not be permitted to deny said authority to innocent third parties who dealt
with Deganos under such belief. 13 13 Petitioners further represent that the Court of Appeals
recognized in its decision that Deganos was an agent of Brigida. 14 14 The evidence does not support
the theory of petitioners that Deganos was an agent of Brigida D. Luz and that the latter should
consequently be held solidarily liable with Deganos in his obligation to petitioners. While the quoted
statement in the findings of fact of the assailed appellate decision mentioned that Deganos
ostensibly acted as an agent of Brigida, the actual conclusion and ruling of the Court of Appeals
categorically stated that, " (Brigida Luz) never authorized her brother (Deganos) to act for and in her
behalf in any transaction with Petitioners . . ." 15 15 It is clear, therefore, that even assuming a r g u
e n d o that Deganos acted as an agent of Brigida, the latter never authorized him to act on her
behalf wit h r e g a r d t o t h e t r a n s a c tio n s s u b je c t o f t his c a s e . The Civil Code provides:
Art. 1868. By the contract of agency a person binds himself to render some service or to do
something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter. The
basis for agency is representation. Here, there is no showing that Brigida consented to the acts of
Deganos or authorized him to act on her behalf, much less with respect to the particular transactions
involved. Petitioners' attempt to foist liability on respondent spouses through the supposed agency
relation with Deganos is groundless and ill-advised. Besides, it was grossly and inexcusably negligent
of petitioners to entrust to Deganos, not once or twice but on at least six occasions as evidenced by
six receipts, several pieces of jewelry of substantial value without requiring a written authorization
from his alleged principal. A person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and must discover
upon his peril the authority of the agent. 16 16 The records show that neither an express nor an
implied agency was proven to have existed between Deganos and Brigida D. Luz. Evidently,
petitioners, who were negligent in their transactions with Deganos, cannot seek relief from the
effects of their negligence by conjuring a supposed agency relation between the two respondents
where no evidence supports such claim. Petitioners next allege that the Court of Appeals erred in
ignoring the fact that the decision of the court below, which it affirmed, is "null and void" as it
contradicted its ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 39445 holding that there is "sufficient evidence/proof"
against Brigida D. Luz and Deganos for estafa in the pending criminal case. They further aver that
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erred in ruling against them in this civil action since the same would result in an inevitable conflict
of decisions should the trial court convict the accused in the criminal case. LLjur By way of backdrop
for this argument of petitioners, herein respondents Brigida D. Luz and Deganos had filed a demurrer
to evidence and a motion for reconsideration in the aforestated criminal case, both of which were
denied by the trial court. They then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals to set aside
the denial of their demurrer and motion for reconsideration but, as just stated, their petition
therefore was dismissed. 17 17 Petitioners now claim that the aforesaid dismissal by the Court of
Appeals of the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 39445 with respect to the criminal case is equivalent to a
finding that there is sufficient evidence in the estafa case against Brigida D. Luz and Deganos. Hence,
as already stated, petitioners theorize that the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals now
being impugned in the case at bar would result in a possible conflict with the prospective decision
in the criminal case. Instead of promulgating the present decision and resolution under review, so
they suggest, the Court of Appeals should have awaited the decision in the criminal case, so as not
to render academic or preempt the same or, worse, create two conflicting rulings. 18 18 Petitioners
have apparently lost sight of Article 33 of the Civil Code which provides that in cases involving alleged
fraudulent acts, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. It is worth noting that this civil case
was instituted four years before the criminal case for estafa was filed, and that although there was
a move to consolidate both cases, the same was denied by the trial court. Consequently, it was the
duty of the two branches of the Regional Trial Court concerned to independently proceed with the
civil and criminal cases. It will also be observed that a final judgment rendered in a civil action
absolving the defendant from civil liability is no bar to a criminal action. 19 19 It is clear, therefore,
that this civil case may proceed independently of the criminal case 20 20 especially because while
both cases are based on the same facts, the quantum of proof required for holding the parties liable
therein differ. Thus, it is improvident of petitioners to claim that the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals in the present case would be preemptive of the outcome of the criminal case. Their
fancied fear of possible conflict between the disposition of this civil case and the outcome of the
pending criminal case is illusory.
Petitioners surprisingly postulate that the Court of Appeals had lost its jurisdiction to issue the denial
resolution dated August 18, 1997, as the same was tainted with irregularities and badges of fraud
perpetrated by its court officers. 21 21 They charge that said appellate court, through conspiracy
and fraud on the part of its officers, gravely abused its discretion in issuing that resolution denying
their motion for reconsideration. They claim that said resolution was drafted by the p o n e n t e ,
then signed and issued by the members of the Eleventh Division of said court within one and a half
days from the elevation thereof by the division clerk of court to the office of the p o n e n t e . It is
the thesis of petitioners that there was undue haste in issuing the resolution as the same was made
without waiting for the lapse of the ten-day period for respondents to file
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their comment and for petitioners to file their reply. It was allegedly impossible for the Court of
Appeals to resolve the issue in just one and a half days, especially because its p o n e n t e , the late
Justice Maximiano C. Asuncion, was then recuperating from surgery and, that, additionally,
"hundreds of more important cases were pending." 22 22 These lamentable allegation of
irregularities in the Court of Appeals and in the conduct of its officers strikes us as a desperate
attempt of petitioners to induce this Court to give credence to their arguments which, as already
found by both the trial and intermediate appellate courts, are devoid of factual and legal substance.
The regrettably irresponsible attempt to tarnish the image of the intermediate appellate tribunal
and its judicial officers through a d h o min e m imputations could well be contumacious, but we are
inclined to let that pass with a strict admonition that petitioners refrain from indulging in such
conduct in litigations. On July 9, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in this case affirming
the trial court's decision. 23 23 Petitioners moved for reconsideration and the Court of Appeals
ordered respondents to file a comment. Respondent filed the same on August 5, 1997 24 24 and
petitioners filed their reply to said comment on August 15, 1997. 25 25 The Eleventh Division of said
court issued the questioned resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration on August
18, 1997. 26 26 It is ironic that while some litigants malign the judiciary for being supposedly slothful
in disposing of cases, petitioners are making a show of calling out for justice because the Court of
Appeals issued a resolution disposing of a case sooner than expected of it. They would even deny
the exercise of discretion by the appellate court to prioritize its action on cases in line with the
procedure it has adopted in disposing thereof and in declogging its dockets. It is definitely not for
the parties to determine and dictate when and how a tribunal should act upon those cases since
they are not even aware of the status of the dockets and the internal rules and policies for acting
thereon. The fact that a resolution was issued by said court within a relatively short period of time
after the records of the case were elevated to the office of the p o n e n t e cannot, by itself, be
deemed irregular. There is no showing whatsoever that the resolution was issued without
considering the reply filed by petitioners. In fact, that brief pleading filed by petitioners does not
exhibit any esoteric or ponderous argument which would not be analyzed within an hour. It is a legal
presumption, born of wisdom and experience, that official duty has been regularly performed; 27
27 that the proceedings of a judicial tribunal are regular and valid, and that judicial acts and duties
have been and will be duly and properly performed. 28 28 The burden of proving irregularity in
official conduct is on the part of petitioners and they have utterly failed to do so. It is thus
reprehensible for them to cast aspersions on a court of law on the bases of conjectures or surmises,
especially since one of the petitioners appears to be a member of the Philippine Bar. Lastly,
petitioners fault the trial court's holding that whatever contract of agency was established between
Brigida D. Luz and Narciso Deganos is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds as that aspect of
this case allegedly is not covered thereby. 29 29 They proceed on the premise that the Statute of
Frauds applies only to executory contracts and not to executed or to partially executed ones. From
there, they move on to claim that the contract involved in this case was an executed contract as the
items had already been delivered by petitioners to Brigida D. Luz, hence, such delivery resulted in
the execution of the contract and removed the same from the coverage of the Statute of Frauds.
Petitioners' claim is speciously unmeritorious. It should be emphasized that neither the CD
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trial court nor the appellate court categorically stated that there was such a contractual relation
between these two respondents. The trial court merely said that if there was such an agency existing
between them, the same is unenforceable as the contract would fall under the Statute of Frauds
which requires the presentation of a note or memorandum thereof in order to be enforceable in
court. That was merely a preparatory statement of a principle of law. What was finally proven as a
matter of fact is that there was no such contract between Brigida D. Luz and Narciso Deganos,
executed or partially executed, and no delivery of any of the items subject of this case was ever
made to the former. WHEREFORE, no error having been committed by the Court of Appeals in
affirming the judgment of the court a q u o , its challenged decision and resolution are hereby
AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DENIED, with double costs against petitioners. llcd SO
ORDERED.

FROILAN C. GANDIONCO, petitioner, vs. HON. SENEN C. PEÑARANDA, as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City, and TERESITA S.
GANDIONCO, respondents.
G.R. No. 79284 November 27, 1987
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS: On 29 May 1986, private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, 10th Judicial District, Branch 18, in Cagayan de Oro City, presided
over by respondent Judge, a complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of
concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages. Private respondent also filed
with the Municipal Trial Court, General Santos City, a complaint against petitioner for concubinage.
On 14 November 1986, application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite, pending a
decision in the action for legal separation, was filed by private respondent in the civil case for legal
separation. The respondent judge, as already stated, on 10 December 1986, ordered the payment
of support pendente lite.
In this recourse, petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents
consequent thereto, such as, application for support pendente lite, should be suspended in view of
the criminal case for concubinage filed against him the private respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the resolution of the
criminal case for concubinage.
HELD: YES. In view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for
legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal
action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability arising from
the offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense.
Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences
thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support,
and disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse, among others.
The governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which refers to "civil
actions to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" as contemplated in the first paragraph
of Section 1 of Rule 111-which is a civil action "for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged." Sec. 1, Rule 111, (1985) is specific that it refers to civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged. Whereas, the old Sec. 1 (c), Rule 107 simply referred to
"Civil action arising from the offense."
A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. 3 No criminal proceeding or conviction
is necessary.

People vs. Abungan G.R. No. 136843 September 28, 2000

Facts:
On August 4, 1992, at Capulaan, Villasis, Pangasinan, the accused conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, armed with long firearms, attack, assault and shoot Camilo Dirilo,
[Sr.] y Pajarito, inflicting upon him wounds on the different parts of his body which directly caused
his death. An Information, dated March 9, 1993, was filed charging appellant Pedro Abungan,
together with Randy Pascua and Ernesto Ragonton Jr. (both at large), with murder. The trial court
rendered a decision finding Abungan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. During
appeal, in a letter dated August 7, 2000, however, Joselito A. Fajardo, assistant director of the
Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that Appellant Abungan had died on July 19, 2000 at the
NBP Hospital.
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal and civil liability of the appellant is extinguished by reason of her death?
Ruling: In the present case, it is clear that, following the case of People vs. Bayotas, the death of
appellant extinguished his criminal liability. Moreover, because he died during the pendency of the
appeal and before the finality of the judgment against him, his civil liability arising from the crime or
delict (civil liability ex delicto) was also extinguished. It must be added, though, that his civil liability
may be based on sources of obligation other than delict. For this reason, the victims may file a
separate civil action against his estate, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.
The death of appellant on July 19, 2000 during the pendency of his appeal extinguished his criminal
as well as his civil liability, based solely on delict (civil liability ex delicto). The death of appellant
extinguished his criminal liability. Moreover, because he died during the pendency of the appeal and
before the finality of the judgment against him, his civil liability arising from the crime or delict (civil
liability ex delicto) was also extinguished. It must be added, though, that his civil liability may be
based on sources of obligation other than delict. For this reason, the victims may file a separate civil
action against his estate, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules. Moreover, the Court
held that the death of
Appellant Abungan would result in the dismissal of the criminal case against him. Necessarily, the
lower court's Decision — finding him guilty and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased — becomes ineffectual. Sec. 5 – Judgment in Civil Action not a
Bar Sec. 6 – Suspension by Reason of Prejudicial Question 1. Requirement of a Petition
ARK TRAVEL EXPRESS vs ABROGAR August 29, 2003 Justice Austria-Martinez
RATIO DECIDENDI Prejudicial question – When the civil case is so intimately connected with the
subject crime that it is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the respondents in the criminal
cases.
QUICK FACTS RTC and MTC grants Motion to Withdraw Information without personally determining
the probable cause for the crime charged.
FACTS Petitioner: Ark Travel Express, Inc. Respondents: The Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 150, Hon. Zeus Abrogar, Violeta Baguio and Lorelei Ira
• Ark Travel Express, Inc. (Ark Travel for brevity) filed with the City Prosecutor of Makati a criminal
complaint for False Testimony in a Civil Case against private respondents Violeta Baguio and Lorelei
Ira. • Violeta Baguio and Lorelei Ira was accused as having given false testimony upon a material fact
in a civil complaint for Collection of sum of money, torts and damages filed by Ark Travel Express
against New Filipino Maritime Agencies (NFMA) in the following manner: o During trial of the said
civil case in which one of the principal issues was whether or not payment of the claim of Ark travel
has been made by NFMA, the accused maliciously testified that the claims of Ark Travel supported
by statements of accounts is baseless and/or been paid, which accused very well knew and ought to
know, by reason of accused’s position as cashier, was false. • In a resolution dated November 20,
1996, the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict private respondents for violation of said
law and accordingly filed the respective Informations against each of them before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MTC). • In a resolution dated March 9, 1998, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo
reversed the City Prosecutors’ resolution. The prosecution office of Makati then filed with the MTC
a Motion to Withdraw Information. • However, on May 15, 1998, Ark Travel filed an Urgent Petition
for Automatic Review with the DOJ. DOJ then directed the City Prosecutor to proceed with the
prosecution of the criminal cases in a resolution dated May 27, 1998. For this reason, the MTC issued
an Order denying the Motion to Withdraw Information filed by the prosecution.
• Meanwhile, Baguio and Ira filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May 27, 1998 resolution. DOJ
Undersecretary Jesus Zozobrado granted the Motion for Reconsideration dated June 26, 1998,
ordering the withdrawal of the informations for false testimony. • MTC however, denied the Motion
to Withdraw Information in an order dated July 21, 1998. It anchors its decision in the Crespo vs.
Mogul case where the Supreme Court held that once an information is filed in court, such filing sets
in motion the criminal action against the accused before the court, and any motion to dismiss or
withdraw information is always addressed to the discretion of the court. The denial or grant of any
motion is done by the court not out of subservience to the secretary of justice but in faithful exercise
of its judicial prerogative. • Private respondents questioned the MTC Orders dated June 10, 1998
and July 21, 1998 with the respondent RTC of Makati. • RTC of Makati held that MTC acted with
grave abuse of discretion when it denied the Motion to Withdraw based solely on its bare and
ambiguous reliance on the Crespo doctrine, since an independent evaluation and assessment of the
existence of a probable cause is necessary before such orders denying the said motions could be
issued.
ISSUE WON the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion when it nullified the Orders of MTC and
enjoined the said court from hearing the criminal cases
HELD (Supreme Court discussed several points, but I will only include the issue relevant to the topic
which is Prejudicial Question )
To constitute the crime of False Testimony in a Civil Case under Article 182 of the Revised Penal
Code, the following requisites must concur: 1. The testimony must be given in a civil case; 2. The
testimony must relate to the issues presented in the case; 3. The testimony is false; 4. The testimony
must be given by the defendant knowing the same to be false; and 5. Such testimony must be
malicious and given with and intent to affect the issues presented in the case.
There is no doubt that the first two requisites are extant in this case. The records show that Ark
Travel filed a complaint for collection of sum of money, torts and damages against NFMA and
Angelina T. Rivera. In said civil case, private respondents were presented by NFMA as witnesses.
They executed their respective
sworn statements and testified before the trial court that NFMA has no outstanding obligation with
Ark Travel as the same had been paid in full.
The existence of the last three requisites is quite dubious. The falsity of the subject testimonies of
private respondents is yet to be established. It is noted that at the time of the filing of the criminal
complaints, the civil case filed by Ark Travel is still pending decision. Ark Travel has yet to prove the
validity of its monetary claims and damages against NFMA. It is only after trial that the RTC can
assess the veracity or falsity of the testimony and correspondingly render a decision. Thus, the civil
case is so intimately connected with the subject crime that it is determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the respondents in the criminal cases. In other words, whether or not the testimonies
of private respondents in the civil cases are false is a prejudicial question. It is clear that the elements
of a prejudicial question are present as provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 7 Elements of Prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed. Section 6, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedures
provides:
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of the criminal action
based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the
prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been
filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time
before the prosecution rests. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, pending determination of the falsity of the subject testimonies of private respondents in the
civil case, the criminal action for false testimony must perforce be suspended. As such, under the
attendant circumstances, although there is no motion to suspend proceedings on the part of the
private respondents, orderly administration of justice dictates that the criminal cases should be
suspended.

Salvador Abunado vs People of the Philippines

426 SCRA 562 – Civil Law – Family Code – Article 35 – Bigamy – Prejudicial Question
Remedial Law – Criminal Procedure – Prejudicial Question

In 1967, Narcisa Arceño married Salvador Abunado. Later, Arceño left for Japan to work there. She
returned in 1992 but Abunado was nowhere to be found as he left the family home. Arceño was
able to locate Abunado but when she did, Abunado was already cohabiting with somebody else.
Further, Arceño also discovered that in 1989, Abunado married a certain Zenaida Biñas.
In January 1995, Abunado filed an annulment case against Arceño. In May 1995, Arceño filed a
bigamy case against Abunado. Both cases proceeded simultaneously and independently in different
courts.
In 1999, the marriage between Arceño and Abunado was annulled. In 2001, Abunado was convicted
by the trial court for bigamy.
Abunado now questions the judgment of conviction against him as he alleged that the annulment
case he filed against Arceño was a prejudicial question to the bigamy case filed against him by
Arceño. Hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should have been suspended during the
pendency of the annulment case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abunado is correct.

HELD: No. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from
the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves
facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that
in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined.
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior
to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.
Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if Abunado eventually obtained a declaration
that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. In short, all the elements of bigamy were present
– the nullity of the prior marriage is immaterial.
No. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused,
and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined. The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage
was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been
consummated.

MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE
FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of the RTC, Brach 139, Makati City, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the
Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City. After twenty-four years of marriage
and having of four children, petitioner filed in RTC of Quezon City a petition for nullity of marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity. In the answer of the wife to the said petition, she alleges
that the petitioner is the one that abandoned their conjugal home and lived with another woman.
She also filed a criminal complaint of concubinage against his husband and other woman in the City
Prosecutor’s Office of Makati, who also found a probable cause and ordered a filing against them.
The petitioner, in order to prevent the issuance of a warrant of arrest, filed a Motion to Defer
Proceedings Including the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. He discussed that the
pendency for the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to
the determination of criminal case. The petition had been denied by Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes
and the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the denial of the said order likewise denied. The
petitioner went to RTC of Makati and questioned the Orders issued by Judge Cervantes, he is praying
for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction, he again been denied for the petition for certiorari
and said court issued another order denying his motion for reconsideration. Petitioner then filed the
instant petition for review. ISSUE
Whether or not the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be invoked as a prejudicial question in
the case at bar RULLING
No. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It
has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of Beltran’s
marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final
determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same
facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.