SESINANDO MERIDA, G.R. No.
158182
Petitioner,
- versus - AZCUNA,
CORONA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated 28
June 2002 and the Resolution dated 14 May 2003 of the Court
of Appeals. The 28 June 2002 Decision affirmed the conviction
of petitioner Sesinando Merida (petitioner) for violation of
Section 68,[3] Presidential Decree No. 705 (PD 705),[4] as
amended by Executive Order No. 277. The Resolution dated 14
May 2003 denied admission of petitioners motion for
reconsideration.[5]
The Facts
Petitioner was charged in the Regional Trial Court of
Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81 (trial court) with violation of
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for cut[ting], gather[ing],
collect[ing] and remov[ing] a lone narra tree inside a private
land in Mayod, Ipil, Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod Property) over
which private complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco (Tansiongco)
claims ownership.[6]
The prosecution evidence showed that on 23 December
1998, Tansiongco learned that petitioner cut a narra tree in the
Mayod Property. Tansiongco reported the matter to Florencio
Royo (Royo), the punong barangay of Ipil. On 24 December
1998,[7] Royo summoned petitioner to a meeting with
Tansiongco. When confronted during the meeting about the
felled narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but
claimed that he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix
(Calix) who, according to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property
from Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale.
Petitioner showed to Royo Calixs written authorization signed by
Calixs wife.[8]
On 11 January 1999, Tansiongco reported the tree-cutting
to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) forester Thelmo S. Hernandez (Hernandez) in Sibuyan,
Romblon. When Hernandez confronted petitioner about the
felled tree, petitioner reiterated his earlier claim to Royo that he
cut the tree with Calixs permission. Hernandez ordered
petitioner not to convert the felled tree trunk into lumber.
On 26 January 1999, Tansiongco informed Hernandez that
petitioner had converted the narra trunk into lumber.
Hernandez, with other DENR employees and enforcement
officers, went to the Mayod Property and saw that the narra tree
had been cut into six smaller pieces of lumber. Hernandez took
custody of the lumber,[9] deposited them for safekeeping with
Royo, and issued an apprehension receipt to petitioner. A larger
portion of the felled tree remained at the Mayod Property. The
DENR subsequently conducted an investigation on the
matter.[10]
Tansiongco filed a complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Romblon (Provincial Prosecutor)
charging petitioner with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended. During the preliminary investigation, petitioner
submitted a counter-affidavit reiterating his claim that he cut
the narra tree with Calixs permission. The Provincial
Prosecutor[11] found probable cause to indict petitioner and
filed the Information with the trial court (docketed as Criminal
Case No. 2207).
During the trial, the prosecution presented six witnesses
including Tansiongco, Royo, and Hernandez who testified on the
events leading to the discovery of and investigation on the tree-
cutting. Petitioner testified as the lone defense witness and
claimed, for the first time, that he had no part in the tree-
cutting.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Decision dated 24 November 2000, the trial court
found petitioner guilty as charged, sentenced him to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal and ordered the seized lumber
forfeited in Tansiongcos favor.[12] The trial court dismissed
petitioners defense of denial in view of his repeated extrajudicial
admissions that he cut the narra tree in the Mayod Property
with Calixs permission. With this finding and petitioners lack of
DENR permit to cut the tree, the trial court held petitioner liable
for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his
defense of denial. Petitioner also contended that (1) the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because it was
based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest
officer as provided under Section 80 of PD 705 and (2) the
penalty imposed by the trial court is excessive.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision dated 28 June 2002, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial courts ruling but ordered the seized lumber
confiscated in the governments favor.[13] The Court of Appeals
sustained the trial courts finding that petitioner is bound by his
extrajudicial admissions of cutting the narra tree in the Mayod
Property without any DENR permit. The Court of Appeals also
found nothing irregular in the filing of the complaint by
Tansiongco instead of a DENR forest officer considering that the
case underwent preliminary investigation by the proper officer
who filed the Information with the trial court.
On the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals, in the
dispositive portion of its ruling, sentenced petitioner to 14
years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years of reclusion temporal.
However, in the body of its ruling, the Court of Appeals held
that the penalty to be imposed on [petitioner] should be (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal,[14] the same penalty the trial court
imposed.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals,
in its Resolution dated 14 May 2003, did not admit his motion
for having been filed late.[15]
Hence, this petition. Petitioner raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER x x x SECTION 68 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED
PROHIBITING THE CUTTING, GATHERING, COLLECTING AND
REMOVING TIMBER OR OTHER FOREST PRODUCTS FROM ANY
FOREST LAND APPLIES TO PETITIONER.
II. WHETHER x x x POSSESSION OF THE NARRA TREE CUT
IN PRIVATE LAND CONTESTED BY VICAR CALIX AND PRIVATE-
COMPLAINANT OSCAR TANSIONGCO IS COVERED BY SECTION
80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED.
III. WHETHER PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT CAN INITIATE THE
CHARGE EVEN WITHOUT THE STANDING AUTHORITY COMING
FROM THE INVESTIGATING FOREST OFFICER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES AS
MANDATED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED.

[IV.] WHETHER x x x THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING
COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE FILED BY PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT
BECAUSE IT WAS NOT THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER AS
REQUIRED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED WHO
MUST BE THE ONE TO INSTITUTE THE FILING OF THE
SAME.[16]
In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) countered that (1) the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the case even though Tansiongco, and not a
DENR forest officer, filed the complaint against petitioner and
(2) petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:[17]
1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over
Criminal Case No. 2207 even though it was based on a
complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer;
and
2) Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of
PD 705, as amended.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
The Trial Court Acquired Jurisdiction Over
Criminal Case No. 2207
We sustain the OSGs claim that the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207. The Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure (Revised Rules) list the cases which must be
initiated by a complaint filed by specified individuals,[18] non-
compliance of which ousts the trial court of jurisdiction from
trying such cases.[19] However, these cases concern only
defamation and other crimes against chastity[20] and not to
cases concerning Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Further,
Section 80 of PD 705 does not prohibit an interested person
from filing a complaint before any qualified officer for violation
of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Section 80 of PD 705
provides in relevant parts:
SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. x x x x
Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any
of the offenses defined in this Chapter, not committed in the
presence of any forest officer or employee, or any of the
deputized officers or officials, shall immediately be investigated
by the forest officer assigned in the area where the offense was
allegedly committed, who shall thereupon receive the evidence
supporting the report or complaint.
If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or
report, the investigating forest officer shall file the necessary
complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to
conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal cases and file an
information in Court. (Emphasis supplied)
We held in People v. CFI of Quezon[21] that the phrase
reports and complaints in Section 80 refers to reports and
complaints as might be brought to the forest officer assigned to
the area by other forest officers or employees of the Bureau of
Forest Development or any of the deputized officers or officials,
for violations of forest laws not committed in their
presence.[22]
Here, it was not forest officers or employees of the Bureau
of Forest Development or any of the deputized officers or
officials who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the
Mayod Property but Tansiongco, a private citizen who claims
ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez cannot be
faulted for not conducting an investigation to determine if there
is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report.[23]
At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section
80 of PD 705 or the Revised Rules, from filing a complaint
before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioners alleged violation
of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. For its part, the trial court
correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2207 as the case
falls within its exclusive original jurisdiction.[24]
Petitioner is Liable for Cutting Timber in Private
Property Without Permit
Section 68, as amended, one of the 12 acts[25] penalized
under PD 705, provides:
SECTION 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber,
or Other Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall
cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land, without any authority, or
possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That
in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the
officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or
possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they
shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further
proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of
the government of the timber or any forest products cut,
gathered, collected, removed, or possessed as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in
the area where the timber or forest products are found.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the
cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber or other
forest products from any forest land without any authority; (2)
the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without
any authority;[26] and (3) the possession of timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations.[27] Petitioner stands
charged of having cut, gathered, collected and removed timber
or other forest products from a private land[28] without x x x
the necessary permit x x x thus his liablity, if ever, should be
limited only for cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and
remov[ing] timber, under the second category. Further, the
prosecution evidence showed that petitioner did not perform
any acts of gathering, collecting, or removing but only the act of
cutting a lone narra tree. Hence, this case hinges on the
question of whether petitioner cut x x x timber in the Mayod
Property without a DENR permit.[29]
 We answer in the affirmative and thus affirm the lower
courts rulings.
On the question of whether petitioner cut a narra tree in
the Mayod Property without a DENR permit, petitioner adopted
conflicting positions. Before his trial, petitioner consistently
represented to the authorities that he cut a narra tree in the
Mayod Property and that he did so only with Calixs permission.
However, when he testified, petitioner denied cutting the tree in
question. We sustain the lower courts rulings that petitioners
extrajudicial admissions bind him.[30] Petitioner does not
explain why Royo and Hernandez, public officials who testified
under oath in their official capacities, would lie on the stand to
implicate petitioner in a serious criminal offense, not to mention
that the acts of these public officers enjoy the presumption of
regularity. Further, petitioner does not deny presenting Calixs
authorization to Royo and Hernandez as his basis for cutting the
narra tree in the Mayod Property. Petitioner has no use of Calixs
authorization if, as he claimed during the trial, he did not cut
any tree in the Mayod Property.
We further hold that the lone narre tree petitioner cut
from the Mayod Property constitutes timber under Section 68 of
PD 705, as amended. PD 705 does not define timber, only
forest product (which circuitously includes timber.)[31] Does
the narra tree in question constitute timber under Section 68?
The closest this Court came to defining the term timber in
Section 68 was to provide that timber, includes lumber or
processed log.[32] In other jurisdictions, timber is determined
by compliance with specified dimensions[33] or certain stand
age or rotation age.[34] In Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,[35] this Court was faced with a similar task of having
to define a term in Section 68 of PD 705 - lumber - to
determine whether possession of lumber is punishable under
that provision. In ruling in the affirmative, we held that lumber
should be taken in its ordinary or common usage meaning to
refer to processed log or timber, thus:
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either
timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products
as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in
paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of
Processing plant, which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine
or combination of machine used for the processing of logs and
other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood,
wallboard, blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other
finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or
processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term
lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright
edition of Websters Third New International Dictionary, lumber
is defined, inter alia, as timber or logs after being prepared for
the market. Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given
their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And in so far
as possession of timber without the required legal documents is
concerned, Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended, makes no
distinction between raw and procesed timber. Neither should
we.[36] x x x x (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)
We see no reason why, as in Mustang, the term timber
under Section 68 cannot be taken in its common acceptation as
referring to wood used for or suitable for building or for
carpentry or joinery.[37] Indeed, tree saplings or tiny tree
stems that are too small for use as posts, panelling, beams,
tables, or chairs cannot be considered timber.[38]
Here, petitioner was charged with having felled a narra
tree and converted the same into several pieces of sawn
lumber, about three (3) pcs. 2x16x6 and three (3) pcs. 2x18x7
x x x consisting of 111 board feet x x x. These measurements
were indicated in the apprehension receipt Hernandez issued to
petitioner on 26 January 1999 which the prosecution introduced
in evidence.[39] Further, Hernandez testified that the larger
portion of the felled log left in the Mayod Property measured 76
something centimeters [at the big end] while the smaller end
measured 65 centimeters and the length was 2.8 meters.[40]
Undoubtedly, the narra tree petitioner felled and converted to
lumber was timber fit for building or for carpentry or joinery and
thus falls under the ambit of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The Penalty Imposable on Petitioner
Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is
punishable as Qualified Theft under Article 310 in relation to
Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), thus:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of qualified theft shall
be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than
those respectively specified in the next preceding article x x x.
Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be
punished by:
1. The penalty of prisin mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the
thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the
maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and
one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of
the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisin
mayor or reclusin temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prisin correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than
6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prisin correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, if the value of the property stolen is more than
200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prisin
correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the property
stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5
pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if
such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the
theft is committed under the circumstances enumerated in
paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of the
thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds
said amount, the provisions of any of the five preceding
subdivisions shall be made applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not
exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing stolen is not
over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the
impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a
livelihood for the support of himself or his family.
The Information filed against petitioner alleged that the six
pieces of lumber measuring 111 board feet were valued at
P3,330. However, if the value of the log left at the Mayod
Property is included, the amount increases to P20,930.40. To
prove this allegation, the prosecution relied on Hernandezs
testimony that these amounts, as stated in the apprehension
receipt he issued, are his estimates based on prevailing local
price.[41]
This evidence does not suffice. To prove the amount of the
property taken for fixing the penalty imposable against the
accused under Article 309 of the RPC, the prosecution must
present more than a mere uncorroborated estimate of such
fact.[42] In the absence of independent and reliable
corroboration of such estimate, courts may either apply the
minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of the
property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the
case.[43] In People v. Dator[44] where, as here, the accused
was charged with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended, for possession of lumber without permit, the
prosecutions evidence for the lumbers value consisted of an
estimate made by the apprehending authorities whose apparent
lack of corroboration was compounded by the fact that the
transmittal letter for the estimate was not presented in
evidence. Accordingly, we imposed on the accused the minimum
penalty under Article 309(6)[45] of the RPC.[46]
Applying Dator in relation to Article 310 of the RPC and
taking into account the Indeterminate Sentence Law, we find it
proper to impose on petitioner, under the circumstances
obtaining here, the penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, four (4)
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correcional, as
maximum.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 June 2002
and the Resolution dated 14 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals
with the modification that petitioner Sesinando Merida is
sentenced to four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to three (3) years, four (4) months and twenty-
one (21) days of prision correcional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104988 June 18, 1996
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FULGENCIO S.
FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), and ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES,
Chief, Special Actions and Investigations Division, DENR,
respondents.
G.R. No. 106424 June 18, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as the
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and RI CHUY PO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 123784 June 18, 1996
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES,
Chief, Special Actions and Investigation Division, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), ATTY. NESTOR V.
GAPUSAN, TIRSO P. PARIAN, JR., and FELIPE H. CALLORINA,
JR., respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p
The first and third case, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No.
123784, were originally assigned to the Second and Third
Divisions of the Court, respectively. They were subsequently
consolidated with the second, a case of the Court en banc.
Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at
Nos. 1350-1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila, and with a
Lumberyard at Fortune Street, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered as a lumber
dealer with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) under
Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469. Its permit
as such was to expire on 25 September 1990.
Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and
respondent Atty. Vincent A. Robles were, during all the time
material to these cases, the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Chief of the
Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) of the DENR,
respectively.
The material operative facts are as follows:
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge
stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside
the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
the SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent
it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course
thereof, the team members saw coming out from the
lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322,
loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and
dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required
invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck
together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR
compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City.1 The team was not
able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of
the owner.2
On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search
warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof,
the team seized on that date from the petitioner's lumberyard
four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a
negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000
board feet of lumber and shorts of various species including
almaciga and supa.3
On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the
petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela and placed under
administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga,
supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board
feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the
corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices,
tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the
invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their
source and origin.4
Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an
administrative seizure the owner retains the physical possession
of the seized articles. Only an inventory of the articles is taken
and signed by the owner or his representative. The owner is
prohibited from disposing them until further orders.5
On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to
Robles requesting an extension of fifteen days from 14 April
1990 to produce the required documents covering the seized
articles because some of them, particularly the certificate of
lumber origin, were allegedly in the Province of Quirino Robles
denied the motion on the ground that the documents being
required from the petitioner must accompany the lumber or
forest products placed under seizure.6
On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his memorandum-
report recommending to Secretary Factoran the following:
 1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of the lumber
Dealer's Permit of Mustang Lumber, Inc. for operating an
unregistered lumberyard and resaw mill and possession of
Almaciga Lumber (a banned specie) without the required
documents;
2. Confiscation of the lumber seized at the Mustang
Lumberyard including the truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and the
lumber loaded herein [sic] now at the DENR compound in the
event its owner fails to submit documents showing legitimacy of
the source of said lumber within ten days from date of seizure;
3. Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy Po,
owner of Mustang Lumber Inc. and Mr. Ruiz, or if the
circumstances warrant for illegal possession of narra and
almaciga lumber and shorts if and when recommendation no. 2
pushes through;
4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639 and
CDV. 458 as well as the lumber loaded therein for transport
lumber using "recycled" documents.7
On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order
suspending immediately the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit
No. NRD-4-092590-0469 and directing the petitioner to explain
in writing within fifteen days why its lumber-dealer's permit
should not be cancelled.
On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another
letter to Robles informing the latter that the petitioner had
already secured the required documents and was ready to
submit them. None, however, was submitted.8
On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued another order
wherein, after reciting the events which took place on 1 April
and 3 April 1990, he ordered "CONFISCATED in favor of the
government to be disposed of in accordance with law" the
approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga
lumber, shorts, and sticks found inside the petitioner's
lumberyard.9
On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of
Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a
restraining order or preliminary injunction against Secretary
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and Atty. Vincent A. Robles. The case
(hereinafter, the FIRST CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case
No. 90-53648 and assigned to Branch 35 of the said court. The
petitioner questioned therein (a) the seizure on 1 April 1990,
without any search and seizure order issued by a judge, of its
truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and its cargo of assorted lumber
consisting of apitong, tanguile, and lauan of different sizes and
dimensions with a total value of P38,000.00; and (b) the orders
of Secretary Factoran of 23 April 1990 for lack of prior notice
and hearing and of 3 May 1990 for violation of Section 2, Article
III of the Constitution.
On 17 September 1990, in response to reports that
violations of P.D. No. 705 (The Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines), as amended, were committed and acting upon
instruction of Robles and under Special Order No. 897, series of
1990, a team of DENR agents went to the business premises of
the petitioner located at No. 1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo,
Manila. The team caught the petitioner operating as a lumber
dealer although its lumber-dealer's permit had already been
suspended or 23 April 1990. Since the gate of the petitioner's
lumberyard was open, the team went inside and saw an owner-
type jeep with a trailer loaded with lumber. Upon investigation,
the team was informed that the lumber loaded on the trailer
was to be delivered to the petitioner's customer. It also came
upon the sales invoice covering the transaction. The members
of the team then introduced themselves to the caretaker, one
Ms. Chua, who turned out to be the wife of the petitioner's
president and general manager, Mr. Ri Chuy Po, who was then
out of town. The team's photographer was able to take
photographs of the stockpiles of lumber including newly cut
ones, fresh dust around sawing or cutting machineries and
equipment, and the transport vehicles loaded with lumber. The
team thereupon effected a constructive seizure of approximately
20,000 board feet of lauan lumber in assorted sizes stockpiled
in the premises by issuing a receipt
therefor. 10
As a consequence of this 17 September 1990 incident, the
petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari
and prohibition. The case (hereinafter, the SECOND CIVIL
CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54610 and assigned
to Branch 24 of the said court.
In the meantime, Robles filed with the Department of
Justice (DOJ) a complaint against the petitioner's president and
general manager, Ri Chuy Po, for violation of Section 68 of P.D.
No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. After appropriate
preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor, Claro
Arellano, handed down a resolution 11 whose dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby
recommended that an information be filed against respondent Ri
Chuy Po for illegal possession of approximately 200,000 bd. ft.
of lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal
shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 68 of PD
705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987.
It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft. of narra
shorts, trimmings and slabs covered by legal documents be
released to the rightful owner, Malupa. 12
This resolution was approved by Undersecretary of Justice
Silvestre H. Bello III, who served as Chairman of the Task Force
on Illegal Logging." 13
On the basis of that resolution, an information was filed on
5 June 1991 by the DOJ with Branch 172 of the RTC of
Valenzuela, charging Ri Chuy Po with the violation of Section 58
of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 324-V-91 (hereinafter, the CRIMINAL CASE). The
accusatory portion of the information reads as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or
subsequent thereto, within the premises and vicinity of Mustang
Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully
have in his possession truckloads of almaciga and lauan and
approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various
species including almaciga and supa, without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations. 14
On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila rendered
its decision 15 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered as follows:
1. The Order of Respondent Secretary of the DENR, the
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated 3 May 1990
ordering the confiscation in favor of the Government the
approximately 311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa, end almaciga
Lumber, shorts and sticks, found inside and seized from the
Lumberyard of the petitioner at Fortune Drive, Fortune Village,
Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on April 4, 1990
(Exhibit 10), is hereby set aside and vacated, and instead the
respondents are required to report and bring to the Hon.
Adriano Osorio, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, NCR,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the said 311,000 board feet of Lauan,
supa and almaciga Lumber, shorts and sticks, to be dealt with
as directed by Law;
 2. The respondents are required to initiate and prosecute
the appropriate action before the proper court regarding the
Lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions
Loaded in petitioner's truck bearing Plate No. CCK-322 which
were seized on April 1, 1990;
3. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court
on August 2, 1990 shall be rendered functus oficio upon
compliance by the respondents with paragraphs 1 and 2 of this
judgment;.
4. Action on the prayer of the petitioner that the Lauan,
supa and almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks mentioned above
in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment be returned to said
petitioner is withheld in this case until after the proper court has
taken cognizance and determined how those Lumber, shorts
and sticks should be disposed of; and
5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the
warrantless search and seizure on 1 April 1990 of the
petitioner's truck, which was moving out from the petitioner's
lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large
volumes of lumber without covering document showing the
legitimacy of its source or origin did not offend the
constitutional mandate that search and seizure must be
supported by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one of the
settled and accepted exceptions where warrantless search and
seizure is justified, viz., a search of a moving vehicle. 16 As to
the seizure of a large volume of almaciga, supa, and lauan
lumber and shorts effected on 4 April 1990, the trial court ruled
that the said seizure was a continuation of that made the
previous day and was still pursuant to or by virtue of the search
warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio whose validity the
petitioner did not even question. 17 And, although the search
warrant did not specifically mention almaciga, supa, and lauan
lumber and shorts, their seizure was valid because it is settled
that the executing officer is not required to ignore contrabands
observed during the conduct of the
search.18
The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's
order of 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation of the seized
articles in favor of the Government for the reason that since the
articles were seized pursuant to the search warrant issued by
Executive Judge Osorio they should have been returned to him
in compliance with the directive in the warrant.
As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of Secretary
Factoran, the trial court ruled that the same had been rendered
moot and academic by the expiration of the petitioner's lumber
dealer's permit on 25 September 1990, a fact the petitioner
admitted in its memorandum.
The petitioner forthwith appealed from the decision in the
FIRST CIVIL CASE to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the
appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 25510.
On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL
CASE a Motion to Quash and/or to Suspend Proceedings based
on the following grounds: (a) the information does not charge
an offense, for possession of lumber, as opposed to timber, is
not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and
even granting arguendo that lumber falls within the purview of
the said section, the same may not be used in evidence against
him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure; and (b)
Civil Case No. 90-53648 of Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila, the
FIRST CIVIL CASE, then pending before the Court of Appeals,
which involves the legality of the seizure, raises a prejudicial
question. 19
The prosecution opposed the motion alleging that lumber
is included in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and
possession thereof without the required legal documents is
penalized therein. It referred to Section 3.2 of DENR
Administrative Order No. 19, series of 1989, for the definitions
of timber and lumber, and then argued that exclusion of lumber
from Section 68 would defeat the very purpose of the law, i.e.,
to minimize, if not halt, illegal logging that has resulted in the
rapid denudation of our forest resources. 20
In her order of 16 August 1991 in the CRIMINAL CASE, 21
respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong granted the motion
to quash and dismissed the case on the ground that "possession
of lumber without the legal documents required by forest laws
and regulations is not a crime. 22
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied in the
order of 18 October 1991, 23 the People filed a petition for
certiorari with this Court in G.R. No. 106424, wherein it
contends that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion in granting the motion to quash and in dismissing the
case.
On 29 November 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision 24 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 dismissing for lack of merit
the petitioner's appeal from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL
CASE and affirming the trial court's rulings on the issues raised.
As to the claim that the truck was not carrying contraband
articles since there is no law punishing the possession of
lumber, and that lumber is not timber whose possession without
the required legal documents is unlawful under P.D. No. 705, as
amended, the Court of Appeals held:
This undue emphasis on lumber or the commercial nature
of the forest product involved has always been foisted by those
who claim to be engaged in the legitimate business of lumber
dealership. But what is important to consider is that when
appellant was required to present the valid documents showing
its acquisition and lawful possession of the lumber in question, it
failed to present any despite the period of extension granted to
it. 25
The petitioner's motion to reconsider the said decision was
denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 3 March
1992. 26 Hence, the petitioner came to this Court by way of a
petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 104988, which was
filed on 2 May 1992. 27
On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila
handed down a decision in the SECOND CIVIL CASE dismissing
the petition for certiorari and prohibition because (a) the
petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies; (b) when
the seizure was made on 17 September 1990 the petitioner
could not lawfully sell lumber, as its license was still under
suspension; (c) the seizure was valid under Section 68-A of P.D.
No. 705, as amended; and (d) the seizure was justified as a
warrantless search and seizure under Section 80 of P.D. No.
705, as amended.
The petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of
Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 33778.
In its decision 28 of 31 July 1995, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petitioner's appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 for
lack of merit and sustained the grounds relied upon by the trial
court in dismissing the SECOND CIVIL CASE. Relying on the
definition of "lumber" by Webster, viz., "timber or logs,
especially after being prepared for the market," and by the
Random House Dictionary of the English Language, viz., "wood,
esp. when suitable or adapted for various building purposes,"
the respondent Court held that since wood is included in the
definition of forest product in Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, lumber is necessarily included in Section 68 under
the term forest product.
The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a forest
officer or employee can seize the forest product involved in a
violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 pursuant to Section 80
thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 1775, which provides in part
as follows:
Sec. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions. -- A
forest officer or employee of the Bureau or any personnel of the
Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police shall arrest
even without warrant any person who has committed or is
committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in this
chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the
Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the
offense, or the forest products cut, gathered or taken by the
offender in the process of committing the offense.
Among the offenses punished in the chapter referred to in
said Section 80 are the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal
of timber or other forest products or possession of timber or
other forest products without the required legal documents.
Its motion to reconsider the decision having been denied
by the Court of Appeals in the resolution of 6 February 1996,
the petitioner filed with this Court on 27 February 1996 a
petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 123784.
We shall now resolve these three cases starting with G.R.
No. 106424 with which the other two were consolidated.
G.R. No. 106424
The petitioner had moved to quash the information in
Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 on the ground that it does not
charge an offense. Respondent Judge Dizon-Capulong granted
the motion reasoning that the subject matter of the information
in the CRIMINAL CASE is LUMBER, which is neither "timber" nor
"other forest product" under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, and hence, possession thereof without the required
legal documents is not prohibited and penalized under the said
section.
Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court, an information may be quashed on the ground that the
facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense. It has been
said that "the test for the correctness of this ground is the
sufficiency of the averments in the information, that is, whether
the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the
elements of the
offense, 29 and matters aliunde will not be considered."
Anent the sufficiency of the information, Section 6, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court requires, inter alia, that the information state
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense.
Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, which
provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber,
or Other Forest Products Without License. -- Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land, without any authority, or
possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That
in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the
officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or
possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they
shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further
proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of
the government of the timber or any forest products cut,
gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in
the area where the timber or forest products are found.
Punished then in this section are (1) the cutting,
gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest
products from the places therein mentioned without any
authority; and (b) possession of timber forest products without
the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations.
Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in Section 68.
But conceding ex gratia that this omission amounts to an
exclusion of lumber from the section's coverage, do the facts
averred in the information in the CRIMINAL CASE validly charge
a violation of the said section?
A cursory reading of the information readily leads us to an
infallible conclusion that lumber is not solely its subject matter.
It is evident therefrom that what are alleged to be in the
possession of the private respondent, without the required legal
documents, are truckloads of
(1) almaciga and lauan; and
(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of
various species including almaciga and supa.
The "almaciga and lauan" specifically mentioned in no. (1)
are not described as "lumber." They cannot refer to the
"lumber" in no. (2) because they are separated by the words
"approximately 200,000 bd. ft." with the conjunction "and," and
not with the preposition "of." They must then be raw forest
products or, more specifically, timbers under Section 3(q) of
P.D. No. 705, as amended, which reads:
Sec. 3. Definitions. --
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Forest product means timber, firewood, bark, tree top,
resin, gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other
forest plant, the associated water, fish game, scenic, historical,
recreational and geological resources in forest lands.
It follows then that lumber is only one of the items
covered by the information. The public and the private
respondents obviously miscomprehended the averments in the
information. Accordingly, even if lumber is not included in
Section 68, the other items therein as noted above fall within
the ambit of the said section, and as to them, the information
validly charges an offense.
Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests
in his dissenting opinion that this Court go beyond the four
corners of the information for enlightenment as to whether the
information exclusively refers to lumber. With the aid of the
pleadings and the annexes thereto, he arrives at the conclusion
that "only lumber has been envisioned in the indictment."
The majority is unable to subscribe to his view. First, his
proposition violates the rule that only the facts alleged in the
information vis-a-vis the law violated must be considered in
determining whether an information charges an offense.
Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted to are
insufficient to justify his conclusion. On the contrary, the Joint
Affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng, which is
one of the annexes he referred to, 30 cannot lead one to infer
that what the team seized was all lumber. Paragraph 8 thereof
expressly states:
8. That when inside the compound, the team found
approximately four (4) truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings
and slabs and a negligible amount of narra lumber, and
approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various
species including almaciga and supa which are classified as
prohibited wood species. (emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the
resolution31 of the investigating prosecutor, which served as
the basis for the filing of the information, does not limit itself to
lumber; thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby
recommended that an information be filed against respondent Ri
Chuy Po for illegal possession of 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber
consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of
almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 63 of PD 705 as
amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987. (emphasis supplied)
The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be
construed as an affirmance of the respondent Judge's conclusion
that lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D.
No. 705, as amended, and thus possession thereof without the
required legal documents is not a crime. On the contrary, this
Court rules that such possession is penalized in the said section
because lumber is included in the term timber.
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either
timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products
as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in
paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of
"Processing plant," which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up,
machine or combination of machine used for the processing of
logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer,
plywood, wallbond, blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or
other finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or
processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term
lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright
edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber
is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for
the market." 32 Simply put, lumber is a processed log or
timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given
their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. 33 And
insofar as possession of timber without the required legal
documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed
timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguere debemus.
Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong
of Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to
quash the information in the CRIMINAL CASE and in dismissing
the said case.
G.R. No. 104988
We find this petition to be without merit. The petitioner
has miserably failed to show that the Court of Appeals
committed any reversible error in its assailed decision of 29
November 1991.
It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the
petitioner's truck with Plate No. CCK-322 was coming out from
the petitioner's lumberyard loaded with lauan and almaciga
lumber of different sizes and dimensions which were not
accompanied with the required invoices and transport
documents. The seizure of such truck and its cargo was a valid
exercise of the power vested upon a forest officer or employee
by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775.
Then, too, as correctly held by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the search was conducted on
a moving vehicle. Such a search could be lawfully conducted
without a search warrant.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally
accepted exceptions to the constitutional mandate 34 that no
search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant
issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of
probable cause. The other exceptions are (3) search as an
incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view,
(3) customs searches, and (4) consented warrantless search. 35
We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that the search on 4 April 1990 was a
continuation of the search on 3 April 1990 done under and by
virtue of the search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by Executive
Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a
search warrant has a lifetime of ten days. Hence, it could be
served at any time within the said period, and if its object or
purpose cannot be accomplished in one day, the same may be
continued the following day or days until completed. Thus, when
the search under a warrant on one day was interrupted, it may
be continued under the same warrant the following day,
provided it is still within the ten-day period. 36
As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was
illegal because possession of lumber without the required legal
documents is not illegal under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, since lumber is neither specified therein nor included
in the term forest product, the same hardly merits further
discussion in view of our ruling in G.R. No. 106424.
G.R. No. 123784
The allegations and arguments set forth in the petition in
this case palpally fail to shaw prima facie that a reversible error
has been committed by the Court of Appeals in its challenged
decision of 31 July 1995 and resolution of 6 February 1996 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 33778. We must, forthwith, deny it for utter
want of merit. There is no need to require the respondents to
comment on the petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's
appeal from the judgment of the trial court in the SECOND
CIVIL CASE. The petitioner never disputed the fact that its
lumber-dealer's license or permit had been suspended by
Secretary Factoran on 23 April 1990. The suspension was never
lifted, and since the license had only a lifetime of up to 25
September 1990, the petitioner has absolutely no right to
possess, sell, or otherwise dispose of lumber. Accordingly,
Secretary Factoran or his authorized representative had the
authority to seize the Lumber pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D.
No. 705, as amended, which provides as follows:
Sec. 68-A Administrative Authority of the Department
Head or his Duly Authorized Representative to Order
Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of this Code or other
forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his
duly authorized representative may order the confiscation of
any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or
possessed or abandoned. . . .
The petitioner's insistence that possession or sale of
lumber is not penalized must also fail view of our disquisition
and ruling on the same issue in G.R. No. 106424. Besides, the
issue is totally irrelevant in the SECOND CIVIL CASE which
involves administrative seizure as a consequence of the
violation of the suspension of the petitioner's license as lumber
dealer.
All told then, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784 are
nothing more than rituals to cover up blatant violations of the
Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 705), as
amended. They are presumably trifling attempts to block the
serious efforts of the DENR to enforce the decree, efforts which
deserve the commendation of the public in light of the urgent
need to take firm and decisive action against despoilers of our
forests whose continuous destruction only ensures to the
generations to come, if not the present, an inheritance of
parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The Government
must not tire in its vigilance to protect the environment by
prosecuting without fear or favor any person who dares to
violate our laws for the utilization and protection of our forests.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b)
SETTING ASIDE and ANNULLING, for having been rendered with
grave abuse of discretion, the challenged orders of 16 August
1991 and 18 October 1991 of respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-
Capulong, Branch 172, Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Ri Chuy Po"; (c) REINSTATING the information in
the said criminal case; and (d) DIRECTING the respondent
Judge or her successor to hear and decide the case with
purposeful dispatch; and
2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G. R.
No. 123784 for utter failure of the petitioner to show that the
respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in
the challenged decisions of 29 November 1991 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 25510 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and of 31 July 1995 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 33778 on the SECOND CIVIL CASE.
Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr.,
Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., dissenting:
The prosecution seeks, in its petition for review on
certiorari in G.R. No. 106424, the annulment of the 16th August
1991 Order of respondent Judge granting the motion of private
respondent Ri Chuy Po to quash the information that has
charged him with the Violation of Section 68 of Presidential
Decree ("PD") No. 705 (otherwise known as the Forestry
Reform Code, as amended by Executive Order ["EO"] No. 2771)
and the 18th October 1991 Order denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
The information of 04 June 1991, containing the alleged
inculpatory facts against private respondent, reads:
The undersigned State Prosecutor hereby accuses RI CHUY
PO of the crime of violation of Section 68, Presidential Decree
No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, Series of
1987, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or
subsequent thereto, within the premises and vicinity of Mustang
Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Drive, Fortune Village, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully,
feloniously and unlawfully, have in his possession truckloads of
almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of
lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and
supa, without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."2
Private respondent, on 10 July 1991, moved for the
quashal of the information on the ground that the facts
comprising the charge did not amount to a criminal offense, or
in the alternative, to suspend the proceedings on the ground of
a prejudicial question, private respondent having formally
challenged the legality of the seizure of the lumber in question
in a civil case before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Manila,
Branch 35, and now pending with the Court of Appeals.
On 16 August 1991, the trial court promulgated its now
questioned order granting the motion of private respondent to
quash the information. It ruled that, unlike the possession of
"timber or other forest products" (without supporting legal
documents), the mere possession of "lumber" had not itself
been declared a criminal offense under Section 68 of PD 705.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration insisting that lumber
should be held to come within the purview of "timber" defined
by Section 2.26 (b) of DENR Administrative Order No. 50, Series
of 1986. The motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the
petition for review on certiorari filed by the prosecution before
this Court.
Private respondent maintains (1) that PD 705
distinguishes "timber" and "other forest products," on the one
hand, from "lumber" and "other finished wood products," on the
other, and that the possession of lumber of any specie, size or
dimension, whether it be lauan, tanguile, apitong, almaciga,
supa, or narra, is not under that law declared a criminal
offense; (2) that DENR Administrative Order No. 74, Series of
1987, totally bans the cutting, handling and disposition of
almaciga trees but that possession of almaciga lumber is not
considered illegal; (3) that while under DENR Administrative
Order No. 78, Series of 1987, the cutting or gathering of narra
and other premium hardwood species (supa included) is
prohibited, it does not, however, make possession of premium
hardwood lumber (narra and supa included) punishable by mere
inference; and (4) that Bureau of Forest Development Circular
No. 10, Series of 1983, clarified by DENR Memorandum No. 12,
Series of 1988, requires a certificate of lumber origin ("CLO")
only on lumber shipped outside the province, city or the greater
Manila area to another province or city or, in lieu of a CLO, an
invoice to accompany a lumber shipment from legitimate
sources if the origin and destination points are both within the
greater Manila area or within the same province or city, and
not, like in the instant case, where the lumber is not removed
from the lumber yard.
Petitioner counters (1) that the almaciga, supa and lauan
lumber products found in the compound of Mustang Lumber,
Inc., are included in Section 68, PD 705, as amended by EO No.
277, the possession of which without requisite legal documents
is penalized under Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No.
19, Series of 1989, dated 17 March 1989, that defines "lumber"
to be a --
. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than
sawing, resawing, kiln-drying and passing lengthwise through a
standard planing machine, including boules or unedged lumber;
 and "timber," under Section 1.11 of DENR Administrative
Order No. 80, Series of 1987, dated 28 December 1987, to be -
- Lumber for violation of Section 68, P.D. 705, as amended by
. . . any piece of wood having an average diameter of at
least 15 centimeters and at 1.5 meters long, except all
mangrove species which in all cases, shall be considered as
timber regardless of size;
which may either be --
a) Squared timber (or) timber squared with an ax or other
similar mechanical hard tools in the forest and which from the
size of the piece and the character of the wood is obviously unfit
for use in that form (Sec. 1.10 DENR Administrative Order No.
80, Series of 1987, dated December 28, 1987); or
b) Manufactured timber (or) timber other than round and
squared timber shall include logs longitudinally sawn into
pieces, even if only to facilitate transporting or hauling, as well
as all sawn products, all timber hewn or otherwise worked to
approximate its finished form, such as house posts, ship keels,
mine props, ties, trolly poles, bancas, troughs, bowls, cart
wheels, table tops and other similar articles (Sec. 2.26, DENR
Administrative Order No. 50, Series of 1986, dated November
11, 1986) --
(2) that to exclude "lumber" under Section 68 of PD 705
would be to defeat the purpose of the law, i.e., to stop or
minimize illegal logging that has resulted in the rapid
denudation of forest resources; (3) that the claim of private
respondent that a CLO is required only upon the transportation
or shipment of lumber, and not when lumber is merely stored in
a compound, contravenes the provisions of Section 68 of PD
705; (4) that the failure to show any CLO or other legal
document required by administrative issuances raises the
presumption that the lumber has been shipped or received from
illegal sources; and, (5) that the decision of the RTC in Civil
Case No. 90-53648 sustaining the legality of the seizure has
rendered moot any possible prejudicial issue to the instant case.
The real and kernel issue then brought up by the parties in
G.R. No. 106424, as well as in the two consolidated cases (G.R.
No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784), is whether or not the term
"timber or other forest products" the possession of which
without the required legal documents would be a criminal
offense under Section 68 of PD 705 also covers "lumber".
Prefatorily, I might point out that the information,
charging private respondent with the possession without
required legal documents of ". . . truckloads of almaciga and
lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of
various species including almaciga and supa, . . ." has failed to
specify whether the "almaciga" and "lauan" there mentioned
refer to "timber" or "lumber" or both. A perusal of the pleadings
and annexes before the Court, however, would indicate that
only lumber has been envisioned in the indictment. For instance
--
(a) The pertinent portions of the joint affidavit of Melencio
Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng,3 subscribed and sworn to
before State Prosecutor Claro Arellano, upon which basis the
latter recommended the filing of the information, read, as
follows:
"That during the weekend, (April 1 and 2, 1990) the
security detail from our agency continued to monitor the
activities inside the compound and in fact apprehended and
later on brought to the DENR compound a six-wheeler truck
loaded with almaciga and lauan lumber after the truck driver
failed to produce any documents covering the shipment;
xxx xxx xxx
"That we are executing this affidavit in order to lodge a
criminal complaint against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang
Executive Order 277, having in its possession prohibited wood
and wood products without the required documents."4
(Emphasis supplied)
(b) The resolution, dated 14 May 1991, issued by
Investigating Prosecutor Arellano, approved by Undersecretary
of Justice Silvestre Bello III, confirmed that --
" . . . On April 1 and 2 1990, the security detail continued
to monitor the activities inside the compound and in fact
apprehended a six-wheeler truck coming from the compound of
Mustang loaded with almaciga and lauan lumber without the
necessary legal documents covering the shipment."5
(c) The 23rd April 1990 Order of then DENR Secretary
Fulgencio Factoran, suspending the Certificate of Registration
No. NRD-4-092590-0469 of Mustang Lumber, Inc., was issued
because of, among other things, the latter's possession of
almaciga lumber without the required documents.6
(d) The subsequent 03rd May 1990 Order, likewise issued
by Secretary Factoran, authorized the confiscation of
approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa and almaciga
lumber, shorts and sticks of various sizes and dimensions
owned by Mustang Lumber, Inc.7
(e) The complaint filed on 27 July 1990 by Vincent A.
Robles, Chief, PIC/SAID, DENR, before the Department of
Justice, Manila, against private respondent was for possession
of lauan and almaciga lumber without required legal
documents,8 in violation of P.D. 705, as amended by EO 277.
(f) The prosecution, in its opposition to private
respondent's motion to quash, sought to argue that the
possession of "almaciga, supa and lauan lumber found in the
compound of Mustang Lumber, Inc.,9 was covered by the penal
provisions of P.D. 705, as amended, pursuant to Section 32 of
DENR Administrative Order No. 19, Series of 1989.
Indeed, the instant petition itself questions the quashal
order of the court a quo solely on the thesis that "lumber"
should be held to be among the items that are banned under
Section 68 of PD 705.
While generally factual matters outside of the information
should not weigh in resolving a motion to quash following the
standing rule that the allegations of the information must alone
be considered and should not be challenged, there should,
however, be no serious objections to taking into account
additional and clarificatory facts which, although not made out
in the information, are admitted, conceded, or not denied by the
parties. As early as the case of People vs. Navarro, 10
reiterated in People vs. Dela Rosa, 11 the Court has had
occasion to explain --
. . . It would seem to be pure technicality to hold that in
the consideration of the motion the parties and the judge were
precluded from considering facts which the fiscal admitted to be
true, simply because they were not described in the complaint.
Of course, it may be added that upon similar motions the court
and the fiscal are not required to go beyond the averments of
the information, nor is the latter to be inveigled into a
premature and risky revelation of his evidence. But we see no
reason to prohibit the fiscal from making, in all candor,
admissions of undeniable facts, because the principle can never
be sufficiently reiterated that such official's role is to see that
justice is done: not that all accused are convicted, but that the
guilty are justly punished. Less reason can there be to prohibit
the court from considering those admissions, and deciding
accordingly, in the interest of a speedy administration of justice.
 And now on the main substantive issue.
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by EO No. 277, reads:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or
Other Forest Products Without License. -- Any person who shall
cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land, without any authority, or
possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That
in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the
officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or
possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they
shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further
proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of
the government of the timber or any forest products cut,
gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in
the area where the timber or forest products are found.
I agree with the court a quo that the coverage of Section
68, PD 705, as so amended, is explicit, and it is confined to
"timber and other forest products." Section 3(q) of the decree
defines "forest product" to mean --
(q) . . . timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin,
gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest
growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant, the associated
water, fish, game, scenic, historical, recreational and geologic
resources in forest lands (emphasis supplied);
and distinguishes it, in correlation with Section 3(aa) of
the law, from that which has undergone processing. In defining
a "processing plant," this section of the decree holds it to refer
to --
. . . any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of
machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw
materials into lumber veneer, plywood, wallboard, block-board,
paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products
(emphasis supplied).
In fine, timber is so classified, under Section 3(q) of the
law, as a forest product, while lumber has been categorized,
under Section 3(aa), among the various finished wood products.
The various DENR issuances, cited by the Solicitor
General, to wit:
(1) Section 1.11 of the DENR Order No. 80, dated 28
December 1987, Series of 1987, which defines "timber" to be --
. . . any piece of wood having an average diameter of at
least 15 centimeters and at 1.5 meters long, except all
mangrove species which in all cases, shall be considered as
timber regardless of size; 12
(2) Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19,
dated 17 March 1989, Series of 1989, stating that "lumber"
includes --
. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than
sawing, resawing, kiln-drying and passing lengthwise through a
standard planing machine, including boules or unedged
lumber;" and
(3) DENR Memorandum Order No. 36, Series of 1988,
dated 06 May 1988, to the effect that the term "forest products"
shall include "lumber --
cannot, in my view, go beyond the clear language of the
basic law.
While great weight is ordinarily accorded to an
interpretation or construction of a statute by the government
agency called upon to implement the enactment, 13 the rule
would only be good, however, to the extent that such
interpretation or construction is congruous with the governing
statute. 14 Administrative issuances can aptly carry the law into
effect 15 but it would be legal absurdity to allow such issuances
to also have the effect, particularly those which are penal in
nature, of extending the scope of the law or its plain
mandate. 16
Accordingly, and with respect, I vote to deny the petition
in G.R. No. 106424, to grant the petition in G.R. No. 104988
and to require comment on the petition in G.R. No. 123784. I
must hasten to add, nevertheless, that I do appreciate the well-
meant rationale of DENR Memorandum Order No. 36, Series of
1988, for, indeed, the need for preserving whatever remains of
the country's forest reserves can never now be fully
emphasized. Until properly addressed and checked, the
continued denudation of forest resources, already known to be
the cause of no few disasters, as well as of untold loss of lives
and property, could well be on end the expected order of the
day. I, therefore, join ail those who call for the passage of
remedial legislation before the problem truly becomes
irreversible.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., dissenting:
The prosecution seeks, in its petition for review on
certiorari in G.R. No. 106424, the annulment of the 16th August
1991 Order of respondent Judge granting the motion of private
respondent Ri Chuy Po to quash the information that has
charged him with the Violation of Section 68 of Presidential
Decree ("PD") No. 705 (otherwise known as the Forestry
Reform Code, as amended by Executive Order ["EO"] No. 2771)
and the 18th October 1991 Order denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
The information of 04 June 1991, containing the alleged
inculpatory facts against private respondent, reads:
The undersigned State Prosecutor hereby accuses RI CHUY
PO of the crime of violation of Section 68, Presidential Decree
No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, Series of
1987, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or
subsequent thereto, within the premises and vicinity of Mustang
Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Drive, Fortune Village, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully,
feloniously and unlawfully, have in his possession truckloads of
almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of
lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and
supa, without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."2
Private respondent, on 10 July 1991, moved for the
quashal of the information on the ground that the facts
comprising the charge did not amount to a criminal offense, or
in the alternative, to suspend the proceedings on the ground of
a prejudicial question, private respondent having formally
challenged the legality of the seizure of the lumber in question
in a civil case before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Manila,
Branch 35, and now pending with the Court of Appeals.
On 16 August 1991, the trial court promulgated its now
questioned order granting the motion of private respondent to
quash the information. It ruled that, unlike the possession of
"timber or other forest products" (without supporting legal
documents), the mere possession of "lumber" had not itself
been declared a criminal offense under Section 68 of PD 705.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration insisting that lumber
should be held to come within the purview of "timber" defined
by Section 2.26 (b) of DENR Administrative Order No. 50, Series
of 1986. The motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the
petition for review on certiorari filed by the prosecution before
this Court.
Private respondent maintains (1) that PD 705
distinguishes "timber" and "other forest products," on the one
hand, from "lumber" and "other finished wood products," on the
other, and that the possession of lumber of any specie, size or
dimension, whether it be lauan, tanguile, apitong, almaciga,
supa, or narra, is not under that law declared a criminal
offense; (2) that DENR Administrative Order No. 74, Series of
1987, totally bans the cutting, handling and disposition of
almaciga trees but that possession of almaciga lumber is not
considered illegal; (3) that while under DENR Administrative
Order No. 78, Series of 1987, the cutting or gathering of narra
and other premium hardwood species (supa included) is
prohibited, it does not, however, make possession of premium
hardwood lumber (narra and supa included) punishable by mere
inference; and (4) that Bureau of Forest Development Circular
No. 10, Series of 1983, clarified by DENR Memorandum No. 12,
Series of 1988, requires a certificate of lumber origin ("CLO")
only on lumber shipped outside the province, city or the greater
Manila area to another province or city or, in lieu of a CLO, an
invoice to accompany a lumber shipment from legitimate
sources if the origin and destination points are both within the
greater Manila area or within the same province or city, and
not, like in the instant case, where the lumber is not removed
from the lumber yard.
Petitioner counters (1) that the almaciga, supa and lauan
lumber products found in the compound of Mustang Lumber,
Inc., are included in Section 68, PD 705, as amended by EO No.
277, the possession of which without requisite legal documents
is penalized under Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No.
19, Series of 1989, dated 17 March 1989, that defines "lumber"
to be a --
. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than
sawing, resawing, kiln-drying and passing lengthwise through a
standard planing machine, including boules or unedged lumber;
and "timber," under Section 1.11 of DENR Administrative
Order No. 80, Series of 1987, dated 28 December 1987, to be -
- Lumber for violation of Section 68, P.D. 705, as amended by
. . . any piece of wood having an average diameter of at
least 15 centimeters and at 1.5 meters long, except all
mangrove species which in all cases, shall be considered as
timber regardless of size;
which may either be --
a) Squared timber (or) timber squared with an ax or other
similar mechanical hard tools in the forest and which from the
size of the piece and the character of the wood is obviously unfit
for use in that form (Sec. 1.10 DENR Administrative Order No.
80, Series of 1987, dated December 28, 1987); or
b) Manufactured timber (or) timber other than round and
squared timber shall include logs longitudinally sawn into
pieces, even if only to facilitate transporting or hauling, as well
as all sawn products, all timber hewn or otherwise worked to
approximate its finished form, such as house posts, ship keels,
mine props, ties, trolly poles, bancas, troughs, bowls, cart
wheels, table tops and other similar articles (Sec. 2.26, DENR
Administrative Order No. 50, Series of 1986, dated November
11, 1986) --
(2) that to exclude "lumber" under Section 68 of PD 705
would be to defeat the purpose of the law, i.e., to stop or
minimize illegal logging that has resulted in the rapid
denudation of forest resources; (3) that the claim of private
respondent that a CLO is required only upon the transportation
or shipment of lumber, and not when lumber is merely stored in
a compound, contravenes the provisions of Section 68 of PD
705; (4) that the failure to show any CLO or other legal
document required by administrative issuances raises the
presumption that the lumber has been shipped or received from
illegal sources; and, (5) that the decision of the RTC in Civil
Case No. 90-53648 sustaining the legality of the seizure has
rendered moot any possible prejudicial issue to the instant case.
The real and kernel issue then brought up by the parties in
G.R. No. 106424, as well as in the two consolidated cases (G.R.
No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784), is whether or not the term
"timber or other forest products" the possession of which
without the required legal documents would be a criminal
offense under Section 68 of PD 705 also covers "lumber".
Prefatorily, I might point out that the information,
charging private respondent with the possession without
required legal documents of ". . . truckloads of almaciga and
lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of
various species including almaciga and supa, . . ." has failed to
specify whether the "almaciga" and "lauan" there mentioned
refer to "timber" or "lumber" or both. A perusal of the pleadings
and annexes before the Court, however, would indicate that
only lumber has been envisioned in the indictment. For instance
--
(a) The pertinent portions of the joint affidavit of Melencio
Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng,3 subscribed and sworn to
before State Prosecutor Claro Arellano, upon which basis the
latter recommended the filing of the information, read, as
follows:
"That during the weekend, (April 1 and 2, 1990) the
security detail from our agency continued to monitor the
activities inside the compound and in fact apprehended and
later on brought to the DENR compound a six-wheeler truck
loaded with almaciga and lauan lumber after the truck driver
failed to produce any documents covering the shipment;
xxx xxx xxx
"That we are executing this affidavit in order to lodge a
criminal complaint against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang
Executive Order 277, having in its possession prohibited wood
and wood products without the required documents."4
(Emphasis supplied)
(b) The resolution, dated 14 May 1991, issued by
Investigating Prosecutor Arellano, approved by Undersecretary
of Justice Silvestre Bello III, confirmed that --
" . . . On April 1 and 2 1990, the security detail continued
to monitor the activities inside the compound and in fact
apprehended a six-wheeler truck coming from the compound of
Mustang loaded with almaciga and lauan lumber without the
necessary legal documents covering the shipment."5
(c) The 23rd April 1990 Order of then DENR Secretary
Fulgencio Factoran, suspending the Certificate of Registration
No. NRD-4-092590-0469 of Mustang Lumber, Inc., was issued
because of, among other things, the latter's possession of
almaciga lumber without the required documents.6
(d) The subsequent 03rd May 1990 Order, likewise issued
by Secretary Factoran, authorized the confiscation of
approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa and almaciga
lumber, shorts and sticks of various sizes and dimensions
owned by Mustang Lumber, Inc.7
(e) The complaint filed on 27 July 1990 by Vincent A.
Robles, Chief, PIC/SAID, DENR, before the Department of
Justice, Manila, against private respondent was for possession
of lauan and almaciga lumber without required legal
documents,8 in violation of P.D. 705, as amended by EO 277.
(f) The prosecution, in its opposition to private
respondent's motion to quash, sought to argue that the
possession of "almaciga, supa and lauan lumber found in the
compound of Mustang Lumber, Inc.,9 was covered by the penal
provisions of P.D. 705, as amended, pursuant to Section 32 of
DENR Administrative Order No. 19, Series of 1989.
Indeed, the instant petition itself questions the quashal
order of the court a quo solely on the thesis that "lumber"
should be held to be among the items that are banned under
Section 68 of PD 705.
While generally factual matters outside of the information
should not weigh in resolving a motion to quash following the
standing rule that the allegations of the information must alone
be considered and should not be challenged, there should,
however, be no serious objections to taking into account
additional and clarificatory facts which, although not made out
in the information, are admitted, conceded, or not denied by the
parties. As early as the case of People vs. Navarro, 10
reiterated in People vs. Dela Rosa, 11 the Court has had
occasion to explain --
. . . It would seem to be pure technicality to hold that in
the consideration of the motion the parties and the judge were
precluded from considering facts which the fiscal admitted to be
true, simply because they were not described in the complaint.
Of course, it may be added that upon similar motions the court
and the fiscal are not required to go beyond the averments of
the information, nor is the latter to be inveigled into a
premature and risky revelation of his evidence. But we see no
reason to prohibit the fiscal from making, in all candor,
admissions of undeniable facts, because the principle can never
be sufficiently reiterated that such official's role is to see that
justice is done: not that all accused are convicted, but that the
guilty are justly punished. Less reason can there be to prohibit
the court from considering those admissions, and deciding
accordingly, in the interest of a speedy administration of justice.
And now on the main substantive issue.
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by EO No. 277, reads:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or
Other Forest Products Without License. -- Any person who shall
cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land, without any authority, or
possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That
in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the
officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or
possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they
shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further
proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of
the government of the timber or any forest products cut,
gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in
the area where the timber or forest products are found.
I agree with the court a quo that the coverage of Section
68, PD 705, as so amended, is explicit, and it is confined to
"timber and other forest products." Section 3(q) of the decree
defines "forest product" to mean --
(q) . . . timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin,
gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest
growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant, the associated
water, fish, game, scenic, historical, recreational and geologic
resources in forest lands (emphasis supplied);
and distinguishes it, in correlation with Section 3(aa) of
the law, from that which has undergone processing. In defining
a "processing plant," this section of the decree holds it to refer
to --
. . . any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of
machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw
materials into lumber veneer, plywood, wallboard, block-board,
paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products
(emphasis supplied).
In fine, timber is so classified, under Section 3(q) of the
law, as a forest product, while lumber has been categorized,
under Section 3(aa), among the various finished wood products.
The various DENR issuances, cited by the Solicitor
General, to wit:
(1) Section 1.11 of the DENR Order No. 80, dated 28
December 1987, Series of 1987, which defines "timber" to be --
. . . any piece of wood having an average diameter of at
least 15 centimeters and at 1.5 meters long, except all
mangrove species which in all cases, shall be considered as
timber regardless of size; 12
(2) Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19,
dated 17 March 1989, Series of 1989, stating that "lumber"
includes --
. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than
sawing, resawing, kiln-drying and passing lengthwise through a
standard planing machine, including boules or unedged
lumber;" and
(3) DENR Memorandum Order No. 36, Series of 1988,
dated 06 May 1988, to the effect that the term "forest products"
shall include "lumber --
cannot, in my view, go beyond the clear language of the
basic law.
While great weight is ordinarily accorded to an
interpretation or construction of a statute by the government
agency called upon to implement the enactment, 13 the rule
would only be good, however, to the extent that such
interpretation or construction is congruous with the governing
statute. 14 Administrative issuances can aptly carry the law into
effect 15 but it would be legal absurdity to allow such issuances
to also have the effect, particularly those which are penal in
nature, of extending the scope of the law or its plain
mandate. 16
Accordingly, and with respect, I vote to deny the petition
in G.R. No. 106424, to grant the petition in G.R. No. 104988
and to require comment on the petition in G.R. No. 123784. I
must hasten to add, nevertheless, that I do appreciate the well-
meant rationale of DENR Memorandum Order No. 36, Series of
1988, for, indeed, the need for preserving whatever remains of
the country's forest reserves can never now be fully
emphasized. Until properly addressed and checked, the
continued denudation of forest resources, already known to be
the cause of no few disasters, as well as of untold loss of lives
and property, could well be on end the expected order of the
day. I, therefore, join ail those who call for the passage of
remedial legislation before the problem truly becomes
irreversible.
[G.R. No. 120365. December 17, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle, vs.
WILSON B. QUE, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Accused-appellant Wilson B. Que appeals from his
conviction for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) 705[1] as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) 277.[2]
The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994,
SPO1 Dexter Corpuz, a member of the Provincial Task Force on
Illegal Logging, received an information that a ten-wheeler truck
bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut lumber
will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information,
members of the Provincial Task Force went on patrol several
times within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag
City.[3]
On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1
Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1 Elmer Patoc went on patrol around
the area. At about 1:00 in the morning, they posted themselves
at the corner of General Segundo Avenue and Rizal Street.
Thirty minutes later, they saw a ten-wheeler truck with plate
number PAD-548 pass by. They followed the truck and
apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge.[4]
There were three persons on board the truck: driver
Wilfredo Cacao, accused-appellant Wilson Que, and an unnamed
person. The driver identified accused-appellant as the owner of
the truck and the cargo.[5]
SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it
contained coconut slabs. When interviewed, accused-appellant
told SPO1 Corpuz that there were sawn lumber inserted in
between the coconut slabs.[6]
SPO1 Corpuz asked accused-appellant for the Cargos
supporting documents, specifically: (1) certificate of lumber
origin, (2) certificate of transport agreement, (3) auxiliary
invoice, (4) receipt from the DENR, and (5) certification from
the forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut slabs.
Accused-appellant failed to present any of these documents. All
he could show was a certification[7] from the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez
Mira, Cagayan that he legally acquired the coconut slabs. The
certification was issued to facilitate transport of the slabs from
Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan.[8]
SPO1 Corpuz brought accused-appellant to the office of
the Provincial Task Force at the provincial capitol. Again,
accused-appellant admitted to the members of the Provincial
Task Force that there were sawn lumber under the coconut
slabs.[9]
At 10:00 oclock in the morning, the members of the
Provincial Task Force, together with three CENRO personnel
examined the cargo. The examination confirmed that the cargo
consisted of coconut slabs and sawn tanguile lumber. The
coconut slabs were piled at the sides of the truck, concealing
the tanguile lumber.[10] When the CENRO personnel
inventoried and scaled the seized forest products, they counted
two hundred fifty eight (258) pieces of tanguile lumber with a
total volume of 3,729.3 board feet (8.79 cubic meters) and total
assessed value of P93,232.50.[11]
On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before
the Regional Trial Court of Laoag with violation of Section 68 of
P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. The Information alleged:
That on or about the 8th day of March, 1994, in the City of
Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being then the owner of an
I(s)uzu Ten Wheeler Truck bearing Plate No. PAD-548, with
intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in possession, control and custody 258 pieces
of various sizes of Forest Products Chainsawn lumber (Species
of Tanguile) with a total volume of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or equivalent
to 8.79 cubic meters valued in the total amount of P93,232.50
at P25.00/bd. ft., necessary permit, license or authority to do so
from the proper authorities, thus violating the aforecited
provision of the law, to the damage and prejudice of the
government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]
Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He
claimed that he acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber from
a legal source. During the trial, he presented the private land
timber permits (PLTP) issued by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica Cayosa[13] and Elpidio
Sabal.[14] The PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and
dispose timber from the forest area covered by the permit. He
alleged that the tanguile lumber came from the forest area
covered by th PLTPs of Cayosa and Sabal and that they were
given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as payment for his hauling
services.[15]
Accused-appellant also objected to the admission of the
258 pieces of lumber as evidence against him. He contended
that they were fruits of an illegal search and seizure and of an
uncounselled extrajudicial admission.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It also ordered the
confiscation of the seized lumber and the ten-wheeler truck
owned by accused-appellant. The dispositive portion of the
Decision[16] states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
accused Wilson B. Que guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by Executive
Order No. 277 and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA, plus all the accessory penalties provided
by law. The bail bond filed for the provisional liberty of the
accused is CANCELLED.
The two hundred fifty-eight (258) pieces of lumber
(tanguile specie) and the ten-wheeler truck bearing plate No.
PAD-548 which was used in the commission of the crime are
hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government to be
disposed of in accordance with law.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Appellant now comes before us with the following
assignment of errors:[18]
1. It was error for the Court to convict accused under
Section 68, PD705 as amended by EO 277 for possessing timber
or other forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations on the
ground that since it is only in EO No. 277 where for the first
time mere possession of timber was criminalized, there are no
existing forest laws and regulations which required certain legal
documents for possession of timber and other forest products.
2. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in
violation of the constitutional rights of accused against unlawful
searches and seizures.
3. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in
violation of the constitutional rights of accused under custodial
investigation.
On the first assignment of error, appellant argues that he
cannot be convicted for violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705
because E.O. 277 which amended Section 68 to penalize the
possession of timber or other forest products without the proper
legal documents did not indicate the particular documents
necessary to make the possession legal. Neither did the other
forest laws and regulations existing at the time of its
enactment.
Appellants argument deserves scant consideration. Section
68 of P.D. 705 provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or
other Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall
cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land without any authority, or
possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That
in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the
officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or
possession shall be liable and if such officers are aliens, they
shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further
proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of
the government of the timber or any forest products cut,
gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in
the area where the timber or forest products are found.
(emphasis supplied)
Appellant interprets the phrase existing forest laws and
regulations to refer to those laws and regulations which were
already in effect at the time of the enactment of E. O. 277. The
suggested interpretation is strained and would render the law
inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but give life to the
law. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and
regulations existing at the time of possession of timber or other
forest products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of
1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of
timber and other forest products. Section 3 of the
Administrative Order provides:
Section 3. Documents Required.
Consistent with the policy stated above, the movement of
logs, lumber, plywood, veneer, non-timber forest products and
wood-based or nonwood-based products/commodities shall be
covered with appropriate Certificates of Origin, issued by
authorized DENR officials, as specified in the succeeding
sections.
xxx
3.3 Lumber. Unless otherwise herein provided, the
transport of lumber shall be accompanied by a CERTIFICATE OF
LUMBER ORIGIN (CLO) issued by the CENRO or his duly
authorized representative which has jurisdiction over the
processing plant producing the said lumber or the lumber firm
authorized to deal in such commodities. In order to be valid, the
CLO must be supported by the company tally sheet or delivery
receipt, and in case of sale, a lumber sales invoice.
xxx
When apprehended on March 8, 1994, accused-appellant
failed to present any certificate of origin of the 258 pieces of
tanguile lumber. The trial court found:
xxx
xxx When apprehended by the police officers, the accused
admittedly could not present a single document to justify his
possession of the subject lumber. xxx
Significantly, at the time the accused was apprehended by
the police offices, he readily showed documents to justify his
possession of the coconut slabs. Thus, he showed a certification
issued by Remigio B. Rosario, Forest Ranger, of the DENR,
CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan (Exhibit "E") and a xerox copy
of the original certificate of title covering the parcel of land
where the coconut slabs were cut. (Exhibit "F")
It is worthy to note that the certification dated March 7,
1994 states:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the one (1) truckload of coconut
slabs to be transported by Mr. Wilson Que on board truck
bearing Plate No. PAD 548 were derived from matured coconut
palms gathered inside the private land of Miss Bonifacia Collado
under OCT No. P-11614 (8) located at Nagrangtayan, Sanchez
Mira, Cagayan.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr.
Wilson Que for the purpose of facilitating the transportation of
said coconut slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan and is valid up to March 11, 1994 or upon
discharge of its cargoes at its final destination, whichever comes
first.
It is crystal clear, therefore, that the accused was given
permit by the DENR to transport one (1) truckload of coconut
slabs only between March 7 to 11, 1994. The accused was
apprehended on March 8, 1994 aboard his truck bearing plate
number PAD-548 which was loaded not only with coconut slabs
but with chainsawn lumber as well. Admittedly, the lumber
could not be seen from the outside. The lumber were placed in
the middle and not visible unless the coconut slabs which were
placed on the top, sides and rear of the truck were removed.
Under these circumstances, the Court has no doubt that
the accused was very much aware that he needed documents to
possess and transport the lumber (b)ut could not secure one
and, therefore, concealed the lumber by placing the same in
such a manner that they could not be seen by police authorities
by merely looking at the cargo.
In this regard, the Court cannot give credence to his
alleged letter dated March 3, 1994 addressed to the OIC CENRO
Officer, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan informing the CENRO
that he would be transporting the subject lumber on March 7,
1994 from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur
but was returned to him for the reason that he did not need a
permit to transport the subject lumber. (Exhibit 8, 8-A)
While it is true that the letter indicates that it was received
by CENRO on March 4, 1994, the court has doubts that this was
duly filed with the concerned office. According to the accused,
he filed the letter in the morning of March 4 and returned in the
afternoon of the same day. He was then informed by an
employee of the CENRO whom he did not identify that he did
not need a permit to transport the lumber because the lumber
would be for personal used (sic) and x x came from PLTP. (Ibid)
The letter-request was returned to him.
The fact that the letter-request was returned to him
creates doubts on the stance of the accused. Documents or
other papers, i.e., letter-request of this kind filed with a
government agency are not returned. Hence, when a person
files or submits any document to a government agency, the
agency gets the original copy. The filer only gets a duplicate
copy to show that he has filed such document with the agency.
Moreover, his avoidance as regards the identity of the employee
of the CENRO who allegedly returned the letter-request to him
also creates doubts on his stance. Thus, on cross-examination,
the accused, when asked about the identity of the employee of
the CENRO who returned the letter-request to him answered
that he could recognize the person x x but they were already
reshuffled. (TSN, February 8, 1995, p. 104) At one point, the
accused also said that he did not know if that person was an
employee of the DENR. (Ibid, p. 105)
Be that as it may, the Court finds significance in the last
paragraph of this letter-request, to wit:
xxx
Please consider this as my Certificate of Transport
Agreement in view of the fact that I am hauling and
transporting my own lumber for my own needs.
Thus, the accused through this letter considered the same
as his certificate of transport agreement. Why then, if he was
telling the truth, did he not take this letter with him when he
transported the lumber on March 7, 1994?
All these circumstances clearly show that the letter comes
from a polluted source.[19]
xxx
Accused-appellants possession of the subject lumber
without any documentation clearly constitutes an offense under
Section 68 of P.D. 705.
We also reject appellants argument that the law only
penalizes possession of illegal forest products and that the
possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting,
gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products is legal.
There are two (2) distinct and separate offenses punished under
Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or
other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without
any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without
the legal documents required under existing forest laws and
regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality
of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber
or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued
by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial
whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the
forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest
products without the proper documents consummates the
crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is
immaterial because E.O. 277 considers the mere possession of
timber or other forest products without the proper legal
documents as malum prohibitum.
On the second and third assignment of error, appellant
contends that the seized lumber are inadmissible in evidence for
being fruits of a poisonous tree. Appellant avers that these
pieces of lumber were obtained in violation of his constitutional
right against unlawful searches and seizures as well as his right
to counsel.
We do not agree.
The rule on warrantless search and seizure of a moving
vehicle was summarized by this court in People vs. Bagista,[20]
thus:
The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be
stated in this manner: no person shall be subjected to a search
of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his residence
except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a
lawful arrest. The basis for the rule can be found in Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to
be seized.
Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence
obtained in violation of the aforementioned right shall, among
others, be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The Constitutional proscription against warrantless
searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from
a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had
been upheld in cases of moving vehicles, and the seizure of
evidence in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had
been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles
makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of
the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the
absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has
been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before
search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. (citations
omitted; emphasis supplied)
As in Bagista, the police officers in the case at bar had
probable cause to search appellants truck. A member of the
Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging received a reliable
information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-
548 loaded with illegal lumber would pass through Ilocos Norte.
Two weeks later, while members of the Provincial Task Force
were patrolling along General Segundo Avenue, they saw the
ten-wheeler truck described by the informant. When they
apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge, accused-appellant, the
owner of the truck and the cargo, admitted that there were
sawn lumber in between the coconut slabs. When the police
officers asked for the lumbers supporting documents, accused-
appellant could not present any. The foregoing circumstances
are sufficient to prove the existence of probable cause which
justified the extensive search of appellants truck even without a
warrant. Thus, the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber were lawfully
seized and were thus properly admitted as evidence to prove
the guilt of accused-appellant.

The foregoing disquisition renders unnecessary the issue
of whether appellants right to counsel under custodial
investigation was violated. The Resolution of the issue will not
affect the finding of guilt of appellant.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The
decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs Against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 111107 January 10, 1997
LOEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge
(OIC), Regional Executive Director (RED), Region 2 and JOVITO
LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as Community Environment and
Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court at
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and
VICTORIA DE GUZMAN, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Without violating the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, may an action for replevin prosper to
recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an
administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of
P.D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of
the Philippines?
Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives
empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in
transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?
These are two fundamental questions presented before us
for our resolution.
The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19,
1989 when the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman
while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan,
was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva
Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required
documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck.
Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued
on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and gave
the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an
explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private
respondents, however, failed to submit the required
explanation. On June 22, 1989,1 Regional Executive Director
Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugan's action
of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking
Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by
Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents filed a letter of
reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order
of Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in
a subsequent order of July 12, 1989.2 Subsequently, the case
was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR
pursuant to private respondents' statement in their letter dated
June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for reconsideration would
be denied then "this letter should be considered as an appeal to
the Secretary."3 Pending resolution however of the appeal, a
suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case 4031, was filed by the
private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive
Director Baggayan4 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of
Cagayan,5 which issued a writ ordering the return of the truck
to private respondents.6 Petitioner Layugan and Executive
Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court
contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of
action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The
trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated
December 28, 1989.7 Their motion for reconsideration having
been likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the
petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals which
sustained the trial court's order ruling that the question involved
is purely a legal question.8 Hence, this present petition,9 with
prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction, seeking to reverse the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals was filed by the petitioners on September 9,
1993. By virtue of the Resolution dated September 27, 1993,10
the prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order of
petitioners was granted by this Court.
Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally
entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under
administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of
P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. Private respondents, on the
other hand, would seek to avoid the operation of this principle
asserting that the instant case falls within the exception of the
doctrine upon the justification that (1) due process was violated
because they were not given the chance to be heard, and (2)
the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that
the Secretary of DENR and his representatives have no
authority to confiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized in
transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that the truck as
admitted by petitioners was not used in the commission of the
crime.
Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and
relevant jurisprudence on the matter, we are of the opinion that
the plea of petitioners for reversal is in order.
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that
before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it
is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means
of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by
giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to
decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such
remedy should be exhausted first before court's judicial power
can be sought, The premature invocation of court's intervention
is fatal to one's cause of action.11 Accordingly, absent any
finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal
for lack of cause of
action.12 This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one
thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser
expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice
for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a
dispute until the system of administrative redress has been
completed and complied with so as to give the administrative
agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to
dispose of the case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that
the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested
by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a
relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity
and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a
case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of
due process,13 (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal
question,14 (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,15 (4) when there is
estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,16
(5) when there is irreparable injury,17 (6) when the respondent
is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the
latter,18 (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable,19 (8) when it would amount
to a nullification of a claim,20 (9) when the subject matter is a
private land in land case proceedings,21 (10) when the rule
does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention.22
In the case at bar, there is no question that the
controversy was pending before the Secretary of DENR when it
was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of
the motion for reconsideration of private respondents through
the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of reconsideration
dated June 28, 1989,23 private respondents clearly recognize
the presence of an administrative forum to which they seek to
avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their case. The
letter, reads, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your
favorable action, then this letter should be considered as an
appeal to the
Secretary.24
It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents
looked up to the Secretary for the review and disposition of
their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the
existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available and
open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they
cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, seek court's intervention by filing an
action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the
pendency of an administrative proceedings.
Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement
of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection,
development and management of forest lands fall within the
primary and special responsibilities of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its
function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by
judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within
its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of
the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an
unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative
agency's prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does
not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to
resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence.25 In
Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary,26
which was reiterated in the recent case of Concerned Officials of
MWSS vs. Vasquez,27 this Court held:
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex
and multifarious problems caused by unbriddled exploitation of
these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of
cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in
matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and training of
such agencies.
To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect
bring the instant controversy beyond the pale of the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall within the ambit
of excepted cases heretofore stated. However, considering the
circumstances prevailing in this case, we can not but rule out
these assertions of private respondents to be without merit.
First, they argued that there was violation of due process
because they did not receive the May 23, 1989 order of
confiscation of petitioner Layugan. This contention has no leg to
stand on. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a
hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard.28 One
may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and
perhaps many times more creditably and practicable than oral
argument, through pleadings.29 In administrative proceedings
moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated
with due process in its strict judicial sense.30 Indeed,
deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked
where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion
for reconsideration,31 as in the instant case, when private
respondents were undisputedly given the opportunity to present
their side when they filed a letter of reconsideration dated June
28, 1989 which was, however, denied in an order of July 12,
1989 of Executive Director Baggayan, In Navarro III vs.
Damasco,32 we ruled that :
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal
or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of
the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute
lack of notice or hearing.
Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality
of seizure and forfeiture of the truck because the administrative
officers of the DENR allegedly have no power to perform these
acts under the law. They insisted that only the court is
authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in
transporting illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the
second paragraph of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by
E.O. 277. The pertinent provision reads as follows:
Sec. 68. ...
xxx xxx xxx
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of
the government of the timber or any forest products cut,
gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipments, implements and tools illegaly [sic] used
in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
(Emphasis ours)
A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go
along with private respondents' thinking not only because the
aforequoted provision apparently does not mention nor include
"conveyances" that can be the subject of confiscation by the
courts, but to a large extent, due to the fact that private
respondents' interpretation of the subject provision unduly
restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces the
other provision of Section 68-A, which is quoted herein below:
Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or
His Duly Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all
cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and
regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative, may order the confiscation of any forest
products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or
abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or
air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same
in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on
the matter. (Emphasis ours)
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the
Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given the
authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in
violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations.
The phrase "to dispose of the same" is broad enough to cover
the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government.
The only limitation is that it should be made "in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter." In the
construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to
give effect to the purpose projected in the statute.33 Statutes
should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and
the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given
such construction as will advance the object, suppress the
mischief, and secure the benefits intended.34 In this wise, the
observation of the Solicitor General is significant, thus:
But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws
"more responsive to present situations and realities" and in view
of the "urgency to conserve the remaining resources of the
country," that the government opted to add Section 68-A. This
amendatory provision is an administrative remedy totally
separate and distinct from criminal proceedings. More than
anything else, it is intended to supplant the inadequacies that
characterize enforcement of forestry laws through criminal
actions. The preamble of EO 277-the law that added Section 68-
A to PD 705-is most revealing:
"WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining
forest resources of the country for the benefit and welfare of the
present and future generations of Filipinos;
WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively
conserved and protected through the vigilant enforcement and
implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers
from technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the
penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines;
and
WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to
penalize certain acts more responsive to present situations and
realities;"
It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new
provision authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not only
"conveyances," but forest products as well. On the other hand,
confiscation of forest products by the "court" in a criminal action
has long been provided for in Section 68. If as private
respondents insist, the power on confiscation cannot be
exercised except only through the court under Section 68, then
Section 68-A would have no Purpose at all. Simply put, Section
68-A would not have provided any solution to the problem
perceived in EO 277, supra.35
Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure
was illegal because the petitioners themselves admitted in the
Order dated July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan that
the truck of private respondents was not used in the
commission of the crime. This order, a copy of which was given
to and received by the counsel of private respondents, reads in
part, viz.:
. . . while it is true that the truck of your client was not
used by her in the commission of the crime, we uphold your
claim that the truck owner is not liable for the crime and in no
case could a criminal case be filed against her as provided under
Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . .36
We observed that private respondents misread the content
of the aforestated order and obviously misinterpreted the
intention of petitioners. What is contemplated by the petitioners
when they stated that the truck "was not used in the
commission of the crime" is that it was not used in the
commission of the crime of theft, hence, in no case can a
criminal action be filed against the owner thereof for violation of
Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners did
not eliminate the possibility that the truck was being used in the
commission of another crime, that is, the breach of Section 68
of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. In the same order of July
12, 1989, petitioners pointed out:
. . . However, under Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended
and further amended by Executive Order No. 277 specifically
provides for the confiscation of the conveyance used in the
transport of forest products not covered by the required legal
documents. She may not have been involved in the cutting and
gathering of the product in question but the fact that she
accepted the goods for a fee or fare the same is therefor liable.
. .37
Private respondents, however, contended that there is no
crime defined and punishable under Section 68 other than
qualified theft, so that, when petitioners admitted in the July
12, 1989 order that private respondents could not be charged
for theft as provided for under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code, then necessarily private respondents could
not have committed an act constituting a crime under Section
68. We disagree. For clarity, the provision of Section 68 of P.D.
705 before its amendment by E.O. 277 and the provision of
Section 1 of E.O. No. 277 amending the aforementioned Section
68 are reproduced herein, thus:
Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or
other products without license. — Any person who shall cut,
gather, collect, or remove timber or other forest products from
any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public
lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a
license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of
qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code . . . (Emphasis ours; Section 68,
P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277)
Sec. 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as
amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or
other forest products without license. — Any person who shall
cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land, without any authority, or
possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code . . . (Emphasis
ours; Section 1, E.O. No. 277 amending Section 68, P.D. 705 as
amended)
With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277
amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering,
collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without
authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from
the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for
under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is
clear from the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it
eliminated the phrase "shall be guilty of qualified theft as
defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code" and inserted the words "shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code". When the statute is clear and explicit, there is
hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or
rationalization of the law.38
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for
replevin can not be sustained against the petitioners for the
subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative
forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P.D.
705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause
of action in view of the private respondents' failure to exhaust
administrative remedies should have been the proper course of
action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over
the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return
of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative
forum, being a condition precedent prior to one's recourse to
the courts and more importantly, being an element of private
respondents' right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by
the lower court.
It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is
founded solely on the claim that the defendant wrongfully
withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover
possession of personal chattels that are unlawfully detained.39
"To detain" is defined as to mean "to hold or keep in
custody,"40 and it has been held that there is tortious taking
whenever there is an unlawful meddling with the property, or an
exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of
authority or right; this, without manual seizing of the property
is sufficient.41 Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in
replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show by his own
affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of property, that
the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging
the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for
tax assessment, or seized under execution, or attachment, or if
so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual
value of the property.42 Private respondents miserably failed to
convince this Court that a wrongful detention of the subject
truck obtains in the instant case. It should be noted that the
truck was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting
forest products without the required permit of the DENR in
manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended
by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended,
unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the
disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized
representatives of the conveyances used in violating the
provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession
or detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative
forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no wrongful
detention exists in the case at bar.
Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a
procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and
forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority
given under P.D. 705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is
explicit that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of
Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the
provisions of the said law are subject to review by the Secretary
of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the
Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or
prohibition. It reads:
Sec. 8. REVIEW — All actions and decisions of the
Director are subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of
any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose
decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty
(30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved party of said
decision, unless appealed to the President in accordance with
Executive Order No. 19, Series of 1966. The Decision of the
Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except
through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals dated October 16, 1991 and its
Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE AND
REVERSED; the Restraining Order promulgated on September
27, 1993 is hereby made permanent; and the Secretary of
DENR is directed to resolve the controversy with utmost
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
ERNESTO AQUINO, G.R. No. 165448
Petitioner,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 5
June 1997 Decision[2] and 24 September 2004 Resolution[3] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534.
The Antecedent Facts
On behalf of Teachers Camp, Sergio Guzman filed with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) an
application to cut down 14 dead Benguet pine trees within the
Teachers Camp in Baguio City. The trees, which had a total
volume of 13.37 cubic meters, were to be used for the repairs
of Teachers Camp.
On 19 May 1993, before the issuance of the permit, a
team composed of members from the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) and Michael Cuteng
(Cuteng), a forest ranger of the Forest Section of the Office of
the City Architect and Parks Superintendent of Baguio City,
conducted an inspection of the trees to be cut.
Thereafter, Sabado T. Batcagan, Executive Director of the
DENR, issued a permit allowing the cutting of 14 trees under
the following terms and conditions:
2. That the cut timber shall be utilized as lumber and fuel-
wood by the permittee;
3. As replacement, the permittee shall plant one hundred
forty (140) pine seedlings in an appropriate place within the
area. In the absence of plantable area in the property, the same
is required to plant within forest area duly designated by CENRO
concerned which shall be properly maintained and protected to
ensure/enhance growth and development of the planted
seedlings;
4. Violation of any of the conditions set hereof is
punishable under Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. No.
277, Series of 1987; and
5. That non-compliance with any of the above conditions
or violations of forestry laws and regulations shall render this
permit null and void without prejudice to the imposition of
penalties in accordance with existing laws and regulations.
This PERMIT is non-transferable and shall expire ten (10)
days from issuance hereof or as soon as the herein authorized
volume is exhausted whichever comes first.[4]
On 23 July 1993, Forest Rangers Ramil Windo, Moises
Sobrepea, Daniel Salamo, Pablo Guinawan, Antonio Abellera,
and Forester Paul Apilis received information that pine trees
were being cut at Teachers Camp without proper authority.
They proceeded to the site where they found Ernesto Aquino
(petitioner), a forest ranger from CENRO, and Cuteng
supervising the cutting of the trees. They also found sawyers
Benedicto Santiago (Santiago) and Mike Masing (Masing) on the
site, together with Clemente Salinas (Salinas) and Andrew
Nacatab (Nacatab), who were also supervising the cutting of the
trees. The forest rangers found 23 tree stumps, out of which
only 12 were covered by the permit. The volume of the trees
cut with permit was 13.58 cubic meters while the volume of the
trees cut without permit was 16.55 cubic meters. The market
value of the trees cut without permit was P182,447.20, and the
forest charges were P11,833.25.
An Information for violation of Section 68 of Presidential
Decree No. 705[5] (PD 705) was filed against petitioner,
Cuteng, Nacatab, Masing, and Santiago, as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of July, 1993, and
subsequent thereto, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one
another, and without any authority, license or permit, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cut nine (9) pine
trees with a total volume and market price as P182,447.20
(Volume 16.55 M3 424 bd. ft./M3 and unit price P26.00 bd. ft.)
and with a total forest charge of P11,833.25 or having a total
sum of P194,280.45 at Teachers Camp, Baguio City, without the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, particularly the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Circular No. 05, Series of 1989, in violation of
the aforecited law.[6]
Masing alleged that he was not aware of the limitations on
the permit as he was not given a copy of the permit. Masing
stated that he cut 10 pine trees under the supervision of
petitioner who claimed to be in possession of the necessary
permit. He stated that three of the trees were stumps about
four or five feet high and were not fit for lumber. He stated that
while he was cutting trees, petitioner and Salinas were present.
Santiago testified that he cut trees under petitioners
supervision. He stated that petitioner was in possession of the
permit. He stated that he cut 10 trees, six of which were cut
into lumber while two were stumps and two were rotten.
Salinas testified that Masing and Santiago were merely
hired as sawyers and they merely followed petitioners
instructions.
Cuteng testified that he was part of the team that
inspected the trees to be cut before the permit was issued. He
stated that the trees cut by Santiago were covered by the
permit.
Nacatab testified that he only went to Teachers Camp on
13 July 1993 and he saw Santiago and Masing cutting down the
trees in petitioners presence.
Petitioner alleged that he was sent to supervise the cutting
of trees at Teachers Camp. He allegedly informed his superior,
Paul Apilis, that he was not aware of the trees covered by the
permit. However, he still supervised the cutting of trees without
procuring a copy of the vicinity map used in the inspection of
the trees to be cut. He claimed that he could not prevent the
overcutting of trees because he was just alone while Cuteng and
Santiago were accompanied by three other men.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In its 26 May 1994 Decision,[7] the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City, Branch 5 (trial court), ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares the accused
ERNESTO AQUINO y ESTIPULAR, MICHAEL CUTENG y LESCAO
and BENEDICTO SANTIAGO y DOCLES guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged and hereby sentences EACH of them
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision
correccional, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion
temporal, as maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the
Government in the amounts of P182,477.20 and P11,833.25,
representing the market value of and forest charges on the
Benguet pine trees cut without permit; and to pay their
proportionate shares in the costs.
The chainsaw confiscated from the accused Santiago is
hereby declared forfeited in favor of the Government.
On the other hand, the accused ANDREW NACATAB y
DODOY and MIKE MASING y GANAS are acquitted on
reasonable doubt, with costs de oficio, and the cash bonds they
deposited for their provisional liberty in the amount of
P7,500.00 each under O.R. Nos. 139605 and 139646, dated
February 4, 1996 and February 23, 1994, respectively, are
ordered released to them upon proper receipt therefor.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The trial court ruled that the trees cut exceeded the
allowed number of the trees authorized to be cut. The trial court
further ruled that the cutting of trees went beyond the period
stated in the permit.
Petitioner, Cuteng and Santiago appealed from the trial
courts Decision.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 5 June 1997 Decision, the Court of Appeals modified
the trial courts Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED.
The accused-appellants Benedicto Santiago and Michael Cuteng
are hereby acquitted on reasonable doubt. The appellant
Ernesto Aquino is found guilty, and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. The award of damages is deleted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The Court of Appeals ruled that as a forest guard or ranger
of the CENRO, DENR, petitioner had the duty to supervise the
cutting of trees and to ensure that the sawyers complied with
the terms of the permit which only he possessed. The Court of
Appeals ruled that while it was Teachers Camp which hired the
sawyers, petitioner had control over their acts. The Court of
Appeals rejected petitioners claim that he was restrained from
taking a bolder action by his fear of Santiago because petitioner
could have informed his superiors but he did not do so. The
Court of Appeals further rejected petitioners contention that the
law contemplated cutting of trees without permit, while in this
case there was a permit for cutting down the trees. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the trees which were cut by the sawyers
were not covered by the permit.
The Court of Appeals ruled that conspiracy was not
sufficiently proven. As such, the Court of Appeals found that the
prosecution failed to prove Cutengs guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The Court of Appeals likewise acquitted Santiago
because he was only following orders as to which trees to cut
and he did not have a copy of the permit.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 24
September 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion for lack of merit.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether petitioner is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68 of PD 705.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
The Solicitor General alleges that the petition should be
denied because petitioner only raises questions of facts and not
questions of law. We do not agree.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what
the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of
fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts.[10] For questions to be one of law, the same
must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants.[11] The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set
of circumstances.[12]
 In this case, petitioner challenges his conviction under
Section 68 of PD 705.
Section 68 of PD 705 provides:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or
Other Forest Products Without License.-Any person who shall
cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land, without any authority, or
possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, that
in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the
officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or
possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they
shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further
proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
There are two distinct and separate offenses punished
under Section 68 of PD 705, to wit:
(1)
Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or
other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without
any authority; and
(2)
Possession of timber or other forest products without the
legal documents required under existing forest laws and
regulations.[13]
The provision clearly punishes anyone who shall cut,
gather, collect or remove timber or other forest products from
any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land, without any authority. In this case,
petitioner was charged by CENRO to supervise the
implementation of the permit. He was not the one who cut,
gathered, collected or removed the pine trees within the
contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705. He was not in
possession of the cut trees because the lumber was used by
Teachers Camp for repairs. Petitioner could not likewise be
convicted of conspiracy to commit the offense because all his
co-accused were acquitted of the charges against them.
Petitioner may have been remiss in his duties when he
failed to restrain the sawyers from cutting trees more than what
was covered by the permit. As the Court of Appeals ruled,
petitioner could have informed his superiors if he was really
intimidated by Santiago. If at all, this could only make petitioner
administratively liable for his acts. It is not enough to convict
him under Section 68 of PD 705.
Neither could petitioner be liable under the last paragraph
of Section 68 of PD 705 as he is not an officer of a partnership,
association, or corporation who ordered the cutting, gathering,
or collection, or is in possession of the pine trees.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 5
June 1997 Decision and 24 September 2004 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534. Petitioner Ernesto
Aquino is ACQUITTED of the charge of violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree No. 705. Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. NO. 134030 April 25, 2006
ASAPHIL CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
VICENTE TUASON, JR., INDUPLEX, INC. and
MINESADJUDICATION BOARD, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assails the Decision of the Mines Adjudication Board
(MAB) dated August 18, 1997, modifying the Decision dated
December 11, 1991 of the Regional Executive Director, DENR-
Region V, Legaspi City. The dispositive portion of the MAB
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 11, 1991 of
the Regional Executive Director is hereby MODIFIED. The
Agreement to Operate Mining Claim, dated May 29, 1976 is
hereby CANCELLED and/or REVOKED and the appeal in so far as
the Contract to Sell and Purchase Perlite Ore, dated March 24,
1975 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.1
On March 24, 1975, respondent Vicente Tuason, Jr. 2
(Tuason) entered into a Contract for Sale and Purchase of
Perlite Ore with Induplex, Inc. (Induplex), wherein Induplex
agreed to buy all the perlite ore that may be found and mined in
Tuason’s mining claim located in Taysa, Daraga, Albay. In
exchange, Induplex will assist Tuason in securing and perfecting
his right over the mining claim.3
Thereafter, Tuason executed on May 29, 1976, an
Agreement to Operate Mining Claims in favor of petitioner
Asaphil Construction and Development Corporation (Asaphil).4
On November 9, 1990, Tuason filed with the Bureau of
Mines, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), a complaint against Asaphil and Induplex for
declaration of nullity of the two contracts, namely, the Contract
for Sale and Purchase of Perlite Ore, and the Agreement to
Operate Mining Claims. Tuason alleged in his complaint that the
stockholders of Induplex formed and organized Ibalon Mineral
Resources, Inc. (Ibalon), an entity whose purpose is to mine
any and all kinds of minerals, and has in fact been mining,
extracting and utilizing the perlite ore in Ibalon’s mining claim;
that this is in violation of the condition imposed by the Board of
Investments (BOI) on Induplex in its Joint Venture Agreement
with Grefco, Inc. dated September 3, 1974, prohibiting Induplex
from mining perlite ore, through an operating agreement or any
other method; that Induplex acquired the majority stocks of
Asaphil on January 14, 1989, and that 95% of Ibalon’s shares
were also transferred to Virgilio R. Romero, who is a stockholder
of Induplex, Asaphil and Ibalon. Tuason claimed that said acts
adversely affected, not only his interest as claimowner, but the
government’s interest as well.5
Asaphil filed its Answer, praying for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that the DENR has no jurisdiction over
the case.6
Induplex filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint, also on
ground of lack of jurisdiction. Induplex contended that to fall
within the jurisdiction of the DENR, the controversy should
involve a mining property and the contending parties must be
claimholders and/or mining operators; and that the dispute in
this case involves "mineral product" and not a mining property,
and the protagonists are claimholders (Tuason) and a buyer
(Induplex).7
The DENR, through the Regional Executive Director, found
merit in Induplex’s arguments and dismissed the complaint. The
dispositive portion of the Regional Executive Director’s Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
complaint should be, as it is hereby dismissed.1avvphil.net
 SO ORDERED.8
On appeal, the MAB rendered the herein assailed Decision
dated August 18, 1997. The MAB ruled that the complaint is for
the cancellation and revocation of the Agreement to Operate
Mining Claims, which is within the jurisdiction of the DENR
under Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1281. The MAB also
found that the acquisition by Induplex of the majority stocks of
Asaphil, and Induplex’s assumption of the mining operation
violated the BOI prohibition. With regard, however, to the
validity of the Contract for Sale and Purchase of Perlite Ore, the
MAB ruled that the evidence does not support Tuason’s plea for
its cancellation.9
Asaphil and Induplex filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the MAB per Order dated March 23,
1998.10
Hence, the herein petition by Asaphil on the following
grounds:
A. THE BOARD A QUO HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE UNDER THE RECENTLY ENACTED MINING ACT OF
1995 (R.A. NO. 7942), NOT THERETOFORE DETERMINED BY
THIS HONORABLE TRIBUNAL –
BY VIOLATING ARTICLE 1930 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES WHEN IT CANCELLED ASAPHIL’S AGENCY
(COUPLED WITH AN INTEREST) UNDER THE OPERATING
AGREEMENT.
BY VIOLATING ASAPHIL’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN THE BOARD ADJUDICATED UPON
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT ON THE PART OF
ASAPHIL, BUT WITHOUT RECEIVING EVIDENCE OF ANY SUCH
VIOLATION.
BY IGNORING ASAPHIL’S 52.5% INTEREST UNDER THE
OPERATING AGREEMENT WHICH GIVES TO ASAPHIL THE RIGHT
TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE OPERATING
AGREEMENT MUST BE CANCELLED.
BY INVALIDATING THE OPERATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
RECEIVING EVIDENCE ON THE PURPORTED GROUND FOR
INVALIDATION.
BY NOT ADJUDICATING UPON THE RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATION OF TUASON AND ASAPHIL UNDER THE
OPERATING AGREEMENT WHICH IS ACTUALLY IN THE NATURE
OF A JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT, BY REASON OF THE
FINANCIAL RAMIFICATIONS THEREOF.
B. THE BOARD A QUO HAS DEPARTED FROM THE
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS –
1. BY INVALIDATING THE OPERATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT RECEIVING EVIDENCE ON THE PURPORTED GROUND
FOR INVALIDATION.
2. THE ACTUATION OF THE MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AS IT DEPRIVES THE PETITIONER OF
ITS RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER
OR NOT THE OPERATING AGREEMENT HAS BEEN VIOLATED,
VIRTUALLLY DEPRIVING THE PETITIONER OF ITS PROPRIETARY
RIGHTS WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
3. THE MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD ERRED IN
ENTERTAINING TUASON’S APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF
DISMISSAL, AS THE LATTER WAS CONCERNED SOLELY WITH
THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION WHICH, BEING A MATTER OF
LAW, IS COGNIZABLE BY THIS HONORABLE TRIBUNAL AND/OR
BY THE COURT OF APPEALS.
4. GRANTING THAT THE MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD
COULD VALIDLY ASSUME THE FACTS (WITHOUT RECEIVING
EVIDENCE),
a) THE MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD NONETHELESS
ERRED IN ANNULLING THE OPERATING AGREEMENT BETWEEN
TUASON AND ASAPHIL, ON THE MERE CIRCUMSTANCE THAT A
STOCKHOLDER OF INDUPLEX HAD BECOME A STOCKHOLDER
OF ASAPHIL IN 1990.
b) THE MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD LIKEWISE ERRED
IN ANNULING THE OPERATING AGREEMENT BETWEEN TUASON
AND ASAPHIL ON THE BASIS OF THE ASAPAHIL’S PURPORTED
VIOLATION OF THE TERMS OF THE OPERATING AGREEMENT.
5. THE MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD FURTHER ERRED IN
ANNULING THE OPERATING AGREEMENT BETWEEN TUASON
AND ASAPHIL AND AT THE SAME TIME THE BOARD UPHELD THE
VALIDITY OF THE SUPPLY CONTRACT BETWEEN TUASON AND
INDUPLEX BASED ON THE SAME INVALIDATING CAUSE.11
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner’s arguments may be summed up into two basic
issues: first, whether or not the DENR has jurisdiction over
Tuason’s complaint for the annulment of the Contract for Sale
and Purchase of Perlite Ore between Tuason and Induplex, and
the Agreement to Operate Mining Claims between Tuason and
Asaphil; and second, whether or not the MAB erred in
invalidating the Agreement to Operate Mining Claims.
As a preliminary matter, it should be stated that MAB
decisions are appealable to the Court of Appeals (CA) under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. In Carpio v. Sulu Resources
Development Corp.,12 the Court clarified that while Section 79
of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 provides that petitions for
review of MAB decisions are to be brought directly to the
Supreme Court, the MAB is a quasi-judicial agency whose
decisions should be brought to the CA. However, considering
that the Carpio case was rendered in 2002, and the petition
before the Court was filed in 1999; and considering further that
the issues raised, specially the issue of the DENR’s jurisdiction,
and the fact that the records of the case are already before the
Court, it is more appropriate and practical to resolve the petition
in order to avoid further delay.13
With regard to the issue of jurisdiction, the DENR Regional
Executive Director opined that the DENR does not have
jurisdiction over the case, while the MAB ruled that the DENR
has jurisdiction.
The Court upholds the finding of the DENR Regional
Executive Director that the DENR does not have jurisdiction
over Tuason’s complaint.
At the time of the filing of the complaint, the jurisdiction of
the DENR over mining disputes and controversies is governed
by P.D. No. 1281, entitled "Revising Commonwealth Act No.
136, Creating the Bureau of Mines, and for Other Purposes."14
Particularly, P.D. No. 1281 vests the Bureau of Mines (now the
Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau) of the DENR with jurisdictional
supervision and control over all holders of mining claims or
applicants for and/or grantees of mining licenses, permits,
leases and/or operators thereof, including mining service
contracts and service contractors insofar as their mining
activities are concerned.15 Under Section 7 of P.D. No. 1281,
the Bureau of Mines also has quasi-judicial powers over cases
involving the following:
(a) a mining property subject of different agreements
entered into by the claim holder thereof with several mining
operators;
 (b) complaints from claimowners that the mining property
subject of an operating agreement has not been placed into
actual operations within the period stipulated therein; and
(c) cancellation and/or enforcement of mining contracts
due to the refusal of the claimowner/operator to abide by the
terms and conditions thereof.
In Pearson v. Intermediate Appellate Court,16 this Court
observed that the trend has been to make the adjudication of
mining cases a purely administrative matter, although it does
not mean that administrative bodies have complete rein over
mining disputes. In several cases on mining disputes, the Court
recognized a distinction between (1) the primary powers
granted by pertinent provisions of law to the then Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources (and the bureau directors) of
an executive or administrative nature, such as granting of
license, permits, lease and contracts, or approving, rejecting,
reinstating or canceling applications, or deciding conflicting
applications, and (2) controversies or disagreements of civil or
contractual nature between litigants which are questions of a
judicial nature that may be adjudicated only by the courts of
justice.17
The allegations in Tuason’s complaint do not make out a
case for a mining dispute or controversy within the jurisdiction
of the DENR. While the Agreement to Operate Mining Claims is a
mining contract, the ground upon which the contract is sought
to be annulled is not due to Asaphil’s refusal to abide by the
terms and conditions of the agreement, but due to Induplex’s
alleged violation of the condition imposed by the BOI in its Joint
Venture Agreement with Grefco, Inc.. Also, Tuason sought the
nullity of the Contract for Sale and Purchase of Perlite Ore,
based on the same alleged violation. Obviously, this raises a
judicial question, which is proper for determination by the
regular courts.18 A judicial question is raised when the
determination of the question involves the exercise of a judicial
function; that is, the question involves the determination of
what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with
respect to the matter in controversy.19
The DENR is not called upon to exercise its technical
knowledge or expertise over any mining operations or dispute;
rather, it is being asked to determine the validity of the
agreements based on circumstances beyond the respective
rights of the parties under the two contracts. In Gonzales v.
Climax Mining Ltd.,20 the Court ruled that:
x x x whether the case involves void or voidable contracts
is still a judicial question. It may, in some instances, involve
questions of fact especially with regard to the determination of
the circumstances of the execution of the contracts. But the
resolution of the validity or voidness of the contracts remains a
legal or judicial question as it requires the exercise of judicial
function. It requires the ascertainment of what laws are
applicable to the dispute, the interpretation and application of
those laws, and the rendering of a judgment based thereon.
Clearly, the dispute is not a mining conflict. It is essentially
judicial. The complaint was not merely for the determination of
rights under the mining contracts since the very validity of
those contracts is put in issue. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the DENR Regional Executive Director was correct in
dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over Tuason’s
complaint; consequently, the MAB committed an error in taking
cognizance of the appeal, and in ruling upon the validity of the
contracts.
Given the DENR’s lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of
Tuason’s complaint, the Court finds it unnecessary to rule on
the issue of validity of the contracts, as this should have been
brought before and resolved by the regular trial courts, to begin
with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Mines Adjudication Board dated August 18, 1997 is SET ASIDE,
and the Decision dated December 11, 1991 of the Regional
Executive Director, DENR-Region V, Legaspi City, dismissing the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction, is REINSTATED.
Costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.
DIDIPIO EARTH-SAVERS MULTI-PURPOSE ASSOCIATION,
INCORPORATED (DESAMA),
- versus -
ELISEA GOZUN, in her capacity as SECRETARY of the
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES
(DENR), HORACIO RAMOS, in his capacity as Director of the
Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR), ALBERTO
ROMULO, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary of the Office
of the President, RICHARD N. FERRER, in his capacity as Acting
Undersecretary of the Office of the President, IAN HEATH
SANDERCOCK, in his capacity as President of CLIMAX-ARIMCO
MINING CORPORATION.
Respondents.
G.R. No. 157882
DECISION
This petition for prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court assails the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995,
together with the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued
pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. 96-40, s. 1996
(DAO 96-40) and of the Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA) entered into on 20 June 1994 by the
Republic of the Philippines and Arimco Mining Corporation
(AMC), a corporation established under the laws of Australia and
owned by its nationals.
On 25 July 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino
promulgated Executive Order No. 279 which authorized the
DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from
foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts of
agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the
Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign
proponent.
On 3 March 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos signed
into law Rep. Act No. 7942 entitled, An Act Instituting A New
System of Mineral Resources Exploration, Development,
Utilization and Conservation, otherwise known as the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995.
On 15 August 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos
issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 23, Series of
1995, containing the implementing guidelines of Rep. Act No.
7942. This was soon superseded by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996,
which took effect on 23 January 1997 after due publication.
Previously, however, or specifically on 20 June 1994,
President Ramos executed an FTAA with AMC over a total land
area of 37,000 hectares covering the provinces of Nueva
Vizcaya and Quirino. Included in this area is Barangay Dipidio,
Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya.
 Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining
Limited to form a single company that now goes under the new
name of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation (CAMC), the
controlling 99% of stockholders of which are Australian
nationals.
On 7 September 2001, counsels for petitioners filed a
demand letter addressed to then DENR Secretary Heherson
Alvarez, for the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA for the primary
reason that Rep. Act No. 7942 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations DAO 96-40 are unconstitutional. The Office of the
Executive Secretary was also furnished a copy of the said letter.
There being no response to both letters, another letter of the
same content dated 17 June 2002 was sent to President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo. This letter was indorsed to the DENR
Secretary and eventually referred to the Panel of Arbitrators of
the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), Regional Office No.
02, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for further action.
On 12 November 2002, counsels for petitioners received a
letter from the Panel of Arbitrators of the MGB requiring the
petitioners to comply with the Rules of the Panel of Arbitrators
before the letter may be acted upon.
Yet again, counsels for petitioners sent President Arroyo
another demand letter dated 8 November 2002. Said letter was
again forwarded to the DENR Secretary who referred the same
to the MGB, Quezon City.
In a letter dated 19 February 2003, the MGB rejected the
demand of counsels for petitioners for the cancellation of the
CAMC FTAA.
Petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition
and mandamus, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order.
They pray that the Court issue an order:
1. enjoining public respondents from acting on
any application for FTAA;
2. declaring unconstitutional the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations;
3. canceling the FTAA issued to CAMC.
In their memorandum petitioners pose the following
issues:
I adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942 AND THE
CAMC FTAA ARE VOID BECAUSE THEY ALLOW THE UNJUST AND
UNLAWFUL TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT PAYMENT OF JUST
COMPENSATION , IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, ARTICLE III OF
THE CONSTITUTION.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE MINING ACT AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE VOID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR SANCTIONING AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS OF
DETERMINING JUST COMPENSATION.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE, THROUGH REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 7942 AND THE CAMC FTAA, ABDICATED ITS PRIMARY
RESPONSIBILITY TO THE FULL CONTROL AND SUPERVISION
OVER NATURAL RESOURCES.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS INTERPRETATION
OF THE ROLE OF WHOLLY FOREIGN AND FOREIGN-OWNED
CORPORATIONS IN THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN MINING
ENTERPRISES, VIOLATES PARAGRAPH 4, SECTION 2, ARTICLE
XII OF THE CONSTITUTION.
V
WHETHER OR NOT THE 1987 CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS
SERVICE CONTRACTS.[1]
Before going to the substantive issues, the procedural
question raised by public respondents shall first be dealt with.
Public respondents are of the view that petitioners eminent
domain claim is not ripe for adjudication as they fail to allege
that CAMC has actually taken their properties nor do they allege
that their property rights have been endangered or are in
danger on account of CAMCs FTAA. In effect, public respondents
insist that the issue of eminent domain is not a justiciable
controversy which this Court can take cognizance of.
A justiciable controversy is defined as a definite and
concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests which may be resolved by a court
of law through the application of a law.[2] Thus, courts have no
judicial power to review cases involving political questions and
as a rule, will desist from taking cognizance of speculative or
hypothetical cases, advisory opinions and cases that have
become moot.[3] The Constitution is quite explicit on this
matter.[4] It provides that judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. Pursuant
to this constitutional mandate, courts, through the power of
judicial review, are to entertain only real disputes between
conflicting parties through the application of law. For the courts
to exercise the power of judicial review, the following must be
extant (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise
of judicial power; (2) the question must be ripe for adjudication;
and (3) the person challenging must have the standing.[5]
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute.[6] There must be a contrariety of
legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence.
Closely related to the second requisite is that the question
must be ripe for adjudication. A question is considered ripe for
adverse effect on the individual challenging it.[7]
The third requisite is legal standing or locus standi. It is
defined as a personal or substantial interest in the case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged, alleging
more than a generalized grievance.[8] The gist of the question
of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.[9] Unless a person is injuriously
affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of
statute or ordinance, he has no standing.[10]
In the instant case, there exists a live controversy
involving a clash of legal rights as Rep. Act No. 7942 has been
enacted, DAO 96-40 has been approved and an FTAAs have
been entered into. The FTAA holders have already been
operating in various provinces of the country. Among them is
CAMC which operates in the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and
Quirino where numerous individuals including the petitioners are
imperiled of being ousted from their landholdings in view of the
CAMC FTAA. In light of this, the court cannot await the adverse
consequences of the law in order to consider the controversy
actual and ripe for judicial intervention.[11] Actual eviction of
the land owners and occupants need not happen for this Court
to intervene. As held in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre[12]:
By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
approval of the challenged act, the dispute is said to have
ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt
act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or
the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.[13]
Petitioners embrace various segments of the society.
These include Didipio Earth-Savers Multi-Purpose Association,
Inc., an organization of farmers and indigenous peoples
organized under Philippine laws, representing a community
actually affected by the mining activities of CAMC, as well as
other residents of areas affected by the mining activities of
CAMC. These petitioners have the standing to raise the
constitutionality of the questioned FTAA as they allege a
personal and substantial injury.[14] They assert that they are
affected by the mining activities of CAMC. Likewise, they are
under imminent threat of being displaced from their
landholdings as a result of the implementation of the questioned
FTAA. They thus meet the appropriate case requirement as they
assert an interest adverse to that of respondents who, on the
other hand, claim the validity of the assailed statute and the
FTAA of CAMC.
Besides, the transcendental importance of the issues
raised and the magnitude of the public interest involved will
have a bearing on the countrys economy which is to a greater
extent dependent upon the mining industry. Also affected by
the resolution of this case are the proprietary rights of
numerous residents in the mining contract areas as well as the
social existence of indigenous peoples which are threatened.
Based on these considerations, this Court deems it proper to
take cognizance of the instant petition.
Having resolved the procedural question, the
constitutionality of the law under attack must be addressed
squarely.
First Substantive Issue: Validity of Section 76 of Rep. Act
No. 7942 and DAO 96-40
In seeking to nullify Rep. Act No. 7942 and its
implementing rules DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional, petitioners
set their sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section
107 of DAO 96-40 which they claim allow the unlawful and
unjust taking of private property for private purpose in
contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
mandating that private property shall not be taken except for
public use and the corresponding payment of just
compensation. They assert that public respondent DENR,
through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private
property and allow taking of land without payment of just
compensation.
Interpreting Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section
107 of DAO 96-40, juxtaposed with the concept of taking of
property for purposes of eminent domain in the case of Republic
v. Vda. de Castellvi,[15] petitioners assert that there is indeed a
taking upon entry into private lands and concession areas.
Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi defines taking under the
concept of eminent domain as entering upon private property
for more than a momentary period, and, under the warrant or
color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise
informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way
as to substantially oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment thereof.
From the criteria set forth in the cited case, petitioners
claim that the entry into a private property by CAMC, pursuant
to its FTAA, is for more than a momentary period, i.e., for 25
years, and renewable for another 25 years; that the entry into
the property is under the warrant or color of legal authority
pursuant to the FTAA executed between the government and
CAMC; and that the entry substantially ousts the owner or
possessor and deprives him of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property. These facts, according to the petitioners, amount to
taking. As such, petitioners question the exercise of the power
of eminent domain as unwarranted because respondents failed
to prove that the entry into private property is devoted for
public use.
Petitioners also stress that even without the doctrine in
the Castellvi case, the nature of the mining activity, the extent
of the land area covered by the CAMC FTAA and the various
rights granted to the proponent or the FTAA holder, such as (a)
the right of possession of the Exploration Contract Area, with
full right of ingress and egress and the right to occupy the
same; (b) the right not to be prevented from entry into private
lands by surface owners and/or occupants thereof when
prospecting, exploring and exploiting for minerals therein; (c)
the right to enjoy easement rights, the use of timber, water and
other natural resources in the Exploration Contract Area; (d) the
right of possession of the Mining Area, with full right of ingress
and egress and the right to occupy the same; and (e) the right
to enjoy easement rights, water and other natural resources in
the Mining Area, result in a taking of private property.
Petitioners quickly add that even assuming arguendo that
there is no absolute, physical taking, at the very least, Section
76 establishes a legal easement upon the surface owners,
occupants and concessionaires of a mining contract area
sufficient to deprive them of enjoyment and use of the property
and that such burden imposed by the legal easement falls within
the purview of eminent domain.
To further bolster their claim that the legal easement
established is equivalent to taking, petitioners cite the case of
National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez[16] holding that the
easement of right-of-way imposed against the use of the land
for an indefinite period is a taking under the power of eminent
domain.
Traversing petitioners assertion, public respondents argue
that Section 76 is not a taking provision but a valid exercise of
the police power and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. This
government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for the
public good and that this adjustment curtails some potential for
the use or economic exploitation of private property. Public
respondents concluded that to require compensation in all such
circumstances would compel the government to regulate by
purchase.
Public respondents are inclined to believe that by entering
private lands and concession areas, FTAA holders do not oust
the owners thereof nor deprive them of all beneficial enjoyment
of their properties as the said entry merely establishes a legal
easement upon surface owners, occupants and concessionaires
of a mining contract area.
Taking in Eminent Domain Distinguished from Regulation
in Police Power
The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the
state (and of those entities to which the power has been
lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public use
upon payment of just compensation.[17] On the other hand,
police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare
by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property.[18] Although both police power and the power of
eminent domain have the general welfare for their object, and
recent trends show a mingling[19] of the two with the latter
being used as an implement of the former, there are still
traditional distinctions between the two.
Property condemned under police power is usually noxious
or intended for a noxious purpose; hence, no compensation
shall be paid.[20] Likewise, in the exercise of police power,
property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints
and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the state. Thus, an ordinance prohibiting theaters
from selling tickets in excess of their seating capacity (which
would result in the diminution of profits of the theater-owners)
was upheld valid as this would promote the comfort,
convenience and safety of the customers.[21] In U.S. v.
Toribio,[22] the court upheld the provisions of Act No. 1147, a
statute regulating the slaughter of carabao for the purpose of
conserving an adequate supply of draft animals, as a valid
exercise of police power, notwithstanding the property rights
impairment that the ordinance imposed on cattle owners. A
zoning ordinance prohibiting the operation of a lumber yard
within certain areas was assailed as unconstitutional in that it
was an invasion of the property rights of the lumber yard
owners in People v. de Guzman.[23] The Court nonetheless
ruled that the regulation was a valid exercise of police power. A
similar ruling was arrived at in Seng Kee S Co. v. Earnshaw and
Piatt[24] where an ordinance divided the City of Manila into
industrial and residential areas.
A thorough scrutiny of the extant jurisprudence leads to a
cogent deduction that where a property interest is merely
restricted because the continued use thereof would be injurious
to public welfare, or where property is destroyed because its
continued existence would be injurious to public interest, there
is no compensable taking.[25] However, when a property
interest is appropriated and applied to some public purpose,
there is compensable taking.[26]
According to noted constitutionalist, Fr. Joaquin Bernas,
SJ, in the exercise of its police power regulation, the state
restricts the use of private property, but none of the property
interests in the bundle of rights which constitute ownership is
appropriated for use by or for the benefit of the public.[27] Use
of the property by the owner was limited, but no aspect of the
property is used by or for the public.[28] The deprivation of use
can in fact be total and it will not constitute compensable taking
if nobody else acquires use of the property or any interest
therein.[29]
If, however, in the regulation of the use of the property,
somebody else acquires the use or interest thereof, such
restriction constitutes compensable taking. Thus, in City
Government of Quezon City v. Ericta,[30] it was argued by the
local government that an ordinance requiring private cemeteries
to reserve 6% of their total areas for the burial of paupers was
a valid exercise of the police power under the general welfare
clause. This court did not agree in the contention, ruling that
property taken under the police power is sought to be destroyed
and not, as in this case, to be devoted to a public use. It further
declared that the ordinance in question was actually a taking of
private property without just compensation of a certain area
from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of
the local government. Being an exercise of eminent domain
without provision for the payment of just compensation, the
same was rendered invalid as it violated the principles
governing eminent domain.
In People v. Fajardo,[31] the municipal mayor refused
Fajardo permission to build a house on his own land on the
ground that the proposed structure would destroy the view or
beauty of the public plaza. The ordinance relied upon by the
mayor prohibited the construction of any building that would
destroy the view of the plaza from the highway. The court ruled
that the municipal ordinance under the guise of police power
permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their
property for the benefit of the public; hence, considered as a
taking under the power of eminent domain that could not be
countenanced without payment of just compensation to the
affected owners. In this case, what the municipality wanted was
to impose an easement on the property in order to preserve the
view or beauty of the public plaza, which was a form of
utilization of Fajardos property for public benefit.[32]
While the power of eminent domain often results in the
appropriation of title to or possession of property, it need not
always be the case. Taking may include trespass without actual
eviction of the owner, material impairment of the value of the
property or prevention of the ordinary uses for which the
property was intended such as the establishment of an
easement.[33] In Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila,[34] it was
held that the imposition of burden over a private property
through easement was considered taking; hence, payment of
just compensation is required. The Court declared:
And, considering that the easement intended to be
established, whatever may be the object thereof, is not merely
a real right that will encumber the property, but is one tending
to prevent the exclusive use of one portion of the same, by
expropriating it for public use which, be it what it may, can not
be accomplished unless the owner of the property condemned
or seized be previously and duly indemnified, it is proper to
protect the appellant by means of the remedy employed in such
cases, as it is only adequate remedy when no other legal action
can be resorted to, against an intent which is nothing short of
an arbitrary restriction imposed by the city by virtue of the
coercive power with which the same is invested.
And in the case of National Power Corporation v.
Gutierrez,[35] despite the NPCs protestation that the owners
were not totally deprived of the use of the land and could still
plant the same crops as long as they did not come into contact
with the wires, the Court nevertheless held that the easement
of right-of-way was a taking under the power of eminent
domain. The Court said:
In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is
definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain.
Considering the nature and effect of the installation of 230 KV
Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC
against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives
private respondents of its ordinary use.
A case exemplifying an instance of compensable taking
which does not entail transfer of title is Republic v. Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Co.[36] Here, the Bureau of
Telecommunications, a government instrumentality, had
contracted with the PLDT for the interconnection between the
Government Telephone System and that of the PLDT, so that
the former could make use of the lines and facilities of the
PLDT. In its desire to expand services to government offices,
the Bureau of Telecommunications demanded to expand its use
of the PLDT lines. Disagreement ensued on the terms of the
contract for the use of the PLDT facilities. The Court ruminated:
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results
in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the
expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said
power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the
owner of the condemned property, without loss of title and
possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through
expropriation, be subjected to an easement right of way.[37]
 In Republic v. Castellvi,[38] this Court had the occasion to
spell out the requisites of taking in eminent domain, to wit:
(1) the expropriator must enter a private
property;
(2) the entry must be for more than a
momentary period.
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of
legal authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to public use
or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;
(5) the utilization of the property for public use
must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property.
As shown by the foregoing jurisprudence, a regulation
which substantially deprives the owner of his proprietary rights
and restricts the beneficial use and enjoyment for public use
amounts to compensable taking. In the case under
consideration, the entry referred to in Section 76 and the
easement rights under Section 75 of Rep. Act No. 7942 as well
as the various rights to CAMC under its FTAA are no different
from the deprivation of proprietary rights in the cases discussed
which this Court considered as taking. Section 75 of the law in
question reads:
Easement Rights. - When mining areas are so situated
that for purposes of more convenient mining operations it is
necessary to build, construct or install on the mining areas or
lands owned, occupied or leased by other persons, such
infrastructure as roads, railroads, mills, waste dump sites,
tailing ponds, warehouses, staging or storage areas and port
facilities, tramways, runways, airports, electric transmission,
telephone or telegraph lines, dams and their normal flood and
catchment areas, sites for water wells, ditches, canals, new
river beds, pipelines, flumes, cuts, shafts, tunnels, or mills, the
contractor, upon payment of just compensation, shall be
entitled to enter and occupy said mining areas or lands.
Section 76 provides:
Entry into private lands and concession areas Subject to
prior notification, holders of mining rights shall not be prevented
from entry into private lands and concession areas by surface
owners, occupants, or concessionaires when conducting mining
operations therein.
The CAMC FTAA grants in favor of CAMC the right of
possession of the Exploration Contract Area, the full right of
ingress and egress and the right to occupy the same. It also
bestows CAMC the right not to be prevented from entry into
private lands by surface owners or occupants thereof when
prospecting, exploring and exploiting minerals therein.
The entry referred to in Section 76 is not just a simple
right-of-way which is ordinarily allowed under the provisions of
the Civil Code. Here, the holders of mining rights enter private
lands for purposes of conducting mining activities such as
exploration, extraction and processing of minerals. Mining right
holders build mine infrastructure, dig mine shafts and
connecting tunnels, prepare tailing ponds, storage areas and
vehicle depots, install their machinery, equipment and sewer
systems. On top of this, under Section 75, easement rights are
accorded to them where they may build warehouses, port
facilities, electric transmission, railroads and other
infrastructures necessary for mining operations. All these will
definitely oust the owners or occupants of the affected areas the
beneficial ownership of their lands. Without a doubt, taking
occurs once mining operations commence.
Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 is a Taking Provision
Moreover, it would not be amiss to revisit the history of
mining laws of this country which would help us understand
Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942.
This provision is first found in Section 27 of
Commonwealth Act No. 137 which took effect on 7 November
1936, viz:
Before entering private lands the prospector shall first
apply in writing for written permission of the private owner,
claimant, or holder thereof, and in case of refusal by such
private owner, claimant, or holder to grant such permission, or
in case of disagreement as to the amount of compensation to be
paid for such privilege of prospecting therein, the amount of
such compensation shall be fixed by agreement among the
prospector, the Director of the Bureau of Mines and the surface
owner, and in case of their failure to unanimously agree as to
the amount of compensation, all questions at issue shall be
determined by the Court of First Instance.
Similarly, the pertinent provision of Presidential Decree
No. 463, otherwise known as The Mineral Resources
Development Decree of 1974, provides:
SECTION 12. Entry to Public and Private Lands. A person
who desires to conduct prospecting or other mining operations
within public lands covered by concessions or rights other than
mining shall first obtain the written permission of the
government official concerned before entering such lands. In
the case of private lands, the written permission of the owner or
possessor of the land must be obtained before entering such
lands. In either case, if said permission is denied, the Director,
at the request of the interested person may intercede with the
owner or possessor of the land. If the intercession fails, the
interested person may bring suit in the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is situated. If the court finds the
request justified, it shall issue an order granting the permission
after fixing the amount of compensation and/or rental due the
owner or possessor: Provided, That pending final adjudication of
such amount, the court shall upon recommendation of the
Director permit the interested person to enter, prospect and/or
undertake other mining operations on the disputed land upon
posting by such interested person of a bond with the court
which the latter shall consider adequate to answer for any
damage to the owner or possessor of the land resulting from
such entry, prospecting or any other mining operations.
Hampered by the difficulties and delays in securing surface
rights for the entry into private lands for purposes of mining
operations, Presidential Decree No. 512 dated 19 July 1974 was
passed into law in order to achieve full and accelerated mineral
resources development. Thus, Presidential Decree No. 512
provides for a new system of surface rights acquisition by
mining prospectors and claimants. Whereas in Commonwealth
Act No. 137 and Presidential Decree No. 463 eminent domain
may only be exercised in order that the mining claimants can
build, construct or install roads, railroads, mills, warehouses and
other facilities, this time, the power of eminent domain may
now be invoked by mining operators for the entry, acquisition
and use of private lands, viz:
SECTION 1. Mineral prospecting, location, exploration,
development and exploitation is hereby declared of public use
and benefit, and for which the power of eminent domain may be
invoked and exercised for the entry, acquisition and use of
private lands. x x x.
The evolution of mining laws gives positive indication that
mining operators who are qualified to own lands were granted
the authority to exercise eminent domain for the entry,
acquisition, and use of private lands in areas open for mining
operations. This grant of authority extant in Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 512 is not expressly repealed by Section
76 of Rep. Act No. 7942; and neither are the former statutes
impliedly repealed by the former. These two provisions can
stand together even if Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 does not
spell out the grant of the privilege to exercise eminent domain
which was present in the old law.
It is an established rule in statutory construction that in
order that one law may operate to repeal another law, the two
laws must be inconsistent.[39] The former must be so
repugnant as to be irreconciliable with the latter act. Simply
because a latter enactment may relate to the same subject
matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to
cause an implied repeal of the latter, since the new law may be
cumulative or a continuation of the old one. As has been the
ruled, repeals by implication are not favored, and will not be
decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so
intended.[40] As laws are presumed to be passed with
deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the
subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a
statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any
former law relating to the same matter, unless the repugnancy
between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and
convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language used,
unless the later act fully embraces the subject matter of the
earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond
peradventure removed.[41] Hence, every effort must be used to
make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction, they
can be reconciled, the latter act will not operate as a repeal of
the earlier.
Considering that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 512
granted the qualified mining operators the authority to exercise
eminent domain and since this grant of authority is deemed
incorporated in Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942, the
inescapable conclusion is that the latter provision is a taking
provision.
While this Court declares that the assailed provision is a
taking provision, this does not mean that it is unconstitutional
on the ground that it allows taking of private property without
the determination of public use and the payment of just
compensation.
The taking to be valid must be for public use.[42] Public
use as a requirement for the valid exercise of the power of
eminent domain is now synonymous with public interest, public
benefit, public welfare and public convenience.[43] It includes
the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. Public
use as traditionally understood as actual use by the public has
already been abandoned.[44]
Mining industry plays a pivotal role in the economic
development of the country and is a vital tool in the
governments thrust of accelerated recovery.[45] The
importance of the mining industry for national development is
expressed in Presidential Decree No. 463:
WHEREAS, mineral production is a major support of the
national economy, and therefore the intensified discovery,
exploration, development and wise utilization of the countrys
mineral resources are urgently needed for national
development.
Irrefragably, mining is an industry which is of public
benefit.
That public use is negated by the fact that the state would
be taking private properties for the benefit of private mining
firms or mining contractors is not at all true. In Heirs of Juancho
Ardona v. Reyes,[46] petitioners therein contended that the
promotion of tourism is not for public use because private
concessionaires would be allowed to maintain various facilities
such as restaurants, hotels, stores, etc., inside the tourist area.
The Court thus contemplated:
The rule in Berman v. Parker [348 U.S. 25; 99 L. ed. 27]
of deference to legislative policy even if such policy might mean
taking from one private person and conferring on another
private person applies as well in the Philippines.
. . . Once the object is within the authority of Congress,
the means by which it will be attained is also for Congress to
determine. Here one of the means chosen is the use of private
enterprise for redevelopment of the area. Appellants argue that
this makes the project a taking from one businessman for the
benefit of another businessman. But the means of executing the
project are for Congress and Congress alone to determine, once
the public purpose has been established. x x x[47]
Petitioners further maintain that the states discretion to
decide when to take private property is reduced contractually by
Section 13.5 of the CAMC FTAA, which reads:
If the CONTRACTOR so requests at its option, the
GOVERNMENT shall use its offices and legal powers to assist in
the acquisition at reasonable cost of any surface areas or rights
required by the CONTRACTOR at the CONTRACTORs cost to
carry out the Mineral Exploration and the Mining Operations
herein.
All obligations, payments and expenses arising from, or
incident to, such agreements or acquisition of right shall be for
the account of the CONTRACTOR and shall be recoverable as
Operating Expense.
According to petitioners, the government is reduced to a
sub-contractor upon the request of the private respondent, and
on account of the foregoing provision, the contractor can
compel the government to exercise its power of eminent domain
thereby derogating the latters power to expropriate property.
The provision of the FTAA in question lays down the ways
and means by which the foreign-owned contractor, disqualified
to own land, identifies to the government the specific surface
areas within the FTAA contract area to be acquired for the mine
infrastructure.[48] The government then acquires ownership of
the surface land areas on behalf of the contractor, through a
voluntary transaction in order to enable the latter to proceed to
fully implement the FTAA. Eminent domain is not yet called for
at this stage since there are still various avenues by which
surface rights can be acquired other than expropriation. The
FTAA provision under attack merely facilitates the
implementation of the FTAA given to CAMC and shields it from
violating the Anti-Dummy Law. Hence, when confronted with
the same question in La Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association, Inc. v.
Ramos,[49] the Court answered:
Clearly, petitioners have needlessly jumped to
unwarranted conclusions, without being aware of the rationale
for the said provision. That provision does not call for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain -- and determination
of just compensation is not an issue -- as much as it calls for a
qualified party to acquire the surface rights on behalf of a
foreign-owned contractor.
Rather than having the foreign contractor act through a
dummy corporation, having the State do the purchasing is a
better alternative. This will at least cause the government to be
aware of such transaction/s and foster transparency in the
contractors dealings with the local property owners. The
government, then, will not act as a subcontractor of the
contractor; rather, it will facilitate the transaction and enable
the parties to avoid a technical violation of the Anti-Dummy
Law.

There is also no basis for the claim that the Mining Law
and its implementing rules and regulations do not provide for
just compensation in expropriating private properties. Section
76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 provide
for the payment of just compensation:
Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property
of the surface owner, occupant, or concessionaire as a
consequence of such operations shall be properly compensated
as may be provided for in the implementing rules and
regulations.
Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and
Occupant- Any damage done to the property of the surface
owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a consequence
of the mining operations or as a result of the construction or
installation of the infrastructure mentioned in 104 above shall
be properly and justly compensated.
Such compensation shall be based on the agreement
entered into between the holder of mining rights and the
surface owner, occupant or concessionaire thereof, where
appropriate, in accordance with P.D. No. 512. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Second Substantive Issue: Power of Courts to Determine
Just Compensation
Closely-knit to the issue of taking is the determination of
just compensation. It is contended that Rep. Act No. 7942 and
Section 107 of DAO 96-40 encroach on the power of the trial
courts to determine just compensation in eminent domain cases
inasmuch as the same determination of proper compensation
are cognizable only by the Panel of Arbitrators.
The question on the judicial determination of just
compensation has been settled in the case of Export Processing
Zone Authority v. Dulay[50] wherein the court declared that the
determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is
a judicial function. Even as the executive department or the
legislature may make the initial determinations, the same
cannot prevail over the courts findings.
Implementing Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942, Section
105 of DAO 96-40 states that holder(s) of mining right(s) shall
not be prevented from entry into its/their contract/mining areas
for the purpose of exploration, development, and/or utilization.
That in cases where surface owners of the lands, occupants or
concessionaires refuse to allow the permit holder or contractor
entry, the latter shall bring the matter before the Panel of
Arbitrators for proper disposition. Section 106 states that
voluntary agreements between the two parties permitting the
mining right holders to enter and use the surface owners lands
shall be registered with the Regional Office of the MGB. In
connection with Section 106, Section 107 provides that the
compensation for the damage done to the surface owner,
occupant or concessionaire as a consequence of mining
operations or as a result of the construction or installation of the
infrastructure shall be properly and justly compensated and that
such compensation shall be based on the agreement between
the holder of mining rights and surface owner, occupant or
concessionaire, or where appropriate, in accordance with
Presidential Decree No. 512. In cases where there is
disagreement to the compensation or where there is no
agreement, the matter shall be brought before the Panel of
Arbitrators. Section 206 of the implementing rules and
regulations provides an aggrieved party the remedy to appeal
the decision of the Panel of Arbitrators to the Mines Adjudication
Board, and the latters decision may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari.[51]
An examination of the foregoing provisions gives no
indication that the courts are excluded from taking cognizance
of expropriation cases under the mining law. The disagreement
referred to in Section 107 does not involve the exercise of
eminent domain, rather it contemplates of a situation wherein
the permit holders are allowed by the surface owners entry into
the latters lands and disagreement ensues as regarding the
proper compensation for the allowed entry and use of the
private lands. Noticeably, the provision points to a voluntary
sale or transaction, but not to an involuntary sale.
The legislature, in enacting the mining act, is presumed to
have deliberated with full knowledge of all existing laws and
jurisprudence on the subject. Thus, it is but reasonable to
conclude that in passing such statute it was in accord with the
existing laws and jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of courts in
the determination of just compensation and that it was not
intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to
the same matter. Indeed, there is nothing in the provisions of
the assailed law and its implementing rules and regulations that
exclude the courts from their jurisdiction to determine just
compensation in expropriation proceedings involving mining
operations. Although Section 105 confers upon the Panel of
Arbitrators the authority to decide cases where surface owners,
occupants, concessionaires refuse permit holders entry, thus,
necessitating involuntary taking, this does not mean that the
determination of the just compensation by the Panel of
Arbitrators or the Mines Adjudication Board is final and
conclusive. The determination is only preliminary unless
accepted by all parties concerned. There is nothing wrong with
the grant of primary jurisdiction by the Panel of Arbitrators or
the Mines Adjudication Board to determine in a preliminary
matter the reasonable compensation due the affected
landowners or occupants.[52] The original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the courts to decide determination of just
compensation remains intact despite the preliminary
determination made by the administrative agency. As held in
Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals[53]:
The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less
original and exclusive because the question is first passed upon
by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of
the administrative determination.
Third Substantive Issue: Sufficient Control by the State
Over Mining Operations
Anent the third issue, petitioners charge that Rep. Act No.
7942, as well as its Implementing Rules and Regulations, makes
it possible for FTAA contracts to cede over to a fully foreign-
owned corporation full control and management of mining
enterprises, with the result that the State is allegedly reduced
to a passive regulator dependent on submitted plans and
reports, with weak review and audit powers. The State is not
acting as the supposed owner of the natural resources for and
on behalf of the Filipino people; it practically has little effective
say in the decisions made by the enterprise. In effect,
petitioners asserted that the law, the implementing regulations,
and the CAMC FTAA cede beneficial ownership of the mineral
resources to the foreign contractor.
 It must be noted that this argument was already raised in
La Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos,[54] where
the Court answered in the following manner:
RA 7942 provides for the states control and supervision
over mining operations. The following provisions thereof
establish the mechanism of inspection and visitorial rights over
mining operations and institute reportorial requirements in this
manner:
1. Sec. 8 which provides for the DENRs power of over-
all supervision and periodic review for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the States
mineral resources;
2. Sec. 9 which authorizes the Mines and Geosciences
Bureau (MGB) under the DENR to exercise direct charge in the
administration and disposition of mineral resources, and
empowers the MGB to monitor the compliance by the contractor
of the terms and conditions of the mineral agreements,
confiscate surety and performance bonds, and deputize
whenever necessary any member or unit of the Phil. National
Police, barangay, duly registered non-governmental
organization (NGO) or any qualified person to police mining
activities;
3. Sec. 66 which vests in the Regional Director
exclusive jurisdiction over safety inspections of all installations,
whether surface or underground, utilized in mining operations.
4. Sec. 35, which incorporates into all FTAAs the
following terms, conditions and warranties:
(g) Mining operations shall be conducted in accordance
with the provisions of the Act and its IRR.
(h) Work programs and minimum expenditures
commitments.
xxxx
(k) Requiring proponent to effectively use appropriate
anti-pollution technology and facilities to protect the
environment and restore or rehabilitate mined-out areas.
(l) The contractors shall furnish the Government
records of geologic, accounting and other relevant data for its
mining operation, and that books of accounts and records shall
be open for inspection by the government. x x x.
(m) Requiring the proponent to dispose of the minerals
at the highest price and more advantageous terms and
conditions.
xxxx
(o) Such other terms and conditions consistent with the
Constitution and with this Act as the Secretary may deem to be
for the best interest of the State and the welfare of the Filipino
people.
The foregoing provisions of Section 35 of RA 7942 are also
reflected and implemented in Section 56 (g), (h), (l), (m) and
(n) of the Implementing Rules, DAO 96-40.
Moreover, RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 also provide various
stipulations confirming the governments control over mining
enterprises:
The contractor is to relinquish to the government
those portions of the contract area not needed for mining
operations and not covered by any declaration of mining
feasibility (Section 35-e, RA 7942; Section 60, DAO 96-40).
The contractor must comply with the provisions
pertaining to mine safety, health and environmental protection
(Chapter XI, RA 7942; Chapters XV and XVI, DAO 96-40).
For violation of any of its terms and conditions,
government may cancel an FTAA. (Chapter XVII, RA 7942;
Chapter XXIV, DAO 96-40).
An FTAA contractor is obliged to open its books of
accounts and records for 0inspection by the government
(Section 56-m, DAO 96-40).
An FTAA contractor has to dispose of the minerals
and by-products at the highest market price and register with
the MGB a copy of the sales agreement (Section 56-n, DAO 96-
40).
MGB is mandated to monitor the contractors
compliance with the terms and conditions of the FTAA; and to
deputize, when necessary, any member or unit of the Philippine
National Police, the barangay or a DENR-accredited
nongovernmental organization to police mining activities
(Section 7-d and -f, DAO 96-40).
An FTAA cannot be transferred or assigned without
prior approval by the President (Section 40, RA 7942; Section
66, DAO 96-40).
A mining project under an FTAA cannot proceed to
the construction/development/utilization stage, unless its
Declaration of Mining Project Feasibility has been approved by
government (Section 24, RA 7942).
The Declaration of Mining Project Feasibility filed by
the contractor cannot be approved without submission of the
following documents:
1. Approved mining project feasibility study (Section 53-
d, DAO 96-40)
2. Approved three-year work program (Section 53-a-4,
DAO 96-40)
3. Environmental compliance certificate (Section 70, RA
7942)
4. Approved environmental protection and enhancement
program (Section 69, RA 7942)
5. Approval by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan/Bayan/Barangay (Section 70, RA 7942; Section
27, RA 7160)
6. Free and prior informed consent by the indigenous
peoples concerned, including payment of royalties through a
Memorandum of Agreement (Section 16, RA 7942; Section 59,
RA 8371)
The FTAA contractor is obliged to assist in the
development of its mining community, promotion of the general
welfare of its inhabitants, and development of science and
mining technology (Section 57, RA 7942).
The FTAA contractor is obliged to submit reports
(on quarterly, semi-annual or annual basis as the case may be;
per Section 270, DAO 96-40), pertaining to the following:
1. Exploration
 2. Drilling
3. Mineral resources and reserves
4. Energy consumption
5. Production
6. Sales and marketing
7. Employment
8. Payment of taxes, royalties, fees and other
Government Shares
9. Mine safety, health and environment
10. Land use
11. Social development
12. Explosives consumption
An FTAA pertaining to areas within government
reservations cannot be granted without a written clearance from
the government agencies concerned (Section 19, RA 7942;
Section 54, DAO 96-40).
An FTAA contractor is required to post a financial
guarantee bond in favor of the government in an amount
equivalent to its expenditures obligations for any particular
year. This requirement is apart from the representations and
warranties of the contractor that it has access to all the
financing, managerial and technical expertise and technology
necessary to carry out the objectives of the FTAA (Section 35-b,
-e, and -f, RA 7942).
Other reports to be submitted by the contractor,
as required under DAO 96-40, are as follows: an environmental
report on the rehabilitation of the mined-out area and/or mine
waste/tailing covered area, and anti-pollution measures
undertaken (Section 35-a-2); annual reports of the mining
operations and records of geologic accounting (Section 56-m);
annual progress reports and final report of exploration activities
(Section 56-2).
Other programs required to be submitted by the
contractor, pursuant to DAO 96-40, are the following: a safety
and health program (Section 144); an environmental work
program (Section 168); an annual environmental protection and
enhancement program (Section 171).
The foregoing gamut of requirements, regulations,
restrictions and limitations imposed upon the FTAA contractor
by the statute and regulations easily overturns petitioners
contention. The setup under RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 hardly
relegates the State to the role of a passive regulator dependent
on submitted plans and reports. On the contrary, the
government agencies concerned are empowered to approve or
disapprove -- hence, to influence, direct and change -- the
various work programs and the corresponding minimum
expenditure commitments for each of the exploration,
development and utilization phases of the mining enterprise.
Once these plans and reports are approved, the contractor
is bound to comply with its commitments therein. Figures for
mineral production and sales are regularly monitored and
subjected to government review, in order to ensure that the
products and by-products are disposed of at the best prices
possible; even copies of sales agreements have to be submitted
to and registered with MGB. And the contractor is mandated to
open its books of accounts and records for scrutiny, so as to
enable the State to determine if the government share has been
fully paid.
The State may likewise compel the contractors compliance
with mandatory requirements on mine safety, health and
environmental protection, and the use of anti-pollution
technology and facilities. Moreover, the contractor is also
obligated to assist in the development of the mining community
and to pay royalties to the indigenous peoples concerned.
Cancellation of the FTAA may be the penalty for violation
of any of its terms and conditions and/or noncompliance with
statutes or regulations. This general, all-around, multipurpose
sanction is no trifling matter, especially to a contractor who may
have yet to recover the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars
sunk into a mining project.
Overall, considering the provisions of the statute and the
regulations just discussed, we believe that the State definitely
possesses the means by which it can have the ultimate word in
the operation of the enterprise, set directions and objectives,
and detect deviations and noncompliance by the contractor;
likewise, it has the capability to enforce compliance and to
impose sanctions, should the occasion therefor arise.
In other words, the FTAA contractor is not free to do
whatever it pleases and get away with it; on the contrary, it will
have to follow the government line if it wants to stay in the
enterprise. Ineluctably then, RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 vest in
the government more than a sufficient degree of control and
supervision over the conduct of mining operations.
Fourth Substantive Issue: The Proper Interpretation of the
Constitutional Phrase Agreements Involving Either Technical or
Financial Assistance
In interpreting the first and fourth paragraphs of Section
2, Article XII of the Constitution, petitioners set forth the
argument that foreign corporations are barred from making
decisions on the conduct of operations and the management of
the mining project. The first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII
reads:
x x x The exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision
of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities,
or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production
sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty percentum of whose capital is owned
by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not
exceeding twenty five years, renewable for not more than
twenty five years, and under such terms and conditions as may
be provided by law x x x.
The fourth paragraph of Section 2, Article XII provides:
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-
owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law,
based on real contributions to the economic growth and general
welfare of the country x x x.

Petitioners maintain that the first paragraph bars aliens
and foreign-owned corporations from entering into any direct
arrangement with the government including those which involve
co-production, joint venture or production sharing agreements.
They likewise insist that the fourth paragraph allows foreign-
owned corporations to participate in the large-scale exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources, but such
participation, however, is merely limited to an agreement for
either financial or technical assistance only.
Again, this issue has already been succinctly passed upon
by this Court in La Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association, Inc. v.
Ramos.[55] In discrediting such argument, the Court
ratiocinated:
Petitioners claim that the phrase agreements x x x
involving either technical or financial assistance simply means
technical assistance or financial assistance agreements, nothing
more and nothing else. They insist that there is no ambiguity in
the phrase, and that a plain reading of paragraph 4 quoted
above leads to the inescapable conclusion that what a foreign-
owned corporation may enter into with the government is
merely an agreement for either financial or technical assistance
only, for the large-scale exploration, development and
utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils; such a
limitation, they argue, excludes foreign management and
operation of a mining enterprise.
This restrictive interpretation, petitioners believe, is in line
with the general policy enunciated by the Constitution reserving
to Filipino citizens and corporations the use and enjoyment of
the countrys natural resources. They maintain that this Courts
Decision of January 27, 2004 correctly declared the WMCP
FTAA, along with pertinent provisions of RA 7942, void for
allowing a foreign contractor to have direct and exclusive
management of a mining enterprise. Allowing such a privilege
not only runs counter to the full control and supervision that the
State is constitutionally mandated to exercise over the
exploration, development and utilization of the countrys natural
resources; doing so also vests in the foreign company beneficial
ownership of our mineral resources. It will be recalled that the
Decision of January 27, 2004 zeroed in on management or other
forms of assistance or other activities associated with the
service contracts of the martial law regime, since the
management or operation of mining activities by foreign
contractors, which is the primary feature of service contracts,
was precisely the evil that the drafters of the 1987 Constitution
sought to eradicate.
xxxx
We do not see how applying a strictly literal or verba legis
interpretation of paragraph 4 could inexorably lead to the
conclusions arrived at in the ponencia. First, the drafters choice
of words -- their use of the phrase agreements x x x involving
either technical or financial assistance -- does not indicate the
intent to exclude other modes of assistance. The drafters opted
to use involving when they could have simply said agreements
for financial or technical assistance, if that was their intention to
begin with. In this case, the limitation would be very clear and
no further debate would ensue.
In contrast, the use of the word involving signifies the
possibility of the inclusion of other forms of assistance or
activities having to do with, otherwise related to or compatible
with financial or technical assistance. The word involving as
used in this context has three connotations that can be
differentiated thus: one, the sense of concerning, having to do
with, or affecting; two, entailing, requiring, implying or
necessitating; and three, including, containing or comprising.
Plainly, none of the three connotations convey a sense of
exclusivity. Moreover, the word involving, when understood in
the sense of including, as in including technical or financial
assistance, necessarily implies that there are activities other
than those that are being included. In other words, if an
agreement includes technical or financial assistance, there is
apart from such assistance -- something else already in, and
covered or may be covered by, the said agreement.
In short, it allows for the possibility that matters, other
than those explicitly mentioned, could be made part of the
agreement. Thus, we are now led to the conclusion that the use
of the word involving implies that these agreements with foreign
corporations are not limited to mere financial or technical
assistance. The difference in sense becomes very apparent
when we juxtapose agreements for technical or financial
assistance against agreements including technical or financial
assistance. This much is unalterably clear in a verba legis
approach.
Second, if the real intention of the drafters was to confine
foreign corporations to financial or technical assistance and
nothing more, their language would have certainly been so
unmistakably restrictive and stringent as to leave no doubt in
anyones mind about their true intent. For example, they would
have used the sentence foreign corporations are absolutely
prohibited from involvement in the management or operation of
mining or similar ventures or words of similar import. A search
for such stringent wording yields negative results. Thus, we
come to the inevitable conclusion that there was a conscious
and deliberate decision to avoid the use of restrictive wording
that bespeaks an intent not to use the expression agreements x
x x involving either technical or financial assistance in an
exclusionary and limiting manner.
Fifth Substantive Issue: Service Contracts Not
Deconstitutionalized
Lastly, petitioners stress that the service contract regime
under the 1973 Constitution is expressly prohibited under the
1987 Constitution as the term service contracts found in the
former was deleted in the latter to avoid the circumvention of
constitutional prohibitions that were prevalent in the 1987
Constitution. According to them, the framers of the 1987
Constitution only intended for foreign-owned corporations to
provide either technical assistance or financial assistance. Upon
perusal of the CAMC FTAA, petitioners are of the opinion that
the same is a replica of the service contract agreements that
the present constitution allegedly prohibit.
Again, this contention is not well-taken. The mere fact that
the term service contracts found in the 1973 Constitution was
not carried over to the present constitution, sans any
categorical statement banning service contracts in mining
activities, does not mean that service contracts as understood in
the 1973 Constitution was eradicated in the 1987
Constitution.[56] The 1987 Constitution allows the continued
use of service contracts with foreign corporations as contractors
who would invest in and operate and manage extractive
enterprises, subject to the full control and supervision of the
State; this time, however, safety measures were put in place to
prevent abuses of the past regime.[57] We ruled, thus:

To our mind, however, such intent cannot be definitively
and conclusively established from the mere failure to carry the
same expression or term over to the new Constitution, absent a
more specific, explicit and unequivocal statement to that effect.
What petitioners seek (a complete ban on foreign participation
in the management of mining operations, as previously allowed
by the earlier Constitutions) is nothing short of bringing about a
momentous sea change in the economic and developmental
policies; and the fundamentally capitalist, free-enterprise
philosophy of our government. We cannot imagine such a
radical shift being undertaken by our government, to the great
prejudice of the mining sector in particular and our economy in
general, merely on the basis of the omission of the terms
service contract from or the failure to carry them over to the
new Constitution. There has to be a much more definite and
even unarguable basis for such a drastic reversal of policies.
xxxx
The foregoing are mere fragments of the framers lengthy
discussions of the provision dealing with agreements x x x
involving either technical or financial assistance, which
ultimately became paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the
Constitution. Beyond any doubt, the members of the ConCom
were actually debating about the martial-law-era service
contracts for which they were crafting appropriate safeguards.
In the voting that led to the approval of Article XII by the
ConCom, the explanations given by Commissioners Gascon,
Garcia and Tadeo indicated that they had voted to reject this
provision on account of their objections to the
constitutionalization of the service contract concept.
Mr. Gascon said, I felt that if we would constitutionalize
any provision on service contracts, this should always be with
the concurrence of Congress and not guided only by a general
law to be promulgated by Congress. Mr. Garcia explained,
Service contracts are given constitutional legitimization in Sec.
3, even when they have been proven to be inimical to the
interests of the nation, providing, as they do, the legal loophole
for the exploitation of our natural resources for the benefit of
foreign interests. Likewise, Mr. Tadeo cited inter alia the fact
that service contracts continued to subsist, enabling foreign
interests to benefit from our natural resources. It was hardly
likely that these gentlemen would have objected so strenuously,
had the provision called for mere technical or financial
assistance and nothing more.
The deliberations of the ConCom and some commissioners
explanation of their votes leave no room for doubt that the
service contract concept precisely underpinned the
commissioners understanding of the agreements involving
either technical or financial assistance.
xxxx
From the foregoing, we are impelled to conclude that the
phrase agreements involving either technical or financial
assistance, referred to in paragraph 4, are in fact service
contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones
are between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the
one hand; and on the other, the government as principal or
owner of the works. In the new service contracts, the foreign
contractors provide capital, technology and technical know-how,
and managerial expertise in the creation and operation of large-
scale mining/extractive enterprises; and the government,
through its agencies (DENR, MGB), actively exercises control
and supervision over the entire operation.
xxxx
It is therefore reasonable and unavoidable to make the
following conclusion, based on the above arguments. As written
by the framers and ratified and adopted by the people, the
Constitution allows the continued use of service contracts with
foreign corporations -- as contractors who would invest in and
operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full
control and supervision of the State -- sans the abuses of the
past regime. The purpose is clear: to develop and utilize our
mineral, petroleum and other resources on a large scale for the
immediate and tangible benefit of the Filipino people.[58]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition and
mandamus is hereby DISMISSED. Section 76 of Republic Act
No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40; Republic Act No. 7942
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations contained in DAO
96-40 insofar as they relate to financial and technical assistance
agreements referred to in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII
of the Constitution are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 149927. March 30, 2004]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Under then Minister ERNESTO R. MACEDA; and Former
Government Officials CATALINO MACARAIG, FULGENCIO S.
FACTORAN, ANGEL C. ALCALA, BEN MALAYANG, ROBERTO
PAGDANGANAN, MARIANO Z. VALERA and ROMULO SAN JUAN,
petitioners, vs. ROSEMOOR MINING AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, PEDRO DEL CONCHA, and ALEJANDRO and
RUFO DE GUZMAN, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A mining license that contravenes a mandatory provision
of the law under which it is granted is void. Being a mere
privilege, a license does not vest absolute rights in the holder.
Thus, without offending the due process and the non-
impairment clauses of the Constitution, it can be revoked by the
State in the public interest.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the May 29, 2001 Decision[2]
and the September 6, 2001 Resolution[3] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 46878. The CA disposed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision
is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.[4]
The questioned Resolution denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
On the other hand, trial courts Decision, which was
affirmed by the CA, had disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring that the cancellation of License No. 33 was
done without jurisdiction and in gross violation of the
Constitutional right of the petitioners against deprivation of their
property rights without due process of law and is hereby set
aside.
2. Declaring that the petitioners right to continue the
exploitation of the marble deposits in the area covered by
License No. 33 is maintained for the duration of the period of its
life of twenty-five (25) years, less three (3) years of continuous
operation before License No. 33 was cancelled, unless sooner
terminated for violation of any of the conditions specified
therein, with due process.
3. Making the Writ of preliminary injunction and the Writ
of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued as permanent.
4. Ordering the cancellation of the bond filed by the
Petitioners in the sum of 1 Million.
5. Allowing the petitioners to present evidence in support
of the damages they claim to have suffered from, as a
consequence of the summary cancellation of License No. 33
pursuant to the agreement of the parties on such dates as
maybe set by the Court; and
6. Denying for lack of merit the motions for contempt, it
appearing that actuations of the respondents were not
contumacious and intended to delay the proceedings or
undermine the integrity of the Court.
No pronouncement yet as to costs.[5]
The Facts
The CA narrated the facts as follows:
The four (4) petitioners, namely, Dr. Lourdes S. Pascual,
Dr. Pedro De la Concha, Alejandro De La Concha, and Rufo De
Guzman, after having been granted permission to prospect for
marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel,
Bulacan, succeeded in discovering marble deposits of high
quality and in commercial quantities in Mount Mabio which
forms part of the Biak-na-Bato mountain range.
Having succeeded in discovering said marble deposits, and
as a result of their tedious efforts and substantial expenses, the
petitioners applied with the Bureau of Mines, now Mines and
Geosciences Bureau, for the issuance of the corresponding
license to exploit said marble deposits.
xxxxxxxxx
After compliance with numerous required conditions,
License No. 33 was issued by the Bureau of Mines in favor of
the herein petitioners.
xxxxxxxxx
Shortly after Respondent Ernesto R. Maceda was
appointed Minister of the Department of Energy and Natural
Resources (DENR), petitioners License No. 33 was cancelled by
him through his letter to ROSEMOOR MINING AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION dated September 6, 1986 for the
reasons stated therein. Because of the aforesaid cancellation,
the original petition was filed and later substituted by the
petitioners AMENDED PETITION dated August 21, 1991 to assail
the same.
Also after due hearing, the prayer for injunctive relief was
granted in the Order of this Court dated February 28, 1992.
Accordingly, the corresponding preliminary writs were issued
after the petitioners filed their injunction bond in the amount of
ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00).
xxxxxxxxx
On September 27, 1996, the trial court rendered the
herein questioned decision.[6]
The trial court ruled that the privilege granted under
respondents license had already ripened into a property right,
which was protected under the due process clause of the
Constitution. Such right was supposedly violated when the
license was cancelled without notice and hearing. The
cancellation was said to be unjustified, because the area that
could be covered by the four separate applications of
respondents was 400 hectares. Finally, according to the RTC,
Proclamation No. 84, which confirmed the cancellation of the
license, was an ex post facto law; as such, it violated Section 3
of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, herein petitioners
asked whether PD 463 or the Mineral Resources Development
Decree of 1974 had been violated by the award of the 330.3062
hectares to respondents in accordance with Proclamation No.
2204. They also questioned the validity of the cancellation of
respondents Quarry License/Permit (QLP) No. 33.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Sustaining the trial court in toto, the CA held that the
grant of the quarry license covering 330.3062 hectares to
respondents was authorized by law, because the license was
embraced by four (4) separate applications -- each for an area
of 81 hectares. Moreover, it held that the limitation under
Presidential Decree No. 463 -- that a quarry license should
cover not more than 100 hectares in any given province -- was
supplanted by Republic Act No. 7942,[7] which increased the
mining areas allowed under PD 463.
It also ruled that the cancellation of respondents license
without notice and hearing was tantamount to a deprivation of
property without due process of law. It added that under the
clause in the Constitution dealing with the non-impairment of
obligations and contracts, respondents license must be
respected by the State.
Hence, this Petition.[8]
Issues
Petitioners submit the following issues for the Courts
consideration:
(1) [W]hether or not QLP No. 33 was issued in blatant
contravention of Section 69, P.D. No. 463; and (2) whether or
not Proclamation No. 84 issued by then President Corazon
Aquino is valid. The corollary issue is whether or not the
Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto law applies to
Proclamation No. 84[9]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has merit.
First Issue:
Validity of License
Respondents contend that the Petition has no legal basis,
because PD 463 has already been repealed.[10] In effect, they
ask for the dismissal of the Petition on the ground of mootness.
PD 463, as amended, pertained to the old system of
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources
through licenses, concessions or leases.[11] While these
arrangements were provided under the 1935[12] and the
1973[13] Constitutions, they have been omitted by Section 2 of
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.[14]
With the shift of constitutional policy toward full control
and supervision of the State over natural resources, the Court in
Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran Jr. [15]
declared the provisions of PD 463 as contrary to or violative of
the express mandate of the 1987 Constitution. The said
provisions dealt with the lease of mining claims; quarry permits
or licenses covering privately owned or public lands; and other
related provisions on lease, licenses and permits.
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 embodies the
new constitutional mandate. It has repealed or amended all
laws, executive orders, presidential decrees, rules and
regulations -- or parts thereof -- that are inconsistent with any
of its provisions.[16]
It is relevant to state, however, that Section 2 of Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply retroactively to a
license, concession or lease granted by the government under
the 1973 Constitution or before the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution on February 2, 1987.[17] As noted in Miners
Association of the Philippines v. Factoran Jr., the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission[18] emphasized the intent to
apply the said constitutional provision prospectively.
While RA 7942 has expressly repealed provisions of mining
laws that are inconsistent with its own, it nonetheless respects
previously issued valid and existing licenses, as follows:
SECTION 5. Mineral Reservations. When the national
interest so requires, such as when there is a need to preserve
strategic raw materials for industries critical to national
development, or certain minerals for scientific, cultural or
ecological value, the President may establish mineral
reservations upon the recommendation of the Director through
the Secretary. Mining operations in existing mineral reservations
and such other reservations as may thereafter be established,
shall be undertaken by the Department or through a contractor:
Provided, That a small scale-mining cooperative covered by
Republic Act No. 7076 shall be given preferential right to apply
for a small-scale mining agreement for a maximum aggregate
area of twenty-five percent (25%) of such mineral reservation,
subject to valid existing mining/quarrying rights as provided
under Section 112 Chapter XX hereof. All submerged lands
within the contiguous zone and in the exclusive economic zone
of the Philippines are hereby declared to be mineral
reservations.
xxxxxxxxx
SECTION 7. Periodic Review of Existing Mineral
Reservations. The Secretary shall periodically review existing
mineral reservations for the purpose of determining whether
their continued existence is consistent with the national interest,
and upon his recommendation, the President may, by
proclamation, alter or modify the boundaries thereof or revert
the same to the public domain without prejudice to prior
existing rights.
SECTION 18. Areas Open to Mining Operations. Subject to
any existing rights or reservations and prior agreements of all
parties, all mineral resources in public or private lands,
including timber or forestlands as defined in existing laws, shall
be open to mineral agreements or financial or technical
assistance agreement applications. Any conflict that may arise
under this provision shall be heard and resolved by the panel of
arbitrators.
SECTION 19. Areas Closed to Mining Applications. --
Mineral agreement or financial or technical assistance
agreement applications shall not be allowed:
(a) In military and other government reservations, except
upon prior written clearance by the government agency
concerned;
(b) Near or under public or private buildings, cemeteries,
archeological and historic sites, bridges, highways, waterways,
railroads, reservoirs, dams or other infrastructure projects,
public or private works including plantations or valuable crops,
except upon written consent of the government agency or
private entity concerned;
(c) In areas covered by valid and existing mining rights;
(d) In areas expressly prohibited by law;
(e) In areas covered by small-scale miners as defined by
law unless with prior consent of the small-scale miners, in which
case a royalty payment upon the utilization of minerals shall be
agreed upon by the parties, said royalty forming a trust fund for
the socioeconomic development of the community concerned;
and
(f) Old growth or virgin forests, proclaimed watershed
forest reserves, wilderness areas, mangrove forests, mossy
forests, national parks, provincial/municipal forests, parks,
greenbelts, game refuge and bird sanctuaries as defined by law
and in areas expressly prohibited under the National Integrated
Protected Areas System (NIPAS) under Republic Act No. 7586,
Department Administrative Order No. 25, series of 1992 and
other laws.
SECTION 112. Non-impairment of Existing Mining/
Quarrying Rights. All valid and existing mining lease contracts,
permits/licenses, leases pending renewal, mineral production-
sharing agreements granted under Executive Order No. 279, at
the date of effectivity of this Act, shall remain valid, shall not be
impaired, and shall be recognized by the Government: Provided,
That the provisions of Chapter XIV on government share in
mineral production-sharing agreement and of Chapter XVI on
incentives of this Act shall immediately govern and apply to a
mining lessee or contractor unless the mining lessee or
contractor indicates his intention to the secretary, in writing, not
to avail of said provisions: Provided, further, That no renewal of
mining lease contracts shall be made after the expiration of its
term: Provided, finally, That such leases, production-sharing
agreements, financial or technical assistance agreements shall
comply with the applicable provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.
SECTION 113. Recognition of Valid and Existing Mining
Claims and Lease/Quarry Application. Holders of valid and
existing mining claims, lease/quarry applications shall be given
preferential rights to enter into any mode of mineral agreement
with the government within two (2) years from the
promulgation of the rules and regulations implementing this Act.
(Underscoring supplied)
Section 3(p) of RA 7942 defines an existing
mining/quarrying right as a valid and subsisting mining claim or
permit or quarry permit or any mining lease contract or
agreement covering a mineralized area granted/issued under
pertinent mining laws. Consequently, determining whether the
license of respondents falls under this definition would be
relevant to fixing their entitlement to the rights and/or
preferences under RA 7942. Hence, the present Petition has not
been mooted.
Petitioners submit that the license clearly contravenes
Section 69 of PD 463, because it exceeds the maximum area
that may be granted. This incipient violation, according to them,
renders the license void ab initio.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that the license
was validly granted, because it was covered by four separate
applications for areas of 81 hectares each.
The license in question, QLP No. 33,[19] is dated August
3, 1982, and it was issued in the name of Rosemoor Mining
Development Corporation. The terms of the license allowed the
corporation to extract and dispose of marbleized limestone from
a 330.3062-hectare land in San Miguel, Bulacan. The license is,
however, subject to the terms and conditions of PD 463, the
governing law at the time it was granted; as well as to the rules
and regulations promulgated thereunder.[20] By the same
token, Proclamation No. 2204 -- which awarded to Rosemoor
the right of development, exploitation, and utilization of the
mineral site -- expressly cautioned that the grant was subject to
existing policies, laws, rules and regulations.[21]
The license was thus subject to Section 69 of PD 463,
which reads:
Section 69. Maximum Area of Quarry License
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 hereof, a quarry
license shall cover an area of not more than one hundred (100)
hectares in any one province and not more than one thousand
(1,000) hectares in the entire Philippines. (Italics supplied)
The language of PD 463 is clear. It states in categorical
and mandatory terms that a quarry license, like that of
respondents, should cover a maximum of 100 hectares in any
given province. This law neither provides any exception nor
makes any reference to the number of applications for a license.
Section 69 of PD 463 must be taken to mean exactly what it
says. Where the law is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.[22]
Moreover, the lower courts ruling is evidently inconsistent
with the fact that QLP No. 33 was issued solely in the name of
Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation, rather than in
the names of the four individual stockholders who are
respondents herein. It likewise brushes aside a basic postulate
that a corporation has a separate personality from that of its
stockholders.[23]
The interpretation adopted by the lower courts is contrary
to the purpose of Section 69 of PD 463. Such intent to limit,
without qualification, the area of a quarry license strictly to 100
hectares in any one province is shown by the opening proviso
that reads: Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 hereof
x x x. The mandatory nature of the provision is also
underscored by the use of the word shall. Hence, in the
application of the 100-hectare-per-province limit, no regard is
given to the size or the number of mining claims under Section
14, which we quote:
SECTION 14. Size of Mining Claim. -- For purposes of
registration of a mining claim under this Decree, the Philippine
territory and its shelf are hereby divided into meridional blocks
or quadrangles of one-half minute (1/2) of latitude and
longitude, each block or quadrangle containing area of eighty-
one (81) hectares, more or less.
A mining claim shall cover one such block although a
lesser area may be allowed if warranted by attendant
circumstances, such as geographical and other justifiable
considerations as may be determined by the Director: Provided,
That in no case shall the locator be allowed to register twice the
area allowed for lease under Section 43 hereof. (Italics
supplied)
Clearly, the intent of the law would be brazenly
circumvented by ruling that a license may cover an area
exceeding the maximum by the mere expediency of filing
several applications. Such ruling would indirectly permit an act
that is directly prohibited by the law.
Second Issue:
Validity of Proclamation No. 84
Petitioners also argue that the license was validly declared
a nullity and consequently withdrawn or terminated. In a letter
dated September 15, 1986, respondents were informed by then
Minister Ernesto M. Maceda that their license had illegally been
issued, because it violated Section 69 of PD 463; and that there
was no more public interest served by the continued existence
or renewal of the license. The latter reason, they added, was
confirmed by the language of Proclamation No. 84. According to
this law, public interest would be served by reverting the parcel
of land that was excluded by Proclamation No. 2204 to the
former status of that land as part of the Biak-na-Bato national
park.
They also contend that Section 74 of PD 463 would not
apply, because Minister Macedas letter did not cancel or revoke
QLP No. 33, but merely declared the latters nullity. They further
argue that respondents waived notice and hearing in their
application for the license.
On the other hand, respondents submit that, as provided
for in Section 74 of PD 463, their right to due process was
violated when their license was cancelled without notice and
hearing. They likewise contend that Proclamation No. 84 is not
valid for the following reasons: 1) it violates the clause on the
non-impairment of contracts; 2) it is an ex post facto law and/or
a bill of attainder; and 3) it was issued by the President after
the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.
This Court ruled on the nature of a natural resource
exploration permit, which was akin to the present respondents
license, in Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation v. Balite
Portal Mining Cooperative,[24] which held:
x x x. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals in its
challenged decision, EP No. 133 merely evidences a privilege
granted by the State, which may be amended, modified or
rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is
necessarily so since the exploration, development and utilization
of the countrys natural mineral resources are matters impressed
with great public interest. Like timber permits, mining
exploration permits do not vest in the grantee any permanent
or irrevocable right within the purview of the non-impairment of
contract and due process clauses of the Constitution, since the
State, under its all-encompassing police power, may alter,
modify or amend the same, in accordance with the demands of
the general welfare.[25]
This same ruling had been made earlier in Tan v. Director
of Forestry[26] with regard to a timber license, a
pronouncement that was reiterated in Ysmael v. Deputy
Executive Secretary,[27] the pertinent portion of which reads:
x x x. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are
the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that
they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest
products therein. They may be validly amended, modified,
replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within
the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections
3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v.
Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125
SCRA 302].[28] (Italics supplied)
In line with the foregoing jurisprudence, respondents
license may be revoked or rescinded by executive action when
the national interest so requires, because it is not a contract,
property or a property right protected by the due process clause
of the Constitution.[29] Respondents themselves acknowledge
this condition of the grant under paragraph 7 of QLP No. 33,
which we quote:
7. This permit/license may be revoked or cancelled at any
time by the Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences when, in his
opinion public interests so require or, upon failure of the
permittee/licensee to comply with the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 463, as amended, and the rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder, as well as with the terms and
conditions specified herein; Provided, That if a permit/license is
cancelled, or otherwise terminated, the permittee/licensee shall
be liable for all unpaid rentals and royalties due up to the time
of the termination or cancellation of the permit/license[.][30]
(Italics supplied)
The determination of what is in the public interest is
necessarily vested in the State as owner of all mineral
resources. That determination was based on policy
considerations formally enunciated in the letter dated
September 15, 1986, issued by then Minister Maceda and,
subsequently, by the President through Proclamation No. 84. As
to the exercise of prerogative by Maceda, suffice it to say that
while the cancellation or revocation of the license is vested in
the director of mines and geo-sciences, the latter is subject to
the formers control as the department head. We also stress the
clear prerogative of the Executive Department in the evaluation
and the consequent cancellation of licenses in the process of its
formulation of policies with regard to their utilization. Courts will
not interfere with the exercise of that discretion without any
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.[31]
Moreover, granting that respondents license is valid, it can
still be validly revoked by the State in the exercise of police
power.[32] The exercise of such power through Proclamation
No. 84 is clearly in accord with jura regalia, which reserves to
the State ownership of all natural resources.[33] This Regalian
doctrine is an exercise of its sovereign power as owner of lands
of the public domain and of the patrimony of the nation, the
mineral deposits of which are a valuable asset.[34]
Proclamation No. 84 cannot be stigmatized as a violation
of the non-impairment clause. As pointed out earlier,
respondents license is not a contract to which the protection
accorded by the non-impairment clause may extend.[35] Even
if the license were, it is settled that provisions of existing laws
and a reservation of police power are deemed read into it,
because it concerns a subject impressed with public
welfare.[36] As it is, the non-impairment clause must yield to
the police power of the state.[37]
We cannot sustain the argument that Proclamation No. 84
is a bill of attainder; that is, a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without judicial trial.[38] Its declaration that QLP
No. 33 is a patent nullity[39] is certainly not a declaration of
guilt. Neither is the cancellation of the license a punishment
within the purview of the constitutional proscription against bills
of attainder.
Too, there is no merit in the argument that the
proclamation is an ex post facto law. There are six recognized
instances when a law is considered as such: 1) it criminalizes
and punishes an action that was done before the passing of the
law and that was innocent when it was done; 2) it aggravates a
crime or makes it greater than it was when it was committed;
3) it changes the punishment and inflicts one that is greater
than that imposed by the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed; 4) it alters the legal rules of evidence and
authorizes conviction upon a less or different testimony than
that required by the law at the time of the commission of the
offense; 5) it assumes the regulation of civil rights and
remedies only, but in effect imposes a penalty or a deprivation
of a right as a consequence of something that was considered
lawful when it was done; and 6) it deprives a person accused of
a crime of some lawful protection to which he or she become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or an
acquittal or the proclamation of an amnesty.[40] Proclamation
No. 84 does not fall under any of the enumerated categories;
hence, it is not an ex post facto law.
It is settled that an ex post facto law is limited in its scope
only to matters criminal in nature.[41] Proclamation 84, which
merely restored the area excluded from the Biak-na-Bato
national park by canceling respondents license, is clearly not
penal in character.
Finally, it is stressed that at the time President Aquino
issued Proclamation No. 84 on March 9, 1987, she was still
validly exercising legislative powers under the Provisional
Constitution of 1986.[42] Section 1 of Article II of Proclamation
No. 3, which promulgated the Provisional Constitution, granted
her legislative power until a legislature is elected and convened
under a new Constitution. The grant of such power is also
explicitly recognized and provided for in Section 6 of Article XVII
of the 1987 Constitution.[43]
WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby GRANTED and the
appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Didipio Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Inc.
(DESAMA) Et al.v Elisea gozun, et al.G.R. No. 157882
March 30, 2006
Facts: A petition for mandamus and prohibition assailing
the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995,
together with the IRR issued by the DENR Administrative Order
No. 96-40, s. 1996(DAO 96-40) and of the Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into on20 June
1994 by the Republic of the Philippines and Arimco Mining
Corporation (AMC), acorporation established under the laws of
Australia and owned by its nationals. After several unsuccessful
actions to cancel the FTAA agreement with the government,
thepetitioners finally submitted a petition to the court. In their
memorandum petitioners posewhether or not Republic Act No.
7942 and the CAMC FTAA are void because they allow theunjust
and unlawful taking of property without payment of just
compensation , in violation of Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution issues, among others issues.
Issue:Whether there has been an actual controversy or
issue with respect to the unlawful and unjusttaking of property
without payment of just compensation.
Ratio Decidendi:Public respondents are of the view that
petitioners¶ eminent domain claim is not ripe for adjudication as
they fail to allege that CAMC has actually taken their properties
nor do theyallege that their property rights have been
endangered or are in danger on account of CAMC¶sFTAA. In
effect, public respondents insist that the issue of eminent
domain is not a justiciablecontroversy which this Court can take
cognizance of. A question is considered ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect
on the individualchallenging it.However, the court cannot await
the adverse consequences of the law in order to consider
thecontroversy actual and ripe for judicial intervention.
Actual eviction of the land owners andoccupants need not
happen for this Court to intervene. By the mere enactment of
thequestioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the
dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even
without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of
theConstitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial
duty.Nevertheless, the petition was still dismissed due to the
baseless contention of the issuessubmitted. The FTAA was in full
compliance with the necessary requirements of the law
andConstitution. The allegation of the lack of payment of just
compensation was dismissed sincethe court has had authority in
eminent domain cases to make sure the proper amount
wasestablished regardless of the fact that there would be an
intervention from an executivedepartment or legislature to
make any initial determination of the amount
Didipio v Gozun (Natural resources)
DIDIPIO v GOZUN
GR No. 157882
March 30, 2006
FACTS:
This petition for prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court assails the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995,
together with the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued
pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. 96-40, s. 1996
(DAO 96-40) and of the Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA) entered into on 20 June 1994 by the
Republic of the Philippines and Arimco Mining Corporation
(AMC), a corporation established under the laws of Australia and
owned by its nationals.
Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining
Limited to form a single company that now goes under the new
name of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation (CAMC), the
controlling 99% of stockholders of which are Australian
nationals.
on 20 June 1994, President Ramos executed an FTAA with
AMC over a total land area of 37,000 hectares covering the
provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino. Included in this area is
Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya.
The CAMC FTAA grants in favor of CAMC the right of
possession of the Exploration Contract Area, the full right of
ingress and egress and the right to occupy the same. It also
bestows CAMC the right not to be prevented from entry into
private lands by surface owners or occupants thereof when
prospecting, exploring and exploiting minerals therein.
Didipio Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Inc., an
organization of farmers and indigenous peoples organized under
Philippine laws, representing a community actually affected by
the mining activities of CAMC, as well as other residents of
areas affected by the mining activities of CAMC.
ISSUES & RULINGS:
I submitted plans and reports. On the contrary, the government
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942 AND THE
CAMC FTAA ARE VOID BECAUSE THEY ALLOW THE UNJUST AND
UNLAWFUL TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT PAYMENT OF JUST
COMPENSATION , IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, ARTICLE III OF
THE CONSTITUTION.
NO.
The provision of the FTAA in question lays down the ways
and means by which the foreign-owned contractor, disqualified
to own land, identifies to the government the specific surface
areas within the FTAA contract area to be acquired for the mine
infrastructure. The government then acquires ownership of the
surface land areas on behalf of the contractor, through a
voluntary transaction in order to enable the latter to proceed to
fully implement the FTAA. Eminent domain is not yet called for
at this stage since there are still various avenues by which
surface rights can be acquired other than expropriation. The
FTAA provision under attack merely facilitates the
implementation of the FTAA given to CAMC and shields it from
violating the Anti-Dummy Law.
There is also no basis for the claim that the Mining Law
and its implementing rules and regulations do not provide for
just compensation in expropriating private properties. Section
76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 provide
for the payment of just compensation.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE MINING ACT AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE VOID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR SANCTIONING AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS OF
DETERMINING JUST COMPENSATION.
NO.
there is nothing in the provisions of the assailed law and
its implementing rules and regulations that exclude the courts
from their jurisdiction to determine just compensation in
expropriation proceedings involving mining operations.
Although Section 105 confers upon the Panel of Arbitrators
the authority to decide cases where surface owners, occupants,
concessionaires refuse permit holders entry, thus, necessitating
involuntary taking, this does not mean that the determination of
the just compensation by the Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines
Adjudication Board is final and conclusive. The determination is
only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. There
is nothing wrong with the grant of primary jurisdiction by the
Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines Adjudication Board to
determine in a preliminary matter the reasonable compensation
due the affected landowners or occupants. The original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the courts to decide determination of
just compensation remains intact despite the preliminary
determination made by the administrative agency.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE, THROUGH REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 7942 AND THE CAMC FTAA, ABDICATED ITS PRIMARY
RESPONSIBILITY TO THE FULL CONTROL AND SUPERVISION
OVER NATURAL RESOURCES.
RA 7942 provides for the state's control and supervision
over mining operations. The following provisions thereof
establish the mechanism of inspection and visitorial rights over
mining operations and institute reportorial requirements.
The setup under RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 hardly relegates
the State to the role of a “passive regulator” dependent on
agencies concerned are empowered to approve or disapprove --
hence, to influence, direct and change -- the various work
programs and the corresponding minimum expenditure
commitments for each of the exploration, development and
utilization phases of the mining enterprise.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS' INTERPRETATION
OF THE ROLE OF WHOLLY FOREIGN AND FOREIGN-OWNED
CORPORATIONS IN THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN MINING
ENTERPRISES, VIOLATES PARAGRAPH 4, SECTION 2, ARTICLE
XII OF THE CONSTITUTION.
the use of the word “involving” signifies the possibility of
the inclusion of other forms of assistance or activities having to
do with, otherwise related to or compatible with financial or
technical assistance.
Thus, we come to the inevitable conclusion that there was
a conscious and deliberate decision to avoid the use of
restrictive wording that bespeaks an intent not to use the
expression “agreements x x x involving either technical or
financial assistance” in an exclusionary and limiting manner.
V (2)
WHETHER OR NOT THE 1987 CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS
SERVICE CONTRACTS
NO. The mere fact that the term service contracts found in
the 1973 Constitution was not carried over to the present
constitution, sans any categorical statement banning service
contracts in mining activities, does not mean that service
contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution was eradicated
in the 1987 Constitution.
The 1987 Constitution allows the continued use of service
contracts with foreign corporations as contractors who would
invest in and operate and manage extractive enterprises,
subject to the full control and supervision of the State; this
time, however, safety measures were put in place to prevent
abuses of the past regime.
the phrase agreements involving either technical or
financial assistance, referred to in paragraph 4, are in fact
service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new
ones are between foreign corporations acting as contractors on
the one hand; and on the other, the government as principal or
“owner” of the works. In the new service contracts, the foreign
contractors provide capital, technology and technical know-how,
and managerial expertise in the creation and operation of large-
scale mining/extractive enterprises; and the government,
through its agencies (DENR, MGB), actively exercises control
and supervision over the entire operation.
OBITER DICTA: ! justiciable controversy: definite and
concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests which may be resolved by a court
of law through the application of a law. ! to exercise the power
of judicial review, the following must be extant (1) there must
be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; -
involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.
In the instant case, there exists a live controversy
involving a clash of legal rights as Rep. Act No. 7942 has been
enacted, DAO 96-40 has been approved and an FTAAs have
been entered into. The FTAA holders have already been
operating in various provinces of the country.
(2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; and - A
question is considered ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. (3) the person challenging must have the
“standing" - personal or substantial interest in the case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged, alleging
more than a generalized grievance.
By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
approval of the challenged act, the dispute is said to have
ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt
act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or
the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
! “taking” under the concept of eminent domain as
entering upon private property for more than a momentary
period, and, under the warrant or color of legal authority,
devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally appropriating
or injuriously affecting it in such a way as to substantially oust
the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
requisites of taking in eminent domain, to wit:
(1) the expropriator must enter a private
property;
the entry must be for more than a
momentary period.
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of
legal authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to public use
or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;
(5) the utilization of the property for public use
must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property.
! Taking in Eminent Domain Distinguished from Regulation
in Police Power
The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the
state (and of those entities to which the power has been
lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public use
upon payment of just compensation.On the other hand, police
power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property.
Although both police power and the power of eminent
domain have the general welfare for their object, and recent
trends show a mingling of the two with the latter being used as
an implement of the former, there are still traditional
distinctions between the two.
Property condemned under police power is usually noxious
or intended for a noxious purpose; hence, no compensation
shall be paid. Likewise, in the exercise of police power,
property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints
and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the state. Thus, an ordinance prohibiting theaters
from selling tickets in excess of their seating capacity (which
would result in the diminution of profits of the theater-owners)
was upheld valid as this would promote the comfort,
convenience and safety of the customers.
where a property interest is merely restricted because the
continued use thereof would be injurious to public welfare, or
where property is destroyed because its continued existence
would be injurious to public interest, there is no compensable
taking. However, when a property interest is appropriated and
applied to some public purpose, there is compensable taking.
! On different roles and responsibilities:
* DENR Secretary : accept, consider and evaluate
proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors
for contracts of agreements involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development,
and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate
recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute
with the foreign proponent. (Executive Order No. 279, 1987)
! in re: easements and taking
In Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila, it was held that the
imposition of burden over a private property through easement
was considered taking; hence, payment of just compensation is
required. The Court declared:
And, considering that the easement intended to be
established, whatever may be the object thereof, is not merely
a real right that will encumber the property, but is one tending
to prevent the exclusive use of one portion of the same, by
expropriating it for public use which, be it what it may, can not
be accomplished unless the owner of the property condemned
or seized be previously and duly indemnified, it is proper to
protect the appellant by means of the remedy employed in such
cases, as it is only adequate remedy when no other legal action
can be resorted to, against an intent which is nothing short of
an arbitrary restriction imposed by the city by virtue of the
coercive power with which the same is invested.

! in order that one law may operate to repeal another law,

the two laws must be inconsistent.The former must be so
repugnant as to be irreconciliable with the latter act.